Mareike Heuer

Beijing World Youth Academy

Are reason and emotion equally necessary in justifying moral decisions?

Considering the above question there are two philosophers who came to different
conclusions on this question: David Hume argues that reason alone can never be a motive to
any action of the will and that reason alone can never oppose passion in the direction of the
will. In contrary to that Immanuel Kant argues that right actions are only those that practical
reason would will as universal law. How did they come to their conclusions? And what
argument seems to be more convincing?1

As a starting point, I will take my own experience: Some days ago I was walking in the
street when I suddenly saw a child crying. As no mother or father seemed to be around I went
to the child to help. After talking to the child it stopped crying. What does such a behaviour –
helping a child in such a situation – mean? Where does my conviction of helping another
person come from? Was I affected by my emotion or did I think reasonable about my action
before going to the child? Is this a particular case which cannot be generalized when it comes
to the question of this essay? Let’s take a closer look at the position of Hume and Kant.

Hume starts with the idea that every man has a free will: “By liberty, then, we can only
mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if
we chuse to remain at rest, we may; if we chuse to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical
liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here
then is no subject of dispute.“2 Hume has no doubt that a person who is independent and not
limited by outside circumstances has the ability to choose freely to move or not to move,
hence to decide to act or not to act. The impulse to act must come from passion, reason alone
can never be sufficient to motivate action. In this regard, emotion is the source of any form of
action, including moral action and can not be understood neither explained without the
important role of passion. Because reasoning is thinking it hardly is the actual initiator of or
instigator of causes and effects.3 Moral actions are therefore primarily caused by emotion.

1
I do not differentiate between the terms moral actions and moral decisions as well as passion and
emotion. Moral actions are linked directly to moral decisions, while passion is similar to emotion.
2
David Hume, An Enquiry Cocerning Human Understanding (1777 edition), 95.
(http://www.etext.leeds.ac.uk.hume/ehu/ehupbsb.htm# index-div2-N959619071)
3
Jud Evans, Emotion versus reason, 2006 (http://evans-
experientialism.freewebspace.com/evans_emotion.htm)
1
Hume then distinguishes between three psychologically distinct players: the moral agent, the
receiver, and the moral spectator. The moral agent is the person who performs an action, such
as helping another person; the receiver is the person affected by the conduct, such as the
person who got help; and the moral spectator is the person who observes and, in this case,
approves of the agent's action. 4 What does it mean for the foundation of moral action and
therefore moral decision? Let’s take an example: If I (moral agent) give money to a poor
person to buy some food, the receiver will immediately experience an agreeable feeling from
my act. The receiver who will get some food will feel lucky about overcoming his hunger and
by that the receiver will receive another agreeable feeling from my act. The person who sells
the food to the receiver (the spectator) will receive agreeable feelings along with the receiver.
The original act of the charity has initiated a feeling of moral approval among the three
participants that leads to the idea of what is good and what is bad. The decision itself was
motivated by the character of the person who donated the money, and such an acting of the
character is called a virtue. Hume was convinced that in this regard the character motivated
the moral action and not the fact of reasoning.

Kant did not reject the idea that feelings may motivate moral actions such as religion or the
idea of the good will. But he disagreed with the argument that moral actions can be justified
by them. So what was Kant’s position on that question? Concerning the main question “What
should I do?” he takes the transcendental faculty to show that moral principles must derive
from reason. Morality cannot be based on empirical facts of humans, because they cannot
hold truth for all rational beings. Therefore basic ethical principles cannot be empirical. They
come from reason and are “a priori” meaning ethical truth is not based on sense experience
but evident through thinking alone.5 Kant says that “what reason brings forth entirely out of
itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason’s common
principle has been discovered.”6 Reason contains the idea of truth in our morality. How does
reason work and in which way it is based on free will and morality? For Kant Reason is
knowledge which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori.
What are these principles from which our ethics derive? Kant’s starting point is the idea of a
free will. He explains it as a causality that acts through freedom. The cause of our actions lies
in the fact that each one of us is a free agent imposing its will on itself.7 Therefore we have to
4
David Hume (1711-1776) Moral Theory, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm)
5
Kant. (http://www.jcu.edu/philosophy/gensler/ms/kant--00.htm)
6
Robert B. Pippin, The Persistence of Subjectivity. On The Kantian Aftermath, Cambridge University
Press 2005, 30.
7
Rob Bass. Kant and Knowledge of the Categorical Imperative.
2
assume that the will can cause an action independently from alien causes. But who is the
legislator of the will concerning our moral ethics? The supreme principal of morality for Kant
is the categorical imperative which can be formulated like this: One must not act upon a
maxim unless one could will that it be universally acted upon.8 Kant defines this maxim that I
should always act in the way wishing at the same time that my actions should become a
universal law.9 Kant does not give us a detailed description of the maxim but just the
framework about how we have to think about ethics which does not come from sense
experience. It is the task of the reason to guide our free will under the idea of this maxim. The
free will is necessary transforming us into a moral being only if we use it to subject ourselves
under the maxim or as Kant says: “What I recognize directly as a law for myself I recognize
with respect, which means merely the consciousness of the submission of my will to a law
without the intervention of other influences on my mind. The direct determination of the will
by the law and the consciousness of this determination is respect; thus respect can be regarded
as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law…The only object of
respect is the law, and indeed only the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize is
necessary in itself.”10 In this regard free will and morality are linked together necessarily. For
Kant, the idea of not having a free will would absolutely mean that we cannot understand
ourselves as moral beings. Kant knows that his conclusion is circular. He must assume liberty
to assert that the categorical imperative grasps the essence of morality.11

As we see both philosophers agree on that idea of a free will as a necessary condition of
moral decisions/actings but differ in their argument of what causes and justify our moral
actions. Which argument is more convincing? To answer this question I refer to the American
philosopher Robert P.Pippin. He argues that we have to reflect our thoughts and ideas at the
background of our historical time. In this regard we can define our society as based on liberal-
democratic institutions. In such a society we think of human beings as something like
individual and self-determining centers of a casual agency.12 As citizens of a democratic
society our moral convictions in public life are based on universal ideas such as the equality
of all men. Such a universal idea should determine our moral decisions and not empirical facts

(http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/knowci.html)
8
Rob Bass
9
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegen der Metaphysik der Sitten, hg von Karl Vorländer, Leipzig, 1945, S.5.
Immanuel Kant, Grounding fort he Metaphysics of Morals, Karl Vorländer, Leipzig, 1945, 5.
10
Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, in: Ingvar Johansson, Respect for Logic, 131.
(http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/festskrift3/johansson.pdf)
11
Manfred Kühn, Kant. Eine Biographie, München 2004, S.331.
Manfred Kühn, Kant. A biography, Munich 2004, 331.
12
Robert B. Pippin, 7.

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or emotions. According to Kant the ultimate principle of morality must be a moral law
conceived so abstractly that it is capable of guiding us to the right action in application to
every possible set of circumstances. Taking the case of helping a child is in that regard not a
case that can be generalized to all kind of moral actions/decisions. As citizens we guideline
our moral decisions on universal values and not on emotions as a bases of our constitutions
and laws.

Comparing Hume’s and Kant’s position, we can see that Kant has finally a different
approach: He wants to prove moral actions under the guideline of a universal law. That does
not mean that moral actions are not often caused by emotions as Hume said. But it means that
they can not be justified by them. In this regard Kant seems to me more convincing. If we
take the idea of the Human Rights we can see them as a moral obligation which comes from
our reason while in daily life we may not always respect them. But the moral obligation which
can find its ground in constitutions and laws is the guideline of our behaviour as a citizen.
While Hume’s argument refers more to daily life and daily actions, Kant shows us the way
above our daily life guiding us to moral actions that even might be superior to our (daily)
emotions. Wherever moral actions come from, it is reason which justifies them while emotion
can be a source of cause of these actions but not the foundation of their justification.

List of sources: Words: 1584

Bass, Rob Kant and Knowledge of the Categorical Imperative.

(http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/knowci.html)
Evans, Jude. 2006. Emotion versus reason.
(http://evansexperientialism.freewebspace.com/evans_emotion.htm)
Hume, David (1777 edition), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
(http://www.etext.leeds.ac.uk/hume/ehu/ehupbsb.htm#index-div2-N959619071)
Hume, David. Moral Theory, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm)
Kant. (http://www.jcu.edu/philosophy/gensler/ms/kant--00.htm)
Kant, Immanuel, 1945. Grundlegen der Metaphysik der Sitten, hg von Karl Vorländer, Leipzig.
Immanuel Kant, Immanuel. 1945. Grounding fort he Metaphysics of Morals, Karl Vorländer,
Leipzig.
Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, in: Ingvar Johansson, Respect for Logic, 131.
(http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/festskrift3/johansson.pdf)
Kühn, Manfred, 2004. Kant. Eine Biographie, München. (Kühn, Manfred. 2004. Kant. A biography,
Munich)
B. Pippin, Robert B. 2005.The Persistence of Subjectivity. On The Kantian Aftermath, Cambridge
University Press.