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Distribution Statement F:
Further distribution only as directed by Joint Task Force Paladin. Forward comments or questions regarding this product to Commanding Officer, Joint Task Force Paladin, APO AE 09354
Publication date:
20 October 2008
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Miscellaneous Information
This reference guide was created to help the warfighter identify IED terrain placement patterns and tactics frequently observed in the Afghanistan area of operations. The guide was not intended to cover every possible IED placement method or tactic, but rather illustrates some of the major events and lessons learned from experienced field operators from the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell. The information presented is intended to assist the reader with recognizing terrain and situations that could offer an advantage to an enemy looking to maximize the effect from an IED strike.
Disclaimer/warning
Recovery and handling of IEDs or their components is inherently dangerous. The booklet is not designed to train non-EOD personnel in render-safe techniques. Actual EOD personnel must attend school for nearly a year before assignment to an EOD team. For the safety of yourself and your team, call EOD if you believe you have found an IED or a suspicious object.
This booklet was produced by CEXC Afghanistan, under Joint Task Force Paladin. Information was derived from many sources, but mostly from reports and photographs sent by field operators. CEXCs mission is to provide technical intelligence on IED techniques, identify trends, and target bomb makers in order to enable both defensive and offensive counter-IED operations. When an incident occurs, all information is passed on to or collected by CEXC investigators. The information is assessed, and any recovered technical material is evaluated. The incident is analyzed and a technical report is produced. The reports are made available as soon as possible and shared at the lowest possible classification. The CEXC team has a mix of skills and experiences: IED and explosives, investigative ability, storage/retrieval/analysis of data, electronic and electrical engineering, operational administration, and of course, desktop publishing (since they produced this booket!)
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Crossings
Introduction
Among the most ready-made structures for IEDs are bridges and culverts. In Afghanistan, the difference between the two is that culverts have a much smaller opening than bridges. Culverts have a small tunnel to allow water to flow under the roadway. The space underneath provides a gap where an emplacer can easily hide a large device without disturbing the road surface. Once the main charge is detonated, the blast follows the path of least resistance - mostly out the sides, but with enough residual energy upward to destroy any vehicles above. Some of the more commonly found types of IED devices at crossings include command wires and RCIEDs. Page 1
Bridges/Culverts
There are thousands of such crossings in Afghanistan, so many that it may not be practical to stop at every one. The best bet is to research the local threat situation before heading out. If investigating a suspect crossing, dismount and conduct proper vulnerable point checks.
Crossings
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Road Hazards
Introduction
Simply driving on what passes for a road in Afghanistan could itself be a hazard. Existing roads were never meant to support routine traffic, much less large, armored vehicles weighing several tons each. The paths are hilly, rough, with dangerous mountain switchbacks, all of which can play into the enemys hand.
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Road Hazards
Uneven surface
Dirt roads can slow convoy traffic, their very nature allows for a quick and easy hiding place for an IED. It would be easy to spot fresh dirt in flat, dry ground, but if everything looks overturned, the mound made by an emplacer is difficult to find. The local tactical picture could give a convoy commander information about whether or not a given area has seen recent activity.
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Road Hazards
Curves
The tighter the curve, the better for the enemy. Bends in the road force vehicles to slow down or drive singlefile, possibly over a pressure-plate IED. (Right) Fortunately, the IED at this turn detonated before any coalition forces arrived. All that was left was a blast seat and little evidence.
Road Hazards
Mud
Rain and mud pose significant threats to the warfighter. IEDs have been known to function in soft mud if effectively wrapped by a bomber, and still disable any Coalition vehicle.
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Inclines
Non-canalizing
If theres one thing Afghanistan has a lot of, its mountains. Enemy forces can use narrow, curving paths to their advantage. The path up the incline in the picture is non-canalizing, that is, it does not necessarily force traffic into one channel. But any incline will slow down armored vehicles, giving the enemy the opportunity to guess what distance a pressure plate needs to be from the explosive charge to detonate under the drivers seat and not the engine compartment. Recommend dismount procedures be considered, and have a foot patrol check the hill for any devices before proceeding with the convoy, or where possible, make your own tracks.
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Inclines
Canalizing
location of IED
An incline with a canalizing or channeling path is much more restrictive to convoy traffic. The enemy can slow a convoy, then estimate its slower speed, and effectively place an IED with the main charge offset enough to detonate directly under a target vehicle. Electric wires coming out of the road surface led EOD to the site. The main charge for this particular IED (inset) was buried about 45 centimeters below a tire track. It was estimated to be about 15 kilograms of high explosives.
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Placement
Introduction
The enemy is studying Coalition tactics, techniques and procedures to get maximum effect from an IED strike. Thats why its important to understand the enemy and what theyre thinking. An IED triggerman has three requirements when choosing a location for the next strike: 1. line of sight to the target - to make sure he gets the right target 2. concealment - to ensure hes not found 3. easy escape - to ensure hes not captured or killed Understanding his decision-making process will show why some locations are preferred for an IED strike while others arent, and why some IEDs just keep showing up at the same place, time after time. (Right) Battery pack wrapped in black electrical tape with clip
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Placement
Buried
(Left) A buried 105 mm projectile, after it was disrupted, and (above), after it was recovered by EOD. The projectile was covered but found using a metal detector.
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Placement
On the ground
This pressure plate IED was turned in by a local farmer who saw someone burying something in the road. Normally concealed, the remote-control receiver and pressure plate were resting on the road surface. The main charge was partially buried, but positioned in the middle of the road to do the most amount of damage possible.
Pressure plate
Main charge
Placement
Over a wall
The portion of the CWIED in the picture is the part of a 140 meterlong wire that was mostly buried about 20 centimeters deep, except when it ran over a mud wall near the firing point, well away from the blast seat. The wall itself, along with a curve in the road, helped obscure the triggerman from approaching traffic.
Command wire
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Placement
Along a wall
Instead of running over the top of a mud wall, this fake command wire is along the bottom in what was previously thought to be a safe area for coalition troops. The wire was strung out in a way that if cut, it would have detonated all of the charges in the IED. If you find anything looking like a command wire, do not disturb it! Call EOD for assistance. (Inset) One of the recovered charges from the site.
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Placement
On a dirt road
The tripwire in this photo is run along the width of the road, offset by about 25 feet from the main charge. The charge is detonated when the tripwire snags the treads of a wheel and pulls an insulator inserted between the contacts of a clothespin switch, closing the circuit. The offset is a guess by the enemy as to what distance the charge needs to be from the tripwire to detonate under the target vehicle.
Electrical wire
Main charge
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Placement
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Placement
PBIED #2
Vest in green camouflage pattern cloth had three large pockets, plus a small pocket on the right front pocket above the large one. Rocker switch to function vest
Battery compartment
Placement
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Placement
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Placement
On a bicycle
(Left) A bicycle with a suspicious package sits outside a mosque. (Below) The same bicycle after disruption by EOD. The package carried two Type 63 107mm rocket warheads.
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Placement
In a tree
Hand grenades (inset) were found in a tree by local children. The placing of grenades that far off the ground was possibly an attempt to target the roofs of passing coalition vehicles. The threat is all around you. Remember to also look up while conducting 5 and 25 checks.
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Placement
Used IED site
In this photo, the bomber emplaced a land mine in the blacktop road right next to debris from a prior IED blast. Traffic was forced to go around the old site and drive over the land mine. There was even a small notch in the road to hide the command wire.
Land mine
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Placement
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Wadis
Wadis (or Wadi for singular) are dry riverbeds where water flows during Afghanistans rainy season. The local population uses water collected in the wadis to fill their cisterns to last the rest of the year. When dry, the wadis smoothness makes them a welcome option for vehicle traffic in a country with few passable roads. Coalition vehicles also use them, which also makes them a hotbed of activity for IEDs.
Two wadis
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Wadis
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Wadis
Trip wire
Some emplacers use the exact same spot for IED emplacement. Both this and the next page show the same spot months apart, but with two different devices. Emplacers know which routes are used more often and target those areas. Page 25
Wadis
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Suspicious Items
Convoys should always be aware of anything out of the ordinary. If it doesnt belong there, it might be an indication of an IED. The only way to be sure of whats diffrent is to understand whats normal. Take the time to learn local customs and routines, the presence or absence or people, and even the surroundings. Knowing that, something new might become apparent. (Right) Rock piles dont occur in nature, so this might be a clue. They are placed by locals to demark tribal areas, mines, and sometimes, any discovered IEDs. The piles also create a vulnerable point, forcing vehicles to slow down and go around. Anytime rock piles are encountered the patrol should dismount and investigate before proceeding.
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Suspicious Items
Usually a donkey with a cart is led by somebody, but an unattended animal should raise a red flag, especially one with a cart. The donkey might be towing an explosive device.
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Methods
Enemy TTPs
When planning a strike, the enemy has several factors to consider: - Is the target route used by coalition forces? If so, when and where? - Is there a landmark that can be used as an aiming marker? - Is there a way for coalition forces to escape from an ambush should one vehicle be hit by an IED? - Is there a way to escape, down, out, or even up a mountain? - Is there a sharp corner that could reduce the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures? The enemy wants to make sure no IED gets wasted, so theyre going to be thinking about how the terrain works for them. By learning what theyre looking for, a convoy could be better prepared for a possible IED strike. Case no. 1 - view from blast seat of IED strike Page 29
Enemy TTPs
The bomber had a clear view of the target from behind the rock wall. He only needed to touch the command wire end to the battery terminals to detonate the charge. To escape, the bomber could have gone down a steep hill, across a field and into a village.
Methods
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Enemy TTPs
Case no. 2 - A CWIED hit the first of a fourvehicle convoy. The CWIED itself was buried along a low wall and led to a firing point about 100 meters away to the opposite side of a hill, where the bomber could slip away unnoticed. The enemy picked this spot because it had two advantages: - a way to aim (the low wall) - someplace to hide and escape (the hill, about 100 meters away) Firing point
Methods
Contact point
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Enemy TTPs
Battery and switch
Methods
Egress routes
Firing point
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Methods
Enemy TTPs
Case no. 3 - A CWIED strike hit the trailing vehicle in a convoy. Upon investigation, a buried command wire was found, which led about 150 meters away to a nearby qualat (mud-walled compound). The wire near the contact point was buried, but surfaced partway to the qualat, suggesting the IED was prestaged, all the bomber had to do was attach a power source to initiate the device. This spot offered two things: - A place to hide, far from the contact point. - A possible aiming marker; a metal pole beside the road. Page 33
Firing point
Path of command wire Looking towards firing point from seat of explosion
Enemy TTPs
Contact point
Methods
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