ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents. 1992 Nov 26 2nd Division G.R. DECISION NOCON, J: No. 96492

weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.'" PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI, accusedappellant. 1991 Jan 18 No. 81561 BIDIN, J.: 3rd Division DECISION G.R.

Juan Mendoza, father of Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 in Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979. Upon the death of Julian, Eufrocina succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots. Between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the case in the agrarian court, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Eufrocina filed before the agrarian court a case for the recovery of possession and damages. The agrarian court decided in favour of Efrocina and ordered petitioner to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Ruling: The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the 'Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.' The same provision states that 'In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.' Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is: 'Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (proprietress) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith reported the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. 3 NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. An Information was filed against Martie for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the trial court found accused/appellant guilty. Issues:

1. Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the object found in the four parcels. 2. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that his rights under custodial investigation were violated. 3. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that the four parcels was not that of the complainant. Ruling: I In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]): 1. This 'constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . .. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 2. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, 3. Marti would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom Marti met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10). We find Marti's disclaimer as incredulous, selfserving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so". As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative selfserving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]). Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SALVAMANTE (at large), accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, accusedappellant. 1995 Mar 22 1st Division 112983 DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: G.R. No.

The prosecution filed an Amended Information with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded against Maqueda only, after he entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court found accused Hector Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, Prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sur-rebuttal witness. The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as follows: Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as was her wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted. At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores. Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house. Julieta villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. She got

In the sanctity of their own home, Horace William Barker was brutally slain and his wife Teresita Medoza badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims' former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the ghastly crime. As to Rene's coconspirator, the prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries. Only Richard Malig was arrested. On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested and he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help. The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving behind her husband who was still asleep. She went down the stairs and proceeded to the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly, the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion. Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, she went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs. At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27, August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder. Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men boarded it. Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he boarded it. In the investigation conducted by the Tuba police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man. A police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision. On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they already left the place. On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that "Putol," who is none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail. Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991. On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial. In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City

was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe provided him by Salvamante. After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry. Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. His testimony is summarized by the trial court in this wise: Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that on August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21, Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa. Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991. It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. As caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory. On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron. On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him (Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

his Christmas vacation, he went back to work at the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Roselyn home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAFGU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he could also become a state witness. He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder. On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SPO3 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay. Although the trial, court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. Maqueda seasonably appealed to the SC his conviction. Ruling: We find no merit in this appeal. Difference between an Extra-Judicial Confession and Extra-Judicial Admission From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang Salaysay - and an extrajudicial admission - the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:

SEC. 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 33. Confession. - The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Extra-Judicial Confession Without Assistance of Counsel is In Admissible The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. It was, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. Extra-Judicial Admission voluntarily and freely given not in the course of an investigation and those given to a private person are admissible The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited." They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a

witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. The guilt of Maqueda was also established by circumstancial evidence Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstancial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991; (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty." Section 4, rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c ) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case. Maquedas Defense of Alibi must fail This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991. CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. 1996 Feb 20 2nd Division No. 107383 MENDOZA, J.: G.R.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, Cecilia entered the clinic of her Alfredo, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Alfredo's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in Alfredo's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Cecilia had filed against Alfredo. Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Cecila. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment for Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On

appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Ruling: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents. 1997 Oct 16 1st Division DECISION J: G.R. No. 113271 DAVIDE, JR.,

check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. In the present case, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. RULING: Catolico was unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the company procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00; 5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation. WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Forthwith, Co asked Catolico to explain her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. Catolico filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what they alleged as complainant's dishonesty". He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. 2004 Jan 13 1st Division No. 152160 D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: G.R.

2. the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses. Ruling: The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows: Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception. Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted. The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon

Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, together with Rosalio Bon Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayane and Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza which shows that Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut and sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the barangay tanods, Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge. He said that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land. The trial court convicted Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Coaccused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Issues: 1. the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him. Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities. Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Second Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance. 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances: Accused Virgilio Bon, being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the barangay tanod, Julian Lascano, with other Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-inlaw, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation. The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability: x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees. A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENROs computation of the value of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Versus SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, Accused, / ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, Appellants. 2004 Mar 30 1st Division DECISION G.R. No. 145176 PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extrajudicial confession. Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia,

Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola. Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the private respondents. On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation. SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latters name, age and address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant Garcias wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcias wallet and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from accusedappellants wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Labita. On November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At 8:00 p.m., he was brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his coaccused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took pictures while he was doing the said act. Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorneys Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed the alleged three (3) sworn statements.

During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia, and that he signed the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto. Garcia during trial alleged was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcias alleged three sworn statements. The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused. The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcias wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused. The RTC found the accused guilty. Issue: the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants, including the admissibility of Garcias confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes; and Ruling: The appeal has merit. First Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence Extrajudicial Confessions It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions13 that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word SAKSI. Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower courts action is manifest error. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession. Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The Constitution states that [a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x. Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. Perforated Currency Notes The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present. Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES, appellants. 2004 Jan 20 3rd Division DECISION J.: G.R. No. 141137 CARPIO-MORALES,

Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member of the army. When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however, offer any. At this point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously. SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however, returned it to Vinecario. Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Gocong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat. SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air. The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. Ruling: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, however. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having

On the night of April 10, 1995, as police officers were manning a checkpoint in Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. One of the police officers blew his whistle and ordered them to return to the checkpoint. Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense. As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the case at bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal. Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial.vThe defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant. 2004 Jan 20 En Banc DECISION G.R. No. 147786 QUISUMBING, J.:

Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound. At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was being dispatched to the scene. Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victims head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters saw. Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees. He

The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp., with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

expressed actions.

no

regret

whatsoever

about

his

The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him like an animal. Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their respective interviews with him. At the trial, appellant Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of police frame-up. The trial court disbelieved appellants version of the incident, but found the prosecutions evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the appellant. Issue: the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible. Ruling: The confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. In the instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said constitutional guarantees. Appellants alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellants right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right to be informed, as it cannot be said that the person has been truly informed of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellants statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under

the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellants spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him. Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7, who testified in court. The TV news reporters testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellants alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellants guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, Appellant. 2004 Apr 14 3rd Division DECISION G.R. No. 142356 CORONA, J.: with

Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana.

Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers. Said information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct surveillance operation against their target female who was described by their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province. At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to their headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. While they were in their car, the informer pointed to them a woman bearing the same description given by the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the woman to put out the contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick, which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves. The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. The trial court found the prosecutions version to be credible, reasoning that appellants defense of frame-up was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The law enforcers testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Ruling: After a thorough review of the records, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving the appellants guilt beyond

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court was supported by the evidence on record. Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand. Besides, in this case, the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor detract from their credibility. Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda rights. (This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the warrantless search was invalid, not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest.) This contention is without merit since this Court has repeatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless search. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Here, in submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial, the appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest. Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant People vs. Barros, reiterated in People vs. Aruta, the waiver of the nonadmissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure is not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested - transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred by probable cause in making the arrest. In this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellants arrival was not known by the informant. The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellants alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcons house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges. EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 1986 October 16 2nd Division G.R. No. L69809 D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ, JR., J: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault" Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the

office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act." After trial on the merits, the lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. Issue: whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; Ruling: We rule for the petitioner. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law? The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon city and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.

1994 Aug 4 2nd Division G.R. No. 110662 DECISION PADILLA, J.: Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora. Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. Ruling: The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows: "Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . ." "Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasijudicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation." Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondent. 1995 Sep 28 1st Division DECISION G.R. No. 93833 KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R A. 4200. In an order dated May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently Constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Issue: Whether Section 1 of Republic Act 4200 apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. Ruling: Section 1 of R.A 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court' conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A 4200. UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. December 20, 2006 THIRD DIVISION No. 126619 D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: G.R.

suspension, the case was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. Titans complaint was thus refiled with the CIAC. Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which was later amended and reamended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. \ Uniwide asserted in its petition that: (a) it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional works in Project 1 and Project 3; (b) it is not liable to pay the Value-Added Tax (VAT) for Project 1; (c) it is entitled to liquidated damages for the delay incurred in constructing Project 1 and Project 3; and (d) it should not have been found liable for deficiencies in the defectively constructed Project 2. An Arbitral Tribunal conducted a preliminary conference with the parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) which was signed by the parties. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection, hearings, and received the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits which were subject to cross-examination. On 17 April 1995, after the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision, the decretal portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: On Project 1 Libis: Uniwide is absolved of any liability for the claims made by [Titan] on this Project. Project 2 Edsa Central: Uniwide is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this project, the same being for the account of the [Titan]. On the other hand, [Titan] is absolved of any liability on the counterclaim for defective construction of this project. Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P6,301,075.77 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 19 December 1992 until the date of payment. On Project 3 Kalookan: Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P5,158,364.63 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 08 September 1993 until the date of payment. [Uniwide] is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project, in such amount as may be computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be paid directly thereto. Issue: Whether Uniwide is entitled to liquidated damages for Projects 1 and 3; and (4) Whether Uniwide is liable for deficiencies in Project 2.

An action for a sum of money was filed by TitanIkeda Construction and Development Corporation against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation arising from Uniwides non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects covered by agreements they entered into with each other. Upon Uniwides motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and Titans open court manifestation agreeing to the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Ruling: Liquidated Damages On the issue of liquidated damages, the CIAC rejected such claim while the Court of Appeals held that the matter should be left for determination in future proceedings where the issue has been made clear. In rejecting Uniwides claim for liquidated damages, the CIAC held that there is no legal basis for passing upon and resolving Uniwides claim for the following reasons: (1) no claim for liquidated damages arising from the alleged delay was ever made by Uniwide at any time before the commencement of Titans complaint; (2) the claim for liquidated damages was not included in the counterclaims stated in Uniwides answer to Titans complaint; (3) the claim was not formulated as an issue to be resolved by the CIAC in the TOR; and (4) no attempt was made to modify the TOR to accommodate the same as an issue to be resolved. Uniwide insists that the CIAC should have applied Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. On this matter, the Court of Appeals held that the CIAC is an arbitration body, which is not necessarily bound by the Rules of Court. Also, the Court of Appeals found that the issue has never been made concrete enough to make Titan and the CIAC aware that it will be an issue. In fact, Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its Memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. The Court of Appeals also noted that the only evidence on record to prove delay in the construction of Project 1 is the testimony of Titans engineer regarding the date of completion of the project while the only evidence of delay in the construction of Project 3 is the affidavit of Uniwides President. According to Uniwide, the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of liquidated damages goes against the established judicial policy that a court should always strive to settle in one proceeding the entire controversy leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigations. Uniwide claims that the required evidence for an affirmative ruling on its claim is already on the record. It cites the pertinent provisions of the written contracts which contained deadlines for liquidated damages. Uniwide also noted that the evidence show that Project 1 was completed either on 15 February 1992, as found by the CIAC, or 12 March 1992, as shown by Titans own evidence, while Project 3, according to Uniwides President, was completed in June 1993. Furthermore, Uniwide asserts, the CIAC should have applied procedural rules such as Section 5, Rule 10 with more liberality because it was an administrative tribunal free from the rigid technicalities of regular courts. On this point, the CIAC held: The Rule of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration promulgated by the CIAC contains no Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

provision on the application of the Rules of Court to arbitration proceedings, even in a suppletory capacity. Hypothetically admitting that there is such a provision, suppletory application is made only if it would not contravene a specific provision in the arbitration rules and the spirit thereof. The Tribunal holds that such importation of the Rules of Court provision on amendment to conform to evidence would contravene the spirit, if not the letter of the CIAC rules. This is for the reason that the formulation of the Terms of Reference is done with the active participation of the parties and their counsel themselves. The TOR is further required to be signed by all the parties, their respective counsel and all the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Unless the issues thus carefully formulated in the Terms of Reference were expressly showed [sic] to be amended, issues outside thereof may not be resolved. As already noted in the Decision, no attempt was ever made by the [Uniwide] to modify the TOR in order to accommodate the issues related to its belated counterclaim on this issue. Arbitration has been defined as an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. Voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the members of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts. As an arbitration body, the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the TOR which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. Thus, if Uniwides claim for liquidated damages was not raised as an issue in the TOR or in any modified or amended version of it, the CIAC cannot make a ruling on it. The Rules of Court cannot be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules, whose policy and objective is to provide a fair and expeditious settlement of construction disputes through a nonjudicial process which ensures harmonious and friendly relations between or among the parties. Further, a party may not be deprived of due process of law by an amendment of the complaint as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. In this case, as noted by the Court of Appeals, Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. Verily, Titan was not given a chance to present evidence to counter Uniwides claim for liquidated damages.

Uniwide alludes to an alleged judicial admission made by Engr. Luzon Tablante wherein he stated that Project 1 was completed on 10 March 1992. It now claims that by virtue of Engr. Tablantes statement, Titan had admitted that it was in delay. We disagree. The testimony of Engr. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was indeed completed. It was not offered to prove the fact of delay. It must be remembered that the purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence may be admissible for several purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the adverse party cannot interpose the proper objection. Evidence submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any other purpose. Furthermore, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that said testimony on the date of completion of Project 1 is admitted, the establishment of the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages. It must further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if not otherwise justifiable. Contrarily, Uniwides belated claim constitutes an admission that the delay was justified and implies a waiver of its right to such damages. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents. 1955 Nov 28 En Banc DECISION J.B.L., J.: G.R. No. L-9181 REYES,

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself? COURT: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law." Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9 The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Ruling: We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him. "SEC. 14. Confession. - The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him." Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that: "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu-proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was

Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extrajudicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the following remarks were made: "FISCAL LUSTRE: Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) transcript, the

hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions - that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1). YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SYGONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SYBERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988 CORTES, J.: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida SyGonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat. After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that: (1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee (2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat and, (3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita SyBernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego

held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, declaring: (1) petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years: (2) oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the People's Republic of China; Issue: Whether the CA erred in declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Yee as not have been proven valid in accordance with the laws of the People Republic of China. Held: To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that: SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus: SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law .

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia. This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

the property and he refused, claiming it as his own. The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River. Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land. Ruling: It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows: Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value." Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus: . . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial. We did say in People vs. Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 85423 CRUZ, J.:p May 6, 1991

An action for recovery of ownership was filed by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the Jose Tabuena, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J.: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989. It appears from the 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00. The Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability. Issue: whether petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491.90, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that: . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy. Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund. In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so. More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit. Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant document. True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial. The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error. Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . . ." Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof. In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

SPS. ERNESTO and MINA CATUNGAL, petitioners, vs. DORIS HAO, respondent. G.R. No. 134972 KAPUNAN, J.: March 22, 2001

The original owner, Aniana Galang, leased a three-storey building situated in Paraaque, Metro Manila, to BPI for a period of about 15 years, to expire on June 20, 1986. During the existence of the lease, BPI subleased the ground floor of said building to respondent Doris Hao. Galang and Hao executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors of the building. The lease was for a term of four (4) years

commencing on August 15, 1984 and ending on August 15, 1988. On August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Emesto and Mina Catungal bought the property from Aniana Galang. Upon expiration of the lease agreements, spouses Catungal sent demand letters to Hao for her to vacate the building. The demand letters were unheeded by Hao causing spouses Catungal to file 2 complaints for ejectment. The MeTC of Paraaque rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of Sps. Catungal. The MeTC ordered Hao to vacate the premises and to pay spouses Catungal the amount of 8,000 a month for the first floor of the building and 5,000 per month for the second and the third floors. On appeal, the RTC fixed the monthly rentals to be paid by herein respondent at the total of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 for the occupancy of the first floor, and P10,000.00 each for the occupancy of the second and third floors. The Court of Appeals, reinstated the ruling of the MeTC, that the monthly rental rates should be P8,000.00 for the first floor and P5,000.00 for each of the second and third floors. Issue: What constitutes the fair rental value in the case at bench? Ruling: The plaintiff in an ejectment case is entitled to damages caused by his loss of the use and possession of the premises Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to "rent" or fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the regional trial court based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus: While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right to the possession of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between the former owner and herein defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March 1997 is inadequate if not unreasonable. The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the vicinity and indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned Order. Said premises is situated along Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the place where the famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all walks of life visit said Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents therein. Needless to say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man. Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the main road and consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is between P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 as testified to by Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of said premises. Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay Oub Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. It reads as follows: It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents. We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to him, or is assumed to have, by virtue of his office. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are "commonly" known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area, where the subject property is located, is fairly grounded.

Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal. The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00 to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled jurisprudence that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract renewals much more with business establishments. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, respondent. x------------------------x FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RODRIGO S. CASPILLO, Pairing Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City and the Department of Agrarian Reform, respondents. January 13, 2004 D E C I YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: S I O N

Land Valuation dated June 18, 1992; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the Land Valuation Worksheets. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. Issue: Whether the compensation arrived at is supported by evidence Ruling: In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by TCT No. NT-206422 and situated in Nueva Ecija In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the DAR for P14.9 million. In November 1991, after the DARs evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the LBP, a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the DARAB for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. DARAB required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position papers in support of their claim. Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed a case for determination of just compensation with the RTC. The DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court. The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

The Trial Court thereafter rendered judgment adverse to the plaintiff Elayda. Issues: Whether the rejection of the proffered statement of Elaydas accountant is proper. Whether Elaydas failure to deny under oath the allegation of usury raised by the Roxases constitute implied admission. Ruling: The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . ." That doctrine, by the way, has since been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964, Section 2, Rule 129 of which reads as follows: Judicial admissions. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake. Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake." Also correct was the Trial Court's ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court, that Elayda's failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out in the Roxases' Amended Answer with Counterclaim alleging that Elayda required and received from the Roxas Spouses, "kickback and interest in excess of the legal rate" constituted an admission of that accusation. The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that "(a)llegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath." The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated "unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake," supra, a showing which Elayda has not made.

AMELIA C. ELAYDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES PEDRO ROXAS and LEONORA T. ROXAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-49327 NARVASA, J.:p July 18, 1991

Amelia C. Elayda filed a complaint against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas. Elayda sought recovery of loans extended to the defendants in the aggregate sum of P90,000.00, with interest, the loans having been secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on commission. The Roxases admitted having received said loans but claimed that the loans had been paid in full; that in fact, their total payments exceeded the total obligation justly and actually due from them, and they had been required to pay usurious interests. On these issues, trial was had. The plaintiff, Elayda, presented her testimonial and documentary proofs in due course, in substantiation of her cause of action for recovery of P90,000.00 plus interest. The Roxas spouses in their turn, adduced evidence which tended to show that they had received the loans aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate occasions one in the sum of P40,000.00 and the other, in the amount of P50,000.00; that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of P10,000.00 and to pay, as they did pay, interest at the rate of four percent (4%) a month; and that the total payment made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00. To counteract this evidence of the Roxases, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as stated in her complaint and as sought to be established by her in her evidence-in-chief); that the payments made by the spouses on account thereof came up to only P110,474.00 of which the sum of P14,223.81 was charged to interest at 14% per annum and P96,250.19, to principal thus leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81. The proffered statement was rejected by the Trial Court, on objection of the Roxases, on the ground that it was contrary to the judicial admissions in plaintiff s complaint and was being presented after conclusion of the trial.

MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents. MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

NARCISO and respondents. July 31, 1984

AMADO

NARCISO,

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny. After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank. Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married. Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931, while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933. Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death. On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the onehalf (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00. On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name, which Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite also in the name of said heirs. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case). Petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551, alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed. The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a onethird (1/3) portion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. The court granted reconsideration and amended its earlier judgment. The court declared Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres and that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres. The court also adjudicated 4/6th of the lot to Macaria Torres, and 2/6th in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso On appeal, the appellate coursed reversed the trial court. Ruling: As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading: the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931.

The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property. We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read: That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931. In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer, denied the legitimacy of petitioner.

Agreement and in the Supplemental Agreement as "owners" and Ariosto SANTOS merely as "broker". It appears from the evidence that the sale to the SANTOSES was one "in trust" for the protection of the SANTOSES who had obligated themselves to give cash advances to the GARDNERS from time to time. On December 5, 1961, new titles were issued in favor of the SANTOSES. Unknown to the GARDNERS, on June 10, 1964, the SANTOSES transferred one lot to Jose Cuenca, married to Amanda Relova, and on June 15, 1964, the other lot to Juan Cuenca, married to Soledad Advincula (jointly, the Second Transfer). Titles were thereafter issued in their respective names. Upon learning of the Transfer of the properties to the CUENCAS, petitioner 'Ruby GARDNER, caused the inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 2, 1965. Juan Cuenca and Jose Cuenca, respectively, transferred the lots to Michael C. VERROYA an office assistant of Ariosto SANTOS (the Third transfer). Titles were issued in VERROYA's name with the adverse Claim carried over. On March 29, 1967, VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina, which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles. On June 29, 1967, VERROYA ARROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent Deogracias Natividad (the Fourth Transfer). On September 30, 1967, the NATIVIDAD transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista (the Fifth Transfer). No titles were issued to Bautista. It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the NATIVIDAD (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the GARDNERS continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, or over a span of approximately six years, the GARDNERS continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties. Aggrieved by the series of transfers, the GARDNERS filed suit on July 8, 1969 for "Declaration of Nullity, Rescission and Damages" against the Five Transferees, including the mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina, praying for the declaration of nullity of all the Five Transfers and the cancellation of all titles issued pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated, fictitious, and without consideration. The GARDNERS, aside from their documentary evidence, adduced in their favor the testimonies of Ruby GARDNER herself, Jose Infante, an

RUBY H. GARDNER and FRANK GARDNER, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEOGRACIAS R. NATIVIDAD and JUANITA A. SANCHEZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-59952 August 31, 1984 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A chain of successive transfers of real property, five in all, is involved. Petitioner Ruby H. GARDNER, married to Frank Gardner, Jr. an American, was the registered owner of two adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated in Laguna. On November 27, 1961, the GARDNERS and the spouses Santos entered into an agreement for the subdivision of the two parcels, with the SANTOSES binding themselves to advance to the GARDNERS the amount of P93,000.00 in installments. For the protection of both parties they executed the following documents all on the same date and referring to the same parcels of land: (1) Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the SANTOSES; (2) Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement; and (3) Supplemental Agreement. Despite the "sale,", the GARDNERS were still denominated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

employee of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and defendant Ariosto SANTOS who was presented as an adverse witness. Of the eight answering defendants, only respondent Deogracias NATIVIDAD testified on his behalf. Defendant Ariosto SANTOS merely adopted as his own evidence the declaration he had given as an adverse witness. The JOSE CUENCAS and the JUAN CUENCAS neither presented any testimonial evidence but just adopted the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS. Defendants Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima, the mortgagees, submitted their case after the genuineness of the deed of mortgage executed in their favor by VERROYA was admitted by the parties. On January 15, 1972, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the GARDNERS declaring as null and void the five Transfers; rescinding the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement as well as the Supplemental Agreement; ordering the GARDNERS to reimburse the SANTOSES the total cash advances of P36,712.80 which theGARDNERS had received; authorizing the cancellation of the corresponding titles issued pursuant to the deeds of sale and the issuance of new ones in favor of the GARDNERS Respondent NATIVIDAD appealed to the then Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Trial Court. The CA subsequently reconsidered its earlier affirmance of the trial courts decision insofar as the Natividad is concerned and declared as valid the sale of the land to him as well as the titles issued pursuant thereto.

The evidence also establishes that the Second Transfer to the CUENCAS was fictitious and simulated for not having been supported with any consideration. By his own admission, Ariosto SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS, who are his "compadres", the disputed properties, together with others that he owned, merely to conceal his ownership and "to protect them from persons who had filed suits against him and were running after the properties registered in his name." It was SANTOS who had caused the execution of those deeds of sale and had them notarized by his own counsel. . The Third Transfer in favor of VERROYA was similarly without consideration and, therefore, void ab initio. The evidence on record shows that Ariosto SANTOS himself caused the execution of the deeds of sal in favor of VERROYA, who is SANTOS' office manager in his brokerage business. The only purpose of the transfer was to enable VERROYA to secure for SANTOS a loan with the Veterans Bank so much so that when the documents of sale were signed by the CUENCAS in their respective houses in favor of VERROYA, the latter was not even present. On equal footing is the Fourth Transfer from VERROYA VERROYA to private respondents NATIVIDADS. It was SANTOS who had caused the preparation of the deed of sale in favor of the NATIVIDADS after sensing that VERROYA was not inclined to return the title to the properties. Deogracias NATIVIDAD was SANTOS' close and trusted compadre who agreed to put the titles in his (NATIVIDAD's) name because of the pending cases against SANTOS. The amount of P 80,000.00 stated in the document of sale was not actually paid by the NATIVIDADS to VERROYA, according to SANTOS' own testimony. The latter further declared that VERROYA was only coerced to sign the deeds after he was boxed by NATIVIDAD in SANTOS' office at the Escolta. That coercion did exist is shown by VERROYA's telegram to the Register of Deeds of Laguna to dishonor any transaction involving the subject properties. The Fifth Transfer to the BAUTISTAS partook of the same nature a simulated and fictitious transaction, for being without consideration, as shown by the evidence. As concluded in the original Decision of respondent Court, all Five Transfers starting from that of the SANTOSES down to the NATIVIDADS, were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were, therefore, void ab initio and inexistent. Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has, in fact, never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. Such sales are inexistent and cannot be considered consummated. In its Resolution reversing the original Decision, respondent Court discredited the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS for being at variance with the

Ruling: We find reversible error in the reversal of respondent Court's original Decision of January 11, 1979. The evidence preponderantly shows that all Five Transfer were null and void for having been simulated and fictitious. The First Transfer in favor of the SANTOSES was "indubitably established" to have been without consideration and is, therefore, void and inexistent. That sale was executed merely as a means of protection to the SANTOSES for their promised cash advances to the GARDNERS in one year in the sum of P93,000.00. Added to this is the admission against his own interest by Ariosto SANTOS that the GARDNERS did not receive from him any consideration, thereby corroborating the declarations of the GARDNERS. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit "E") eloquently express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the GARDNERS and the SANTOSES was for a subdivision and not a sale transaction.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

allegations in his Answer. The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings and in his declarations in open Court differed win not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent Court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As Ariosto SANTOS himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon.

amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, the latter filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against AMANCOR and LHUILLLER. At the pre-trial conference, petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER, assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on the following: 1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 June 1988, the Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989, and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989; 2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to P199,888.89 as of October 1, 1990; and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court: a. From the aforesaid agreements, is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable to the plaintiff? b. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J. Lhuillier, if the latter is liable, pay the plaintiff? On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount of P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing. LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor. It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to respondent court, arguing therein that as LHULLLIER signed the Memorandum of Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR, LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR. In his petition in the SC, petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that: 3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of Amancor, Inc. xxx xxx xxx 3.14. Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded to the personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned. And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law,

FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC. and MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents. G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997 RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: On August 15, 1985, Amancor, Inc., a corporation then owned and controlled by Florentino L. Atillo III , contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Metrobank, secured by real estate properties owned by the petitioner. Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 14, 1988 with Michell Lhuillier whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%. In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLLER executed another Memorandum of Agreement on February 13, 1989 by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As an addendum to the foregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11, 1989. Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement which provides as follows: 4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve prepayment of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metrobank. After offsetting the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the consistent pronouncement of this Court that: ". . . an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . . Ruling: We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law and jurisprudence misplaced. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the admission "out of context", then the one making the admission may show that he made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear." That is the reason for the modifier "such". Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner. Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer asserted the following: 3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of Agreement and par. 4 of the actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement, Lhuillier did not engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to release the property to plaintiff. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in the aforesaid par. 4 of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate." 3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier . . . only agreed, for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre-terminated corporate loans with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancor's finances, for said corporation to pay interest at prevailing bank rate. . . . Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the issues to be resolved by the trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he made in his answer. It is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pretrial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.

Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners, vs. PLUS BUILDERS, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 154430 June 16, 2006 D E C ISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Plus Builders, Inc., respondent, is in charge of the construction and sale of the houses therein. Spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327,491.95. Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter. However, petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking, prompting respondents counsel to send them a demand letter. On July 6, 1998, petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three installments. Respondents counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay. Consequently, respondent filed with the MTC a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, rendered a Decision, affirming in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer, did not deny respondents allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.

Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00; (b) they still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no amount of rationalization can offset it.

CONSTANTINO G. SY v. JUDGE CARLOS C. FERNANDO, MTCC, BRANCH 2, MANDAUE CITY A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1652-MTJ First Division April 3, 2006

Constantino G. Sy charged Judge Fernando with grave partiality or bias, gross ignorance of the law/rules and dereliction of duty. The complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 3825 entitled Constantino G. Sy v. Ang Bian Huat Sons Industries, Inc. and Edilberto Ang Gabonsseng (sic) for damages with prayer far a writ of preliminary injunction, which was filed with Branch 2. An amended complaint was later filed, seeking a TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory Injunction against the defendants. Complainant alleged that he was not given a fair chance to prove the necessity of the ancillary remedy prayed for, as respondent judge "brushed aside" the injunctive relief sought on the pretext that "only in matters of life and death are courts allowed to issue the same," a condition, which complainant claims to be not found in the Rules. He likewise took exception to the denial of his "impromptu motion and prayer for an ocular inspection" by the respondent judge. For these reasons, Sy accused respondent judge of "unbridled bias and mental dishonesty," which amounts to gross ignorance of the rules, as well as dereliction of duty. For his part, respondent judge clarified that Civil Case No. 3825 had already been decided in favor of herein complainant, and the decision had already become final, and had been executed and satisfied. He claimed that he cannot be held administratively liable even assuming that his decision was erroneous considering that complainant failed to impute to him fraud, dishonesty or corruption in the performance of his judicial functions. On the contrary, it was complainant who is guilty of dishonesty for his failure to disclose the filing of a second amended complaint in Civil Case No. 3825 in which he abandoned his application for a TRO or preliminary injunction, thereby rendering the alleged refusal of the judge to grant the same moot and academic. Consequently, he filed a motion to cite complainant and counsel in contempt of court for misleading the Court.

Issue: Whether petitioners admitted absolutely in their answer their liability under the proposed payment plan. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondents complaint. As correctly ruled by the Court of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Ruling: The complaint is premised on the denial by the respondent judge of the prayer for a TRO or preliminary injunction in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 3825. A perusal of the records, however, revealed that complainant opted not to pursue this ancillary remedy by filing a second amended complaint without reiterating the same remedy therein. Consequently, he is deemed to have abandoned his prayer therefor, taking into consideration the provision of Section 8, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus: Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings. - An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. By abandoning his prayer for injunctive relief, complainant has no factual or legal basis to question the inaction of the respondent judge on his earlier plea for such relief as well as the motion for ocular inspection, the latter being intertwined with the ancillary remedy sought for. That Civil Case No. 3825 was decided in favor of complainant belies the allegation of partiality against the respondent judge. In fact, it is not only in this case that respondent judge decided in favor of the complainant, but in two other cases as well, all of which have already attained finality. Nonetheless, whatever error that may have been committed, if any, can only be viewed as an error of judgment because complainant failed to prove any act constituting bad faith, malice or corrupt practice on the part of the respondent judge [Dela Cruz v. Conception, 235 SCRA 597 (1994)]. DEVELOPMENT B ANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA CANAD ALLA- GO, represented by her Attorney- in-fact BENITO A. CAN ADALLA, Respondents. G.R. No. 2005 JR., CJ .: 153034 DECISION September 20, DAVIDE,

comply with her obligations to the DBP. Subsequently, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. On 5 September 1989, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which emerged as the only bidder. The sale was evidenced by a Certificate of Sale and registered on 17 January 1990. Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property covered by TCT No. T-7609 within the redemption period of one year from 17 January 1990. As to the properties covered by OCT Nos. P-4226 and P-6679, she had six years from 17 January 1990 to redeem the same, they being free patent titles. On 5 October 1995, she offered to redeem the properties for a redemption price of P1.5 million. But the DBP countered that the redemption price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its total claim, which was P1,927,729.50 as of 30 September 1995. Subsequently, she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, herein private respondent Rosalinda A. Canadalla-Go. In January 1996, Go offered to redeem the properties for P526,882.40. In response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1,814,700.58 representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in its name. Go filed a Supplemental Complaint for the Exercise of Right of Redemption and Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporar y Restraining Order. After the DBP filed its Ans wer but before the parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Adm ission by Adverse Part y. Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment. During the hearing on 20 May 1997, Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the admiss ion or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained in the Request for Adm ission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had already been either spec ifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Ans wer; and third, the reasons for the denial or admiss ion had already been specifically stated therein. On 22 May 1997, the DBP filed a manifestation inc orporating its response to Gos objections during the 20 May 1997 hearing, attaching therewith an affidavit exec uted by its officer and counsel Att y. Perla Melanie Caraan.

Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from DBP for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed on 19 January 1977 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. T7609 and OCT No. P-4226. On 10 August 1979, Canadalla procured another loan in the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by OCT No. P-6679. Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, compounded by devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her store by fire, Canadalla failed to Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

The RT C issued an order granting the motion of Go to consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment. Issue: whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which are mere reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath. Ruling: We find for petitioner DBP. Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters stated in Gos Request for Adm ission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. Bes ides, they had already been either specific ally denied or admitted in DBPs Ans wer to the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and superfluous. We have held in Po v. Court of Appeals that a part y should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and to make a second denial of those already denied in his ans wer to the complaint. The Po doctrine was brought a step further in Concrete Aggregates Co. v. Court of Appeals where we ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the ver y same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied or other wise dealt wit h in the answer, a response to the request is no longer required. It becomes, therefore, unnecessar y to dwell on the issue of the propriet y of an unsworn response to the request for admission. The reason is obvious. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of discover y, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarif y and tend to shed light on the truth or falsit y of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings. Hence, the DBP did not even have to file its Comment on Gos Request for Adm ission, which merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. DBPs Ans wer itself controverts the averments in the complaint and those recopied in the request for admission. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Moreover, some of the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission were matters of la w or opinions, to wit: 20. Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, recognizes the right of redemption, just as it provides the amount to be paid by a redemptioner. On the other hand, Section 30, Rule 39, Rev ised Rules of Court specifically defines the amount which a redemptioner must pay. 21. Accordingly, plaintiff s offer to redeem t wo subject properties, as earlier mentioned, wer e in accord with the said provis ions of Act No. 3135, as amended, and Rule 39 of the Rev ised Rules of Court and such offer to redeem should be well-placed in la w and procedure. 22. Plaintiff exercised the right of redemption on Januar y 11, 1996, within the prescribed period of six (6) years, t wo subject properties being redeemed are covered by Free Patent titles. She made a tender of the offer. A substantial compliance with the requisites in law was met. Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the scope of matters that a part y may request the adversar y to admit are (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; and (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. The rule authoriz ing a part y to call on the other part y to make an adm ission implies the making of demands for admiss ion of relevant and material matters of fact and not for admiss ion of matters of law, conc lusions, or opinions. Since the afore-quoted allegations are matters of la w or opinion, they are improper matters and cannot therefore be deemed impliedly admitted under Rule 26. MIGUEL PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant, MACARIO ANGELES, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. 1511 July 26, 1905 TORRES, J.: On January 15, 1903, Miguel Pascual brought an action to recover the possession of a certain tract of land unlawfully occupied by the defendant, Macario Angeles, and for the payment of rent due, damages, and costs. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant, Angeles, then held under a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio of Uaua, municipality of San Jose de Navotas; that the land formerly belonged vs.

to Ciriaca Pascual, his sister, from whom he inherited it; that the defendant owed him 30 pesos for the use of the land during the years 1899, 1900, and 1901 under the terms of the lease written in Tagalog and attached to the complaint; that, demand having been made upon the defendant for payment of the rent due for the first two years, he asked for and obtained an extension; that by virtue of this extension the lease was continued in force; that a subsequent demand was made upon the defendant about the end of the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the possession of the land; that the defendant refused to do either; and that he had since been in the wrongful possession of the land. The defendant, Angeles, entered a general denial to the complaint. He denied specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease attached to the complaint, alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of the land claimed, and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public, and uninterrupted possession of the same for more than thirty years, having during that period built houses and planted trees thereon. The court, after hearing the evidence, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, with costs to the plaintiff. To this judgment the plaintiff excepted on the ground that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in the judgment were against the law and the weight of evidence, and thereupon presented a motion for a new trial, alleging in support thereof that it was not necessary to show that the land in question had been allotted to the plaintiff in the partition of the state of the deceased Ciriaca Pascual, since it satisfactorily appeared that Macario Angeles had paid rent to plaintiff under the lease in question, thus recognizing him as the lawful heir and successor of Ciriaca Pascual. Ruling: The existence of the lease under which Macario Angeles held the land in question having been proved, and it appearing that he failed to pay rent for several years, a sufficient cause existed for the ejectment of the tenant. This action arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes in the lessor a right to the ownership or possession of the property. For this reason he can not be compelled to prove his title thereto. The tenant can not deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Those in the actual possession of land under a claim of ownership, right of usufruct, or any other right entitling them to the use of the same may maintain an action for ejectment against a wrongful possessor. Miguel Pascual, as testamentary heir of his sister, was in the actual and adverse possession of a tract of land in Uaua, Navotas, of which the land Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

in question was a part. His possession dated from the death of the testatrix, who must have died prior to April 7, 1894, when her executor asked for and obtained a copy of her will executed in January of the same year. The plaintiff was recognized by the lessee, Macario Angeles, as such owner and lawful possessor and as heir and successor to the deceased Ciriaca Pascual. Angeles paid him rent for the land from the time of the death of the former lessor until the year 1898, as shown by the record. It was not until the year 1901, when he decided to keep the land, that defendant refused to pay rent for that and the two preceding years, 1899 and 1900. If the juridical personality of the deceased testatrix is transmitted to the heir and the latter is considered as identified, with his devisor, to whose rights, action, and obligations, not extinguished by her death, he succeeded, then there is no doubt that the plaintiff, as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca, as appears from the will on page 17 of the bill of exceptions, had a right to oust the defendant, Angeles, for failure to pay the stipulated rent. Miguel Pascual is now vested with the rights of the lessor. To him, as successor of the deceased, Angeles had been paying rent from 1894 to 1898. Angeles is now barred from questioning the rights of the deceased owner of the land and much less Pascual's capacity and rights in the lease, under her will, which is the only basis of his judicial claim. Again, the defendant can not question the genuineness and due execution of the written lease, a copy of which appears on page 15 of the bill of exceptions. He himself recognized it and it was admitted in evidence during the trial, the court stating that it established a fact relating to the question at issue. (Bill of exceptions, p. 11) the presumption, therefore, is that the contract was executed for a good and sufficient consideration. As to the identity of the land referred to in the complaint, it may be said that this was fully established not only by the lease and the evidence introduced at the trial but by defendant's answer as well. He stated that he had not been in possession of the land in question as tenant but as owner, and that his possession covered a period of more than thirty years. This shows that both parties agree that there is but one certain tract of land in dispute.

MANUEL ORMACHEA TIN-CONGCO, deceased, represented by the CHINAMAN TIU TUSAY, judicial administrator of his estate, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTIAGO TRILLANA, defendant-appellant. 1909 Mar 18 En Banc DECISION G.R. No. 4776 TORRES, J.:

Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco, a Chinaman, presented an amended complaint against Santiago Trillana, alleging that the plaintiff Ormachea and Luis Vizmanos Ong Queco were engaged in business in the Province of Bulacan, and that in the course thereof the defendant purchased from them merchandise to the value of 4,000 pesos, local currency; that two years prior to that date, the partnership was dissolved and the business was divided up between the partners, all accounts and debts of the defendant were allotted to the plaintiff, and became the individual property of Ormachea Tin-Congco; the indebtedness is proven by the documents signed by the defendant or his agents in favor of Ormachea or of Vizmanos Ong Queco or their agent named Lawa in charge of the business. The documents of indebtedness are inserted in the complaint and duly numbered. They aggregate 135 documents, some of which are written in Tagalog with their corresponding translations; that the legal interest on the said 4,000 pesos is 1,500 pesos which makes the total debt amount to 5,500 pesos, and the same has not been paid by the defendant. Defendant alleged that he had already settled his accounts and obligations contracted in the business to which the complaint refers, by means of periodical payments in tuba or the liquor of the nipa palm, and that if any accounts are still pending, the same should, owing to their character and the manner in which they were constituted, be paid in kind and not in money as the plaintiff claims in his complaint, and should be paid at the time and under the circumstances which, as is customary in Hagonoy, such class of obligations are settled; he therefore asked the court below to enter judgment absolving the defendant of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff. Trillanas debts was shown by the 135 vales which are attached to the complaint and which were admitted as authentic by the defendant. After hearing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial judge, rendered judgment ordering the defendant, Santiago Trillana, to pay to the Chinaman Florentino Tiu Tusay, the judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased plaintiff, Ormachea Tin-Congco, the sum of P2,832.22, in tuba, under the same conditions stipulated between the debtor and the copartnership for the working of the distillery of Luis Vizmanos and the late Chinaman Manuel Ormachea, with costs. Ruling: Since the vales existed, and were in the possession of the creditor, it was because the amounts they called for had not yet been paid, inasmuch as an obligation can only be presumed to have been fulfilled when the proofs of its existence have been returned to the debtor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. NONA SALAZAR PADIERNOS, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-37284 February 27, 1976 CONCEPCION, JR., J.: The accused, Nona Salazar Padiernos and the deceased, Rodolfo Padiernos were husband and wife. During his lifetime, the deceased a tall, big and robust man was an agent of the Bureau of Customs and as such was issued a gun, which he used to keep under the mattress of their bed. On the night of October 22, 1968, the accused waited for the deceased, but the latter came home only at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1968-drunk. The accused helped him change his clothes, after which he went to bed by himself. At about 6:30 in the morning of the same day, the accused brought her son Ronald to the Lourdes School in Mandaluyong, Rizal, using the family car driven by Roberto Valeriano, the family driver. Upon her return to the house half an hour later she went directly to their bedroom. A few minutes later, she came out of the room and asked Letty Basa, a cousin of the deceased: "Letty, nasaan ang gamit ng Kuya mo?" At that time, the deceased was already awake and was on the bed lying on his stomach, reading a newspaper. Having been informed that the things of the deceased were in their bedroom, the accused returned inside and closed the door. Shortly, thereafter, the accused and the deceased came out of the room, at which instant the former called for help, shouting: "Vale, Vale". Vale (Roberto Valerians), the family driver, responded to the call, and when he entered the house, he saw the accused holding with her' right hand, a blood-stained knife, and the deceased sprawled in a bloody mess on the floor, groaning and moaning in pain. The accused was very angry and said: "Ganyan na lang ang pagmamahal ko sa iyo, niloloko mo pa ako." Thereupon, Roberto Valeriano together with the other members of the household, including the accused, carried the deceased inside the car, and proceeded to the hospital (Waterous Clinic) at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On the way, the accused was still mad at the deceased and cursed him, saying: "Putang ina mo, iyan ang nababagay sa iyo, pag namatay ka magpapakamatay na din ako." When they reached the hospital, the deceased was pronounced "dead on arrival". Meanwhile, the authorities of Waterous Clinic notified the San Juan Police Department. Immediately, thereafter, Capt. Enrique Aguinaldo and Pat. Arsenio Santos arrived, and then proceeded to the residence of the deceased at San Juan, Rizal, where they conducted an

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

investigation. After interviewing Letty Basa, Pat. Arsenio Santos entered the bedroom where the stabbing took place-followed by Letty Basa-and searched the place. The room was well arranged, but the bedspread was "spilled with blood". When the policeman lifted the mattress of the bed, Letty saw thereunder the gun of the deceased, and gave it to the officer. The knife u by the accused in stabbing the deceased was likewise taken by Pat. Arsenio Santos. However, they were not able to investigate the accused as she could no longer be located. She had fled and gone into hiding. The accused admitted that she killed the deceased. However, she claims that she did it in self defense According to her, after taking Ronald to school, she returned to their house at about 7:15 or 7:30 in the morning and went directly to their M. Inside, she found that the deceased was already awake and was on the bed reading a newspaper. While she and the deceased were in the room, the latter accused her of stealing P1,000.00 from his brief case, which she allegedly gave to her brother Jose Salazar. After a heated argument, the deceased pulled her hair and slapped her on the face. She held the clothes of the deceased, and when the latter pushed her back, they fell on the floor together. The deceased stood up first, and then, kicked her on the stomach, saying: "Putang ina mo, papatayin kita." Then, he got his gun under the mattress and pointed it at her. Believing that the deceased would kill her, she grabbed, with her left hand, the knife under the bed. Then she stood up and with the deceased in front of her, covered her eyes with her right hand, and began swinging the knife from left to right and from right to left to prevent the deceased from coming near her. After awhile, she opened her eyes and seeing that the deceased was about two (2) meters away from her, she opened the door and ran out fast. The deceased followed her but he fell on the floor in a bloody mess. The foregoing version of the accused was disbelieved by the trial court. The accused, now appellant, maintains and insists in this appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim of selfdefense, and, likewise, assails the trial court in admitting and in giving 'weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Ruling: Appellant's plea of self-defense is untenable. If she really inflicted the wounds sustained by the deceased in the manner claimed and demonstrated by her during the trial, that is, by swinging the knife sidewise from left to right and from right to left, then the deceased would have sustained "slash wounds and not stab wounds". The autopsy report, however, shows that the deceased sustained three (3) stab wounds, one of which, the fatal wound, being located at the left part of the back of the deceased. Moreover, these stab wounds, specially the fatal wound at the back, could not have been sustained by the deceased if he had been facing the appellant. The nature and location Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

of the stab wounds indicate that the appellant inflicted those wounds while she was behind or at the back of the deceased. These physical facts belie and negate the appellant's claim of selfdefense. Besides, appellant's version of the indent is highly incredible and improbable. Thus, as aptly observed by the court below, if the appellant covered her eyes with her right hand when she began to swing the knife from left to right and from right to left, how was she able to hit her husband without seeing him? Why did her husband remain standing in front of her, immobile like a post without avoiding the knife and allowed himself to be killed? If it were true that the deceased was standing in front of her with a gun pointed at her and angry enough to kill her, why didn't he shoot her? Furthermore, after the stabbing incident, the appellant did not surrender to the authorities, but fled and went into hiding and surrendered only after almost four (4) years from the commission of the crime. Such conduct of the appellant is inconsistent with and casts doubt upon her claim of self defense. On the Contrary, it tends to establish her guilt. "It is now a well-settled rule that one who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence. If such evidence is of doubtful veracity, and is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail, for having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased it was incumbent upon appellant, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing." Having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence her plea of self-defense, the appellant must suffer the consequences of her unlawful act. Upon a review of the records, We find no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court. To begin with, the appellant's contention that prosecution witness Letty Basa is biased because she is the cousin of the deceased, is without merit. While witnesses may be said to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their declarations should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the ground of bias alone where-as in the present case-they are reasonable, consistent and supported by facts and circumstances. Nor do We find merit in the contention that the non-presentation of the written statement of this witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, gave rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence

was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. In the case at bar, the alleged statement of prosecution witness Letty Basa was in the possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense could have requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring the police to produce such statement, but as the defense failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said statement if produced would have been adverse to the prosecution.

Eventually, the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition Issue: Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. Ruling: No. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison vs. Court of Appeals, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be overemphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondents supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas) father and her (Paulitas) mother, who are both Franciscos siblings, told them so. And one Jose Carreon

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent. G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005 DECISION GARCIA, J.: Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. In the petition, respondent alleged, among other things, the following: 1. That Francisco died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties; 2. That she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 FranciscoGenoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Franciscos house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war. In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details. While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut. Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion as well as the appellate courts conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genovevas death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a surviving spouse of the decedent.

Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname. Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname. Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion. Reversing an earlier decision upon an MR the CA held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. Ruling: The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents. DECISION August 31, 2005 G.R. No. 123450 CORONA, J.:

Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations. Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her. Gerardos argument is without merit. First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt. Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy. Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for. In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasiconclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA, Respondents. DECISION G.R. November 2, 2006 QUISUMBING, J.: No. 157906

Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for damages against petitioner. The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter. Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. The appellate court found the petitioner liable for Jasmins death Issue: Whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaa. Ruling: In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school. In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held: As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. We find petitioners explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

the safety of the schools premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position. DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. and/or JAIME B. AQUINO, Petitioners, vs. BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE, INC. Respondents. DECISION G.R. August 30, 2006 No. 144268 GARCIA, J.:

The premises involved in this case is a warehouse used by Datalift Movers. The warehouse stands on a 3,967.70 square meter lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR). Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage. Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. Belgravia put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3,000 squaremeters of the lot. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift, represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease dated October 2, 1990, commencing on October 5, 1990 and ending on October 5, 1991, subject to extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000.00 starting June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly rental was again increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November 1994 onwards, allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latters lease of the formers lot whereon the warehouse in question stands. Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse. Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands having proved futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint for ejectment against Datalift. In their Answer, the defendants interposed the following defenses: 1) Sampaguita has no cause of action against them, not being a party nor privy to the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease; 2) Under the PNR-Sampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot, Sampaguita is prohibited from subleasing the property;

3) The same PNR-Sampaguita contract had allegedly expired; 4) Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was neither the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse stands. The lower court rendered judgment for Sampaguita and Belgravia. The MeTC rejected the defendants challenge against Belgravias title over the PNR lot occupied by the subject warehouse. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession as their lessor. Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. -- The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Conclusive presumptions have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have. In fact, the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents, because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the lessors title or better right of possession as against the lessee Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

will eternally be a non-issue in any proceeding before any court. Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA, being non-privies to the contract of lease between PNR and respondent Sampaguita, the petitioners have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue relating thereto. BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC., Petitioner, vs. NEOMI* and DANILO OLIVARES, Respondents. February 12, 2008 G.R. No. 169737 ISION CORONA, J.: D E C

Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm. For the period October 16, 2002 to October 15, 2003, she paid the amount of P11,117. For the same period, she also availed of the additional service of limitless consultations for an additional amount of P1,000. She paid these amounts in full on October 17, 2002. The application was approved on October 22, 2002. In the health care agreement, ailments due to pre-existing conditions were excluded from the coverage. On November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City which was one of the hospitals accredited by petitioner. During her confinement, she underwent several laboratory tests. On December 2, 2002, her attending physician, Dr. Edmundo Saniel, informed her that she could be discharged from the hospital. She incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34,217.20. Consequently, she requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of authorization in order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended payment pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a preexisting condition. She was discharged from the hospital on December 3, 2002. On December 5, 2002, she demanded that petitioner pay her medical bill. When petitioner still refused, she and her husband, respondent Danilo Olivares, were constrained to settle the bill. They thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner. In its answer, petitioner maintained that it had not yet denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr. Saniel's report. In a letter to petitioner, Dr. Saniel stated that: This is in response to your letter dated February 13, 2003. Neomi T. Olivares called by phone on January 29, 2003. She stated that she is invoking patient-physician confidentiality. That she no longer has any relationship with petitioner. And that I should not release any medical information

concerning her neurologic status to anyone without her approval. Hence, the same day I instructed my secretary to inform your office thru Ms. Bernie regarding respondent's wishes. xxx The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. It held that the best person to determine whether or not the stroke she suffered was not caused by pre-existing conditions is her attending physician Dr. Saniel who treated her and conducted the test during her confinement. But since the evidence on record reveals that it was no less than Neomi herself who prevented her attending physician from issuing the required certification, petitioner cannot be faulted from suspending payment of her claim, for until and unless it can be shown from the findings made by her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not due to pre-existing conditions could she demand entitlement to the benefits of her policy. On appeal, the RTC reversed the ruling of the MeTC and ordered petitioner to pay respondents. The RTC held that it was the burden of petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing condition. It was not able to discharge that burden. Issue: Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a preexisting condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it contends that the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor. Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that Neomi's stroke was excluded from the coverage of their agreement because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It failed to prove this. Ruling: We agree with respondents. In Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance. It is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. This doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements. Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a preexisting condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient. Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they should be scrutinized by the courts with extreme jealousy and care and with a jaundiced eye. Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA REYES AND CONRADO B. REYES G.R. No. 157177 ISION February 11, 2008 D E C AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P 2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled every month. She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.

Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P 200,000.00, P 100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 02332433-88 and the other P 100,000.00 will be given by her in cash. Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P 200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures. While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the signature cards and several other forms. Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P 200,000.00. Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P 100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of P 100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P 500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P 200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-076748 and brought the same to the teller's booth. After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P 200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date. Plaintiff and daughter then left. On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said bank. Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States and returned to Manila on January 31, 1991. When she went to her pawnshop, she made aware by her statement of account to her by BPI bank that her ATM account contained the amount of P 100,000.00 interest. was sent only with

On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P 200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof. Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation, she got angry. Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated into. When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding return of the missing P 100,000.00 plus interest. The same was received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively. The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the problem. The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test. Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant case. Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the amount of P 100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990, however, it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit of P 100,000.00 was made. Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with flying colors, indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990 Ruling: It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean

She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her that they would look into the matter. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus: SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record. After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P 200,000.00 in her Express Teller account. Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller account for P 200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer P 100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she had an additional P 100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for P 200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P 100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only P 100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P 100,000.00 in cash with her. Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her concerns, would make sure that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is very near the space where the amount of P 200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the amount of P 200,000.00 was written instead of P 100,000.00. The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P 200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions. The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount of P 200,000.00, and not P 100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount of P 100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim. Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former deposited P 100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer of P 100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the amount of P 200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit of P 100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit.

This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan. Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail. In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.

said report petitioner's counsel had implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's death. We agree with this conclusion. Quite recently, in the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, we reproduced with approval the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., supra, we said: Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again, though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be drawn.

VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-9268 PARAS, C.J. November 28, 1959

Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner, was sleeping on board the latter's vessel, M/V "Miss Leyte", when it caught fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. The employee was unmarried, receiving daily P4.00 with meals estimated at P1.20, and respondent Juan Icong, his father was his partial dependent. On April 30, 1954, the latter filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and a petitioner a notice of claim for death compensation. The petitioner reported the matter to the Commision only on August 17, 1954. The Commission rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee. The petitioner has appealed to this Court for the review of the award and has presented three points of law,which among other include that: the Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was not applied in determining whether or not Pedro Icong should be considered dead. The petitioner contends that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro Icong, the nearest approach to the matter, from the facts of his case, is the provision on the presumption of death established in Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, according to which the person to be presumed dead must be unheard of for at least four years; that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few months from the alleged accident, there is as yet legal presumption of death on which to base any award for compensation. Ruling: The respondent Commission obviously did not apply the rule on presumption of death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by petitioner, laborer Pedro Icong was reported as the only casualty, and in transmitting Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents. G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983 ESCOLIN, J.: Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the Hongkong-Manila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office: First Message: REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS WEATHER WITH STRONG

NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL ROLLING AND PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT Second Message: RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT SIDE AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE HAVE TO JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING VIOLENTLY Third Message: NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 1935 N 116-40 E SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDON ANYTIME Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the following steps: RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air Base. Respondent also released radio messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there are signs of debris from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In the meantime, two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for search and rescue operation, but the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative results, Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same. Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila. The Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of death benefits to the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into by and between the heirs and the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs. Lucero who was not a party thereto. Ruling: It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time. There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." In People vs. Ansang where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta ignited three home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims, and the said boat was later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen again by anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder, holding that the victims were dead. Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, the claim of the appellants therein that there was no conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found was overruled by this Court in this wise: In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. 'Mere are cases like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency be proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence. Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cages decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he had or

tortured and later taken away, where the victims were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they were lulled or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused this, for the purpose of fixing the penalty. If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents. DECISION G.R. No. 128587 GARCIA, J.: FIRST DIVISION March 16, 2007

At about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. Wang filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Respondent judge granted Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. Ruling: There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the DILG, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Section 5, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. In People v. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 1999 Aug 26 2nd Division G.R. DECISION J.: No. 121087 MENDOZA,

In the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?" At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?" As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

(petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated: After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence. This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or injury. Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries. Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ruling: The appeal is without merit. First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated

by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it. NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents. 1996 Feb 1 1st Division BELLOSILLO, J.: G.R. No. 107493

The DAR certified that the case was proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment of rentals and not on the ejectment of respondent Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of non-payment of rentals. After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the lower court dismissed the complaint. Ruling: Petitioners would impress upon us that the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents. We are not persuaded. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. 7 The affidavit of petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of rentals was never formally offered; neither the alleged certification by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Not having been formally offered, the affidavit and certification cannot be considered as evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them. If they neglected to offer those documents in evidence, however vital they may be, petitioners only have themselves to blame, not respondent who was not even given a chance to object as the documents were never offered in evidence. A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case. Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit of petitioner Natividad C. Candido despite absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the trial court. This is futile since this is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to be taken judicial notice of; neither can we consider it of public knowledge, or capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class irrigated riceland with an area of 21,193 square meters located in Orion, Bataan. Respondent Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. On 21 July 1986 petitioners lodged a complaint against respondent Dabu for termination of tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983. Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons, respectively, which respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the filing of the complaint. Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that until 1983 their sharing system was on a 50-50 basis; that his share in the crop year 1983 dry season was still with petitioner Natividad Candido who likewise retained his water pump. He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a proposal for thirteen (13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five percent (25%) of the net harvest during the dry season was put forward. He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13) cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy season crop, thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents. DECISION No. 169129 NAZARIO, J.: THIRD DIVISION G.R. March 28, 2007 CHICO-

letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages. Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation. After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered petitioners to reconvey 107 square meters of the property. Issue: Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance with damages. Ruling: Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their Answer that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document. Virgilios answers were unsure and

Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos, who died on 20 October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-inlaw of Rita. On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. Spouses Lumbao sent a formal demand letter to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case. Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary public. It is wellsettled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where ones signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.

his wife Lacorte, what he signed was a document captioned Lease Contract (modeled after a July 1976 lease agreement he had previously executed with previous lessee, Maria Luisa Montenegro) wherein he leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo at P1,000.00 per hectare and which was witnessed by two women employees of one Judge Villegas of Bais City. Villaner thus filed a complaint against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property, for annulment of the deeds of sale. On the other hand, Leonardo asserts that what Villaner executed was a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of P10,000.00 which he had already paid,[19] and as he had become the absolute owner of the property, he validly transferred it to Ramon Nicolas on May 19, 1990. Carmelo Cadalin who admittedly prepared the deed of absolute sale and who appears as a witness, along with his wife, to the execution of the document corroborated Leonardos claim. The trial court found for petitioners Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas and accordingly dismissed the complaint. Ruling: Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, respondent Villaner having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the April 19, 1990 Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners contention does not persuade. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. On the merits, this Court rules in petitioners favor. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. For the circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case, assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways. In the case at bar, it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to prove that

LEONARDO ACABAL and RAMON NICOLAS, petitioners, vs. VILLANER ACABAL, EDUARDO ACABAL, SOLOMON ACABAL, GRACE ACABAL, MELBA ACABAL, EVELYN ACABAL, ARMIN ACABAL, RAMIL ACABAL, and BYRON ACABAL, respondents. DECISION THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 148376 March 31, 2005 CARPIO MORALES, In dispute is the exact nature of the document which respondent Villaner Acabal executed in favor of his godson-nephew-petitioner Leonardo Acabal on April 19, 1990. Villaners parents, Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of land situated in Negros Oriental, described in Tax Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971, his parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to him, who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. Sometime after the foregoing transfer, it appears that Villaner became a widower. Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed conveying the same property in favor of Leonardo. Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19, 1990 document he executed now appears to be a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly witnessed by a Bais City trial court clerk Carmelo Cadalin and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Except for his bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. His conjecture that perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the contract of lease, must fail, for facts not conjectures decide cases. Attempting to seek corroboration of his account, Villaner presented Atty. Vicente Real who notarized the document. While on direct examination, Atty. Real virtually corroborated Villaners claim that he did not bring the document to him for notarization, on crossexamination, Atty. Real conceded that it was impossible to remember every person who would ask him to notarize documents. On Villaners claim that two women employees of Judge Villegas signed as witnesses to the deed but that the signatures appearing thereon are not those of said witnesses, the same must be discredited in light of his unexplained failure to present such alleged women employeewitnesses. And now, Villaners co-heirs claim that as coowners of the property, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo does not bind them as they did not consent to such an undertaking. There is no question that the property is conjugal. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption, this Court has held, applies to all properties acquired during marriage. For the presumption to be invoked, therefore, the property must be shown to have been acquired during the marriage. In the case at bar, the property was acquired on July 6, 1971 during Villaners marriage with Justiniana Lipajan. It cannot be seriously contended that simply because the tax declarations covering the property was solely in the name of Villaner it is his personal and exclusive property. In Bucoy v. Paulino and Mendoza v. Reyes which both apply by analogy, this Court held that registration alone of the properties in the name of the husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties. What is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana. Since the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage of Villaner and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Justiniana, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code is that it is the couples conjugal property. The burden is on petitioners then to prove that it is not. This they failed to do. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Justiniana Lipajan, the conjugal partnership was terminated. With the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Villaners interest in the conjugal partnership became actual and vested with respect to an undivided one-half portion. Justiniana's rights to the other half, in turn, vested upon her death to her heirs including Villaner who is entitled to the same share as that of each of their eight legitimate children. As a result then of the death of Justiniana, a regime of co-ownership arose between Villaner and his co-heirs in relation to the property. With respect to Justinianas one-half share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the provisions on the law of succession, her eight children and Villaner each receives oneninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths (9/18), Villaners total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title to any definite portion of the community property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property. Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided share thereof. Villaner, however, sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners. Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so, the disposition affects only Villaners share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it. Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the

Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed. PROGRAMME INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF BATAAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 144635 SECOND DIVISION June 26, 2006 DECISION CORONA, J.: BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge, both located in Mariveles, Bataan. On May 14, 1986, BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease over Piazza Hotel at a monthly rental of P6,500 for three years, i.e., from January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1989, subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the parties. After the expiration of the three-year lease period, petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel on monthly extensions of the lease. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a sequestration order against BASECO pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of former President Corazon C. Aquino. Among the properties provisionally seized and taken over was the lot on which Piazza Hotel stood. On July 19, 1989, however, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes to respondent Province of Bataan. The title of the property was transferred to respondent. BASECOs TCT No. T-59631 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-128456, was issued to the Province of Bataan. Petitioner filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and collection of sum of money against BASECO. Respondent, as the new owner of the property, filed a motion for leave to intervene on November 22, 1990. After its motion was granted, respondent filed a complaint-in-intervention praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge for lack of legal interest. During the pre-trial of the complaint-inintervention, the parties agreed that the case be tried on the sole issue of whether respondent province, as complainant-intervenor, was the legitimate owner of the Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Ruling: The evidence clearly established respondents ownership of Piazza Hotel. First, the title of the land on which Piazza Hotel stands was in the name of respondent. Second, Tax Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Declaration No. 12782 was in the name of respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel. Third, petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. In the lease contract annexed to the complaint, petitioner in fact admitted BASECOs (respondents predecessor-in-interest) ownership then of the subject property. The Rules of Court states that [a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Such admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case. Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered judicial admissions. To be considered as a judicial admission, the same must be made in the same case in which it is offered. In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner acknowledged that it was not the owner of the property when it stated that BASECO leased to petitioner the building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge xxx for monthly rentals of P6,500.00. Petitioner could not possibly be the owner of a building merely leased to it. ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995 PUNO, J.: Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 8649008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.

The cases were consolidated and raffled to the RTC of Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling. On July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow tshirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival. Salcedo died traumatic." of "hemorrhage, intracranial

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.

For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City. Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense. On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. Issue: Wether the lower court erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28 Ruling: There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony. Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and documentary evidence on record. Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument.

Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand. Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, as he was being chased by his assailants and as he sat pleading with his assailants. Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, Mr. and Ms. Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Malaya. The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs. MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 181494 SECOND DIVISION March 17, 2009 DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV), received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Acting on this bit of information, a team arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Argusons rest house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza, Cavite. Upon arriving at the rest house, PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos, acting as

poseur-buyers, were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500,000 worth of shabu, simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Since Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises, he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. For the purpose, he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia. At about three oclock in the afternoon of that day, in front of the McDonalds branch in P. Ocampo St., Pasay City, Arguson instructed the would-bebuyers to wait for someone who will come out from the nearby Estrella St. Very much later, accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. After being shown the money bundle, accused-appellant left, only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson, Wilson Del Monte, who was holding a black plastic bag, and Richard Requiz. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag, later found to contain 473.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos, who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the prearranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim. The black plastic bag containing the six small selfsealing bags of white crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her. On April 6, 2000, C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. D-115800 on the crystalline substance. Per her report, the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Apart from the witnesses affidavits and other documents, the prosecution, in the hearing of March 4, 2002, offered in evidence the following exhibits, inclusive of its sub markings, which, as may be expected, were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit B Chemistry Report No. D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo; (b) Exhibit C Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5, 2000 to the Chief, Laboratory Service, requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags; (c) Exhibits D and D-1 to D-6 Black plastic bag with markings; and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the confiscated shabu; and (d) Exhibit F Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses.

The CA decision likewise summarized the defenses account of what purportedly transpired, to wit: Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F.B. Harrison on April 4, 2000, her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, to buy ice cream. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon, there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions, one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. Thereafter, two (2) younger male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ, were also boarded into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time. On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question, while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, a commotion happened near his post. As he moved backward from where he stood, he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that incident. For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question, he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center, passing by F.B. Harrison St., when he bumped a parked van, wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him, saying pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan! The man left and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him. Thereafter, he was boarded into the van together with the other accused. While not stated in the CA decision, Del Monte testified, like accused-appellant, that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente Lim. These testimonies remained uncontroverted. The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution. Ruling: After a circumspect study, the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant, considering certain circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, PO3 Ramos, who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box, PO3 testified that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter, accused-appellant emerged from said street, checked on the purchase money, asked the operatives to wait, and later re-appeared. As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accusedappellant, while at the crime scene, ever handled the merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte, but convicted accused-appellant, stating: Clearly, accused Monalyn Cervantes complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos. But two paragraphs later, the RTC went on to write: x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson, there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson, it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag. Before us then is a situation where two persons accused-appellant, a laundry woman; and Del Monte, a car park boy, in the company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson, during the actual buy bustare being indicted, on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness, with confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money, disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. As between the two acts performed, carrying the bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonalds at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were apprehended. But the trial court, in its observation that it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag, extended to Del Monte the benefit of the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

doubt, a benevolence denied to accusedappellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant, but an unreliable one as against Del Monte, when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman? To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accusedappellants guilt. We shall explain. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from, or sold by, the accused. Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People, the chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecutions failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal. Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or the Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and

Laboratory Equipment, defines chain of custody, thusly: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-ofcustody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise: While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. xxxx A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. What is on record is Exhibit C, which, as earlier described, is a memorandum PO3 Ramos prepared dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong, [T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. And she did not as she could not, even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson. Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall: immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal, there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti. Adding a negative dimension to the prosecutions case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis. To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented. It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout, a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist, i.e., the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. In this case, C/I Geronimos resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Trias competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. At any rate, Inspector Trias testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in question only established, at best, the existence, due Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this regard, the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed, a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonalds was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellants guilt. Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not belabor this matter anew. Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. We held in one case: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just thata mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for this kind of disposition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. EMILIO RIVERA Y CABLANG ALIAS `BOY,' ACCUSED-APPELLANT. DECISION G.R. No. 182347 CHICO-NAZARIO: THIRD October DIVISION 17, 2008

Group (DDEG) NPD Chief Reynaldo B. Orante. During the operation, the team recovered from him one (1) piece of One Hundred Peso bearing Serial Nos. HL 034748 and with markings AL representing the initials of PO2 Allan Llantino, as the buy-bust money used in the operation. The plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance allegedly recovered from accusedappellant was submitted to the NPDO-CLO for chemical analysis. The Request for Laboratory Examination indicated that the following evidence was submitted: One (1) pc. of small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance believed to be Methamphetamine Hcl or shabu with marking as "ERC-BB" Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo examined the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. After conducting a qualitative examination on the above-said specimen, the substance weighing 0.25 gram was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1162-02 dated 22 October 2002. The RTC convicted accused-appellant and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt Issue: Whether the police officers failed to follow the procedure outlined in paragraph 1, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 on the seizure and custody of the suspected dangerous drugs as nothing in the records would show that immediately after the seizure, the police officers conducted a physical inventory and photographed the same. Thus, the defense contends there is a gap in the chain of custody and a clear doubt on whether the specimen examined by the chemist and eventually presented in court were the same specimen allegedly recovered from accusedappellant. Ruling: We conviction. sustain accused-appellant's

In the afternoon of 21 October 2002, a confidential informer personally appeared at their police station. Confidential information was relayed to PO2 Allan Llantino of the District Drug Enforcement Unit, Northern Police District Office, Larangay, Caloocan City that one alias `Boy' was selling shabu. Said information was then relayed to the Chief of the Station Police, Superintendent Reynaldo B. Orante, who immediately ordered PO2 Llantino to organize a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, a team composed of Police Inspector Rodrigo Soriano, PO2 Henry Pineda, PO2 Joel Borda, PO2 Allan Llantino, and PO1 Ronald Mesina, was dispatched at Pitong Gatang, Dampalit, Malabon City, to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant, then known to them only as alias Boy. PO2 Llantino was designated as poseur-buyer while the rest of the team served as his back-up. One marked one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. LS 034778 was prepared to be used in the operation. Thereafter, PO2 Llantino, together with the confidential informant, went ahead to the target area at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, and while walking, they saw accusedappellant alias Boy standing. They then approached accused-appellant and the confidential informant introduced PO2 Llantino as a friend. After the introduction, appellant asked PO2 Llantino if he would buy shabu. He replied positively and told accused-appellant "piso," meaning one hundred pesos. PO2 Llantino handed the money to accused-appellant and the latter took from his right pocket one plastic sachet and handed it to PO2 Llantino. After the accusedappellant handed the plastic sachet, PO2 Llantino raised his right hand as the pre-arranged signal to his companions. Thereafter, his companions (P/Insp. Rodrigo Soriano, PO2 Henry Pineda, PO2 Joel Borda, and PO1 Ronald Mesina) proceeded to where PO2 Llantino was. Accused-appellant was arrested by PO2 Llantino with the help of his companions, specifically PO2 Borda and PO2 Pineda, and was brought to the Caloocan Police Station. PO2 Llantino turned over the confiscated plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance to the investigator who put his markings "BB" (meaning buy-bust) and made a laboratory request. The seized item and request for laboratory examination were delivered by PO1 Mesina to the Northern Police District Office Crime Laboratory Office (NPDO-CLO) for analysis based on the request for laboratory examination signed by District Drug Enforcement Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

In prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs, what determines if there was a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. Conviction is proper if the following elements concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti as evidence. Accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante

delicto in a buy-bust operation which is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted to be a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, ways and means are employed for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their plan. The idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. PO2 Llantino's testimony proved all the elements of the crime. He testified vividly on the buy-bust operation. He positively identified accusedappellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Report No. D-1162-02 of Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo, the substance, weighing 0.25 gram, which was bought from accused-appellant in consideration of P100.00, was examined and found to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride. He testified that he was the one who prepared the marked money, acted as the poseur-buyer, arrested the accused, and turned-over the suspected shabu to the investigator. PO2 Llantino testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. His testimony was able to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between the designated poseur-buyer PO2 Llantino and the pusher accused-appellant, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The shabu subject of the sale was brought to and properly identified in court. Moreover, the chain of custody is unbroken and thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved. The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accusedappellant's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that `non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.' The same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved. This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. In the case at bar, the totality of the testimonial,

documentary, and object evidence adequately supports not only the findings that a valid buy-bust operation took place but accounted for an unbroken chain of custody of the seized evidence as well. A certified true photocopy of the NPDO-DDEG logbook indicated that a team was officially dispatched at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon for a buy-bust operation at Pitong Gatang, Dampalit, in Malabon City, and brought with them one (1) piece of one hundred peso bill with Serial Number HL 034748 to be used as buy-bust money. The testimony of PO2 Llantino established that the buy-bust operation occurred between 4:00 o'clock to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 21 October 2002. Accused-appellant was brought to the Larangay police station at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. PO2 Llantino testified that the seized evidence was turned over to the police investigator who put his markings "ERC-BB." DDEG Chief Reynaldo Orante made the request for laboratory examination dated 21 October 2002. The request, together with the seized item (one sachet) was brought to the NPDO-CLO at 11:30 o'clock in the evening that same night and received by Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo at 11:35 o'clock in the evening. The parties stipulated on the qualification and competence of the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was stipulated that the Forensic Chemist was the one who prepared the report on the examination of the specimen submitted and that he can identify the specimen. While the Court notes that there is a slight discrepancy in the Serial Numbers of the buy-bust money as stated in the affidavit of PO2 Llantino vis-a-vis the Serial Numbers reflected in the NPDO-DDEG Police Blotter[51] and the actual buy-bust money presented. This minor inconsistency does not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant in consideration of which he sold and delivered the shabu. Moreover, any discrepancy on the the buy-bust money was resolved on the categorical statement of PO2 Llantino that he put the markings AL on the buybust money, corresponding to his initials Allan Llantino. Thus, beyond his bare allegations, accusedappellant has not shown any evidence that will destroy the identity of the sachet. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RANILO DE LA CRUZ Y LIZING, APPELLANT. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 177222 October 29, 2008 DECISION TINGA, J.: On 12 September 2002, the Office of the Station Drugs Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Mandaluyong City received information that appellant, alias "Boy Tigre," was engaging in the trade of illegal Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

drugs. A team composed of Peregrino, Boyles, Drilon and Resuello was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area at around 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Peregrino, Boyles, and Drilon positioned themselves at a nearby area while Resuello, the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant described as a long-haired, medium built, not-so-tall male, sporting a moustache and frequently seen wearing short pants. At the time, appellant was standing outside of their gate and kept on glancing from side to side. Resuello then told appellant that he wanted to buy shabu. Dela Cruz looked surprised prompting Resuello to repeat what he had said and handed him the P100 bill with Serial No. XY 588120. Appellant, in turn, handed him a plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. At which point, Resuello executed the prearranged signal and Peregrino immediately rushed to the scene. Peregrino, identifying himself as a policeman, held appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights. Peregrino then recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. Subsequently, appellant was brought to SDECU for investigation. Thereat, Peregrino placed his initials (BP) on the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance before sending it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for chemical examination. The sachet was later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Subsequently, Peregrino and Resuello accomplished the booking and information sheets regarding the incident. Peregrino also executed an affidavit on the matter. Appellant was later identified as Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lising. Forensic Chemist Perdido testified that the plastic sachet was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. He, however, admitted that he examined the specimen and had made the markings on the same without the presence of appellant. Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him Issue: Whether the police officers failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165 and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. Ruling: In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the

custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms. While there was testimony regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no mention whether the same had been done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused, the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution's case. Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence of proof of entitlement to such leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the Court save when it is accompanied by proof. According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such noncompliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at compliance with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved. Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers' non-compliance with the procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant's acquittal is in order. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. NORBERTO DEL MONTE Y GAPAY @ OBET, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

DECISION THIRD G.R. No. 179940 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DIVISION April 23,

At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills. The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a prearranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked money. The white crystalline substance in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002, the substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged despite the inadmissibility of the evidence against him for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug

allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him. Ruling: At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers' alleged noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. In People v. Pringas, we explained that noncompliance with Section 21 will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised. We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules. We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the nonadmissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Adamczuk v. Holloway 338 Pa. 263, 13 A.2d 2 (1940) Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack J. Adamczuk, and a car owned by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by defendant, Elmer Holloway. A certain photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6 was offered as evidence. When plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, was on the stand, he was shown "Exhibit No. 3" and he identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture and stated, in answer to his counsel, that "the conditions represented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark."

Then the exhibit was offered in evidence. On cross-examination it was disclosed that the witness did not know who took the picture or when it was taken. He stated that when the picture was taken the location of the camera was on route 6 but he did not know at what distance from the intersection. He had no experience in photography. He said he did not know whether the photographer tilted the camera up or down when the picture was taken, and he did not know whether the photographer "endeavored to accentuate certain parts of the picture." The court then sustained the objection to the picture's introduction. It was offered in evidence again when Herbert C. Dillard, Civil Engineer and County Surveyor, was on the stand. He was asked on cross-examination by defendant's counsel: "If you were taking a picture, and wanted to accentuate the curve of route six to the west, you could accomplish that by taking the picture farther away from the intersection, that is, farther to the east of the intersection, could you not?" He answered: "I think you could, yes." This witness was asked if he took photographs and developed them. He answered: "Very little." At the close of plaintiff's case the picture was again offered in evidence and was objected to and the objection sustained, and court saying: "There is some mystery about exhibit number three, which is not clear to the court. There is no proof of who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon; it isn't shown where the camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not." The court then commented on the fact that plaintiff had two days "since adjournment last Friday, to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants' counsel of the photographer." The court refused to admit the photograph. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. Issue: Admissibility of a certain photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6. Ruling: The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), Vol. 2, sec. 792, p.97, says: The objection that a photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. It is true that a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object. But so also can any witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. The fallacy of the objection occurs in assuming Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

that the photograph can come in testimonially without a competent person's oath to support it. If a qualified observer is found to say, "This photograph represents the fact as I saw it," there is no more reason to exclude it than if he had said, "The following words represent the fact as I saw it," which is always in effect the tenor of a witness's oath. If no witness has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it should not come in at all, any more than an anonymous letter should be received as testimony. Section 793: The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be verified. There is nothing anomalous or exceptional in this requirement of verification; it is simply the exaction of those testimonial qualities which are required equally of all witnesses; the application merely takes a different form. In other words, if a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO, accusedappellants. EN BANC G.R. No. 132676 April 4, 2001

The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows: On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening while he was watching television with his family his dogs barked. His mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded him to check the disturbance. To allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his cow that was tied to a mango tree. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was really wrong. After transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went inside the kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe. The darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2) bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through the slats and illumined the surroundings. There was also moon in the sky. A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously stooping near his barn. He knew Jaime and Warlito very well. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito lived in his neighborhood. Warlitos son Roche was also there; he was standing by the mango tree. They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulays house which was about a meter to the south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulays hut. As soon as he

reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulays screams broke into the night. Ruben Meriales rushed outside. He ran towards Florentinos hut but was deterred by darkness. He returned home to take his flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose head was oozing with blood. Ruben went to the police station where he gave his statement to Police Officer Osio. He named Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said that Florentino was killed because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales. On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Rubens testimony, a criminal complaint for the murder of Florentino Dulay and his two (2) daughters Norwela and Nissan as well as the frustrated murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao. At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano Subido and Police Officers Virgilio dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses. In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben. It accepted his straightforward testimony and ruled that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of falsehood on his lips." Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to Appellants Brief urging that the favorable result of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records. Ruling: A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant. EN BANC CURIAM: In the afternoon of July 10, 1999, the mother of the victim sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimees house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accusedappellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accusedappellant went back to the latters house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbors house, and there saw accusedappellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant. Then, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the compuerta by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive. Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She asked Daisy and her G.R. No. 144656 DECISION May 9, 2002 PER

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemins one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemins house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the compuerta. Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim. On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accusedappellant. The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory. Ruling: DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results: 1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; 2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or 3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant: In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

SECOND DIVISION G.R. October 26, 2007 TINGA, J.:

No. 172607 RESOLUTION

In the evening of July 15, 1989, while on her way to her grandmothers home, when private complainant [AAA] was accosted by a young male. It was only later when she learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO. She recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO waited for her by the creek, and then with a knife pointed at [AAA]s left side of the abdomen, he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding her breasts and stomach, and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home Economics Building inside the premises of the Daramuangan Elementary School where accused-appellant UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his right hand while he still clutched the knife menacingly on his left hand. Private complainant [AAA] recounted that she could not shout because she was afraid. She further recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO laid her down on a bench, 4 meters long and 24 inches wide, set the knife down, then mounted her, inserting his penis into her [AAAs] vagina and shortly thereafter, accused-appellant UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while poking the knife at her neck, not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her. Accused-appellant UMANITO then left, while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmothers house and she noticed that it was already around 1:00 oclock in the morning when she reached there. In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, private complainant [AAAs] mother, [BBB], noticed the prominence on [AAA]s stomach. It was only then when the victim, private complainant [AAA], divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her the details of what had happened in July, 1989. After hearing private complainant [AAA]s story, her mother brought her to the police station. Finding that the prosecution had proven appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him. Issue: Whether the prosecution has successfully met the level of proof needed to find appellant guilty of the crime of rape. Among the many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense, the disharmony on a certain point stands out. Ruling: Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the definitive key to the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAAs child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

alleged victims child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and AAAs child to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein. DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. Verily, as we pointed out in People v. Yatar, the process of obtaining such vital evidence has become less arduous The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, x x x has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis. It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over

the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties. What should be the proper scope of such hearings? Section 4 of the Rules spells out the matters which the trial court must determine, thus: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order.The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. Given our earlier pronouncements on the relevance of the DNA testing, it would be unbecoming of the RTC to conclude otherwise, Section 4 (d) notwithstanding. The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Section 4 (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the Rules. Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar, it shall order the same, in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules. It is also the RTC which shall determine the institution to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice of DNA testing center. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules, to wit: SEC. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following: (a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided. The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily. SEC. 8. Reliability of DNA testing methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following: (a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods; (c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community; (d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data gathered; (e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and (f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles. The trial court is further enjoined to observe the requirements of confidentiality and preservation of the DNA evidence in accordance with Sections 11 and 12 of the Rules. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records, i.e.: that the samples are

collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation thereto.

DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the known print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect. As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. Although the term DNA testing was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr., it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals that more than a passing mention was given to DNA analysis. In Tijing,we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage. However, we observed that: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents. DECISION FIRST G.R. No. 148220 June CARPIO, J.: DIVISION 15, 2005

Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute, a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Issue: Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit. Ruling: The petition has no merit. DNA Analysis as Evidence Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows: The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence. This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence. Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases: In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of nonpaternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards. Right Against Self-Incrimination Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against selfincrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this

action, will not violate the right against selfincrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material.

arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel. In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel. Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide. After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide Although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. Significantly, subsequent testing Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) specimen from the vagina of identical the semen to be that of type. showed that the of the sperm the victim was appellants gene

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant. DECISION No. 150224 CURIAM: EN BANC May 19, 2004 G.R. PER

Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband then Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Ruling: DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has

been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CORNELIO CAJUMOCAN, appellant. FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 155023 28, 2004 DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO May

At 11:30 p.m. of September 30, 1999, while the deceased, Apolinario Mirabueno, was asleep beside his fourteen year old brother Leo inside their house Rizal, the latter was roused from his slumber by the rustling of dried leaves outside the house. He saw a solitary figure walk toward their house, paused outside their room, and removed the fish net covering the window and looked inside the house. From the light of the fluorescent lamp inside the house, Leo recognized the man as appellant Cornelio Cajumocan, who drew a gun and shot Apolinario in the head, and thereafter ran away. Leo cried out to his older sister, Margarita and they brought Apolinario to a hospital in Morong, but he was declared dead on arrival. Appellant was charged with Murder. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of Murder Issue: Whether the negative findings of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is conclusive proof of his innocence Ruling: Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific

experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. Appellants argument that the negative result of gunpowder nitrates from the paraffin test conducted on him the day after the crime was committed, thereby showing an absence of physical evidence that he fired a gun, is untenable. In the case of People v. Manalo, we stressed: xxx even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol. In People v. Abriol, et al., we reiterated the rule on the admissibility of this kind of evidence: A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand. However, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrate was the discharge of firearms. Nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants. Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a gun. However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test. Paraffin tests, it must be emphasized, merely corroborate direct evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. In the case at bar, the positive, clear and categorical testimony of the lone eyewitness to the crime deserves full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant. Verily, establishing the identity of the malefactor through the testimony of the witness is the heart and cause of the prosecution. All other matters, such as the paraffin test, are of lesser consequence where there is positive identification by the lone eyewitness, Leo Mirabueno, of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, a paraffin test cannot be considered as conclusive proof of appellants innocence. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

ARTURO REVITA "ALIAS" PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

ARTHUR, OF THE

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 177564 October 31, 2008 D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO In the evening of 23 July 2002, Bryan and his cousin, Manilyn Rangel (Manilyn), were idly talking at the yard of Flordeliza in Sitio Bantog, Barangay Rajal, Balungao, Pangasinan, when Arturo arrived. Bryan asked Arturo where he was going, but the latter, who looked infuriated, did not reply. Arturo proceeded to the direction of Flordeliza who was coming out of her house towards the terrace. When Arturo was already close to Flordeliza, at the distance of two and a half meters, he shot the latter with a baby armalite several times. Flordeliza fell down. Bryan saw the incident since the place was illuminated by a light coming from his aunt's terrace. After witnessing the shocking incident, Bryan and Manilyn ran away from the scene to a cousin's house nearby. Arturo denied the accusation against him. He claimed that when the killing of Flordeliza occurred on 23 July 2002, he was in the house of his sister situated in Sitio Bantog, Barangay Rajal, Balungao, Pangasinan, enjoying a drinking spree while waiting for the arrival of his sister from Spain. He alleged he was with the company of his brothers, sister, wife, children and some friends. After getting drunk, he went to sleep only to be awakened by his wife at around 8:30 to 9:00 p.m. as police officers were looking for him. The same police officers brought him to the municipal jail and detained him. The following morning, he was brought to Urdaneta City where he was subjected to a paraffin test. The test yielded a negative result since there was no gunpowder residue found in his hands. Witnesses Lemie, Teodoro and Rolando corroborated Arturo's testimony that he was in his sister's house and that they were there the whole time when the incident was supposed to have happened. Lemie further testified that as the finance officer of the Barangay Power Association, she personally knew, through the billing statement, that there was no electricity in the house of the victim during the fateful night. P/Insp. Emelda Besarra Roderos testified that when she conducted a paraffin test on Arturo, she found that the latter was negative for the presence of gunpowder nitrates. The RTC found Arturo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of homicide Arturo insists that his conviction is tainted by reasonable doubt since the paraffin test conducted on him resulted negative.

Ruling: Even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. A paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable. The Court thus once held: Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. RUDY BUDUHAN Y BULLAN AND ROBERT BUDUHAN Y BULLAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. THIRD DIVISION G.R. August 06, 2008 J.: No. 178196 CHICO-NAZARIO,

Romualde, which caused them to fall down. Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table. Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao testified that she was the one who conducted the examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and Boy Guinhicna. She likewise brought before the trial court the original Letter Request of the Maddela Police Station for the conduct of paraffin casting; the Letter of Request addressed to the Officer-in-Charge the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin examination; and the paraffin casts of subjects Rudy, Ginyang, Guinhicna and Robert. Police Inspector Chua-Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a paraffin test was to determine the presence of gunpowder residue in the hands of a person through extraction using paraffin wax. The process involves two stages: first, the paraffin casting, in which the hands of the subject are covered with paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin examination per se, which refers to the actual chemical examination to determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted. For the second stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl amine agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subject's hands. In this test, a positive result occurs when blue specks are produced in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder residue. When no such reaction takes place, the result is negative. The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted yielded a negative result for all the four accused. Nonetheless, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a gun. The positive or negative results of the test can be influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm. The trial court found appellants guilty of the charges. Issue: Whether appellants guilt were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the trial court erred in the appreciation of the evidence for and against them. Ruling: The appeal lacks merit. Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party, and they are not conclusive with

Witness Cherry Rose was working as a GRO at the RML Canteen in Quirino. At about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups of men inside the beerhouse. The group that went there first was that of the appellants, which was composed of Robert Buduhan, who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano, Rudy Buduhan, who was wearing a red T-shirt, a man wearing a blue T-shirt, and another man wearing a blue Tshirt with a black jacket. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding). At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose's Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter. The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up. Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Robert's group fired their guns at Larry and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the positive and negative results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm, namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm. AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. 1966 Sep 28 En Banc DECISION J.: G.R. No. L-21438 SANCHEZ,

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Petitioner draws the SCs attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus "Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser? A. When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, 'We will note that you were transferred to the tourist class'. I said, 'Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer.' And I also said, You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer. Q. Was she able to note it? A. No, because I did not give my ticket. Q. About that purser? A. Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, 'I have recorded the incident in my notebook.' He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in French 'First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.' MR. VALTE I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor. COURT I will allow that as part of his testimony." Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as

"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man'; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane." Ruling: Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a 'first class' airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits 'A', 'A1', 'B', 'B-1', 'C' and 'C- 1' belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a 'first class' accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation ,defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the 'first class' ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong." Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XIII, PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, ANGELITA CENTENO, JULIA CARPIO, CALIXTO HERMOSA, and CRISPULA R. PAGARAN alias PULA, respondents. 1959 Jul 31 En Banc DECISION J.: G.R. No. L-14257 LABRADOR,

signing of the originals. The witness giving the testimony was the salesman who issued the triplicates marked as Exh, "D-1". As the witness was explaining the figures or words appearing on the triplicates, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, then presiding in the court below, interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and can not be produced. Another witness, accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in Manila, was also called by the prosecution to testify. He declared that sales in the provinces were reported to the Manila office of the Metro Drug Corporation, and that the originals of the sales invoices are transmitted to the main office in support of cash journal sheets, but that the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicate or pink copies are submitted to the central office in Manila. Testifying on certain cash journal sheets, Exhs, "A", "A-1", to "A-10" he further declared that he received these from the Metro Drug Corporation, Cebu branch, and that the said cash journal sheets contained the sales made in the Cebu branch. After the cross-examination of this last witness, the prosecution again went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice, Exh. "D-1", already above referred to. It was at this stage that the judge below told the prosecution that the law applicable is Section 46, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which requires the production of the originals. In response to the above ruling, the special prosecutor claimed that the evidence of the prosecution the originals on account of their loss. Issue: Whether the invoice sought introduced is a duplicate original. to be

In Criminal Case No. 36885 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents Pacita MadrigalGonzales and others are charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever been made. In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts, which was marked Exh. "D", containing blue invoices numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug Corporation, Magallanes corner Jakosalem, Cebu City. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to the Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the three sheets, the original, the duplicate and the triplicate, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the used of the carbons in the course of the preparation and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

Ruling: The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question and we need not elaborate on the reasons for the rule. This matter has received consideration from the foremost commentator on the Rules of Court thus: "When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.' It has also been decided in favor of the petitioner by Us in the case of People vs. Quinones, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 1520, 1525, thus:

"It is argued in the second assignment of error that the confession Exhibit B is not admissible because it is merely a carbon copy. The said confession Exhibit B, being carbon copy of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant, is admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the same does not require an accounting for the nonproduction of the original. (Sec. 47, Rule 123, Rules of Court)" Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of th admissibility of duplicate originals, as follows: "SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip' has been held to be primary evidence, p. 616. "SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. - Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at the same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other. "SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be reversed. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, defendant-appellant. 1990 December 04 1st Division 80505 DECISION CRUZ, J.: G.R. No.

rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money. Ruling: The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY, defendants-appellants. 1910 Dec 17 1st Division 5791 D E C I S I O N G.R. No. LTORRES, J.:

On May 27, 1986Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati. The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there two Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor against Eustaquio Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92. For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were attached and the 27th of May, 1908, was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties to the highest bidder. On the 18th of the same month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the filing of the compliant. In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it

to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such vendor. The charge consists in that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor, Pedro Salazar, and for the purpose of avoiding the attachment and sale of one of the properties belonging to him, to secure the payment of the judgment obtained by his creditor in the aforementioned suit, did, with disregard of the truth in the narration of the facts, execute or write the said memorandum whereby, on February 25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the attached properties in favor of the said Bernardo Gregorio, according to the aforesaid copy, when in fact the said memorandum was written in April, 1908. For the foregoing reasons a complaint was filed charging each of the defendants with the crime of the falsification of a private document, and proceedings having been instituted in both causes, which were afterwards, by agreement of the parties thereto, consolidated, the court, on November 6, 1909, pronounced in both of them the judgment appealed from, written in duplicate, whereby Balistoy were found guilty. Ruling: In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution. Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and although, judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there is reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendant's innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In view of the evidence produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes can only be terminated by such a finding. For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to acquit, and we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo Gregorio, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-35366 1931 VILLAMOR, J.:

August 5,

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one libelous article in the Ing Magumasid for July 13, 1930. The court overruled the demurrer. A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court. Issue: Admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. Ruling: The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.

COMPAIA MARITIMA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, SALVADOR T. LLUCH, MARIANO LL. BADELLES, individually and in their capacities as President and Vice-President, respectively of the Allied Free Workers Union, NICANOR HALEBAS and LAURENTINO LL. BADELLES, individually and officers of Allied Free Workers Union, SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-28999 24, 1977 AQUINO, J.: May

THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA, petitioner, vs. HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, and ANDRES GUEVARRA, respondents. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

On August 11, 1952 the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month counted from August 12, 1952.

It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper service. The contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties. At the time the contract was entered into, the union had just been organized. Its primordial desire was to find work for its members. The union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan City" The union found out later that that stipulation was oppressive and that the company was unduly favored by that arrangement. Under the contract, the work of the union consisted of arrastre and stevedoring service. Arrastre, a Spanish word which refers to hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. The service is usually performed by longshoremen. On the other hand, stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The shippers and consignees paid the union both for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense. On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract explicitly provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees, as was the alleged practice in Iligan City, and that the shipowner would not be liable for the payment of such services. Thus, the issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of contention between the parties. The union members labored under the impression that they were not being compensated for their stevedoring service as distinguished from arrastre service. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the contract because its members were in dire need of work and work, which was not adequately compensated, was preferable to having no work at all. Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract was verbally renewed. The company allowed the union to continue performing arrastre and stevedoring work. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

On July 23, 1954 the union sent a letter to the company requesting that it be recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and unload the cargo of its vessels at Iligan City. The company ignored that demand. So, the union filed on August 6, 1954 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective bargaining unit. Despite that certification case, the company on August 24, 1954 served a written notice on the union that, in accordance with payment of the 1952 contract, the same would be terminated on August 31, 1954. Because of that notice, the union on August 26, 1954 filed in the CIR charges of unfair labor practice against the company. On August 31, 1954 the company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. On the following day, September 1, the union members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work. The picket lasted for nine days. On September 8, 1954 the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision which declared the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated on August 1, 1954. The trial court awarded actual damages, amounting to P450,000 on the basis of the auditor's reports, Exhibits A to I. It did not carefully examine the said exhibits. Contrary to the trial court's impression, Exhibits B, C and D are not auditors' reports. During trial Teves, the consignees branch manager, submitted a statement (Exh. K) showing the alleged cost of three forklifts, 200 pieces of pallet boards, 530 pieces of wire rope slings and two pieces of tarpaulins in the total sum of P27,215. In that statement, he claims that the damages, to the company by reason of the depreciation of the said items of equipment amounted to P38,835 or more than the cost thereof. The company's counsel, in his summary of the damages, ignored the alleged damages, of P38,835 indicated by Teves in Exhibit K. The consignees counsel relied oth on the auditors' reports, Exhibits A and E to I and on Exhibit B, the chief clerk's statement. As already noted, those documents show that the total damages, claimed by the company amounted to P349,245.37. Ruling: After analyzing the nature of the damages, awarded, how the same were computed, and the trustworthiness of the

company's evidence, we find the first assignment of error meritorious. The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony of Teves. He did not produce the sales invoices. We have already stress that, on the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants' reports and in the statement made by the consignees chief clerk amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000. The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court). That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established (U. S. vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am Jur 2nd 529). It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S. 111). What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like" (Anno 52 ALR 1266). That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529). A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value. It would not be proper to allow accountants estimates as recoverable damages. They are not supported by reliable evidence. They can hardly be sanctioned by the "generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in accountant's report. The pertinent records of the company should have been produced in court. The purser and steward did not testify. The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or inferences (29 Am Jur 2d 519). His opinion is not evidence. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

The trial court unreservedly gave credence to the conjectures of Jayme. Obviously, his inflated guesses are inherently speculative and devoid of probative value. Furthermore, his estimate of the unrealized freight revenue for January 1 to August 31, 1954 overlapped with his computation of the lost freight for the unloaded 74,751 bags of fertilizer and other cargoes covering the same period (Statement A of Exh. A). Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which were not produced in court. The union objected to Jayme's report as inadmissible under the hearsay rule or as not being the best evidence. Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been dispensed with, yet the complaint to show good faith and fair dealing, could have brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading, receipts for the freights, if any, etc.) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries. Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was not able to collect the stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should have been proforma in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report. No such exhibits were presented. VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSEBIO E. FERRER, PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, defendants. EN BANC 29, 1968 G.R. No. L-23893 ANGELES, J.: October

Prior to 1959, Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business name of Villa Rey Transit, pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service Commission, which authorized him to operate a total of thirty-two (32) units on various routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila. On January 8, 1959, he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public convenience to the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc., for P350,000.00 with the condition, among others, that the seller (Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer." Barely three months thereafter, or on March 6, 1959: a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. was organized with a capital stock of P500,000.00 divided into 5,000 shares of the par value of P100.00 each; P200,000.00 was the subscribed stock; Natividad R. Villarama (wife of Jose M. Villarama) was one of the incorporators, and she subscribed for P1,000.00; the balance of P199,000.00 was subscribed by the brother and

sister-in-law of Jose M. Villarama; of the subscribed capital stock, P105,000.00 was paid to the treasurer of the corporation, who was Natividad R. Villarama. In less than a month after its registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Corporation, on April 7, 1959, bought five certificates of public convenience, forty-nine buses, tools and equipment from one Valentin Fernando, for the sum of P249,000.00, of which P100,000.00 was paid upon the signing of the contract; P50,000.00 was payable upon the final approval of the sale by the PSC; P49,500.00 one year after the final approval of the sale; and the balance of P50,000.00 "shall be paid by the BUYER to the different suppliers of the SELLER." The very same day that the aforementioned contract of sale was executed, the parties thereto immediately applied with the PSC for its approval, with a prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in favor of the vendee Corporation to operate the service therein involved. On May 19, 1959, the PSC granted the provisional permit prayed for, upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by the Commission at any time, shall be subject to whatever action that may be taken on the basic application and shall be valid only during the pendency of said application." Before the PSC could take final action on said application for approval of sale, however, the Sheriff of Manila, on July 7, 1959, levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved therein, namely, those issued under PSC cases Nos. 59494 and 63780, pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 13798, in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, plaintiff, judgment creditor, against Valentin Fernando, defendant, judgment debtor. The Sheriff made and entered the levy in the records of the PSC. On July 16, 1959, a public sale was conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of public convenience. Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in his name. Thereafter, Ferrer sold the two certificates of public convenience to Pantranco, and jointly submitted for approval their corresponding contract of sale to the PSC. Pantranco therein prayed that it be authorized provisionally to operate the service involved in the said two certificates. The applications for approval of sale, filed before the PSC, by Fernando and the Corporation, Case No. 124057, and that of Ferrer and Pantranco, Case No. 126278, were scheduled for a joint hearing. In the meantime, to wit, on July 22, 1959, the PSC issued an order disposing that during the pendency of the cases and before a final resolution on the aforesaid applications, the Pantranco shall be the one to operate provisionally the service under the two certificates Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

embraced in the contract between Ferrer and Pantranco. The Corporation took issue with this particular ruling of the PSC and elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which decreed, after deliberation, that until the issue on the ownership of the disputed certificates shall have been finally settled by the proper court, the Corporation should be the one to operate the lines provisionally. On November 4, 1959, the Corporation filed in the CFI of Manila, a complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale of the aforesaid two certificates of public convenience in favor of the defendant Ferrer, and the subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco, against Ferrer, Pantranco and the PSC. Pantranco filed a counterclaim against the Coproration alleging that it violated their agreement that the corporation will not compete with Pantranco for 10 years. The lower court decided in favour of the corporation and held that the Sheriff's sale to Ferrer is null and void and that the agreement between Villarama did not bind the corporation since Villarama and the Corporation have separate and distinct personalities. Ruling: The evidence shows that when the Corporation was in its initial months of operation, Villarama purchased and paid with his personal checks Ford trucks for the Corporation. Exhibits 20 and 21 disclose that the said purchases were paid by Philippine Bank of Commerce Checks Nos. 992618-B and 993621-B, respectively. These checks have been sufficiently established by Fausto Abad, Assistant Accountant of Manila Trading & Supply Co., from which the trucks were purchased9 and Aristedes Solano, an employee of the Philippine Bank of Commerce,10 as having been drawn by Villarama. Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation, are very illuminating evidence. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to produce the alleged photostat copies thereof. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in

court.11 Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites.12 As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them.13 Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession.14 Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court."15 The originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22. Taking account of the foregoing evidence, together with Celso Rivera's testimony,16 it would appear that: Villarama supplied the organization expenses and the assets of the Corporation, such as trucks and equipment;17 there was no actual payment by the original subscribers of the amounts of P95,000.00 and P100,000.00 as appearing in the books;18 Villarama made use of the money of the Corporation and deposited them to his private accounts;19 and the Corporation paid his personal accounts. The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that Villarama has been too much involved in the affairs of the Corporation to altogether negative the claim that he was only a part-time general manager. They show beyond doubt that the Corporation is his alter ego. BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993 CAMPOS, JR., J.: Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956. On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name. On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959. On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe. True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M). The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.

Ruling: We rule in the negative. Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states: Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit: Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document. After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like). In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), P e t i t i o n e r, vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND SPOUSE, R e s p o n d e n t s. DECISION SECOND DIVISION July 29, 2005 G.R. No. 143338 CHICO-NAZARIO, Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner

attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents loan. During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to respondents failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to respondents; that as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial payment to their companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit A; petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit B; Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit D.[10] On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E. The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. Respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

exhibits, one of which was Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E, the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly, respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer. The trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court. The trial court then dismissed the complaint. Ruling: The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides: SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,[25] this Court held that Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.

In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein).[28] According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule that the best evidence phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing the rationale being: (1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is justified. Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the best evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the precise wording of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the best evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point. Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule. Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant. In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. this Court held that Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due execution of these documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 142641 July 17, 2006 D E C I S I CORONA

On March 14, 1991, petitioner, obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, petitioner obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from Cenizal. Petitioner then issued in favor of Cenizal, BPI Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizals house located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because petitioner promised that he would replace the

check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the BPI through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed Cenizal that the check bounced because of insufficient funds. Thereafter, Cenizal went to the house of petitioner to inform him of the dishonor of the check but Cenizal found out that petitioner had left the place. So, Cenizal referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving petitioner three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. Petitioner still failed to make good the amount of the check. After due investigation, a case for violation of BP 22 was filed against petitioner on March 27, 1992. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial. Ruling: Petitioners contention has no merit. Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content. Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case. Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 152881 August 17, 2004 CALLEJO An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 16, 1993. When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence. The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the latters account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in payment of the petitioners obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00. The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the latters absence and that of his counsel, the direct examination on the witness could not be

terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date, and that the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit A, and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit A-1. After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial. They again failed to appear when the case was called for continuation of trial on November 21, 1995. The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, which the court admitted. Petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecutions failure to produce the original thereof. T The trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence Ruling: The petition has no merit. We rule against the petitioner. The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. As to the second element, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law creates a prima facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit, coincidental with the attendance of the two other elements. We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight. Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted. In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis. In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that he caused the nonpayment of the dishonored check. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special

Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records. There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored check to testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The petitioner had already been informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as shown by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored check. Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that of the prosecutions. The petitioners contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the subject check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to identify the petitioner after his direct examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear. The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check.

father's residence at and from then on, lived with his father. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony Ruling: Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination. November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents. DECISION SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll. The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed MADRID, respondents. 1998 Oct 21 3rd Division DECISION G.R. No.117384 ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area of 3,277 square meters. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property. However, sometime in October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said land. On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit petitioners' possession of the land, they assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated demands that the former relinquish the same. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976.5 During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost. Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit "A," a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction. However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit "A" was admissible in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it was offered during the trial. While ruling that Exhibit "A" was admissible, the CA concluded that the same had no probative value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959. Ruling: While we concur with the Court of Appeals' finding that Exhibit "A" does not prove that the sale of the land indeed occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the circumstances present in this case. To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable. Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed, not only to object, but even to crossexamine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. As earlier stated, Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit "A," the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners' predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners' predecessor-ininterest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable. However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner. The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners' exclusive claim of ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other buildings was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them protested. We cannot accept the Madrids' explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the unexplained killings within the area. BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

SECOND DIVISION G.R. February 9, 1993

No. 83377 CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956. On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name. On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959. On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M). The trial court ordered the reconveyance of the property in favour of petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible. Issue: whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same. Ruling: We rule in the negative.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public. After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for nonproduction of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies. Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible. Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 establish the loss or destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration No. 15412 and of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites, prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the document in question. We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents. THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007 D E C I S I O N M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioners power barges. Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence. Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its submarkings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. The CA certiorari. dismissed petitioners petition for

an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its submarkings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the

Issue: Whetherthe photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means". Ruling: We do not agree. An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

document in the proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2, both dated April 17, 2000. On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong. However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit. Consequently, on August 15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehouse expenses, related interests and charges. Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan. On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2. The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC. MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike. Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand letter to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference, warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply. Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS04011 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION G.R. No. 170633 NACHURA, J.: THIRD DIVISION October 17, 2007

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.8 On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter. On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened. In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea and paid the same in full. Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two, one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges. Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan . After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. The lower court denied the demurrer and ruled that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per MT, the contract was perfected. Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the nonproduction of the original fax transmittals. In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows: Admissibility of Pro Forma Invoices; Breach of Contract by Appellants Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218, Records), appellants argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best evidence rule. The argument is untenable. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01SC). The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document." The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as follows: Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows: xxx c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. xxx f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792, which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as: Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows: Xxx

(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic document." xxxx (h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic data message." The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder. The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" was the result of the Senate of the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term "electronic document." In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working group of the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each one. Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between the two terms. While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation, unlike an electronic document. Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction. The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner: SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows: xxxx Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. (h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message." Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document? The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document from one place to another via a fax machine. As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade relations. The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be considered. Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL's definition of "data message": "Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data message." However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data message." This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of our bill. The record is the data. The record may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a similar device. The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not covered. Though when the video is transferred to a website, it would be covered because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disc would be covered. In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible under other rules of law. This provision focuses on replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records and using standards to show systems reliability. Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts are themselves electronic records being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record subject to the usual rules about copies, but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this bill. However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again called on are treated as paper records. In that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the record is irrelevant to its reliability. Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message," it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the ECommerce Law of Canada, Senator DefensorSantiago had in mind the term "electronic data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations: "Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be any medium. It is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations, since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records are not covered, though when the video is transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would be covered. In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible under other rules of law. This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records, and using standards to show systems reliability. Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are themselves electronic records, being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about

copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act. However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose computer origin is never again called on, are treated as paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system that produced the record is relevant to its reliability. There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based. A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. Thus, in Garvida v. Sales, Jr., where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines, we ruled that: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)

have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paperbased copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message." Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature.91 Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuancean administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law. We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-

POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests)