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DE CE MBER 20, 2012

'As Chief Operating Officer of the Long Island Power Authoritv, I recognize that the disruption
of our daily lives breeds frustration, even when it is brought upon us by a storm of unimaginable
magnitude. In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the safety of our customers and the dedicated workers
who restored power to our region was paramount. I am proud to say that power was restored without the
loss of life or serious injury. It is my sincere hope that as we deal with forces of nature of increasing
frequency and unpredictability, the assessment of this event is less about bl ame and more about the
honest evaluation of how to move forward to improve our svstem for future storms.`

The following are highlights from my written statement attached herein.

x Unprecedented series of storms
o 'Superstorm Sandy¨: flood, followed by hurricane, followed by snowstorm
o Storm far exceeded expert weather forecasts and estimates
o Two to three times larger than any storm in modern Long Island history
o 40,000 damage locations (Irene: 18,000 / Gloria: 6,000)

x Storm hardening
o $3.3 billion in capital investments to T&D system & IT infrastructure
o $500 million investment over 20 years | $25 million per year

x Improvements since Irene
o Called customers to advise on preparation and restoration
o Revamped Communication Command Center to maximize coordination & access
o Tested procedures through routine drills
o Conducted 'municipal calls¨ twice each day to keep all localities inIormed
o Public awareness concerning preparation and restoration

x Estimated time oI restoration ('ETRs¨)
o Technical issues with system did not have any effect on restoration time

x Response and restoration
o Followed detailed and established industry standards
o Adhered to established emergency response plans
o Restored power to 85% of customers after 7 days
o Thousands of off-Island lineman and emergency response personnel
o Coordinated and restored power to critical care facilities and polling places in a
Presidential election




DE CE MBER 20, 2012

Good Evening. My name is Michael Hervey and I am the Chief Operating Officer and
acting Chief Executive Officer of the Long Island Power Authority. I welcome the opportunity
to address this Commission
and to clarify certain issues that seem to be of concern in
connection with LIPA`s storm preparedness, storm hardening efforts and restoration activities
related to both Superstorm Sandy, which we all know was a storm of unimaginable magnitude,
and the significant Nor`easter which Iollowed only days later. It is understandable that the
disruption to our daily lives breeds frustration even when brought about by such unprecedented
events, which in the case of Sandy, left a trail of death and destruction all along the East Coast of
the United States.
In that regard, it is important to note that in the aItermath oI Sandy, the saIety oI LIPA`s
customers and the dedicated workers who worked tirelessly to restore power in our service area,
was paramount. I am proud to say that the restoration of power was accomplished without the
loss of life, or serious injury to any person.
It is my sincere hope that my comments will help to balance the discussion about how we
deal with forces of nature of increasing frequency and unpredictability in order to best assess
how to move forward to improve the electrical system, and provide better service to customers,
for future storms.

This statement is submitted pursuant to the Code of Fair Procedure for Investigating Agencies set forth at section
73 of the New York Civil Rights Law.

As you may know, the Long Island Power Authority ('LIPA¨) is a not-for-profit, public
power authority created by the State Legislature in May 1998. It is responsible for the supply of
electric service to Nassau and Suffolk Counties and the Rockaway Peninsula of Queens County
(the 'Service Area¨). LIPA provides retail electric service, not gas service, to approximately
1.1 million customers within the Service Area. Through its contract with LIPA, National Grid is
responsible for managing the day-to-day operations and maintenance of the electricity
transmission and distribution networks which supply power to LIPA customers. The
management and personnel of National Grid are largely the management and employees of
National Grid, an international energy delivery company, delivers electricity to
approximately 3.4 million customers in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and New
York, and manages the electricity network on Long Island under its agreement with LIPA.
National Grid is also the largest distributor of natural gas in the northeastern U.S., serving
approximately 3.4 million customers in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New York. National
Grid owns over 4,000 megawatts oI contracted electric generation that provides power to LIPA`s
Stated more simply, while LIPA owns the electricity transmission and distribution
networks in the Service Area, National Grid is responsible for managing the system on behalf of
LIPA, managing the day-to-day operations and maintenance of the system, providing services to
LIPA`s retail customers, purchasing and selling electricity on behalf of LIPA and managing the
delivery of energy produced by National Grid.
We note that National Grid has submitted a statement to the Commission outlining its key

restoration efforts and we refer the Commission to those statements for any additional
In order to appreciate the severity of Superstorm Sandy, it is appropriate to compare it
with two prior storms that impacted Long Island over the years: Gloria and Irene.
Back in 1985, Hurricane Gloria struck Long Island, bringing with it sustained winds of
95 miles per hour and wind gusts up to 115 miles per hour in eastern Long Island. Because
Gloria arrived at low tide, storm surges were generally low, peaking at 6.9 feet at Battery Park.
Although Gloria moved across Long Island very quickly, its high winds caused significant
damage across Long Island, leaving some 700,000 plus customers without power and causing
outages at approximately 30 percent of the substations. Gloria caused 6,000 damage locations,
which can be defined as locations at which damage has occurred resulting in the loss of power to
one or more customers.
Hurricane Irene, which hit Long Island in 2011, brought with it slightly less wind speed
than Gloria; however, it impacted Long Island for a significantly longer period of time. It also
had a wider breadth than Gloria, causing it to affect Long Island from end to end. Irene caused
approximately 18,000 damage locations, resulting in power outages to approximately 523,000
customers across Long Island. However, only 22, or 12 percent, of the substations were
impacted by Irene. Further, only one-half of the number of poles damaged by Gloria were
damaged by Irene and the number of transmission line trips was half in Irene than what they
were in Gloria.
Superstorm Sandy obliterated many storm records along the East Coast, from its
extraordinarily low air pressure, sustained wind speeds and wind gusts, to never-before seen

storm surge levels. Sandy created a path of destruction along the eastern seaboard from Florida
to Maine. In many ways it was even worse than a worst-case scenario. This slow moving
superstorm with a diameter of approximately 1000 miles, within which winds in excess of 90
miles per hour were sustained on October 29 when it made landfall, was unlike any storm the
area had ever seen before. The toll in lives disrupted or lost and communities washed out
was staggering. A rampaging fire reduced more than 100 LIPA customers` homes to ash in
Breezy Point, Queens. Explosions and downed power lines left the lower part of Manhattan in
the dark. The New York City subway system was paralyzed by flooded tunnels resulting in the
worst damage in its 108-year history. The flooding in the tunnels in Lower Manhattan was so
serious that the Federal Emergency Management Agency asked specialists from the Army Corps
of Engineers to help. For the first time since the Blizzard of 1888, the New York Stock
Exchange closed for two consecutive days due to weather.
Closer to home, the devastation was no less staggering. Long Island sustained more than
40,000 damage locations, leaving 90% of LIPA`s 1.1 million customers without power. In
comparison to prior storms, Long Island sustained over twice as many damage locations as in
Irene, and over six times as many damage locations as in Gloria. The Island further suffered
damage to 50 of its substations, with 377 circuit lockouts, as compared to 22 substations affected
by Irene with 175 circuit lockouts. Long Island experienced sustained winds of 56 miles per
hour, lasting for approximately 16 hours with wind gusts recorded on the Island as high as 96
miles per hour.
Unlike Gloria or Irene, Sandy brought with it a storm surge of unprecedented magnitude,
bringing water levels to between 9 and 11 feet above average high tide levels, with a surge of
between 16 and 18 feet in Long Beach, many feet beyond anticipated flood levels of the

In short, Sandy was two to three times larger by every metric than any storm in modern
Long Island history.
Seven days after Sandy hit Long Island, power was restored to 85% of LIPA`s customers
and LIPA was on track to restore 90% of customers by day ten. On day 10, however, Long
Island suffered continued devastation, when it was hit once again by a Nor`easter a major
storm event in its own right which caused approximately an additional 123,000 power outages,
setting the restoration efforts back by at least five days.
The unique combination of 1) an unprecedented storm; 2) unpredictable storm surges;
and 3) a subsequent winter storm- a significant event in its own right- created a challenge to the
utility. I believe the challenge was clearly met, since the recovery from Sandy and the
Nor`easter took no longer than Gloria, due in large part to LIPA`s eIIorts over the years.
Over the past ten years, LIPA has spent in excess of $3.3 billion in capital investments to
the transmission and distribution system and IT structure to provide for additional capacity, for
the replacement of aged and deteriorated equipment, and for improvements to enhance the
reliability of the system.
In the early to mid-2000`s, numerous coastal utilities experienced major damage due to
hurricanes, including Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in extended outage restoration times and
heavy restoration costs. In an effort to proactively evaluate potential options to enhance its
existing investments, LIPA commissioned Navigant to evaluate Storm Hardening practices
among utilities, and develop recommendations on specific initiatives for LIPA. Over two dozen
initiatives to enhance the system`s ability to withstand and recover Irom Category 3 Hurricanes

were identified for potential application on Long Island. To implement all initiatives would
result in an estimated cost of $3 billion.
A prioritization of the initiatives was then conducted with tasks being divided between
three phases of implementation, with a projected annual expenditure of $25 million per year, for
twenty years. The policy identified three major areas of focus:
1. improve the durability of the power system, to minimize the damage a major
storm might cause on the grid;
2. improve the resilience of the power system, to minimize the impact a storm would
cause on that power system; and
3. improve expected restoration times, to determine more accurately when
customers` power can be restored.
Subsequent to the launch of the storm hardening plan, efforts were made to identify
vulnerable points in the power system, and to develop strategies to address those points. The
program dollars were initially divided into two components. First, setting aside an annual
investment of $20 million for various projects and programs to increase the strength of the
system`s facilities, to eliminate or mitigate facilities that would be in the flood-prone or tidal
surge areas, and eliminate vulnerability of the overhead exposure through selective
undergrounding of facilities.
The second component, which would receive an annual investment of up to $5 million,
was a targeted effort to remove dangerous trees that could Iall into LIPA`s critical lines, to
accelerate the tree-trimming cycles that LIPA`s circuits are on, to address tree conditions beIore
the trees grow back into the lines, and for the expansion of critical right-of-ways for transmission
circuits to prevent trees adjacent to the line from impacting performance.

Over the years since the development of the storm hardening policy, LIPA has invested
in a variety of projects and programs geared to improve the durability and resilience of the power
Specifically, investment dollars have been spent on the installation of new underground
circuits which provide substations with a hardened source of power. Substations have also been
reinforced so that they may withstand higher wind speeds. In addition, pole lines have been
strengthened and the tree clearance program has been improved.
Capital investments have also been made to improve restoration times associated with
major weather events, including: 1) The continued expansion of the distribution automation
strategy that has been in place for years; 2) the improvement of damage assessment processes; 3)
the expansion of our access to, and use of, mobile generators; and 4) the expansion of our mobile
substation and emergency restoration equipment. Additionally, within weeks after Hurricane
Irene in 2011, the process of replacing the outage management computer system was accelerated
to allow for automatic links to geographic information and other systems, a process which takes
between 18 to 24 months and is ongoing.
All of these activities have and will continue to play an important role in improving the
outage restoration times our customers experience.
I have discussed the plan in a general sense to this point. But let me give you a better
sense of the strategies that have been developed to address storm hardening. Let me shift some
focus into some very specific projects and programs that have been implemented.
Some projects have storm hardening components added to their design. Over the last
five years, we have installed six new substations and expanded two major substations, with each
of these having very specific hardening features, including, the additional redundancy that they

provide and the improved strength in foundations, insulators, and structural design. Similarly,
those substations located in likely storm surge areas were identified and seven of those existing
substations have been storm hardened over the last several years with either flood-resistant
equipment, as in the case of the Fire Island Pines, Captree Island, Ocean Beach, and the other
substations on Fire Island, or flood and surge mitigation strategies like those that were installed
at Island Park and Long Beach. In the example of Island Park, we actually raised the control
room and certain other equipment up so that in the event of a flood or tidal surge, the electrical
system would be protected to a certain extent. Plans have also been developed for storm surge
cleanup at effected substations which sustain damage due to the flooding and exposure to salt
Additionally, several transmission lines have recently been re-conductered to increase
their capacity. As part of the storm hardening design criteria, these lines have also been
strengthened to enable them to withstand higher wind speeds. Recent examples include the
projects involving the Syosset to Oyster Bay; the William Floyd to Yaphank, the William Floyd
to West Yaphank and the Pinelawn to West Babylon circuits.
New underground lines were constructed between Southampton and Bridgehampton;
East Garden City and Newbridge; Newbridge and Ruland Road; and between Brightwaters and
Other projects have been undertaken to increase the hardening of our distribution
facilities, including programs to strengthen our automated sectionalizing points, which enable us
to automatically switch our system to reconfigure it and minimize the number of customers that
are impacted when an outage occurs. We have hardened over one-third of our sectionalizing
points to date.

We have hardened ten percent of our circuit supply points, where the circuit begins as it
exits the substation, and have made investments in strengthening our circuits that span over the
major roadways and across and along railroad corridors, having completed about 40 percent of
those improvements to date.
We also have made investments to improve the reliability in neighborhoods where
repeated outages have occurred, having addressed 80 of those locations to this point. And of
course, we have made significant investments in enhancing our tree-clearing efforts both in
additional miles of line clearance, and the removal, to date, of over 5,700 hazardous trees
adjacent to our lines.
Approximately half of the annual $25 million targeted each year for hardening comes
from the programs developed specifically to address storm hardening. The other half comes
from the projects where a portion of the project investment costs have been associated with
hardening features. As an example, for each substation that we build, we spend approximately
$500,000 in storm hardening features, such as higher strength steel structure components to
better withstand higher wind speeds, and larger, more robust foundations as well.
Collectively, these initiatives and activities over recent years demonstrate LIPA`s
commitment to storm hardening.
Storm monitoring began on October 22, 2012 when a Tropical Depression was identified
approximately 325 miles SSW of Kingston, Jamaica. It was expected that the storm would
develop into at least a Tropical Storm over the following day or so and would move to the NNE.
By Wednesday, October 24
, while the storm models continued to diverge, reports were being
made for the 'Potential for a High Impact Coastal Storm¨ between Sunday October 28

Tuesday, October 30
Based on the National Weather Service reports, which predicted a tropical storm event,
pre-storm activities were commenced in accordance with established Emergency Restoration
Implementation Plans (known as 'ERIPs¨). Four days prior to the storm reaching Long Island,
however, the storm preparation was upgraded to respond to the potential for a Category 1
Hurricane. In preparation for the storm, the plan was implemented, storm anticipation meetings
were launched, availability of key materials was confirmed, and outreach began to customers and
key stakeholder groups. Throughout Thursday, October 25
, LIPA and National Grid continued
to engage in storm preparation activities, and LIPA issued a media release urging customers to
'make appropriate preparations Ior this possible multi-day event.¨
The same day, LIPA and National Grid analyzed staffing requirements for a tropical
storm event and a hurricane. Based upon the National Weather Service reports of the storm
expectations, LIPA anticipated approximately 200,000 to 350,000 outages and determined that a
7-day restoration plan for a storm of the magnitude expected would require approximately 700
off-island linemen and tree-trimmers. However, in an effort to reduce that restoration period,
LIPA authorized National Grid to immediately request 1,250 off-island workers. The number of
off-island support crews requested continued to rise as it became apparent that Sandy would be
of far greater magnitude than the National Weather Service had initially forecasted.
As Sandy affected the entire eastern seaboard, and requests for outside crews were being
made by numerous utility companies, for LIPA, as with all other regional utilities, only
approximately twenty percent of the support requested was able to be secured. The off-island
resources ultimately reached a total of nearly 6,000 off-island linemen and more than 3,500 off-
island tree trimmers. By contrast, 2,700 off-island linemen and 1,300 tree-trimmers were

utilized during Irene. Those support crews aided the approximately 4,000 on-island linemen,
substation managers, call center staff and administrative personnel. The momentous size of the
workforce created safety concerns as off-island workers were not generally familiar with the
system. Moreover, having so many crews working on the system simultaneously requires
coordination. It is a credit to those workers and National Grid`s workIorce that no worker was
seriously injured during the restoration process.
Beginning prior to the storm and continuing until aIter Veteran`s Day, LIPA and National
Grid management engaged in two calls every day with many hundreds of municipal officials.
These 'municipal calls¨ were implemented in response to criticism received after Irene to ensure
that municipal officials had ready access to the most up-to-date information about the restoration
efforts. Each of these two daily calls was attended by hundreds of municipal officials,
representing the many towns, villages, cities and other municipalities on Long Island.
Dedicated staffing was supplied by LIPA/National Grid to each county Office of
Emergency Management (OEM) and to the New York City OEM.
By Friday, October 26
, pre-emptive notifications, including e-mail blasts, robo-calls
and text messages, were sent to all customers advising that power would not be restored for 7
10 days. Those communications also reinforced customer preparedness tips, emphasized safety
during and after the storm and provided contact numbers and website information. Public
service announcements were also aired on 10 local radio stations. LIPA had not previously
provided such pre-emptive notifications for prior storms, nor are such notifications common
among other utilities.
The initial Sandy damage was reported at approximately 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, October
28, 2012, and power was restored to 220,000 customers prior to when the peak winds reached

Long Island the following day. During the storm, crews were ultimately removed from the field
for nearly 16 hours in consideration of their own safety because of the high winds and dangerous
Throughout the storm, the storm management process was decentralized, with
approximately 80 substations being utilized as remote offices to more quickly assess damage at
the substations, to respond to the outages and to assign work to crews in the field.
Customers suffered peak outages on October 29, 2012 with approximately 1,071,000
customers without power. As a result of the need to perform restoration procedures in a
particular sequence to provide power and to ensure the safety of those working on the lines, a
general strategy for restoration was deployed. Generally, the restoration plan which was
followed during Sandy was to 1) repair transmission lines to enable power to be supplied to area
substations; 2) repair substation damage to permit power to be supplied on to the distribution
system; 3) restore the backbone of the distribution system, which typically runs along main
roadways; 4) restore the distribution feeds in to the individual neighborhoods; and 5) restore
small pockets / individual homes affected by storm damage. This repair sequence is common to
most utilities.
In addition to following this general sequence of repair, the restoration effort also focused
on high priority critical infrastructure like the Long Island Rail Road, hospitals, nursing homes,
fire and police stations, and schools deemed safe to be re-energized. In the case of Sandy, the
high priority customer list also included polling places (due to the impending federal elections)
and gas supply (due to the fuel supply issues experienced in the New York and New Jersey area).
The restoration of these priority customers typically coincides with into the earlier steps of the
general sequence of repair since many of these customers are located along major roadways.

Beyond the priority customers, restoration was focused on the largest number of customers in the
shortest amount of time.
It is important to note that the flooding situation experienced along the south shore of
Long Island including Long Beach and the Rockaways, resulted in heavy damage to numerous
substations. To address the significant impact in these communities, crews were immediately
dispatched to those substations to assess the situation and formulate recovery plans that could
address restoration requirements.
Despite the magnitude of Sandy and the competing restoration priorities that ensued, it
was still anticipated that 90% of our customers would be restored by the end of day 10, as
originally projected. As stated earlier, 85% of customers were restored by the end of day 7.
However, as day 10 neared, so did a Nor`easter, which brought with it wind, gusting up to 53
miles per hour, heavy wet snow and rain to Long Island, causing approximately an additional
123,000 outages. In Iact, the outages caused by the Nor`easter increased the number oI
customers without power to more than 236,000, a number that had been surpassed a full four to
five days earlier. Therefore, the process of damage assessment and prioritization of new outages
began again.
While I have set forth many of the actions taken by LIPA and National Grid in
connection with preparing Ior and recovering Irom Sandy and the Nor`easter, all of which
improved upon the processes implemented both before and after Hurricane Irene in particular, it
is important to recognize that certain processes were not yet fully developed enough to address
the enormity of Sandy. For example, a new Outage Management System ('OMS¨), which
would improve upon the ability to provide estimated times of restoration, was under

development on an accelerated basis when Sandy hit. Efforts made to enhance the existing
system while the new system was underway, were not sufficient to handle the volume of outages
experienced during Sandy. Replacement of the OMS is an 18 to 24 month process and was
expedited as a result of Hurricane Irene.
However, it is important to understand that while difficulties were encountered with
updating the OMS data during Sandy, in no way did it affect the speed of restoration. It did,
however, affect the ability to convey the most accurate, up-to-date restoration statistics to
municipalities and customers, which was source of significant frustration at certain times during
the restoration period.
Another example is with respect to conducting surveys of those homes and buildings
affected by flooding as a result of the storm surge in order to re-energize. While under ordinary
circumstances the re-energization of homes and buildings would not provide for utility
involvement on the customer side of the meter, due to the severity of the flooding and the
significant number of customers affected-approximately 100,000-LIPA and National Grid
stepped up to take an active role in helping to ensure that those customers could be restored
saIely in jurisdictions where a process either didn`t exist, or could not Iacilitate the magnitude of
the effort required. Ultimately, those efforts facilitated the safe re-energization of thousands of
affected homes and buildings.
I cannot conclude without acknowledging the contributions of the many members of the
Long Island community who worked together under these most challenging circumstances. In
particular, I wish to commend the dedicated members of IBEW 1049, the out of state workers,
and National Grid and LIPA employees, all who showed unbelievable talent, dedication and

As you may know, today is my last day with LIPA. However, I can confidently say that
LIPA is in a much better place today than it was twelve years ago when I started with the
I would like to thank the Commission for giving me the opportunity to address the
concerns raised with respect to LIPA`s activities beIore, during and aIter Superstorm Sandy and
the Nor`easter which followed closely thereafter. LIPA is ready to provide any additional
information in support of the statements made herein and remains available to answer any
follow-up questions the Commission may have relating to these and other issues going forward.