[G.R. No. 155450, August 06, 2008] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.

: The Case This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3]Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928[4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994. B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8] Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles[9] on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. [10] Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res

judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. [11] Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents. [12] On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13] The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared: The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction; Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land; Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15] We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution. x x x x

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and

erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner's failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled: In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[18] Since petitioner's complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner's complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[19] Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[20] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.[21] Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,[22] we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps [24] petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25] The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26]which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -

(a) (b)

Alienable Timber

or

disposable and

(c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the GovernorGeneral may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled: We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were"subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution."[29]When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines' complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, [1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents. Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents: (a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;[4] (b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5] (c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6] (d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;[7] (e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;[8] (f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;[9] and (g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10] On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11] The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. [12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16] During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days. On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18] Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus: In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its

subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water. As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20] The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments: First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it. I Jurisdiction Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic. A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration. Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit: . . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots. The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties). The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court. B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court. Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29] Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner: 1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.[31] In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction. II Period of Possession Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.[32] Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35] The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37] Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots. Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, [40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073]. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. [41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42] The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act. However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44] Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree. Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46] WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Carpo vs. Ayala Land

DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision[1] dated December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and set aside the Summary Judgment[2] dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also subject of the present petition is the CA Resolution[3] dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier decision. A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:

On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title [4] with the RTC of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292. In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names. [5] They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of: (a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 155,345 square meters. No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint. According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to cover and embrace the Carpos property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos title.[6] The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing construction and development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos rights. The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment: (1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the property described therein including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000 as attorneys fees plus costs of suit and litigation expenses.[7] On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias that the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala Corporation.[8] On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction[9] and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended Answer,[10] respectively. In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro[11] which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007. During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by TCT No. T-5333.[12]

In the Order[13] dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to the RTC of Las Pias where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082. On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one which of the two (2) titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos predecessors title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were genuine issues and controversies to be litigated. In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALIs motion for summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243. In a decision[14] dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALIs petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.[15] Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CAs refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CAs ruling that trial was unnecessary. In separate minute Resolutions,[16] the Court denied both petitions. Both parties motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus: Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177). Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void. It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of defendant ALIs predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayalas predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

Evidently, Ayalas claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayalas answer is its admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void. WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of defendant Ayalas TCT No. T-5333; (b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void; (c) (d) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and To pay the costs.[17]

On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution [18] dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Pias. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALIs petition meritorious, the Court, in a Decision[19] dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CAs dismissal of ALIs appeal and remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings. On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as follows: (1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title to the subject property; (2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;

(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued covering the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect.[20] The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.[21] The Petition contained the following assignment of errors: A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC RELIED HEAVILY ON AN ALLEGED ADMISSION BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND. D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT.[22] Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTCs Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998; or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court should be reversed and set aside. Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters. It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that: On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged: 14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALIs TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALIs TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALIs TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx. This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property described in private respondents TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath: 9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x. 9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions found in the plaintiffs and ALIs respective titles. The standard operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the technical description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the available survey plans described in the titles for reference. 9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs title vis-a-vis ALIs title. Attached hereto as Annex G is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant. 9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs claimed property entirely overlaps ALIs property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALIs lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886). 9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALIs TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs claimed property. The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private respondents TCT No. 296463 and petitioners TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333).[23] In addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles: xxxx In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioners allegation that their (private respondents) title, TCT No. 296463 traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents attached no supporting document to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx. xxxx

Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription and laches which may likewise be resolved without going to trial.[24](Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CAs factual finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are those covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and ALIs TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint. The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners claims with respect to these properties are already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[25]petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALIs predecessor in interest,[26] is the one with valid title to these properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here: Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit: 1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N33721 and N-43516, respectively. 2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166. 3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777. On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration.x x x. xxxx In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors. xxxx Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x. xxxx The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein. Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is

deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.) We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition. First Assignment of Error Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CAs ruling on this point. It is the CAs view that the trial courts pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of regularity that said title enjoys. We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the Summary Judgment: Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177). Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.[28] To begin with, a perusal of the defendants answer or amended answer would show that, contrary to the trial courts allusions thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial courts finding that the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the notation SWO appeared in the technical description of the said title which was attached to the answer and due to ALIs failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.[29] It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate authority all from the notation SWO which appeared beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the discussion of the CA on this point: Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-appellants failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALIs original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have

carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALIs failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land registration case. The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further. [30] (Underscoring ours; citations omitted.) It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALIs TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxxx (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x. Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna[31]: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:[32] To overturn this legal presumption carelessly more than 90 years since the termination of the case will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.) The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do. We cannot accept petitioners proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALIs title since the burden of proof purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC. This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALIs title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALIs title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALIs titles should be declared void for not being derivatives of the Carpos title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over ALIs. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court. Indubitably, in view of the CAs Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."[33] (Emphasis supplied.) In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite,[34] we held that [w]here two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the principle Primus Tempore, Portior Jure (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALIs title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT. Second Assignment of Error Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist. In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CAs finding that: As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Courts firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches. Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffsappellees complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960. By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus: SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,

whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value.[35] Third Assignment of Error The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows: In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALIs statement to be of no moment. Nowhere in ALIs statement was there an admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. x x x. The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees certificate of title. x x x.[36] An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALIs supposed admission of the existence of Carpos title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared: The existence of plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex G to defendant ALIs answer. This admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255). Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x.[37] Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted the validity of Carpos title with its admission of the said titles existence, that is the unmistakable import of the trial courts statements that ALIs admission of the existence of Carpos title are conclusive upon it and bars ALI from taking a position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer followed by the statement that the trial court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs. This is yet another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly pointed out in its own Decision. Fourth Assignment of Error As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro[38] was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus: In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Paraaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALIs TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guicos application was opposed by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was derived. It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886. It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro. For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only

have objections with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the instant case.[39] We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties respective OCTs were not issued in these persons names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there was identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CAs questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case. In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are herebyAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010 FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz. Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land 1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. 2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void. Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981. The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision 6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same property. The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto. During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9 upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the case. Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same. The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.10 On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.12

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read: ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to: (1) x x x x x x (2) x x x x x x (3) x x x x x x (4) x x x x x x (5) x x x x x x (6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;] (7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect; (8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999; (9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and (10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.14 Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It was denied for raising factual issues. 16 She moved for reconsideration.17 This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18 Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to thebanc was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed. 22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course. Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself. 23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety: This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.] I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review. Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A". The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case. In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice. In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost.

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza. I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves. I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday. I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system. Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original). The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public. This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners letter/third motion for reconsideration. APPLICABILITY OF REYES The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this case. To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24 The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25 This contention is erroneous. The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res judicataas against his successors-in-interest. We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27 We also declared in Aquino that: From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28 Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around. However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man. By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.30 All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."31 ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."

By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus: Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32 Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141. [E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33 However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) 34coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act. 35 This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.37 Coming now to petitioners contention that her "private rights" to the property, meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate: Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership. But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted: Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. xxx During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x xxx A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.38 xxx Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for registration. NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same was null and void. An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration

Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her. 40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41 In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients. Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied). Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied) Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man. PETITIONERS CONTEMPT OF COURT This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack. That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating: This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.] It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted: I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review. Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A". The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied). Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that: If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. But she hastens to add in the same breath that: I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza. Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task: . . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system. When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered: xxx The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the

appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic. Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court. xxx Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat. The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court. It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions. As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.42 Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court. In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held: A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification. A FEW OBSERVATIONS If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that: It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcias successorin-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied). The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel. WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit. Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely. Treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.