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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

*able o# Contents

Book I
Part 1 "hen the ob-ects o# an in.uiry$ in any department$ have principles$ conditions$ or elements$ it is throu/h ac.uaintance with these that knowled/e$ that is to say scienti#ic knowled/e$ is attained! 0or we do not think that we know a thin/ until we are ac.uainted with its primary conditions or #irst principles$ and have carried our analysis as #ar as its simplest elements! lainly there#ore in the science o# 1ature$ as in other branches o# study$ our #irst task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles!

*he natural way o# doin/ this is to start #rom the thin/s which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature2 #or the same thin/s are not 3knowable relatively to us3 and 3knowable3 without .uali#ication! So in the present in.uiry we must #ollow this method and advance #rom what is more obscure by nature$ but clearer to us$ towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature! 1ow what is to us plain and obvious at #irst is rather con#used masses$ the elements and principles o# which become known to us later by analysis! *hus we must advance #rom /eneralities to particulars2 #or it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception$ and a /enerality is a kind o# whole$ comprehendin/ many thin/s within it$ like parts! Much the same thin/ happens in the relation o# the name to the #ormula! A name$ e!/! 3round3$ means va/uely a sort o# whole4 its de#inition analyses this into its particular senses! Similarly a child be/ins by callin/ all men 3#ather3$ and all women 3mother3$ but later on distin/uishes each o# them! Part 2 *he principles in .uestion must be either 5a6 one or 5b6 more than one! 7# 5a6 one$ it must be either 5i6 motionless$ as armenides and Melissus assert$ or 5ii6 in motion$ as the physicists hold$ some declarin/ air to be the #irst principle$ others water! 7# 5b6 more than one$ then either 5i6 a #inite or 5ii6 an in#inite plurality! 7# 5i6 #inite 5but more than one6$ then either two or three or #our or some other number! 7# 5ii6 in#inite$ then either as Democritus believed one in kind$ but di##erin/ in shape or #orm2 or di##erent in kind and even contrary! A similar in.uiry is made by those who in.uire into the number o# e%istents4 #or they in.uire whether the ultimate constituents o# e%istin/ thin/s are one or many$ and i# many$ whether a #inite or an in#inite plurality! So they too are in.uirin/ whether the principle or element is one or many! 1ow to investi/ate whether Bein/ is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science o# 1ature! 0or -ust as the /eometer has nothin/ more to say to one who denies the principles o# his science-this bein/ a .uestion #or a di##erent science or #or or common to all-so a man investi/atin/ principles cannot ar/ue with one who denies their e%istence! 0or i# Bein/ is -ust one$ and one in the way mentioned$ there is a principle no lon/er$ since a principle must be the principle o# some thin/ or thin/s! *o in.uire there#ore whether Bein/ is one in this sense would be like ar/uin/ a/ainst any other position maintained #or the sake o# ar/ument 5such as the Heraclitean thesis$ or such a thesis as that Bein/ is one man6 or like re#utin/ a merely contentious ar/ument-a description which applies to the

ar/uments both o# Melissus and o# armenides4 their premisses are #alse and their conclusions do not #ollow! Or rather the ar/ument o# Melissus is /ross and palpable and o##ers no di##iculty at all4 accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest #ollows-a simple enou/h proceedin/! "e physicists$ on the other hand$ must take #or /ranted that the thin/s that e%ist by nature are$ either all or some o# them$ in motion which is indeed made plain by induction! Moreover$ no man o# science is bound to solve every kind o# di##iculty that may be raised$ but only as many as are drawn #alsely #rom the principles o# the science4 it is not our business to re#ute those that do not arise in this way4 -ust as it is the duty o# the /eometer to re#ute the s.uarin/ o# the circle by means o# se/ments$ but it is not his duty to re#ute Antiphon3s proo#! At the same time the holders o# the theory o# which we are speakin/ do incidentally raise physical .uestions$ thou/h 1ature is not their sub-ect4 so it will perhaps be as well to spend a #ew words on them$ especially as the in.uiry is not without scienti#ic interest! *he most pertinent .uestion with which to be/in will be this4 7n what sense is it asserted that all thin/s are one8 0or 3is3 is used in many senses! Do they mean that all thin/s 3are3 substance or .uantities or .ualities8 And$ #urther$ are all thin/s one substance-one man$ one horse$ or one soul-or .uality and that one and the same-white or hot or somethin/ o# the kind8 *hese are all very di##erent doctrines and all impossible to maintain! 0or i# both substance and .uantity and .uality are$ then$ whether these e%ist independently o# each other or not$ Bein/ will be many! 7# on the other hand it is asserted that all thin/s are .uality or .uantity$ then$ whether substance e%ists or not$ an absurdity results$ i# the impossible can properly be called absurd! 0or none o# the others can e%ist independently4 substance alone is independent4 #or everythin/ is predicated o# substance as sub-ect! 1ow Melissus says that Bein/ is in#inite! 7t is then a .uantity! 0or the in#inite is in the cate/ory o# .uantity$ whereas substance or .uality or a##ection cannot be in#inite e%cept throu/h a concomitant attribute$ that is$ i# at the same time they are also .uantities! 0or to de#ine the in#inite you must use .uantity in your #ormula$ but not substance or .uality! 7# then Bein/ is both substance and .uantity$ it is two$ not one4 i# only substance$ it is not in#inite and has no ma/nitude2 #or to have that it will have to be a .uantity! A/ain$ 3one3 itsel#$ no less than 3bein/3$ is used in many senses$ so we must consider in what sense the word is used when it is said that the All is one! 1ow we say that 5a6 the continuous is one or that 5b6 the indivisible is one$ or 5c6 thin/s are said to be 3one3$ when their essence is one and the same$ as 3li.uor3 and 3drink3! 7# 5a6 their One is one in the sense o# continuous$ it is many$ #or the

continuous is divisible ad in#initum! *here is$ indeed$ a di##iculty about part and whole$ perhaps not relevant to the present ar/ument$ yet deservin/ consideration on its own accountnamely$ whether the part and the whole are one or more than one$ and how they can be one or many$ and$ i# they are more than one$ in what sense they are more than one! 5Similarly with the parts o# wholes which are not continuous!6 0urther$ i# each o# the two parts is indivisibly one with the whole$ the di##iculty arises that they will be indivisibly one with each other also! But to proceed4 7# 5b6 their One is one as indivisible$ nothin/ will have .uantity or .uality$ and so the one will not be in#inite$ as Melissus says-nor$ indeed$ limited$ as armenides says$ #or thou/h the limit is indivisible$ the limited is not! But i# 5c6 all thin/s are one in the sense o# havin/ the same de#inition$ like 3raiment3 and 3dress3$ then it turns out that they are maintainin/ the Heraclitean doctrine$ #or it will be the same thin/ 3to be /ood3 and 3to be bad3$ and 3to be /ood3 and 3to be not /ood3$ and so the same thin/ will be 3/ood3 and 3not /ood3$ and man and horse2 in #act$ their view will be$ not that all thin/s are one$ but that they are nothin/2 and that 3to be o# such-and-such a .uality3 is the same as 3to be o# such-and-such a si9e3! )ven the more recent o# the ancient thinkers were in a pother lest the same thin/ should turn out in their hands both one and many! So some$ like :ycophron$ were led to omit 3is3$ others to chan/e the mode o# e%pression and say 3the man has been whitened3 instead o# 3is white3$ and 3walks3 instead o# 3is walkin/3$ #or #ear that i# they added the word 3is3 they should be makin/ the one to be many-as i# 3one3 and 3bein/3 were always used in one and the same sense! "hat 3is3 may be many either in de#inition 5#or e%ample 3to be white3 is one thin/$ 3to be musical3 another$ yet the same thin/ be both$ so the one is many6 or by division$ as the whole and its parts! On this point$ indeed$ they were already /ettin/ into di##iculties and admitted that the one was many-as i# there was any di##iculty about the same thin/ bein/ both one and many$ provided that these are not opposites2 #or 3one3 may mean either 3potentially one3 or 3actually one3! Part 3 7#$ then$ we approach the thesis in this way it seems impossible #or all thin/s to be one! 0urther$ the ar/uments they use to prove their position are not di##icult to e%pose! 0or both o# them reason contentiously-7 mean both Melissus and armenides! ;*heir premisses are #alse and their conclusions do not #ollow! Or rather the ar/ument o# Melissus is /ross and palpable and o##ers no di##iculty at all4 admit one ridiculous proposition and the rest #ollows-a simple enou/h proceedin/!< *he #allacy o# Melissus is obvious!

0or he supposes that the assumption 3what has come into bein/ always has a be/innin/3 -usti#ies the assumption 3what has not come into bein/ has no be/innin/3! *hen this also is absurd$ that in every case there should be a be/innin/ o# the thin/-not o# the time and not only in the case o# comin/ to be in the #ull sense but also in the case o# comin/ to have a .uality-as i# chan/e never took place suddenly! A/ain$ does it #ollow that Bein/$ i# one$ is motionless8 "hy should it not move$ the whole o# it within itsel#$ as parts o# it do which are unities$ e!/! this water8 A/ain$ why is .ualitative chan/e impossible8 But$ #urther$ Bein/ cannot be one in #orm$ thou/h it may be in what it is made o#! 5)ven some o# the physicists hold it to be one in the latter way$ thou/h not in the #ormer!6 Man obviously di##ers #rom horse in #orm$ and contraries #rom each other! *he same kind o# ar/ument holds /ood a/ainst armenides also$ besides any that may apply specially to his view4 the answer to him bein/ that 3this is not true3 and 3that does not #ollow3! His assumption that one is used in a sin/le sense only is #alse$ because it is used in several! His conclusion does not #ollow$ because i# we take only white thin/s$ and i# 3white3 has a sin/le meanin/$ none the less what is white will be many and not one! 0or what is white will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the sense that it must be de#ined in only one way! 3"hiteness3 will be di##erent #rom 3what has whiteness3! 1or does this mean that there is anythin/ that can e%ist separately$ over and above what is white! 0or 3whiteness3 and 3that which is white3 di##er in de#inition$ not in the sense that they are thin/s which can e%ist apart #rom each other! But armenides had not come in si/ht o# this distinction! 7t is necessary #or him$ then$ to assume not only that 3bein/3 has the same meanin/$ o# whatever it is predicated$ but #urther that it means 5=6 what -ust is and 5>6 what is -ust one! 7t must be so$ #or 5=6 an attribute is predicated o# some sub-ect$ so that the sub-ect to which 3bein/3 is attributed will not be$ as it is somethin/ di##erent #rom 3bein/3! Somethin/$ there#ore$ which is not will be! Hence 3substance3 will not be a predicate o# anythin/ else! 0or the sub-ect cannot be a bein/$ unless 3bein/3 means several thin/s$ in such a way that each is somethin/! But e% hypothesi 3bein/3 means only one thin/! 7#$ then$ 3substance3 is not attributed to anythin/$ but other thin/s are attributed to it$ how does 3substance3 mean what is rather than what is not8 0or suppose that 3substance3 is also 3white3! Since the de#inition o# the latter is di##erent 5#or bein/ cannot even be attributed to white$ as nothin/ is which is not 3substance36$ it #ollows that 3white3 is not-bein/--and that not in the sense o# a particular not-bein/$ but in the sense that it is not at all! Hence 3substance3 is not2 #or it is true to say that it is white$ which we #ound to mean not-bein/! 7# to avoid this we say that even 3white3 means substance$ it #ollows that 3bein/3 has more than one meanin/!

7n particular$ then$ Bein/ will not have ma/nitude$ i# it is substance! 0or each o# the two parts must he in a di##erent sense! 5>6 Substance is plainly divisible into other substances$ i# we consider the mere nature o# a de#inition! 0or instance$ i# 3man3 is a substance$ 3animal3 and 3biped3 must also be substances! 0or i# not substances$ they must be attributes-and i# attributes$ attributes either o# 5a6 man or o# 5b6 some other sub-ect! But neither is possible! 5a6 An attribute is either that which may or may not belon/ to the sub-ect or that in whose de#inition the sub-ect o# which it is an attribute is involved! *hus 3sittin/3 is an e%ample o# a separable attribute$ while 3snubness3 contains the de#inition o# 3nose3$ to which we attribute snubness! 0urther$ the de#inition o# the whole is not contained in the de#initions o# the contents or elements o# the de#initory #ormula2 that o# 3man3 #or instance in 3biped3$ or that o# 3white man3 in 3white3! 7# then this is so$ and i# 3biped3 is supposed to be an attribute o# 3man3$ it must be either separable$ so that 3man3 mi/ht possibly not be 3biped3$ or the de#inition o# 3man3 must come into the de#inition o# 3biped3-which is impossible$ as the converse is the case! 5b6 7#$ on the other hand$ we suppose that 3biped3 and 3animal3 are attributes not o# man but o# somethin/ else$ and are not each o# them a substance$ then 3man3 too will be an attribute o# somethin/ else! But we must assume that substance is not the attribute o# anythin/$ that the sub-ect o# which both 3biped3 and 3animal3 and each separately are predicated is the sub-ect also o# the comple% 3biped animal3! Are we then to say that the All is composed o# indivisible substances8 Some thinkers did$ in point o# #act$ /ive way to both ar/uments! *o the ar/ument that all thin/s are one i# bein/ means one thin/$ they conceded that not-bein/ is2 to that #rom bisection$ they yielded by positin/ atomic ma/nitudes! But obviously it is not true that i# bein/ means one thin/$ and cannot at the same time mean the contradictory o# this$ there will be nothin/ which is not$ #or even i# what is not cannot be without .uali#ication$ there is no reason why it should not be a particular not-bein/! *o say that all thin/s will be one$ i# there is nothin/ besides Bein/ itsel#$ is absurd! 0or who understands 3bein/ itsel#3 to be anythin/ but a particular substance8 But i# this is so$ there is nothin/ to prevent there bein/ many bein/s$ as has been said! 7t is$ then$ clearly impossible #or Bein/ to be one in this sense! Part 4 *he physicists on the other hand have two modes o# e%planation! *he #irst set make the underlyin/ body one either one o# the three or somethin/ else which is denser than #ire and rarer than air then /enerate

everythin/ else #rom this$ and obtain multiplicity by condensation and rare#action! 1ow these are contraries$ which may be /enerali9ed into 3e%cess and de#ect3! 5Compare lato3s 3,reat and Small3-e%cept that he make these his matter$ the one his #orm$ while the others treat the one which underlies as matter and the contraries as di##erentiae$ i!e! #orms6! *he second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the one and emer/e #rom it by se/re/ation$ #or e%ample Ana%imander and also all those who assert that 3what is3 is one and many$ like )mpedocles and Ana%a/oras2 #or they too produce other thin/s #rom their mi%ture by se/re/ation! *hese di##er$ however$ #rom each other in that the #ormer ima/ines a cycle o# such chan/es$ the latter a sin/le series! Ana%a/oras a/ain made both his 3homceomerous3 substances and his contraries in#inite in multitude$ whereas )mpedocles posits only the so-called elements! *he theory o# Ana%a/oras that the principles are in#inite in multitude was probably due to his acceptance o# the common opinion o# the physicists that nothin/ comes into bein/ #rom not-bein/! 0or this is the reason why they use the phrase 3all thin/s were to/ether3 and the comin/ into bein/ o# such and such a kind o# thin/ is reduced to chan/e o# .uality$ while some spoke o# combination and separation! Moreover$ the #act that the contraries proceed #rom each other led them to the conclusion! *he one$ they reasoned$ must have already e%isted in the other2 #or since everythin/ that comes into bein/ must arise either #rom what is or #rom what is not$ and it is impossible #or it to arise #rom what is not 5on this point all the physicists a/ree6$ they thou/ht that the truth o# the alternative necessarily #ollowed$ namely that thin/s come into bein/ out o# e%istent thin/s$ i!e! out o# thin/s already present$ but imperceptible to our senses because o# the smallness o# their bulk! So they assert that everythin/ has been mi%ed in every! thin/$ because they saw everythin/ arisin/ out o# everythin/! But thin/s$ as they say$ appear di##erent #rom one another and receive di##erent names accordin/ to the nature o# the particles which are numerically predominant amon/ the innumerable constituents o# the mi%ture! 0or nothin/$ they say$ is purely and entirely white or black or sweet$ bone or #lesh$ but the nature o# a thin/ is held to be that o# which it contains the most! 1ow 5=6 the in#inite .ua in#inite is unknowable$ so that what is in#inite in multitude or si9e is unknowable in .uantity$ and what is in#inite in variety o# kind is unknowable in .uality! But the principles in .uestion are in#inite both in multitude and in kind! *here#ore it is impossible to know thin/s which are composed o# them2 #or it is when we know the nature and .uantity o# its components that we suppose we know a comple%! 0urther 5>6 i# the parts o# a whole may be o# any si9e in the direction either o# /reatness or o# smallness 5by 3parts3 7 mean components into which a whole can be divided and which are actually present in it6$ it is necessary that the whole thin/ itsel# may be o# any si9e! Clearly$ there#ore$ since it is

impossible #or an animal or plant to be inde#initely bi/ or small$ neither can its parts be such$ or the whole will be the same! But #lesh$ bone$ and the like are the parts o# animals$ and the #ruits are the parts o# plants! Hence it is obvious that neither #lesh$ bone$ nor any such thin/ can be o# inde#inite si9e in the direction either o# the /reater or o# the less! A/ain 5&6 accordin/ to the theory all such thin/s are already present in one another and do not come into bein/ but are constituents which are separated out$ and a thin/ receives its desi/nation #rom its chie# constituent! 0urther$ anythin/ may come out o# anythin/-water by se/re/ation #rom #lesh and #lesh #rom water! Hence$ since every #inite body is e%hausted by the repeated abstraction o# a #inite body$ it seems obviously to #ollow that everythin/ cannot subsist in everythin/ else! 0or let #lesh be e%tracted #rom water and a/ain more #lesh be produced #rom the remainder by repeatin/ the process o# separation4 then$ even thou/h the .uantity separated out will continually decrease$ still it will not #all below a certain ma/nitude! 7#$ there#ore$ the process comes to an end$ everythin/ will not be in everythin/ else 5#or there will be no #lesh in the remainin/ water62 i# on the other hand it does not$ and #urther e%traction is always possible$ there will be an in#inite multitude o# #inite e.ual particles in a #inite .uantity-which is impossible! Another proo# may be added4 Since every body must diminish in si9e when somethin/ is taken #rom it$ and #lesh is .uantitatively de#inite in respect both o# /reatness and smallness$ it is clear that #rom the minimum .uantity o# #lesh no body can be separated out2 #or the #lesh le#t would be less than the minimum o# #lesh! :astly 5?6 in each o# his in#inite bodies there would be already present in#inite #lesh and blood and brain- havin/ a distinct e%istence$ however$ #rom one another$ and no less real than the in#inite bodies$ and each in#inite4 which is contrary to reason! *he statement that complete separation never will take place is correct enou/h$ thou/h Ana%a/oras is not #ully aware o# what it means! 0or a##ections are indeed inseparable! 7# then colours and states had entered into the mi%ture$ and i# separation took place$ there would be a 3white3 or a 3healthy3 which was nothin/ but white or healthy$ i!e! was not the predicate o# a sub-ect! So his 3Mind3 is an absurd person aimin/ at the impossible$ i# he is supposed to wish to separate them$ and it is impossible to do so$ both in respect o# .uantity and o# .uality- o# .uantity$ because there is no minimum ma/nitude$ and o# .uality$ because a##ections are inseparable! 1or is Ana%a/oras ri/ht about the comin/ to be o# homo/eneous bodies! 7t is true there is a sense in which clay is divided into pieces o# clay$ but there is another in which it is not! "ater and air are$ and are /enerated 3#rom3 each other$ but not in the way in which bricks come 3#rom3 a house and a/ain a house 3#rom3 bricks2 and it is better to assume a smaller and #inite number o# principles$ as )mpedocles does!

Part 5 All thinkers then a/ree in makin/ the contraries principles$ both those who describe the All as one and unmoved 5#or even armenides treats hot and cold as principles under the names o# #ire and earth6 and those too who use the rare and the dense! *he same is true o# Democritus also$ with his plenum and void$ both o# which e%ist$ be says$ the one as bein/$ the other as notbein/! A/ain he speaks o# di##erences in position$ shape$ and order$ and these are /enera o# which the species are contraries$ namely$ o# position$ above and below$ be#ore and behind2 o# shape$ an/ular and an/le-less$ strai/ht and round! 7t is plain then that they all in one way or another identi#y the contraries with the principles! And with /ood reason! 0or #irst principles must not be derived #rom one another nor #rom anythin/ else$ while everythin/ has to be derived #rom them! But these conditions are #ul#illed by the primary contraries$ which are not derived #rom anythin/ else because they are primary$ nor #rom each other because they are contraries! But we must see how this can be arrived at as a reasoned result$ as well as in the way -ust indicated! Our #irst presupposition must be that in nature nothin/ acts on$ or is acted on by$ any other thin/ at random$ nor may anythin/ come #rom anythin/ else$ unless we mean that it does so in virtue o# a concomitant attribute! 0or how could 3white3 come #rom 3musical3$ unless 3musical3 happened to be an attribute o# the not-white or o# the black8 1o$ 3white3 comes #rom 3not-white3and not #rom any 3not-white3$ but #rom black or some intermediate colour! Similarly$ 3musical3 comes to be #rom 3not-musical3$ but not #rom any thin/ other than musical$ but #rom 3unmusical3 or any intermediate state there may be! 1or a/ain do thin/s pass into the #irst chance thin/2 3white3 does not pass into 3musical3 5e%cept$ it may be$ in virtue o# a concomitant attribute6$ but into 3not-white3-and not into any chance thin/ which is not white$ but into black or an intermediate colour2 3musical3 passes into 3not-musical3-and not into any chance thin/ other than musical$ but into 3unmusical3 or any intermediate state there may be! *he same holds o# other thin/s also4 even thin/s which are not simple but comple% #ollow the same principle$ but the opposite state has not received a name$ so we #ail to notice the #act! "hat is in tune must come #rom what is not in tune$ and vice versa2 the tuned passes into untunedness-and not into any untunedness$ but into the correspondin/ opposite! 7t does not matter whether we take attunement$ order$ or composition #or our illustration2 the principle is obviously the same in all$ and in #act applies e.ually to the

production o# a house$ a statue$ or any other comple%! A house comes #rom certain thin/s in a certain state o# separation instead o# con-unction$ a statue 5or any other thin/ that has been shaped6 #rom shapelessness-each o# these ob-ects bein/ partly order and partly composition! 7# then this is true$ everythin/ that comes to be or passes away #rom$ or passes into$ its contrary or an intermediate state! But the intermediates are derived #rom the contraries-colours$ #or instance$ #rom black and white! )verythin/$ there#ore$ that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product o# contraries! @p to this point we have practically had most o# the other writers on the sub-ect with us$ as 7 have said already4 #or all o# them identi#y their elements$ and what they call their principles$ with the contraries$ /ivin/ no reason indeed #or the theory$ but contrained as it were by the truth itsel#! *hey di##er$ however$ #rom one another in that some assume contraries which are more primary$ others contraries which are less so4 some those more knowable in the order o# e%planation$ others those more #amiliar to sense! 0or some make hot and cold$ or a/ain moist and dry$ the conditions o# becomin/2 while others make odd and even$ or a/ain :ove and Stri#e2 and these di##er #rom each other in the way mentioned! Hence their principles are in one sense the same$ in another di##erent2 di##erent certainly$ as indeed most people think$ but the same inasmuch as they are analo/ous2 #or all are taken #rom the same table o# columns$ some o# the pairs bein/ wider$ others narrower in e%tent! 7n this way then their theories are both the same and di##erent$ some better$ some worse2 some$ as 7 have said$ take as their contraries what is more knowable in the order o# e%planation$ others what is more #amiliar to sense! 5*he universal is more knowable in the order o# e%planation$ the particular in the order o# sense4 #or e%planation has to do with the universal$ sense with the particular!6 3*he /reat and the small3$ #or e%ample$ belon/ to the #ormer class$ 3the dense and the rare3 to the latter! 7t is clear then that our principles must be contraries! Part 6 *he ne%t .uestion is whether the principles are two or three or more in number! One they cannot be$ #or there cannot be one contrary! 1or can they be innumerable$ because$ i# so$ Bein/ will not be knowable4 and in any one /enus there is only one contrariety$ and substance is one /enus4 also a #inite number is su##icient$ and a #inite number$ such as the principles o# )mpedocles$ is better than an in#inite multitude2 #or )mpedocles pro#esses to obtain #rom his principles all that Ana%a/oras obtains #rom his innumerable

principles! :astly$ some contraries are more primary than others$ and some arise #rom others-#or e%ample sweet and bitter$ white and black-whereas the principles must always remain principles! *his will su##ice to show that the principles are neither one nor innumerable! ,ranted$ then$ that they are a limited number$ it is plausible to suppose them more than two! 0or it is di##icult to see how either density should be o# such a nature as to act in any way on rarity or rarity on density! *he same is true o# any other pair o# contraries2 #or :ove does not /ather Stri#e to/ether and make thin/s out o# it$ nor does Stri#e make anythin/ out o# :ove$ but both act on a third thin/ di##erent #rom both! Some indeed assume more than one such thin/ #rom which they construct the world o# nature! Other ob-ections to the view that it is not necessary to assume a third principle as a substratum may be added! 5=6 "e do not #ind that the contraries constitute the substance o# any thin/! But what is a #irst principle ou/ht not to be the predicate o# any sub-ect! 7# it were$ there would be a principle o# the supposed principle4 #or the sub-ect is a principle$ and prior presumably to what is predicated o# it! A/ain 5>6 we hold that a substance is not contrary to another substance! How then can substance be derived #rom what are not substances8 Or how can non-substances be prior to substance8 7# then we accept both the #ormer ar/ument and this one$ we must$ to preserve both$ assume a third somewhat as the substratum o# the contraries$ such as is spoken o# by those who describe the All as one nature-water or #ire or what is intermediate between them! "hat is intermediate seems pre#erable2 #or #ire$ earth$ air$ and water are already involved with pairs o# contraries! *here is$ there#ore$ much to be said #or those who make the underlyin/ substance di##erent #rom these #our2 o# the rest$ the ne%t best choice is air$ as presentin/ sensible di##erences in a less de/ree than the others2 and a#ter air$ water! All$ however$ a/ree in this$ that they di##erentiate their One by means o# the contraries$ such as density and rarity and more and less$ which may o# course be /enerali9ed$ as has already been said into e%cess and de#ect! 7ndeed this doctrine too 5that the One and e%cess and de#ect are the principles o# thin/s6 would appear to be o# old standin/$ thou/h in di##erent #orms2 #or the early thinkers made the two the active and the one the passive principle$ whereas some o# the more recent maintain the reverse! *o suppose then that the elements are three in number would seem$ #rom these and similar considerations$ a plausible view$ as 7 said be#ore! On the other hand$ the view that they are more than three in number would seem to be untenable! 0or the one substratum is su##icient to be acted on2 but i# we have #our

contraries$ there will be two contrarieties$ and we shall have to suppose an intermediate nature #or each pair separately! 7#$ on the other hand$ the contrarieties$ bein/ two$ can /enerate #rom each other$ the second contrariety will be super#luous! Moreover$ it is impossible that there should be more than one primary contrariety! 0or substance is a sin/le /enus o# bein/$ so that the principles can di##er only as prior and posterior$ not in /enus2 in a sin/le /enus there is always a sin/le contrariety$ all the other contrarieties in it bein/ held to be reducible to one! 7t is clear then that the number o# elements is neither one nor more than two or three2 but whether two or three is$ as 7 said$ a .uestion o# considerable di##iculty! Part 7 "e will now /ive our own account$ approachin/ the .uestion #irst with re#erence to becomin/ in its widest sense4 #or we shall be #ollowin/ the natural order o# in.uiry i# we speak #irst o# common characteristics$ and then investi/ate the characteristics o# special cases! "e say that one thin/ comes to be #rom another thin/$ and one sort o# thin/ #rom another sort o# thin/$ both in the case o# simple and o# comple% thin/s! 7 mean the #ollowin/! "e can say 5=6 3man becomes musical3$ 5>6 what is 3not-musical becomes musical3$ or 5&6$ the 3not-musical man becomes a musical man3! 1ow what becomes in 5=6 and 5>6-3man3 and 3not musical3-7 call simple$ and what each becomes-3musical3-simple also! But when 5&6 we say the 3not-musical man becomes a musical man3$ both what becomes and what it becomes are comple%! As re/ards one o# these simple 3thin/s that become3 we say not only 3this becomes so-and-so3$ but also 3#rom bein/ this$ comes to be so-and-so3$ as 3#rom bein/ not-musical comes to be musical32 as re/ards the other we do not say this in all cases$ as we do not say 5=6 3#rom bein/ a man he came to be musical3 but only 3the man became musical3! "hen a 3simple3 thin/ is said to become somethin/$ in one case 5=6 it survives throu/h the process$ in the other 5>6 it does not! 0or man remains a man and is such even when he becomes musical$ whereas what is not musical or is unmusical does not continue to e%ist$ either simply or combined with the sub-ect! *hese distinctions drawn$ one can /ather #rom surveyin/ the various cases o# becomin/ in the way we are describin/ that$ as we say$ there must always be an underlyin/ somethin/$ namely that which becomes$ and that this$ thou/h always one numerically$ in #orm at least is not one! 5By that 7 mean that it can be described in di##erent ways!6 0or 3to be man3 is not the same as 3to be unmusical3! One part survives$ the other does not4 what is not an opposite

survives 5#or 3man3 survives6$ but 3not-musical3 or 3unmusical3 does not survive$ nor does the compound o# the two$ namely 3unmusical man3! "e speak o# 3becomin/ that #rom this3 instead o# 3this becomin/ that3 more in the case o# what does not survive the chan/e-3becomin/ musical #rom unmusical3$ not 3#rom man3-but there are e%ceptions$ as we sometimes use the latter #orm o# e%pression even o# what survives2 we speak o# 3a statue comin/ to be #rom bron9e3$ not o# the 3bron9e becomin/ a statue3! *he chan/e$ however$ #rom an opposite which does not survive is described indi##erently in both ways$ 3becomin/ that #rom this3 or 3this becomin/ that3! "e say both that 3the unmusical becomes musical3$ and that 3#rom unmusical he becomes musical3! And so both #orms are used o# the comple%$ 3becomin/ a musical man #rom an unmusical man3$ and unmusical man becomin/ a musical man3! But there are di##erent senses o# 3comin/ to be3! 7n some cases we do not use the e%pression 3come to be3$ but 3come to be so-and-so3! Only substances are said to 3come to be3 in the un.uali#ied sense! 1ow in all cases other than substance it is plain that there must be some sub-ect$ namely$ that which becomes! 0or we know that when a thin/ comes to be o# such a .uantity or .uality or in such a relation$ time$ or place$ a sub-ect is always presupposed$ since substance alone is not predicated o# another sub-ect$ but everythin/ else o# substance! But that substances too$ and anythin/ else that can be said 3to be3 without .uali#ication$ come to be #rom some substratum$ will appear on e%amination! 0or we #ind in every case somethin/ that underlies #rom which proceeds that which comes to be2 #or instance$ animals and plants #rom seed! ,enerally thin/s which come to be$ come to be in di##erent ways4 5=6 by chan/e o# shape$ as a statue2 5>6 by addition$ as thin/s which /row2 5&6 by takin/ away$ as the Hermes #rom the stone2 5?6 by puttin/ to/ether$ as a house2 5'6 by alteration$ as thin/s which 3turn3 in respect o# their material substance! 7t is plain that these are all cases o# comin/ to be #rom a substratum! *hus$ clearly$ #rom what has been said$ whatever comes to be is always comple%! *here is$ on the one hand$ 5a6 somethin/ which comes into e%istence$ and a/ain 5b6 somethin/ which becomes that-the latter 5b6 in two senses$ either the sub-ect or the opposite! By the 3opposite3 7 mean the 3unmusical3$ by the 3sub-ect3 3man3$ and similarly 7 call the absence o# shape or #orm or order the 3opposite3$ and the bron9e or stone or /old the 3sub-ect3! lainly then$ i# there are conditions and principles which constitute natural ob-ects and #rom which they primarily are or have come to be-have come to

be$ 7 mean$ what each is said to be in its essential nature$ not what each is in respect o# a concomitant attribute-plainly$ 7 say$ everythin/ comes to be #rom both sub-ect and #orm! 0or 3musical man3 is composed 5in a way6 o# 3man3 and 3musical34 you can analyse it into the de#initions o# its elements! 7t is clear then that what comes to be will come to be #rom these elements! 1ow the sub-ect is one numerically$ thou/h it is two in #orm! 50or it is the man$ the /old-the 3matter3 /enerally-that is counted$ #or it is more o# the nature o# a 3this3$ and what comes to be does not come #rom it in virtue o# a concomitant attribute2 the privation$ on the other hand$ and the contrary are incidental in the process!6 And the positive #orm is one-the order$ the ac.uired art o# music$ or any similar predicate! *here is a sense$ there#ore$ in which we must declare the principles to be two$ and a sense in which they are three2 a sense in which the contraries are the principles-say #or e%ample the musical and the unmusical$ the hot and the cold$ the tuned and the untuned-and a sense in which they are not$ since it is impossible #or the contraries to be acted on by each other! But this di##iculty also is solved by the #act that the substratum is di##erent #rom the contraries$ #or it is itsel# not a contrary! *he principles there#ore are$ in a way$ not more in number than the contraries$ but as it were two$ nor yet precisely two$ since there is a di##erence o# essential nature$ but three! 0or 3to be man3 is di##erent #rom 3to be unmusical3$ and 3to be un#ormed3 #rom 3to be bron9e3! "e have now stated the number o# the principles o# natural ob-ects which are sub-ect to /eneration$ and how the number is reached4 and it is clear that there must be a substratum #or the contraries$ and that the contraries must be two! 5Aet in another way o# puttin/ it this is not necessary$ as one o# the contraries will serve to e##ect the chan/e by its successive absence and presence!6 *he underlyin/ nature is an ob-ect o# scienti#ic knowled/e$ by an analo/y! 0or as the bron9e is to the statue$ the wood to the bed$ or the matter and the #ormless be#ore receivin/ #orm to any thin/ which has #orm$ so is the underlyin/ nature to substance$ i!e! the 3this3 or e%istent! *his then is one principle 5thou/h not one or e%istent in the same sense as the 3this36$ and the de#inition was one as we a/reed2 then #urther there is its contrary$ the privation! 7n what sense these are two$ and in what sense more$ has been stated above! Brie#ly$ we e%plained #irst that only the contraries were principles$ and later that a substratum was indispensable$ and that the principles were three2 our last statement has elucidated the di##erence between the contraries$ the mutual relation o# the principles$ and the nature o# the substratum! "hether the #orm or the substratum is the essential nature o# a physical ob-ect is not yet clear! But that the principles are three$ and in what sense$ and the way in which each is a principle$ is clear!

So much then #or the .uestion o# the number and the nature o# the principles! Part "e will now proceed to show that the di##iculty o# the early thinkers$ as well as our own$ is solved in this way alone! *he #irst o# those who studied science were misled in their search #or truth and the nature o# thin/s by their ine%perience$ which as it were thrust them into another path! So they say that none o# the thin/s that are either comes to be or passes out o# e%istence$ because what comes to be must do so either #rom what is or #rom what is not$ both o# which are impossible! 0or what is cannot come to be 5because it is already6$ and #rom what is not nothin/ could have come to be 5because somethin/ must be present as a substratum6! So too they e%a//erated the conse.uence o# this$ and went so #ar as to deny even the e%istence o# a plurality o# thin/s$ maintainin/ that only Bein/ itsel# is! Such then was their opinion$ and such the reason #or its adoption! Our e%planation on the other hand is that the phrases 3somethin/ comes to be #rom what is or #rom what is not3$ 3what is not or what is does somethin/ or has somethin/ done to it or becomes some particular thin/3$ are to be taken 5in the #irst way o# puttin/ our e%planation6 in the same sense as 3a doctor does somethin/ or has somethin/ done to him3$ 3is or becomes somethin/ #rom bein/ a doctor!3 *hese e%pressions may be taken in two senses$ and so too$ clearly$ may 3#rom bein/3$ and 3bein/ acts or is acted on3! A doctor builds a house$ not .ua doctor$ but .ua housebuilder$ and turns /ray$ not .ua doctor$ but .ua dark-haired! On the other hand he doctors or #ails to doctor .ua doctor! But we are usin/ words most appropriately when we say that a doctor does somethin/ or under/oes somethin/$ or becomes somethin/ #rom bein/ a doctor$ i# he does$ under/oes$ or becomes .ua doctor! Clearly then also 3to come to be so-and-so #rom not-bein/3 means 3.ua not-bein/3! 7t was throu/h #ailure to make this distinction that those thinkers /ave the matter up$ and throu/h this error that they went so much #arther astray as to suppose that nothin/ else comes to be or e%ists apart #rom Bein/ itsel#$ thus doin/ away with all becomin/! "e ourselves are in a/reement with them in holdin/ that nothin/ can be said without .uali#ication to come #rom what is not! But nevertheless we maintain that a thin/ may 3come to be #rom what is not3-that is$ in a .uali#ied sense! 0or a thin/ comes to be #rom the privation$ which in its own nature is not-bein/$-this not survivin/ as a constituent o# the result! Aet this causes surprise$ and it is thou/ht impossible that somethin/ should come to be in the way described #rom what is not!

7n the same way we maintain that nothin/ comes to be #rom bein/$ and that bein/ does not come to be e%cept in a .uali#ied sense! 7n that way$ however$ it does$ -ust as animal mi/ht come to be #rom animal$ and an animal o# a certain kind #rom an animal o# a certain kind! *hus$ suppose a do/ to come to be #rom a horse! *he do/ would then$ it is true$ come to be #rom animal 5as well as #rom an animal o# a certain kind6 but not as animal$ #or that is already there! But i# anythin/ is to become an animal$ not in a .uali#ied sense$ it will not be #rom animal4 and i# bein/$ not #rom bein/-nor #rom notbein/ either$ #or it has been e%plained that by 3#rom not bein/3 we mean #rom not-bein/ .ua not-bein/! 1ote #urther that we do not subvert the principle that everythin/ either is or is not! *his then is one way o# solvin/ the di##iculty! Another consists in pointin/ out that the same thin/s can be e%plained in terms o# potentiality and actuality! But this has been done with /reater precision elsewhere! So$ as we said$ the di##iculties which constrain people to deny the e%istence o# some o# the thin/s we mentioned are now solved! 0or it was this reason which also caused some o# the earlier thinkers to turn so #ar aside #rom the road which leads to comin/ to be and passin/ away and chan/e /enerally! 7# they had come in si/ht o# this nature$ all their i/norance would have been dispelled! Part ! Others$ indeed$ have apprehended the nature in .uestion$ but not ade.uately! 7n the #irst place they allow that a thin/ may come to be without .uali#ication #rom not bein/$ acceptin/ on this point the statement o# armenides! Secondly$ they think that i# the substratum is one numerically$ it must have also only a sin/le potentiality-which is a very di##erent thin/! 1ow we distin/uish matter and privation$ and hold that one o# these$ namely the matter$ is not-bein/ only in virtue o# an attribute which it has$ while the privation in its own nature is not-bein/2 and that the matter is nearly$ in a sense is$ substance$ while the privation in no sense is! *hey$ on the other hand$ identi#y their ,reat and Small alike with not bein/$ and that whether they are taken to/ether as one or separately! *heir triad is there#ore o# .uite a di##erent kind #rom ours! 0or they /ot so #ar as to see that there must be some underlyin/ nature$ but they make it one-#or even i# one philosopher makes a dyad o# it$ which he calls ,reat and Small$ the e##ect is the same$ #or he overlooked the other nature! 0or the one which persists is a -oint cause$ with the #orm$ o# what comes to be-a mother$ as it were! But the ne/ative part o# the contrariety may o#ten seem$ i# you concentrate your attention on it as an evil a/ent$ not to e%ist at all!

0or admittin/ with them that there is somethin/ divine$ /ood$ and desirable$ we hold that there are two other principles$ the one contrary to it$ the other such as o# its own nature to desire and yearn #or it! But the conse.uence o# their view is that the contrary desires its wte%tinction! Aet the #orm cannot desire itsel#$ #or it is not de#ective2 nor can the contrary desire it$ #or contraries are mutually destructive! *he truth is that what desires the #orm is matter$ as the #emale desires the male and the u/ly the beauti#ul-only the u/ly or the #emale not per se but per accidens! *he matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense$ while in another it does not! As that which contains the privation$ it ceases to be in its own nature$ #or what ceases to be-the privation-is contained within it! But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature$ but is necessarily outside the sphere o# becomin/ and ceasin/ to be! 0or i# it came to be$ somethin/ must have e%isted as a primary substratum #rom which it should come and which should persist in it2 but this is its own special nature$ so that it will be be#ore comin/ to be! 50or my de#inition o# matter is -ust this-the primary substratum o# each thin/$ #rom which it comes to be without .uali#ication$ and which persists in the result!6 And i# it ceases to be it will pass into that at the last$ so it will have ceased to be be#ore ceasin/ to be! *he accurate determination o# the #irst principle in respect o# #orm$ whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are$ is the province o# the primary type o# science2 so these .uestions may stand over till then! But o# the natural$ i!e! perishable$ #orms we shall speak in the e%positions which #ollow! *he above$ then$ may be taken as su##icient to establish that there are principles and what they are and how many there are! 1ow let us make a #resh start and proceed!

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book II
Part 1 O# thin/s that e%ist$ some e%ist by nature$ some #rom other causes! 3By nature3 the animals and their parts e%ist$ and the plants and the simple bodies 5earth$ #ire$ air$ water6-#or we say that these and the like e%ist 3by nature3! All the thin/s mentioned present a #eature in which they di##er #rom thin/s which are not constituted by nature! )ach o# them has within itsel# a

principle o# motion and o# stationariness 5in respect o# place$ or o# /rowth and decrease$ or by way o# alteration6! On the other hand$ a bed and a coat and anythin/ else o# that sort$ .ua receivin/ these desi/nations i!e! in so #ar as they are products o# art-have no innate impulse to chan/e! But in so #ar as they happen to be composed o# stone or o# earth or o# a mi%ture o# the two$ they do have such an impulse$ and -ust to that e%tent which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause o# bein/ moved and o# bein/ at rest in that to which it belon/s primarily$ in virtue o# itsel# and not in virtue o# a concomitant attribute! 7 say 3not in virtue o# a concomitant attribute3$ because 5#or instance6 a man who is a doctor mi/ht cure himsel#! 1evertheless it is not in so #ar as he is a patient that he possesses the art o# medicine4 it merely has happened that the same man is doctor and patient-and that is why these attributes are not always #ound to/ether! So it is with all other arti#icial products! 1one o# them has in itsel# the source o# its own production! But while in some cases 5#or instance houses and the other products o# manual labour6 that principle is in somethin/ else e%ternal to the thin/$ in others those which may cause a chan/e in themselves in virtue o# a concomitant attribute-it lies in the thin/s themselves 5but not in virtue o# what they are6! 31ature3 then is what has been stated! *hin/s 3have a nature3which have a principle o# this kind! )ach o# them is a substance2 #or it is a sub-ect$ and nature always implies a sub-ect in which it inheres! *he term 3accordin/ to nature3 is applied to all these thin/s and also to the attributes which belon/ to them in virtue o# what they are$ #or instance the property o# #ire to be carried upwards-which is not a 3nature3 nor 3has a nature3 but is 3by nature3 or 3accordin/ to nature3! "hat nature is$ then$ and the meanin/ o# the terms 3by nature3 and 3accordin/ to nature3$ has been stated! *hat nature e%ists$ it would be absurd to try to prove2 #or it is obvious that there are many thin/s o# this kind$ and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark o# a man who is unable to distin/uish what is sel#-evident #rom what is not! 5*his state o# mind is clearly possible! A man blind #rom birth mi/ht reason about colours! resumably there#ore such persons must be talkin/ about words without any thou/ht to correspond!6 Some identi#y the nature or substance o# a natural ob-ect with that immediate constituent o# it which taken by itsel# is without arran/ement$ e!/! the wood is the 3nature3 o# the bed$ and the bron9e the 3nature3 o# the statue! As an indication o# this Antiphon points out that i# you planted a bed and the rottin/ wood ac.uired the power o# sendin/ up a shoot$ it would not be a bed that would come up$ but wood-which shows that the arran/ement in accordance with the rules o# the art is merely an incidental attribute$ whereas

the real nature is the other$ which$ #urther$ persists continuously throu/h the process o# makin/! But i# the material o# each o# these ob-ects has itsel# the same relation to somethin/ else$ say bron9e 5or /old6 to water$ bones 5or wood6 to earth and so on$ that 5they say6 would be their nature and essence! Conse.uently some assert earth$ others #ire or air or water or some or all o# these$ to be the nature o# the thin/s that are! 0or whatever any one o# them supposed to have this character-whether one thin/ or more than one thin/-this or these he declared to be the whole o# substance$ all else bein/ its a##ections$ states$ or dispositions! )very such thin/ they held to be eternal 5#or it could not pass into anythin/ else6$ but other thin/s to come into bein/ and cease to be times without number! *his then is one account o# 3nature3$ namely that it is the immediate material substratum o# thin/s which have in themselves a principle o# motion or chan/e! Another account is that 3nature3 is the shape or #orm which is speci#ied in the de#inition o# the thin/! 0or the word 3nature3 is applied to what is accordin/ to nature and the natural in the same way as 3art3 is applied to what is artistic or a work o# art! "e should not say in the latter case that there is anythin/ artistic about a thin/$ i# it is a bed only potentially$ not yet havin/ the #orm o# a bed2 nor should we call it a work o# art! *he same is true o# natural compounds! "hat is potentially #lesh or bone has not yet its own 3nature3$ and does not e%ist until it receives the #orm speci#ied in the de#inition$ which we name in de#inin/ what #lesh or bone is! *hus in the second sense o# 3nature3 it would be the shape or #orm 5not separable e%cept in statement6 o# thin/s which have in themselves a source o# motion! 5*he combination o# the two$ e!/! man$ is not 3nature3 but 3by nature3 or 3natural3!6 *he #orm indeed is 3nature3 rather than the matter2 #or a thin/ is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to #ul#ilment than when it e%ists potentially! A/ain man is born #rom man$ but not bed #rom bed! *hat is why people say that the #i/ure is not the nature o# a bed$ but the wood is-i# the bed sprouted not a bed but wood would come up! But even i# the #i/ure is art$ then on the same principle the shape o# man is his nature! 0or man is born #rom man! "e also speak o# a thin/3s nature as bein/ e%hibited in the process o# /rowth by which its nature is attained! *he 3nature3 in this sense is not like 3doctorin/3$ which leads not to the art o# doctorin/ but to health! Doctorin/ must start #rom the art$ not lead to it! But it is not in this way that nature 5in the one sense6 is related to nature 5in the other6! "hat /rows .ua /rowin/ /rows #rom somethin/ into somethin/! 7nto what then does it /row8 1ot into

that #rom which it arose but into that to which it tends! *he shape then is nature! 3Shape3 and 3nature3$ it should be added$ are in two senses! 0or the privation too is in a way #orm! But whether in un.uali#ied comin/ to be there is privation$ i!e! a contrary to what comes to be$ we must consider later! Part 2 "e have distin/uished$ then$ the di##erent ways in which the term 3nature3 is used! *he ne%t point to consider is how the mathematician di##ers #rom the physicist! Obviously physical bodies contain sur#aces and volumes$ lines and points$ and these are the sub-ect-matter o# mathematics! 0urther$ is astronomy di##erent #rom physics or a department o# it8 7t seems absurd that the physicist should be supposed to know the nature o# sun or moon$ but not to know any o# their essential attributes$ particularly as the writers on physics obviously do discuss their shape also and whether the earth and the world are spherical or not! 1ow the mathematician$ thou/h he too treats o# these thin/s$ nevertheless does not treat o# them as the limits o# a physical body2 nor does he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes o# such bodies! *hat is why he separates them2 #or in thou/ht they are separable #rom motion$ and it makes no di##erence$ nor does any #alsity result$ i# they are separated! *he holders o# the theory o# 0orms do the same$ thou/h they are not aware o# it2 #or they separate the ob-ects o# physics$ which are less separable than those o# mathematics! *his becomes plain i# one tries to state in each o# the two cases the de#initions o# the thin/s and o# their attributes! 3Odd3 and 3even3$ 3strai/ht3 and 3curved3$ and likewise 3number3$ 3line3$ and 3#i/ure3$ do not involve motion2 not so 3#lesh3 and 3bone3 and 3man3-these are de#ined like 3snub nose3$ not like 3curved3! Similar evidence is supplied by the more physical o# the branches o# mathematics$ such as optics$ harmonics$ and astronomy! *hese are in a way the converse o# /eometry! "hile /eometry investi/ates physical lines but not .ua physical$ optics investi/ates mathematical lines$ but .ua physical$ not .ua mathematical! Since 3nature3 has two senses$ the #orm and the matter$ we must investi/ate its ob-ects as we would the essence o# snubness! *hat is$ such thin/s are neither independent o# matter nor can be de#ined in terms o# matter only! Here too indeed one mi/ht raise a di##iculty! Since there are two natures$ with which is the physicist concerned8 Or should he investi/ate the combination o# the two8 But i# the combination o# the two$ then also each

severally! Does it belon/ then to the same or to di##erent sciences to know each severally8 7# we look at the ancients$ physics would to be concerned with the matter! 57t was only very sli/htly that )mpedocles and Democritus touched on the #orms and the essence!6 But i# on the other hand art imitates nature$ and it is the part o# the same discipline to know the #orm and the matter up to a point 5e!/! the doctor has a knowled/e o# health and also o# bile and phle/m$ in which health is reali9ed$ and the builder both o# the #orm o# the house and o# the matter$ namely that it is bricks and beams$ and so #orth64 i# this is so$ it would be the part o# physics also to know nature in both its senses! A/ain$ 3that #or the sake o# which3$ or the end$ belon/s to the same department o# knowled/e as the means! But the nature is the end or 3that #or the sake o# which3! 0or i# a thin/ under/oes a continuous chan/e and there is a sta/e which is last$ this sta/e is the end or 3that #or the sake o# which3! 5*hat is why the poet was carried away into makin/ an absurd statement when he said 3he has the end #or the sake o# which he was born3! 0or not every sta/e that is last claims to be an end$ but only that which is best!6 0or the arts make their material 5some simply 3make3 it$ others make it serviceable6$ and we use everythin/ as i# it was there #or our sake! 5"e also are in a sense an end! 3*hat #or the sake o# which3 has two senses4 the distinction is made in our work On hilosophy!6 *he arts$ there#ore$ which /overn the matter and have knowled/e are two$ namely the art which uses the product and the art which directs the production o# it! *hat is why the usin/ art also is in a sense directive2 but it di##ers in that it knows the #orm$ whereas the art which is directive as bein/ concerned with production knows the matter! 0or the helmsman knows and prescribes what sort o# #orm a helm should have$ the other #rom what wood it should be made and by means o# what operations! 7n the products o# art$ however$ we make the material with a view to the #unction$ whereas in the products o# nature the matter is there all alon/! A/ain$ matter is a relative term4 to each #orm there corresponds a special matter! How #ar then must the physicist know the #orm or essence8 @p to a point$ perhaps$ as the doctor must know sinew or the smith bron9e 5i!e! until he understands the purpose o# each64 and the physicist is concerned only with thin/s whose #orms are separable indeed$ but do not e%ist apart #rom matter! Man is be/otten by man and by the sun as well! *he mode o# e%istence and essence o# the separable it is the business o# the primary type o# philosophy to de#ine! Part 3

1ow that we have established these distinctions$ we must proceed to consider causes$ their character and number! +nowled/e is the ob-ect o# our in.uiry$ and men do not think they know a thin/ till they have /rasped the 3why3 o# 5which is to /rasp its primary cause6! So clearly we too must do this as re/ards both comin/ to be and passin/ away and every kind o# physical chan/e$ in order that$ knowin/ their principles$ we may try to re#er to these principles each o# our problems! 7n one sense$ then$ 5=6 that out o# which a thin/ comes to be and which persists$ is called 3cause3$ e!/! the bron9e o# the statue$ the silver o# the bowl$ and the /enera o# which the bron9e and the silver are species! 7n another sense 5>6 the #orm or the archetype$ i!e! the statement o# the essence$ and its /enera$ are called 3causes3 5e!/! o# the octave the relation o# >4=$ and /enerally number6$ and the parts in the de#inition! A/ain 5&6 the primary source o# the chan/e or comin/ to rest2 e!/! the man who /ave advice is a cause$ the #ather is cause o# the child$ and /enerally what makes o# what is made and what causes chan/e o# what is chan/ed! A/ain 5?6 in the sense o# end or 3that #or the sake o# which3 a thin/ is done$ e!/! health is the cause o# walkin/ about! 53"hy is he walkin/ about83 we say! 3*o be healthy3$ and$ havin/ said that$ we think we have assi/ned the cause!6 *he same is true also o# all the intermediate steps which are brou/ht about throu/h the action o# somethin/ else as means towards the end$ e!/! reduction o# #lesh$ pur/in/$ dru/s$ or sur/ical instruments are means towards health! All these thin/s are 3#or the sake o#3 the end$ thou/h they di##er #rom one another in that some are activities$ others instruments! *his then perhaps e%hausts the number o# ways in which the term 3cause3 is used! As the word has several senses$ it #ollows that there are several causes o# the same thin/ not merely in virtue o# a concomitant attribute6$ e!/! both the art o# the sculptor and the bron9e are causes o# the statue! *hese are causes o# the statue .ua statue$ not in virtue o# anythin/ else that it may be-only not in the same way$ the one bein/ the material cause$ the other the cause whence the motion comes! Some thin/s cause each other reciprocally$ e!/! hard work causes #itness and vice versa$ but a/ain not in the same way$ but the one as end$ the other as the ori/in o# chan/e! 0urther the same thin/ is the cause o# contrary results! 0or that which by its presence brin/s about one result is sometimes blamed #or brin/in/ about the contrary by its absence! *hus we ascribe the wreck o# a ship to the absence o# the pilot whose presence was the cause o# its sa#ety! All the causes now mentioned #all into #our #amiliar divisions! *he letters are the causes o# syllables$ the material o# arti#icial products$ #ire$ Dc!$ o#

bodies$ the parts o# the whole$ and the premisses o# the conclusion$ in the sense o# 3that #rom which3! O# these pairs the one set are causes in the sense o# substratum$ e!/! the parts$ the other set in the sense o# essence-the whole and the combination and the #orm! But the seed and the doctor and the adviser$ and /enerally the maker$ are all sources whence the chan/e or stationariness ori/inates$ while the others are causes in the sense o# the end or the /ood o# the rest2 #or 3that #or the sake o# which3 means what is best and the end o# the thin/s that lead up to it! 5"hether we say the 3/ood itsel# or the 3apparent /ood3 makes no di##erence!6 Such then is the number and nature o# the kinds o# cause! 1ow the modes o# causation are many$ thou/h when brou/ht under heads they too can be reduced in number! 0or 3cause3 is used in many senses and even within the same kind one may be prior to another 5e!/! the doctor and the e%pert are causes o# health$ the relation >4= and number o# the octave6$ and always what is inclusive to what is particular! Another mode o# causation is the incidental and its /enera$ e!/! in one way 3 olyclitus3$ in another 3sculptor3 is the cause o# a statue$ because 3bein/ olyclitus3 and 3sculptor3 are incidentally con-oined! Also the classes in which the incidental attribute is included2 thus 3a man3 could be said to be the cause o# a statue or$ /enerally$ 3a livin/ creature3! An incidental attribute too may be more or less remote$ e!/! suppose that 3a pale man3 or 3a musical man3 were said to be the cause o# the statue! All causes$ both proper and incidental$ may be spoken o# either as potential or as actual2 e!/! the cause o# a house bein/ built is either 3house-builder3 or 3house-builder buildin/3! Similar distinctions can be made in the thin/s o# which the causes are causes$ e!/! o# 3this statue3 or o# 3statue3 or o# 3ima/e3 /enerally$ o# 3this bron9e3 or o# 3bron9e3 or o# 3material3 /enerally! So too with the incidental attributes! A/ain we may use a comple% e%pression #or either and say$ e!/! neither 3 olyclitus3 nor 3sculptor3 but 3 olyclitus$ sculptor3! All these various uses$ however$ come to si% in number$ under each o# which a/ain the usa/e is two#old! Cause means either what is particular or a /enus$ or an incidental attribute or a /enus o# that$ and these either as a comple% or each by itsel#2 and all si% either as actual or as potential! *he di##erence is this much$ that causes which are actually at work and particular e%ist and cease to e%ist simultaneously with their e##ect$ e!/! this healin/ person with this bein/-healed person and that house-buildin/ man with that bein/-built house2 but this is not always true o# potential causes--the house and the housebuilder do not pass away simultaneously! 7n investi/atin/ the cause o# each thin/ it is always necessary to seek what is most precise 5as also in other thin/s64 thus man builds because he is a builder$ and a builder builds in virtue o# his art o# buildin/! *his last cause

then is prior4 and so /enerally! 0urther$ /eneric e##ects should be assi/ned to /eneric causes$ particular e##ects to particular causes$ e!/! statue to sculptor$ this statue to this sculptor2 and powers are relative to possible e##ects$ actually operatin/ causes to thin/s which are actually bein/ e##ected! *his must su##ice #or our account o# the number o# causes and the modes o# causation! Part 4 But chance also and spontaneity are reckoned amon/ causes4 many thin/s are said both to be and to come to be as a result o# chance and spontaneity! "e must in.uire there#ore in what manner chance and spontaneity are present amon/ the causes enumerated$ and whether they are the same or di##erent$ and /enerally what chance and spontaneity are! Some people even .uestion whether they are real or not! *hey say that nothin/ happens by chance$ but that everythin/ which we ascribe to chance or spontaneity has some de#inite cause$ e!/! comin/ 3by chance3 into the market and #indin/ there a man whom one wanted but did not e%pect to meet is due to one3s wish to /o and buy in the market! Similarly in other cases o# chance it is always possible$ they maintain$ to #ind somethin/ which is the cause2 but not chance$ #or i# chance were real$ it would seem stran/e indeed$ and the .uestion mi/ht be raised$ why on earth none o# the wise men o# old in speakin/ o# the causes o# /eneration and decay took account o# chance2 whence it would seem that they too did not believe that anythin/ is by chance! But there is a #urther circumstance that is surprisin/! Many thin/s both come to be and are by chance and spontaneity$ and althou/h know that each o# them can be ascribed to some cause 5as the old ar/ument said which denied chance6$ nevertheless they speak o# some o# these thin/s as happenin/ by chance and others not! 0or this reason also they ou/ht to have at least re#erred to the matter in some way or other! Certainly the early physicists #ound no place #or chance amon/ the causes which they reco/ni9ed-love$ stri#e$ mind$ #ire$ or the like! *his is stran/e$ whether they supposed that there is no such thin/ as chance or whether they thou/ht there is but omitted to mention it-and that too when they sometimes used it$ as )mpedocles does when he says that the air is not always separated into the hi/hest re/ion$ but 3as it may chance3! At any rate he says in his cosmo/ony that 3it happened to run that way at that time$ but it o#ten ran otherwise!3 He tells us also that most o# the parts o# animals came to be by chance! *here are some too who ascribe this heavenly sphere and all the worlds to spontaneity! *hey say that the vorte% arose spontaneously$ i!e! the motion

that separated and arran/ed in its present order all that e%ists! *his statement mi/ht well cause surprise! 0or they are assertin/ that chance is not responsible #or the e%istence or /eneration o# animals and plants$ nature or mind or somethin/ o# the kind bein/ the cause o# them 5#or it is not any chance thin/ that comes #rom a /iven seed but an olive #rom one kind and a man #rom another62 and yet at the same time they assert that the heavenly sphere and the divinest o# visible thin/s arose spontaneously$ havin/ no such cause as is assi/ned to animals and plants! Aet i# this is so$ it is a #act which deserves to be dwelt upon$ and somethin/ mi/ht well have been said about it! 0or besides the other absurdities o# the statement$ it is the more absurd that people should make it when they see nothin/ comin/ to be spontaneously in the heavens$ but much happenin/ by chance amon/ the thin/s which as they say are not due to chance2 whereas we should have e%pected e%actly the opposite! Others there are who$ indeed$ believe that chance is a cause$ but that it is inscrutable to human intelli/ence$ as bein/ a divine thin/ and #ull o# mystery! *hus we must in.uire what chance and spontaneity are$ whether they are the same or di##erent$ and how they #it into our division o# causes! Part 5 0irst then we observe that some thin/s always come to pass in the same way$ and others #or the most part! 7t is clearly o# neither o# these that chance is said to be the cause$ nor can the 3e##ect o# chance3 be identi#ied with any o# the thin/s that come to pass by necessity and always$ or #or the most part! But as there is a third class o# events besides these two-events which all say are 3by chance3-it is plain that there is such a thin/ as chance and spontaneity2 #or we know that thin/s o# this kind are due to chance and that thin/s due to chance are o# this kind! But$ secondly$ some events are #or the sake o# somethin/$ others not! A/ain$ some o# the #ormer class are in accordance with deliberate intention$ others not$ but both are in the class o# thin/s which are #or the sake o# somethin/! Hence it is clear that even amon/ the thin/s which are outside the necessary and the normal$ there are some in conne%ion withwhich the phrase 3#or the sake o# somethin/3 is applicable! 5)vents that are #or the sake o# somethin/ include whatever may be done as a result o# thou/ht or o# nature!6 *hin/s o# this kind$ then$ when they come to pass incidental are said to be 3by chance3! 0or -ust as a thin/ is somethin/ either in virtue o# itsel# or incidentally$ so may it be a cause! 0or instance$ the housebuildin/ #aculty is in virtue o# itsel# the cause o# a house$ whereas the pale or the musical is the incidental cause! *hat which is per se cause o# the e##ect is determinate$ but the incidental cause is indeterminable$ #or the possible attributes o# an individual are innumerable! *o resume then2 when a thin/ o# this kind comes to pass

amon/ events which are #or the sake o# somethin/$ it is said to be spontaneous or by chance! 5*he distinction between the two must be made later-#or the present it is su##icient i# it is plain that both are in the sphere o# thin/s done #or the sake o# somethin/!6 )%ample4 A man is en/a/ed in collectin/ subscriptions #or a #east! He would have /one to such and such a place #or the purpose o# /ettin/ the money$ i# he had known! He actually went there #or another purpose and it was only incidentally that he /ot his money by /oin/ there2 and this was not due to the #act that he went there as a rule or necessarily$ nor is the end e##ected 5/ettin/ the money6 a cause present in himsel#-it belon/s to the class o# thin/s that are intentional and the result o# intelli/ent deliberation! 7t is when these conditions are satis#ied that the man is said to have /one 3by chance3! 7# he had /one o# deliberate purpose and #or the sake o# this-i# he always or normally went there when he was collectin/ payments-he would not be said to have /one 3by chance3! 7t is clear then that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere o# those actions #or the sake o# somethin/ which involve purpose! 7ntelli/ent re#lection$ then$ and chance are in the same sphere$ #or purpose implies intelli/ent re#lection! 7t is necessary$ no doubt$ that the causes o# what comes to pass by chance be inde#inite2 and that is why chance is supposed to belon/ to the class o# the inde#inite and to be inscrutable to man$ and why it mi/ht be thou/ht that$ in a way$ nothin/ occurs by chance! 0or all these statements are correct$ because they are well /rounded! *hin/s do$ in a way$ occur by chance$ #or they occur incidentally and chance is an incidental cause! But strictly it is not the cause-without .uali#ication-o# anythin/2 #or instance$ a housebuilder is the cause o# a house2 incidentally$ a #luteplayer may be so! And the causes o# the man3s comin/ and /ettin/ the money 5when he did not come #or the sake o# that6 are innumerable! He may have wished to see somebody or been #ollowin/ somebody or avoidin/ somebody$ or may have /one to see a spectacle! *hus to say that chance is a thin/ contrary to rule is correct! 0or 3rule3 applies to what is always true or true #or the most part$ whereas chance belon/s to a third type o# event! Hence$ to conclude$ since causes o# this kind are inde#inite$ chance too is inde#inite! 5Aet in some cases one mi/ht raise the .uestion whether any incidental #act mi/ht be the cause o# the chance occurrence$ e!/! o# health the #resh air or the sun3s heat may be the cause$ but havin/ had one3s hair cut cannot2 #or some incidental causes are more relevant to the e##ect than others!6 Chance or #ortune is called 3/ood3 when the result is /ood$ 3evil3 when it is evil! *he terms 3/ood #ortune3 and 3ill #ortune3 are used when either result is o# considerable ma/nitude! *hus one who comes within an ace o# some /reat evil or /reat /ood is said to be #ortunate or un#ortunate! *he mind

a##irms the essence o# the attribute$ i/norin/ the hair3s breadth o# di##erence! 0urther$ it is with reason that /ood #ortune is re/arded as unstable2 #or chance is unstable$ as none o# the thin/s which result #rom it can be invariable or normal! Both are then$ as 7 have said$ incidental causes-both chance and spontaneityin the sphere o# thin/s which are capable o# comin/ to pass not necessarily$ nor normally$ and with re#erence to such o# these as mi/ht come to pass #or the sake o# somethin/! Part 6 *hey di##er in that 3spontaneity3 is the wider term! )very result o# chance is #rom what is spontaneous$ but not everythin/ that is #rom what is spontaneous is #rom chance! Chance and what results #rom chance are appropriate to a/ents that are capable o# /ood #ortune and o# moral action /enerally! *here#ore necessarily chance is in the sphere o# moral actions! *his is indicated by the #act that /ood #ortune is thou/ht to be the same$ or nearly the same$ as happiness$ and happiness to be a kind o# moral action$ since it is well-doin/! Hence what is not capable o# moral action cannot do anythin/ by chance! *hus an inanimate thin/ or a lower animal or a child cannot do anythin/ by chance$ because it is incapable o# deliberate intention2 nor can 3/ood #ortune3 or 3ill #ortune3 be ascribed to them$ e%cept metaphorically$ as rotarchus$ #or e%ample$ said that the stones o# which altars are made are #ortunate because they are held in honour$ while their #ellows are trodden under #oot! )ven these thin/s$ however$ can in a way be a##ected by chance$ when one who is dealin/ with them does somethin/ to them by chance$ but not otherwise! *he spontaneous on the other hand is #ound both in the lower animals and in many inanimate ob-ects! "e say$ #or e%ample$ that the horse came 3spontaneously3$ because$ thou/h his comin/ saved him$ he did not come #or the sake o# sa#ety! A/ain$ the tripod #ell 3o# itsel#3$ because$ thou/h when it #ell it stood on its #eet so as to serve #or a seat$ it did not #all #or the sake o# that! Hence it is clear that events which 5=6 belon/ to the /eneral class o# thin/s that may come to pass #or the sake o# somethin/$ 5>6 do not come to pass #or the sake o# what actually results$ and 5&6 have an e%ternal cause$ may be described by the phrase 3#rom spontaneity3! *hese 3spontaneous3 events are said to be 3#rom chance3 i# they have the #urther characteristics o# bein/ the ob-ects o# deliberate intention and due to a/ents capable o# that mode o# action! *his is indicated by the phrase 3in vain3$ which is used when A which is #or the sake o# B$ does not result in B! 0or instance$ takin/ a walk is #or the sake o# evacuation o# the bowels2 i# this does not #ollow a#ter walkin/$ we say that we have walked 3in vain3 and that the walkin/ was 3vain3! *his

implies that what is naturally the means to an end is 3in vain3$ when it does not e##ect the end towards which it was the natural means-#or it would be absurd #or a man to say that he had bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed$ since the one was not done with a view to the other! *hus the spontaneous is even accordin/ to its derivation the case in which the thin/ itsel# happens in vain! *he stone that struck the man did not #all #or the purpose o# strikin/ him2 there#ore it #ell spontaneously$ because it mi/ht have #allen by the action o# an a/ent and #or the purpose o# strikin/! *he di##erence between spontaneity and what results by chance is /reatest in thin/s that come to be by nature2 #or when anythin/ comes to be contrary to nature$ we do not say that it came to be by chance$ but by spontaneity! Aet strictly this too is di##erent #rom the spontaneous proper2 #or the cause o# the latter is e%ternal$ that o# the #ormer internal! "e have now e%plained what chance is and what spontaneity is$ and in what they di##er #rom each other! Both belon/ to the mode o# causation 3source o# chan/e3$ #or either some natural or some intelli/ent a/ent is always the cause2 but in this sort o# causation the number o# possible causes is in#inite! Spontaneity and chance are causes o# e##ects which thou/h they mi/ht result #rom intelli/ence or nature$ have in #act been caused by somethin/ incidentally! 1ow since nothin/ which is incidental is prior to what is per se$ it is clear that no incidental cause can be prior to a cause per se! Spontaneity and chance$ there#ore$ are posterior to intelli/ence and nature! Hence$ however true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity$ it will still be true that intelli/ence and nature will be prior causes o# this All and o# many thin/s in it besides! Part 7 7t is clear then that there are causes$ and that the number o# them is what we have stated! *he number is the same as that o# the thin/s comprehended under the .uestion 3why3! *he 3why3 is re#erred ultimately either 5=6$ in thin/s which do not involve motion$ e!/! in mathematics$ to the 3what3 5to the de#inition o# 3strai/ht line3 or 3commensurable3$ Dc!6$ or 5>6 to what initiated a motion$ e!/! 3why did they /o to war8-because there had been a raid32 or 5&6 we are in.uirin/ 3#or the sake o# what83-3that they may rule32 or 5?6$ in the case o# thin/s that come into bein/$ we are lookin/ #or the matter! *he causes$ there#ore$ are these and so many in number! 1ow$ the causes bein/ #our$ it is the business o# the physicist to know about them all$ and i# he re#ers his problems back to all o# them$ he will assi/n the 3why3 in the way proper to his science-the matter$ the #orm$ the mover$ 3that #or the sake o# which3! *he last three o#ten coincide2 #or the 3what3 and 3that #or the sake o# which3 are one$ while the primary source o# motion is the same in species as these 5#or man /enerates man6$ and so too$ in /eneral$ are all thin/s which cause movement by bein/ themselves moved2 and such as

are not o# this kind are no lon/er inside the province o# physics$ #or they cause motion not by possessin/ motion or a source o# motion in themselves$ but bein/ themselves incapable o# motion! Hence there are three branches o# study$ one o# thin/s which are incapable o# motion$ the second o# thin/s in motion$ but indestructible$ the third o# destructible thin/s! *he .uestion 3why3$ then$ is answered by re#erence to the matter$ to the #orm$ and to the primary movin/ cause! 0or in respect o# comin/ to be it is mostly in this last way that causes are investi/ated-3what comes to be a#ter what8 what was the primary a/ent or patient83 and so at each step o# the series! 1ow the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two$ o# which one is not physical$ as it has no principle o# motion in itsel#! O# this kind is whatever causes movement$ not bein/ itsel# moved$ such as 5=6 that which is completely unchan/eable$ the primary reality$ and 5>6 the essence o# that which is comin/ to be$ i!e! the #orm2 #or this is the end or 3that #or the sake o# which3! Hence since nature is #or the sake o# somethin/$ we must know this cause also! "e must e%plain the 3why3 in all the senses o# the term$ namely$ 5=6 that #rom this that will necessarily result 53#rom this3 either without .uali#ication or in most cases62 5>6 that 3this must be so i# that is to be so3 5as the conclusion presupposes the premisses62 5&6 that this was the essence o# the thin/2 and 5?6 because it is better thus 5not without .uali#ication$ but with re#erence to the essential nature in each case6! Part "e must e%plain then 5=6 that 1ature belon/s to the class o# causes which act #or the sake o# somethin/2 5>6 about the necessary and its place in physical problems$ #or all writers ascribe thin/s to this cause$ ar/uin/ that since the hot and the cold$ Dc!$ are o# such and such a kind$ there#ore certain thin/s necessarily are and come to be-and i# they mention any other cause 5one his 3#riendship and stri#e3$ another his 3mind36$ it is only to touch on it$ and then /ood-bye to it! A di##iculty presents itsel#4 why should not nature work$ not #or the sake o# somethin/$ nor because it is better so$ but -ust as the sky rains$ not in order to make the corn /row$ but o# necessity8 "hat is drawn up must cool$ and what has been cooled must become water and descend$ the result o# this bein/ that the corn /rows! Similarly i# a man3s crop is spoiled on the threshin/-#loor$ the rain did not #all #or the sake o# this-in order that the crop mi/ht be spoiled-but that result -ust #ollowed! "hy then should it not be the same with the parts in nature$ e!/! that our teeth should come up o# necessity-the #ront teeth sharp$ #itted #or tearin/$ the molars broad and use#ul #or /rindin/ down the #ood-since they did not arise #or this end$ but it was merely a coincident result2 and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose8 "herever then all the parts came about -ust what they would have been i# they had come be #or an end$ such thin/s survived$ bein/

or/ani9ed spontaneously in a #ittin/ way2 whereas those which /rew otherwise perished and continue to perish$ as )mpedocles says his 3man#aced o%-pro/eny3 did! Such are the ar/uments 5and others o# the kind6 which may cause di##iculty on this point! Aet it is impossible that this should be the true view! 0or teeth and all other natural thin/s either invariably or normally come about in a /iven way2 but o# not one o# the results o# chance or spontaneity is this true! "e do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the #re.uency o# rain in winter$ but #re.uent rain in summer we do2 nor heat in the do/-days$ but only i# we have it in winter! 7# then$ it is a/reed that thin/s are either the result o# coincidence or #or an end$ and these cannot be the result o# coincidence or spontaneity$ it #ollows that they must be #or an end2 and that such thin/s are all due to nature even the champions o# the theory which is be#ore us would a/ree! *here#ore action #or an end is present in thin/s which come to be and are by nature! 0urther$ where a series has a completion$ all the precedin/ steps are #or the sake o# that! 1ow surely as in intelli/ent action$ so in nature2 and as in nature$ so it is in each action$ i# nothin/ inter#eres! 1ow intelli/ent action is #or the sake o# an end2 there#ore the nature o# thin/s also is so! *hus i# a house$ e!/! had been a thin/ made by nature$ it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art2 and i# thin/s made by nature were made also by art$ they would come to be in the same way as by nature! )ach step then in the series is #or the sake o# the ne%t2 and /enerally art partly completes what nature cannot brin/ to a #inish$ and partly imitates her! 7#$ there#ore$ arti#icial products are #or the sake o# an end$ so clearly also are natural products! *he relation o# the later to the earlier terms o# the series is the same in both! *his is most obvious in the animals other than man4 they make thin/s neither by art nor a#ter in.uiry or deliberation! "here#ore people discuss whether it is by intelli/ence or by some other #aculty that these creatures work$spiders$ ants$ and the like! By /radual advance in this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which is conducive to the end-leaves$ e!/! /row to provide shade #or the #ruit! 7# then it is both by nature and #or an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web$ and plants /row leaves #or the sake o# the #ruit and send their roots down 5not up6 #or the sake o# nourishment$ it is plain that this kind o# cause is operative in thin/s which come to be and are by nature! And since 3nature3 means two thin/s$ the matter and the #orm$ o# which the latter is the end$ and since all the rest is #or the sake o# the end$ the #orm must be the cause in the sense o# 3that #or the sake o# which3! 1ow mistakes come to pass even in the operations o# art4 the /rammarian makes a mistake in writin/ and the doctor pours out the wron/ dose! Hence clearly mistakes are possible in the operations o# nature also! 7# then in art there are cases in which what is ri/htly produced serves a purpose$ and i# where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted$ only it

was not attained$ so must it be also in natural products$ and monstrosities will be #ailures in the purposive e##ort! *hus in the ori/inal combinations the 3o%-pro/eny3 i# they #ailed to reach a determinate end must have arisen throu/h the corruption o# some principle correspondin/ to what is now the seed! 0urther$ seed must have come into bein/ #irst$ and not strai/htway the animals4 the words 3whole-natured #irst!!!3 must have meant seed! A/ain$ in plants too we #ind the relation o# means to end$ thou/h the de/ree o# or/ani9ation is less! "ere there then in plants also 3olive-headed vinepro/eny3$ like the 3man-headed o%-pro/eny3$ or not8 An absurd su//estion2 yet there must have been$ i# there were such thin/s amon/ animals! Moreover$ amon/ the seeds anythin/ must have come to be at random! But the person who asserts this entirely does away with 3nature3 and what e%ists 3by nature3! 0or those thin/s are natural which$ by a continuous movement ori/inated #rom an internal principle$ arrive at some completion4 the same completion is not reached #rom every principle2 nor any chance completion$ but always the tendency in each is towards the same end$ i# there is no impediment! *he end and the means towards it may come about by chance! "e say$ #or instance$ that a stran/er has come by chance$ paid the ransom$ and /one away$ when he does so as i# he had come #or that purpose$ thou/h it was not #or that that he came! *his is incidental$ #or chance is an incidental cause$ as 7 remarked be#ore! But when an event takes place always or #or the most part$ it is not incidental or by chance! 7n natural products the se.uence is invariable$ i# there is no impediment! 7t is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the a/ent deliberatin/! Art does not deliberate! 7# the ship-buildin/ art were in the wood$ it would produce the same results by nature! 7#$ there#ore$ purpose is present in art$ it is present also in nature! *he best illustration is a doctor doctorin/ himsel#4 nature is like that! 7t is plain then that nature is a cause$ a cause that operates #or a purpose! Part ! As re/ards what is 3o# necessity3$ we must ask whether the necessity is 3hypothetical3$ or 3simple3 as well! *he current view places what is o# necessity in the process o# production$ -ust as i# one were to suppose that the wall o# a house necessarily comes to be because what is heavy is naturally carried downwards and what is li/ht to the top$ where#ore the stones and #oundations take the lowest place$ with earth above because it is li/hter$ and wood at the top o# all as bein/ the li/htest! "hereas$ thou/h the wall does

not come to be without these$ it is not due to these$ e%cept as its material cause4 it comes to be #or the sake o# shelterin/ and /uardin/ certain thin/s! Similarly in all other thin/s which involve production #or an end2 the product cannot come to be without thin/s which have a necessary nature$ but it is not due to these 5e%cept as its material62 it comes to be #or an end! 0or instance$ why is a saw such as it is8 *o e##ect so-and-so and #or the sake o# so-and-so! *his end$ however$ cannot be reali9ed unless the saw is made o# iron! 7t is$ there#ore$ necessary #or it to be o# iron$ it we are to have a saw and per#orm the operation o# sawin/! "hat is necessary then$ is necessary on a hypothesis2 it is not a result necessarily determined by antecedents! 1ecessity is in the matter$ while 3that #or the sake o# which3 is in the de#inition! 1ecessity in mathematics is in a way similar to necessity in thin/s which come to be throu/h the operation o# nature! Since a strai/ht line is what it is$ it is necessary that the an/les o# a trian/le should e.ual two ri/ht an/les! But not conversely2 thou/h i# the an/les are not e.ual to two ri/ht an/les$ then the strai/ht line is not what it is either! But in thin/s which come to be #or an end$ the reverse is true! 7# the end is to e%ist or does e%ist$ that also which precedes it will e%ist or does e%ist2 otherwise -ust as there$ i#-the conclusion is not true$ the premiss will not be true$ so here the end or 3that #or the sake o# which3 will not e%ist! 0or this too is itsel# a startin/-point$ but o# the reasonin/$ not o# the action2 while in mathematics the startin/-point is the startin/-point o# the reasonin/ only$ as there is no action! 7# then there is to be a house$ such-and-such thin/s must be made or be there already or e%ist$ or /enerally the matter relative to the end$ bricks and stones i# it is a house! But the end is not due to these e%cept as the matter$ nor will it come to e%ist because o# them! Aet i# they do not e%ist at all$ neither will the house$ or the saw-the #ormer in the absence o# stones$ the latter in the absence o# iron--ust as in the other case the premisses will not be true$ i# the an/les o# the trian/le are not e.ual to two ri/ht an/les! *he necessary in nature$ then$ is plainly what we call by the name o# matter$ and the chan/es in it! Both causes must be stated by the physicist$ but especially the end2 #or that is the cause o# the matter$ not vice versa2 and the end is 3that #or the sake o# which3$ and the be/innin/ starts #rom the de#inition or essence2 as in arti#icial products$ since a house is o# such-andsuch a kind$ certain thin/s must necessarily come to be or be there already$ or since health is this$ these thin/s must necessarily come to be or be there already! Similarly i# man is this$ then these2 i# these$ then those! erhaps the necessary is present also in the de#inition! 0or i# one de#ines the operation o# sawin/ as bein/ a certain kind o# dividin/$ then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth o# a certain kind2 and these cannot be unless it is o# iron! 0or in the de#inition too there are some parts that are$ as it were$ its matter!

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book III
Part 1 1ature has been de#ined as a 3principle o# motion and chan/e3$ and it is the sub-ect o# our in.uiry! "e must there#ore see that we understand the meanin/ o# 3motion32 #or i# it were unknown$ the meanin/ o# 3nature3 too would be unknown! "hen we have determined the nature o# motion$ our ne%t task will be to attack in the same way the terms which are involved in it! 1ow motion is

supposed to belon/ to the class o# thin/s which are continuous2 and the in#inite presents itsel# #irst in the continuous-that is how it comes about that 3in#inite3 is o#ten used in de#initions o# the continuous 53what is in#initely divisible is continuous36! Besides these$ place$ void$ and time are thou/ht to be necessary conditions o# motion! Clearly$ then$ #or these reasons and also because the attributes mentioned are common to$ and coe%tensive with$ all the ob-ects o# our science$ we must #irst take each o# them in hand and discuss it! 0or the investi/ation o# special attributes comes a#ter that o# the common attributes! *o be/in then$ as we said$ with motion! "e may start by distin/uishin/ 5=6 what e%ists in a state o# #ul#ilment only$ 5>6 what e%ists as potential$ 5&6 what e%ists as potential and also in #ul#ilment-one bein/ a 3this3$ another 3so much3$ a third 3such3$ and similarly in each o# the other modes o# the predication o# bein/! 0urther$ the word 3relative3 is used with re#erence to 5=6 e%cess and de#ect$ 5>6 a/ent and patient and /enerally what can move and what can be moved! 0or 3what can cause movement3 is relative to 3what can be moved3$ and vice versa! A/ain$ there is no such thin/ as motion over and above the thin/s! 7t is always with respect to substance or to .uantity or to .uality or to place that what chan/es chan/es! But it is impossible$ as we assert$ to #ind anythin/ common to these which is neither 3this3 nor .uantum nor .uale nor any o# the other predicates! Hence neither will motion and chan/e have re#erence to somethin/ over and above the thin/s mentioned$ #or there is nothin/ over and above them! 1ow each o# these belon/s to all its sub-ects in either o# two ways4 namely 5=6 substance-the one is positive #orm$ the other privation2 5>6 in .uality$ white and black2 5&6 in .uantity$ complete and incomplete2 5?6 in respect o# locomotion$ upwards and downwards or li/ht and heavy! Hence there are as many types o# motion or chan/e as there are meanin/s o# the word 3is3! "e have now be#ore us the distinctions in the various classes o# bein/ between what is #ull real and what is potential! De"# *he #ul#ilment o# what e%ists potentially$ in so #ar as it e%ists potentially$ is motion-namely$ o# what is alterable .ua alterable$ alteration4 o# what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased 5there is no common name6$ increase and decrease4 o# what can come to be and can pass away$ comin/ to he and passin/ away4 o# what can be carried alon/$ locomotion! )%amples will elucidate this de#inition o# motion! "hen the buildable$ in so

#ar as it is -ust that$ is #ully real$ it is bein/ built$ and this is buildin/! Similarly$ learnin/$ doctorin/$ rollin/$ leapin/$ ripenin/$ a/ein/! *he same thin/$ i# it is o# a certain kind$ can be both potential and #ully real$ not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect$ but e!/! potentially hot and actually cold! Hence at once such thin/s will act and be acted on by one another in many ways4 each o# them will be capable at the same time o# causin/ alteration and o# bein/ altered! Hence$ too$ what e##ects motion as a physical a/ent can be moved4 when a thin/ o# this kind causes motion$ it is itsel# also moved! *his$ indeed$ has led some people to suppose that every mover is moved! But this .uestion depends on another set o# ar/uments$ and the truth will be made clear later! is possible #or a thin/ to cause motion$ thou/h it is itsel# incapable o# bein/ moved! 7t is the #ul#ilment o# what is potential when it is already #ully real and operates not as itsel# but as movable$ that is motion! "hat 7 mean by 3as3 is this4 Bron9e is potentially a statue! But it is not the #ul#ilment o# bron9e as bron9e which is motion! 0or 3to be bron9e3 and 3to be a certain potentiality3 are not the same! 7# they were identical without .uali#ication$ i!e! in de#inition$ the #ul#ilment o# bron9e as bron9e would have been motion! But they are not the same$ as has been said! 5*his is obvious in contraries! 3*o be capable o# health3 and 3to be capable o# illness3 are not the same$ #or i# they were there would be no di##erence between bein/ ill and bein/ well! Aet the sub-ect both o# health and o# sickness-whether it is humour or blood-is one and the same!6 "e can distin/uish$ then$ between the two--ust as$ to /ive another e%ample$ 3colour3 and visible3 are di##erent-and clearly it is the #ul#ilment o# what is potential as potential that is motion! So this$ precisely$ is motion! 0urther it is evident that motion is an attribute o# a thin/ -ust when it is #ully real in this way$ and neither be#ore nor a#ter! 0or each thin/ o# this kind is capable o# bein/ at one time actual$ at another not! *ake #or instance the buildable as buildable! *he actuality o# the buildable as buildable is the process o# buildin/! 0or the actuality o# the buildable must be either this or the house! But when there is a house$ the buildable is no lon/er buildable! On the other hand$ it is the buildable which is bein/ built! *he process then o# bein/ built must be the kind o# actuality re.uired But buildin/ is a kind o# motion$ and the same account will apply to the other kinds also! Part 2 *he soundness o# this de#inition is evident both when we consider the accounts o# motion that the others have /iven$ and also #rom the di##iculty o# de#inin/ it otherwise!

One could not easily put motion and chan/e in another /enus-this is plain i# we consider where some people put it2 they identi#y motion with or 3ine.uality3 or 3not bein/32 but such thin/s are not necessarily moved$ whether they are 3di##erent3 or 3une.ual3 or 3non-e%istent32 1or is chan/e either to or #rom these rather than to or #rom their opposites! *he reason why they put motion into these /enera is that it is thou/ht to be somethin/ inde#inite$ and the principles in the second column are inde#inite because they are privative4 none o# them is either 3this3 or 3such3 or comes under any o# the other modes o# predication! *he reason in turn why motion is thou/ht to be inde#inite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality-a thin/ that is merely capable o# havin/ a certain si9e is not under/oin/ chan/e$ nor yet a thin/ that is actually o# a certain si9e$ and motion is thou/ht to be a sort o# actuality$ but incomplete$ the reason #or this view bein/ that the potential whose actuality it is is incomplete! *his is why it is hard to /rasp what motion is! 7t is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with sheer actuality$ yet none o# these seems possible! *here remains then the su//ested mode o# de#inition$ namely that it is a sort o# actuality$ or actuality o# the kind described$ hard to /rasp$ but not incapable o# e%istin/! *he mover too is moved$ as has been said-every mover$ that is$ which is capable o# motion$ and whose immobility is rest-when a thin/ is sub-ect to motion its immobility is rest! 0or to act on the movable as such is -ust to move it! But this it does by contact$ so that at the same time it is also acted on! Hence we can de#ine motion as the #ul#ilment o# the movable .ua movable$ the cause o# the attribute bein/ contact with what can move so that the mover is also acted on! *he mover or a/ent will always be the vehicle o# a #orm$ either a 3this3 or 3such3$ which$ when it acts$ will be the source and cause o# the chan/e$ e!/! the #ull-#ormed man be/ets man #rom what is potentially man! Part 3 *he solution o# the di##iculty that is raised about the motion-whether it is in the movable-is plain! 7t is the #ul#ilment o# this potentiality$ and by the action o# that which has the power o# causin/ motion2 and the actuality o# that which has the power o# causin/ motion is not other than the actuality o# the movable$ #or it must be the #ul#ilment o# both! A thin/ is capable o# causin/ motion because it can do this$ it is a mover because it actually does it! But it is on the movable that it is capable o# actin/! Hence there is a sin/le actuality o# both alike$ -ust as one to two and two to one are the same interval$ and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one-#or these are one and the same$ althou/h they can be described in di##erent ways! So it is with the mover and the moved! *his view has a dialectical di##iculty! erhaps it is necessary that the

actuality o# the a/ent and that o# the patient should not be the same! *he one is 3a/ency3 and the other 3patiency32 and the outcome and completion o# the one is an 3action3$ that o# the other a 3passion3! Since then they are both motions$ we may ask4 in what are they$ i# they are di##erent8 )ither 5a6 both are in what is acted on and moved$ or 5b6 the a/ency is in the a/ent and the patiency in the patient! 57# we ou/ht to call the latter also 3a/ency3$ the word would be used in two senses!6 1ow$ in alternative 5b6$ the motion will be in the mover$ #or the same statement will hold o# 3mover3 and 3moved3! Hence either every mover will be moved$ or$ thou/h havin/ motion$ it will not be moved! 7# on the other hand 5a6 both are in what is moved and acted on-both the a/ency and the patiency 5e!/! both teachin/ and learnin/$ thou/h they are two$ in the learner6$ then$ #irst$ the actuality o# each will not be present in each$ and$ a second absurdity$ a thin/ will have two motions at the same time! How will there be two alterations o# .uality in one sub-ect towards one de#inite .uality8 *he thin/ is impossible4 the actuali9ation will be one! But 5some one will say6 it is contrary to reason to suppose that there should be one identical actuali9ation o# two thin/s which are di##erent in kind! Aet there will be$ i# teachin/ and learnin/ are the same$ and a/ency and patiency! *o teach will be the same as to learn$ and to act the same as to be acted onthe teacher will necessarily be learnin/ everythin/ that he teaches$ and the a/ent will be acted on! One may reply4 5=6 7t is not absurd that the actuali9ation o# one thin/ should be in another! *eachin/ is the activity o# a person who can teach$ yet the operation is per#ormed on some patient-it is not cut adri#t #rom a sub-ect$ but is o# A on B! 5>6 *here is nothin/ to prevent two thin/s havin/ one and the same actuali9ation$ provided the actuali9ations are not described in the same way$ but are related as what can act to what is actin/! 5&6 1or is it necessary that the teacher should learn$ even i# to act and to be acted on are one and the same$ provided they are not the same in de#inition 5as 3raiment3 and 3dress36$ but are the same merely in the sense in which the road #rom *hebes to Athens and the road #rom Athens to *hebes are the same$ as has been e%plained above! 0or it is not thin/s which are in a way the same that have all their attributes the same$ but only such as have the same de#inition! But indeed it by no means #ollows #rom the #act that teachin/ is the same as learnin/$ that to learn is the same as to teach$ any more than it #ollows #rom the #act that there is one distance between two thin/s which are at a distance #rom each other$ that the two vectors AB and Ba$ are one and the same! *o /enerali9e$ teachin/ is not the same as learnin/$ or a/ency as patiency$ in the #ull sense$ thou/h they belon/ to the

same sub-ect$ the motion2 #or the 3actuali9ation o# E in A3 and the 3actuali9ation o# A throu/h the action o# E3 di##er in de#inition! "hat then Motion is$ has been stated both /enerally and particularly! 7t is not di##icult to see how each o# its types will be de#ined-alteration is the #ul#illment o# the alterable .ua alterable 5or$ more scienti#ically$ the #ul#ilment o# what can act and what can be acted on$ as such6-/enerally and a/ain in each particular case$ buildin/$ healin/$ Dc! A similar de#inition will apply to each o# the other kinds o# motion! Part 4 *he science o# nature is concerned with spatial ma/nitudes and motion and time$ and each o# these at least is necessarily in#inite or #inite$ even i# some thin/s dealt with by the science are not$ e!/! a .uality or a point-it is not necessary perhaps that such thin/s should be put under either head! Hence it is incumbent on the person who speciali9es in physics to discuss the in#inite and to in.uire whether there is such a thin/ or not$ and$ i# there is$ what it is! *he appropriateness to the science o# this problem is clearly indicated! All who have touched on this kind o# science in a way worth considerin/ have #ormulated views about the in#inite$ and indeed$ to a man$ make it a principle o# thin/s! 5=6 Some$ as the ytha/oreans and lato$ make the in#inite a principle in the sense o# a sel#-subsistent substance$ and not as a mere attribute o# some other thin/! Only the ytha/oreans place the in#inite amon/ the ob-ects o# sense 5they do not re/ard number as separable #rom these6$ and assert that what is outside the heaven is in#inite! lato$ on the other hand$ holds that there is no body outside 5the 0orms are not outside because they are nowhere6$yet that the in#inite is present not only in the ob-ects o# sense but in the 0orms also! 0urther$ the ytha/oreans identi#y the in#inite with the even! 0or this$ they say$ when it is cut o## and shut in by the odd$ provides thin/s with the element o# in#inity! An indication o# this is what happens with numbers! 7# the /nomons are placed round the one$ and without the one$ in the one construction the #i/ure that results is always di##erent$ in the other it is always the same! But lato has two in#inites$ the ,reat and the Small! *he physicists$ on the other hand$ all o# them$ always re/ard the in#inite as an attribute o# a substance which is di##erent #rom it and belon/s to the class o# the so-called elements-water or air or what is intermediate between them! *hose who make them limited in number never make them in#inite in amount! But those who make the elements in#inite in number$ as Ana%a/oras and Democritus do$ say that the in#inite is continuous by contactcompounded o# the homo/eneous parts accordin/ to the one$ o# the seed-

mass o# the atomic shapes accordin/ to the other! 0urther$ Ana%a/oras held that any part is a mi%ture in the same way as the All$ on the /round o# the observed #act that anythin/ comes out o# anythin/! 0or it is probably #or this reason that he maintains that once upon a time all thin/s were to/ether! 5*his #lesh and this bone were to/ether$ and so o# any thin/4 there#ore all thin/s4 and at the same time too!6 0or there is a be/innin/ o# separation$ not only #or each thin/$ but #or all! )ach thin/ that comes to be comes #rom a similar body$ and there is a comin/ to be o# all thin/s$ thou/h not$ it is true$ at the same time! Hence there must also be an ori/in o# comin/ to be! One such source there is which he calls Mind$ and Mind be/ins its work o# thinkin/ #rom some startin/-point! So necessarily all thin/s must have been to/ether at a certain time$ and must have be/un to be moved at a certain time! Democritus$ #or his part$ asserts the contrary$ namely that no element arises #rom another element! 1evertheless #or him the common body is a source o# all thin/s$ di##erin/ #rom part to part in si9e and in shape! 7t is clear then #rom these considerations that the in.uiry concerns the physicist! 1or is it without reason that they all make it a principle or source! "e cannot say that the in#inite has no e##ect$ and the only e##ectiveness which we can ascribe to it is that o# a principle! )verythin/ is either a source or derived #rom a source! But there cannot be a source o# the in#inite or limitless$ #or that would be a limit o# it! 0urther$ as it is a be/innin/$ it is both uncreatable and indestructible! 0or there must be a point at which what has come to be reaches completion$ and also a termination o# all passin/ away! *hat is why$ as we say$ there is no principle o# this$ but it is this which is held to be the principle o# other thin/s$ and to encompass all and to steer all$ as those assert who do not reco/ni9e$ alon/side the in#inite$ other causes$ such as Mind or 0riendship! 0urther they identi#y it with the Divine$ #or it is 3deathless and imperishable3 as Ana%imander says$ with the ma-ority o# the physicists! Belie# in the e%istence o# the in#inite comes mainly #rom #ive considerations4 5=6 0rom the nature o# time-#or it is in#inite! 5>6 0rom the division o# ma/nitudes-#or the mathematicians also use the notion o# the in#inite! 5&6 7# comin/ to be and passin/ away do not /ive out$ it is only because that #rom which thin/s come to be is in#inite! 5?6 Because the limited always #inds its limit in somethin/$ so that there must be no limit$ i# everythin/ is always limited by somethin/ di##erent #rom itsel#!

5'6 Most o# all$ a reason which is peculiarly appropriate and presents the di##iculty that is #elt by everybody-not only number but also mathematical ma/nitudes and what is outside the heaven are supposed to be in#inite because they never /ive out in our thou/ht! *he last #act 5that what is outside is in#inite6 leads people to suppose that body also is in#inite$ and that there is an in#inite number o# worlds! "hy should there be body in one part o# the void rather than in another8 ,rant only that mass is anywhere and it #ollows that it must be everywhere! Also$ i# void and place are in#inite$ there must be in#inite body too$ #or in the case o# eternal thin/s what may be must be! But the problem o# the in#inite is di##icult4 many contradictions result whether we suppose it to e%ist or not to e%ist! 7# it e%ists$ we have still to ask how it e%ists2 as a substance or as the essential attribute o# some entity8 Or in neither way$ yet none the less is there somethin/ which is in#inite or some thin/s which are in#initely many8 *he problem$ however$ which specially belon/s to the physicist is to investi/ate whether there is a sensible ma/nitude which is in#inite! "e must be/in by distin/uishin/ the various senses in which the term 3in#inite3 is used! 5=6 "hat is incapable o# bein/ /one throu/h$ because it is not in its nature to be /one throu/h 5the sense in which the voice is 3invisible36! 5>6 "hat admits o# bein/ /one throu/h$ the process however havin/ no termination$ or what scarcely admits o# bein/ /one throu/h! 5&6 "hat naturally admits o# bein/ /one throu/h$ but is not actually /one throu/h or does not actually reach an end! 0urther$ everythin/ that is in#inite may be so in respect o# addition or division or both! Part 5 1ow it is impossible that the in#inite should be a thin/ which is itsel# in#inite$ separable #rom sensible ob-ects! 7# the in#inite is neither a ma/nitude nor an a//re/ate$ but is itsel# a substance and not an attribute$ it will be indivisible2 #or the divisible must be either a ma/nitude or an a//re/ate! But i# indivisible$ then not in#inite$ e%cept in the sense 5=6 in which the voice is 3invisible3! But this is not the sense in which it is used by those who say that the in#inite e%ists$ nor that in which we are investi/atin/ it$ namely as 5>6 3that which cannot be /one throu/h3! But i# the in#inite e%ists as an attribute$ it would not be$ .ua in#inite an element in substances$ any more than the invisible would be an element o# speech$ thou/h the voice is invisible!

0urther$ how can the in#inite be itsel# any thin/$ unless both number and ma/nitude$ o# which it is an essential attribute$ e%ist in that way8 7# they are not substances$ a #ortiori the in#inite is not! 7t is plain$ too$ that the in#inite cannot be an actual thin/ and a substance and principle! 0or any part o# it that is taken will be in#inite$ i# it has parts4 #or 3to be in#inite3 and 3the in#inite3 are the same$ i# it is a substance and not predicated o# a sub-ect! Hence it will be either indivisible or divisible into in#inites! But the same thin/ cannot be many in#inites! 5Aet -ust as part o# air is air$ so a part o# the in#inite would be in#inite$ i# it is supposed to be a substance and principle!6 *here#ore the in#inite must be without parts and indivisible! But this cannot be true o# what is in#inite in #ull completion4 #or it must be a de#inite .uantity! Suppose then that in#inity belon/s to substance as an attribute! But$ i# so$ it cannot$ as we have said$ be described as a principle$ but rather that o# which it is an attribute-the air or the even number! *hus the view o# those who speak a#ter the manner o# the ytha/oreans is absurd! "ith the same breath they treat the in#inite as substance$ and divide it into parts! *his discussion$ however$ involves the more /eneral .uestion whether the in#inite can be present in mathematical ob-ects and thin/s which are intelli/ible and do not have e%tension$ as well as amon/ sensible ob-ects! Our in.uiry 5as physicists6 is limited to its special sub-ect-matter$ the ob-ects o# sense$ and we have to ask whether there is or is not amon/ them a body which is in#inite in the direction o# increase! "e may be/in with a dialectical ar/ument and show as #ollows that there is no such thin/! 7# 3bounded by a sur#ace3 is the de#inition o# body there cannot be an in#inite body either intelli/ible or sensible! 1or can number taken in abstraction be in#inite$ #or number or that which has number is numerable! 7# then the numerable can be numbered$ it would also be possible to /o throu/h the in#inite! 7#$ on the other hand$ we investi/ate the .uestion more in accordance with principles appropriate to physics$ we are led as #ollows to the same result! *he in#inite body must be either 5=6 compound$ or 5>6 simple2 yet neither alternative is possible! 5=6 Compound the in#inite body will not be$ i# the elements are #inite in number! 0or they must be more than one$ and the contraries must always balance$ and no one o# them can be in#inite! 7# one o# the bodies #alls in any de/ree short o# the other in potency-suppose #ire is #inite in amount while air

is in#inite and a /iven .uantity o# #ire e%ceeds in power the same amount o# air in any ratio provided it is numerically de#inite-the in#inite body will obviously prevail over and annihilate the #inite body! On the other hand$ it is impossible that each should be in#inite! 3Body3 is what has e%tension in all directions and the in#inite is what is boundlessly e%tended$ so that the in#inite body would be e%tended in all directions ad in#initum! 1or 5>6 can the in#inite body be one and simple$ whether it is$ as some hold$ a thin/ over and above the elements 5#rom which they /enerate the elements6 or is not thus .uali#ied! 5a6 "e must consider the #ormer alternative2 #or there are some people who make this the in#inite$ and not air or water$ in order that the other elements may not be annihilated by the element which is in#inite! *hey have contrariety with each other-air is cold$ water moist$ #ire hot2 i# one were in#inite$ the others by now would have ceased to be! As it is$ they say$ the in#inite is di##erent #rom them and is their source! 7t is impossible$ however$ that there should be such a body2 not because it is in#inite on that point a /eneral proo# can be /iven which applies e.ually to all$ air$ water$ or anythin/ else-but simply because there is$ as a matter o# #act$ no such sensible body$ alon/side the so-called elements! )verythin/ can be resolved into the elements o# which it is composed! Hence the body in .uestion would have been present in our world here$ alon/side air and #ire and earth and water4 but nothin/ o# the kind is observed! 5b6 1or can #ire or any other o# the elements be in#inite! 0or /enerally$ and apart #rom the .uestion o# how any o# them could be in#inite$ the All$ even i# it were limited$ cannot either be or become one o# them$ as Heraclitus says that at some time all thin/s become #ire! 5*he same ar/ument applies also to the one which the physicists suppose to e%ist alon/side the elements4 #or everythin/ chan/es #rom contrary to contrary$ e!/! #rom hot to cold6! *he precedin/ consideration o# the various cases serves to show us whether it is or is not possible that there should be an in#inite sensible body! *he #ollowin/ ar/uments /ive a /eneral demonstration that it is not possible! 7t is the nature o# every kind o# sensible body to be somewhere$ and there is a place appropriate to each$ the same #or the part and #or the whole$ e!/! #or the whole earth and #or a sin/le clod$ and #or #ire and #or a spark! Suppose 5a6 that the in#inite sensible body is homo/eneous! *hen each part will be either immovable or always bein/ carried alon/! Aet neither is possible! 0or why downwards rather than upwards or in any other direction8 7 mean$ e!/$ i# you take a clod$ where will it be moved or where will it be at rest8 0or e% hypothesi the place o# the body akin to it is in#inite! "ill it occupy the whole place$ then8 And how8 "hat then will be the nature o# its

rest and o# its movement$ or where will they be8 7t will either be at home everywhere-then it will not be moved2 or it will be moved everywhere-then it will not come to rest! But i# 5b6 the All has dissimilar parts$ the proper places o# the parts will be dissimilar also$ and the body o# the All will have no unity e%cept that o# contact! *hen$ #urther$ the parts will be either #inite or in#inite in variety o# kind! 5i6 0inite they cannot be$ #or i# the All is to be in#inite$ some o# them would have to be in#inite$ while the others were not$ e!/! #ire or water will be in#inite! But$ as we have seen be#ore$ such an element would destroy what is contrary to it! 5*his indeed is the reason why none o# the physicists made #ire or earth the one in#inite body$ but either water or air or what is intermediate between them$ because the abode o# each o# the two was plainly determinate$ while the others have an ambi/uous place between up and down!6 But 5ii6 i# the parts are in#inite in number and simple$ their proper places too will be in#inite in number$ and the same will be true o# the elements themselves! 7# that is impossible$ and the places are #inite$ the whole too must be #inite2 #or the place and the body cannot but #it each other! 1either is the whole place lar/er than what can be #illed by the body 5and then the body would no lon/er be in#inite6$ nor is the body lar/er than the place2 #or either there would be an empty space or a body whose nature it is to be nowhere! Ana%a/oras /ives an absurd account o# why the in#inite is at rest! He says that the in#inite itsel# is the cause o# its bein/ #i%ed! *his because it is in itsel#$ since nothin/ else contains it-on the assumption that wherever anythin/ is$ it is there by its own nature! But this is not true4 a thin/ could be somewhere by compulsion$ and not where it is its nature to be! )ven i# it is true as true can be that the whole is not moved 5#or what is #i%ed by itsel# and is in itsel# must be immovable6$ yet we must e%plain why it is not its nature to be moved! 7t is not enou/h -ust to make this statement and then decamp! Anythin/ else mi/ht be in a state o# rest$ but there is no reason why it should not be its nature to be moved! *he earth is not carried alon/$ and would not be carried alon/ i# it were in#inite$ provided it is held to/ether by the centre! But it would not be because there was no other re/ion in which it could be carried alon/ that it would remain at the centre$ but because this is its nature! Aet in this case also we may say that it #i%es itsel#! 7# then in the case o# the earth$ supposed to be in#inite$ it is at rest$ not because it is in#inite$ but because it has wei/ht and what is heavy rests at the centre and the earth is at the centre$ similarly the in#inite also would rest in itsel#$ not because it is in#inite and #i%es itsel#$ but owin/ to some other cause! Another di##iculty emer/es at the same time! Any part o# the in#inite body

ou/ht to remain at rest! Fust as the in#inite remains at rest in itsel# because it #i%es itsel#$ so too any part o# it you may take will remain in itsel#! *he appropriate places o# the whole and o# the part are alike$ e!/! o# the whole earth and o# a clod the appropriate place is the lower re/ion2 o# #ire as a whole and o# a spark$ the upper re/ion! 7#$ there#ore$ to be in itsel# is the place o# the in#inite$ that also will be appropriate to the part! *here#ore it will remain in itsel#! 7n /eneral$ the view that there is an in#inite body is plainly incompatible with the doctrine that there is necessarily a proper place #or each kind o# body$ i# every sensible body has either wei/ht or li/htness$ and i# a body has a natural locomotion towards the centre i# it is heavy$ and upwards i# it is li/ht! *his would need to be true o# the in#inite also! But neither character can belon/ to it4 it cannot be either as a whole$ nor can it be hal# the one and hal# the other! 0or how should you divide it8 or how can the in#inite have the one part up and the other down$ or an e%tremity and a centre8 0urther$ every sensible body is in place$ and the kinds or di##erences o# place are up-down$ be#ore-behind$ ri/ht-le#t2 and these distinctions hold not only in relation to us and by arbitrary a/reement$ but also in the whole itsel#! But in the in#inite body they cannot e%ist! 7n /eneral$ i# it is impossible that there should be an in#inite place$ and i# every body is in place$ there cannot be an in#inite body! Surely what is in a special place is in place$ and what is in place is in a special place! Fust$ then$ as the in#inite cannot be .uantity-that would imply that it has a particular .uantity$ e$/$ two or three cubits2 .uantity -ust means these-so a thin/3s bein/ in place means that it is somewhere$ and that is either up or down or in some other o# the si% di##erences o# position4 but each o# these is a limit! 7t is plain #rom these ar/uments that there is no body which is actually in#inite! Part 6 But on the other hand to suppose that the in#inite does not e%ist in any way leads obviously to many impossible conse.uences4 there will be a be/innin/ and an end o# time$ a ma/nitude will not be divisible into ma/nitudes$ number will not be in#inite! 7#$ then$ in view o# the above considerations$ neither alternative seems possible$ an arbiter must be called in2 and clearly there is a sense in which the in#inite e%ists and another in which it does not! "e must keep in mind that the word 3is3 means either what potentially is or what #ully is! 0urther$ a thin/ is in#inite either by addition or by division! 1ow$ as we have seen$ ma/nitude is not actually in#inite! But by division it

is in#inite! 5*here is no di##iculty in re#utin/ the theory o# indivisible lines!6 *he alternative then remains that the in#inite has a potential e%istence! But the phrase 3potential e%istence3 is ambi/uous! "hen we speak o# the potential e%istence o# a statue we mean that there will be an actual statue! 7t is not so with the in#inite! *here will not be an actual in#inite! *he word 3is3 has many senses$ and we say that the in#inite 3is3 in the sense in which we say 3it is day3 or 3it is the /ames3$ because one thin/ a#ter another is always comin/ into e%istence! 0or o# these thin/s too the distinction between potential and actual e%istence holds! "e say that there are Olympic /ames$ both in the sense that they may occur and that they are actually occurrin/! *he in#inite e%hibits itsel# in di##erent ways-in time$ in the /enerations o# man$ and in the division o# ma/nitudes! 0or /enerally the in#inite has this mode o# e%istence4 one thin/ is always bein/ taken a#ter another$ and each thin/ that is taken is always #inite$ but always di##erent! A/ain$ 3bein/3 has more than one sense$ so that we must not re/ard the in#inite as a 3this3$ such as a man or a horse$ but must suppose it to e%ist in the sense in which we speak o# the day or the /ames as e%istin/ thin/s whose bein/ has not come to them like that o# a substance$ but consists in a process o# comin/ to be or passin/ away2 de#inite i# you like at each sta/e$ yet always di##erent! But when this takes place in spatial ma/nitudes$ what is taken perists$ while in the succession o# time and o# men it takes place by the passin/ away o# these in such a way that the source o# supply never /ives out! 7n a way the in#inite by addition is the same thin/ as the in#inite by division! 7n a #inite ma/nitude$ the in#inite by addition comes about in a way inverse to that o# the other! 0or in proportion as we see division /oin/ on$ in the same proportion we see addition bein/ made to what is already marked o##! 0or i# we take a determinate part o# a #inite ma/nitude and add another part determined by the same ratio 5not takin/ in the same amount o# the ori/inal whole6$ and so on$ we shall not traverse the /iven ma/nitude! But i# we increase the ratio o# the part$ so as always to take in the same amount$ we shall traverse the ma/nitude$ #or every #inite ma/nitude is e%hausted by means o# any determinate .uantity however small! *he in#inite$ then$ e%ists in no other way$ but in this way it does e%ist$ potentially and by reduction! 7t e%ists #ully in the sense in which we say 3it is day3 or 3it is the /ames32 and potentially as matter e%ists$ not independently as what is #inite does! By addition then$ also$ there is potentially an in#inite$ namely$ what we have described as bein/ in a sense the same as the in#inite in respect o# division! 0or it will always be possible to take somethin/ ah e%tra! Aet the sum o# the parts taken will not e%ceed every determinate ma/nitude$ -ust as in the direction o# division every determinate ma/nitude is surpassed in smallness

and there will be a smaller part! But in respect o# addition there cannot be an in#inite which even potentially e%ceeds every assi/nable ma/nitude$ unless it has the attribute o# bein/ actually in#inite$ as the physicists hold to be true o# the body which is outside the world$ whose essential nature is air or somethin/ o# the kind! But i# there cannot be in this way a sensible body which is in#inite in the #ull sense$ evidently there can no more be a body which is potentially in#inite in respect o# addition$ e%cept as the inverse o# the in#inite by division$ as we have said! 7t is #or this reason that lato also made the in#inites two in number$ because it is supposed to be possible to e%ceed all limits and to proceed ad in#initum in the direction both o# increase and o# reduction! Aet thou/h he makes the in#inites two$ he does not use them! 0or in the numbers the in#inite in the direction o# reduction is not present$ as the monad is the smallest2 nor is the in#inite in the direction o# increase$ #or the parts number only up to the decad! *he in#inite turns out to be the contrary o# what it is said to be! 7t is not what has nothin/ outside it that is in#inite$ but what always has somethin/ outside it! *his is indicated by the #act that rin/s also that have no be9el are described as 3endless3$ because it is always possible to take a part which is outside a /iven part! *he description depends on a certain similarity$ but it is not true in the #ull sense o# the word! *his condition alone is not su##icient4 it is necessary also that the ne%t part which is taken should never be the same! 7n the circle$ the latter condition is not satis#ied4 it is only the ad-acent part #rom which the new part is di##erent! Our de#inition then is as #ollows4 A .uantity is in#inite i# it is such that we can always take a part outside what has been already taken! On the other hand$ what has nothin/ outside it is complete and whole! 0or thus we de#ine the whole-that #rom which nothin/ is wantin/$ as a whole man or a whole bo%! "hat is true o# each particular is true o# the whole as such-the whole is that o# which nothin/ is outside! On the other hand that #rom which somethin/ is absent and outside$ however small that may be$ is not 3all3! 3"hole3 and 3complete3 are either .uite identical or closely akin! 1othin/ is complete 5teleion6 which has no end 5telos62 and the end is a limit! Hence armenides must be thou/ht to have spoken better than Melissus! *he latter says that the whole is in#inite$ but the #ormer describes it as limited$ 3e.ually balanced #rom the middle3! 0or to connect the in#inite with the all and the whole is not like -oinin/ two pieces o# strin/2 #or it is #rom this they /et the di/nity they ascribe to the in#inite-its containin/ all thin/s and holdin/ the all in itsel#-#rom its havin/ a certain similarity to the whole! 7t is in #act the matter o# the completeness which belon/s to si9e$ and what is potentially a whole$ thou/h not in the #ull sense! 7t is divisible both in the direction o# reduction and o# the inverse addition! 7t is a whole and limited2

not$ however$ in virtue o# its own nature$ but in virtue o# what is other than it! 7t does not contain$ but$ in so #ar as it is in#inite$ is contained! Conse.uently$ also$ it is unknowable$ .ua in#inite2 #or the matter has no #orm! 5Hence it is plain that the in#inite stands in the relation o# part rather than o# whole! 0or the matter is part o# the whole$ as the bron9e is o# the bron9e statue!6 7# it contains in the case o# sensible thin/s$ in the case o# intelli/ible thin/s the /reat and the small ou/ht to contain them! But it is absurd and impossible to suppose that the unknowable and indeterminate should contain and determine! Part 7 7t is reasonable that there should not be held to be an in#inite in respect o# addition such as to surpass every ma/nitude$ but that there should be thou/ht to be such an in#inite in the direction o# division! 0or the matter and the in#inite are contained inside what contains them$ while it is the #orm which contains! 7t is natural too to suppose that in number there is a limit in the direction o# the minimum$ and that in the other direction every assi/ned number is surpassed! 7n ma/nitude$ on the contrary$ every assi/ned ma/nitude is surpassed in the direction o# smallness$ while in the other direction there is no in#inite ma/nitude! *he reason is that what is one is indivisible whatever it may be$ e!/! a man is one man$ not many! 1umber on the other hand is a plurality o# 3ones3 and a certain .uantity o# them! Hence number must stop at the indivisible4 #or 3two3 and 3three3 are merely derivative terms$ and so with each o# the other numbers! But in the direction o# lar/eness it is always possible to think o# a lar/er number4 #or the number o# times a ma/nitude can be bisected is in#inite! Hence this in#inite is potential$ never actual4 the number o# parts that can be taken always surpasses any assi/ned number! But this number is not separable #rom the process o# bisection$ and its in#inity is not a permanent actuality but consists in a process o# comin/ to be$ like time and the number o# time! "ith ma/nitudes the contrary holds! "hat is continuous is divided ad in#initum$ but there is no in#inite in the direction o# increase! 0or the si9e which it can potentially be$ it can also actually be! Hence since no sensible ma/nitude is in#inite$ it is impossible to e%ceed every assi/ned ma/nitude2 #or i# it were possible there would be somethin/ bi//er than the heavens! *he in#inite is not the same in ma/nitude and movement and time$ in the sense o# a sin/le nature$ but its secondary sense depends on its primary sense$ i!e! movement is called in#inite in virtue o# the ma/nitude covered by the movement 5or alteration or /rowth6$ and time because o# the movement! 57 use these terms #or the moment! :ater 7 shall e%plain what each o# them means$ and also why every ma/nitude is divisible into ma/nitudes!6 Our account does not rob the mathematicians o# their science$ by disprovin/ the actual e%istence o# the in#inite in the direction o# increase$ in the sense o#

the untraversable! 7n point o# #act they do not need the in#inite and do not use it! *hey postulate only that the #inite strai/ht line may be produced as #ar as they wish! 7t is possible to have divided in the same ratio as the lar/est .uantity another ma/nitude o# any si9e you like! Hence$ #or the purposes o# proo#$ it will make no di##erence to them to have such an in#inite instead$ while its e%istence will be in the sphere o# real ma/nitudes! 7n the #our#old scheme o# causes$ it is plain that the in#inite is a cause in the sense o# matter$ and that its essence is privation$ the sub-ect as such bein/ what is continuous and sensible! All the other thinkers$ too$ evidently treat the in#inite as matter-that is why it is inconsistent in them to make it what contains$ and not what is contained! Part 7t remains to dispose o# the ar/uments which are supposed to support the view that the in#inite e%ists not only potentially but as a separate thin/! Some have no co/ency2 others can be met by #resh ob-ections that are valid! 5=6 7n order that comin/ to be should not #ail$ it is not necessary that there should be a sensible body which is actually in#inite! *he passin/ away o# one thin/ may be the comin/ to be o# another$ the All bein/ limited! 5>6 *here is a di##erence between touchin/ and bein/ limited! *he #ormer is relative to somethin/ and is the touchin/ o# somethin/ 5#or everythin/ that touches touches somethin/6$ and #urther is an attribute o# some one o# the thin/s which are limited! On the other hand$ what is limited is not limited in relation to anythin/! A/ain$ contact is not necessarily possible between any two thin/s taken at random! 5&6 *o rely on mere thinkin/ is absurd$ #or then the e%cess or de#ect is not in the thin/ but in the thou/ht! One mi/ht think that one o# us is bi//er than he is and ma/ni#y him ad in#initum! But it does not #ollow that he is bi//er than the si9e we are$ -ust because some one thinks he is$ but only because he is the si9e he is! *he thou/ht is an accident! 5a6 *ime indeed and movement are in#inite$ and also thinkin/$ in the sense that each part that is taken passes in succession out o# e%istence! 5b6 Ma/nitude is not in#inite either in the way o# reduction or o# ma/ni#ication in thou/ht! *his concludes my account o# the way in which the in#inite e%ists$ and o# the way in which it does not e%ist$ and o# what it is!

*able o# Contents
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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book I$
Part 1 *he physicist must have a knowled/e o# lace$ too$ as well as o# the in#initenamely$ whether there is such a thin/ or not$ and the manner o# its e%istence and what it is-both because all suppose that thin/s which e%ist are somewhere 5the non-e%istent is nowhere--where is the /oat-sta/ or the sphin%86$ and because 3motion3 in its most /eneral and primary sense is chan/e o# place$ which we call 3locomotion3!

*he .uestion$ what is place8 presents many di##iculties! An e%amination o# all the relevant #acts seems to lead to diver/ent conclusions! Moreover$ we have inherited nothin/ #rom previous thinkers$ whether in the way o# a statement o# di##iculties or o# a solution! *he e%istence o# place is held to be obvious #rom the #act o# mutual replacement! "here water now is$ there in turn$ when the water has /one out as #rom a vessel$ air is present! "hen there#ore another body occupies this same place$ the place is thou/ht to be di##erent #rom all the bodies which come to be in it and replace one another! "hat now contains air #ormerly contained water$ so that clearly the place or space into which and out o# which they passed was somethin/ di##erent #rom both! 0urther$ the typical locomotions o# the elementary natural bodies-namely$ #ire$ earth$ and the like-show not only that place is somethin/$ but also that it e%erts a certain in#luence! )ach is carried to its own place$ i# it is not hindered$ the one up$ the other down! 1ow these are re/ions or kinds o# place-up and down and the rest o# the si% directions! 1or do such distinctions 5up and down and ri/ht and le#t$ Dc!6 hold only in relation to us! *o us they are not always the same but chan/e with the direction in which we are turned4 that is why the same thin/ may be both ri/ht and le#t$ up and down$ be#ore and behind! But in nature each is distinct$ taken apart by itsel#! 7t is not every chance direction which is 3up3$ but where #ire and what is li/ht are carried2 similarly$ too$ 3down3 is not any chance direction but where what has wei/ht and what is made o# earth are carried-the implication bein/ that these places do not di##er merely in relative position$ but also as possessin/ distinct potencies! *his is made plain also by the ob-ects studied by mathematics! *hou/h they have no real place$ they nevertheless$ in respect o# their position relatively to us$ have a ri/ht and le#t as attributes ascribed to them only in conse.uence o# their relative position$ not havin/ by nature these various characteristics! A/ain$ the theory that the void e%ists involves the e%istence o# place4 #or one would de#ine void as place bere#t o# body! *hese considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is somethin/ distinct #rom bodies$ and that every sensible body is in place! Hesiod too mi/ht be held to have /iven a correct account o# it when he made chaos #irst! At least he says4 30irst o# all thin/s came chaos to bein/$ then broad-breasted earth$3 implyin/ that thin/s need to have space #irst$ because he thou/ht$ with most people$ that everythin/ is somewhere and in place! 7# this is its nature$ the potency o# place must be a marvellous thin/$ and take precedence o# all other thin/s! 0or that without which nothin/ else can e%ist$ while it can e%ist without the others$ must needs be #irst2 #or place does not pass out o# e%istence when the thin/s in it are annihilated! *rue$ but even i# we suppose its e%istence settled$ the .uestion o# its nature

presents di##iculty-whether it is some sort o# 3bulk3 o# body or some entity other than that$ #or we must #irst determine its /enus! 5=6 1ow it has three dimensions$ len/th$ breadth$ depth$ the dimensions by which all body also is bounded! But the place cannot be body2 #or i# it were there would be two bodies in the same place! 5>6 0urther$ i# body has a place and space$ clearly so too have sur#ace and the other limits o# body2 #or the same statement will apply to them4 where the boundin/ planes o# the water were$ there in turn will be those o# the air! But when we come to a point we cannot make a distinction between it and its place! Hence i# the place o# a point is not di##erent #rom the point$ no more will that o# any o# the others be di##erent$ and place will not be somethin/ di##erent #rom each o# them! 5&6 "hat in the world then are we to suppose place to be8 7# it has the sort o# nature described$ it cannot be an element or composed o# elements$ whether these be corporeal or incorporeal4 #or while it has si9e$ it has not body! But the elements o# sensible bodies are bodies$ while nothin/ that has si9e results #rom a combination o# intelli/ible elements! 5?6 Also we may ask4 o# what in thin/s is space the cause8 1one o# the #our modes o# causation can be ascribed to it! 7t is neither in the sense o# the matter o# e%istents 5#or nothin/ is composed o# it6$ nor as the #orm and de#inition o# thin/s$ nor as end$ nor does it move e%istents! 5'6 0urther$ too$ i# it is itsel# an e%istent$ where will it be8 Geno3s di##iculty demands an e%planation4 #or i# everythin/ that e%ists has a place$ place too will have a place$ and so on ad in#initum! 5H6 A/ain$ -ust as every body is in place$ so$ too$ every place has a body in it! "hat then shall we say about /rowin/ thin/s8 7t #ollows #rom these premisses that their place must /row with them$ i# their place is neither less nor /reater than they are! By askin/ these .uestions$ then$ we must raise the whole problem about place-not only as to what it is$ but even whether there is such a thin/! Part 2 "e may distin/uish /enerally between predicatin/ B o# A because it 5A6 is itsel#$ and because it is somethin/ else2 and particularly between place which is common and in which all bodies are$ and the special place occupied primarily by each! 7 mean$ #or instance$ that you are now in the heavens because you are in the air and it is in the heavens2 and you are in the air because you are on the earth2 and similarly on the earth because you are in this place which contains no more than you!

1ow i# place is what primarily contains each body$ it would be a limit$ so that the place would be the #orm or shape o# each body by which the ma/nitude or the matter o# the ma/nitude is de#ined4 #or this is the limit o# each body! 7#$ then$ we look at the .uestion in this way the place o# a thin/ is its #orm! But$ i# we re/ard the place as the e%tension o# the ma/nitude$ it is the matter! 0or this is di##erent #rom the ma/nitude4 it is what is contained and de#ined by the #orm$ as by a boundin/ plane! Matter or the indeterminate is o# this nature2 when the boundary and attributes o# a sphere are taken away$ nothin/ but the matter is le#t! *his is why lato in the *imaeus says that matter and space are the same2 #or the 3participant3 and space are identical! 57t is true$ indeed$ that the account he /ives there o# the 3participant3 is di##erent #rom what he says in his so-called 3unwritten teachin/3! 1evertheless$ he did identi#y place and space!6 7 mention lato because$ while all hold place to be somethin/$ he alone tried to say what it is! 7n view o# these #acts we should naturally e%pect to #ind di##iculty in determinin/ what place is$ i# indeed it is one o# these two thin/s$ matter or #orm! *hey demand a very close scrutiny$ especially as it is not easy to reco/ni9e them apart! But it is at any rate not di##icult to see that place cannot be either o# them! *he #orm and the matter are not separate #rom the thin/$ whereas the place can be separated! As we pointed out$ where air was$ water in turn comes to be$ the one replacin/ the other2 and similarly with other bodies! Hence the place o# a thin/ is neither a part nor a state o# it$ but is separable #rom it! 0or place is supposed to be somethin/ like a vessel-the vessel bein/ a transportable place! But the vessel is no part o# the thin/! 7n so #ar then as it is separable #rom the thin/$ it is not the #orm4 .ua containin/$ it is di##erent #rom the matter! Also it is held that what is anywhere is both itsel# somethin/ and that there is a di##erent thin/ outside it! 5 lato o# course$ i# we may di/ress$ ou/ht to tell us why the #orm and the numbers are not in place$ i# 3what participates3 is place-whether what participates is the ,reat and the Small or the matter$ as he called it in writin/ in the *imaeus!6 0urther$ how could a body be carried to its own place$ i# place was the matter or the #orm8 7t is impossible that what has no re#erence to motion or the distinction o# up and down can be place! So place must be looked #or amon/ thin/s which have these characteristics!

7# the place is in the thin/ 5it must be i# it is either shape or matter6 place will have a place4 #or both the #orm and the indeterminate under/o chan/e and motion alon/ with the thin/$ and are not always in the same place$ but are where the thin/ is! Hence the place will have a place! 0urther$ when water is produced #rom air$ the place has been destroyed$ #or the resultin/ body is not in the same place! "hat sort o# destruction then is that8 *his concludes my statement o# the reasons why space must be somethin/$ and a/ain o# the di##iculties that may be raised about its essential nature! Part 3 *he ne%t step we must take is to see in how many senses one thin/ is said to be 3in3 another! 5=6 As the #in/er is 3in3 the hand and /enerally the part 3in3 the whole! 5>6 As the whole is 3in3 the parts4 #or there is no whole over and above the parts! 5&6 As man is 3in3 animal and /enerally species 3in3 /enus! 5?6 As the /enus is 3in3 the species and /enerally the part o# the speci#ic #orm 3in3 the de#inition o# the speci#ic #orm! 5'6 As health is 3in3 the hot and the cold and /enerally the #orm 3in3 the matter! 5H6 As the a##airs o# ,reece centre 3in3 the kin/$ and /enerally events centre 3in3 their primary motive a/ent! 5I6 As the e%istence o# a thin/ centres 3in its /ood and /enerally 3in3 its end$ i!e! in 3that #or the sake o# which3 it e%ists! 5J6 7n the strictest sense o# all$ as a thin/ is 3in3 a vessel$ and /enerally 3in3 place! One mi/ht raise the .uestion whether a thin/ can be in itsel#$ or whether nothin/ can be in itsel#-everythin/ bein/ either nowhere or in somethin/ else! *he .uestion is ambi/uous2 we may mean the thin/ .ua itsel# or .ua somethin/ else! "hen there are parts o# a whole-the one that in which a thin/ is$ the other the thin/ which is in it-the whole will be described as bein/ in itsel#! 0or a

thin/ is described in terms o# its parts$ as well as in terms o# the thin/ as a whole$ e!/! a man is said to be white because the visible sur#ace o# him is white$ or to be scienti#ic because his thinkin/ #aculty has been trained! *he -ar then will not be in itsel# and the wine will not be in itsel#! But the -ar o# wine will4 #or the contents and the container are both parts o# the same whole! 7n this sense then$ but not primarily$ a thin/ can be in itsel#$ namely$ as 3white3 is in body 5#or the visible sur#ace is in body6$ and science is in the mind! 7t is #rom these$ which are 3parts3 5in the sense at least o# bein/ 3in3 the man6$ that the man is called white$ Dc! But the -ar and the wine in separation are not parts o# a whole$ thou/h to/ether they are! So when there are parts$ a thin/ will be in itsel#$ as 3white3 is in man because it is in body$ and in body because it resides in the visible sur#ace! "e cannot /o #urther and say that it is in sur#ace in virtue o# somethin/ other than itsel#! 5Aet it is not in itsel#4 thou/h these are in a way the same thin/$6 they di##er in essence$ each havin/ a special nature and capacity$ 3sur#ace3 and 3white3! *hus i# we look at the matter inductively we do not #ind anythin/ to be 3in3 itsel# in any o# the senses that have been distin/uished2 and it can be seen by ar/ument that it is impossible! 0or each o# two thin/s will have to be both$ e!/! the -ar will have to be both vessel and wine$ and the wine both wine and -ar$ i# it is possible #or a thin/ to be in itsel#2 so that$ however true it mi/ht be that they were in each other$ the -ar will receive the wine in virtue not o# its bein/ wine but o# the wine3s bein/ wine$ and the wine will be in the -ar in virtue not o# its bein/ a -ar but o# the -ar3s bein/ a -ar! 1ow that they are di##erent in respect o# their essence is evident2 #or 3that in which somethin/ is3 and 3that which is in it3 would be di##erently de#ined! 1or is it possible #or a thin/ to be in itsel# even incidentally4 #or two thin/s would at the same time in the same thin/! *he -ar would be in itsel#-i# a thin/ whose nature it is to receive can be in itsel#2 and that which it receives$ namely 5i# wine6 wine$ will be in it! Obviously then a thin/ cannot be in itsel# primarily! Geno3s problem-that i# lace is somethin/ it must be in somethin/-is not di##icult to solve! *here is nothin/ to prevent the #irst place #rom bein/ 3in3 somethin/ else-not indeed in that as 3in3 place$ but as health is 3in3 the hot as a positive determination o# it or as the hot is 3in3 body as an a##ection! So we escape the in#inite re/ress! Another thin/ is plain4 since the vessel is no part o# what is in it 5what contains in the strict sense is di##erent #rom what is contained6$ place could not be either the matter or the #orm o# the thin/ contained$ but must di##erent-#or the latter$ both the matter and the shape$ are parts o# what is

contained! *his then may serve as a critical statement o# the di##iculties involved! Part 4 "hat then a#ter all is place8 *he answer to this .uestion may be elucidated as #ollows! :et us take #or /ranted about it the various characteristics which are supposed correctly to belon/ to it essentially! "e assume then5=6 lace is what contains that o# which it is the place! 5>6 lace is no part o# the thin/! 5&6 *he immediate place o# a thin/ is neither less nor /reater than the thin/! 5?6 lace can be le#t behind by the thin/ and is separable! 7n addition4 5'6 All place admits o# the distinction o# up and down$ and each o# the bodies is naturally carried to its appropriate place and rests there$ and this makes the place either up or down! Havin/ laid these #oundations$ we must complete the theory! "e ou/ht to try to make our investi/ation such as will render an account o# place$ and will not only solve the di##iculties connected with it$ but will also show that the attributes supposed to belon/ to it do really belon/ to it$ and #urther will make clear the cause o# the trouble and o# the di##iculties about it! Such is the most satis#actory kind o# e%position! 0irst then we must understand that place would not have been thou/ht o#$ i# there had not been a special kind o# motion$ namely that with respect to place! 7t is chie#ly #or this reason that we suppose the heaven also to be in place$ because it is in constant movement! O# this kind o# chan/e there are two species-locomotion on the one hand and$ on the other$ increase and diminution! 0or these too involve variation o# place4 what was then in this place has now in turn chan/ed to what is lar/er or smaller! A/ain$ when we say a thin/ is 3moved3$ the predicate either 5=6 belon/s to it actually$ in virtue o# its own nature$ or 5>6 in virtue o# somethin/ con-oined with it! 7n the latter case it may be either 5a6 somethin/ which by its own nature is capable o# bein/ moved$ e!/! the parts o# the body or the nail in the ship$ or 5b6 somethin/ which is not in itsel# capable o# bein/ moved$ but is always moved throu/h its con-unction with somethin/ else$ as 3whiteness3 or 3science3! *hese have chan/ed their place only because the sub-ects to which they belon/ do so! "e say that a thin/ is in the world$ in the sense o# in place$ because it is in

the air$ and the air is in the world2 and when we say it is in the air$ we do not mean it is in every part o# the air$ but that it is in the air because o# the outer sur#ace o# the air which surrounds it2 #or i# all the air were its place$ the place o# a thin/ would not be e.ual to the thin/-which it is supposed to be$ and which the primary place in which a thin/ is actually is! "hen what surrounds$ then$ is not separate #rom the thin/$ but is in continuity with it$ the thin/ is said to be in what surrounds it$ not in the sense o# in place$ but as a part in a whole! But when the thin/ is separate and in contact$ it is immediately 3in3 the inner sur#ace o# the surroundin/ body$ and this sur#ace is neither a part o# what is in it nor yet /reater than its e%tension$ but e.ual to it2 #or the e%tremities o# thin/s which touch are coincident! 0urther$ i# one body is in continuity with another$ it is not moved in that but with that! On the other hand it is moved in that i# it is separate! 7t makes no di##erence whether what contains is moved or not! A/ain$ when it is not separate it is described as a part in a whole$ as the pupil in the eye or the hand in the body4 when it is separate$ as the water in the cask or the wine in the -ar! 0or the hand is moved with the body and the water in the cask! 7t will now be plain #rom these considerations what place is! *here are -ust #our thin/s o# which place must be one-the shape$ or the matter$ or some sort o# e%tension between the boundin/ sur#aces o# the containin/ body$ or this boundary itsel# i# it contains no e%tension over and above the bulk o# the body which comes to be in it! *hree o# these it obviously cannot be4 5=6 *he shape is supposed to be place because it surrounds$ #or the e%tremities o# what contains and o# what is contained are coincident! Both the shape and the place$ it is true$ are boundaries! But not o# the same thin/4 the #orm is the boundary o# the thin/$ the place is the boundary o# the body which contains it! 5>6 *he e%tension between the e%tremities is thou/ht to be somethin/$ because what is contained and separate may o#ten be chan/ed while the container remains the same 5as water may be poured #rom a vessel6-the assumption bein/ that the e%tension is somethin/ over and above the body displaced! But there is no such e%tension! One o# the bodies which chan/e places and are naturally capable o# bein/ in contact with the container #alls in whichever it may chance to be! 7# there were an e%tension which were such as to e%ist independently and be permanent$ there would be an in#inity o# places in the same thin/! 0or when the water and the air chan/e places$ all the portions o# the two to/ether will

play the same part in the whole which was previously played by all the water in the vessel2 at the same time the place too will be under/oin/ chan/e2 so that there will be another place which is the place o# the place$ and many places will be coincident! *here is not a di##erent place o# the part$ in which it is moved$ when the whole vessel chan/es its place4 it is always the same4 #or it is in the 5pro%imate6 place where they are that the air and the water 5or the parts o# the water6 succeed each other$ not in that place in which they come to be$ which is part o# the place which is the place o# the whole world! 5&6 *he matter$ too$ mi/ht seem to be place$ at least i# we consider it in what is at rest and is thus separate but in continuity! 0or -ust as in chan/e o# .uality there is somethin/ which was #ormerly black and is now white$ or #ormerly so#t and now hard-this is -ust why we say that the matter e%ists-so place$ because it presents a similar phenomenon$ is thou/ht to e%ist-only in the one case we say so because what was air is now water$ in the other because where air #ormerly was there a is now water! But the matter$ as we said be#ore$ is neither separable #rom the thin/ nor contains it$ whereas place has both characteristics! "ell$ then$ i# place is none o# the three-neither the #orm nor the matter nor an e%tension which is always there$ di##erent #rom$ and over and above$ the e%tension o# the thin/ which is displaced-place necessarily is the one o# the #our which is le#t$ namely$ the boundary o# the containin/ body at which it is in contact with the contained body! 5By the contained body is meant what can be moved by way o# locomotion!6 lace is thou/ht to be somethin/ important and hard to /rasp$ both because the matter and the shape present themselves alon/ with it$ and because the displacement o# the body that is moved takes place in a stationary container$ #or it seems possible that there should be an interval which is other than the bodies which are moved! *he air$ too$ which is thou/ht to be incorporeal$ contributes somethin/ to the belie#4 it is not only the boundaries o# the vessel which seem to be place$ but also what is between them$ re/arded as empty! Fust$ in #act$ as the vessel is transportable place$ so place is a non-portable vessel! So when what is within a thin/ which is moved$ is moved and chan/es its place$ as a boat on a river$ what contains plays the part o# a vessel rather than that o# place! lace on the other hand is rather what is motionless4 so it is rather the whole river that is place$ because as a whole it is motionless! Hence we conclude that the innermost motionless boundary o# what contains is place! *his e%plains why the middle o# the heaven and the sur#ace which #aces us o# the rotatin/ system are held to be 3up3 and 3down3 in the strict and #ullest sense #or all men4 #or the one is always at rest$ while the inner side o# the rotatin/ body remains always coincident with itsel#! Hence since the li/ht is

what is naturally carried up$ and the heavy what is carried down$ the boundary which contains in the direction o# the middle o# the universe$ and the middle itsel#$ are down$ and that which contains in the direction o# the outermost part o# the universe$ and the outermost part itsel#$ are up! 0or this reason$ too$ place is thou/ht to be a kind o# sur#ace$ and as it were a vessel$ i!e! a container o# the thin/! 0urther$ place is coincident with the thin/$ #or boundaries are coincident with the bounded! Part 5 7# then a body has another body outside it and containin/ it$ it is in place$ and i# not$ not! *hat is why$ even i# there were to be water which had not a container$ the parts o# it$ on the one hand$ will be moved 5#or one part is contained in another6$ while$ on the other hand$ the whole will be moved in one sense$ but not in another! 0or as a whole it does not simultaneously chan/e its place$ thou/h it will be moved in a circle4 #or this place is the place o# its parts! 5Some thin/s are moved$ not up and down$ but in a circle2 others up and down$ such thin/s namely as admit o# condensation and rare#action!6 As was e%plained$ some thin/s are potentially in place$ others actually! So$ when you have a homo/eneous substance which is continuous$ the parts are potentially in place4 when the parts are separated$ but in contact$ like a heap$ they are actually in place! A/ain$ 5=6 some thin/s are per se in place$ namely every body which is movable either by way o# locomotion or by way o# increase is per se somewhere$ but the heaven$ as has been said$ is not anywhere as a whole$ nor in any place$ i# at least$ as we must suppose$ no body contains it! On the line on which it is moved$ its parts have place4 #or each is conti/uous the ne%t! But 5>6 other thin/s are in place indirectly$ throu/h somethin/ con-oined with them$ as the soul and the heaven! *he latter is$ in a way$ in place$ #or all its parts are4 #or on the orb one part contains another! *hat is why the upper part is moved in a circle$ while the All is not anywhere! 0or what is somewhere is itsel# somethin/$ and there must be alon/side it some other thin/ wherein it is and which contains it! But alon/side the All or the "hole there is nothin/ outside the All$ and #or this reason all thin/s are in the heaven2 #or the heaven$ we may say$ is the All! Aet their place is not the same as the heaven! 7t is part o# it$ the innermost part o# it$ which is in contact with the movable body2 and #or this reason the earth is in water$ and this in the air$ and the air in the aether$ and the aether in heaven$ but we cannot /o on and say that the heaven is in anythin/ else!

7t is clear$ too$ #rom these considerations that all the problems which were raised about place will be solved when it is e%plained in this way4 5=6 *here is no necessity that the place should /row with the body in it$ 5>6 1or that a point should have a place$ 5&6 1or that two bodies should be in the same place$ 5?6 1or that place should be a corporeal interval4 #or what is between the boundaries o# the place is any body which may chance to be there$ not an interval in body! 0urther$ 5'6 place is also somewhere$ not in the sense o# bein/ in a place$ but as the limit is in the limited2 #or not everythin/ that is is in place$ but only movable body! Also 5H6 it is reasonable that each kind o# body should be carried to its own place! 0or a body which is ne%t in the series and in contact 5not by compulsion6 is akin$ and bodies which are united do not a##ect each other$ while those which are in contact interact on each other! 1or 5I6 is it without reason that each should remain naturally in its proper place! 0or this part has the same relation to its place$ as a separable part to its whole$ as when one moves a part o# water or air4 so$ too$ air is related to water$ #or the one is like matter$ the other #orm-water is the matter o# air$ air as it were the actuality o# water$ #or water is potentially air$ while air is potentially water$ thou/h in another way! *hese distinctions will be drawn more care#ully later! On the present occasion it was necessary to re#er to them4 what has now been stated obscurely will then be made more clear! 7# the matter and the #ul#ilment are the same thin/ 5#or water is both$ the one potentially$ the other completely6$ water will be related to air in a way as part to whole! *hat is why these have contact4 it is or/anic union when both become actually one! *his concludes my account o# place-both o# its e%istence and o# its nature! Part 6 *he investi/ation o# similar .uestions about the void$ also$ must be held to belon/ to the physicist-namely whether it e%ists or not$ and how it e%ists or what it is--ust as about place! *he views taken o# it involve ar/uments both #or and a/ainst$ in much the same sort o# way! 0or those who hold that the void e%ists re/ard it as a sort o# place or vessel which is supposed to be 3#ull3 when it holds the bulk which it is capable o# containin/$ 3void3 when it is deprived o# that-as i# 3void3 and 3#ull3 and 3place3 denoted the same thin/$ thou/h the essence o# the three is di##erent!

"e must be/in the in.uiry by puttin/ down the account /iven by those who say that it e%ists$ then the account o# those who say that it does not e%ist$ and third the current view on these .uestions! *hose who try to show that the void does not e%ist do not disprove what people really mean by it$ but only their erroneous way o# speakin/2 this is true o# Ana%a/oras and o# those who re#ute the e%istence o# the void in this way! *hey merely /ive an in/enious demonstration that air is somethin/--by strainin/ wine-skins and showin/ the resistance o# the air$ and by cuttin/ it o## in clepsydras! But people really mean that there is an empty interval in which there is no sensible body! *hey hold that everythin/ which is in body is body and say that what has nothin/ in it at all is void 5so what is #ull o# air is void6! 7t is not then the e%istence o# air that needs to be proved$ but the non-e%istence o# an interval$ di##erent #rom the bodies$ either separable or actual-an interval which divides the whole body so as to break its continuity$ as Democritus and :eucippus hold$ and many other physicists-or even perhaps as somethin/ which is outside the whole body$ which remains continuous! *hese people$ then$ have not reached even the threshold o# the problem$ but rather those who say that the void e%ists! 5=6 *hey ar/ue$ #or one thin/$ that chan/e in place 5i!e! locomotion and increase6 would not be! 0or it is maintained that motion would seem not to e%ist$ i# there were no void$ since what is #ull cannot contain anythin/ more! 7# it could$ and there were two bodies in the same place$ it would also be true that any number o# bodies could be to/ether2 #or it is impossible to draw a line o# division beyond which the statement would become untrue! 7# this were possible$ it would #ollow also that the smallest body would contain the /reatest2 #or 3many a little makes a mickle34 thus i# many e.ual bodies can be to/ether$ so also can many une.ual bodies! Melissus$ indeed$ in#ers #rom these considerations that the All is immovable2 #or i# it were moved there must$ he says$ be void$ but void is not amon/ the thin/s that e%ist! *his ar/ument$ then$ is one way in which they show that there is a void! 5>6 *hey reason #rom the #act that some thin/s are observed to contract and be compressed$ as people say that a cask will hold the wine which #ormerly #illed it$ alon/ with the skins into which the wine has been decanted$ which implies that the compressed body contracts into the voids present in it! A/ain 5&6 increase$ too$ is thou/ht to take always by means o# void$ #or nutriment is body$ and it is impossible #or two bodies to be to/ether! A proo# o# this they #ind also in what happens to ashes$ which absorb as much water

as the empty vessel! *he ytha/oreans$ too$ 5?6 held that void e%ists and that it enters the heaven itsel#$ which as it were inhales it$ #rom the in#inite air! 0urther it is the void which distin/uishes the natures o# thin/s$ as i# it were like what separates and distin/uishes the terms o# a series! *his holds primarily in the numbers$ #or the void distin/uishes their nature! *hese$ then$ and so many$ are the main /rounds on which people have ar/ued #or and a/ainst the e%istence o# the void! Part 7 As a step towards settlin/ which view is true$ we must determine the meanin/ o# the name! *he void is thou/ht to be place with nothin/ in it! *he reason #or this is that people take what e%ists to be body$ and hold that while every body is in place$ void is place in which there is no body$ so that where there is no body$ there must be void! )very body$ a/ain$ they suppose to be tan/ible2 and o# this nature is whatever has wei/ht or li/htness! Hence$ by a syllo/ism$ what has nothin/ heavy or li/ht in it$ is void! *his result$ then$ as 7 have said$ is reached by syllo/ism! 7t would be absurd to suppose that the point is void2 #or the void must be place which has in it an interval in tan/ible body! But at all events we observe then that in one way the void is described as what is not #ull o# body perceptible to touch2 and what has heaviness and li/htness is perceptible to touch! So we would raise the .uestion4 what would they say o# an interval that has colour or sound-is it void or not8 Clearly they would reply that i# it could receive what is tan/ible it was void$ and i# not$ not! 7n another way void is that in which there is no 3this3 or corporeal substance! So some say that the void is the matter o# the body 5they identi#y the place$ too$ with this6$ and in this they speak incorrectly2 #or the matter is not separable #rom the thin/s$ but they are in.uirin/ about the void as about somethin/ separable! Since we have determined the nature o# place$ and void must$ i# it e%ists$ be place deprived o# body$ and we have stated both in what sense place e%ists and in what sense it does not$ it is plain that on this showin/ void does not e%ist$ either unseparated or separated2 the void is meant to be$ not body but

rather an interval in body! *his is why the void is thou/ht to be somethin/$ vi9! because place is$ and #or the same reasons! 0or the #act o# motion in respect o# place comes to the aid both o# those who maintain that place is somethin/ over and above the bodies that come to occupy it$ and o# those who maintain that the void is somethin/! *hey state that the void is the condition o# movement in the sense o# that in which movement takes place2 and this would be the kind o# thin/ that some say place is! But there is no necessity #or there bein/ a void i# there is movement! 7t is not in the least needed as a condition o# movement in /eneral$ #or a reason which$ incidentally$ escaped Melissus2 vi9! that the #ull can su##er .ualitative chan/e! But not even movement in respect o# place involves a void2 #or bodies may simultaneously make room #or one another$ thou/h there is no interval separate and apart #rom the bodies that are in movement! And this is plain even in the rotation o# continuous thin/s$ as in that o# li.uids! And thin/s can also be compressed not into a void but because they s.uee9e out what is contained in them 5as$ #or instance$ when water is compressed the air within it is s.uee9ed out62 and thin/s can increase in si9e not only by the entrance o# somethin/ but also by .ualitative chan/e2 e!/! i# water were to be trans#ormed into air! 7n /eneral$ both the ar/ument about increase o# si9e and that about water poured on to the ashes /et in their own way! 0or either not any and every part o# the body is increased$ or bodies may be increased otherwise than by the addition o# body$ or there may be two bodies in the same place 5in which case they are claimin/ to solve a .uite /eneral di##iculty$ but are not provin/ the e%istence o# void6$ or the whole body must be void$ i# it is increased in every part and is increased by means o# void! *he same ar/ument applies to the ashes! 7t is evident$ then$ that it is easy to re#ute the ar/uments by which they prove the e%istence o# the void! Part :et us e%plain a/ain that there is no void e%istin/ separately$ as some maintain! 7# each o# the simple bodies has a natural locomotion$ e!/! #ire upward and earth downward and towards the middle o# the universe$ it is clear that it cannot be the void that is the condition o# locomotion! "hat$ then$ will the void be the condition o#8 7t is thou/ht to be the condition o# movement in respect o# place$ and it is not the condition o# this! A/ain$ i# void is a sort o# place deprived o# body$ when there is a void where will a body placed in it move to8 7t certainly cannot move into the whole o#

the void! *he same ar/ument applies as a/ainst those who think that place is somethin/ separate$ into which thin/s are carried2 vi9! how will what is placed in it move$ or rest8 Much the same ar/ument will apply to the void as to the 3up3 and 3down3 in place$ as is natural enou/h since those who maintain the e%istence o# the void make it a place! And in what way will thin/s be present either in place-or in the void8 0or the e%pected result does not take place when a body is placed as a whole in a place conceived o# as separate and permanent2 #or a part o# it$ unless it be placed apart$ will not be in a place but in the whole! 0urther$ i# separate place does not e%ist$ neither will void! 7# people say that the void must e%ist$ as bein/ necessary i# there is to be movement$ what rather turns out to be the case$ i# one the matter$ is the opposite$ that not a sin/le thin/ can be moved i# there is a void2 #or as with those who #or a like reason say the earth is at rest$ so$ too$ in the void thin/s must be at rest2 #or there is no place to which thin/s can move more or less than to another2 since the void in so #ar as it is void admits no di##erence! *he second reason is this4 all movement is either compulsory or accordin/ to nature$ and i# there is compulsory movement there must also be natural 5#or compulsory movement is contrary to nature$ and movement contrary to nature is posterior to that accordin/ to nature$ so that i# each o# the natural bodies has not a natural movement$ none o# the other movements can e%ist62 but how can there be natural movement i# there is no di##erence throu/hout the void or the in#inite8 0or in so #ar as it is in#inite$ there will be no up or down or middle$ and in so #ar as it is a void$ up di##ers no whit #rom down2 #or as there is no di##erence in what is nothin/$ there is none in the void 5#or the void seems to be a non-e%istent and a privation o# bein/6$ but natural locomotion seems to be di##erentiated$ so that the thin/s that e%ist by nature must be di##erentiated! )ither$ then$ nothin/ has a natural locomotion$ or else there is no void! 0urther$ in point o# #act thin/s that are thrown move thou/h that which /ave them their impulse is not touchin/ them$ either by reason o# mutual replacement$ as some maintain$ or because the air that has been pushed pushes them with a movement .uicker than the natural locomotion o# the pro-ectile wherewith it moves to its proper place! But in a void none o# these thin/s can take place$ nor can anythin/ be moved save as that which is carried is moved! 0urther$ no one could say why a thin/ once set in motion should stop anywhere2 #or why should it stop here rather than here8 So that a thin/ will either be at rest or must be moved ad in#initum$ unless somethin/ more power#ul /et in its way! 0urther$ thin/s are now thou/ht to move into the void because it yields2 but

in a void this .uality is present e.ually everywhere$ so that thin/s should move in all directions! 0urther$ the truth o# what we assert is plain #rom the #ollowin/ considerations! "e see the same wei/ht or body movin/ #aster than another #or two reasons$ either because there is a di##erence in what it moves throu/h$ as between water$ air$ and earth$ or because$ other thin/s bein/ e.ual$ the movin/ body di##ers #rom the other owin/ to e%cess o# wei/ht or o# li/htness! 1ow the medium causes a di##erence because it impedes the movin/ thin/$ most o# all i# it is movin/ in the opposite direction$ but in a secondary de/ree even i# it is at rest2 and especially a medium that is not easily divided$ i!e! a medium that is somewhat dense! A$ then$ will move throu/h B in time ,$ and throu/h D$ which is thinner$ in time ) 5i# the len/th o# B is e/ual to D6$ in proportion to the density o# the hinderin/ body! 0or let B be water and D air2 then by so much as air is thinner and more incorporeal than water$ A will move throu/h D #aster than throu/h B! :et the speed have the same ratio to the speed$ then$ that air has to water! *hen i# air is twice as thin$ the body will traverse B in twice the time that it does D$ and the time , will be twice the time )! And always$ by so much as the medium is more incorporeal and less resistant and more easily divided$ the #aster will be the movement! 1ow there is no ratio in which the void is e%ceeded by body$ as there is no ratio o# ( to a number! 0or i# ? e%ceeds & by =$ and > by more than =$ and = by still more than it e%ceeds >$ still there is no ratio by which it e%ceeds (2 #or that which e%ceeds must be divisible into the e%cess K that which is e%ceeded$ so that will be what it e%ceeds ( by K (! 0or this reason$ too$ a line does not e%ceed a point unless it is composed o# pointsL Similarly the void can bear no ratio to the #ull$ and there#ore neither can movement throu/h the one to movement throu/h the other$ but i# a thin/ moves throu/h the thickest medium such and such a distance in such and such a time$ it moves throu/h the void with a speed beyond any ratio! 0or let G be void$ e.ual in ma/nitude to B and to D! *hen i# A is to traverse and move throu/h it in a certain time$ H$ a time less than )$ however$ the void will bear this ratio to the #ull! But in a time e.ual to H$ A will traverse the part O o# A! And it will surely also traverse in that time any substance G which e%ceeds air in thickness in the ratio which the time ) bears to the time H! 0or i# the body G be as much thinner than D as ) e%ceeds H$ A$ i# it moves throu/h G$ will traverse it in a time inverse to the speed o# the movement$ i!e! in a time e.ual to H! 7#$ then$ there is no body in G$ A will traverse G still more .uickly! But we supposed that its traverse o# G when G was void occupied the time H! So that it will traverse G in an e.ual time whether G be #ull or void! But this is impossible! 7t is plain$ then$ that i# there is a time in which it will move throu/h any part o# the void$ this impossible result will #ollow4 it will be #ound to traverse a certain distance$ whether this be #ull or void$ in an e.ual

time2 #or there will be some body which is in the same ratio to the other body as the time is to the time! *o sum the matter up$ the cause o# this result is obvious$ vi9! that between any two movements there is a ratio 5#or they occupy time$ and there is a ratio between any two times$ so lon/ as both are #inite6$ but there is no ratio o# void to #ull! *hese are the conse.uences that result #rom a di##erence in the media2 the #ollowin/ depend upon an e%cess o# one movin/ body over another! "e see that bodies which have a /reater impulse either o# wei/ht or o# li/htness$ i# they are alike in other respects$ move #aster over an e.ual space$ and in the ratio which their ma/nitudes bear to each other! *here#ore they will also move throu/h the void with this ratio o# speed! But that is impossible2 #or why should one move #aster8 57n movin/ throu/h plena it must be so2 #or the /reater divides them #aster by its #orce! 0or a movin/ thin/ cleaves the medium either by its shape$ or by the impulse which the body that is carried alon/ or is pro-ected possesses!6 *here#ore all will possess e.ual velocity! But this is impossible! 7t is evident #rom what has been said$ then$ that$ i# there is a void$ a result #ollows which is the very opposite o# the reason #or which those who believe in a void set it up! *hey think that i# movement in respect o# place is to e%ist$ the void cannot e%ist$ separated all by itsel#2 but this is the same as to say that place is a separate cavity2 and this has already been stated to be impossible! But even i# we consider it on its own merits the so-called vacuum will be #ound to be really vacuous! 0or as$ i# one puts a cube in water$ an amount o# water e.ual to the cube will be displaced2 so too in air2 but the e##ect is imperceptible to sense! And indeed always in the case o# any body that can be displaced$ must$ i# it is not compressed$ be displaced in the direction in which it is its nature to be displaced-always either down$ i# its locomotion is downwards as in the case o# earth$ or up$ i# it is #ire$ or in both directionswhatever be the nature o# the inserted body! 1ow in the void this is impossible2 #or it is not body2 the void must have penetrated the cube to a distance e.ual to that which this portion o# void #ormerly occupied in the void$ -ust as i# the water or air had not been displaced by the wooden cube$ but had penetrated ri/ht throu/h it! But the cube also has a ma/nitude e.ual to that occupied by the void2 a ma/nitude which$ i# it is also hot or cold$ or heavy or li/ht$ is none the less di##erent in essence #rom all its attributes$ even i# it is not separable #rom them2 7 mean the volume o# the wooden cube! So that even i# it were separated #rom everythin/ else and were neither heavy nor li/ht$ it will occupy an e.ual amount o# void$ and #ill the same place$ as the part o# place or o# the void e.ual to itsel#! How then will the body o# the cube di##er #rom

the void or place that is e.ual to it8 And i# there can be two such thin/s$ why cannot there be any number coincidin/8 *his$ then$ is one absurd and impossible implication o# the theory! 7t is also evident that the cube will have this same volume even i# it is displaced$ which is an attribute possessed by all other bodies also! *here#ore i# this di##ers in no respect #rom its place$ why need we assume a place #or bodies over and above the volume o# each$ i# their volume be conceived o# as #ree #rom attributes8 7t contributes nothin/ to the situation i# there is an e.ual interval attached to it as well! ;0urther it ou/ht to be clear by the study o# movin/ thin/s what sort o# thin/ void is! But in #act it is #ound nowhere in the world! 0or air is somethin/$ thou/h it does not seem to be so-nor$ #or that matter$ would water$ i# #ishes were made o# iron2 #or the discrimination o# the tan/ible is by touch!< 7t is clear$ then$ #rom these considerations that there is no separate void! Part ! *here are some who think that the e%istence o# rarity and density shows that there is a void! 7# rarity and density do not e%ist$ they say$ neither can thin/s contract and be compressed! But i# this were not to take place$ either there would be no movement at all$ or the universe would bul/e$ as Euthus said$ or air and water must always chan/e into e.ual amounts 5e!/! i# air has been made out o# a cup#ul o# water$ at the same time out o# an e.ual amount o# air a cup#ul o# water must have been made6$ or void must necessarily e%ist2 #or compression and e%pansion cannot take place otherwise! 1ow$ i# they mean by the rare that which has many voids e%istin/ separately$ it is plain that i# void cannot e%ist separate any more than a place can e%ist with an e%tension all to itsel#$ neither can the rare e%ist in this sense! But i# they mean that there is void$ not separately e%istent$ but still present in the rare$ this is less impossible$ yet$ #irst$ the void turns out not to be a condition o# all movement$ but only o# movement upwards 5#or the rare is li/ht$ which is the reason why they say #ire is rare62 second$ the void turns out to be a condition o# movement not as that in which it takes place$ but in that the void carries thin/s up as skins by bein/ carried up themselves carry up what is continuous with them! Aet how can void have a local movement or a place8 0or thus that into which void moves is till then void o# a void! A/ain$ how will they e%plain$ in the case o# what is heavy$ its movement downwards8 And it is plain that i# the rarer and more void a thin/ is the .uicker it will move upwards$ i# it were completely void it would move with a ma%imum speedL But perhaps even this is impossible$ that it should move at all2 the same reason which showed that in the void all thin/s are incapable o# movin/ shows that the void cannot move$ vi9! the #act that the speeds are incomparable!

Since we deny that a void e%ists$ but #or the rest the problem has been truly stated$ that either there will be no movement$ i# there is not to be condensation and rare#action$ or the universe will bul/e$ or a trans#ormation o# water into air will always be balanced by an e.ual trans#ormation o# air into water 5#or it is clear that the air produced #rom water is bulkier than the water64 it is necessary there#ore$ i# compression does not e%ist$ either that the ne%t portion will be pushed outwards and make the outermost part bul/e$ or that somewhere else there must be an e.ual amount o# water produced out o# air$ so that the entire bulk o# the whole may be e.ual$ or that nothin/ moves! 0or when anythin/ is displaced this will always happen$ unless it comes round in a circle2 but locomotion is not always circular$ but sometimes in a strai/ht line! *hese then are the reasons #or which they mi/ht say that there is a void2 our statement is based on the assumption that there is a sin/le matter #or contraries$ hot and cold and the other natural contrarieties$ and that what e%ists actually is produced #rom a potential e%istent$ and that matter is not separable #rom the contraries but its bein/ is di##erent$ and that a sin/le matter may serve #or colour and heat and cold! *he same matter also serves #or both a lar/e and a small body! *his is evident2 #or when air is produced #rom water$ the same matter has become somethin/ di##erent$ not by ac.uirin/ an addition to it$ but has become actually what it was potentially$ and$ a/ain$ water is produced #rom air in the same way$ the chan/e bein/ sometimes #rom smallness to /reatness$ and sometimes #rom /reatness to smallness! Similarly$ there#ore$ i# air which is lar/e in e%tent comes to have a smaller volume$ or becomes /reater #rom bein/ smaller$ it is the matter which is potentially both that comes to be each o# the two! 0or as the same matter becomes hot #rom bein/ cold$ and cold #rom bein/ hot$ because it was potentially both$ so too #rom hot it can become more hot$ thou/h nothin/ in the matter has become hot that was not hot when the thin/ was less hot2 -ust as$ i# the arc or curve o# a /reater circle becomes that o# a smaller$ whether it remains the same or becomes a di##erent curve$ conve%ity has not come to e%ist in anythin/ that was not conve% but strai/ht 5#or di##erences o# de/ree do not depend on an intermission o# the .uality62 nor can we /et any portion o# a #lame$ in which both heat and whiteness are not present! So too$ then$ is the earlier heat related to the later! So that the /reatness and smallness$ also$ o# the sensible volume are e%tended$ not by the matter3s ac.uirin/ anythin/ new$ but because the matter is potentially matter #or both states2 so that the same thin/ is dense and rare$ and the two .ualities have one matter! *he dense is heavy$ and the rare is li/ht! ;A/ain$ as the arc o# a circle when contracted into a smaller space does not ac.uire a new part which is conve%$

but what was there has been contracted2 and as any part o# #ire that one takes will be hot2 so$ too$ it is all a .uestion o# contraction and e%pansion o# the same matter!< *here are two types in each case$ both in the dense and in the rare2 #or both the heavy and the hard are thou/ht to be dense$ and contrariwise both the li/ht and the so#t are rare2 and wei/ht and hardness #ail to coincide in the case o# lead and iron! 0rom what has been said it is evident$ then$ that void does not e%ist either separate 5either absolutely separate or as a separate element in the rare6 or potentially$ unless one is willin/ to call the condition o# movement void$ whatever it may be! At that rate the matter o# the heavy and the li/ht$ .ua matter o# them$ would be the void2 #or the dense and the rare are productive o# locomotion in virtue o# this contrariety$ and in virtue o# their hardness and so#tness productive o# passivity and impassivity$ i!e! not o# locomotion but rather o# .ualitative chan/e! So much$ then$ #or the discussion o# the void$ and o# the sense in which it e%ists and the sense in which it does not e%ist! Part 1% 1e%t #or discussion a#ter the sub-ects mentioned is *ime! *he best plan will be to be/in by workin/ out the di##iculties connected with it$ makin/ use o# the current ar/uments! 0irst$ does it belon/ to the class o# thin/s that e%ist or to that o# thin/s that do not e%ist8 *hen secondly$ what is its nature8 *o start$ then4 the #ollowin/ considerations would make one suspect that it either does not e%ist at all or barely$ and in an obscure way! One part o# it has been and is not$ while the other is /oin/ to be and is not yet! Aet timeboth in#inite time and any time you like to take-is made up o# these! One would naturally suppose that what is made up o# thin/s which do not e%ist could have no share in reality! 0urther$ i# a divisible thin/ is to e%ist$ it is necessary that$ when it e%ists$ all or some o# its parts must e%ist! But o# time some parts have been$ while others have to be$ and no part o# it is thou/h it is divisible! 0or what is 3now3 is not a part4 a part is a measure o# the whole$ which must be made up o# parts! *ime$ on the other hand$ is not held to be made up o# 3nows3! A/ain$ the 3now3 which seems to bound the past and the #uture-does it always remain one and the same or is it always other and other8 7t is hard to say! 5=6 7# it is always di##erent and di##erent$ and i# none o# the parts in time which are other and other are simultaneous 5unless the one contains and the other is contained$ as the shorter time is by the lon/er6$ and i# the 3now3 which is not$ but #ormerly was$ must have ceased-to-be at some time$ the 3nows3 too cannot be simultaneous with one another$ but the prior 3now3 must always have ceased-to-be! But the prior 3now3 cannot have ceased-to-be in

itsel# 5since it then e%isted62 yet it cannot have ceased-to-be in another 3now3! 0or we may lay it down that one 3now3 cannot be ne%t to another$ any more than point to point! 7# then it did not cease-to-be in the ne%t 3now3 but in another$ it would e%ist simultaneously with the innumerable 3nows3 between the two-which is impossible! Aes$ but 5>6 neither is it possible #or the 3now3 to remain always the same! 1o determinate divisible thin/ has a sin/le termination$ whether it is continuously e%tended in one or in more than one dimension4 but the 3now3 is a termination$ and it is possible to cut o## a determinate time! 0urther$ i# coincidence in time 5i!e! bein/ neither prior nor posterior6 means to be 3in one and the same MnowM3$ then$ i# both what is be#ore and what is a#ter are in this same 3now3$ thin/s which happened ten thousand years a/o would be simultaneous with what has happened to-day$ and nothin/ would be be#ore or a#ter anythin/ else! *his may serve as a statement o# the di##iculties about the attributes o# time! As to what time is or what is its nature$ the traditional accounts /ive us as little li/ht as the preliminary problems which we have worked throu/h! Some assert that it is 5=6 the movement o# the whole$ others that it is 5>6 the sphere itsel#! 5=6 Aet part$ too$ o# the revolution is a time$ but it certainly is not a revolution4 #or what is taken is part o# a revolution$ not a revolution! Besides$ i# there were more heavens than one$ the movement o# any o# them e.ually would be time$ so that there would be many times at the same time! 5>6 *hose who said that time is the sphere o# the whole thou/ht so$ no doubt$ on the /round that all thin/s are in time and all thin/s are in the sphere o# the whole! *he view is too naive #or it to be worth while to consider the impossibilities implied in it! But as time is most usually supposed to be 5&6 motion and a kind o# chan/e$ we must consider this view! 1ow 5a6 the chan/e or movement o# each thin/ is only in the thin/ which chan/es or where the thin/ itsel# which moves or chan/es may chance to be! But time is present e.ually everywhere and with all thin/s! A/ain$ 5b6 chan/e is always #aster or slower$ whereas time is not4 #or 3#ast3 and 3slow3 are de#ined by time-3#ast3 is what moves much in a short time$ 3slow3 what moves little in a lon/ time2 but time is not de#ined by time$ by bein/ either a certain amount or a certain kind o# it! Clearly then it is not movement! 5"e need not distin/uish at present

between 3movement3 and 3chan/e3!6 Part 11 But neither does time e%ist without chan/e2 #or when the state o# our own minds does not chan/e at all$ or we have not noticed its chan/in/$ we do not reali9e that time has elapsed$ any more than those who are #abled to sleep amon/ the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened2 #or they connect the earlier 3now3 with the later and make them one$ cuttin/ out the interval because o# their #ailure to notice it! So$ -ust as$ i# the 3now3 were not di##erent but one and the same$ there would not have been time$ so too when its di##erence escapes our notice the interval does not seem to be time! 7#$ then$ the non-reali9ation o# the e%istence o# time happens to us when we do not distin/uish any chan/e$ but the soul seems to stay in one indivisible state$ and when we perceive and distin/uish we say time has elapsed$ evidently time is not independent o# movement and chan/e! 7t is evident$ then$ that time is neither movement nor independent o# movement! "e must take this as our startin/-point and try to discover-since we wish to know what time is-what e%actly it has to do with movement! 1ow we perceive movement and time to/ether4 #or even when it is dark and we are not bein/ a##ected throu/h the body$ i# any movement takes place in the mind we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed2 and not only that but also$ when some time is thou/ht to have passed$ some movement also alon/ with it seems to have taken place! Hence time is either movement or somethin/ that belon/s to movement! Since then it is not movement$ it must be the other! But what is moved is moved #rom somethin/ to somethin/$ and all ma/nitude is continuous! *here#ore the movement /oes with the ma/nitude! Because the ma/nitude is continuous$ the movement too must be continuous$ and i# the movement$ then the time2 #or the time that has passed is always thou/ht to be in proportion to the movement! *he distinction o# 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 holds primarily$ then$ in place2 and there in virtue o# relative position! Since then 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 hold in ma/nitude$ they must hold also in movement$ these correspondin/ to those! But also in time the distinction o# 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 must hold$ #or time and movement always correspond with each other! *he 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 in motion is identical in substratum with motion yet di##ers #rom it in de#inition$ and is not identical with motion! But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion$ markin/ it by 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter32 and it is only when we have perceived 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 in motion that we say that time has elapsed! 1ow we mark them by -ud/in/ that A and B are di##erent$ and that some third thin/ is intermediate to them!

"hen we think o# the e%tremes as di##erent #rom the middle and the mind pronounces that the 3nows3 are two$ one be#ore and one a#ter$ it is then that we say that there is time$ and this that we say is time! 0or what is bounded by the 3now3 is thou/ht to be time-we may assume this! "hen$ there#ore$ we perceive the 3now3 one$ and neither as be#ore and a#ter in a motion nor as an identity but in relation to a 3be#ore3 and an 3a#ter3$ no time is thou/ht to have elapsed$ because there has been no motion either! On the other hand$ when we do perceive a 3be#ore3 and an 3a#ter3$ then we say that there is time! 0or time is -ust this-number o# motion in respect o# 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3! Hence time is not movement$ but only movement in so #ar as it admits o# enumeration! A proo# o# this4 we discriminate the more or the less by number$ but more or less movement by time! *ime then is a kind o# number! 51umber$ we must note$ is used in two senses-both o# what is counted or the countable and also o# that with which we count! *ime obviously is what is counted$ not that with which we count4 there are di##erent kinds o# thin/!6 Fust as motion is a perpetual succession$ so also is time! But every simultaneous time is sel#-identical2 #or the 3now3 as a sub-ect is an identity$ but it accepts di##erent attributes! *he 3now3 measures time$ in so #ar as time involves the 3be#ore and a#ter3! *he 3now3 in one sense is the same$ in another it is not the same! 7n so #ar as it is in succession$ it is di##erent 5which is -ust what its bein/ was supposed to mean6$ but its substratum is an identity4 #or motion$ as was said$ /oes with ma/nitude$ and time$ as we maintain$ with motion! Similarly$ then$ there corresponds to the point the body which is carried alon/$ and by which we are aware o# the motion and o# the 3be#ore and a#ter3 involved in it! *his is an identical substratum 5whether a point or a stone or somethin/ else o# the kind6$ but it has di##erent attributes as the sophists assume that Coriscus3 bein/ in the :yceum is a di##erent thin/ #rom Coriscus3 bein/ in the marketplace! And the body which is carried alon/ is di##erent$ in so #ar as it is at one time here and at another there! But the 3now3 corresponds to the body that is carried alon/$ as time corresponds to the motion! 0or it is by means o# the body that is carried alon/ that we become aware o# the 3be#ore and a#ter3 the motion$ and i# we re/ard these as countable we /et the 3now3! Hence in these also the 3now3 as substratum remains the same 5#or it is what is be#ore and a#ter in movement6$ but what is predicated o# it is di##erent2 #or it is in so #ar as the 3be#ore and a#ter3 is numerable that we /et the 3now3! *his is what is most knowable4 #or$ similarly$ motion is known because o# that which is moved$ locomotion because o# that which is carried! what is carried is a real thin/$ the movement is not! *hus what is called 3now3 in one sense is always the same2 in another it is not the same4 #or this is true also o# what is carried! Clearly$ too$ i# there were no time$ there would be no 3now3$ and vice versa! -ust as the movin/ body and its locomotion involve each other mutually$ so

too do the number o# the movin/ body and the number o# its locomotion! 0or the number o# the locomotion is time$ while the 3now3 corresponds to the movin/ body$ and is like the unit o# number! *ime$ then$ also is both made continuous by the 3now3 and divided at it! 0or here too there is a correspondence with the locomotion and the movin/ body! 0or the motion or locomotion is made one by the thin/ which is moved$ because it is one-not because it is one in its own nature 5#or there mi/ht be pauses in the movement o# such a thin/6-but because it is one in de#inition4 #or this determines the movement as 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3! Here$ too there is a correspondence with the point2 #or the point also both connects and terminates the len/th-it is the be/innin/ o# one and the end o# another! But when you take it in this way$ usin/ the one point as two$ a pause is necessary$ i# the same point is to be the be/innin/ and the end! *he 3now3 on the other hand$ since the body carried is movin/$ is always di##erent! Hence time is not number in the sense in which there is 3number3 o# the same point because it is be/innin/ and end$ but rather as the e%tremities o# a line #orm a number$ and not as the parts o# the line do so$ both #or the reason /iven 5#or we can use the middle point as two$ so that on that analo/y time mi/ht stand still6$ and #urther because obviously the 3now3 is no part o# time nor the section any part o# the movement$ any more than the points are parts o# the line-#or it is two lines that are parts o# one line! 7n so #ar then as the 3now3 is a boundary$ it is not time$ but an attribute o# it2 in so #ar as it numbers$ it is number2 #or boundaries belon/ only to that which they bound$ but number 5e!/! ten6 is the number o# these horses$ and belon/s also elsewhere! 7t is clear$ then$ that time is 3number o# movement in respect o# the be#ore and a#ter3$ and is continuous since it is an attribute o# what is continuous! Part 12 *he smallest number$ in the strict sense o# the word 3number3$ is two! But o# number as concrete$ sometimes there is a minimum$ sometimes not4 e!/! o# a 3line3$ the smallest in respect o# multiplicity is two 5or$ i# you like$ one6$ but in respect o# si9e there is no minimum2 #or every line is divided ad in#initum! Hence it is so with time! 7n respect o# number the minimum is one 5or two62 in point o# e%tent there is no minimum! 7t is clear$ too$ that time is not described as #ast or slow$ but as many or #ew and as lon/ or short! 0or as continuous it is lon/ or short and as a number many or #ew$ but it is not #ast or slow-any more than any number with which we number is #ast or slow! 0urther$ there is the same time everywhere at once$ but not the same time

be#ore and a#ter$ #or while the present chan/e is one$ the chan/e which has happened and that which will happen are di##erent! *ime is not number with which we count$ but the number o# thin/s which are counted$ and this accordin/ as it occurs be#ore or a#ter is always di##erent$ #or the 3nows3 are di##erent! And the number o# a hundred horses and a hundred men is the same$ but the thin/s numbered are di##erent-the horses #rom the men! 0urther$ as a movement can be one and the same a/ain and a/ain$ so too can time$ e!/! a year or a sprin/ or an autumn! 1ot only do we measure the movement by the time$ but also the time by the movement$ because they de#ine each other! *he time marks the movement$ since it is its number$ and the movement the time! "e describe the time as much or little$ measurin/ it by the movement$ -ust as we know the number by what is numbered$ e!/! the number o# the horses by one horse as the unit! 0or we know how many horses there are by the use o# the number2 and a/ain by usin/ the one horse as unit we know the number o# the horses itsel#! So it is with the time and the movement2 #or we measure the movement by the time and vice versa! 7t is natural that this should happen2 #or the movement /oes with the distance and the time with the movement$ because they are .uanta and continuous and divisible! *he movement has these attributes because the distance is o# this nature$ and the time has them because o# the movement! And we measure both the distance by the movement and the movement by the distance2 #or we say that the road is lon/$ i# the -ourney is lon/$ and that this is lon/$ i# the road is lon/-the time$ too$ i# the movement$ and the movement$ i# the time! *ime is a measure o# motion and o# bein/ moved$ and it measures the motion by determinin/ a motion which will measure e%actly the whole motion$ as the cubit does the len/th by determinin/ an amount which will measure out the whole! 0urther 3to be in time3 means #or movement$ that both it and its essence are measured by time 5#or simultaneously it measures both the movement and its essence$ and this is what bein/ in time means #or it$ that its essence should be measured6! Clearly then 3to be in tim e3 has the same meanin/ #or other thin/s also$ namely$ that their bein/ should be measured by time! 3*o be in time3 is one o# two thin/s4 5=6 to e%ist when time e%ists$ 5>6 as we say o# some thin/s that they are 3in number3! *he latter means either what is a part or mode o# number-in /eneral$ somethin/ which belon/s to number-or that thin/s have a number! 1ow$ since time is number$ the 3now3 and the 3be#ore3 and the like are in time$ -ust as 3unit3 and 3odd3 and 3even3 are in number$ i!e! in the sense that the one set belon/s to number$ the other to time! But thin/s are in time as they are in number! 7# this is so$ they are contained by time as thin/s in place are contained by place!

lainly$ too$ to be in time does not mean to co-e%ist with time$ any more than to be in motion or in place means to co-e%ist with motion or place! 0or i# 3to be in somethin/3 is to mean this$ then all thin/s will be in anythin/$ and the heaven will be in a /rain2 #or when the /rain is$ then also is the heaven! But this is a merely incidental con-unction$ whereas the other is necessarily involved4 that which is in time necessarily involves that there is time when it is$ and that which is in motion that there is motion when it is! Since what is 3in time3 is so in the same sense as what is in number is so$ a time /reater than everythin/ in time can be #ound! So it is necessary that all the thin/s in time should be contained by time$ -ust like other thin/s also which are 3in anythin/3$ e!/! the thin/s 3in place3 by place! A thin/$ then$ will be a##ected by time$ -ust as we are accustomed to say that time wastes thin/s away$ and that all thin/s /row old throu/h time$ and that there is oblivion owin/ to the lapse o# time$ but we do not say the same o# /ettin/ to know or o# becomin/ youn/ or #air! 0or time is by its nature the cause rather o# decay$ since it is the number o# chan/e$ and chan/e removes what is! Hence$ plainly$ thin/s which are always are not$ as such$ in time$ #or they are not contained time$ nor is their bein/ measured by time! A proo# o# this is that none o# them is a##ected by time$ which indicates that they are not in time! Since time is the measure o# motion$ it will be the measure o# rest tooindirectly! 0or all rest is in time! 0or it does not #ollow that what is in time is moved$ thou/h what is in motion is necessarily moved! 0or time is not motion$ but 3number o# motion34 and what is at rest$ also$ can be in the number o# motion! 1ot everythin/ that is not in motion can be said to be 3at rest3-but only that which can be moved$ thou/h it actually is not moved$ as was said above! 3*o be in number3 means that there is a number o# the thin/$ and that its bein/ is measured by the number in which it is! Hence i# a thin/ is 3in time3 it will be measured by time! But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest$ the one .ua moved$ the other .ua at rest2 #or it will measure their motion and rest respectively! Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in so #ar as it has .uantity$ but in so #ar as its motion has .uantity! *hus none o# the thin/s which are neither moved nor at rest are in time4 #or 3to be in time3 is 3to be measured by time3$ while time is the measure o# motion and rest! lainly$ then$ neither will everythin/ that does not e%ist be in time$ i!e! those non-e%istent thin/s that cannot e%ist$ as the dia/onal cannot be

commensurate with the side! ,enerally$ i# time is directly the measure o# motion and indirectly o# other thin/s$ it is clear that a thin/ whose e%istence is measured by it will have its e%istence in rest or motion! *hose thin/s there#ore which are sub-ect to perishin/ and becomin/-/enerally$ those which at one time e%ist$ at another do not-are necessarily in time4 #or there is a /reater time which will e%tend both beyond their e%istence and beyond the time which measures their e%istence! O# thin/s which do not e%ist but are contained by time some were$ e!/! Homer once was$ some will be$ e!/! a #uture event2 this depends on the direction in which time contains them2 i# on both$ they have both modes o# e%istence! As to such thin/s as it does not contain in any way$ they neither were nor are nor will be! *hese are those none%istents whose opposites always are$ as the incommensurability o# the dia/onal always is-and this will not be in time! 1or will the commensurability$ there#ore2 hence this eternally is not$ because it is contrary to what eternally is! A thin/ whose contrary is not eternal can be and not be$ and it is o# such thin/s that there is comin/ to be and passin/ away! Part 13 *he 3now3 is the link o# time$ as has been said 5#or it connects past and #uture time6$ and it is a limit o# time 5#or it is the be/innin/ o# the one and the end o# the other6! But this is not obvious as it is with the point$ which is #i%ed! 7t divides potentially$ and in so #ar as it is dividin/ the 3now3 is always di##erent$ but in so #ar as it connects it is always the same$ as it is with mathematical lines! 0or the intellect it is not always one and the same point$ since it is other and other when one divides the line2 but in so #ar as it is one$ it is the same in every respect! So the 3now3 also is in one way a potential dividin/ o# time$ in another the termination o# both parts$ and their unity! And the dividin/ and the unitin/ are the same thin/ and in the same re#erence$ but in essence they are not the same! So one kind o# 3now3 is described in this way4 another is when the time is near this kind o# 3now3! 3He will come now3 because he will come to-day2 3he has come now3 because he came to-day! But the thin/s in the 7liad have not happened 3now3$ nor is the #lood 3now3-not that the time #rom now to them is not continuous$ but because they are not near! 3At some time3 means a time determined in relation to the #irst o# the two types o# 3now3$ e!/! 3at some time3 *roy was taken$ and 3at some time3 there will be a #lood2 #or it must be determined with re#erence to the 3now3! *here will thus be a determinate time #rom this 3now3 to that$ and there was such in re#erence to the past event! But i# there be no time which is not 3sometime3$ every time will be determined!

"ill time then #ail8 Surely not$ i# motion always e%ists! 7s time then always di##erent or does the same time recur8 Clearly time is$ in the same way as motion is! 0or i# one and the same motion sometimes recurs$ it will be one and the same time$ and i# not$ not! Since the 3now3 is an end and a be/innin/ o# time$ not o# the same time however$ but the end o# that which is past and the be/innin/ o# that which is to come$ it #ollows that$ as the circle has its conve%ity and its concavity$ in a sense$ in the same thin/$ so time is always at a be/innin/ and at an end! And #or this reason it seems to be always di##erent2 #or the 3now3 is not the be/innin/ and the end o# the same thin/2 i# it were$ it would be at the same time and in the same respect two opposites! And time will not #ail2 #or it is always at a be/innin/! 3 resently3 or 3-ust3 re#ers to the part o# #uture time which is near the indivisible present 3now3 53"hen do you walk8 3 resently3$ because the time in which he is /oin/ to do so is near6$ and to the part o# past time which is not #ar #rom the 3now3 53"hen do you walk83 37 have -ust been walkin/36! But to say that *roy has -ust been taken-we do not say that$ because it is too #ar #rom the 3now3! 3:ately3$ too$ re#ers to the part o# past time which is near the present 3now3! 3"hen did you /o83 3:ately3$ i# the time is near the e%istin/ now! 3:on/ a/o3 re#ers to the distant past! 3Suddenly3

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

*able o# Contents

Book $
Part 1 )verythin/ which chan/es does so in one o# three senses! 7t may chan/e 5=6 accidentally$ as #or instance when we say that somethin/ musical walks$ that which walks bein/ somethin/ in which aptitude #or music is an accident! A/ain 5>6 a thin/ is said without .uali#ication to chan/e because somethin/ belon/in/ to it chan/es$ i!e! in statements which re#er to part o# the thin/ in .uestion4 thus the body is restored to health because the eye or the chest$ that is to say a part o# the whole body$ is restored to health! And above all there

is 5&6 the case o# a thin/ which is in motion neither accidentally nor in respect o# somethin/ else belon/in/ to it$ but in virtue o# bein/ itsel# directly in motion! Here we have a thin/ which is essentially movable4 and that which is so is a di##erent thin/ accordin/ to the particular variety o# motion4 #or instance it may be a thin/ capable o# alteration4 and within the sphere o# alteration it is a/ain a di##erent thin/ accordin/ as it is capable o# bein/ restored to health or capable o# bein/ heated! And there are the same distinctions in the case o# the mover4 5=6 one thin/ causes motion accidentally$ 5>6 another partially 5because somethin/ belon/in/ to it causes motion6$ 5&6 another o# itsel# directly$ as$ #or instance$ the physician heals$ the hand strikes! "e have$ then$ the #ollowin/ #actors4 5a6 on the one hand that which directly causes motion$ and 5b6 on the other hand that which is in motion4 #urther$ we have 5c6 that in which motion takes place$ namely time$ and 5distinct #rom these three6 5d6 that #rom which and 5e6 that to which it proceeds4 #or every motion proceeds #rom somethin/ and to somethin/$ that which is directly in motion bein/ distinct #rom that to which it is in motion and that #rom which it is in motion4 #or instance$ we may take the three thin/s 3wood3$ 3hot3$ and 3cold3$ o# which the #irst is that which is in motion$ the second is that to which the motion proceeds$ and the third is that #rom which it proceeds! *his bein/ so$ it is clear that the motion is in the wood$ not in its #orm4 #or the motion is neither caused nor e%perienced by the #orm or the place or the .uantity! So we are le#t with a mover$ a moved$ and a /oal o# motion! 7 do not include the startin/-point o# motion4 #or it is the /oal rather than the startin/-point o# motion that /ives its name to a particular process o# chan/e! *hus 3perishin/3 is chan/e to not-bein/$ thou/h it is also true that that that which perishes chan/es #rom bein/4 and 3becomin/3 is chan/e to bein/$ thou/h it is also chan/e #rom not-bein/! 1ow a de#inition o# motion has been /iven above$ #rom which it will be seen that every /oal o# motion$ whether it be a #orm$ an a##ection$ or a place$ is immovable$ as$ #or instance$ knowled/e and heat! Here$ however$ a di##iculty may be raised! A##ections$ it may be said$ are motions$ and whiteness is an a##ection4 thus there may be chan/e to a motion! *o this we may reply that it is not whiteness but whitenin/ that is a motion! Here also the same distinctions are to be observed4 a /oal o# motion may be so accidentally$ or partially and with re#erence to somethin/ other than itsel#$ or directly and with no re#erence to anythin/ else4 #or instance$ a thin/ which is becomin/ white chan/es accidentally to an ob-ect o# thou/ht$ the colour bein/ only accidentally the ob-ect o# thou/ht2 it chan/es to colour$ because white is a part o# colour$ or to )urope$ because Athens is a part o# )urope2 but it chan/es essentially to white colour! 7t is now clear in what sense a thin/ is in motion essentially$ accidentally$ or in respect o# somethin/ other than itsel#$ and in what sense the phrase 3itsel# directly3 is used in the case both o# the mover and o# the moved4 and it is also clear that the motion is not in the #orm but in that which is in motion$ that is to say 3the movable in activity3! 1ow accidental chan/e we may leave out o# account4 #or it is to be #ound in everythin/$ at any time$ and in any respect! Chan/e which is not accidental

on the other hand is not to be #ound in everythin/$ but only in contraries$ in thin/s intermediate contraries$ and in contradictories$ as may be proved by induction! An intermediate may be a startin/-point o# chan/e$ since #or the purposes o# the chan/e it serves as contrary to either o# two contraries4 #or the intermediate is in a sense the e%tremes! Hence we speak o# the intermediate as in a sense a contrary relatively to the e%tremes and o# either e%treme as a contrary relatively to the intermediate4 #or instance$ the central note is low relatively-to the hi/hest and hi/h relatively to the lowest$ and /rey is li/ht relatively to black and dark relatively to white! And since every chan/e is #rom somethin/ to somethin/-as the word itsel# 5metabole6 indicates$ implyin/ somethin/ 3a#ter3 5meta6 somethin/ else$ that is to say somethin/ earlier and somethin/ later-that which chan/es must chan/e in one o# #our ways4 #rom sub-ect to sub-ect$ #rom sub-ect to nonsub-ect$ #rom non-sub-ect to sub-ect$ or #rom non-sub-ect to non-sub-ect$ where by 3sub-ect3 7 mean what is a##irmatively e%pressed! So it #ollows necessarily #rom what has been said above that there are only three kinds o# chan/e$ that #rom sub-ect to sub-ect$ that #rom sub-ect to non-sub-ect$ and that #rom non-sub-ect to sub-ect4 #or the #ourth conceivable kind$ that #rom non-sub-ect to nonsub-ect$ is not chan/e$ as in that case there is no opposition either o# contraries or o# contradictories! 1ow chan/e #rom non-sub-ect to sub-ect$ the relation bein/ that o# contradiction$ is 3comin/ to be3-3un.uali#ied comin/ to be3 when the chan/e takes place in an un.uali#ied way$ 3particular comin/ to be3 when the chan/e is chan/e in a particular character4 #or instance$ a chan/e #rom not-white to white is a comin/ to be o# the particular thin/$ white$ while chan/e #rom un.uali#ied not-bein/ to bein/ is comin/ to be in an un.uali#ied way$ in respect o# which we say that a thin/ 3comes to be3 without .uali#ication$ not that it 3comes to be3 some particular thin/! Chan/e #rom sub-ect to nonsub-ect is 3perishin/3-3un.uali#ied perishin/3 when the chan/e is #rom bein/ to not-bein/$ 3particular perishin/3 when the chan/e is to the opposite ne/ation$ the distinction bein/ the same as that made in the case o# comin/ to be! 1ow the e%pression 3not-bein/3 is used in several senses4 and there can be motion neither o# that which 3is not3 in respect o# the a##irmation or ne/ation o# a predicate$ nor o# that which 3is not3 in the sense that it only potentially 3is3$ that is to say the opposite o# that which actually 3is3 in an un.uali#ied sense4 #or althou/h that which is 3not-white3 or 3not-/ood3 may nevertheless he in motion accidentally 5#or e%ample that which is 3not-white3 mi/ht be a man6$ yet that which is without .uali#ication 3not-so-and-so3 cannot in any sense be in motion4 there#ore it is impossible #or that which is not to be in motion! *his bein/ so$ it #ollows that 3becomin/3 cannot be a motion4 #or it is that which 3is not3 that 3becomes3! 0or however true it may be that it accidentally 3becomes3$ it is nevertheless correct to say that it is that which 3is not3 that in an un.uali#ied sense 3becomes3! And similarly it is impossible #or

that which 3is not3 to be at rest! *here are these di##iculties$ then$ in the way o# the assumption that that which 3is not3 can be in motion4 and it may be #urther ob-ected that$ whereas everythin/ which is in motion is in space$ that which 3is not3 is not in space4 #or then it would be somewhere! So$ too$ 3perishin/3 is not a motion4 #or a motion has #or its contrary either another motion or rest$ whereas 3perishin/3 is the contrary o# 3becomin/3! Since$ then$ every motion is a kind o# chan/e$ and there are only the three kinds o# chan/e mentioned above$ and since o# these three those which take the #orm o# 3becomin/3 and 3perishin/3$ that is to say those which imply a relation o# contradiction$ are not motions4 it necessarily #ollows that only chan/e #rom sub-ect to sub-ect is motion! And every such sub-ect is either a contrary or an intermediate 5#or a privation may be allowed to rank as a contrary6 and can be a##irmatively e%pressed$ as naked$ toothless$ or black! 7#$ then$ the cate/ories are severally distin/uished as Bein/$ Nuality$ lace$ *ime$ Relation$ Nuantity$ and Activity or assivity$ it necessarily #ollows that there are three kinds o# motion-.ualitative$ .uantitative$ and local! Part 2 7n respect o# Substance there is no motion$ because Substance has no contrary amon/ thin/s that are! 1or is there motion in respect o# Relation4 #or it may happen that when one correlative chan/es$ the other$ althou/h this does not itsel# chan/e$ is no lon/er applicable$ so that in these cases the motion is accidental! 1or is there motion in respect o# A/ent and atient-in #act there can never be motion o# mover and moved$ because there cannot be motion o# motion or becomin/ o# becomin/ or in /eneral chan/e o# chan/e! 0or in the #irst place there are two senses in which motion o# motion is conceivable! 5=6 *he motion o# which there is motion mi/ht be conceived as sub-ect2 e!/! a man is in motion because he chan/es #rom #air to dark! Can it be that in this sense motion /rows hot or cold$ or chan/es place$ or increases or decreases8 7mpossible4 #or chan/e is not a sub-ect! Or 5>6 can there be motion o# motion in the sense that some other sub-ect chan/es #rom a chan/e to another mode o# bein/$ as e!/! a man chan/es #rom #allin/ ill to /ettin/ well8 )ven this is possible only in an accidental sense! 0or$ whatever the sub-ect may be$ movement is chan/e #rom one #orm to another! 5And the same holds /ood o# becomin/ and perishin/$ e%cept that in these processes we have a chan/e to a particular kind o# opposite$ while the other$ motion$ is a chan/e to a di##erent kind!6 So$ i# there is to be motion o# motion$ that which is chan/in/ #rom health to sickness must simultaneously be chan/in/ #rom this very chan/e to another! 7t is clear$ then$ that by the time that it has become sick$ it must also have chan/ed to whatever may be the other chan/e concerned 5#or that it should be at rest$ thou/h lo/ically possible$ is e%cluded

by the theory6! Moreover this other can never be any casual chan/e$ but must be a chan/e #rom somethin/ de#inite to some other de#inite thin/! So in this case it must be the opposite chan/e$ vi9! convalescence! 7t is only accidentally that there can be chan/e o# chan/e$ e!/! there is a chan/e #rom rememberin/ to #or/ettin/ only because the sub-ect o# this chan/e chan/es at one time to knowled/e$ at another to i/norance! 7n the second place$ i# there is to be chan/e o# chan/e and becomin/ o# becomin/$ we shall have an in#inite re/ress! *hus i# one o# a series o# chan/es is to be a chan/e o# chan/e$ the precedin/ chan/e must also be so4 e!/! i# simple becomin/ was ever in process o# becomin/$ then that which was becomin/ simple becomin/ was also in process o# becomin/$ so that we should not yet have arrived at what was in process o# simple becomin/ but only at what was already in process o# becomin/ in process o# becomin/! And this a/ain was sometime in process o# becomin/$ so that even then we should not have arrived at what was in process o# simple becomin/! And since in an in#inite series there is no #irst term$ here there will be no #irst sta/e and there#ore no #ollowin/ sta/e either! On this hypothesis$ then$ nothin/ can become or be moved or chan/e! *hirdly$ i# a thin/ is capable o# any particular motion$ it is also capable o# the correspondin/ contrary motion or the correspondin/ comin/ to rest$ and a thin/ that is capable o# becomin/ is also capable o# perishin/4 conse.uently$ i# there be becomin/ o# becomin/$ that which is in process o# becomin/ is in process o# perishin/ at the very moment when it has reached the sta/e o# becomin/4 since it cannot be in process o# perishin/ when it is -ust be/innin/ to become or a#ter it has ceased to become4 #or that which is in process o# perishin/ must be in e%istence! 0ourthly$ there must be a substrate underlyin/ all processes o# becomin/ and chan/in/! "hat can this be in the present case8 7t is either the body or the soul that under/oes alteration4 what is it that correspondin/ly becomes motion or becomin/8 And a/ain what is the /oal o# their motion8 7t must be the motion or becomin/ o# somethin/ #rom somethin/ to somethin/ else! But in what sense can this be so8 0or the becomin/ o# learnin/ cannot be learnin/4 so neither can the becomin/ o# becomin/ be becomin/$ nor can the becomin/ o# any process be that process! 0inally$ since there are three kinds o# motion$ the substratum and the /oal o# motion must be one or other o# these$ e!/! locomotion will have to be altered or to be locally moved! *o sum up$ then$ since everythin/ that is moved is moved in one o# three ways$ either accidentally$ or partially$ or essentially$ chan/e can chan/e only accidentally$ as e!/! when a man who is bein/ restored to health runs or learns4 and accidental chan/e we have lon/ a/o decided to leave out o# account!

Since$ then$ motion can belon/ neither to Bein/ nor to Relation nor to A/ent and atient$ it remains that there can be motion only in respect o# Nuality$ Nuantity$ and lace4 #or with each o# these we have a pair o# contraries! Motion in respect o# Nuality let us call alteration$ a /eneral desi/nation that is used to include both contraries4 and by Nuality 7 do not here mean a property o# substance 5in that sense that which constitutes a speci#ic distinction is a .uality6 but a passive .uality in virtue o# which a thin/ is said to be acted on or to be incapable o# bein/ acted on! Motion in respect o# Nuantity has no name that includes both contraries$ but it is called increase or decrease accordin/ as one or the other is desi/nated4 that is to say motion in the direction o# complete ma/nitude is increase$ motion in the contrary direction is decrease! Motion in respect o# lace has no name either /eneral or particular4 but we may desi/nate it by the /eneral name o# locomotion$ thou/h strictly the term 3locomotion3 is applicable to thin/s that chan/e their place only when they have not the power to come to a stand$ and to thin/s that do not move themselves locally! Chan/e within the same kind #rom a lesser to a /reater or #rom a /reater to a lesser de/ree is alteration4 #or it is motion either #rom a contrary or to a contrary$ whether in an un.uali#ied or in a .uali#ied sense4 #or chan/e to a lesser de/ree o# a .uality will be called chan/e to the contrary o# that .uality$ and chan/e to a /reater de/ree o# a .uality will be re/arded as chan/e #rom the contrary o# that .uality to the .uality itsel#! 7t makes no di##erence whether the chan/e be .uali#ied or un.uali#ied$ e%cept that in the #ormer case the contraries will have to be contrary to one another only in a .uali#ied sense4 and a thin/3s possessin/ a .uality in a /reater or in a lesser de/ree means the presence or absence in it o# more or less o# the opposite .uality! 7t is now clear$ then$ that there are only these three kinds o# motion! *he term 3immovable3 we apply in the #irst place to that which is absolutely incapable o# bein/ moved 5-ust as we correspondin/ly apply the term invisible to sound62 in the second place to that which is moved with di##iculty a#ter a lon/ time or whose movement is slow at the start-in #act$ what we describe as hard to move2 and in the third place to that which is naturally desi/ned #or and capable o# motion$ but is not in motion when$ where$ and as it naturally would be so! *his last is the only kind o# immovable thin/ o# which 7 use the term 3bein/ at rest34 #or rest is contrary to motion$ so that rest will be ne/ation o# motion in that which is capable o# admittin/ motion! *he #ore/oin/ remarks are su##icient to e%plain the essential nature o# motion and rest$ the number o# kinds o# chan/e$ and the di##erent varieties o# motion! Part 3

:et us now proceed to de#ine the terms 3to/ether3 and 3apart3$ 3in contact3$ 3between3$ 3in succession3$ 3conti/uous3$ and 3continuous3$ and to show in what circumstances each o# these terms is naturally applicable! *hin/s are said to be to/ether in place when they are in one place 5in the strictest sense o# the word 3place36 and to be apart when they are in di##erent places! *hin/s are said to be in contact when their e%tremities are to/ether! *hat which a chan/in/ thin/$ i# it chan/es continuously in a natural manner$ naturally reaches be#ore it reaches that to which it chan/es last$ is between! *hus 3between3 implies the presence o# at least three thin/s4 #or in a process o# chan/e it is the contrary that is 3last34 and a thin/ is moved continuously i# it leaves no /ap or only the smallest possible /ap in the material-not in the time 5#or a /ap in the time does not prevent thin/s havin/ a 3between3$ while$ on the other hand$ there is nothin/ to prevent the hi/hest note soundin/ immediately a#ter the lowest6 but in the material in which the motion takes place! *his is mani#estly true not only in local chan/es but in every other kind as well! 51ow every chan/e implies a pair o# opposites$ and opposites may be either contraries or contradictories2 since then contradiction admits o# no mean term$ it is obvious that 3between3 must imply a pair o# contraries6 *hat is locally contrary which is most distant in a strai/ht line4 #or the shortest line is de#initely limited$ and that which is de#initely limited constitutes a measure! A thin/ is 3in succession3 when it is a#ter the be/innin/ in position or in #orm or in some other respect in which it is de#initely so re/arded$ and when #urther there is nothin/ o# the same kind as itsel# between it and that to which it is in succession$ e!/! a line or lines i# it is a line$ a unit or units i# it is a unit$ a house i# it is a house 5there is nothin/ to prevent somethin/ o# a di##erent kind bein/ between6! 0or that which is in succession is in succession to a particular thin/$ and is somethin/ posterior4 #or one is not 3in succession3 to two$ nor is the #irst day o# the month to be second4 in each case the latter is 3in succession3 to the #ormer! A thin/ that is in succession and touches is 3conti/uous3! *he 3continuous3 is a subdivision o# the conti/uous4 thin/s are called continuous when the touchin/ limits o# each become one and the same and are$ as the word implies$ contained in each other4 continuity is impossible i# these e%tremities are two! *his de#inition makes it plain that continuity belon/s to thin/s that naturally in virtue o# their mutual contact #orm a unity! And in whatever way that which holds them to/ether is one$ so too will the whole be one$ e!/! by a rivet or /lue or contact or or/anic union! 7t is obvious that o# these terms 3in succession3 is #irst in order o# analysis4 #or that which touches is necessarily in succession$ but not everythin/ that is

in succession touches4 and so succession is a property o# thin/s prior in de#inition$ e!/! numbers$ while contact is not! And i# there is continuity there is necessarily contact$ but i# there is contact$ that alone does not imply continuity4 #or the e%tremities o# thin/s may be 3to/ether3 without necessarily bein/ one4 but they cannot be one without bein/ necessarily to/ether! So natural -unction is last in comin/ to be4 #or the e%tremities must necessarily come into contact i# they are to be naturally -oined4 but thin/s that are in contact are not all naturally -oined$ while there is no contact clearly there is no natural -unction either! Hence$ i# as some say 3point3 and 3unit3 have an independent e%istence o# their own$ it is impossible #or the two to be identical4 #or points can touch while units can only be in succession! Moreover$ there can always be somethin/ between points 5#or all lines are intermediate between points6$ whereas it is not necessary that there should possibly be anythin/ between units4 #or there can be nothin/ between the numbers one and two! "e have now de#ined what is meant by 3to/ether3 and 3apart3$ 3contact3$ 3between3 and 3in succession3$ 3conti/uous3 and 3continuous34 and we have shown in what circumstances each o# these terms is applicable! Part 4 *here are many senses in which motion is said to be 3one34 #or we use the term 3one3 in many senses! Motion is one /enerically accordin/ to the di##erent cate/ories to which it may be assi/ned4 thus any locomotion is one /enerically with any other locomotion$ whereas alteration is di##erent /enerically #rom locomotion! Motion is one speci#ically when besides bein/ one /enerically it also takes place in a species incapable o# subdivision4 e!/! colour has speci#ic di##erences4 there#ore blackenin/ and whitenin/ di##er speci#ically2 but at all events every whitenin/ will be speci#ically the same with every other whitenin/ and every blackenin/ with every other blackenin/! But white is not #urther subdivided by speci#ic di##erences4 hence any whitenin/ is speci#ically one with any other whitenin/! "here it happens that the /enus is at the same time a species$ it is clear that the motion will then in a sense be one speci#ically thou/h not in an un.uali#ied sense4 learnin/ is an e%ample o# this$ knowled/e bein/ on the one hand a species o# apprehension and on the other hand a /enus includin/ the various knowled/es! A di##iculty$ however$ may be raised as to whether a motion is speci#ically one when the same thin/ chan/es #rom the same to the same$ e!/! when one point chan/es a/ain and a/ain #rom a particular place to a particular place4 i# this motion is speci#ically one$ circular motion will be the same as rectilinear motion$ and rollin/ the same as walkin/! But is not this di##iculty removed by the principle already laid down that i# that in which the motion takes place is speci#ically di##erent 5as in the present instance the circular path is

speci#ically di##erent #rom the strai/ht6 the motion itsel# is also di##erent8 "e have e%plained$ then$ what is meant by sayin/ that motion is one /enerically or one speci#ically! Motion is one in an un.uali#ied sense when it is one essentially or numerically4 and the #ollowin/ distinctions will make clear what this kind o# motion is! *here are three classes o# thin/s in conne%ion with which we speak o# motion$ the 3that which3$ the 3that in which3$ and the 3that durin/ which3! 7 mean that there must he somethin/ that is in motion$ e!/! a man or /old$ and it must be in motion in somethin/$ e!/! a place or an a##ection$ and durin/ somethin/$ #or all motion takes place durin/ a time! O# these three it is the thin/ in which the motion takes place that makes it one /enerically or speci#ically$ it is the thin/ moved that makes the motion one in sub-ect$ and it is the time that makes it consecutive4 but it is the three to/ether that make it one without .uali#ication4 to e##ect this$ that in which the motion takes place 5the species6 must be one and incapable o# subdivision$ that durin/ which it takes place 5the time6 must be one and unintermittent$ and that which is in motion must be one-not in an accidental sense 5i!e! it must be one as the white that blackens is one or Coriscus who walks is one$ not in the accidental sense in which Coriscus and white may be one6$ nor merely in virtue o# community o# nature 5#or there mi/ht be a case o# two men bein/ restored to health at the same time in the same way$ e!/! #rom in#lammation o# the eye$ yet this motion is not really one$ but only speci#ically one6! Suppose$ however$ that Socrates under/oes an alteration speci#ically the same but at one time and a/ain at another4 in this case i# it is possible #or that which ceased to be a/ain to come into bein/ and remain numerically the same$ then this motion too will be one4 otherwise it will be the same but not one! And akin to this di##iculty there is another2 vi9! is health one8 and /enerally are the states and a##ections in bodies severally one in essence althou/h 5as is clear6 the thin/s that contain them are obviously in motion and in #lu%8 *hus i# a person3s health at daybreak and at the present moment is one and the same$ why should not this health be numerically one with that which he recovers a#ter an interval8 *he same ar/ument applies in each case! *here is$ however$ we may answer$ this di##erence4 that i# the states are two then it #ollows simply #rom this #act that the activities must also in point o# number be two 5#or only that which is numerically one can /ive rise to an activity that is numerically one6$ but i# the state is one$ this is not in itsel# enou/h to make us re/ard the activity also as one4 #or when a man ceases walkin/$ the walkin/ no lon/er is$ but it will a/ain be i# he be/ins to walk a/ain! But$ be this as it may$ i# in the above instance the health is one and the same$ then it must be possible #or that which is one and the same to come to be and to cease to be many times! However$ these di##iculties lie outside our present in.uiry! Since every motion is continuous$ a motion that is one in an un.uali#ied sense must 5since every motion is divisible6 be continuous$ and a continuous

motion must be one! *here will not be continuity between any motion and any other indiscriminately any more than there is between any two thin/s chosen at random in any other sphere4 there can be continuity only when the e%tremities o# the two thin/s are one! 1ow some thin/s have no e%tremities at all4 and the e%tremities o# others di##er speci#ically althou/h we /ive them the same name o# 3end34 how should e!/! the 3end3 o# a line and the 3end3 o# walkin/ touch or come to be one8 Motions that are not the same either speci#ically or /enerically may$ it is true$ be consecutive 5e!/! a man may run and then at once #all ill o# a #ever6$ and a/ain$ in the torch-race we have consecutive but not continuous locomotion4 #or accordin/ to our de#inition there can be continuity only when the ends o# the two thin/s are one! Hence motions may be consecutive or successive in virtue o# the time bein/ continuous$ but there can be continuity only in virtue o# the motions themselves bein/ continuous$ that is when the end o# each is one with the end o# the other! Motion$ there#ore$ that is in an un.uali#ied sense continuous and one must be speci#ically the same$ o# one thin/$ and in one time! @nity is re.uired in respect o# time in order that there may be no interval o# immobility$ #or where there is intermission o# motion there must be rest$ and a motion that includes intervals o# rest will be not one but many$ so that a motion that is interrupted by stationariness is not one or continuous$ and it is so interrupted i# there is an interval o# time! And thou/h o# a motion that is not speci#ically one 5even i# the time is unintermittent6 the time is one$ the motion is speci#ically di##erent$ and so cannot really be one$ #or motion that is one must be speci#ically one$ thou/h motion that is speci#ically one is not necessarily one in an un.uali#ied sense! "e have now e%plained what we mean when we call a motion one without .uali#ication! 0urther$ a motion is also said to be one /enerically$ speci#ically$ or essentially when it is complete$ -ust as in other cases completeness and wholeness are characteristics o# what is one4 and sometimes a motion even i# incomplete is said to be one$ provided only that it is continuous! And besides the cases already mentioned there is another in which a motion is said to be one$ vi9! when it is re/ular4 #or in a sense a motion that is irre/ular is not re/arded as one$ that title belon/in/ rather to that which is re/ular$ as a strai/ht line is re/ular$ the irre/ular bein/ as such divisible! But the di##erence would seem to be one o# de/ree! 7n every kind o# motion we may have re/ularity or irre/ularity4 thus there may be re/ular alteration$ and locomotion in a re/ular path$ e!/! in a circle or on a strai/ht line$ and it is the same with re/ard to increase and decrease! *he di##erence that makes a motion irre/ular is sometimes to be #ound in its path4 thus a motion cannot be re/ular i# its path is an irre/ular ma/nitude$ e!/! a broken line$ a spiral$ or any other ma/nitude that is not such that any part o# it taken at random #its on to any other that may be chosen! Sometimes it is #ound neither in the place nor in the time nor in the /oal but in the manner o# the motion4 #or in some cases the motion is di##erentiated by .uickness and slowness4 thus i# its velocity is uni#orm a motion is re/ular$ i# not it is irre/ular! So .uickness

and slowness are not species o# motion nor do they constitute speci#ic di##erences o# motion$ because this distinction occurs in conne%ion with all the distinct species o# motion! *he same is true o# heaviness and li/htness when they re#er to the same thin/4 e!/! they do not speci#ically distin/uish earth #rom itsel# or #ire #rom itsel#! 7rre/ular motion$ there#ore$ while in virtue o# bein/ continuous it is one$ is so in a lesser de/ree$ as is the case with locomotion in a broken line4 and a lesser de/ree o# somethin/ always means an admi%ture o# its contrary! And since every motion that is one can be both re/ular and irre/ular$ motions that are consecutive but not speci#ically the same cannot be one and continuous4 #or how should a motion composed o# alteration and locomotion be re/ular8 7# a motion is to be re/ular its parts ou/ht to #it one another! Part 5 "e have #urther to determine what motions are contrary to each other$ and to determine similarly how it is with rest! And we have #irst to decide whether contrary motions are motions respectively #rom and to the same thin/$ e!/! a motion #rom health and a motion to health 5where the opposition$ it would seem$ is o# the same kind as that between comin/ to be and ceasin/ to be62 or motions respectively #rom contraries$ e!/! a motion #rom health and a motion #rom disease2 or motions respectively to contraries$ e!/! a motion to health and a motion to disease2 or motions respectively #rom a contrary and to the opposite contrary$ e!/! a motion #rom health and a motion to disease2 or motions respectively #rom a contrary to the opposite contrary and #rom the latter to the #ormer$ e!/! a motion #rom health to disease and a motion #rom disease to health4 #or motions must be contrary to one another in one or more o# these ways$ as there is no other way in which they can be opposed! 1ow motions respectively #rom a contrary and to the opposite contrary$ e!/! a motion #rom health and a motion to disease$ are not contrary motions4 #or they are one and the same! 5Aet their essence is not the same$ -ust as chan/in/ #rom health is di##erent #rom chan/in/ to disease!6 1or are motion respectively #rom a contrary and #rom the opposite contrary contrary motions$ #or a motion #rom a contrary is at the same time a motion to a contrary or to an intermediate 5o# this$ however$ we shall speak later6$ but chan/in/ to a contrary rather than chan/in/ #rom a contrary would seem to be the cause o# the contrariety o# motions$ the latter bein/ the loss$ the #ormer the /ain$ o# contrariness! Moreover$ each several motion takes its name rather #rom the /oal than #rom the startin/-point o# chan/e$ e!/! motion to health we call convalescence$ motion to disease sickenin/! *hus we are le#t with motions respectively to contraries$ and motions respectively to contraries #rom the opposite contraries! 1ow it would seem that motions to contraries are at the same time motions #rom contraries 5thou/h their essence may not be the same2 3to health3 is distinct$ 7 mean$ #rom 3#rom disease3$ and 3#rom health3 #rom 3to disease36!

Since then chan/e di##ers #rom motion 5motion bein/ chan/e #rom a particular sub-ect to a particular sub-ect6$ it #ollows that contrary motions are motions respectively #rom a contrary to the opposite contrary and #rom the latter to the #ormer$ e!/! a motion #rom health to disease and a motion #rom disease to health! Moreover$ the consideration o# particular e%amples will also show what kinds o# processes are /enerally reco/ni9ed as contrary4 thus #allin/ ill is re/arded as contrary to recoverin/ one3s health$ these processes havin/ contrary /oals$ and bein/ tau/ht as contrary to bein/ led into error by another$ it bein/ possible to ac.uire error$ like knowled/e$ either by one3s own a/ency or by that o# another! Similarly we have upward locomotion and downward locomotion$ which are contrary len/thwise$ locomotion to the ri/ht and locomotion to the le#t$ which are contrary breadthwise$ and #orward locomotion and backward locomotion$ which too are contraries! On the other hand$ a process simply to a contrary$ e!/! that denoted by the e%pression 3becomin/ white3$ where no startin/-point is speci#ied$ is a chan/e but not a motion! And in all cases o# a thin/ that has no contrary we have as contraries chan/e #rom and chan/e to the same thin/! *hus comin/ to be is contrary to ceasin/ to be$ and losin/ to /ainin/! But these are chan/es and not motions! And wherever a pair o# contraries admit o# an intermediate$ motions to that intermediate must be held to be in a sense motions to one or other o# the contraries4 #or the intermediate serves as a contrary #or the purposes o# the motion$ in whichever direction the chan/e may be$ e!/! /rey in a motion #rom /rey to white takes the place o# black as startin/-point$ in a motion #rom white to /rey it takes the place o# black as /oal$ and in a motion #rom black to /rey it takes the place o# white as /oal4 #or the middle is opposed in a sense to either o# the e%tremes$ as has been said above! *hus we see that two motions are contrary to each other only when one is a motion #rom a contrary to the opposite contrary and the other is a motion #rom the latter to the #ormer! Part 6 But since a motion appears to have contrary to it not only another motion but also a state o# rest$ we must determine how this is so! A motion has #or its contrary in the strict sense o# the term another motion$ but it also has #or an opposite a state o# rest 5#or rest is the privation o# motion and the privation o# anythin/ may be called its contrary6$ and motion o# one kind has #or its opposite rest o# that kind$ e!/! local motion has local rest! *his statement$ however$ needs #urther .uali#ication4 there remains the .uestion$ is the opposite o# remainin/ at a particular place motion #rom or motion to that place8 7t is surely clear that since there are two sub-ects between which motion takes place$ motion #rom one o# these 5A6 to its contrary 5B6 has #or its opposite remainin/ in A while the reverse motion has #or its opposite remainin/ in B! At the same time these two are also contrary to each other4 #or it would be absurd to suppose that there are contrary motions and not opposite states o# rest! States o# rest in contraries are opposed! *o take an

e%ample$ a state o# rest in health is 5=6 contrary to a state o# rest in disease$ and 5>6 the motion to which it is contrary is that #rom health to disease! 0or 5>6 it would be absurd that its contrary motion should be that #rom disease to health$ since motion to that in which a thin/ is at rest is rather a comin/ to rest$ the comin/ to rest bein/ #ound to come into bein/ simultaneously with the motion2 and one o# these two motions it must be! And 5=6 rest in whiteness is o# course not contrary to rest in health! O# all thin/s that have no contraries there are opposite chan/es 5vi9! chan/e #rom the thin/ and chan/e to the thin/$ e!/! chan/e #rom bein/ and chan/e to bein/6$ but no motion! So$ too$ o# such thin/s there is no remainin/ thou/h there is absence o# chan/e! Should there be a particular sub-ect$ absence o# chan/e in its bein/ will be contrary to absence o# chan/e in its not-bein/! And here a di##iculty may be raised4 i# not-bein/ is not a particular somethin/$ what is it$ it may be asked$ that is contrary to absence o# chan/e in a thin/3s bein/8 and is this absence o# chan/e a state o# rest8 7# it is$ then either it is not true that every state o# rest is contrary to a motion or else comin/ to be and ceasin/ to be are motion! 7t is clear then that$ since we e%clude these #rom amon/ motions$ we must not say that this absence o# chan/e is a state o# rest4 we must say that it is similar to a state o# rest and call it absence o# chan/e! And it will have #or its contrary either nothin/ or absence o# chan/e in the thin/3s not-bein/$ or the ceasin/ to be o# the thin/4 #or such ceasin/ to be is chan/e #rom it and the thin/3s comin/ to be is chan/e to it! A/ain$ a #urther di##iculty may be raised! How is it$ it may be asked$ that whereas in local chan/e both remainin/ and movin/ may be natural or unnatural$ in the other chan/es this is not so8 e!/! alteration is not now natural and now unnatural$ #or convalescence is no more natural or unnatural than #allin/ ill$ whitenin/ no more natural or unnatural than blackenin/2 so$ too$ with increase and decrease4 these are not contrary to each other in the sense that either o# them is natural while the other is unnatural$ nor is one increase contrary to another in this sense2 and the same account may be /iven o# becomin/ and perishin/4 it is not true that becomin/ is natural and perishin/ unnatural 5#or /rowin/ old is natural6$ nor do we observe one becomin/ to be natural and another unnatural! "e answer that i# what happens under violence is unnatural$ then violent perishin/ is unnatural and as such contrary to natural perishin/! Are there then also some becomin/s that are violent and not the result o# natural necessity$ and are there#ore contrary to natural becomin/s$ and violent increases and decreases$ e!/! the rapid /rowth to maturity o# pro#li/ates and the rapid ripenin/ o# seeds even when not packed close in the earth8 And how is it with alterations8 Surely -ust the same4 we may say that some alterations are violent while others are natural$ e!/! patients alter naturally or unnaturally accordin/ as they throw o## #evers on the critical days or not! But$ it may be ob-ected$ then we shall have perishin/s contrary to one another$ not to becomin/! Certainly4 and why should not this in a sense be so8 *hus it is so i# one perishin/ is

pleasant and another pain#ul4 and so one perishin/ will be contrary to another not in an un.uali#ied sense$ but in so #ar as one has this .uality and the other that! 1ow motions and states o# rest universally e%hibit contrariety in the manner described above$ e!/! upward motion and rest above are respectively contrary to downward motion and rest below$ these bein/ instances o# local contrariety2 and upward locomotion belon/s naturally to #ire and downward to earth$ i!e! the locomotions o# the two are contrary to each other! And a/ain$ #ire moves up naturally and down unnaturally4 and its natural motion is certainly contrary to its unnatural motion! Similarly with remainin/4 remainin/ above is contrary to motion #rom above downwards$ and to earth this remainin/ comes unnaturally$ this motion naturally! So the unnatural remainin/ o# a thin/ is contrary to its natural motion$ -ust as we #ind a similar contrariety in the motion o# the same thin/4 one o# its motions$ the upward or the downward$ will be natural$ the other unnatural! Here$ however$ the .uestion arises$ has every state o# rest that is not permanent a becomin/$ and is this becomin/ a comin/ to a standstill8 7# so$ there must be a becomin/ o# that which is at rest unnaturally$ e!/! o# earth at rest above4 and there#ore this earth durin/ the time that it was bein/ carried violently upward was comin/ to a standstill! But whereas the velocity o# that which comes to a standstill seems always to increase$ the velocity o# that which is carried violently seems always to decrease4 so it will he in a state o# rest without havin/ become so! Moreover 3comin/ to a standstill3 is /enerally reco/ni9ed to be identical or at least concomitant with the locomotion o# a thin/ to its proper place! *here is also another di##iculty involved in the view that remainin/ in a particular place is contrary to motion #rom that place! 0or when a thin/ is movin/ #rom or discardin/ somethin/$ it still appears to have that which is bein/ discarded$ so that i# a state o# rest is itsel# contrary to the motion #rom the state o# rest to its contrary$ the contraries rest and motion will be simultaneously predicable o# the same thin/! May we not say$ however$ that in so #ar as the thin/ is still stationary it is in a state o# rest in a .uali#ied sense8 0or$ in #act$ whenever a thin/ is in motion$ part o# it is at the startin/point while part is at the /oal to which it is chan/in/4 and conse.uently a motion #inds its true contrary rather in another motion than in a state o# rest! "ith re/ard to motion and rest$ then$ we have now e%plained in what sense each o# them is one and under what conditions they e%hibit contrariety! ;"ith re/ard to comin/ to a standstill the .uestion may be raised whether there is an opposite state o# rest to unnatural as well as to natural motions! 7t would be absurd i# this were not the case4 #or a thin/ may remain still merely under violence4 thus we shall have a thin/ bein/ in a non-permanent state o# rest without havin/ become so! But it is clear that it must be the case4 #or

-ust as there is unnatural motion$ so$ too$ a thin/ may be in an unnatural state o# rest! 0urther$ some thin/s have a natural and an unnatural motion$ e!/! #ire has a natural upward motion and an unnatural downward motion4 is it$ then$ this unnatural downward motion or is it the natural downward motion o# earth that is contrary to the natural upward motion8 Surely it is clear that both are contrary to it thou/h not in the same sense4 the natural motion o# earth is contrary inasmuch as the motion o# #ire is also natural$ whereas the upward motion o# #ire as bein/ natural is contrary to the downward motion o# #ire as bein/ unnatural! *he same is true o# the correspondin/ cases o# remainin/! But there would seem to be a sense in which a state o# rest and a motion are opposites!<

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book $I
Part 1 1ow i# the terms 3continuous3$ 3in contact3$ and 3in succession3 are understood as de#ined above thin/s bein/ 3continuous3 i# their e%tremities are one$ 3in contact3 i# their e%tremities are to/ether$ and 3in succession3 i# there is nothin/ o# their own kind intermediate between them-nothin/ that is continuous can be composed 3o# indivisibles34 e!/! a line cannot be composed o# points$ the line bein/ continuous and the point indivisible! 0or the e%tremities o# two points can neither be one 5since o# an indivisible there can

be no e%tremity as distinct #rom some other part6 nor to/ether 5since that which has no parts can have no e%tremity$ the e%tremity and the thin/ o# which it is the e%tremity bein/ distinct6! Moreover$ i# that which is continuous is composed o# points$ these points must be either continuous or in contact with one another4 and the same reasonin/ applies in the case o# all indivisibles! 1ow #or the reason /iven above they cannot be continuous4 and one thin/ can be in contact with another only i# whole is in contact with whole or part with part or part with whole! But since indivisibles have no parts$ they must be in contact with one another as whole with whole! And i# they are in contact with one another as whole with whole$ they will not be continuous4 #or that which is continuous has distinct parts4 and these parts into which it is divisible are di##erent in this way$ i!e! spatially separate! 1or$ a/ain$ can a point be in succession to a point or a moment to a moment in such a way that len/th can be composed o# points or time o# moments4 #or thin/s are in succession i# there is nothin/ o# their own kind intermediate between them$ whereas that which is intermediate between points is always a line and that which is intermediate between moments is always a period o# time! A/ain$ i# len/th and time could thus be composed o# indivisibles$ they could be divided into indivisibles$ since each is divisible into the parts o# which it is composed! But$ as we saw$ no continuous thin/ is divisible into thin/s without parts! 1or can there be anythin/ o# any other kind intermediate between the parts or between the moments4 #or i# there could be any such thin/ it is clear that it must be either indivisible or divisible$ and i# it is divisible$ it must be divisible either into indivisibles or into divisibles that are in#initely divisible$ in which case it is continuous! Moreover$ it is plain that everythin/ continuous is divisible into divisibles that are in#initely divisible4 #or i# it were divisible into indivisibles$ we should have an indivisible in contact with an indivisible$ since the e%tremities o# thin/s that are continuous with one another are one and are in contact! *he same reasonin/ applies e.ually to ma/nitude$ to time$ and to motion4 either all o# these are composed o# indivisibles and are divisible into indivisibles$ or none! *his may be made clear as #ollows! 7# a ma/nitude is composed o# indivisibles$ the motion over that ma/nitude must be composed o# correspondin/ indivisible motions4 e!/! i# the ma/nitude AB, is composed o# the indivisibles A$ B$ ,$ each correspondin/ part o# the motion D)G o# O over AB, is indivisible! *here#ore$ since where there is motion there must be somethin/ that is in motion$ and where there is somethin/ in motion there must be motion$ there#ore the bein/-moved will also be composed o# indivisibles! So O traversed A when its motion was D$ B when

its motion was )$ and , similarly when its motion was G! 1ow a thin/ that is in motion #rom one place to another cannot at the moment when it was in motion both be in motion and at the same time have completed its motion at the place to which it was in motion4 e!/! i# a man is walkin/ to *hebes$ he cannot be walkin/ to *hebes and at the same time have completed his walk to *hebes4 and$ as we saw$ O traverses a the partless section A in virtue o# the presence o# the motion D! Conse.uently$ i# O actually passed throu/h A a#ter bein/ in process o# passin/ throu/h$ the motion must be divisible4 #or at the time when O was passin/ throu/h$ it neither was at rest nor had completed its passa/e but was in an intermediate state4 while i# it is passin/ throu/h and has completed its passa/e at the same moment$ then that which is walkin/ will at the moment when it is walkin/ have completed its walk and will be in the place to which it is walkin/2 that is to say$ it will have completed its motion at the place to which it is in motion! And i# a thin/ is in motion over the whole +b/ and its motion is the three D$ )$ and G$ and i# it is not in motion at all over the partless section A but has completed its motion over it$ then the motion will consist not o# motions but o# starts$ and will take place by a thin/3s havin/ completed a motion without bein/ in motion4 #or on this assumption it has completed its passa/e throu/h A without passin/ throu/h it! So it will be possible #or a thin/ to have completed a walk without ever walkin/4 #or on this assumption it has completed a walk over a particular distance without walkin/ over that distance! Since$ then$ everythin/ must be either at rest or in motion$ and O is there#ore at rest in each o# the sections A$ B$ and ,$ it #ollows that a thin/ can be continuously at rest and at the same time in motion4 #or$ as we saw$ O is in motion over the whole AB, and at rest in any part 5and conse.uently in the whole6 o# it! Moreover$ i# the indivisibles composin/ D)G are motions$ it would be possible #or a thin/ in spite o# the presence in it o# motion to be not in motion but at rest$ while i# they are not motions$ it would be possible #or motion to be composed o# somethin/ other than motions! And i# len/th and motion are thus indivisible$ it is neither more nor less necessary that time also be similarly indivisible$ that is to say be composed o# indivisible moments4 #or i# the whole distance is divisible and an e.ual velocity will cause a thin/ to pass throu/h less o# it in less time$ the time must also be divisible$ and conversely$ i# the time in which a thin/ is carried over the section A is divisible$ this section A must also be divisible! Part 2 And since every ma/nitude is divisible into ma/nitudes-#or we have shown that it is impossible #or anythin/ continuous to be composed o# indivisible parts$ and every ma/nitude is continuous-it necessarily #ollows that the .uicker o# two thin/s traverses a /reater ma/nitude in an e.ual time$ an e.ual ma/nitude in less time$ and a /reater ma/nitude in less time$ in con#ormity with the de#inition sometimes /iven o# 3the .uicker3! Suppose that A is .uicker than B! 1ow since o# two thin/s that which chan/es sooner

is .uicker$ in the time GH$ in which A has chan/ed #rom , to D$ B will not yet have arrived at D but will be short o# it4 so that in an e.ual time the .uicker will pass over a /reater ma/nitude! More than this$ it will pass over a /reater ma/nitude in less time4 #or in the time in which A has arrived at D$ B bein/ the slower has arrived$ let us say$ at )! *hen since A has occupied the whole time GH in arrivin/ at D$ will have arrived at O in less time than this$ say G+! 1ow the ma/nitude ,O that A has passed over is /reater than the ma/nitude ,)$ and the time G+ is less than the whole time GH4 so that the .uicker will pass over a /reater ma/nitude in less time! And #rom this it is also clear that the .uicker will pass over an e.ual ma/nitude in less time than the slower! 0or since it passes over the /reater ma/nitude in less time than the slower$ and 5re/arded by itsel#6 passes over :M the /reater in more time than :E the lesser$ the time Rh in which it passes over :M will be more than the time S$ which it passes over :E4 so that$ the time Rh bein/ less than the time Ch in which the slower passes over :E$ the time S will also be less than the time E4 #or it is less than the time Rh$ and that which is less than somethin/ else that is less than a thin/ is also itsel# less than that thin/! Hence it #ollows that the .uicker will traverse an e.ual ma/nitude in less time than the slower! A/ain$ since the motion o# anythin/ must always occupy either an e.ual time or less or more time in comparison with that o# another thin/$ and since$ whereas a thin/ is slower i# its motion occupies more time and o# e.ual velocity i# its motion occupies an e.ual time$ the .uicker is neither o# e.ual velocity nor slower$ it #ollows that the motion o# the .uicker can occupy neither an e.ual time nor more time! 7t can only be$ then$ that it occupies less time$ and thus we /et the necessary conse.uence that the .uicker will pass over an e.ual ma/nitude 5as well as a /reater6 in less time than the slower! And since every motion is in time and a motion may occupy any time$ and the motion o# everythin/ that is in motion may be either .uicker or slower$ both .uicker motion and slower motion may occupy any time4 and this bein/ so$ it necessarily #ollows that time also is continuous! By continuous 7 mean that which is divisible into divisibles that are in#initely divisible4 and i# we take this as the de#inition o# continuous$ it #ollows necessarily that time is continuous! 0or since it has been shown that the .uicker will pass over an e.ual ma/nitude in less time than the slower$ suppose that A is .uicker and B slower$ and that the slower has traversed the ma/nitude ,D in the time GH! 1ow it is clear that the .uicker will traverse the same ma/nitude in less time than this4 let us say in the time GO! A/ain$ since the .uicker has passed over the whole D in the time GO$ the slower will in the same time pass over ,+$ say$ which is less than ,D! And since B$ the slower$ has passed over ,+ in the time GO$ the .uicker will pass over it in less time4 so that the time GO will a/ain be divided! And i# this is divided the ma/nitude ,+ will also be divided -ust as ,D was4 and a/ain$ i# the ma/nitude is divided$ the time will also be divided! And we can carry on this process #or ever$ takin/ the slower a#ter the .uicker and the .uicker a#ter the slower alternately$ and usin/ what has been demonstrated at each sta/e as a new point o# departure4

#or the .uicker will divide the time and the slower will divide the len/th! 7#$ then$ this alternation always holds /ood$ and at every turn involves a division$ it is evident that all time must be continuous! And at the same time it is clear that all ma/nitude is also continuous2 #or the divisions o# which time and ma/nitude respectively are susceptible are the same and e.ual! Moreover$ the current popular ar/uments make it plain that$ i# time is continuous$ ma/nitude is continuous also$ inasmuch as a thin/ asses over hal# a /iven ma/nitude in hal# the time taken to cover the whole4 in #act without .uali#ication it passes over a less ma/nitude in less time2 #or the divisions o# time and o# ma/nitude will be the same! And i# either is in#inite$ so is the other$ and the one is so in the same way as the other2 i!e! i# time is in#inite in respect o# its e%tremities$ len/th is also in#inite in respect o# its e%tremities4 i# time is in#inite in respect o# divisibility$ len/th is also in#inite in respect o# divisibility4 and i# time is in#inite in both respects$ ma/nitude is also in#inite in both respects! Hence Geno3s ar/ument makes a #alse assumption in assertin/ that it is impossible #or a thin/ to pass over or severally to come in contact with in#inite thin/s in a #inite time! 0or there are two senses in which len/th and time and /enerally anythin/ continuous are called 3in#inite34 they are called so either in respect o# divisibility or in respect o# their e%tremities! So while a thin/ in a #inite time cannot come in contact with thin/s .uantitatively in#inite$ it can come in contact with thin/s in#inite in respect o# divisibility4 #or in this sense the time itsel# is also in#inite4 and so we #ind that the time occupied by the passa/e over the in#inite is not a #inite but an in#inite time$ and the contact with the in#inites is made by means o# moments not #inite but in#inite in number! *he passa/e over the in#inite$ then$ cannot occupy a #inite time$ and the passa/e over the #inite cannot occupy an in#inite time4 i# the time is in#inite the ma/nitude must be in#inite also$ and i# the ma/nitude is in#inite$ so also is the time! *his may be shown as #ollows! :et AB be a #inite ma/nitude$ and let us suppose that it is traversed in in#inite time ,$ and let a #inite period ,D o# the time be taken! 1ow in this period the thin/ in motion will pass over a certain se/ment o# the ma/nitude4 let B) be the se/ment that it has thus passed over! 5*his will be either an e%act measure o# AB or less or /reater than an e%act measure4 it makes no di##erence which it is!6 *hen$ since a ma/nitude e.ual to B) will always be passed over in an e.ual time$ and B) measures the whole ma/nitude$ the whole time occupied in passin/ over AB will be #inite4 #or it will be divisible into periods e.ual in number to the se/ments into which the ma/nitude is divisible! Moreover$ i# it is the case that in#inite time is not occupied in passin/ over every ma/nitude$ but it is possible to ass over some ma/nitude$ say B)$ in a #inite time$ and i# this B) measures the whole o# which it is a part$ and i# an e.ual ma/nitude is passed over in an e.ual time$ then it #ollows that the time like the ma/nitude is #inite! *hat in#inite time will not be occupied in passin/ over B) is

evident i# the time be taken as limited in one direction4 #or as the part will be passed over in less time than the whole$ the time occupied in traversin/ this part must be #inite$ the limit in one direction bein/ /iven! *he same reasonin/ will also show the #alsity o# the assumption that in#inite len/th can be traversed in a #inite time! 7t is evident$ then$ #rom what has been said that neither a line nor a sur#ace nor in #act anythin/ continuous can be indivisible! *his conclusion #ollows not only #rom the present ar/ument but #rom the consideration that the opposite assumption implies the divisibility o# the indivisible! 0or since the distinction o# .uicker and slower may apply to motions occupyin/ any period o# time and in an e.ual time the .uicker passes over a /reater len/th$ it may happen that it will pass over a len/th twice$ or one and a hal# times$ as /reat as that passed over by the slower4 #or their respective velocities may stand to one another in this proportion! Suppose$ then$ that the .uicker has in the same time been carried over a len/th one and a hal# times as /reat as that traversed by the slower$ and that the respective ma/nitudes are divided$ that o# the .uicker$ the ma/nitude AB,D$ into three indivisibles$ and that o# the slower into the two indivisibles )G$ GH! *hen the time may also be divided into three indivisibles$ #or an e.ual ma/nitude will be passed over in an e.ual time! Suppose then that it is thus divided into +:$ :m$ M1! A/ain$ since in the same time the slower has been carried over )9$ GH$ the time may also be similarly divided into two! *hus the indivisible will be divisible$ and that which has no parts will be passed over not in an indivisible but in a /reater time! 7t is evident$ there#ore$ that nothin/ continuous is without parts! Part 3 *he present also is necessarily indivisible-the present$ that is$ not in the sense in which the word is applied to one thin/ in virtue o# another$ but in its proper and primary sense2 in which sense it is inherent in all time! 0or the present is somethin/ that is an e%tremity o# the past 5no part o# the #uture bein/ on this side o# it6 and also o# the #uture 5no part o# the past bein/ on the other side o# it64 it is$ as we have said$ a limit o# both! And i# it is once shown that it is essentially o# this character and one and the same$ it will at once be evident also that it is indivisible! 1ow the present that is the e%tremity o# both times must be one and the same4 #or i# each e%tremity were di##erent$ the one could not be in succession to the other$ because nothin/ continuous can be composed o# thin/s havin/ no parts4 and i# the one is apart #rom the other$ there will be time intermediate between them$ because everythin/ continuous is such that there is somethin/ intermediate between its limits and described by the same name as itsel#! But i# the intermediate thin/ is time$ it will be divisible4 #or all time has been shown to be divisible! *hus on this assumption the present is divisible! But i# the present is divisible$ there will be part o# the past in the

#uture and part o# the #uture in the past4 #or past time will be marked o## #rom #uture time at the actual point o# division! Also the present will be a present not in the proper sense but in virtue o# somethin/ else4 #or the division which yields it will not be a division proper! 0urthermore$ there will be a part o# the present that is past and a part that is #uture$ and it will not always be the same part that is past or #uture4 in #act one and the same present will not be simultaneous4 #or the time may be divided at many points! 7#$ there#ore$ the present cannot possibly have these characteristics$ it #ollows that it must be the same present that belon/s to each o# the two times! But i# this is so it is evident that the present is also indivisible4 #or i# it is divisible it will be involved in the same implications as be#ore! 7t is clear$ then$ #rom what has been said that time contains somethin/ indivisible$ and this is what we call a present! "e will now show that nothin/ can be in motion in a present! 0or i# this is possible$ there can be both .uicker and slower motion in the present! Suppose then that in the present 1 the .uicker has traversed the distance AB! *hat bein/ so$ the slower will in the same present traverse a distance less than AB$ say A,! But since the slower will have occupied the whole present in traversin/ A,$ the .uicker will occupy less than this in traversin/ it! *hus we shall have a division o# the present$ whereas we #ound it to be indivisible! 7t is impossible$ there#ore$ #or anythin/ to be in motion in a present! 1or can anythin/ be at rest in a present4 #or$ as we were sayin/$ only can be at rest which is naturally desi/ned to be in motion but is not in motion when$ where$ or as it would naturally be so4 since$ there#ore$ nothin/ is naturally desi/ned to be in motion in a present$ it is clear that nothin/ can be at rest in a present either! Moreover$ inasmuch as it is the same present that belon/s to both the times$ and it is possible #or a thin/ to be in motion throu/hout one time and to be at rest throu/hout the other$ and that which is in motion or at rest #or the whole o# a time will be in motion or at rest as the case may be in any part o# it in which it is naturally desi/ned to be in motion or at rest4 this bein/ so$ the assumption that there can be motion or rest in a present will carry with it the implication that the same thin/ can at the same time be at rest and in motion4 #or both the times have the same e%tremity$ vi9! the present! A/ain$ when we say that a thin/ is at rest$ we imply that its condition in whole and in part is at the time o# speakin/ uni#orm with what it was previously4 but the present contains no 3previously34 conse.uently$ there can be no rest in it! 7t #ollows then that the motion o# that which is in motion and the rest o# that which is at rest must occupy time! Part 4

0urther$ everythin/ that chan/es must be divisible! 0or since every chan/e is #rom somethin/ to somethin/$ and when a thin/ is at the /oal o# its chan/e it is no lon/er chan/in/$ and when both it itsel# and all its parts are at the startin/-point o# its chan/e it is not chan/in/ 5#or that which is in whole and in part in an unvaryin/ condition is not in a state o# chan/e62 it #ollows$ there#ore$ that part o# that which is chan/in/ must be at the startin/-point and part at the /oal4 #or as a whole it cannot be in both or in neither! 5Here by 3/oal o# chan/e3 7 mean that which comes #irst in the process o# chan/e4 e!/! in a process o# chan/e #rom white the /oal in .uestion will be /rey$ not black4 #or it is not necessary that that that which is chan/in/ should be at either o# the e%tremes!6 7t is evident$ there#ore$ that everythin/ that chan/es must be divisible! 1ow motion is divisible in two senses! 7n the #irst place it is divisible in virtue o# the time that it occupies! 7n the second place it is divisible accordin/ to the motions o# the several parts o# that which is in motion4 e!/! i# the whole A, is in motion$ there will be a motion o# AB and a motion o# B,! *hat bein/ so$ let D) be the motion o# the part AB and )G the motion o# the part B,! *hen the whole D9 must be the motion o# A,4 #or DG must constitute the motion o# A, inasmuch as D) and )G severally constitute the motions o# each o# its parts! But the motion o# a thin/ can never be constituted by the motion o# somethin/ else4 conse.uently the whole motion is the motion o# the whole ma/nitude! A/ain$ since every motion is a motion o# somethin/$ and the whole motion DG is not the motion o# either o# the parts 5#or each o# the parts D)$ )G is the motion o# one o# the parts AB$ B,6 or o# anythin/ else 5#or$ the whole motion bein/ the motion o# a whole$ the parts o# the motion are the motions o# the parts o# that whole4 and the parts o# DG are the motions o# AB$ B, and o# nothin/ else4 #or$ as we saw$ a motion that is one cannot be the motion o# more thin/s than one64 since this is so$ the whole motion will be the motion o# the ma/nitude AB,! A/ain$ i# there is a motion o# the whole other than DG$ say the the o# each o# the arts may be subtracted #rom it4 and these motions will be e.ual to D)$ )G respectively4 #or the motion o# that which is one must be one! So i# the whole motion O7 may be divided into the motions o# the parts$ O7 will be e.ual to DG4 i# on the other hand there is any remainder$ say +7$ this will be a motion o# nothin/4 #or it can be the motion neither o# the whole nor o# the parts 5as the motion o# that which is one must be one6 nor o# anythin/ else4 #or a motion that is continuous must be the motion o# thin/s that are continuous! And the same result #ollows i# the division o# O7 reveals a surplus on the side o# the motions o# the parts! Conse.uently$ i# this is impossible$ the whole motion must be the same as and e.ual to DG! *his then is what is meant by the division o# motion accordin/ to the

motions o# the parts4 and it must be applicable to everythin/ that is divisible into parts! Motion is also susceptible o# another kind o# division$ that accordin/ to time! 0or since all motion is in time and all time is divisible$ and in less time the motion is less$ it #ollows that every motion must be divisible accordin/ to time! And since everythin/ that is in motion is in motion in a certain sphere and #or a certain time and has a motion belon/in/ to it$ it #ollows that the time$ the motion$ the bein/-in-motion$ the thin/ that is in motion$ and the sphere o# the motion must all be susceptible o# the same divisions 5thou/h spheres o# motion are not all divisible in a like manner4 thus .uantity is essentially$ .uality accidentally divisible6! 0or suppose that A is the time occupied by the motion B! *hen i# all the time has been occupied by the whole motion$ it will take less o# the motion to occupy hal# the time$ less a/ain to occupy a #urther subdivision o# the time$ and so on to in#inity! A/ain$ the time will be divisible similarly to the motion4 #or i# the whole motion occupies all the time hal# the motion will occupy hal# the time$ and less o# the motion a/ain will occupy less o# the time! 7n the same way the bein/-in-motion will also be divisible! 0or let , be the whole bein/-in-motion! *hen the bein/-in-motion that corresponds to hal# the motion will be less than the whole bein/-in-motion$ that which corresponds to a .uarter o# the motion will be less a/ain$ and so on to in#inity! Moreover by settin/ out successively the bein/-in-motion correspondin/ to each o# the two motions D, 5say6 and ,)$ we may ar/ue that the whole bein/-in-motion will correspond to the whole motion 5#or i# it were some other bein/-in-motion that corresponded to the whole motion$ there would be more than one bein/-in motion correspondin/ to the same motion6$ the ar/ument bein/ the same as that whereby we showed that the motion o# a thin/ is divisible into the motions o# the parts o# the thin/4 #or i# we take separately the bein/-in motion correspondin/ to each o# the two motions$ we shall see that the whole bein/-in motion is continuous! *he same reasonin/ will show the divisibility o# the len/th$ and in #act o# everythin/ that #orms a sphere o# chan/e 5thou/h some o# these are only accidentally divisible because that which chan/es is so64 #or the division o# one term will involve the division o# all! So$ too$ in the matter o# their bein/ #inite or in#inite$ they will all alike be either the one or the other! And we now see that in most cases the #act that all the terms are divisible or in#inite is a direct conse.uence o# the #act that the thin/ that chan/es is divisible or in#inite4 #or the attributes 3divisible3 and 3in#inite3 belon/ in the #irst instance to the thin/ that chan/es! *hat divisibility does so we have already shown4 that in#inity does so will be made clear in what #ollows8 Part 5 Since everythin/ that chan/es chan/es #rom somethin/ to somethin/$ that

which has chan/ed must at the moment when it has #irst chan/ed be in that to which it has chan/ed! 0or that which chan/es retires #rom or leaves that #rom which it chan/es4 and leavin/$ i# not identical with chan/in/$ is at any rate a conse.uence o# it! And i# leavin/ is a conse.uence o# chan/in/$ havin/ le#t is a conse.uence o# havin/ chan/ed4 #or there is a like relation between the two in each case! One kind o# chan/e$ then$ bein/ chan/e in a relation o# contradiction$ where a thin/ has chan/ed #rom not-bein/ to bein/ it has le#t not-bein/! *here#ore it will be in bein/4 #or everythin/ must either be or not be! 7t is evident$ then$ that in contradictory chan/e that which has chan/ed must be in that to which it has chan/ed! And i# this is true in this kind o# chan/e$ it will be true in all other kinds as well4 #or in this matter what holds /ood in the case o# one will hold /ood likewise in the case o# the rest! Moreover$ i# we take each kind o# chan/e separately$ the truth o# our conclusion will be e.ually evident$ on the /round that that that which has chan/ed must be somewhere or in somethin/! 0or$ since it has le#t that #rom which it has chan/ed and must be somewhere$ it must be either in that to which it has chan/ed or in somethin/ else! 7#$ then$ that which has chan/ed to B is in somethin/ other than B$ say ,$ it must a/ain be chan/in/ #rom , to B4 #or it cannot be assumed that there is no interval between , and B$ since chan/e is continuous! *hus we have the result that the thin/ that has chan/ed$ at the moment when it has chan/ed$ is chan/in/ to that to which it has chan/ed$ which is impossible4 that which has chan/ed$ there#ore$ must be in that to which it has chan/ed! So it is evident likewise that that that which has come to be$ at the moment when it has come to be$ will be$ and that which has ceased to be will not-be4 #or what we have said applies universally to every kind o# chan/e$ and its truth is most obvious in the case o# contradictory chan/e! 7t is clear$ then$ that that which has chan/ed$ at the moment when it has #irst chan/ed$ is in that to which it has chan/ed! "e will now show that the 3primary when3 in which that which has chan/ed e##ected the completion o# its chan/e must be indivisible$ where by 3primary3 7 mean possessin/ the characteristics in .uestion o# itsel# and not in virtue o# the possession o# them by somethin/ else belon/in/ to it! 0or let A, be divisible$ and let it be divided at B! 7# then the completion o# chan/e has been e##ected in AB or a/ain in B,$ A, cannot be the primary thin/ in which the completion o# chan/e has been e##ected! 7#$ on the other hand$ it has been chan/in/ in both AB and B, 5#or it must either have chan/ed or be chan/in/ in each o# them6$ it must have been chan/in/ in the whole A,4 but our assumption was that A, contains only the completion o# the chan/e! 7t is e.ually impossible to suppose that one part o# A, contains the process and the other the completion o# the chan/e4 #or then we shall have somethin/ prior to what is primary! So that in which the completion o# chan/e has been e##ected must be indivisible! 7t is also evident$ there#ore$ that that that in which that which has ceased to be has ceased to be and that

in which that which has come to be has come to be are indivisible! But there are two senses o# the e%pression 3the primary when in which somethin/ has chan/ed3! On the one hand it may mean the primary when containin/ the completion o# the process o# chan/e- the moment when it is correct to say 3it has chan/ed34 on the other hand it may mean the primary when containin/ the be/innin/ o# the process o# chan/e! 1ow the primary when that has re#erence to the end o# the chan/e is somethin/ really e%istent4 #or a chan/e may really be completed$ and there is such a thin/ as an end o# chan/e$ which we have in #act shown to be indivisible because it is a limit! But that which has re#erence to the be/innin/ is not e%istent at all4 #or there is no such thin/ as a be/innin/ o# a process o# chan/e$ and the time occupied by the chan/e does not contain any primary when in which the chan/e be/an! 0or suppose that AD is such a primary when! *hen it cannot be indivisible4 #or$ i# it were$ the moment immediately precedin/ the chan/e and the moment in which the chan/e be/ins would be consecutive 5and moments cannot be consecutive6! A/ain$ i# the chan/in/ thin/ is at rest in the whole precedin/ time ,A 5#or we may suppose that it is at rest6$ it is at rest in A also4 so i# AD is without parts$ it will simultaneously be at rest and have chan/ed4 #or it is at rest in A and has chan/ed in D! Since then AD is not without parts$ it must be divisible$ and the chan/in/ thin/ must have chan/ed in every part o# it 5#or i# it has chan/ed in neither o# the two parts into which AD is divided$ it has not chan/ed in the whole either4 i#$ on the other hand$ it is in process o# chan/e in both parts$ it is likewise in process o# chan/e in the whole4 and i#$ a/ain$ it has chan/ed in one o# the two parts$ the whole is not the primary when in which it has chan/ed4 it must there#ore have chan/ed in every part6! 7t is evident$ then$ that with re#erence to the be/innin/ o# chan/e there is no primary when in which chan/e has been e##ected4 #or the divisions are in#inite! So$ too$ o# that which has chan/ed there is no primary part that has chan/ed! 0or suppose that o# A) the primary part that has chan/ed is A9 5everythin/ that chan/es havin/ been shown to be divisible64 and let O7 be the time in which DG has chan/ed! 7#$ then$ in the whole time DG has chan/ed$ in hal# the time there will be a part that has chan/ed$ less than and there#ore prior to DG4 and a/ain there will be another part prior to this$ and yet another$ and so on to in#inity! *hus o# that which chan/es there cannot be any primary part that has chan/ed! 7t is evident$ then$ #rom what has been said$ that neither o# that which chan/es nor o# the time in which it chan/es is there any primary part! "ith re/ard$ however$ to the actual sub-ect o# chan/e-that is to say that in respect o# which a thin/ chan/es-there is a di##erence to be observed! 0or in a process o# chan/e we may distin/uish three terms-that which chan/es$ that in which it chan/es$ and the actual sub-ect o# chan/e$ e!/! the man$ the time$ and the #air comple%ion! O# these the man and the time are divisible4 but with the #air comple%ion it is otherwise 5thou/h they are all divisible

accidentally$ #or that in which the #air comple%ion or any other .uality is an accident is divisible6! 0or o# actual sub-ects o# chan/e it will be seen that those which are classed as essentially$ not accidentally$ divisible have no primary part! *ake the case o# ma/nitudes4 let AB be a ma/nitude$ and suppose that it has moved #rom B to a primary 3where3 ,! *hen i# B, is taken to be indivisible$ two thin/s without parts will have to be conti/uous 5which is impossible64 i# on the other hand it is taken to be divisible$ there will be somethin/ prior to , to which the ma/nitude has chan/ed$ and somethin/ else a/ain prior to that$ and so on to in#inity$ because the process o# division may be continued without end! *hus there can be no primary 3where3 to which a thin/ has chan/ed! And i# we take the case o# .uantitative chan/e$ we shall /et a like result$ #or here too the chan/e is in somethin/ continuous! 7t is evident$ then$ that only in .ualitative motion can there be anythin/ essentially indivisible! Part 6 1ow everythin/ that chan/es chan/es time$ and that in two senses4 #or the time in which a thin/ is said to chan/e may be the primary time$ or on the other hand it may have an e%tended re#erence$ as e!/! when we say that a thin/ chan/es in a particular year because it chan/es in a particular day! *hat bein/ so$ that which chan/es must be chan/in/ in any part o# the primary time in which it chan/es! *his is clear #rom our de#inition o# 3primary3$ in which the word is said to e%press -ust this4 it may also$ however$ be made evident by the #ollowin/ ar/ument! :et ChRh be the primary time in which that which is in motion is in motion4 and 5as all time is divisible6 let it be divided at +! 1ow in the time Ch+ it either is in motion or is not in motion$ and the same is likewise true o# the time +Rh! *hen i# it is in motion in neither o# the two parts$ it will be at rest in the whole4 #or it is impossible that it should be in motion in a time in no part o# which it is in motion! 7# on the other hand it is in motion in only one o# the two parts o# the time$ ChRh cannot be the primary time in which it is in motion4 #or its motion will have re#erence to a time other than ChRh! 7t must$ then$ have been in motion in any part o# ChRh! And now that this has been proved$ it is evident that everythin/ that is in motion must have been in motion be#ore! 0or i# that which is in motion has traversed the distance +: in the primary time ChRh$ in hal# the time a thin/ that is in motion with e.ual velocity and be/an its motion at the same time will have traversed hal# the distance! But i# this second thin/ whose velocity is e.ual has traversed a certain distance in a certain time$ the ori/inal thin/ that is in motion must have traversed the same distance in the same time! Hence that which is in motion must have been in motion be#ore! A/ain$ i# by takin/ the e%treme moment o# the time-#or it is the moment that de#ines the time$ and time is that which is intermediate between momentswe are enabled to say that motion has taken place in the whole time ChRh or

in #act in any period o# it$ motion may likewise be said to have taken place in every other such period! But hal# the time #inds an e%treme in the point o# division! *here#ore motion will have taken place in hal# the time and in #act in any part o# it4 #or as soon as any division is made there is always a time de#ined by moments! 7#$ then$ all time is divisible$ and that which is intermediate between moments is time$ everythin/ that is chan/in/ must have completed an in#inite number o# chan/es! A/ain$ since a thin/ that chan/es continuously and has not perished or ceased #rom its chan/e must either be chan/in/ or have chan/ed in any part o# the time o# its chan/e$ and since it cannot be chan/in/ in a moment$ it #ollows that it must have chan/ed at every moment in the time4 conse.uently$ since the moments are in#inite in number$ everythin/ that is chan/in/ must have completed an in#inite number o# chan/es! And not only must that which is chan/in/ have chan/ed$ but that which has chan/ed must also previously have been chan/in/$ since everythin/ that has chan/ed #rom somethin/ to somethin/ has chan/ed in a period o# time! 0or suppose that a thin/ has chan/ed #rom A to B in a moment! 1ow the moment in which it has chan/ed cannot be the same as that in which it is at A 5since in that case it would be in A and B at once64 #or we have shown above that that that which has chan/ed$ when it has chan/ed$ is not in that #rom which it has chan/ed! 7#$ on the other hand$ it is a di##erent moment$ there will be a period o# time intermediate between the two4 #or$ as we saw$ moments are not consecutive! Since$ then$ it has chan/ed in a period o# time$ and all time is divisible$ in hal# the time it will have completed another chan/e$ in a .uarter another$ and so on to in#inity4 conse.uently when it has chan/ed$ it must have previously been chan/in/! Moreover$ the truth o# what has been said is more evident in the case o# ma/nitude$ because the ma/nitude over which what is chan/in/ chan/es is continuous! 0or suppose that a thin/ has chan/ed #rom , to D! *hen i# ,D is indivisible$ two thin/s without parts will be consecutive! But since this is impossible$ that which is intermediate between them must be a ma/nitude and divisible into an in#inite number o# se/ments4 conse.uently$ be#ore the chan/e is completed$ the thin/ chan/es to those se/ments! )verythin/ that has chan/ed$ there#ore$ must previously have been chan/in/4 #or the same proo# also holds /ood o# chan/e with respect to what is not continuous$ chan/es$ that is to say$ between contraries and between contradictories! 7n such cases we have only to take the time in which a thin/ has chan/ed and a/ain apply the same reasonin/! So that which has chan/ed must have been chan/in/ and that which is chan/in/ must have chan/ed$ and a process o# chan/e is preceded by a completion o# chan/e and a completion by a process4 and we can never take any sta/e and say that it is absolutely the #irst! *he reason o# this is that no two thin/s without parts can be conti/uous$ and there#ore in chan/e the process o# division is in#inite$ -ust as lines may be in#initely divided so that one part is continually increasin/ and

the other continually decreasin/! So it is evident also that that that which has become must previously have been in process o# becomin/$ and that which is in process o# becomin/ must previously have become$ everythin/ 5that is6 that is divisible and continuous4 thou/h it is not always the actual thin/ that is in process o# becomin/ o# which this is true4 sometimes it is somethin/ else$ that is to say$ some part o# the thin/ in .uestion$ e!/! the #oundation-stone o# a house! So$ too$ in the case o# that which is perishin/ and that which has perished4 #or that which becomes and that which perishes must contain an element o# in#initeness as an immediate conse.uence o# the #act that they are continuous thin/s4 and so a thin/ cannot be in process o# becomin/ without havin/ become or have become without havin/ been in process o# becomin/! So$ too$ in the case o# perishin/ and havin/ perished4 perishin/ must be preceded by havin/ perished$ and havin/ perished must be preceded by perishin/! 7t is evident$ then$ that that which has become must previously have been in process o# becomin/$ and that which is in process o# becomin/ must previously have become4 #or all ma/nitudes and all periods o# time are in#initely divisible! Conse.uently no absolutely #irst sta/e o# chan/e can be represented by any particular part o# space or time which the chan/in/ thin/ may occupy! Part 7 1ow since the motion o# everythin/ that is in motion occupies a period o# time$ and a /reater ma/nitude is traversed in a lon/er time$ it is impossible that a thin/ should under/o a #inite motion in an in#inite time$ i# this is understood to mean not that the same motion or a part o# it is continually repeated$ but that the whole in#inite time is occupied by the whole #inite motion! 7n all cases where a thin/ is in motion with uni#orm velocity it is clear that the #inite ma/nitude is traversed in a #inite time! 0or i# we take a part o# the motion which shall be a measure o# the whole$ the whole motion is completed in as many e.ual periods o# the time as there are parts o# the motion! Conse.uently$ since these parts are #inite$ both in si9e individually and in number collectively$ the whole time must also be #inite4 #or it will be a multiple o# the portion$ e.ual to the time occupied in completin/ the a#oresaid part multiplied by the number o# the parts! But it makes no di##erence even i# the velocity is not uni#orm! 0or let us suppose that the line AB represents a #inite stretch over which a thin/ has been moved in the /iven time$ and let ,D be the in#inite time! 1ow i# one part o# the stretch must have been traversed be#ore another part 5this is clear$ that in the earlier and in the later part o# the time a di##erent part o# the stretch has been traversed4 #or as the time len/thens a di##erent part o# the motion will always be completed in it$ whether the thin/ in motion chan/es with uni#orm velocity or not4 and whether the rate o# motion increases or diminishes or remains stationary this is none the less so6$ let us then take A)

a part o# the whole stretch o# motion AB which shall be a measure o# AB! 1ow this part o# the motion occupies a certain period o# the in#inite time4 it cannot itsel# occupy an in#inite time$ #or we are assumin/ that that is occupied by the whole AB! And i# a/ain 7 take another part e.ual to A)$ that also must occupy a #inite time in conse.uence o# the same assumption! And i# 7 /o on takin/ parts in this way$ on the one hand there is no part which will be a measure o# the in#inite time 5#or the in#inite cannot be composed o# #inite parts whether e.ual or une.ual$ because there must be some unity which will be a measure o# thin/s #inite in multitude or in ma/nitude$ which$ whether they are e.ual or une.ual$ are none the less limited in ma/nitude62 while on the other hand the #inite stretch o# motion AB is a certain multiple o# A)4 conse.uently the motion AB must be accomplished in a #inite time! Moreover it is the same with comin/ to rest as with motion! And so it is impossible #or one and the same thin/ to be in#initely in process o# becomin/ or o# perishin/! *he reasonin/ he will prove that in a #inite time there cannot be an in#inite e%tent o# motion or o# comin/ to rest$ whether the motion is re/ular or irre/ular! 0or i# we take a part which shall be a measure o# the whole time$ in this part a certain #raction$ not the whole$ o# the ma/nitude will be traversed$ because we assume that the traversin/ o# the whole occupies all the time! A/ain$ in another e.ual part o# the time another part o# the ma/nitude will be traversed4 and similarly in each part o# the time that we take$ whether e.ual or une.ual to the part ori/inally taken! 7t makes no di##erence whether the parts are e.ual or not$ i# only each is #inite4 #or it is clear that while the time is e%hausted by the subtraction o# its parts$ the in#inite ma/nitude will not be thus e%hausted$ since the process o# subtraction is #inite both in respect o# the .uantity subtracted and o# the number o# times a subtraction is made! Conse.uently the in#inite ma/nitude will not be traversed in #inite time4 and it makes no di##erence whether the ma/nitude is in#inite in only one direction or in both4 #or the same reasonin/ will hold /ood! *his havin/ been proved$ it is evident that neither can a #inite ma/nitude traverse an in#inite ma/nitude in a #inite time$ the reason bein/ the same as that /iven above4 in part o# the time it will traverse a #inite ma/nitude and in each several part likewise$ so that in the whole time it will traverse a #inite ma/nitude! And since a #inite ma/nitude will not traverse an in#inite in a #inite time$ it is clear that neither will an in#inite traverse a #inite in a #inite time! 0or i# the in#inite could traverse the #inite$ the #inite could traverse the in#inite2 #or it makes no di##erence which o# the two is the thin/ in motion2 either case involves the traversin/ o# the in#inite by the #inite! 0or when the in#inite ma/nitude A is in motion a part o# it$ say ,D$ will occupy the #inite and then another$ and then another$ and so on to in#inity! *hus the two results will coincide4 the in#inite will have completed a motion over the #inite and the #inite will have traversed the in#inite4 #or it would seem to be impossible #or the motion o# the in#inite over the #inite to occur in any way other than

by the #inite traversin/ the in#inite either by locomotion over it or by measurin/ it! *here#ore$ since this is impossible$ the in#inite cannot traverse the #inite! 1or a/ain will the in#inite traverse the in#inite in a #inite time! Otherwise it would also traverse the #inite$ #or the in#inite includes the #inite! "e can #urther prove this in the same way by takin/ the time as our startin/-point! Since$ then$ it is established that in a #inite time neither will the #inite traverse the in#inite$ nor the in#inite the #inite$ nor the in#inite the in#inite$ it is evident also that in a #inite time there cannot be in#inite motion4 #or what di##erence does it make whether we take the motion or the ma/nitude to be in#inite8 7# either o# the two is in#inite$ the other must be so likewise4 #or all locomotion is in space! Part Since everythin/ to which motion or rest is natural is in motion or at rest in the natural time$ place$ and manner$ that which is comin/ to a stand$ when it is comin/ to a stand$ must be in motion4 #or i# it is not in motion it must be at rest4 but that which is at rest cannot be comin/ to rest! 0rom this it evidently #ollows that comin/ to a stand must occupy a period o# time4 #or the motion o# that which is in motion occupies a period o# time$ and that which is comin/ to a stand has been shown to be in motion4 conse.uently comin/ to a stand must occupy a period o# time! A/ain$ since the terms 3.uicker3 and 3slower3 are used only o# that which occupies a period o# time$ and the process o# comin/ to a stand may be .uicker or slower$ the same conclusion #ollows! And that which is comin/ to a stand must be comin/ to a stand in any part o# the primary time in which it is comin/ to a stand! 0or i# it is comin/ to a stand in neither o# two parts into which the time may be divided$ it cannot be comin/ to a stand in the whole time$ with the result that that that which is comin/ to a stand will not be comin/ to a stand! 7# on the other hand it is comin/ to a stand in only one o# the two parts o# the time$ the whole cannot be the primary time in which it is comin/ to a stand4 #or it is comin/ to a stand in the whole time not primarily but in virtue o# somethin/ distinct #rom itsel#$ the ar/ument bein/ the same as that which we used above about thin/s in motion! And -ust as there is no primary time in which that which is in motion is in motion$ so too there is no primary time in which that which is comin/ to a stand is comin/ to a stand$ there bein/ no primary sta/e either o# bein/ in motion or o# comin/ to a stand! 0or let AB be the primary time in which a thin/ is comin/ to a stand! 1ow AB cannot be without parts4 #or there cannot be motion in that which is without parts$ because the movin/ thin/

would necessarily have been already moved #or part o# the time o# its movement4 and that which is comin/ to a stand has been shown to be in motion! But since Ab is there#ore divisible$ the thin/ is comin/ to a stand in every one o# the parts o# AB4 #or we have shown above that it is comin/ to a stand in every one o# the parts in which it is primarily comin/ to a stand! Since then$ that in which primarily a thin/ is comin/ to a stand must be a period o# time and not somethin/ indivisible$ and since all time is in#initely divisible$ there cannot be anythin/ in which primarily it is comin/ to a stand! 1or a/ain can there be a primary time at which the bein/ at rest o# that which is at rest occurred4 #or it cannot have occurred in that which has no parts$ because there cannot be motion in that which is indivisible$ and that in which rest takes place is the same as that in which motion takes place4 #or we de#ined a state o# rest to be the state o# a thin/ to which motion is natural but which is not in motion when 5that is to say in that in which6 motion would be natural to it! A/ain$ our use o# the phrase 3bein/ at rest3 also implies that the previous state o# a thin/ is still unaltered$ not one point only but two at least bein/ thus needed to determine its presence4 conse.uently that in which a thin/ is at rest cannot be without parts! Since$ then it is divisible$ it must be a period o# time$ and the thin/ must be at rest in every one o# its parts$ as may be shown by the same method as that used above in similar demonstrations! So there can be no primary part o# the time4 and the reason is that rest and motion are always in a period o# time$ and a period o# time has no primary part any more than a ma/nitude or in #act anythin/ continuous4 #or everythin/ continuous is divisible into an in#inite number o# parts! And since everythin/ that is in motion is in motion in a period o# time and chan/es #rom somethin/ to somethin/$ when its motion is comprised within a particular period o# time essentially-that is to say when it #ills the whole and not merely a part o# the time in .uestion-it is impossible that in that time that which is in motion should be over a/ainst some particular thin/ primarily! 0or i# a thin/-itsel# and each o# its parts-occupies the same space #or a de#inite period o# time$ it is at rest4 #or it is in -ust these circumstances that we use the term 3bein/ at rest3-when at one moment a#ter another it can be said with truth that a thin/$ itsel# and its parts$ occupies the same space! So i# this is bein/ at rest it is impossible #or that which is chan/in/ to be as a whole$ at the time when it is primarily chan/in/$ over a/ainst any particular thin/ 5#or the whole period o# time is divisible6$ so that in one part o# it a#ter another it will be true to say that the thin/$ itsel# and its parts$ occupies the same space! 7# this is not so and the a#oresaid proposition is true only at a sin/le moment$ then the thin/ will be over a/ainst a particular thin/ not #or any period o# time but only at a moment that limits the time! 7t is true that at any moment it is always over a/ainst somethin/ stationary4 but it is not at rest4 #or at a moment it is not possible #or anythin/ to be either in motion or

at rest! So while it is true to say that that which is in motion is at a moment not in motion and is opposite some particular thin/$ it cannot in a period o# time be over a/ainst that which is at rest4 #or that would involve the conclusion that that which is in locomotion is at rest! Part ! Geno3s reasonin/$ however$ is #allacious$ when he says that i# everythin/ when it occupies an e.ual space is at rest$ and i# that which is in locomotion is always occupyin/ such a space at any moment$ the #lyin/ arrow is there#ore motionless! *his is #alse$ #or time is not composed o# indivisible moments any more than any other ma/nitude is composed o# indivisibles! Geno3s ar/uments about motion$ which cause so much dis.uietude to those who try to solve the problems that they present$ are #our in number! *he #irst asserts the non-e%istence o# motion on the /round that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the hal#-way sta/e be#ore it arrives at the /oal! *his we have discussed above! *he second is the so-called 3Achilles3$ and it amounts to this$ that in a race the .uickest runner can never overtake the slowest$ since the pursuer must #irst reach the point whence the pursued started$ so that the slower must always hold a lead! *his ar/ument is the same in principle as that which depends on bisection$ thou/h it di##ers #rom it in that the spaces with which we successively have to deal are not divided into halves! *he result o# the ar/ument is that the slower is not overtaken4 but it proceeds alon/ the same lines as the bisection-ar/ument 5#or in both a division o# the space in a certain way leads to the result that the /oal is not reached$ thou/h the 3Achilles3 /oes #urther in that it a##irms that even the .uickest runner in le/endary tradition must #ail in his pursuit o# the slowest6$ so that the solution must be the same! And the a%iom that that which holds a lead is never overtaken is #alse4 it is not overtaken$ it is true$ while it holds a lead4 but it is overtaken nevertheless i# it is /ranted that it traverses the #inite distance prescribed! *hese then are two o# his ar/uments! *he third is that already /iven above$ to the e##ect that the #lyin/ arrow is at rest$ which result #ollows #rom the assumption that time is composed o# moments4 i# this assumption is not /ranted$ the conclusion will not #ollow! *he #ourth ar/ument is that concernin/ the two rows o# bodies$ each row bein/ composed o# an e.ual number o# bodies o# e.ual si9e$ passin/ each other on a race-course as they proceed with e.ual velocity in opposite directions$ the one row ori/inally occupyin/ the space between the /oal and the middle point o# the course and the other that between the middle point and the startin/-post! *his$ he thinks$ involves the conclusion that hal# a /iven time is e.ual to double that time! *he #allacy o# the reasonin/ lies in the assumption that a body occupies an e.ual time in passin/ with e.ual

velocity a body that is in motion and a body o# e.ual si9e that is at rest2 which is #alse! 0or instance 5so runs the ar/ument6$ let A$ A!!!be the stationary bodies o# e.ual si9e$ B$ B!!!the bodies$ e.ual in number and in si9e to A$ A!!!$ori/inally occupyin/ the hal# o# the course #rom the startin/-post to the middle o# the A3s$ and ,$ ,!!!those ori/inally occupyin/ the other hal# #rom the /oal to the middle o# the A3s$ e.ual in number$ si9e$ and velocity to B$ B!!!!*hen three conse.uences #ollow4 0irst$ as the B3s and the ,3s pass one another$ the #irst B reaches the last , at the same moment as the #irst , reaches the last B! Secondly at this moment the #irst , has passed all the A3s$ whereas the #irst B has passed only hal# the A3s$ and has conse.uently occupied only hal# the time occupied by the #irst ,$ since each o# the two occupies an e.ual time in passin/ each A! *hirdly$ at the same moment all the B3s have passed all the ,3s4 #or the #irst , and the #irst B will simultaneously reach the opposite ends o# the course$ since 5so says Geno6 the time occupied by the #irst , in passin/ each o# the B3s is e.ual to that occupied by it in passin/ each o# the A3s$ because an e.ual time is occupied by both the #irst B and the #irst , in passin/ all the A3s! *his is the ar/ument$ but it presupposed the a#oresaid #allacious assumption! 1or in re#erence to contradictory chan/e shall we #ind anythin/ unanswerable in the ar/ument that i# a thin/ is chan/in/ #rom not-white$ say$ to white$ and is in neither condition$ then it will be neither white nor notwhite4 #or the #act that it is not wholly in either condition will not preclude us #rom callin/ it white or not-white! "e call a thin/ white or not-white not necessarily because it is be one or the other$ but cause most o# its parts or the most essential parts o# it are so4 not bein/ in a certain condition is di##erent #rom not bein/ wholly in that condition! So$ too$ in the case o# bein/ and not-bein/ and all other conditions which stand in a contradictory relation4 while the chan/in/ thin/ must o# necessity be in one o# the two opposites$ it is never wholly in either! A/ain$ in the case o# circles and spheres and everythin/ whose motion is con#ined within the space that it occupies$ it is not true to say the motion can be nothin/ but rest$ on the /round that such thin/s in motion$ themselves and their parts$ will occupy the same position #or a period o# time$ and that there#ore they will be at once at rest and in motion! 0or in the #irst place the parts do not occupy the same position #or any period o# time4 and in the second place the whole also is always chan/in/ to a di##erent position4 #or i# we take the orbit as described #rom a point A on a circum#erence$ it will not be the same as the orbit as described #rom B or , or any other point on the same circum#erence e%cept in an accidental sense$ the sense that is to say in which a musical man is the same as a man! *hus one orbit is always chan/in/ into another$ and the thin/ will never be at rest! And it is the same with the sphere and everythin/ else whose motion is con#ined within the space that it occupies!

Part 1% Our ne%t point is that that which is without parts cannot be in motion e%cept accidentally4 i!e! it can be in motion only in so #ar as the body or the ma/nitude is in motion and the partless is in motion by inclusion therein$ -ust as that which is in a boat may be in motion in conse.uence o# the locomotion o# the boat$ or a part may be in motion in virtue o# the motion o# the whole! 57t must be remembered$ however$ that by 3that which is without parts3 7 mean that which is .uantitatively indivisible 5and that the case o# the motion o# a part is not e%actly parallel64 #or parts have motions belon/in/ essentially and severally to themselves distinct #rom the motion o# the whole! *he distinction may be seen most clearly in the case o# a revolvin/ sphere$ in which the velocities o# the parts near the centre and o# those on the sur#ace are di##erent #rom one another and #rom that o# the whole2 this implies that there is not one motion but many6! As we have said$ then$ that which is without parts can be in motion in the sense in which a man sittin/ in a boat is in motion when the boat is travellin/$ but it cannot be in motion o# itsel#! 0or suppose that it is chan/in/ #rom AB to B,-either #rom one ma/nitude to another$ or #rom one #orm to another$ or #rom some state to its contradictory-and let D be the primary time in which it under/oes the chan/e! *hen in the time in which it is chan/in/ it must be either in AB or in B, or partly in one and partly in the other4 #or this$ as we saw$ is true o# everythin/ that is chan/in/! 1ow it cannot be partly in each o# the two4 #or then it would be divisible into parts! 1or a/ain can it be in B,4 #or then it will have completed the chan/e$ whereas the assumption is that the chan/e is in process! 7t remains$ then$ that in the time in which it is chan/in/$ it is in Ab! *hat bein/ so$ it will be at rest4 #or$ as we saw$ to be in the same condition #or a period o# time is to be at rest! So it is not possible #or that which has no parts to be in motion or to chan/e in any way4 #or only one condition could have made it possible #or it to have motion$ vi9! that time should be composed o# moments$ in which case at any moment it would have completed a motion or a chan/e$ so that it would never be in motion$ but would always have been in motion! But this we have already shown above to be impossible4 time is not composed o# moments$ -ust as a line is not composed o# points$ and motion is not composed o# starts4 #or this theory simply makes motion consist o# indivisibles in e%actly the same way as time is made to consist o# moments or a len/th o# points! A/ain$ it may be shown in the #ollowin/ way that there can be no motion o# a point or o# any other indivisible! *hat which is in motion can never traverse a space /reater than itsel# without #irst traversin/ a space e.ual to or less than itsel#! *hat bein/ so$ it is evident that the point also must #irst traverse a space e.ual to or less than itsel#! But since it is indivisible$ there can be no space less than itsel# #or it to traverse #irst4 so it will have to traverse a distance e.ual to itsel#! *hus the line will be composed o# points$ #or the point$ as it continually traverses a distance e.ual to itsel#$ will be a measure o# the whole line! But since this is impossible$ it is likewise

impossible #or the indivisible to be in motion! A/ain$ since motion is always in a period o# time and never in a moment$ and all time is divisible$ #or everythin/ that is in motion there must be a time less than that in which it traverses a distance as /reat as itsel#! 0or that in which it is in motion will be a time$ because all motion is in a period o# time2 and all time has been shown above to be divisible! *here#ore$ i# a point is in motion$ there must be a time less than that in which it has itsel# traversed any distance! But this is impossible$ #or in less time it must traverse less distance$ and thus the indivisible will be divisible into somethin/ less than itsel#$ -ust as the time is so divisible4 the #act bein/ that the only condition under which that which is without parts and indivisible could be in motion would have been the possibility o# the in#initely small bein/ in motion in a moment4 #or in the two .uestions-that o# motion in a moment and that o# motion o# somethin/ indivisible-the same principle is involved! Our ne%t point is that no process o# chan/e is in#inite4 #or every chan/e$ whether between contradictories or between contraries$ is a chan/e #rom somethin/ to somethin/! *hus in contradictory chan/es the positive or the ne/ative$ as the case may be$ is the limit$ e!/! bein/ is the limit o# comin/ to be and not-bein/ is the limit o# ceasin/ to be4 and in contrary chan/es the particular contraries are the limits$ since these are the e%treme points o# any such process o# chan/e$ and conse.uently o# every process o# alteration4 #or alteration is always dependent upon some contraries! Similarly contraries are the e%treme points o# processes o# increase and decrease4 the limit o# increase is to be #ound in the complete ma/nitude proper to the peculiar nature o# the thin/ that is increasin/$ while the limit o# decrease is the complete loss o# such ma/nitude! :ocomotion$ it is true$ we cannot show to be #inite in this way$ since it is not always between contraries! But since that which cannot be cut 5in the sense that it is inconceivable that it should be cut$ the term 3cannot3 bein/ used in several senses6-since it is inconceivable that that which in this sense cannot be cut should be in process o# bein/ cut$ and /enerally that that which cannot come to be should be in process o# comin/ to be$ it #ollows that it is inconceivable that that which cannot complete a chan/e should be in process o# chan/in/ to that to which it cannot complete a chan/e! 7#$ then$ it is to be assumed that that which is in locomotion is in process o# chan/in/$ it must be capable o# completin/ the chan/e! Conse.uently its motion is not in#inite$ and it will not be in locomotion over an in#inite distance$ #or it cannot traverse such a distance! 7t is evident$ then$ that a process o# chan/e cannot be in#inite in the sense that it is not de#ined by limits! But it remains to be considered whether it is possible in the sense that one and the same process o# chan/e may be in#inite in respect o# the time which it occupies! 7# it is not one process$ it would seem that there is nothin/ to prevent its bein/ in#inite in this sense2 e!/! i# a process o# locomotion be succeeded by a process o# alteration and that by a

process o# increase and that a/ain by a process o# comin/ to be4 in this way there may be motion #or ever so #ar as the time is concerned$ but it will not be one motion$ because all these motions do not compose one! 7# it is to be one process$ no motion can be in#inite in respect o# the time that it occupies$ with the sin/le e%ception o# rotatory locomotion!

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book $II
Part 1 )verythin/ that is in motion must be moved by somethin/! 0or i# it has not the source o# its motion in itsel# it is evident that it is moved by somethin/ other than itsel#$ #or there must be somethin/ else that moves it! 7# on the other hand it has the source o# its motion in itsel#$ let AB be taken to represent that which is in motion essentially o# itsel# and not in virtue o# the #act that somethin/ belon/in/ to it is in motion! 1ow in the #irst place to assume that Ab$ because it is in motion as a whole and is not moved by

anythin/ e%ternal to itsel#$ is there#ore moved by itsel#-this is -ust as i#$ supposin/ that +: is movin/ :M and is also itsel# in motion$ we were to deny that +M is moved by anythin/ on the /round that it is not evident which is the part that is movin/ it and which the part that is moved! 7n the second place that which is in motion without bein/ moved by anythin/ does not necessarily cease #rom its motion because somethin/ else is at rest$ but a thin/ must be moved by somethin/ i# the #act o# somethin/ else havin/ ceased #rom its motion causes it to be at rest! *hus$ i# this is accepted$ everythin/ that is in motion must be moved by somethin/! 0or AB$ which has been taken to represent that which is in motion$ must be divisible since everythin/ that is in motion is divisible! :et it be divided$ then$ at ,! 1ow i# ,B is not in motion$ then AB will not be in motion4 #or i# it is$ it is clear that A, would be in motion while B, is at rest$ and thus AB cannot be in motion essentially and primarily! But e% hypothesi AB is in motion essentially and primarily! *here#ore i# ,B is not in motion AB will be at rest! But we have a/reed that that which is at rest i# somethin/ else is not in motion must be moved by somethin/! Conse.uently$ everythin/ that is in motion must be moved by somethin/4 #or that which is in motion will always be divisible$ and i# a part o# it is not in motion the whole must be at rest! Since everythin/ that is in motion must be moved by somethin/$ let us take the case in which a thin/ is in locomotion and is moved by somethin/ that is itsel# in motion$ and that a/ain is moved by somethin/ else that is in motion$ and that by somethin/ else$ and so on continually4 then the series cannot /o on to in#inity$ but there must be some #irst movent! 0or let us suppose that this is not so and take the series to be in#inite! :et A then be moved by B$ B by ,$ , by D$ and so on$ each member o# the series bein/ moved by that which comes ne%t to it! *hen since e% hypothesi the movent while causin/ motion is also itsel# in motion$ and the motion o# the moved and the motion o# the movent must proceed simultaneously 5#or the movent is causin/ motion and the moved is bein/ moved simultaneously6 it is evident that the respective motions o# A$ B$ ,$ and each o# the other moved movents are simultaneous! :et us take the motion o# each separately and let ) be the motion o# A$ G o# B$ and H and O respectively the motions o# , and D4 #or thou/h they are all moved severally one by another$ yet we may still take the motion o# each as numerically one$ since every motion is #rom somethin/ to somethin/ and is not in#inite in respect o# its e%treme points! By a motion that is numerically one 7 mean a motion that proceeds #rom somethin/ numerically one and the same to somethin/ numerically one and the same in a period o# time numerically one and the same4 #or a motion may be the same /enerically$ speci#ically$ or numerically4 it is /enerically the same i# it belon/s to the same cate/ory$ e!/! substance or .uality4 it is speci#ically the same i# it proceeds #rom somethin/ speci#ically the same to somethin/ speci#ically the same$ e!/! #rom white to black or #rom /ood to bad$ which is not o# a kind speci#ically distinct4 it is numerically the same i# it proceeds #rom somethin/ numerically one to somethin/ numerically one in the same

period o# time$ e!/! #rom a particular white to a particular black$ or #rom a particular place to a particular place$ in a particular period o# time4 #or i# the period o# time were not one and the same$ the motion would no lon/er be numerically one thou/h it would still be speci#ically one! "e have dealt with this .uestion above! 1ow let us #urther take the time in which A has completed its motion$ and let it be represented by +! *hen since the motion o# A is #inite the time will also be #inite! But since the movents and the thin/s moved are in#inite$ the motion )GHO$ i!e! the motion that is composed o# all the individual motions$ must be in#inite! 0or the motions o# A$ B$ and the others may be e.ual$ or the motions o# the others may be /reater4 but assumin/ what is conceivable$ we #ind that whether they are e.ual or some are /reater$ in both cases the whole motion is in#inite! And since the motion o# A and that o# each o# the others are simultaneous$ the whole motion must occupy the same time as the motion o# A4 but the time occupied by the motion o# A is #inite4 conse.uently the motion will be in#inite in a #inite time$ which is impossible! 7t mi/ht be thou/ht that what we set out to prove has thus been shown$ but our ar/ument so #ar does not prove it$ because it does not yet prove that anythin/ impossible results #rom the contrary supposition4 #or in a #inite time there may be an in#inite motion$ thou/h not o# one thin/$ but o# many4 and in the case that we are considerin/ this is so4 #or each thin/ accomplishes its own motion$ and there is no impossibility in many thin/s bein/ in motion simultaneously! But i# 5as we see to be universally the case6 that which primarily is moved locally and corporeally must be either in contact with or continuous with that which moves it$ the thin/s moved and the movents must be continuous or in contact with one another$ so that to/ether they all #orm a sin/le unity4 whether this unity is #inite or in#inite makes no di##erence to our present ar/ument2 #or in any case since the thin/s in motion are in#inite in number the whole motion will be in#inite$ i#$ as is theoretically possible$ each motion is either e.ual to or /reater than that which #ollows it in the series4 #or we shall take as actual that which is theoretically possible! 7#$ then$ A$ B$ ,$ D #orm an in#inite ma/nitude that passes throu/h the motion )GHO in the #inite time +$ this involves the conclusion that an in#inite motion is passed throu/h in a #inite time4 and whether the ma/nitude in .uestion is #inite or in#inite this is in either case impossible! *here#ore the series must come to an end$ and there must be a #irst movent and a #irst moved4 #or the #act that this impossibility results only #rom the assumption o# a particular case is immaterial$ since the case assumed is theoretically possible$ and the assumption o# a theoretically possible case ou/ht not to /ive rise to any impossible result! Part 2 *hat which is the #irst movement o# a thin/-in the sense that it supplies not 3that #or the sake o# which3 but the source o# the motion-is always to/ether

with that which is moved by it by 3to/ether3 7 mean that there is nothin/ intermediate between them6! *his is universally true wherever one thin/ is moved by another! And since there are three kinds o# motion$ local$ .ualitative$ and .uantitative$ there must also be three kinds o# movent$ that which causes locomotion$ that which causes alteration$ and that which causes increase or decrease! :et us be/in with locomotion$ #or this is the primary motion! )verythin/ that is in locomotion is moved either by itsel# or by somethin/ else! 7n the case o# thin/s that are moved by themselves it is evident that the moved and the movent are to/ether4 #or they contain within themselves their #irst movent$ so that there is nothin/ in between! *he motion o# thin/s that are moved by somethin/ else must proceed in one o# #our ways4 #or there are #our kinds o# locomotion caused by somethin/ other than that which is in motion$ vi9! pullin/$ pushin/$ carryin/$ and twirlin/! All #orms o# locomotion are reducible to these! *hus pushin/ on is a #orm o# pushin/ in which that which is causin/ motion away #rom itsel# #ollows up that which it pushes and continues to push it4 pushin/ o## occurs when the movent does not #ollow up the thin/ that it has moved4 throwin/ when the movent causes a motion away #rom itsel# more violent than the natural locomotion o# the thin/ moved$ which continues its course so lon/ as it is controlled by the motion imparted to it! A/ain$ pushin/ apart and pushin/ to/ether are #orms respectively o# pushin/ o## and pullin/4 pushin/ apart is pushin/ o##$ which may be a motion either away #rom the pusher or away #rom somethin/ else$ while pushin/ to/ether is pullin/$ which may be a motion towards somethin/ else as well as the puller! "e may similarly classi#y all the varieties o# these last two$ e!/! packin/ and combin/4 the #ormer is a #orm o# pushin/ to/ether$ the latter a #orm o# pushin/ apart! *he same is true o# the other processes o# combination and separation 5they will all be #ound to be #orms o# pushin/ apart or o# pushin/ to/ether6$ e%cept such as are involved in the processes o# becomin/ and perishin/! 5At same time it is evident that there is no other kind o# motion but combination and separation4 #or they may all be apportioned to one or other o# those already mentioned!6 A/ain$ inhalin/ is a #orm o# pullin/$ e%halin/ a #orm o# pushin/4 and the same is true o# spittin/ and o# all other motions that proceed throu/h the body$ whether secretive or assimilative$ the assimilative bein/ #orms o# pullin/$ the secretive o# pushin/ o##! All other kinds o# locomotion must be similarly reduced$ #or they all #all under one or other o# our #our heads! And a/ain$ o# these #our$ carryin/ and twirlin/ are to pullin/ and pushin/! 0or carryin/ always #ollows one o# the other three methods$ #or that which is carried is in motion accidentally$ because it is in or upon somethin/ that is in motion$ and that which carries it is in doin/ so bein/ either pulled or pushed or twirled2 thus carryin/ belon/s to all the other three kinds o# motion in common! And twirlin/ is a compound o# pullin/ and pushin/$ #or that which is twirlin/ a thin/ must be pullin/ one part o# the thin/ and pushin/ another part$ since it impels one part away #rom itsel# and another part towards itsel#! 7#$ there#ore$ it can be shown that that which is pushin/ and that which is

pushin/ and pullin/ are ad-acent respectively to that which is bein/ pushed and that which is bein/ pulled$ it will be evident that in all locomotion there is nothin/ intermediate between moved and movent! But the #ormer #act is clear even #rom the de#initions o# pushin/ and pullin/$ #or pushin/ is motion to somethin/ else #rom onesel# or #rom somethin/ else$ and pullin/ is motion #rom somethin/ else to onesel# or to somethin/ else$ when the motion o# that which is pullin/ is .uicker than the motion that would separate #rom one another the two thin/s that are continuous4 #or it is this that causes one thin/ to be pulled on alon/ with the other! 57t mi/ht indeed be thou/ht that there is a #orm o# pullin/ that arises in another way4 that wood$ e!/! pulls #ire in a manner di##erent #rom that described above! But it makes no di##erence whether that which pulls is in motion or is stationary when it is pullin/4 in the latter case it pulls to the place where it is$ while in the #ormer it pulls to the place where it was!6 1ow it is impossible to move anythin/ either #rom onesel# to somethin/ else or somethin/ else to onesel# without bein/ in contact with it4 it is evident$ there#ore$ that in all locomotion there is nothin/ intermediate between moved and movent! 1or a/ain is there anythin/ intermediate between that which under/oes and that which causes alteration4 this can be proved by induction4 #or in every case we #ind that the respective e%tremities o# that which causes and that which under/oes alteration are ad-acent! 0or our assumption is that thin/s that are under/oin/ alteration are altered in virtue o# their bein/ a##ected in respect o# their so-called a##ective .ualities$ since that which is o# a certain .uality is altered in so #ar as it is sensible$ and the characteristics in which bodies di##er #rom one another are sensible characteristics4 #or every body di##ers #rom another in possessin/ a /reater or lesser number o# sensible characteristics or in possessin/ the same sensible characteristics in a /reater or lesser de/ree! But the alteration o# that which under/oes alteration is also caused by the above-mentioned characteristics$ which are a##ections o# some particular underlyin/ .uality! *hus we say that a thin/ is altered by becomin/ hot or sweet or thick or dry or white4 and we make these assertions alike o# what is inanimate and o# what is animate$ and #urther$ where animate thin/s are in .uestion$ we make them both o# the parts that have no power o# sense-perception and o# the senses themselves! 0or in a way even the senses under/o alteration$ since the active sense is a motion throu/h the body in the course o# which the sense is a##ected in a certain way! "e see$ then$ that the animate is capable o# every kind o# alteration o# which the inanimate is capable4 but the inanimate is not capable o# every kind o# alteration o# which the animate is capable$ since it is not capable o# alteration in respect o# the senses4 moreover the inanimate is unconscious o# bein/ a##ected by alteration$ whereas the animate is conscious o# it$ thou/h there is nothin/ to prevent the animate also bein/ unconscious o# it when the process o# the alteration does not concern the senses! Since$ then$ the alteration o# that which under/oes alteration is caused by sensible thin/s$ in every case o# such alteration it is evident that the respective e%tremities o# that which causes and that which under/oes alteration are ad-acent! *hus the

air is continuous with that which causes the alteration$ and the body that under/oes alteration is continuous with the air! A/ain$ the colour is continuous with the li/ht and the li/ht with the si/ht! And the same is true o# hearin/ and smellin/4 #or the primary movent in respect to the moved is the air! Similarly$ in the case o# tastin/$ the #lavour is ad-acent to the sense o# taste! And it is -ust the same in the case o# thin/s that are inanimate and incapable o# sense-perception! *hus there can be nothin/ intermediate between that which under/oes and that which causes alteration! 1or$ a/ain$ can there be anythin/ intermediate between that which su##ers and that which causes increase4 #or the part o# the latter that starts the increase does so by becomin/ attached in such a way to the #ormer that the whole becomes one! A/ain$ the decrease o# that which su##ers decrease is caused by a part o# the thin/ becomin/ detached! So that which causes increase and that which causes decrease must be continuous with that which su##ers increase and that which su##ers decrease respectively4 and i# two thin/s are continuous with one another there can be nothin/ intermediate between them! 7t is evident$ there#ore$ that between the e%tremities o# the moved and the movent that are respectively #irst and last in re#erence to the moved there is nothin/ intermediate! Part 3 )verythin/$ we say$ that under/oes alteration is altered by sensible causes$ and there is alteration only in thin/s that are said to be essentially a##ected by sensible thin/s! *he truth o# this is to be seen #rom the #ollowin/ considerations! O# all other thin/s it would be most natural to suppose that there is alteration in #i/ures and shapes$ and in ac.uired states and in the processes o# ac.uirin/ and losin/ these4 but as a matter o# #act in neither o# these two classes o# thin/s is there alteration! 7n the #irst place$ when a particular #ormation o# a thin/ is completed$ we do not call it by the name o# its material4 e!/! we do not call the statue 3bron9e3 or the pyramid 3wa%3 or the bed 3wood3$ but we use a derived e%pression and call them 3o# bron9e3$ 3wa%en3$ and 3wooden3 respectively! But when a thin/ has been a##ected and altered in any way we still call it by the ori/inal name4 thus we speak o# the bron9e or the wa% bein/ dry or #luid or hard or hot! And not only so4 we also speak o# the particular #luid or hot substance as bein/ bron9e$ /ivin/ the material the same name as that which we use to describe the a##ection! Since$ there#ore$ havin/ re/ard to the #i/ure or shape o# a thin/ we no lon/er call that which has become o# a certain #i/ure by the name o# the material that e%hibits the #i/ure$ whereas havin/ re/ard to a thin/3s a##ections or

alterations we still call it by the name o# its material$ it is evident that becomin/s o# the #ormer kind cannot be alterations! Moreover it would seem absurd even to speak in this way$ to speak$ that is to say$ o# a man or house or anythin/ else that has come into e%istence as havin/ been altered! *hou/h it may be true that every such becomin/ is necessarily the result o# somethin/3s bein/ altered$ the result$ e!/! o# the material3s bein/ condensed or rare#ied or heated or cooled$ nevertheless it is not the thin/s that are comin/ into e%istence that are altered$ and their becomin/ is not an alteration! A/ain$ ac.uired states$ whether o# the body or o# the soul$ are not alterations! 0or some are e%cellences and others are de#ects$ and neither e%cellence nor de#ect is an alteration4 e%cellence is a per#ection 5#or when anythin/ ac.uires its proper e%cellence we call it per#ect$ since it is then i# ever that we have a thin/ in its natural state4 e!/! we have a per#ect circle when we have one as /ood as possible6$ while de#ect is a perishin/ o# or departure #rom this condition! So as when speakin/ o# a house we do not call its arrival at per#ection an alteration 5#or it would be absurd to suppose that the copin/ or the tilin/ is an alteration or that in receivin/ its copin/ or its tilin/ a house is altered and not per#ected6$ the same also holds /ood in the case o# e%cellences and de#ects and o# the persons or thin/s that possess or ac.uire them4 #or e%cellences are per#ections o# a thin/3s nature and de#ects are departures #rom it4 conse.uently they are not alterations! 0urther$ we say that all e%cellences depend upon particular relations! *hus bodily e%cellences such as health and a /ood state o# body we re/ard as consistin/ in a blendin/ o# hot and cold elements within the body in due proportion$ in relation either to one another or to the surroundin/ atmosphere4 and in like manner we re/ard beauty$ stren/th$ and all the other bodily e%cellences and de#ects! )ach o# them e%ists in virtue o# a particular relation and puts that which possesses it in a /ood or bad condition with re/ard to its proper a##ections$ where by 3proper3 a##ections 7 mean those in#luences that #rom the natural constitution o# a thin/ tend to promote or destroy its e%istence! Since then$ relatives are neither themselves alterations nor the sub-ects o# alteration or o# becomin/ or in #act o# any chan/e whatever$ it is evident that neither states nor the processes o# losin/ and ac.uirin/ states are alterations$ thou/h it may be true that their becomin/ or perishin/ is necessarily$ like the becomin/ or perishin/ o# a speci#ic character or #orm$ the result o# the alteration o# certain other thin/s$ e!/! hot and cold or dry and wet elements or the elements$ whatever they may be$ on which the states primarily depend! 0or each several bodily de#ect or e%cellence involves a relation with those thin/s #rom which the possessor o# the de#ect or e%cellence is naturally sub-ect to alteration4 thus e%cellence disposes its possessor to be una##ected by these in#luences or to be a##ected by those o# them that ou/ht to be admitted$ while de#ect disposes its possessor to be a##ected by them or to be una##ected by those o# them that

ou/ht to be admitted! And the case is similar in re/ard to the states o# the soul$ all o# which 5like those o# body6 e%ist in virtue o# particular relations$ the e%cellences bein/ per#ections o# nature and the de#ects departures #rom it4 moreover$ e%cellence puts its possessor in /ood condition$ while de#ect puts its possessor in a bad condition$ to meet his proper a##ections! Conse.uently these cannot any more than the bodily states be alterations$ nor can the processes o# losin/ and ac.uirin/ them be so$ thou/h their becomin/ is necessarily the result o# an alteration o# the sensitive part o# the soul$ and this is altered by sensible ob-ects4 #or all moral e%cellence is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains$ which a/ain depend either upon actin/ or upon rememberin/ or upon anticipatin/! 1ow those that depend upon action are determined by sense-perception$ i!e! they are stimulated by somethin/ sensible4 and those that depend upon memory or anticipation are likewise to be traced to sense-perception$ #or in these cases pleasure is #elt either in rememberin/ what one has e%perienced or in anticipatin/ what one is /oin/ to e%perience! *hus all pleasure o# this kind must be produced by sensible thin/s4 and since the presence in any one o# moral de#ect or e%cellence involves the presence in him o# pleasure or pain 5with which moral e%cellence and de#ect are always concerned6$ and these pleasures and pains are alterations o# the sensitive part$ it is evident that the loss and ac.uisition o# these states no less than the loss and ac.uisition o# the states o# the body must be the result o# the alteration o# somethin/ else! Conse.uently$ thou/h their becomin/ is accompanied by an alteration$ they are not themselves alterations! A/ain$ the states o# the intellectual part o# the soul are not alterations$ nor is there any becomin/ o# them! 7n the #irst place it is much more true o# the possession o# knowled/e that it depends upon a particular relation! And #urther$ it is evident that there is no becomin/ o# these states! 0or that which is potentially possessed o# knowled/e becomes actually possessed o# it not by bein/ set in motion at all itsel# but by reason o# the presence o# somethin/ else4 i!e! it is when it meets with the particular ob-ect that it knows in a manner the particular throu/h its knowled/e o# the universal! 5A/ain$ there is no becomin/ o# the actual use and activity o# these states$ unless it is thou/ht that there is a becomin/ o# vision and touchin/ and that the activity in .uestion is similar to these!6 And the ori/inal ac.uisition o# knowled/e is not a becomin/ or an alteration4 #or the terms 3knowin/3 and 3understandin/3 imply that the intellect has reached a state o# rest and come to a standstill$ and there is no becomin/ that leads to a state o# rest$ since$ as we have said above$ chan/e at all can have a becomin/! Moreover$ -ust as to say$ when any one has passed #rom a state o# into%ication or sleep or disease to the contrary state$ that he has become possessed o# knowled/e a/ain is incorrect in spite o# the #act that he was previously incapable o# usin/ his knowled/e$ so$ too$ when any one ori/inally ac.uires the state$ it is incorrect to say that he becomes possessed o# knowled/e4 #or the possession o#

understandin/ and knowled/e is produced by the soul3s settlin/ down out o# the restlessness natural to it! Hence$ too$ in learnin/ and in #ormin/ -ud/ements on matters relatin/ to their sense-perceptions children are in#erior to adults owin/ to the /reat amount o# restlessness and motion in their souls! 1ature itsel# causes the soul to settle down and come to a state o# rest #or the per#ormance o# some o# its #unctions$ while #or the per#ormance o# others other thin/s do so4 but in either case the result is brou/ht about throu/h the alteration o# somethin/ in the body$ as we see in the case o# the use and activity o# the intellect arisin/ #rom a man3s becomin/ sober or bein/ awakened! 7t is evident$ then$ #rom the precedin/ ar/ument that alteration and bein/ altered occur in sensible thin/s and in the sensitive part o# the soul$ and$ e%cept accidentally$ in nothin/ else! Part 4 A di##iculty may be raised as to whether every motion is commensurable with every other or not! 1ow i# they are all commensurable and i# two thin/s to have the same velocity must accomplish an e.ual motion in an e.ual time$ then we may have a circum#erence e.ual to a strai/ht line$ or$ o# course$ the one may be /reater or less than the other! 0urther$ i# one thin/ alters and another accomplishes a locomotion in an e.ual time$ we may have an alteration and a locomotion e.ual to one another4 thus an a##ection will be e.ual to a len/th$ which is impossible! But is it not only when an e.ual motion is accomplished by two thin/s in an e.ual time that the velocities o# the two are e.ual8 1ow an a##ection cannot be e.ual to a len/th! *here#ore there cannot be an alteration e.ual to or less than a locomotion4 and conse.uently it is not the case that every motion is commensurable with every other! But how will our conclusion work out in the case o# the circle and the strai/ht line8 7t would be absurd to suppose that the motion o# one in a circle and o# another in a strai/ht line cannot be similar$ but that the one must inevitably move more .uickly or more slowly than the other$ -ust as i# the course o# one were downhill and o# the other uphill! Moreover it does not as a matter o# #act make any di##erence to the ar/ument to say that the one motion must inevitably be .uicker or slower than the other4 #or then the circum#erence can be /reater or less than the strai/ht line2 and i# so it is possible #or the two to be e.ual! 0or i# in the time A the .uicker 5B6 passes over the distance B3 and the slower 5,6 passes over the distance ,3$ B3 will be /reater than ,34 #or this is what we took 3.uicker3 to mean4 and so .uicker motion also implies that one thin/ traverses an e.ual distance in less time than another4 conse.uently there will be a part o# A in which B will pass over a part o# the circle e.ual to ,3$ while , will occupy the whole o# A in passin/ over ,3! 1one the less$ i# the two motions are commensurable$ we are con#ronted with the conse.uence stated above$ vi9! that there may be a strai/ht line e.ual to a circle! But these are not commensurable4 and so the correspondin/ motions are not commensurable either!

But may we say that thin/s are always commensurable i# the same terms are applied to them without e.uivocation8 e!/! a pen$ a wine$ and the hi/hest note in a scale are not commensurable4 we cannot say whether any one o# them is sharper than any other4 and why is this8 they are incommensurable because it is only e.uivocally that the same term 3sharp3 is applied to them4 whereas the hi/hest note in a scale is commensurable with the leadin/-note$ because the term 3sharp3 has the same meanin/ as applied to both! Can it be$ then$ that the term 3.uick3 has not the same meanin/ as applied to strai/ht motion and to circular motion respectively8 7# so$ #ar less will it have the same meanin/ as applied to alteration and to locomotion! Or shall we in the #irst place deny that thin/s are always commensurable i# the same terms are applied to them without e.uivocation8 0or the term 3much3 has the same meanin/ whether applied to water or to air$ yet water and air are not commensurable in respect o# it4 or$ i# this illustration is not considered satis#actory$ 3double3 at any rate would seem to have the same meanin/ as applied to each 5denotin/ in each case the proportion o# two to one6$ yet water and air are not commensurable in respect o# it! But here a/ain may we not take up the same position and say that the term 3much3 is e.uivocal8 7n #act there are some terms o# which even the de#initions are e.uivocal2 e!/! i# 3much3 were de#ined as 3so much and more3$3so much3 would mean somethin/ di##erent in di##erent cases4 3e.ual3 is similarly e.uivocal2 and 3one3 a/ain is perhaps inevitably an e.uivocal term2 and i# 3one3 is e.uivocal$ so is 3two3! Otherwise why is it that some thin/s are commensurable while others are not$ i# the nature o# the attribute in the two cases is really one and the same8 Can it be that the incommensurability o# two thin/s in respect o# any attribute is due to a di##erence in that which is primarily capable o# carryin/ the attribute8 *hus horse and do/ are so commensurable that we may say which is the whiter$ since that which primarily contains the whiteness is the same in both$ vi9! the sur#ace4 and similarly they are commensurable in respect o# si9e! But water and speech are not commensurable in respect o# clearness$ since that which primarily contains the attribute is di##erent in the two cases! 7t would seem$ however that we must re-ect this solution$ since clearly we could thus make all e.uivocal attributes univocal and say merely that that contains each o# them is di##erent in di##erent cases4 thus 3e.uality3$ 3sweetness3$ and 3whiteness3 will severally always be the same$ thou/h that which contains them is di##erent in di##erent cases! Moreover$ it is not any casual thin/ that is capable o# carryin/ any attribute4 each sin/le attribute can be carried primarily only by one sin/le thin/! Must we then say that$ i# two thin/s are to be commensurable in respect o# any attribute$ not only must the attribute in .uestion be applicable to both without e.uivocation$ but there must also be no speci#ic di##erences either in the attribute itsel# or in that which contains the attribute-that these$ 7 mean$

must not be divisible in the way in which colour is divided into kinds8 *hus in this respect one thin/ will not be commensurable with another$ i!e! we cannot say that one is more coloured than the other where only colour in /eneral and not any particular colour is meant2 but they are commensurable in respect o# whiteness! Similarly in the case o# motion4 two thin/s are o# the same velocity i# they occupy an e.ual time in accomplishin/ a certain e.ual amount o# motion! Suppose$ then$ that in a certain time an alteration is under/one by one hal# o# a body3s len/th and a locomotion is accomplished the other hal#4 can be say that in this case the alteration is e.ual to the locomotion and o# the same velocity8 *hat would be absurd$ and the reason is that there are di##erent species o# motion! And i# in conse.uence o# this we must say that two thin/s are o# e.ual velocity i# they accomplish locomotion over an e.ual distance in an e.ual time$ we have to admit the e.uality o# a strai/ht line and a circum#erence! "hat$ then$ is the reason o# this8 7s it that locomotion is a /enus or that line is a /enus8 5"e may leave the time out o# account$ since that is one and the same!6 7# the lines are speci#ically di##erent$ the locomotions also di##er speci#ically #rom one another4 #or locomotion is speci#ically di##erentiated accordin/ to the speci#ic di##erentiation o# that over which it takes place! 57t is also similarly di##erentiated$ it would seem$ accordin/ly as the instrument o# the locomotion is di##erent4 thus i# #eet are the instrument$ it is walkin/$ i# win/s it is #lyin/2 but perhaps we should rather say that this is not so$ and that in this case the di##erences in the locomotion are merely di##erences o# posture in that which is in motion!6 "e may say$ there#ore$ that thin/s are o# e.ual velocity in an e.ual time they traverse the same ma/nitude4 and when 7 call it 3the same3 7 mean that it contains no speci#ic di##erence and there#ore no di##erence in the motion that takes place over it! So we have now to consider how motion is di##erentiated4 and this discussion serves to show that the /enus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it and distinct #rom it$ and that in the case o# e.uivocal terms sometimes the di##erent senses in which they are used are #ar removed #rom one another$ while sometimes there is a certain likeness between them$ and sometimes a/ain they are nearly related either /enerically or analo/ically$ with the result that they seem not to be e.uivocal thou/h they really are! "hen$ then$ is there a di##erence o# species8 7s an attribute speci#ically di##erent i# the sub-ect is di##erent while the attribute is the same$ or must the attribute itsel# be di##erent as well8 And how are we to de#ine the limits o# a species8 "hat will enable us to decide that particular instances o# whiteness or sweetness are the same or di##erent8 7s it enou/h that it appears di##erent in one sub-ect #rom what appears in another8 Or must there be no sameness at all8 And #urther$ where alteration is in .uestion$ how is one alteration to be o# e.ual velocity with another8 One person may be cured .uickly and another slowly$ and cures may also be simultaneous4 so that$ recovery o# health bein/ an alteration$ we have here alterations o# e.ual velocity$ since

each alteration occupies an e.ual time! But what alteration8 "e cannot here speak o# an 3e.ual3 alteration4 what corresponds in the cate/ory o# .uality to e.uality in the cate/ory o# .uantity is 3likeness3! However$ let us say that there is e.ual velocity where the same chan/e is accomplished in an e.ual time! Are we$ then$ to #ind the commensurability in the sub-ect o# the a##ection or in the a##ection itsel#8 7n the case that we have -ust been considerin/ it is the #act that health is one and the same that enables us to arrive at the conclusion that the one alteration is neither more nor less than the other$ but that both are alike! 7# on the other hand the a##ection is di##erent in the two cases$ e!/! when the alterations take the #orm o# becomin/ white and becomin/ healthy respectively$ here there is no sameness or e.uality or likeness inasmuch as the di##erence in the a##ections at once makes the alterations speci#ically di##erent$ and there is no unity o# alteration any more than there would be unity o# locomotion under like conditions! So we must #ind out how many species there are o# alteration and o# locomotion respectively! 1ow i# the thin/s that are in motion-that is to say$ the thin/s to which the motions belon/ essentially and not accidentallydi##er speci#ically$ then their respective motions will also di##er speci#ically4 i# on the other hand they di##er /enerically or numerically$ the motions also will di##er /enerically or numerically as the case may be! But there still remains the .uestion whether$ supposin/ that two alterations are o# e.ual velocity$ we ou/ht to look #or this e.uality in the sameness 5or likeness6 o# the a##ections$ or in the thin/s altered$ to see e!/! whether a certain .uantity o# each has become white! Or ou/ht we not rather to look #or it in both8 *hat is to say$ the alterations are the same or di##erent accordin/ as the a##ections are the same or di##erent$ while they are e.ual or une.ual accordin/ as the thin/s altered are e.ual or une.ual! And now we must consider the same .uestion in the case o# becomin/ and perishin/4 how is one becomin/ o# e.ual velocity with another8 *hey are o# e.ual velocity i# in an e.ual time there are produced two thin/s that are the same and speci#ically inseparable$ e!/! two men 5not merely /enerically inseparable as e!/! two animals6! Similarly one is .uicker than the other i# in an e.ual time the product is di##erent in the two cases! 7 state it thus because we have no pair o# terms that will convey this 3di##erence3 in the way in which unlikeness is conveyed! 7# we adopt the theory that it is number that constitutes bein/$ we may indeed speak o# a 3/reater number3 and a 3lesser number3 within the same species$ but there is no common term that will include both relations$ nor are there terms to e%press each o# them separately in the same way as we indicate a hi/her de/ree or preponderance o# an a##ection by 3more3$ o# a .uantity by 3/reater!3 Part 5 1ow since wherever there is a movent$ its motion always acts upon somethin/$ is always in somethin/$ and always e%tends to somethin/ 5by 3is always in somethin/3 7 mean that it occupies a time4 and by 3e%tends to

somethin/3 7 mean that it involves the traversin/ o# a certain amount o# distance4 #or at any moment when a thin/ is causin/ motion$ it also has caused motion$ so that there must always be a certain amount o# distance that has been traversed and a certain amount o# time that has been occupied6! then$ A the movement have moved B a distance , in a time D$ then in the same time the same #orce A will move =O>B twice the distance ,$ and in =O>D it will move =O>B the whole distance #or ,4 thus the rules o# proportion will be observed! A/ain i# a /iven #orce move a /iven wei/ht a certain distance in a certain time and hal# the distance in hal# the time$ hal# the motive power will move hal# the wei/ht the same distance in the same time! :et ) represent hal# the motive power A and G hal# the wei/ht B4 then the ratio between the motive power and the wei/ht in the one case is similar and proportionate to the ratio in the other$ so that each #orce will cause the same distance to be traversed in the same time! But i# ) move G a distance , in a time D$ it does not necessarily #ollow that ) can move twice G hal# the distance , in the same time! 7#$ then$ A move B a distance , in a time D$ it does not #ollow that )$ bein/ hal# o# A$ will in the time D or in any #raction o# it cause B to traverse a part o# , the ratio between which and the whole o# , is proportionate to that between A and ) 5whatever #raction o# A) may be64 in #act it mi/ht well be that it will cause no motion at all2 #or it does not #ollow that$ i# a /iven motive power causes a certain amount o# motion$ hal# that power will cause motion either o# any particular amount or in any len/th o# time4 otherwise one man mi/ht move a ship$ since both the motive power o# the ship-haulers and the distance that they all cause the ship to traverse are divisible into as many parts as there are men! Hence Geno3s reasonin/ is #alse when he ar/ues that there is no part o# the millet that does not make a sound4 #or there is no reason why any such part should not in any len/th o# time #ail to move the air that the whole bushel moves in #allin/! 7n #act it does not o# itsel# move even such a .uantity o# the air as it would move i# this part were by itsel#4 #or no part even e%ists otherwise than potentially! 7# on the other hand we have two #orces each o# which separately moves one o# two wei/hts a /iven distance in a /iven time$ then the #orces in combination will move the combined wei/hts an e.ual distance in an e.ual time4 #or in this case the rules o# proportion apply! *hen does this hold /ood o# alteration and o# increase also8 Surely it does$ #or in any /iven case we have a de#inite thin/ that cause increase and a de#inite thin/ that su##ers increase$ and the one causes and the other su##ers a certain amount o# increase in a certain amount o# time! Similarly we have a de#inite thin/ that causes alteration and a de#inite thin/ that under/oes alteration$ and a certain amount$ or rather de/ree$ o# alteration is completed in a certain amount o# time4 thus in twice as much time twice as much alteration will be completed and conversely twice as much alteration will occupy twice as much time4 and the alteration o# hal# o# its ob-ect will occupy hal# as much time and in hal# as much time hal# o# the ob-ect will be altered4 or a/ain$ in the same amount o# time it will be altered twice as

much! On the other hand i# that which causes alteration or increase causes a certain amount o# increase or alteration respectively in a certain amount o# time$ it does not necessarily #ollow that hal# the #orce will occupy twice the time in alterin/ or increasin/ the ob-ect$ or that in twice the time the alteration or increase will be completed by it4 it may happen that there will be no alteration or increase at all$ the case bein/ the same as with the wei/ht!

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Physics
By Aristotle
Commentary: Several comments have been posted about hysics! Read them or add your own! Reader Recommendations: Recommend a "eb site you #eel is appropriate to this work$ list recommended "eb sites$ or visit a random recommended "eb site! Download: A te%t-only version is available #or download!

Physics
By Aristotle "ritten &'( B!C!) *ranslated by R! ! Hardie and R! +! ,aye

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Book $III
Part 1 7t remains to consider the #ollowin/ .uestion! "as there ever a becomin/ o# motion be#ore which it had no bein/$ and is it perishin/ a/ain so as to leave nothin/ in motion8 Or are we to say that it never had any becomin/ and is not perishin/$ but always was and always will be8 7s it in #act an immortal never-#ailin/ property o# thin/s that are$ a sort o# li#e as it were to all naturally constituted thin/s8

1ow the e%istence o# motion is asserted by all who have anythin/ to say about nature$ because they all concern themselves with the construction o# the world and study the .uestion o# becomin/ and perishin/$ which processes could not come about without the e%istence o# motion! But those who say that there is an in#inite number o# worlds$ some o# which are in process o# becomin/ while others are in process o# perishin/$ assert that there is always motion 5#or these processes o# becomin/ and perishin/ o# the worlds necessarily involve motion6$ whereas those who hold that there is only one world$ whether everlastin/ or not$ make correspondin/ assumptions in re/ard to motion! 7# then it is possible that at any time nothin/ should be in motion$ this must come about in one o# two ways4 either in the manner described by Ana%a/oras$ who says that all thin/s were to/ether and at rest #or an in#inite period o# time$ and that then Mind introduced motion and separated them2 or in the manner described by )mpedocles$ accordin/ to whom the universe is alternately in motion and at rest-in motion$ when :ove is makin/ the one out o# many$ or Stri#e is makin/ many out o# one$ and at rest in the intermediate periods o# time-his account bein/ as #ollows4 &'ince (ne hath learned to s)rin* "rom +ani"old, -nd (ne dis.oined makes mani"old arise, /h0s they Become, nor sta1le is their li"e: B0t since their motion m0st alternate 1e, /h0s ha2e they e2er Rest 0)on their ro0nd&: #or we must suppose that he means by this that they alternate #rom the one motion to the other! "e must consider$ then$ how this matter stands$ #or the discovery o# the truth about it is o# importance$ not only #or the study o# nature$ but also #or the investi/ation o# the 0irst rinciple! :et us take our start #rom what we have already laid down in our course on hysics! Motion$ we say$ is the #ul#ilment o# the movable in so #ar as it is movable! )ach kind o# motion$ there#ore$ necessarily involves the presence o# the thin/s that are capable o# that motion! 7n #act$ even apart #rom the de#inition o# motion$ every one would admit that in each kind o# motion it is that which is capable o# that motion that is in motion4 thus it is that which is capable o# alteration that is altered$ and that which is capable o# local chan/e that is in locomotion4 and so there must be somethin/ capable o# bein/ burned be#ore there can be a process o# bein/ burned$ and somethin/ capable o# burnin/ be#ore there can be a process o# burnin/! Moreover$ these thin/s also must either have a be/innin/ be#ore which they had no bein/$ or they must be eternal! 1ow i# there was a becomin/ o# every movable thin/$ it #ollows that be#ore the motion in .uestion another chan/e or motion must have taken place in which that which was capable o# bein/ moved or o# causin/ motion had its becomin/! *o suppose$ on the other hand$ that these thin/s were in bein/ throu/hout all previous time without there bein/ any motion appears unreasonable on a moment3s thou/ht$ and still more unreasonable$ we shall #ind$ on #urther consideration! 0or i# we are to say that$ while there are on the one hand thin/s that are movable$ and on the other hand thin/s that are motive$ there is a time when there is a #irst movent

and a #irst moved$ and another time when there is no such thin/ but only somethin/ that is at rest$ then this thin/ that is at rest must previously have been in process o# chan/e4 #or there must have been some cause o# its rest$ rest bein/ the privation o# motion! *here#ore$ be#ore this #irst chan/e there will be a previous chan/e! 0or some thin/s cause motion in only one way$ while others can produce either o# two contrary motions4 thus #ire causes heatin/ but not coolin/$ whereas it would seem that knowled/e may be directed to two contrary ends while remainin/ one and the same! )ven in the #ormer class$ however$ there seems to be somethin/ similar$ #or a cold thin/ in a sense causes heatin/ by turnin/ away and retirin/$ -ust as one possessed o# knowled/e voluntarily makes an error when he uses his knowled/e in the reverse way! But at any rate all thin/s that are capable respectively o# a##ectin/ and bein/ a##ected$ or o# causin/ motion and bein/ moved$ are capable o# it not under all conditions$ but only when they are in a particular condition and approach one another4 so it is on the approach o# one thin/ to another that the one causes motion and the other is moved$ and when they are present under such conditions as rendered the one motive and the other movable! So i# the motion was not always in process$ it is clear that they must have been in a condition not such as to render them capable respectively o# bein/ moved and o# causin/ motion$ and one or other o# them must have been in process o# chan/e4 #or in what is relative this is a necessary conse.uence4 e!/! i# one thin/ is double another when be#ore it was not so$ one or other o# them$ i# not both$ must have been in process o# chan/e! 7t #ollows then$ that there will be a process o# chan/e previous to the #irst! 50urther$ how can there be any 3be#ore3 and 3a#ter3 without the e%istence o# time8 Or how can there be any time without the e%istence o# motion8 7#$ then$ time is the number o# motion or itsel# a kind o# motion$ it #ollows that$ i# there is always time$ motion must also be eternal! But so #ar as time is concerned we see that all with one e%ception are in a/reement in sayin/ that it is uncreated4 in #act$ it is -ust this that enables Democritus to show that all thin/s cannot have had a becomin/4 #or time$ he says$ is uncreated! lato alone asserts the creation o# time$ sayin/ that it had a becomin/ to/ether with the universe$ the universe accordin/ to him havin/ had a becomin/! 1ow since time cannot e%ist and is unthinkable apart #rom the moment$ and the moment a kind o# middle-point$ unitin/ as it does in itsel# both a be/innin/ and an end$ a be/innin/ o# #uture time and an end o# past time$ it #ollows that there must always be time4 #or the e%tremity o# the last period o# time that we take must be #ound in some moment$ since time contains no point o# contact #or us e%cept the moment! *here#ore$ since the moment is both a be/innin/ and an end$ there must always be time on both sides o# it! But i# this is true o# time$ it is evident that it must also be true o# motion$ time bein/ a kind o# a##ection o# motion!6 *he same reasonin/ will also serve to show the imperishability o# motion4 -ust as a becomin/ o# motion would involve$ as we saw$ the e%istence o# a

process o# chan/e previous to the #irst$ in the same way a perishin/ o# motion would involve the e%istence o# a process o# chan/e subse.uent to the last4 #or when a thin/ ceases to be moved$ it does not there#ore at the same time cease to be movable-e!/! the cessation o# the process o# bein/ burned does not involve the cessation o# the capacity o# bein/ burned$ since a thin/ may be capable o# bein/ burned without bein/ in process o# bein/ burnednor$ when a thin/ ceases to be movent$ does it there#ore at the same time cease to a be motive! A/ain$ the destructive a/ent will have to be destroyed$ a#ter what it destroys has been destroyed$ and then that which has the capacity o# destroyin/ it will have to be destroyed a#terwards$ 5so that there will be a process o# chan/e subse.uent to the last$6 #or bein/ destroyed also is a kind o# chan/e! 7#$ then$ view which we are critici9in/ involves these impossible conse.uences$ it is clear that motion is eternal and cannot have e%isted at one time and not at another4 in #act such a view can hardly be described as anythlin/ else than #antastic! And much the same may be said o# the view that such is the ordinance o# nature and that this must be re/arded as a principle$ as would seem to be the view o# )mpedocles when he says that the constitution o# the world is o# necessity such that :ove and Stri#e alternately predominate and cause motion$ while in the intermediate period o# time there is a state o# rest! robably also those who like like Ana%a/oras$ assert a sin/le principle 5o# motion6 would hold this view! But that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anythin/ disorderly4 #or nature is everywhere the cause o# order! Moreover$ there is no ratio in the relation o# the in#inite to the in#inite$ whereas order always means ratio! But i# we say that there is #irst a state o# rest #or an in#inite time$ and then motion is started at some moment$ and that the #act that it is this rather than a previous moment is o# no importance$ and involves no order$ then we can no lon/er say that it is nature3s work4 #or i# anythin/ is o# a certain character naturally$ it either is so invariably and is not sometimes o# this and sometimes o# another character 5e!/! #ire$ which travels upwards naturally$ does not sometimes do so and sometimes not6 or there is a ratio in the variation! 7t would be better$ there#ore$ to say with )mpedocles and any one else who may have maintained such a theory as his that the universe is alternately at rest and in motion4 #or in a system o# this kind we have at once a certain order! But even here the holder o# the theory ou/ht not only to assert the #act4 he ou/ht to e%plain the cause o# it4 i!e! he should not make any mere assumption or lay down any /ratuitous a%iom$ but should employ either inductive or demonstrative reasonin/! *he :ove and Stri#e postulated by )mpedocles are not in themselves causes o# the #act in .uestion$ nor is it o# the essence o# either that it should be so$ the essential #unction o# the #ormer bein/ to unite$ o# the latter to separate! 7# he is to /o on to e%plain this alternate predominance$ he should adduce cases where such a state o# thin/s e%ists$ as he points to the #act that amon/ mankind we have somethin/ that unites men$ namely :ove$ while on the other hand enemies avoid one another4 thus #rom the observed #act that this occurs in certain cases comes the assumption

that it occurs also in the universe! *hen$ a/ain$ some ar/ument is needed to e%plain why the predominance o# each o# the two #orces lasts #or an e.ual period o# time! But it is a wron/ assumption to suppose universally that we have an ade.uate #irst principle in virtue o# the #act that somethin/ always is so or always happens so! *hus Democritus reduces the causes that e%plain nature to the #act that thin/s happened in the past in the same way as they happen now4 but he does not think #it to seek #or a #irst principle to e%plain this 3always34 so$ while his theory is ri/ht in so #ar as it is applied to certain individual cases$ he is wron/ in makin/ it o# universal application! *hus$ a trian/le always has its an/les e.ual to two ri/ht an/les$ but there is nevertheless an ulterior cause o# the eternity o# this truth$ whereas #irst principles are eternal and have no ulterior cause! :et this conclude what we have to say in support o# our contention that there never was a time when there was not motion$ and never will be a time when there will not be motion! Part 2 *he ar/uments that may be advanced a/ainst this position are not di##icult to dispose o#! *he chie# considerations that mi/ht be thou/ht to indicate that motion may e%ist thou/h at one time it had not e%isted at all are the #ollowin/4 0irst$ it may be said that no process o# chan/e is eternal4 #or the nature o# all chan/e is such that it proceeds #rom somethin/ to somethin/$ so that every process o# chan/e must be bounded by the contraries that mark its course$ and no motion can /o on to in#inity! Secondly$ we see that a thin/ that neither is in motion nor contains any motion within itsel# can be set in motion2 e!/! inanimate thin/s that are 5whether the whole or some part is in .uestion6 not in motion but at rest$ are at some moment set in motion4 whereas$ i# motion cannot have a becomin/ be#ore which it had no bein/$ these thin/s ou/ht to be either always or never in motion! *hirdly$ the #act is evident above all in the case o# animate bein/s4 #or it sometimes happens that there is no motion in us and we are .uite still$ and that nevertheless we are then at some moment set in motion$ that is to say it sometimes happens that we produce a be/innin/ o# motion in ourselves spontaneously without anythin/ havin/ set us in motion #rom without! "e see nothin/ like this in the case o# inanimate thin/s$ which are always set in motion by somethin/ else #rom without4 the animal$ on the other hand$ we say$ moves itsel#4 there#ore$ i# an animal is ever in a state o# absolute rest$ we have a motionless thin/ in which motion can be produced #rom the thin/ itsel#$ and not #rom without! 1ow i# this can occur in an animal$ why should not the same be true also o# the universe as a whole8 7# it can occur in a small world it could also occur in a /reat one4 and i# it can occur in the

world$ it could also occur in the in#inite2 that is$ i# the in#inite could as a whole possibly be in motion or at rest! O# these ob-ections$ then$ the #irst-mentioned motion to opposites is not always the same and numerically one a correct statement2 in #act$ this may be said to be a necessary conclusion$ provided that it is possible #or the motion o# that which is one and the same to be not always one and the same! 57 mean that e!/! we may .uestion whether the note /iven by a sin/le strin/ is one and the same$ or is di##erent each time the strin/ is struck$ althou/h the strin/ is in the same condition and is moved in the same way!6 But still$ however this may be$ there is nothin/ to prevent there bein/ a motion that is the same in virtue o# bein/ continuous and eternal4 we shall have somethin/ to say later that will make this point clearer! As re/ards the second ob-ection$ no absurdity is involved in the #act that somethin/ not in motion may be set in motion$ that which caused the motion #rom without bein/ at one time present$ and at another absent! 1evertheless$ how this can be so remains matter #or in.uiry2 how it comes about$ 7 mean$ that the same motive #orce at one time causes a thin/ to be in motion$ and at another does not do so4 #or the di##iculty raised by our ob-ector really amounts to this-why is it that some thin/s are not always at rest$ and the rest always in motion8 *he third ob-ection may be thou/ht to present more di##iculty than the others$ namely$ that which alle/es that motion arises in thin/s in which it did not e%ist be#ore$ and adduces in proo# the case o# animate thin/s4 thus an animal is #irst at rest and a#terwards walks$ not havin/ been set in motion apparently by anythin/ #rom without! *his$ however$ is #alse4 #or we observe that there is always some part o# the animal3s or/anism in motion$ and the cause o# the motion o# this part is not the animal itsel#$ but$ it may be$ its environment! Moreover$ we say that the animal itsel# ori/inates not all o# its motions but its locomotion! So it may well be the case-or rather we may perhaps say that it must necessarily be the case-that many motions are produced in the body by its environment$ and some o# these set in motion the intellect or the appetite$ and this a/ain then sets the whole animal in motion4 this is what happens when animals are asleep4 thou/h there is then no perceptive motion in them$ there is some motion that causes them to wake up a/ain! But we will leave this point also to be elucidated at a later sta/e in our discussion! Part 3 Our en.uiry will resolve itsel# at the outset into a consideration o# the abovementioned problem-what can be the reason why some thin/s in the world at one time are in motion and at another are at rest a/ain8 1ow one o# three thin/s must be true4 either all thin/s are always at rest$ or all thin/s are always in motion$ or some thin/s are in motion and others at rest4 and in this

last case a/ain either the thin/s that are in motion are always in motion and the thin/s that are at rest are always at rest$ or they are all constituted so as to be capable alike o# motion and o# rest2 or there is yet a third possibility remainin/-it may be that some thin/s in the world are always motionless$ others always in motion$ while others a/ain admit o# both conditions! *his last is the account o# the matter that we must /ive4 #or herein lies the solution o# all the di##iculties raised and the conclusion o# the investi/ation upon which we are en/a/ed! *o maintain that all thin/s are at rest$ and to disre/ard sense-perception in an attempt to show the theory to be reasonable$ would be an instance o# intellectual weakness4 it would call in .uestion a whole system$ not a particular detail4 moreover$ it would be an attack not only on the physicist but on almost all sciences and all received opinions$ since motion plays a part in all o# them! 0urther$ -ust as in ar/uments about mathematics ob-ections that involve #irst principles do not a##ect the mathematician-and the other sciences are in similar case-so$ too$ ob-ections involvin/ the point that we have -ust raised do not a##ect the physicist4 #or it is a #undamental assumption with him that motion is ultimately re#erable to nature hersel#! *he assertion that all thin/s are in motion we may #airly re/ard as e.ually #alse$ thou/h it is less subversive o# physical science4 #or thou/h in our course on physics it was laid down that rest no less than motion is ultimately re#erable to nature hersel#$ nevertheless motion is the characteristic #act o# nature4 moreover$ the view is actually held by some that not merely some thin/s but all thin/s in the world are in motion and always in motion$ thou/h we cannot apprehend the #act by sense-perception! Althou/h the supporters o# this theory do not state clearly what kind o# motion they mean$ or whether they mean all kinds$ it is no hard matter to reply to them4 thus we may point out that there cannot be a continuous process either o# increase or o# decrease4 that which comes between the two has to be included! *he theory resembles that about the stone bein/ worn away by the drop o# water or split by plants /rowin/ out o# it4 i# so much has been e%truded or removed by the drop$ it does not #ollow that hal# the amount has previously been e%truded or removed in hal# the time4 the case o# the hauled ship is e%actly comparable4 here we have so many drops settin/ so much in motion$ but a part o# them will not set as much in motion in any period o# time! *he amount removed is$ it is true$ divisible into a number o# parts$ but no one o# these was set in motion separately4 they were all set in motion to/ether! 7t is evident$ then$ that #rom the #act that the decrease is divisible into an in#inite number o# parts it does not #ollow that some part must always be passin/ away4 it all passes away at a particular moment! Similarly$ too$ in the case o# any alteration whatever i# that which su##ers alteration is in#initely divisible it does not #ollow #rom this that the same is true o# the alteration itsel#$ which o#ten occurs all at once$ as in #ree9in/! A/ain$ when any one has #allen ill$ there must #ollow a period o# time in which his restoration to health is in the #uture4 the process o# chan/e cannot take place in an instant4 yet the chan/e

cannot be a chan/e to anythin/ else but health! *he assertion! there#ore$ that alteration is continuous is an e%trava/ant callin/ into .uestion o# the obvious4 #or alteration is a chan/e #rom one contrary to another! Moreover$ we notice that a stone becomes neither harder nor so#ter! A/ain$ in the matter o# locomotion$ it would be a stran/e thin/ i# a stone could be #allin/ or restin/ on the /round without our bein/ able to perceive the #act! 0urther$ it is a law o# nature that earth and all other bodies should remain in their proper places and be moved #rom them only by violence4 #rom the #act then that some o# them are in their proper places it #ollows that in respect o# place also all thin/s cannot be in motion! *hese and other similar ar/uments$ then$ should convince us that it is impossible either that all thin/s are always in motion or that all thin/s are always at rest! 1or a/ain can it be that some thin/s are always at rest$ others always in motion$ and nothin/ sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion! *his theory must be pronounced impossible on the same /rounds as those previously mentioned4 vi9! that we see the above-mentioned chan/es occurrin/ in the case o# the same thin/s! "e may #urther point out that the de#ender o# this position is #i/htin/ a/ainst the obvious$ #or on this theory there can be no such thin/ as increase4 nor can there be any such thin/ as compulsory motion$ i# it is impossible that a thin/ can be at rest be#ore bein/ set in motion unnaturally! *his theory$ then$ does away with becomin/ and perishin/! Moreover$ motion$ it would seem$ is /enerally thou/ht to be a sort o# becomin/ and perishin/$ #or that to which a thin/ chan/es comes to be$ or occupancy o# it comes to be$ and that #rom which a thin/ chan/es ceases to be$ or there ceases to be occupancy o# it! 7t is clear$ there#ore$ that there are cases o# occasional motion and occasional rest! "e have now to take the assertion that all thin/s are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion and to con#ront it with the ar/uments previously advanced! "e must take our start as be#ore #rom the possibilities that we distin/uished -ust above! )ither all thin/s are at rest$ or all thin/s are in motion$ or some thin/s are at rest and others in motion! And i# some thin/s are at rest and others in motion$ then it must be that either all thin/s are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion$ or some thin/s are always at rest and the remainder always in motion$ or some o# the thin/s are always at rest and others always in motion while others a/ain are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion! 1ow we have said be#ore that it is impossible that all thin/s should be at rest4 nevertheless we may now repeat that assertion! "e may point out that$ even i# it is really the case$ as certain persons assert$ that the e%istent is in#inite and motionless$ it certainly does not appear to be so i# we #ollow sense-perception4 many thin/s that e%ist appear to be in motion! 1ow i# there is such a thin/ as #alse opinion or opinion at all$ there is also motion2 and similarly i# there is such a thin/ as ima/ination$ or i# it is the case that anythin/ seems to be di##erent at di##erent times4 #or ima/ination and opinion are thou/ht to be motions o# a kind! But to investi/ate this .uestion at all-to seek a reasoned -usti#ication o# a belie# with re/ard to

which we are too well o## to re.uire reasoned -usti#ication-implies bad -ud/ement o# what is better and what is worse$ what commends itsel# to belie# and what does not$ what is ultimate and what is not! 7t is likewise impossible that all thin/s should be in motion or that some thin/s should be always in motion and the remainder always at rest! "e have su##icient /round #or re-ectin/ all these theories in the sin/le #act that we see some thin/s that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest! 7t is evident$ there#ore$ that it is no less impossible that some thin/s should be always in motion and the remainder always at rest than that all thin/s should be at rest or that all thin/s should be in motion continuously! 7t remains$ then$ to consider whether all thin/s are so constituted as to be capable both o# bein/ in motion and o# bein/ at rest$ or whether$ while some thin/s are so constituted$ some are always at rest and some are always in motion4 #or it is this last view that we have to show to be true! Part 4 1ow o# thin/s that cause motion or su##er motion$ to some the motion is accidental$ to others essential4 thus it is accidental to what merely belon/s to or contains as a part a thin/ that causes motion or su##ers motion$ essential to a thin/ that causes motion or su##ers motion not merely by belon/in/ to such a thin/ or containin/ it as a part! O# thin/s to which the motion is essential some derive their motion #rom themselves$ others #rom somethin/ else4 and in some cases their motion is natural$ in others violent and unnatural! *hus in thin/s that derive their motion #rom themselves$ e!/! all animals$ the motion is natural 5#or when an animal is in motion its motion is derived #rom itsel#64 and whenever the source o# the motion o# a thin/ is in the thin/ itsel# we say that the motion o# that thin/ is natural! *here#ore the animal as a whole moves itsel# naturally4 but the body o# the animal may be in motion unnaturally as well as naturally4 it depends upon the kind o# motion that it may chance to be su##erin/ and the kind o# element o# which it is composed! And the motion o# thin/s that derive their motion #rom somethin/ else is in some cases natural$ in other unnatural4 e!/! upward motion o# earthy thin/s and downward motion o# #ire are unnatural! Moreover the parts o# animals are o#ten in motion in an unnatural way$ their positions and the character o# the motion bein/ abnormal! *he #act that a thin/ that is in motion derives its motion #rom somethin/ is most evident in thin/s that are in motion unnaturally$ because in such cases it is clear that the motion is derived #rom somethin/ other than the thin/ itsel#! 1e%t to thin/s that are in motion unnaturally those whose motion while natural is derived #rom themselves-e!/! animals-make this #act clear4 #or here the uncertainty is not as to whether the motion is derived #rom somethin/ but as to how we ou/ht to distin/uish in the thin/ between the movent and the moved! 7t would seem that in animals$ -ust as in ships and thin/s not naturally or/ani9ed$ that which causes motion is separate #rom that which su##ers motion$ and that it is only in this sense that the animal as a

whole causes its own motion! *he /reatest di##iculty$ however$ is presented by the remainin/ case o# those that we last distin/uished! "here thin/s derive their motion #rom somethin/ else we distin/uished the cases in which the motion is unnatural4 we are le#t with those that are to be contrasted with the others by reason o# the #act that the motion is natural! 7t is in these cases that di##iculty would be e%perienced in decidin/ whence the motion is derived$ e!/! in the case o# li/ht and heavy thin/s! "hen these thin/s are in motion to positions the reverse o# those they would properly occupy$ their motion is violent4 when they are in motion to their proper positions-the li/ht thin/ up and the heavy thin/ down-their motion is natural2 but in this latter case it is no lon/er evident$ as it is when the motion is unnatural$ whence their motion is derived! 7t is impossible to say that their motion is derived #rom themselves4 this is a characteristic o# li#e and peculiar to livin/ thin/s! 0urther$ i# it were$ it would have been in their power to stop themselves 57 mean that i# e!/! a thin/ can cause itsel# to walk it can also cause itsel# not to walk6$ and so$ since on this supposition #ire itsel# possesses the power o# upward locomotion$ it is clear that it should also possess the power o# downward locomotion! Moreover i# thin/s move themselves$ it would be unreasonable to suppose that in only one kind o# motion is their motion derived #rom themselves! A/ain$ how can anythin/ o# continuous and naturally connected substance move itsel#8 7n so #ar as a thin/ is one and continuous not merely in virtue o# contact$ it is impassive4 it is only in so #ar as a thin/ is divided that one part o# it is by nature active and another passive! *here#ore none o# the thin/s that we are now considerin/ move themselves 5#or they are o# naturally connected substance6$ nor does anythin/ else that is continuous4 in each case the movent must be separate #rom the moved$ as we see to be the case with inanimate thin/s when an animate thin/ moves them! 7t is the #act that these thin/s also always derive their motion #rom somethin/4 what it is would become evident i# we were to distin/uish the di##erent kinds o# cause! *he above-mentioned distinctions can also be made in the case o# thin/s that cause motion4 some o# them are capable o# causin/ motion unnaturally 5e!/! the lever is not naturally capable o# movin/ the wei/ht6$ others naturally 5e!/! what is actually hot is naturally capable o# movin/ what is potentially hot64 and similarly in the case o# all other thin/s o# this kind! 7n the same way$ too$ what is potentially o# a certain .uality or o# a certain .uantity in a certain place is naturally movable when it contains the correspondin/ principle in itsel# and not accidentally 5#or the same thin/ may be both o# a certain .uality and o# a certain .uantity$ but the one is an accidental$ not an essential property o# the other6! So when #ire or earth is moved by somethin/ the motion is violent when it is unnatural$ and natural when it brin/s to actuality the proper activities that they potentially possess! But the #act that the term 3potentially3 is used in more than one sense is the reason why it is not evident whence such motions as the upward motion o#

#ire and the downward motion o# earth are derived! One who is learnin/ a science potentially knows it in a di##erent sense #rom one who while already possessin/ the knowled/e is not actually e%ercisin/ it! "herever we have somethin/ capable o# actin/ and somethin/ capable o# bein/ correspondin/ly acted on$ in the event o# any such pair bein/ in contact what is potential becomes at times actual4 e!/! the learner becomes #rom one potential somethin/ another potential somethin/4 #or one who possesses knowled/e o# a science but is not actually e%ercisin/ it knows the science potentially in a sense$ thou/h not in the same sense as he knew it potentially be#ore he learnt it! And when he is in this condition$ i# somethin/ does not prevent him$ he actively e%ercises his knowled/e4 otherwise he would be in the contradictory state o# not knowin/! 7n re/ard to natural bodies also the case is similar! *hus what is cold is potentially hot4 then a chan/e takes place and it is #ire$ and it burns$ unless somethin/ prevents and hinders it! So$ too$ with heavy and li/ht4 li/ht is /enerated #rom heavy$ e!/! air #rom water 5#or water is the #irst thin/ that is potentially li/ht6$ and air is actually li/ht$ and will at once reali9e its proper activity as such unless somethin/ prevents it! *he activity o# li/htness consists in the li/ht thin/ bein/ in a certain situation$ namely hi/h up4 when it is in the contrary situation$ it is bein/ prevented #rom risin/! *he case is similar also in re/ard to .uantity and .uality! But$ be it noted$ this is the .uestion we are tryin/ to answer-how can we account #or the motion o# li/ht thin/s and heavy thin/s to their proper situations8 *he reason #or it is that they have a natural tendency respectively towards a certain position4 and this constitutes the essence o# li/htness and heaviness$ the #ormer bein/ determined by an upward$ the latter by a downward$ tendency! As we have said$ a thin/ may be potentially li/ht or heavy in more senses than one! *hus not only when a thin/ is water is it in a sense potentially li/ht$ but when it has become air it may be still potentially li/ht4 #or it may be that throu/h some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position$ whereas$ i# what hinders it is removed$ it reali9es its activity and continues to rise hi/her! *he process whereby what is o# a certain .uality chan/es to a condition o# active e%istence is similar4 thus the e%ercise o# knowled/e #ollows at once upon the possession o# it unless somethin/ prevents it! So$ too$ what is o# a certain .uantity e%tends itsel# over a certain space unless somethin/ prevents it! *he thin/ in a sense is and in a sense is not moved by one who moves what is obstructin/ and preventin/ its motion 5e!/! one who pulls away a pillar #rom under a roo# or one who removes a stone #rom a wineskin in the water is the accidental cause o# motion64 and in the same way the real cause o# the motion o# a ball reboundin/ #rom a wall is not the wall but the thrower! So it is clear that in all these cases the thin/ does not move itsel#$ but it contains within itsel# the source o# motion-not o# movin/ somethin/ or o# causin/ motion$ but o# su##erin/ it! 7# then the motion o# all thin/s that are in motion is either natural or unnatural and violent$ and all thin/s whose motion is violent and unnatural are moved by somethin/$ and somethin/ other than themselves$ and a/ain all

thin/s whose motion is natural are moved by somethin/-both those that are moved by themselves and those that are not moved by themselves 5e!/! li/ht thin/s and heavy thin/s$ which are moved either by that which brou/ht the thin/ into e%istence as such and made it li/ht and heavy$ or by that which released what was hinderin/ and preventin/ it62 then all thin/s that are in motion must be moved by somethin/! Part 5 1ow this may come about in either o# two ways! )ither the movent is not itsel# responsible #or the motion$ which is to be re#erred to somethin/ else which moves the movent$ or the movent is itsel# responsible #or the motion! 0urther$ in the latter case$ either the movent immediately precedes the last thin/ in the series$ or there may be one or more intermediate links4 e!/! the stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand$ which a/ain is moved by the man4 in the man$ however$ we have reached a movent that is not so in virtue o# bein/ moved by somethin/ else! 1ow we say that the thin/ is moved both by the last and by the #irst movent in the series$ but more strictly by the #irst$ since the #irst movent moves the last$ whereas the last does not move the #irst$ and the #irst will move the thin/ without the last$ but the last will not move it without the #irst4 e!/! the stick will not move anythin/ unless it is itsel# moved by the man! 7# then everythin/ that is in motion must be moved by somethin/$ and the movent must either itsel# be moved by somethin/ else or not$ and in the #ormer case there must be some #irst movent that is not itsel# moved by anythin/ else$ while in the case o# the immediate movent bein/ o# this kind there is no need o# an intermediate movent that is also moved 5#or it is impossible that there should be an in#inite series o# movents$ each o# which is itsel# moved by somethin/ else$ since in an in#inite series there is no #irst term6-i# then everythin/ that is in motion is moved by somethin/$ and the #irst movent is moved but not by anythin/ else$ it much be moved by itsel#! *his same ar/ument may also be stated in another way as #ollows! )very movent moves somethin/ and moves it with somethin/$ either with itsel# or with somethin/ else4 e!/! a man moves a thin/ either himsel# or with a stick$ and a thin/ is knocked down either by the wind itsel# or by a stone propelled by the wind! But it is impossible #or that with which a thin/ is moved to move it without bein/ moved by that which imparts motion by its own a/ency4 on the other hand$ i# a thin/ imparts motion by its own a/ency$ it is not necessary that there should be anythin/ else with which it imparts motion$ whereas i# there is a di##erent thin/ with which it imparts motion$ there must be somethin/ that imparts motion not with somethin/ else but with itsel#$ or else there will be an in#inite series! 7#$ then$ anythin/ is a movent while bein/ itsel# moved$ the series must stop somewhere and not be in#inite! *hus$ i# the stick moves somethin/ in virtue o# bein/ moved by the hand$ the hand moves the stick4 and i# somethin/ else moves with the hand$ the hand also is moved by somethin/ di##erent #rom itsel#! So when motion

by means o# an instrument is at each sta/e caused by somethin/ di##erent #rom the instrument$ this must always be preceded by somethin/ else which imparts motion with itsel#! *here#ore$ i# this last movent is in motion and there is nothin/ else that moves it$ it must move itsel#! So this reasonin/ also shows that when a thin/ is moved$ i# it is not moved immediately by somethin/ that moves itsel#$ the series brin/s us at some time or other to a movent o# this kind! And i# we consider the matter in yet a third wa :y we shall /et this same result as #ollows! 7# everythin/ that is in motion is moved by somethin/ that is in motion$ ether this bein/ in motion is an accidental attribute o# the movents in .uestion$ so that each o# them moves somethin/ while bein/ itsel# in motion$ but not always because it is itsel# in motion$ or it is not accidental but an essential attribute! :et us consider the #ormer alternative! 7# then it is an accidental attribute$ it is not necessary that that is in motion should be in motion4 and i# this is so it is clear that there may be a time when nothin/ that e%ists is in motion$ since the accidental is not necessary but contin/ent! 1ow i# we assume the e%istence o# a possibility$ any conclusion that we thereby reach will not be an impossibility thou/h it may be contrary to #act! But the none%istence o# motion is an impossibility4 #or we have shown above that there must always be motion! Moreover$ the conclusion to which we have been led is a reasonable one! 0or there must be three thin/s-the moved$ the movent$ and the instrument o# motion! 1ow the moved must be in motion$ but it need not move anythin/ else4 the instrument o# motion must both move somethin/ else and be itsel# in motion 5#or it chan/es to/ether with the moved$ with which it is in contact and continuous$ as is clear in the case o# thin/s that move other thin/s locally$ in which case the two thin/s must up to a certain point be in contact64 and the movent-that is to say$ that which causes motion in such a manner that it is not merely the instrument o# motion-must be unmoved! 1ow we have visual e%perience o# the last term in this series$ namely that which has the capacity o# bein/ in motion$ but does not contain a motive principle$ and also o# that which is in motion but is moved by itsel# and not by anythin/ else4 it is reasonable$ there#ore$ not to say necessary$ to suppose the e%istence o# the third term also$ that which causes motion but is itsel# unmoved! So$ too$ Ana%a/oras is ri/ht when he says that Mind is impassive and unmi%ed$ since he makes it the principle o# motion4 #or it could cause motion in this sense only by bein/ itsel# unmoved$ and have supreme control only by bein/ unmi%ed! "e will now take the second alternative! 7# the movement is not accidentally but necessarily in motion-so that$ i# it were not in motion$ it would not move anythin/-then the movent$ in so #ar as it is in motion$ must be in motion in one o# two ways4 it is moved either as that is which is moved with the same kind o# motion$ or with a di##erent kind-either that which is heatin/$ 7 mean$ is itsel# in process o# becomin/ hot$ that which is makin/ healthy in process

o# becomin/ healthy$ and that which is causin/ locomotion in process o# locomotion$ or else that which is makin/ healthy is$ let us say$ in process o# locomotion$ and that which is causin/ locomotion in process o#$ say$ increase! But it is evident that this is impossible! 0or i# we adopt the #irst assumption we have to make it apply within each o# the very lowest species into which motion can be divided4 e!/! we must say that i# some one is teachin/ some lesson in /eometry$ he is also in process o# bein/ tau/ht that same lesson in /eometry$ and that i# he is throwin/ he is in process o# bein/ thrown in -ust the same manner! Or i# we re-ect this assumption we must say that one kind o# motion is derived #rom another2 e!/! that that which is causin/ locomotion is in process o# increase$ that which is causin/ this increase is in process o# bein/ altered by somethin/ else$ and that which is causin/ this alteration is in process o# su##erin/ some di##erent kind o# motion! But the series must stop somewhere$ since the kinds o# motion are limited2 and i# we say that the process is reversible$ and that that which is causin/ alteration is in process o# locomotion$ we do no more than i# we had said at the outset that that which is causin/ locomotion is in process o# locomotion$ and that one who is teachin/ is in process o# bein/ tau/ht4 #or it is clear that everythin/ that is moved is moved by the movent that is #urther back in the series as well as by that which immediately moves it4 in #act the earlier movent is that which more strictly moves it! But this is o# course impossible4 #or it involves the conse.uence that one who is teachin/ is in process o# learnin/ what he is teachin/$ whereas teachin/ necessarily implies possessin/ knowled/e$ and learnin/ not possessin/ it! Still more unreasonable is the conse.uence involved that$ since everythin/ that is moved is moved by somethin/ that is itsel# moved by somethin/ else$ everythin/ that has a capacity #or causin/ motion has as such a correspondin/ capacity #or bein/ moved4 i!e! it will have a capacity #or bein/ moved in the sense in which one mi/ht say that everythin/ that has a capacity #or makin/ healthy$ and e%ercises that capacity$ has as such a capacity #or bein/ made healthy$ and that which has a capacity #or buildin/ has as such a capacity #or bein/ built! 7t will have the capacity #or bein/ thus moved either immediately or throu/h one or more links 5as it will i#$ while everythin/ that has a capacity #or causin/ motion has as such a capacity #or bein/ moved by somethin/ else$ the motion that it has the capacity #or su##erin/ is not that with which it a##ects what is ne%t to it$ but a motion o# a di##erent kind2 e!/! that which has a capacity #or makin/ healthy mi/ht as such have a capacity #or learn! the series$ however$ could be traced back$ as we said be#ore$ until at some time or other we arrived at the same kind o# motion6! 1ow the #irst alternative is impossible$ and the second is #antastic4 it is absurd that that which has a capacity #or causin/ alteration should as such necessarily have a capacity$ let us say$ #or increase! 7t is not necessary$ there#ore$ that that which is moved should always be moved by somethin/ else that is itsel# moved by somethin/ else4 so there will be an end to the series! Conse.uently the #irst thin/ that is in motion will derive its motion either #rom somethin/ that is at rest or #rom itsel#! But i# there were any need to consider which o# the two$ that which moves itsel# or that which is moved

by somethin/ else$ is the cause and principle o# motion$ every one would decide the #ormer4 #or that which is itsel# independently a cause is always prior as a cause to that which is so only in virtue o# bein/ itsel# dependent upon somethin/ else that makes it so! "e must there#ore make a #resh start and consider the .uestion2 i# a thin/ moves itsel#$ in what sense and in what manner does it do so8 1ow everythin/ that is in motion must be in#initely divisible$ #or it has been shown already in our /eneral course on hysics$ that everythin/ that is essentially in motion is continuous! 1ow it is impossible that that which moves itsel# should in its entirety move itsel#4 #or then$ while bein/ speci#ically one and indivisible$ it would as a "hole both under/o and cause the same locomotion or alteration4 thus it would at the same time be both teachin/ and bein/ tau/ht 5the same thin/6$ or both restorin/ to and bein/ restored to the same health! Moreover$ we have established the #act that it is the movable that is moved2 and this is potentially$ not actually$ in motion$ but the potential is in process to actuality$ and motion is an incomplete actuality o# the movable! *he movent on the other hand is already in activity4 e!/! it is that which is hot that produces heat4 in #act$ that which produces the #orm is always somethin/ that possesses it! Conse.uently 5i# a thin/ can move itsel# as a whole6$ the same thin/ in respect o# the same thin/ may be at the same time both hot and not hot! So$ too$ in every other case where the movent must be described by the same name in the same sense as the moved! *here#ore when a thin/ moves itsel# it is one part o# it that is the movent and another part that is moved! But it is not sel#-movin/ in the sense that each o# the two parts is moved by the other part4 the #ollowin/ considerations make this evident! 7n the #irst place$ i# each o# the two parts is to move the other$ there will be no #irst movent! 7# a thin/ is moved by a series o# movents$ that which is earlier in the series is more the cause o# its bein/ moved than that which comes ne%t$ and will be more truly the movent4 #or we #ound that there are two kinds o# movent$ that which is itsel# moved by somethin/ else and that which derives its motion #rom itsel#4 and that which is #urther #rom the thin/ that is moved is nearer to the principle o# motion than that which is intermediate! 7n the second place$ there is no necessity #or the movent part to be moved by anythin/ but itsel#4 so it can only be accidentally that the other part moves it in return! 7 take then the possible case o# its not movin/ it4 then there will be a part that is moved and a part that is an unmoved movent! 7n the third place$ there is no necessity #or the movent to be moved in return4 on the contrary the necessity that there should always be motion makes it necessary that there should be some movent that is either unmoved or moved by itsel#! 7n the #ourth place we should then have a thin/ under/oin/ the same motion that it is causin/-that which is producin/ heat$ there#ore$ bein/ heated! But as a matter o# #act that which primarily moves itsel# cannot contain either a sin/le part that moves itsel# or a number o# parts each o# which moves itsel#! 0or$ i# the whole is moved by itsel#$ it must be moved either by some part o# itsel# or as a whole by itsel# as a whole! 7#$ then$ it is moved in virtue o# some part o# it bein/

moved by that part itsel#$ it is this part that will be the primary sel#-movent$ since$ i# this part is separated #rom the whole$ the part will still move itsel#$ but the whole will do so no lon/er! 7# on the other hand the whole is moved by itsel# as a whole$ it must be accidentally that the parts move themselves4 and there#ore$ their sel#-motion not bein/ necessary$ we may take the case o# their not bein/ moved by themselves! *here#ore in the whole o# the thin/ we may distin/uish that which imparts motion without itsel# bein/ moved and that which is moved4 #or only in this way is it possible #or a thin/ to be sel#moved! 0urther$ i# the whole moves itsel# we may distin/uish in it that which imparts the motion and that which is moved4 so while we say that AB is moved by itsel#$ we may also say that it is moved by A! And since that which imparts motion may be either a thin/ that is moved by somethin/ else or a thin/ that is unmoved$ and that which is moved may be either a thin/ that imparts motion to somethin/ else or a thin/ that does not$ that which moves itsel# must be composed o# somethin/ that is unmoved but imparts motion and also o# somethin/ that is moved but does not necessarily impart motion but may or may not do so! *hus let A be somethin/ that imparts motion but is unmoved$ B somethin/ that is moved by A and moves ,$ , somethin/ that is moved by B but moves nothin/ 5/ranted that we eventually arrive at , we may take it that there is only one intermediate term$ thou/h there may be more6! *hen the whole AB, moves itsel#! But i# 7 take away ,$ AB will move itsel#$ A impartin/ motion and B bein/ moved$ whereas , will not move itsel# or in #act be moved at all! 1or a/ain will B, move itsel# apart #rom A4 #or B imparts motion only throu/h bein/ moved by somethin/ else$ not throu/h bein/ moved by any part o# itsel#! So only AB moves itsel#! *hat which moves itsel#$ there#ore$ must comprise somethin/ that imparts motion but is unmoved and somethin/ that is moved but does not necessarily move anythin/ else4 and each o# these two thin/s$ or at any rate one o# them$ must be in contact with the other! 7#$ then$ that which imparts motion is a continuous substance-that which is moved must o# course be so-it is clear that it is not throu/h some part o# the whole bein/ o# such a nature as to be capable o# movin/ itsel# that the whole moves itsel#4 it moves itsel# as a whole$ both bein/ moved and impartin/ motion throu/h containin/ a part that imparts motion and a part that is moved! 7t does not impart motion as a whole nor is it moved as a whole4 it is A alone that imparts motion and B alone that is moved! 7t is not true$ #urther$ that , is moved by A$ which is impossible! Here a di##iculty arises4 i# somethin/ is taken away #rom A 5supposin/ that that which imparts motion but is unmoved is a continuous substance6$ or #rom B the part that is moved$ will the remainder o# A continue to impart motion or the remainder o# B continue to be moved8 7# so$ it will not be AB primarily that is moved by itsel#$ since$ when somethin/ is taken away #rom AB$ the remainder o# AB will still continue to move itsel#! erhaps we may state the case thus4 there is nothin/ to prevent each o# the two parts$ or at any rate one o# them$ that which is moved$ bein/ divisible thou/h actually undivided$ so that i# it is divided it will not continue in the possession o# the

same capacity4 and so there is nothin/ to prevent sel#-motion residin/ primarily in thin/s that are potentially divisible! 0rom what has been said$ then$ it is evident that that which primarily imparts motion is unmoved4 #or$ whether the series is closed at once by that which is in motion but moved by somethin/ else derivin/ its motion directly #rom the #irst unmoved$ or whether the motion is derived #rom what is in motion but moves itsel# and stops its own motion$ on both suppositions we have the result that in all cases o# thin/s bein/ in motion that which primarily imparts motion is unmoved! Part 6 Since there must always be motion without intermission$ there must necessarily be somethin/$ one thin/ or it may be a plurality$ that #irst imparts motion$ and this #irst movent must be unmoved! 1ow the .uestion whether each o# the thin/s that are unmoved but impart motion is eternal is irrelevant to our present ar/ument4 but the #ollowin/ considerations will make it clear that there must necessarily be some such thin/$ which$ while it has the capacity o# movin/ somethin/ else$ is itsel# unmoved and e%empt #rom all chan/e$ which can a##ect it neither in an un.uali#ied nor in an accidental sense! :et us suppose$ i# any one likes$ that in the case o# certain thin/s it is possible #or them at di##erent times to be and not to be$ without any process o# becomin/ and perishin/ 5in #act it would seem to be necessary$ i# a thin/ that has not parts at one time is and at another time is not$ that any such thin/ should without under/oin/ any process o# chan/e at one time be and at another time not be6! And let us #urther suppose it possible that some principles that are unmoved but capable o# impartin/ motion at one time are and at another time are not! )ven so$ this cannot be true o# all such principles$ since there must clearly be somethin/ that causes thin/s that move themselves at one time to be and at another not to be! 0or$ since nothin/ that has not parts can be in motion$ that which moves itsel# must as a whole have ma/nitude$ thou/h nothin/ that we have said makes this necessarily true o# every movent! So the #act that some thin/s become and others perish$ and that this is so continuously$ cannot be caused by any one o# those thin/s that$ thou/h they are unmoved$ do not always e%ist4 nor a/ain can it be caused by any o# those which move certain particular thin/s$ while others move other thin/s! *he eternity and continuity o# the process cannot be caused either by any one o# them sin/ly or by the sum o# them$ because this causal relation must be eternal and necessary$ whereas the sum o# these movents is in#inite and they do not all e%ist to/ether! 7t is clear$ then$ that thou/h there may be countless instances o# the perishin/ o# some principles that are unmoved but impart motion$ and thou/h many thin/s that move themselves perish and are succeeded by others that come into bein/$ and thou/h one thin/ that is unmoved moves one thin/ while another moves another$ nevertheless there is somethin/ that comprehends them all$ and that as somethin/ apart #rom each one o# them$ and this it is that is the cause o#

the #act that some thin/s are and others are not and o# the continuous process o# chan/e4 and this causes the motion o# the other movents$ while they are the causes o# the motion o# other thin/s! Motion$ then$ bein/ eternal$ the #irst movent$ i# there is but one$ will be eternal also4 i# there are more than one$ there will be a plurality o# such eternal movents! "e ou/ht$ however$ to suppose that there is one rather than many$ and a #inite rather than an in#inite number! "hen the conse.uences o# either assumption are the same$ we should always assume that thin/s are #inite rather than in#inite in number$ since in thin/s constituted by nature that which is #inite and that which is better ou/ht$ i# possible$ to be present rather than the reverse4 and here it is su##icient to assume only one movent$ the #irst o# unmoved thin/s$ which bein/ eternal will be the principle o# motion to everythin/ else! *he #ollowin/ ar/ument also makes it evident that the #irst movent must be somethin/ that is one and eternal! "e have shown that there must always be motion! *hat bein/ so$ motion must also be continuous$ because what is always is continuous$ whereas what is merely in succession is not continuous! But #urther$ i# motion is continuous$ it is one4 and it is one only i# the movent and the moved that constitute it are each o# them one$ since in the event o# a thin/3s bein/ moved now by one thin/ and now by another the whole motion will not be continuous but successive! Moreover a conviction that there is a #irst unmoved somethin/ may be reached not only #rom the #ore/oin/ ar/uments$ but also by considerin/ a/ain the principles operative in movents! 1ow it is evident that amon/ e%istin/ thin/s there are some that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest! *his #act has served above to make it clear that it is not true either that all thin/s are in motion or that all thin/s are at rest or that some thin/s are always at rest and the remainder always in motion4 on this matter proo# is supplied by thin/s that #luctuate between the two and have the capacity o# bein/ sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest! *he e%istence o# thin/s o# this kind is clear to all4 but we wish to e%plain also the nature o# each o# the other two kinds and show that there are some thin/s that are always unmoved and some thin/s that are always in motion! 7n the course o# our ar/ument directed to this end we established the #act that everythin/ that is in motion is moved by somethin/$ and that the movent is either unmoved or in motion$ and that$ i# it is in motion$ it is moved either by itsel# or by somethin/ else and so on throu/hout the series4 and so we proceeded to the position that the #irst principle that directly causes thin/s that are in motion to be moved is that which moves itsel#$ and the #irst principle o# the whole series is the unmoved! 0urther it is evident #rom actual observation that there are thin/s that have the characteristic o# movin/ themselves$ e!/! the animal kin/dom and the whole class o# livin/ thin/s! *his bein/ so$ then$ the view was su//ested that perhaps it may be possible #or motion to come to be in a thin/ without havin/ been in e%istence at all be#ore$ because we see this actually occurrin/ in animals4 they are unmoved at one time and then a/ain they are in motion$ as it seems! "e must /rasp the #act$ there#ore$ that

animals move themselves only with one kind o# motion$ and that this is not strictly ori/inated by them! *he cause o# it is not derived #rom the animal itsel#4 it is connected with other natural motions in animals$ which they do not e%perience throu/h their own instrumentality$ e!/! increase$ decrease$ and respiration4 these are e%perienced by every animal while it is at rest and not in motion in respect o# the motion set up by its own a/ency4 here the motion is caused by the atmosphere and by many thin/s that enter into the animal4 thus in some cases the cause is nourishment4 when it is bein/ di/ested animals sleep$ and when it is bein/ distributed throu/h the system they awake and move themselves$ the #irst principle o# this motion bein/ thus ori/inally derived #rom outside! *here#ore animals are not always in continuous motion by their own a/ency4 it is somethin/ else that moves them$ itsel# bein/ in motion and chan/in/ as it comes into relation with each several thin/ that moves itsel#! 5Moreover in all these sel#-movin/ thin/s the #irst movent and cause o# their sel#-motion is itsel# moved by itsel#$ thou/h in an accidental sense4 that is to say$ the body chan/es its place$ so that that which is in the body chan/es its place also and is a sel#-movent throu/h its e%ercise o# levera/e!6 Hence we may con#idently conclude that i# a thin/ belon/s to the class o# unmoved movents that are also themselves moved accidentally$ it is impossible that it should cause continuous motion! So the necessity that there should be motion continuously re.uires that there should be a #irst movent that is unmoved even accidentally$ i#$ as we have said$ there is to be in the world o# thin/s an unceasin/ and undyin/ motion$ and the world is to remain permanently sel#-contained and within the same limits4 #or i# the #irst principle is permanent$ the universe must also be permanent$ since it is continuous with the #irst principle! 5"e must distin/uish$ however$ between accidental motion o# a thin/ by itsel# and such motion by somethin/ else$ the #ormer bein/ con#ined to perishable thin/s$ whereas the latter belon/s also to certain #irst principles o# heavenly bodies$ o# all those$ that is to say$ that e%perience more than one locomotion!6 And #urther$ i# there is always somethin/ o# this nature$ a movent that is itsel# unmoved and eternal$ then that which is #irst moved by it must be eternal! 7ndeed this is clear also #rom the consideration that there would otherwise be no becomin/ and perishin/ and no chan/e o# any kind in other thin/s$ which re.uire somethin/ that is in motion to move them4 #or the motion imparted by the unmoved will always be imparted in the same way and be one and the same$ since the unmoved does not itsel# chan/e in relation to that which is moved by it! But that which is moved by somethin/ that$ thou/h it is in motion$ is moved directly by the unmoved stands in varyin/ relations to the thin/s that it moves$ so that the motion that it causes will not be always the same4 by reason o# the #act that it occupies contrary positions or assumes contrary #orms at di##erent times it will produce contrary motions in each several thin/ that it moves and will cause it to be at one time at rest and at another time in motion!

*he #ore/oin/ ar/ument$ then$ has served to clear up the point about which we raised a di##iculty at the outset-why is it that instead o# all thin/s bein/ either in motion or at rest$ or some thin/s bein/ always in motion and the remainder always at rest$ there are thin/s that are sometimes in motion and sometimes not8 *he cause o# this is now plain4 it is because$ while some thin/s are moved by an eternal unmoved movent and are there#ore always in motion$ other thin/s are moved by a movent that is in motion and chan/in/$ so that they too must chan/e! But the unmoved movent$ as has been said$ since it remains permanently simple and unvaryin/ and in the same state$ will cause motion that is one and simple! Part 7 *his matter will be made clearer$ however$ i# we start a#resh #rom another point! "e must consider whether it is or is not possible that there should be a continuous motion$ and$ i# it is possible$ which this motion is$ and which is the primary motion4 #or it is plain that i# there must always be motion$ and a particular motion is primary and continuous$ then it is this motion that is imparted by the #irst movent$ and so it is necessarily one and the same and continuous and primary! 1ow o# the three kinds o# motion that there are-motion in respect o# ma/nitude$ motion in respect o# a##ection$ and motion in respect o# place-it is this last$ which we call locomotion$ that must be primary! *his may be shown as #ollows! 7t is impossible that there should be increase without the previous occurrence o# alteration4 #or that which is increased$ althou/h in a sense it is increased by what is like itsel#$ is in a sense increased by what is unlike itsel#4 thus it is said that contrary is nourishment to contrary4 but /rowth is e##ected only by thin/s becomin/ like to like! *here must be alteration$ then$ in that there is this chan/e #rom contrary to contrary! But the #act that a thin/ is altered re.uires that there should be somethin/ that alters it$ somethin/ e!/! that makes the potentially hot into the actually hot4 so it is plain that the movent does not maintain a uni#orm relation to it but is at one time nearer to and at another #arther #rom that which is altered4 and we cannot have this without locomotion! 7#$ there#ore$ there must always be motion$ there must also always be locomotion as the primary motion$ and$ i# there is a primary as distin/uished #rom a secondary #orm o# locomotion$ it must be the primary #orm! A/ain$ all a##ections have their ori/in in condensation and rare#action4 thus heavy and li/ht$ so#t and hard$ hot and cold$ are considered to be #orms o# density and rarity! But condensation and rare#action are nothin/ more than combination and separation$ processes in accordance with which substances are said to become and perish4 and in bein/ combined and separated thin/s must chan/e in respect o# place! And #urther$ when a thin/ is increased or decreased its ma/nitude chan/es in respect o# place! A/ain$ there is another point o# view #rom which it will be clearly seen that

locomotion is primary! As in the case o# other thin/s so too in the case o# motion the word 3primary3 may be used in several senses! A thin/ is said to be prior to other thin/s when$ i# it does not e%ist$ the others will not e%ist$ whereas it can e%ist without the others4 and there is also priority in time and priority in per#ection o# e%istence! :et us be/in$ then$ with the #irst sense! 1ow there must be motion continuously$ and there may be continuously either continuous motion or successive motion$ the #ormer$ however$ in a hi/her de/ree than the latter4 moreover it is better that it should be continuous rather than successive motion$ and we always assume the presence in nature o# the better$ i# it be possible4 since$ then$ continuous motion is possible 5this will be proved later4 #or the present let us take it #or /ranted6$ and no other motion can be continuous e%cept locomotion$ locomotion must be primary! 0or there is no necessity #or the sub-ect o# locomotion to be the sub-ect either o# increase or o# alteration$ nor need it become or perish4 on the other hand there cannot be any one o# these processes without the e%istence o# the continuous motion imparted by the #irst movent! Secondly$ locomotion must be primary in time4 #or this is the only motion possible #or thin/s! 7t is true indeed that$ in the case o# any individual thin/ that has a becomin/$ locomotion must be the last o# its motions4 #or a#ter its becomin/ it #irst e%periences alteration and increase$ and locomotion is a motion that belon/s to such thin/s only when they are per#ected! But there must previously be somethin/ else that is in process o# locomotion to be the cause even o# the becomin/ o# thin/s that become$ without itsel# bein/ in process o# becomin/$ as e!/! the be/otten is preceded by what be/ot it4 otherwise becomin/ mi/ht be thou/ht to be the primary motion on the /round that the thin/ must #irst become! But thou/h this is so in the case o# any individual thin/ that becomes$ nevertheless be#ore anythin/ becomes$ somethin/ else must be in motion$ not itsel# becomin/ but bein/$ and be#ore this there must a/ain be somethin/ else! And since becomin/ cannot be primary-#or$ i# it were$ everythin/ that is in motion would be perishable-it is plain that no one o# the motions ne%t in order can be prior to locomotion! By the motions ne%t in order 7 mean increase and then alteration$ decrease$ and perishin/! All these are posterior to becomin/4 conse.uently$ i# not even becomin/ is prior to locomotion$ then no one o# the other processes o# chan/e is so either! *hirdly$ that which is in process o# becomin/ appears universally as somethin/ imper#ect and proceedin/ to a #irst principle4 and so what is posterior in the order o# becomin/ is prior in the order o# nature! 1ow all thin/s that /o throu/h the process o# becomin/ ac.uire locomotion last! 7t is this that accounts #or the #act that some livin/ thin/s$ e!/! plants and many kinds o# animals$ owin/ to lack o# the re.uisite or/an$ are entirely without motion$ whereas others ac.uire it in the course o# their bein/ per#ected! *here#ore$ i# the de/ree in which thin/s possess locomotion corresponds to

the de/ree in which they have reali9ed their natural development$ then this motion must be prior to all others in respect o# per#ection o# e%istence4 and not only #or this reason but also because a thin/ that is in motion loses its essential character less in the process o# locomotion than in any other kind o# motion4 it is the only motion that does not involve a chan/e o# bein/ in the sense in which there is a chan/e in .uality when a thin/ is altered and a chan/e in .uantity when a thin/ is increased or decreased! Above all it is plain that this motion$ motion in respect o# place$ is what is in the strictest sense produced by that which moves itsel#2 but it is the sel#-movent that we declare to be the #irst principle o# thin/s that are moved and impart motion and the primary source to which thin/s that are in motion are to be re#erred! 7t is clear$ then$ #rom the #ore/oin/ ar/uments that locomotion is the primary motion! "e have now to show which kind o# locomotion is primary! *he same process o# reasonin/ will also make clear at the same time the truth o# the assumption we have made both now and at a previous sta/e that it is possible that there should be a motion that is continuous and eternal! 1ow it is clear #rom the #ollowin/ considerations that no other than locomotion can be continuous! )very other motion and chan/e is #rom an opposite to an opposite4 thus #or the processes o# becomin/ and perishin/ the limits are the e%istent and the non-e%istent$ #or alteration the various pairs o# contrary a##ections$ and #or increase and decrease either /reatness and smallness or per#ection and imper#ection o# ma/nitude4 and chan/es to the respective contraries are contrary chan/es! 1ow a thin/ that is under/oin/ any particular kind o# motion$ but thou/h previously e%istent has not always under/one it$ must previously have been at rest so #ar as that motion is concerned! 7t is clear$ then$ that #or the chan/in/ thin/ the contraries will be states o# rest! And we have a similar result in the case o# chan/es that are not motions4 #or becomin/ and perishin/$ whether re/arded simply as such without .uali#ication or as a##ectin/ somethin/ in particular$ are opposites4 there#ore provided it is impossible #or a thin/ to under/o opposite chan/es at the same time$ the chan/e will not be continuous$ but a period o# time will intervene between the opposite processes! *he .uestion whether these contradictory chan/es are contraries or not makes no di##erence$ provided only it is impossible #or them both to be present to the same thin/ at the same time4 the point is o# no importance to the ar/ument! 1or does it matter i# the thin/ need not rest in the contradictory state$ or i# there is no state o# rest as a contrary to the process o# chan/e4 it may be true that the none%istent is not at rest$ and that perishin/ is a process to the non-e%istent! All that matters is the intervention o# a time4 it is this that prevents the chan/e #rom bein/ continuous4 so$ too$ in our previous instances the important thin/ was not the relation o# contrariety but the impossibility o# the two processes bein/ present to a thin/ at the same time! And there is no need to be disturbed by the #act that on this showin/ there may be more than one contrary to the same thin/$ that a particular motion will be contrary both to rest and to motion in the contrary direction! "e have only to /rasp the #act that a particular motion is in a sense the opposite both o# a state o# rest and

o# the contrary motion$ in the same way as that which is o# e.ual or standard measure is the opposite both o# that which surpasses it and o# that which it surpasses$ and that it is impossible #or the opposite motions or chan/es to be present to a thin/ at the same time! 0urthermore$ in the case o# becomin/ and perishin/ it would seem to be an utterly absurd thin/ i# as soon as anythin/ has become it must necessarily perish and cannot continue to e%ist #or any time4 and$ i# this is true o# becomin/ and perishin/$ we have #air /rounds #or in#errin/ the same to be true o# the other kinds o# chan/e$ since it would be in the natural order o# thin/s that they should be uni#orm in this respect! Part :et us now proceed to maintain that it is possible that there should be an in#inite motion that is sin/le and continuous$ and that this motion is rotatory motion! *he motion o# everythin/ that is in process o# locomotion is either rotatory or rectilinear or a compound o# the two4 conse.uently$ i# one o# the #ormer two is not continuous$ that which is composed o# them both cannot be continuous either! 1ow it is plain that i# the locomotion o# a thin/ is rectilinear and #inite it is not continuous locomotion4 #or the thin/ must turn back$ and that which turns back in a strai/ht line under/oes two contrary locomotions$ since$ so #ar as motion in respect o# place is concerned$ upward motion is the contrary o# downward motion$ #orward motion o# backward motion$ and motion to the le#t o# motion to the ri/ht$ these bein/ the pairs o# contraries in the sphere o# place! But we have already de#ined sin/le and continuous motion to be motion o# a sin/le thin/ in a sin/le period o# time and operatin/ within a sphere admittin/ o# no #urther speci#ic di##erentiation 5#or we have three thin/s to consider$ #irst that which is in motion$ e!/! a man or a /od$ secondly the 3when3 o# the motion$ that is to say$ the time$ and thirdly the sphere within which it operates$ which may be either place or a##ection or essential #orm or ma/nitude64 and contraries are speci#ically not one and the same but distinct4 and within the sphere o# place we have the above-mentioned distinctions! Moreover we have an indication that motion #rom A to B is the contrary o# motion #rom B to A in the #act that$ i# they occur at the same time$ they arrest and stop each other! And the same is true in the case o# a circle4 the motion #rom A towards B is the contrary o# the motion #rom A towards ,4 #or even i# they are continuous and there is no turnin/ back they arrest each other$ because contraries annihilate or obstruct one another! On the other hand lateral motion is not the contrary o# upward motion! But what shows most clearly that rectilinear motion cannot be continuous is the #act that turnin/ back necessarily implies comin/ to a stand$ not only when it is a strai/ht line that is traversed$ but also in the case o# locomotion in a circle 5which is not the same thin/ as rotatory locomotion4 #or$ when a thin/ merely traverses a circle$ it may either proceed on its course without a break or turn back a/ain when it has reached the same point #rom which it started6! "e may assure ourselves o# the necessity o# this comin/ to a stand not only on the stren/th o# observation$

but also on theoretical /rounds! "e may start as #ollows4 we have three points$ startin/-point$ middle-point$ and #inishin/-point$ o# which the middle-point in virtue o# the relations in which it stands severally to the other two is both a startin/-point and a #inishin/-point$ and thou/h numerically one is theoretically two! "e have #urther the distinction between the potential and the actual! So in the strai/ht line in .uestion any one o# the points lyin/ between the two e%tremes is potentially a middlepoint4 but it is not actually so unless that which is in motion divides the line by comin/ to a stand at that point and be/innin/ its motion a/ain4 thus the middle-point becomes both a startin/-point and a /oal$ the startin/-point o# the latter part and the #inishin/-point o# the #irst part o# the motion! *his is the case e!/! when A in the course o# its locomotion comes to a stand at B and starts a/ain towards ,4 but when its motion is continuous A cannot either have come to be or have ceased to be at the point B4 it can only have been there at the moment o# passin/$ its passa/e not bein/ contained within any period o# time e%cept the whole o# which the particular moment is a dividin/-point! *o maintain that it has come to be and ceased to be there will involve the conse.uence that A in the course o# its locomotion will always be comin/ to a stand4 #or it is impossible that A should simultaneously have come to be at B and ceased to be there$ so that the two thin/s must have happened at di##erent points o# time$ and there#ore there will be the intervenin/ period o# time4 conse.uently A will be in a state o# rest at B$ and similarly at all other points$ since the same reasonin/ holds /ood in every case! "hen to A$ that which is in process o# locomotion$ B$ the middlepoint$ serves both as a #inishin/-point and as a startin/-point #or its motion$ A must come to a stand at B$ because it makes it two -ust as one mi/ht do in thou/ht! However$ the point A is the real startin/-point at which the movin/ body has ceased to be$ and it is at , that it has really come to be when its course is #inished and it comes to a stand! So this is how we must meet the di##iculty that then arises$ which is as #ollows! Suppose the line ) is e.ual to the line G$ that A proceeds in continuous locomotion #rom the e%treme point o# ) to ,$ and that$ at the moment when A is at the point B$ D is proceedin/ in uni#orm locomotion and with the same velocity as A #rom the e%tremity o# G to H4 then$ says the ar/ument$ D will have reached H be#ore A has reached , #or that which makes an earlier start and departure must make an earlier arrival4 the reason$ then$ #or the late arrival o# A is that it has not simultaneously come to be and ceased to be at B4 otherwise it will not arrive later4 #or this to happen it will be necessary that it should come to a stand there! *here#ore we must not hold that there was a moment when A came to be at B and that at the same moment D was in motion #rom the e%tremity o# G4 #or the #act o# A3s havin/ come to be at B will involve the #act o# its also ceasin/ to be there$ and the two events will not be simultaneous$ whereas the truth is that A is at B at a s