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Nick Fletcher PH317
science fiction example in which there is technology available that can replicate a
human being exactly, ‘atom for atom’ (1978; pp.1). The original and the replica
human being will have identical psychological properties; for example amongst
other things they will have exactly the same beliefs, personality, memories and
tendencies as each other. As Stich puts it, ‘any psychological property
instantiated by one of these subjects will be instantiated by the other’ (1978;
pp.1). Stich adds to this that the organisms do not have to exist in the same time
or place, and that the replication may be accidental as these factors have no
effect upon whether or not the subjects are psychologically identical. Sitch also
assumes, and there are few that would disagree1, that mental and physical
properties are nomologically correlated. Instances of psychological autonomy can
occur in any of a number of ways, but the point of this example is to illustrate
exactly what is meant by ‘psychologically identical’.
It could be argued that the subject and the replica described above are not
psychologically identical as Stich suggests; whilst the replica will have memory
traces that exactly match the memories of the original, these will be merely
traces: he or she will not have the actual memories. For example, the replica may
have a memory trace of a childhood game he or she used to play, but will not
have an actual memory of the game; the replica did not exist at the time and so
could not have actually played the game. The original organism actually played
the game during childhood and so will have an actual memory of the game.
However, Stich has a ready answer for this concern, he posits that such
psychological properties are ‘hybrid’ in nature, and are analysable into purely
psychological properties and non-psychological properties (1978; pp.2). For
example he suggests that ‘remembering that p’ and ‘knowing that p’ can be
reduced to psychological properties ‘seeming to remember that p’ and ‘believing
that p,’ along with non-psychological properties such as ‘p being true’ or ‘the
memory trace being caused in a certain way by the fact that p’ (1978, pp.2).
Furthermore, Stich points out that intuitively only the purely psychological part of
the hybrid properties can be used to explain behaviour (1978; pp2); seeming to
remember that p will have the same effect upon behaviour whether or not the
organism actually has a real memory that p; equally, believing that p will have
the same effect upon behaviour as knowing that p. Thus, the principle of
psychological autonomy holds up to this concern as it only needs to take into
account properties that can be used to explain behaviour.
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Nick Fletcher PH317
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Nick Fletcher PH317
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Nick Fletcher PH317
the truth-value of our beliefs has no effect upon our actions, surely one cannot
appeal to truth-values in order to disprove the fact that a persons beliefs can act
as a cause of their action.
More importantly, the truth-value is not a property inherent to the belief
itself, it is decided by external factors. Whilst it is true that it is not possible that
two people can hold the same belief but with different truth-values, this is not
because truth-values have an effect upon beliefs; it is simply because a single
belief cannot be true and false at the same time. Thus the very premise from
which Stichs argument comes from is all but irrelevant to his argument. Indeed,
Stich’s examples are cleverly designed to create a situation in which two people
hold the same beliefs and perform the same actions, with only the truth-value of
the beliefs being different. In each, it is intuitively obvious that the belief is what
causes the action, but Stich postulates that this intuition is incorrect because ‘if a
particular belief of mine is false, and a particular belief of yours is true, then they
are not the same belief’ (1978; pp.4). This does not equate to the non-identity
principle, the clause ‘when these instantiations occur at the same time’2 must be
added, which rules our its application in any of Stichs examples.
To conclude, Stich is unsuccessful in arguing against the folk psychological
category of belief. His arguments, whilst drawn from a sensible principle, that of
psychological autonomy, are built upon a highly flawed premise that attempts to
use obvious intuition that could be considered folk psychology to disprove
obvious intuition that is folk psychology. Indeed, to me the four examples that he
uses in his argument serve more to support the folk psychological category of
belief than to disprove it as in each of them the most intuitive and simplest
explanation of the subjects’ actions is that they are caused by their beliefs.
Bibliography
S. Stich, ‘Autonomous Psychology & the Belief-Desire Thesis’, Monist 61 (1978);
rpt. in Bermudez, ed. (2005) & Lycan, ed. (1999).
I. Ravenscroft, ‘Folk Psychology as a Theory’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2004)
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Nick Fletcher PH317
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Inclusion of ‘by different people’ is supplementary to this main addition, as a single person
cannot have conflicting two beliefs conflicting in truth-value on the same subject at the same time.
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