Justin Skirry - Descartes Metaphysics of Human Nature

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature
Continuum Studies in Philosophy: Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin
Andrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life Christopher M. Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus Justin Skirry, Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature Matthew Simpson, Rousseau's Theory of Freedom David A. Roberts, Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil James J. Delaney, Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus Robert Dyson, St Augustine of Hippo Tammy Nyden-Bullock, Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind Ryan Hickerson, The History of Intentionality Daniel Whiting, The Philosophy of John McDowell

Justin Skirry
continuum
L O N D O N N E W Y O R K
Continuum The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 15 East 26th Street, New York NY 10010 www. continuumbooks. com Justin Skirry 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without orior oermission in writing from the tmblishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 0-8264-8637-1 (hardback) Typeset by Kenneth Burnley, Wirral, Cheshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire
Contents
Acknowledgements Abbreviations
vii ix
Introduction 1 Substance and Mode 1.1 Scholastic Substance 1.2 Substantial Form and Per Se Unity 1.3 Accidents 1.4 Cartesian Substance and Subject 1.5 The Mode-Substance Relation 1.6 Cartesian Substance and Self-Subsistence 1.7 Descartes's Definition of Substance 1.8 Cartesian vs Scholastic Substance Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction 2.1 The Standard Account: A Summary 2.2 The Doctrine of Distinctions 2.3 Descartes's Confusion and the Formal Distinction 2.4 Cartesian Attributes 2.5 Some Textual Objections 2.6 The Textual Inconsistency 2.7 The Metaphysical Inconsistency 2.8 Substance and a Plurality of Attributes Cartesian Bodies 3.1 The Monist Position 3.2 The Vacuum and the Problem of the Real Distinction 3.3 Particular Bodies Are Substances 3.4 The Rejection of Substantial Forms 3.5 Material Forms and the Human Body 3.6 Conclusion
1 11 11 14 17 19 23 27 30 34 39 39 41 46 53 56 59 63 66 70 71 76 80 80 87 92
vi
Contents
The 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
Substantial Union Argument The Sailor in a Ship Analogy Unity and the Confused Modes of Sensation The Union Resulting in an Unum Quid Causal Interaction Evaluation Prove too Little/Prove too Much
97 98 102 106 109 112 117 121 121 126 131 136 140 145 147 152 156 159 163 167
171 111
Cartesian Hylomorphism 5.1 Descartes Among the Pluralists 5.2 The Substantial Form of Human Being 5.3 Complete and Incomplete Substances 5.4 The Whole in the Whole and the Whole in Any One of its Parts 5.5 What Am I? Descartes's Dissolution to the Mind-Body Problem 6.1 The Primitive Notion of Mind-Body Union 6.2 Composite Natures and their Parts 6.3 The True and Immutable Nature of Human Being 6.4 Thinking-Extended Composites 6.5 Dissolving the Mind-Body Problem 6.6 Formal Causal Interaction
Bibliography Index
Acknowledgements
Chapter 2 was originally published as 'Descartes's conceptual distinction

and its ontological import' in the Journal of the History of Philosophy.
Chapter 4 was published as 'Does Descartes's real distinction argument

prove too much?' in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. Many
thanks are due to the referees of these journals for their helpful comments. Thanks are also owed to their editors for permission to reprint them here. Paul Hoffman and Tad Schmaltz are also owed debts of gratitude for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of Chapter 4. An early version of Chapter 5 was first presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and subsequently published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
under the title 'A hylomorphic interpretation of Descartes's theory of mind-body union'. I am grateful for permission to reprint a revised version of that essay here. Thanks are owed to J. A. Cover, Jeffrey Brower, William L. Rowe and Michael Jacovides for their rigorous scrutiny of an earlier version of the entire manuscript. Finally, although his influence on this study is much greater than the citations might suggest, this work is greatly indebted to Paul Hoffman's articles, 'The unity of Descartes's man' and 'Cartesian Composites'.
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Abbreviations
AT
Descartes, Rene (1974-89), Ouevres de Descartes, 11 vols, eds Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Vrin. References are made to volume and page number. Descartes, Rene (1984-91), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. References are made to volume and page number. Suarez, Francisco, Metaphysical Disputations, Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosophia. References are made by disputation, section and article. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. References are made by volume and chapter. Eustachius of St Paul (1609), Summa Philosphica Quadripartite, Paris: Carolus Chastelain. Reference is made to part, treatise number and article. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae. Standard references are made to part, question and article.
CSM/CSMK
MD
SCG SPQ
ST
For Sarah Jane in loving appreciation
Introduction
Vere Chappell makes a distinction between hard and soft varieties of dualism and unionism.1 Although it is impossible for both hard dualism and hard unionism to be true, since mind and body cannot be both actually two things and actually one, it is possible for both hard dualism and soft unionism or soft dualism and hard unionism to be true. Most scholars maintain that Descartes's theory of mind and body commits him to hard dualism and soft unionism. On this account, mind and body are two things that actually exist apart, i.e. hard dualism, but they are united into a human being in a soft sense, for otherwise mind and body would not be two but one.2 But, soft dualism is also consistent with hard unionism. On this account, mind and body are distinct in a weak sense, while they are united in a strong or hard sense to make one, whole human being.3 This would mean that mind and body are actually united to form one thing but are potentially two. This book defends a version of this latter thesis. This book argues that the nature of Descartes's human being is the result of the mind's per se unity with a properly disposed human body. This means that Descartes maintained a fundamentally hylomorphic theory of mind-body union roughly in line with his scholastic predecessors and contemporaries. This kind of unity results in something that is actually one but potentially two, i.e. soft dualism/hard unionism. But, the hard dualism/soft unionism thesis has the most currency among scholars and is the traditional understanding of Descartes's metaphysics of human nature accepted by just about any philosopher who has taught the Meditations in an introductory level course. The first three chapters of this book are intended to lay to rest certain misunderstandings about Descartes's basic metaphysical commitments that give rise to this widely accepted, but mistaken, view. For instance, several scholars maintain that Descartes's human being cannot be a substance since it depends on mind and body for its
existence. Chapter 1 closely examines Descartes's definition of substance and its conceptual relations with its scholastic counterpart in response to this concern. This chapter shows that scholastic substances are composites of a substantial form united per se with matter so as to make one, complete substantial or self-subsisting nature in a given species. Then Descartes's definition of substance is established as primarily a selfsubsisting being and secondarily as a subject of accidents as with the scholastic doctrine. One important result is that the kind of ontological independence required for being a created Cartesian substance just is non-inherence in some other thing. But, the dependence of something on its essential parts does not exclude it from the category of substance. Another important result is that Descartes's doctrine differs from the scholastic's in that a complete substance need not be a composite of form - and matter. Hence, a scholastic substance is also a Cartesian substance but not the other way around. Another misunderstanding stems from Descartes's claim that the two ultimate kinds of substance have one principal attribute each. Many take this to mean that a Cartesian substance can have one and only one principal attribute. Chapter 2 helps make metaphysical room for a Cartesian substance with both principal attributes, viz a human being, by examining Descartes's doctrine of attributes through their conceptual distinction. It is established that, contrary to current scholarship, the distinction among attributes is not a product of the mind's activity but is discovered in re. In effect, Descartes's conceptual distinction just is Scotus' formal distinction understood as a rational distinction ratiocinatae, or a rational distinction of 'reasoned reason'. Hence, every substance is composed of the attributes of being, order, duration and number. Since every substance is composed of a plurality of attributes, there is metaphysical space for a substance composed of both principal attributes. Along the way the distinction between formal identity (i.e. an identification of definition or essence) and real identity (i.e. an identification within a definition or essence) is established and is eventually used to make sense of Descartes's distinction between a unity of essence and a unity of composition in Chapter 6. Two other difficulties arise due to Descartes's metaphysics of body in general and the human body in particular. One is that most scholars believe that particular Cartesian bodies are not substances themselves but modes of the one extended substance that is the entire physical universe. But, if this were true, then the body would be united to the mind as a mode is united with its underlying substance and not to make
Introduction
one, whole substance. The other difficulty is that Descartes's claim that the essence or nature of body is nothing but extension has led some to argue that the mind would have to be the form of the human body for Descartes, if his theory is hylomorphic, because he cannot have recourse to a substantial form of corporeity, as some of the scholastics did, given his rejection of substantial forms in physics. But, the mind or soul only has the faculties of intellect and will and, therefore, it cannot be the form of the body. Chapter 3 addresses both of these concerns. First, although the claim runs up against some difficulties with other aspects of Descartes's metaphysics, the evidence indicates that particular bodies are substances. Second, even though extension is the essence of the genus 'body', the configuration and motion of a given part of that extension constitutes that species of body. So, a certain configuration and motion of parts results in a cow body, whereas another results in a human body, which, strictly speaking, must have a disposition for union with the mind. Descartes's rejection of substantial forms is also examined in order to elucidate certain aspects of his metaphysics of body as well as provide the groundwork for the claim made in Chapter 5 that the Cartesian mind is the substantial form of human being. The remaining three chapters specifically address the theory of mind-body union. Chapter 4 reconstructs and evaluates Descartes's argument for the union of mind and body found in the Sixth Meditation. It shows that this is in fact an argument for their per se unity into a true human nature and against any theory maintaining they are united per accidens. Chapter 5 explicates how this per se unity works within Descartes's metaphysics. Here it is argued that (1) the mind is the substantial form of human being, (2) mind and a properly disposed human body are two incomplete substances in a particularly Cartesian sense, and (3) these two incomplete substances unite per se to form one, whole and complete human nature in a Scotistic or Ockhamistic fashion. Finally, Chapter 6 examines Descartes's other remarks on composite natures and how this strong unionism account avoids the traditional problem of mind-body causal interaction. However, before moving on to the main text, it is important to address one last, but quite important, impediment to the soft dualism/hard unionism view offered here. This is the issue of Descartes's sincerity. Many commentators take Descartes's use of scholastic language as a veil for his real views. Indeed, this assumption underlies Gilson's famous dictum of how Descartes practises the art of putting 'new wine in old bottles'.4 Henri Gouhier goes so far as to say that 'what Descartes retains
from scholastic philosophy is precisely what is not philosophical'.5 In more recent scholarship, David Yandell has argued that Descartes probably unpacks the notion of 'substantial union' in terms of efficient causal interaction and not in the traditional sense of a union of a substantial form with matter.6 Rozemond also goes through great pains to dismiss Descartes's use of scholastic language based on what she takes to be inconsistencies between their traditional meaning and other aspects of Descartes's metaphysics. This, of course, implies that Descartes is being disingenuous in his use of scholastic terminology. Of course, these examples do not exhaust the vast prejudice among scholars that Descartes is being dishonest under these circumstances. Yet, no one really argues for this thesis. One possible reason lies with Descartes's famous decision not to publish The World in light of Galileo's house arrest. Hence, it might seem that Descartes was fearful of being persecuted for his views. Although this may have been true in the early 1630s, he seems to have regained his courage in the late 1630s and 1640s. For all of the main theses put forth in The World, such as providing scientific explanations without recourse to substantial forms, real qualities, or prime matter, eventually see the light of day in his more
mature works: the Discourse on Method, the Meditations and the Principles.
Indeed, in a 13 March 1641 letter to Mersenne, Descartes claims that those who condemned Galileo are 'people who confound Aristotle with the Bible and abuse the authority of the Church': They would have my views condemned likewise if they had the power; but if there is ever any question of that, I am confident I can show that none of the tenets of their philosophy accords with the Faith so well as my doctrines. (AT III 349-50: CSMK 177) So, even though some may want to condemn his views, they do not have the power to do so and, moreover, Descartes is confident that his philosophy is more in accordance with the Catholic faith than the Aristotelian philosophy practised in the schools. Therefore, whatever trepidation Descartes felt at the time he suppressed The World is replaced by a new confidence in his own philosophy and personal safety by 1641. Descartes's use of scholastic language to describe the union of mind and body should also be taken as sincere given his main philosophical concerns, viz to lay the foundation for his mechanistic physics:
Introduction
These six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. (AT III 297-8: CSMK 173) In this excerpt from a 28 January 1641 letter to Mersenne, Descartes states that the Meditations contain all the principles of his physics and implies that Aristotle, and not the Catholic Church, is his main opponent. This suggests that the underlying purpose of the Meditations is to lay a non-Aristotelian foundation for his mechanistic physics. As argued in Chapter 3, this entails a rejection of the use of substantial forms and real qualities in scientific explanations. This, in turn, makes way for efficient or mechanistic causal explanations without recourse to final or formal causal principles as Descartes understood the scholastic usage. So, his main agenda is to promote his mechanistic physics. Hence, it would make no sense for him to take issue with the scholastics on issues not bearing directly on this concern, viz the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the union of mind and body into one, whole complete human being. This may raise the spectre of whether or not Descartes genuinely believed in these fundamental Catholic doctrines. But, although he was no saint, it is reasonable to suppose, at least without evidence to the contrary, that he was a typical Catholic layperson; he believed in the basic doctrines of the church even though he may not have lived by them every day of his life. Indeed, as mentioned above, Descartes thought his philosophy was more in accordance with Catholicism than the philosophy of Aristotle. So, these most obvious reasons for maintaining Descartes's insincerity for these matters just do not hold water. It is rare, however, that anyone ever really argues that Descartes is being insincere. Strangely enough, most scholars maintaining Descartes's insincerity have assumed the burden of proof is on those wishing to take him sincerely to show that he is being sincere. But, the Principle of Charity dictates that a text should be taken as sincere unless good reasons are given for believing otherwise. Accordingly, the burden of proof is on those who wish to show Descartes insincere in his use of scholastic terminology.7 Although an argument claiming a blanket insincerity is unlikely, not to mention useless, arguments for insincerity could be levelled on a passage-by-passage basis.
One such argument has been made against Descartes's most explicit discussion of the subject of mind-body union, i.e. his correspondence with Henri de Roy or Henricus Regius. Rozemond, for instance, suggests that the letters to Regius, particularly those of December 1641 and January 1642, cannot be used as textual support for the hylomorphic account, because '[Descartes] is explicitly engaged in advising Regius about how to respond to his opponents . . . One may simply infer that Descartes's advice in this letter cannot be regarded as expressing his own views.'8 Rozemond, however, does not take this route but prefers to criticize these passages on other grounds. Her other criticisms will be addressed in their appropriate places. Here it is argued that Descartes is not merely advising his friend on how to handle his opponents. Instead, he is defending his philosophy against those who were attacking it based on Regius's incautious expression of it. Let us begin by placing these letters within their historical context. Regius was appointed to the Chair of Medicine at the University of Utrecht in 1638. After his appointment Henri Regneir or Henricus Reneri, who was a friend of both Regius and Descartes, exposed Regius to the Discourse on Method. Regius also saw the Meditations in manuscript and even provided some punctuation and spelling corrections as well as a few objections (AT III 63-6: CSMK 146-8). As a result, Regius was compelled by Descartes's natural philosophy and he became a disciple. In 1641 Regius engaged in two sets of disputations. His intent was to espouse his ideas on a Cartesian physics, which he had been teaching privately at the time. But the new rector, the theologian Gysbertus Voetius, with whom Regius initially had a good relationship but would later turn sour, decided that the Chair of Medicine should not openly encroach upon the domain of philosophy. So it was decided that Regius submit a series of medical disputations and present an outline of natural philosophy or physics as an introduction to theoretical medicine. These theses were published under the title Physiology or the Science of Health. What is important for present purposes is that this outline is decidedly Cartesian. He provides fairly detailed accounts of bodily function in terms of the 'disposition of parts' and claims that the soul is a thinking substance.9 The first disputation did not arouse much opposition. But another series of disputations was started on 24 November 1641 wherein Regius presented his views in a more compact way thereby losing the medical flavour of the previous theses. This more compact style also made his theses appear more aggressively anti-Aristotelian than the previous
Introduction
disputation, even though he had made no substantive changes. The final day of this disputation was 8 December 1641 and ended with a tumultuous uproar, which Descartes attributed to Voetius but others attributed to Regius.10 This second disputation gave rise to a great controversy due largely to Regius's claim that a human being is an ens per accidens, which seemed contrary to the orthodox view that it is an ens per se. Descartes's letters to Regius dated December 1641 and January 1642 address the theses of this second disputation and advise Regius on how best to defend against Voetius. A closer look at the correspondence with Regius in May 1641 and January and February 1642 will shed light on the extent to which Descartes considered himself to be defending his own philosophy. The first two letters of 1641 were written in May of that year, and therefore occur prior to the second disputation. But, they do shed some light on the issue at hand. In the first letter Descartes responds to Regius's claim that the soul has a threefold nature: Our entire dispute concerning the threefold nature of the soul is more verbal than real. In the first place, a Roman Catholic is not allowed to say that the soul in man is threefold, and I am afraid that people will impute to me the views expressed in your thesis. So I would prefer you to avoid this way of talking. (AT III 369: CSMK 181) In this letter, Descartes realizes that people will see Regius as a representative of his views. This is confirmed in the second letter of May 1641: I certainly cannot complain that you and M. de Raey have been so kind as to place my name at the head of your theses; but on the other hand I do not know how I can thank you for it. I see only that it means further work for me. For people will believe henceforth that my opinions are the same as yours, and so I shall be unable to extricate myself from having to defend your propositions as best I can. So I shall have to examine with extreme care what you sent me to read, for fear of letting something pass which I would not wish to defend. (AT III 371: CSMK 181) Descartes continues on to point out those aspects of Regius's theses about the soul with which he disagrees and to provide clarifications of his own views regarding sensation and growth in human beings. Since
Regius and de Raey put Descartes's name at the head of their theses (presumably for the first disputation), it is quite likely that people would see Regius as expressing Descartes's views. Indeed, Descartes is sure that this would happen and goes to some pains to make sure that Regius expresses his views correctly so that he is not forced to defend a position that is not his own. After the uproar of 8 December 1641 concluding the second disputation, Voetius and the theology faculty added three corollaries to a disputation already scheduled for 18 December. These corollaries were directed at Regius's controversial theses, although he was not mentioned by name. Descartes then proposed that Regius respond by publishing an open letter to Voetius. He proceeds to draft this letter 'in the form I would think it ought to take, were I in your position' in a letter dated January 1642 (AT III 494: CSMK 206). Descartes's and Regius's defence was successful according to Descartes's February 1642 letter to his disciple: As far as I hear from my friends, everyone who has read your reply to Voetius praises it highly and very many have read it. Everyone is laughing at Voetius and say he has lost hope for his cause, seeing that he has had to call on the assistance of the magistrates for its defense. As for substantial forms, everyone is denouncing them; and they are saying quite openly that if all the rest of our philosophy were explained in the manner of your reply, everyone would embrace it. (AT III 528-9: CSMK 210) Regius's reply was published on 16 February 1642 and is presumably the open letter originally drafted by Descartes in the January 1642 letter. Notice that Regius's reply had the desired effect in that people were embracing 'our philosophy'. Although Regius (directly) and Descartes (indirectly) were impugned for supposedly believing certain things about human beings, what must be borne firmly in mind is that Voetius is attacking Regius's incautiously stated Cartesian thesis that a human being is an ens per accidens. These considerations indicate that Descartes is not merely helping Regius get out of hot water but is defending his own views from attack. In fact, as will be seen below, Descartes makes the same response to what amounts to the same objection by Arnauld in the Fourth Objections. Therefore, the correspondence with Regius, including the January 1642 letter containing Descartes's draft of the open letter to Voetius, should be taken
Introduction
as expressing Descartes's considered view on mind-body union, since he is helping Regius respond to objections made against his (Descartes's) metaphysics.11 With this said, it is now time to discuss Descartes's definition of created substance.
NOTES
1 Vere Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien', in Jean-Marie Beyssade and Jean-Luc Marian (eds) Descartes: objecter et responder (Paris: Vrin, 1994), pp. 403-26. The terms Chappell uses are actually hard and soft dualism and hard and soft unitarianism.This latter term has been replaced with 'unionism' in order to avoid confusion between hard unitarianism (i.e. unionism) and scholastic unitarianism as opposed to scholastic pluralism, which figures prominently in chapters 1 and 5. 2 See Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien'; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Stephen Voss, 'Descartes: the end of anthropology', in John Cottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism? The nature of the union of mind and body', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 199-217 for explicit arguments for the hard dualism/soft unionism position. 3 See Janet Broughton and Ruth Mattern, 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 23-32; Marjorie Grene, Descartes Among the Scholastics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991); Paul Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', The Philiosophical Review 95 (1986): 339-69 and 'Cartesian composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 251-70; R. C. Richardson, 'The "scandal" of cartesian interactionism', Mind 91 (1982): 20-37; Tad Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mind-body union', Philosophical Review (April 1992): 281-325 for those arguing for some variety of this thesis. 4 Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le Role de al Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien (Paris: Vrin, 1951), p. 247. 5 Henri Gouhier, Le Pensee Metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1962), p. 351. 6 Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism?', pp. 210-11. 7 This is not to deny that Descartes chose his words carefully and employed certain rhetorical techniques to get people to see things his way without levelling an out-and-out attack on Aristotelian principles of scientific explanation. As such, his texts should be read carefully but not read into to such an extent that the terms used, e.g. 'substantial union', lose their meanings entirely. 8 Chappell maintains a similar position. See Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien', p. 411.
10
9 Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy
1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 13-14. 10 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, pp. 16-17 11 It is noteworthy that Desmond Clarke assumes Descartes's sincerity in these letters and uses them in support of his account of the rejection of substantial forms as principles of scientific explanation. See Desmond Clarke, Descartes's Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), especially chapter 1. Hoffman also defends these letters as textual support for the hylomorphic account of mind-body union. He points out that Descartes offers the exact same solution to Arnauld in the Fourth Replies. As such Descartes is not making things up to defend Regius but is expressing a view published as his own. Paul Hoffman, 'Cartesian composites', p. 261.
CHAPTER I
Substance and Mode
Any examination of Descartes's theory of mind-body union should begin with a clear understanding of some of his basic metaphysical commitments. One such commitment is his substance-mode ontology. Yet, despite the importance of understanding this ontology, it has received very little attention in the literature. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed examination of Descartes's conceptions of substance, mode and the senses in which each is ontologically independent or dependent. Once these issues are firmly grasped, they can be used to clarify other aspects of his metaphysics of body and his doctrine of human nature. The chapter begins with a discussion of the pertinent aspects of the scholastic conceptions of substance and accident, and then moves on to establish Descartes's definition of substance as an ultimate determinable and his account of a mode as a determinate way or manner of being.
1.1 SCHOLASTIC SUBSTANCE The late scholastic philosophy Descartes confronted at the beginning of the seventeenth century has its origins in Thomas Aquinas' interpretation and appropriation of Aristotle's thought. Fundamental to Aristotle's metaphysics (at least as Aquinas understood him) is the doctrine of matter and form which, in turn, were unpacked by means of the distinction between potency and act. Matter is the stuff out of which something is made, while the form of that matter or stuff is what makes that thing the kind of thing that it is. Take for example a marble statue of Plato. The marble is the matter out of which the statue is made. Now before it is a statue of anything and merely a hunk of marble, it has the potential for being any number of things, e.g. a statue of a horse, an altar, a table, etc. The artisan takes this hunk of marble with its vast potential and then
12
bestows on it the form of Plato. In so doing, the artisan actualizes the potential in the marble for having the form of Plato and for thereby being a statue of Plato. So, matter is the potency for being something and the form is what actualizes this potential. It is also important to note that basically there are two kinds of form. One is the form that actualizes the potential in matter for being a selfsubsisting species of thing, e.g. a tree, a dog, or a human being. By Descartes's time this sort of form was known as a 'substantial form'. The union of a substantial form with matter results in a substance with a complete nature within a given species. The other kind of form is the accidental form. This form actualizes a potential in a substance for having some feature. For example, Socrates is a substance composed of matter and the substantial form of human being, i.e. the intellectual soul. This substance has the potential for taking on certain accidents, e.g. sitting or standing. The forms of sitting and standing are accidental to the substance, Socrates, because they are not part of his nature or essence (i.e. what it is to be human). That is, Socrates is still a human being whether he has the form of sitting or the form of standing. Although some deep divisions arose among later scholastic thinkers about how this metaphysics of substance worked, the basic notions of substance and accident, form and matter, and act and potency were the foundations of scholastic metaphysics from Aquinas onward. However, despite these differences, all scholastic philosophers maintained the following three suppositions about substances and accidents. First, substances are subsistent per se; that is, unlike accidents, substances do not reside or inhere in some other thing as in a subject. Second, substances are also per se unities of a substantial form with matter, which together compose one, whole substantial nature within a given species and not a mere aggregate of such substantial natures like a pile of stones or a house. Third, accidental properties that can change without a change in the substance itself require inherence in some substantial nature, and therefore such accidents presuppose a substantial nature with the capacity for having that kind of accident. Each of these suppositions will be addressed in turn. Aquinas and those medieval philosophers coming after him all maintained that a substance is primarily something existing per se, i.e. through or by itself, such that it does not require any other being besides itself in order to exist. This does not mean that created substances are not causally dependent on God or even other creatures for their existence, but only that their natures do not contain any reference to some other
Substance and Mode
13
thing as is the case with accidents. This characterization is found in the following passage from Aquinas' Summa Theologicae: Now being belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they be simple, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being - that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being because its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly said to be of a being than a being.1 In this passage, Aquinas is contrasting the ontological independence of substances with the sort of ontological dependence had by accidents: an accident does not subsist by its own being but exists by virtue of being of
a being.
Although Aquinas indicates that accidents are not subsistent beings, he does not specify the sort of ontological dependence required by them. Eustachius of St Paul, a scholastic contemporary of Descartes's, provides the following definition of substance, which he contrasts with the notion of an accident: Substance in general can be defined: A being subsisting or existing through itself . . . But nothing [is] in another and subsists or exists through itself which does not exist in another as though inhering in a subject; according to which a substance differs from an accident which is not able to exist through itself (per se) but in another . . .2 On this account, accidents are not self-subsistent, because their natures require some other being in order to exist such that they exist in alio or in another in that they ultimately inhere in a substance as in a subject. Therefore, non-inherence in some other thing is the kind of ontological independence required for something to be a scholastic substance. However, it is also important to note that, although self-subsistence is a necessary condition for being a substance, this by itself is not sufficient. The further requirement of being the result of a per se unity of a substantial form with matter is the subject of the next section.
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1.2 SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND PER SE UNITY Again, despite some differences in the details, all scholastic philosophers agreed to the following two theses. First, a complete substantial nature is a combination of a substantial form with matter. These were considered complementary parts such that matter is the potentiality for being a specific kind of thing, while the substantial form is the principle by which that potentiality is actualized. Second, matter must be actualized by at least one substantial form in order to be a composite substance and, as a result, to have the potential for receiving certain kinds of accidents. These two somewhat vague theses are fleshed out in this and the following section. Traditionally, a substantial form was defined as a form that gives being to a thing. However, Francisco Suarez, another one of Descartes's near contemporaries,3 considered this formulation too vague and proposed his own: 'a certain simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a composite substance'.4 This essence is ultimately established by that form's final cause, i.e. purpose or goal of being a species of thing. Aristotle provides the following example: If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit, and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. And since 'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'.5 According to this passage, the form establishes the end of a species of substance. In the case of organisms, the end is the maintenance of life or some other goal characteristic of that species of organism. For instance, the goal of a swallow is to maintain its swallow-life and a characteristic goal of the swallow-life is making a nest. So, the goal of a swallow-life is the cause for the sake of which the rest of the organism is organized. Hence, this goal determines the configuration of matter so that it has certain parts of a certain size and shape, which bear certain causal relations with one another that are conducive to achieving its goal of being a species of thing, viz a swallow. As a result, the swallow insofar as
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it is a species of thing has its own set of capabilities. For example, swallows are capable of making nests, flight, etc. So, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose bestowed on a thing by its substantial form is the ultimate cause of everything that species of thing essentially is. Another point of agreement among scholastic thinkers was that complete substantial natures must have per se unity. Since this issue is also of vital importance for understanding Descartes's theory of mind-body union, an examination of Suarez's account of this sort of unity will prove helpful. According to Suarez, a substantial nature has per se unity when it is complete in a given species. These specifically complete substantial natures can be either simple or composite. For instance, angels have simple natures since they are not composed of form and matter but of form alone, and as such they do not require anything else to complete their natures. Substantial natures that are composite are complete when the requisite combination of form and matter obtains such that nothing else is required for that thing to be that species of thing.6 Suarez explains further that the word 'unity' just means 'lack of division'. This forms the basis of a criterion for determining whether or not something is a complete nature and, therefore, has per se unity: And this is both confirmed and emphasized; for, if the nature has of itself the negation of division, then division will be incompatible with it, because that which belongs to a nature from itself is inseparable from it, and its contradictory is thereby rendered always incompatible . . .7 The inseparability of a feature from the nature of the thing marks the 'lack of division' characteristic of a complete nature, because if this feature were separated, a contradiction would result. So, it is important to bear in mind that the per se unity of a scholastic substance is required for something to be a complete kind or species of thing. The considerations of this and the previous section indicate two necessary conditions for being a scholastic substance. The first requirement is self-subsistence. This means that all substances are capable of existing without inhering in some other thing as is the case with accidents. But, something could self-subsist but not, strictly speaking, be a substance, viz the human soul, and so another requirement is needed. This second requirement is per se unity. In the case of terrestrial things, this means a union of a substantial form with matter so as to form a complete species of thing. So, on Aquinas' account, the human soul selfsubsists but is not a complete nature, because it does not constitute the
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entire human nature but only the active part of it. A complete human nature or substance is composed of the per se unity of the intellectual soul with matter. Although all scholastic thinkers accepted these two requirements, the conditions necessary for having this per se unity of form with matter was a bone of contention between them. Aquinas argued that the per se unity of a substance can be preserved only if one substantial form is united directly with prime matter, which is pure potentiality, so that all of a substance's actuality is received from this one substantial form. Aquinas, as well as others maintaining a similar position, e.g. Suarez, argued that a being composed of matter and more than one substantial form cannot possess per se unity but can be united only per accidens. This is because such an aggregate of particular substantial natures would not be unified for the sake of one and the same specific end, but rather for the sake of a plurality of ends. For example, each particular stone of a pile of stones has the same specific end in the sense that each particular stone is the same species of thing such that the matter of each is organized for the sake of being a stone. But, each stone does not share the same end in the sense that each is a particular instantiation of this specific kind of thing. Hence, a pile of stones is a plurality of particular instantiations of specific ends but are not subordinated to some higher end for the sake of which the whole pile is organized and thereby united to form one thing. Since there is no one, ultimate end for the pile of stones, it does not have per se unity or being, and therefore it is not a scholastic substance. Accordingly, on Aquinas' account, a being composed of more than one substantial form would be a mere aggregate of a plurality of unified ends without an ultimate end unifying the whole into one single thing. Many of Aquinas' successors took issue with this Unitarian line of argument. Perhaps the most famous of these detractors is Duns Scotus.8 He argued that all living terrestrial substances are composed of two substantial forms and matter. While Aquinas argued that a function of this one substantial form is to quantify and organize matter into the species of body required for being a specific substantial nature, Scotus argued that a different substantial form, viz the form of corporeity, performs this function. He does this by making a distinction between complete and incomplete substances. On this account, the form of corporeity makes a body the kind of body that it is, conferring on it the potentiality (or disposition) to receive a specific substantial form.9 For example, a form of corporeity actualizes the potential in matter for being a cow body which, in turn, now has the potential for being a living, sensing cow. The
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substantial form of bovinity then actualizes this potential for bovine-life in this properly disposed cow body. Accordingly, the entire being, including the cow body, is organized for the sake of the ultimate end of bovine life. Hence, on this pluralist account, a substantial nature can have a plurality of substantial forms and still have per se unity so long as the entire being is united for the sake of one, ultimate end. This brief exposition of some of the fundamental features of scholastic substance is important for understanding Descartes's substancemode metaphysics in general and his theory of mind-body union in particular for two reasons. First, the similarities and differences between the scholastic conception of substance and Descartes's definition of it will be made more evident. Indeed, Descartes's rejection of final causes in physics, discussed more fully in 3.4, amounts to rejecting the per se unifying principle so important for the scholastic metaphysics. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that Descartes's definition of substance focuses quite heavily on the self-subsistence condition. Second, it will help provide a richer and more detailed understanding of Descartes's conception of a complete substantial nature with respect to both the principal attributes of thinking and extension as well as the nature of a human being discussed in subsequent chapters. But, before moving on to examine Descartes's definition of substance, a brief account of accidental forms within the scholastic tradition is in order.
1.3 ACCIDENTS Accidental forms, unlike substantial forms, do not complete a substantial nature but require a substantial nature in order to exist. In this way, the primary difference between scholastic substantial natures and accidents lies in the inherence of the latter in a subject and the noninherence of the former. This implies that generally accidents are ontologically dependent on some underlying substance or substratum and, therefore, accidents are not self-subsistent beings. Furthermore, this means that accidents are logically and metaphysically posterior to complete substantial natures, and so it is not internal to a substantial nature but exterior to it. So, something exterior to some substantial nature can come and go (with the exception of propria to be discussed below) without corrupting that nature. For example, Socrates may accidentally have hair at one time in his life and no hair at some later time. Yet, Socrates is still Socrates whether or not he has hair. Hence, this
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particular substantial thing, Socrates, preserves its identity over time throughout such a change, because having or not having hair is external, or accidental, and not internal or essential to that substantial nature. This brief discussion of accidental forms brings to the fore a substance's role as the ultimate subject in which accidents inhere. In the following passage, Suarez indicates that this role for substances is a result of their self-subsistent nature: 'to be under' (substare) is the same as to be under others as their support and foundation . . . According to this interpretation, there are two notions or properties indicated by the verb 'standing under' (substans) and the name 'substance' (substantia). One is absolute, namely, to exist in itself and by itself (per se), something which, owing to its simplicity, we explain as the negation of existing in a subject; the other is relative, it has to do with supporting the accidents.10 According to this passage, absolutely speaking a substance is a selfsubsisting thing, because it does not require inherence in anything else to exist and is the subject of accidents only in a relative sense when spoken of with reference to accidents. Accordingly, substances are primarily selfsubsisting beings with complete substantial natures and only secondarily are they the subjects of accidents. But, accidents must inhere in some other thing (in alid) in order to exist and, therefore, their existence is not through themselves (per se) but through another (per alid). Now an accident's ontological dependence in alio can have at least two different causes: one cause is that of an extrinsic agent while the other is the activity of the substantial nature in which it inheres: [A]ctuality is found in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being found in the accidental form; and therefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So, the subject, inasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form; but inasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only; and such an accident is caused by an extrinsic agent.11 The first sentence reiterates the claim made in 1.1 that accidents require a substantial form united per se with matter in order to exist. That is, the absolute actuality bestowed upon a thing in completing its specific and
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complete substantial nature by a substantial form is logically and sometimes temporally prior to its further, albeit limited, actualization by an accidental form. In this way, the actuality or existence of the accident is explained by this substantial actuality, for an actual subject in which to inhere is required for the existence of the accident. The second sentence indicates that the subject is the cause of all its accidents in at least two ways. First, the subject has that accident potentially and so it is the material cause of all its accidents. Second, some accidents are caused by their subject insofar as that subject is active. This activity is internal to that substantial nature and results in the production of the proper and per se accidents or propria, and so they are not caused by some extrinsic agent. There are several features of these propria or properties that are germane to this study. First, these propria were understood to be capacities or dispositions for having certain kinds of accidents that were entailed by that kind of substantial nature but were not considered to be internal parts of that nature. For example, risibility is an accident entailed by the substantial nature of human being without being internal to that nature. That is, the ability to laugh is not part of the real definition or essence of a human being but results from it in that every human being has the capacity to laugh. Accidentia propria or proper accidents are actualizations, instantiations or determinations of a substantial nature's propria. For instance, actually laughing is an actualization of the capacity or potential for laughter (i.e. the proprium of risibility). This brief discussion of the scholastic doctrine of accidents and propria will become especially important in Chapters 4 and 6 where ascribing accidents (i.e. modes) to their appropriate substantial natures will be imperative for understanding Descartes's theory of mind-body union. But first it is important to come to a clear understanding of Descartes's own substance-mode ontology.
1.4 CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE AND SUBJECT Commentators generally maintain that Descartes offered at least two different definitions of substance. One is found in the Second Replies where 'substance' is defined as the subject in which resides all that we perceive (i.e. properties, qualities or attributes). The other is found at Principles 1.51. Here Descartes claims that a substance is something depending on nothing else for its existence. Strictly speaking, only God
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is a substance in this sense, but creatures requiring only God's concurrence to exist are substances in a qualified sense. Peter Markie stands apart from other scholars by offering a third definition found in the Synopsis to the Meditations where Descartes talks about 'pure substances'.12 The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the definitions of substance apparently offered in the Second Replies and the Principles in order to bring important elements of Descartes's substance-mode ontology into clearer focus and set the stage for further considerations of his theory of mindbody union. A discussion of Markie's proposed third definition will be saved for Chapter 3, since the Synopsis passage on which this claim is based is also central to the issue about whether or not particular bodies are substances. In the geometrical exposition of the Second Replies, Descartes lists several definitions, the fifth of which is: Substance: This term applies to every thing in which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject, or to everything by means of which whatever we perceive exists. By 'whatever we perceive' is meant any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea. The only idea we have of substance itself, in the strict sense, is that it is the thing in which we perceive (or whatever has objective being in one of our ideas) exists, either formally or eminently. For we know by the natural light that a real attribute cannot belong to nothing. (AT VII 161: CSM II 114) There are two features of this passage germane to the present discussion. First, Descartes defines substance as the subject in which whatever we perceive, viz properties, qualities or attributes, resides. This raises a question about the nature of this subject: Is it a bare particular or a concrete individual thing? On the bare particular reading, a substance would be a featureless substratum in itself but would have the capacity for taking on a variety of different features. That is, it would actually be no thing at all but would potentially be any thing whatsoever. On this account, a concrete individual would be constituted by a bare particular and the properties, qualities or attributes residing in it. On the concrete individual reading, these properties would reside in discrete things, such as particular minds or particular bodies. On this account, such properties reside in something constituted by some set of features, e.g. a principal attribute. Louis Loeb understands Descartes as endorsing some version of the bare particular or bare substratum view and proceeds to criticize it
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through some of the objections raised against this theory by John Locke.13 However, other scholars, such as Peter Markie, Marleen Rozemond and Matthew Stuart, have offered compelling grounds for rejecting any bare particular account of Descartes's theory of substance.14 A detailed rehearsal of these arguments would lead us too far afield, but suffice it to say that Descartes is quite clear that all properties, qualities or attributes presuppose some nature or essence. In the case of mind and body these are the principal attributes of thinking and extension {Principles 1.53, ATVIIIA 25: CSM I 210. See also AT VIIIA 30-1: CSM I 215). Descartes also claims in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet that extension is the subject of modes or modifications such as shape and that the modes of thinking are present in thinking things (ATVIIIB 348-9: CSM I 297-8).This indicates that individual extended and thinking things are metaphysical preconditions for the existence of their properties, qualities, or other attributes, for otherwise there would be no subject in which they could reside as mentioned in the discussion of the scholastic conception of accidents at 1.3. The second feature of the Second Replies account germane to this discussion is the remark that there is no idea of substance itself but only ideas of those things of which we have a real idea. Here Descartes is explicit in limiting this perception to whatever is found in the objective reality of a 'real idea'. Descartes is not explicit about his meaning of this term but, presumably, he means to distinguish those properties, qualities or attributes that are really found in perceived things from those that are found in the mind alone, e.g. colour, taste. This veridical perception of a property, quality or attribute, in addition to the principle that a 'real attribute cannot belong to nothing' and, therefore, must belong to something, permits the inference from a perceivable attribute really in the thing itself to a subject of residence. So, it is important to bear in mind that Descartes's language of ideas is not intended to suggest that these properties, qualities or attributes are mere products of the mind, but rather they are found in things themselves. Hence, properties, qualities and attributes have real ontological dependence on real, concrete individual things. Bearing this conclusion in mind, an examination of this notion of substance can now be pursued. It is important first to notice that the definitive nature of this 'definition' should be taken with a grain of salt. This account of substance is listed as a definition in a short geometrical exposition of the Meditations^ which was composed in response to a suggestion made at the end of the Second Objections. The suggestion was
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made in order to give Descartes the opportunity 'to fill the mind of each reader so that he could see everything, as it were, at a single glance' (AT VII 128: CSM II 92). Descartes first responds by explaining the extent to which the Meditations already followed this method by first distinguishing between the order and method of demonstration. The Meditations follows a geometrical order in that '[t]he items which are put forward first must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before' (AT VII 155: CSM II 110). The main difference between the Meditations and the geometrical exposition is that the former uses the method of analysis by leading the reader along the path of discovery, while the latter uses the synthetic method, which starts with a set of definitions, axioms and postulates from which the desired conclusions are derived. Descartes goes on to explain that, on the one hand, analytic demonstration requires close attention from the reader, and so people overly disposed to finding counter-arguments may miss the minute details and, therefore, not fully understand the necessity of the conclusions. On the other hand, synthetic demonstration is much easier to follow since any doubt can be put to rest by a quick look at the stipulated definitions, axioms and postulates (AT VII 156: CSM II 110-11). But, even though synthetic demonstrations work quite well in geometry where everyone agrees to the common notions, it does not work so well when demonstrating metaphysical truths due to the amount of effort it takes to formulate them clearly and distinctly. As such, if put forward in isolation, these common notions, although even more evident than those of geometry by those who attend to them, would be easily denied by those who like to contradict for the sake of it (AT VII 157: CSM II 111). Descartes then decides to 'append here a short exposition in the synthetic style, which will, I hope, assist my readers a little' but with the following caveat: But they [i.e. Descartes's readers] must please realize that I do not intend to include as much material as I put in the Meditations, for if I did so I should have to go on much longer than I did there. And even the items that I do include will not be given a fully precise explanation. This is partly to achieve brevity and partly to prevent anyone supposing that what follows is adequate on its own. (AT VII 159: CSM II 113)
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So the geometrical exposition of the Second Replies, including its definitions, axioms and postulates, should not be expected to be complete or wholly precise given the nature of employing synthetic demonstration in metaphysics and Descartes's explicit disavowal that it is a precise or adequate explication of the Meditations. Hence, it should come as no surprise if the Second Replies 'definition' of substance turns out not to be definitive. Indeed, upon closer examination, being the subject in which properties, qualities or attributes reside is not sufficient for being a substance for Descartes and so this account cannot be definitive. A counterexample is found in an April 1641 letter to Thomas Hobbes. There Descartes claims that the direction or 'determination' of motion resides in the accident (i.e. property, quality or attribute) of motion itself, '[fjor there is no awkwardness or absurdity in saying that an accident is the subject of another accident just as we say quantity is the subject of other accidents' (AT III 355-6: CSMK 178). Hence, being the subject in which properties, qualities or attributes reside is not sufficient for being a substance, because this subject could itself be a property, quality or attribute requiring residence in some other subject.15 As a result, this definition would not adequately distinguish substances from the properties, qualities or attributes residing in them, and therefore it is not definitive. This, however, is not to say that being the subject of accidents is wholly superfluous to being a Cartesian substance. In fact, a closer look at the ontological dependence of these properties, qualities or attributes on an underlying substance will help shed more light on this issue.
1.5 THE MODE-SUBSTANCE RELATION Although the Second Replies 'definition' of substance is not really definitive, it expresses a central component of Descartes's fundamental ontology, namely, that these properties, qualities or attributes bear a relation of 'residence' in some underlying subject. But how should the relation of 'residence' be unpacked? Answering this question will help bring into clearer focus the sort of ontological dependence and independence necessary for adequately distinguishing substances from modes in his truly definitive account of substance at Principles 1.51. But before discussing the relation itself, it is important to get clear on what Descartes means by the words 'property', 'quality' and 'attribute' in this context.
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Help can be found in Descartes's description of the ambiguity of the

word 'attribute' in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet:
We must take care here not to understand the word 'attribute' to mean simply 'mode', for we term an 'attribute' whatever we recognize as being naturally ascribable to something, whether it be a mode which is susceptible of change, or the absolutely immutable essence of the thing in question. Thus God has many attributes, but no modes . . . The extension of a body, moreover, may take on various different modes: a body's being spherical constitutes one mode, being square a different mode. But considered in itself, the extension itself - the subject of these modes - is not a mode of the corporeal substance, but an attribute which constitutes its natural essence. (ATVIIIB 348-9: CSM I 297) According to this passage, 'attribute' is ambiguous between an unchangeable, essential property in which modes reside and a changeable mode or modification residing in this essential property or attribute. This latter sense of'attribute' will be discussed in more detail in 2.4. But now it is important to ask: What sense of'attribute' is Descartes using in the Second Replies account of substance? The answer can be found with further help from Principles 1.56 where Descartes exhibits the strict senses of'mode', 'quality' and 'attribute': By mode, as used above, we understand exactly the same as what is elsewhere meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we are thinking of a substance as being affected or modified. (ATVIIIA 26: CSM I 211-12) In the first sentence, Descartes is explicit that 'attribute' and 'quality' can also be used in the sense of 'mode', which is described in the second sentence as an affection or modification of a substance. These passages, as well as the use of these terms in the Second Replies, indicate that 'attribute' and 'quality' are synonymous with 'mode' in the context of the geometrical exposition. Moreover, since 'property' is also in this list of what resides in a subject, it is reasonable to suppose that it, too, is being used in this way. So, the residence relation of a property, quality or attribute in a substance should be understood along the lines of the relation of an affection or modification of an essential attribute.
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Further guidance can be found in the meaning of the term itself. Daniel Garber has made the observation that the Latin term modus, which just means 'way' or 'manner', suggests that a mode is nothing but a way or manner of being.16 This suggestion is corroborated in a 1645 letter to Mesland where Descartes states that a body's surface is nothing but a 'mode or manner of being' (AT IV 163-4: CSMK 241). Moreover, at Principles 1.64, Descartes claims that the principal attributes of extension and thinking can, in some sense, be recognized as modes of a substance 'insofar as one and the same mind is capable of having many different thoughts, and one and the same body, with its quantity unchanged, may be extended in many different ways (modis)' (AT VIIIA 31: CSM I 215). These considerations indicate that modes are ways or manners of being something. Garber also suggests that these different ways or modes of being are either propria or accidentia propria. For example, the capacity for having size would be a proprium of extension, because it is a deductive consequence of this kind of thing; and actually have the size 100 x 80 x 60 cm would be an accidentium proprium, because it is a particular determination or actualization of this capacity. Moreover, the capacity for understanding, for example, is not a consequence of being extended but only of being a thinking thing, and so understanding is only a way or mode of being a mental kind of thing. Similarly, thinking things do not have the capacity for modes of size. Hence, these two ultimate kinds of things or substances entail a set of capacities for having certain kinds of modes, and as such these entailed capacities are the propria for that kind of substance. This account of modes as ways or manners of being brings to the foreground the sort of ontological dependence they have on the substances in which they reside. At Principles 1.61, Descartes says that a distinction between a mode and its substance 'can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance' (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 214). This means that modes ontologically depend on an underlying substance such that it is inconceivable for them to exist independently of a substance even by the power of God. This notion of a 'mode' should then be contrasted with the late scholastic doctrine of 'real accidents'. These are accidents that can exist without an underlying substance at least by the power of God. It was invoked by scholastic thinkers in order to explain the miracle of the Eucharist. The point is that certain accidents of the bread, e.g. its colour, remain even though the bread's substance has been replaced by
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the body of Christ. Although Descartes provides his own account of the Eucharist after being pressed by Father Mesland, this is not important for present purposes but only that modes, unlike real accidents, cannot exist separately from an underlying substance. Cartesian accidents, then, are just modes or ways of being something. For example, some shape cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without extension, because the notion of a non-extended shape is unintelligible. But extension can be clearly and distinctly understood without any particular shape. For example, this hunk of clay exists regardless of whether it is shaped in a spherical, cubical, cylindrical or any other way. As such, shape is just a way or manner of being extended. Similar considerations apply to thinking and the modes of thought. For instance, the idea that 2 + 2 = 4 cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without thinking, because an idea that is not a thought is unintelligible. But thinking can be clearly and distinctly understood without any particular idea. That is, it need not have the idea that 2 + 2 = 4 in order to exist but may have any number of different, particular ideas. This means that particular modes are just determinate ways of being extended or thinking while extension and thinking themselves are determinable (i.e. have the capacity for being determined) in these multifarious ways. For example, a particular shape, such as spherical, requires something that can be shaped in that way and, in turn, being shaped just is a determinate way of being extended. On this account, spherical is a determinate of the determinable shape, and shape is a determinate of the determinable extension. But extension is not a determinate of another determinable, since it depends on God alone for its existence (AT VIIIA 25: CSM I 210) and God does not admit of any modification (AT VIIIA 26: CSM I 211 and ATVIIIB 348: CSM I 297). Thus extension is what Jorge Secada calls an 'ultimate determinable', i.e. a determinable that does not determine a higher order determinable.17 Of course, a similar story can be told about the modes of thinking. For example, a determinate idea, such as the understanding that 2 + 2 = 4, is a determinate way of understanding and, in turn, understanding is a determinate way of thinking. But thinking requires only God's concurrence to exist and so it does not determine a higher order determinable. Therefore, thinking is also an ultimate determinable. Bearing these considerations in mind, it is now time to turn to the Principles account of substance.
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1.6 CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE AND SELF-SUBSISTENCE Descartes describes substance in the following way at Principles 1.51: By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God's concurrence. (ATVIIIA 24: CSM I 210) Notice that, strictly speaking, only God is a substance, because only he subsists without requiring anything else at all. This, however, is not true for creatures, for everything requires God's creative and conservative activity in order to exist. But, 'substance' can be applied in a qualified sense to those creatures requiring only God's concurrence to exist. This implies that created substances, although ontologically dependent on God, are not ontologically dependent on any other creature. However, this ontological independence from other creatures should not be understood as being absolute. Indeed, the wording of the passage itself leaves room for created substances to be ontologically dependent in at least two
1 Q
ways. The first is that this ontological independence is limited to depending on no other thing (nulla alia re) for its existence. As such, an internal dependence on a thing's own nature does not exclude it from the category of substance. For example, God's dependence on his attributes does not mean he is not a substance, but rather his ontological independence stems from his not depending on anything external to his nature in order to exist. This applies to created substances in that they depend on God for their existence but not on any other created thing. For instance Joe's ontological dependence on thinking would not mean that Joe (or Joe's mind) is not a substance since this is a dependence that is internal and not external to his nature. Second, it is evident from everyday experience that some creatures are (at least partially) ontologically dependent on other creatures for their existence, if we take Descartes's avowed concurrentism seriously. For example, some things need parents, food, water, etc. in order to exist.19 But actually depending on other creatures to exist does not disqualify a creature from the category of substance so long as its existence can be clearly and distinctly understood such that we know God could have created that thing alone
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without anything else. On this account, the ontological independence enjoyed by created substances is rooted in the possibility of existing without any other created thing (see Principles 1.60, AT VIIIA 28-9: CSM I 213).20 But what sort of ontological independence is this? Louis Loeb, for instance, has claimed that the relevant sort of ontological independence is causal independence from any other creature besides God.21 But, before moving on to evaluate this claim, it is important to be clear about the sense of 'cause' operative in his formulation. Loeb is explicit about this issue when he claims that ' [m] ost (familiar) causal relations obtain between objects, events, or states which are not simultaneous'.22 He then goes on to claim that a substance's ontological independence is causal but a mode's dependence on its underlying substance is non-causal. The characterization of the modesubstance relation as non-causal is not wholly accurate since it neglects the distinction between the four Aristotelian causes accepted not just in the schools but more generally at Descartes's time, viz efficient, final, formal and material. Although this is not the place for a detailed explication of the Aristotelian taxonomy of causation and causal explanation, a brief remark about efficient and material causes is in order. Notice that Loeb is conceiving causation as nothing but an efficient causal relation wherein one object or event brings about the existence of another object or event. For example, one moving billiard ball striking a second billiard ball brings about the existence of motion in the second billiard ball. Surely Loeb is correct in noticing that this is not the sort of relation obtaining in the mode-substance relation, but this is not to say that there is not a causal relation in one of the other three Aristotelian senses of the term. Descartes and his contemporaries would not have maintained there is no causal relation between a mode and its underlying substance. As discussed in 1.5, a mode would be at least materially causally dependent on an underlying substance in that the potential for having that kind of mode plays a part in the explanation of why that thing has that mode. So, such a relation would not be 'non-causal' in this sense. As such, Loeb's distinction between the causal independence of substances and the non-causal dependence of modes is not an accurate description of these respective relations. Based on these considerations, any evaluation of Loeb's causal independence account of a substance's ontological independence should focus on efficient causal independence. Loeb argues that a created substance qua ontologically independent thing is by definition not efficiently causally dependent on any other substance qua subject. This is
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quite puzzling given his earlier account of a mode's dependence on a substance as non-efficiently causal. Since he unpacks ontological independence as efficient causal independence, modes are not causally dependent on substances, and so they, too, would be causally independent things or substances on this account. It is important to note that Loeb changes his formulation from being causally independent from another substance qua subject to causal independence from any other entity except God. However, he does this for reasons other than those raised here.23 Loeb's efficient causal account of the ontological independence of created substances described at Principles 1.51 yields the following formulation: x is a created substance if and only if it is possible for x to exist efficiently causally dependent on God alone but efficiently causally independent from any other creature. In other words, there is some possible world in which that creature exists without efficiently causally depending on any other creature. But, as Markie discovered, efficient causal independence from other creatures alone is not sufficient for being a substance. For example, an individual mind can be clearly and distinctly understood to exist without any other individual mind and without any body whatsoever (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 213). So, God has the power to create a possible world with a particular finite mind as its only existent. Moreover, since this mind must have some determinate thought in order to be thinking and, therefore, continue to exist, it has some mode of thinking. Now, if efficient causal independence from creatures was sufficient, not only the mind but also its mode would be a substance, because the mode would not efficiently causally depend on anything except God, including the mind it determines, because this is not an efficient causal relation. Hence, efficient causal independence alone is not sufficient for being a substance, since modes would also be substances on this account.24 This implies that some other sort of ontological independence is necessary for distinguishing substances from modes. Indeed, Descartes is very interested in sharply distinguishing these two fundamental pieces of his ontology. In fact, he draws a contrast between substances and modes in at least two places in order to explicate his conception of substance. For instance, in an addition to the French edition of the Principles, Descartes makes the following clarification: In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they cannot exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary
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concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the latter 'substances' and the former 'qualities' or 'attributes' of those substances. (ATVIIIA 24: CSM I 210) Presumably the terms 'qualities' and 'attributes' are being used in the same sense as in the Second Replies to mean 'mode'. Descartes makes the same contrast in a 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes, 'We mean only that [substance] is the kind of thing that can exist without any other created thing, and this is something that cannot be said about the modes of things' (AT III 429: CSMK 193-4). Based on these passages, substances are not ontologically dependent on other creatures in the way that modes are dependent. This implies that created substances are ontologically independent in that they do not reside in some other thing as in a subject. That is, they do not determine a higher order determinable, which means they just are ultimate determinables.25 The distinction between a determinate and an ultimate determinable permits a clear demarcation between mode and substance for Descartes. To illustrate this point let us return to that possible world with the one finite mind and its mode as the only existents. On the one hand, the determinate thought is not a substance because, although it can exist depending efficiently causally on God alone, it is a determinate way of thinking, and so ontologically depends on something capable of being determined in that way, viz a mind. On the other hand, the mind can exist while efficiently causally relying only on God's concurrence alone but without determining him, since God is incapable of any modification. That is, thinking does not determine a higher order determinable and is, therefore, an ultimate determinable. Hence, the relevant sort of ontological independence and dependence needed to clearly distinguish substances from modes is that of a determinated dependence on its determinable and an ultimate determinable's freedom from determining any other thing.
1.7 DESCARTES'S DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE The previous sections have laid the groundwork for understanding Descartes's considered definition of substance. First, in 1.4 it was shown that the Second Replies 'definition' is not really definitive given the limited nature of the geometrical exposition in which it appears and the counterexample of accidents or modes residing in other accidents in the 1641
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letter for Hobbes. 1.5 elaborated on the kind of ontological dependence modes have on substances by means of the determinate-determinable relation. Then 1.6 showed how the relation of determining a determinable and not determining a higher order determinable can be used to clearly distinguish substances from modes. The purpose of this section is to establish that self-subsistence, in the sense of being an ultimate determinable, is Descartes's one and only definition of substance. This conclusion can be established through a closer look at the contrast drawn between substance and accident commonly made at Descartes's time as well as how Descartes puts the notion of self-subsistence to work in arguing against the existence of incomplete substances and real accidents. Descartes also uses the language of self-subsistence in discussing the qualified sense in which some creatures are substances in the 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes cited above: 'This does not mean that they should not be called substance, because when we call created substance selfsubsistent (per se subsistat) we do not rule out the divine concurrence which it needs in order to subsist (subsistendum)' (AT III 429: CSMK 193). The same equivalence made between subsisting and not inhering in a subject is found not only in Eustachius' textbook cited above in 1.1, but also in some of the philosophical lexicons of the time. For instance, in the Lexicon Philosophicum of Rudolph Goclenius first published in 1613, 'subsistere' is defined as 'what is subsisting being, not being in a subject of inherence'. Another example is found in the Lexicon Philosophicum: Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum of Johannes Micraelius first published in 1662, 'Subsistence (Subsistere) signifies what has complete being through itself (per se) [and] not as an accident inhering in a subject, or as parts bound to a whole.'26 He then defines substance by means of self-subsistence: 'Substance is a being subsisting through itself (per se).' This definition, as well as Eustachius', indicates that defining substance as self-subsisting being was not an uncommon practice around Descartes's time. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that Descartes defines substance in this way as well. Moreover, Descartes's arguments against incomplete substances and real accidents indicate that self-subsistence is both necessary and sufficient for being a created Cartesian substance. The following argument against the existence of incomplete substances is made in the Fourth
Replies:
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I am aware that certain substances are commonly called 'incomplete'. But if the reason for calling them incomplete is that they are unable to exist on their own, then I confess I find it self-contradictory that they should be substances, that is, things which subsist on their own, and at the same time incomplete, that is, not possessing the power to subsist on their own. (AT VII 222: CSM II 156-7) In this passage, he argues that a substance cannot be 'incomplete' in the sense of not being self-subsistent. In order for the charge of self-contradiction to hold, self-subsistence must be a necessary condition for being a created substance. For if it were merely sufficient, then an inability to exist on its own would not be enough to exclude incomplete substances from the category of substance proper, since the entity in question could satisfy some other sufficient condition. He goes on to explain that something can be incomplete in one sense but complete in another, i.e. qua substance. It can be incomplete insofar as it is a part of a whole but complete in that it is a self-subsisting part, i.e. it is a part not bound to a whole, and as such it is a substance (AT VII 222: CSM II 157).27 Hence, self-subsistence is also used as a sufficient condition for being a substance in this passage. Furthermore, the argument in the Sixth Replies against the existence of real accidents, which were understood to be accidents that can exist without residing in a subject, at least by the power of God, also uses selfsubsistence as a necessary and sufficient condition for being a substance: [I]t is completely contradictory that there should be real accidents, since whatever is real can exist separately from any other subject; yet anything that can exist separately in this way is a substance, not an accident. (AT VII 434: CSM II 293) First, according to this passage, accidents do not self-subsist but reside in a subject by their very natures, and as such the notion of a real accident just is the notion of something both self-subsisting and not self-subsisting. Again, ontological independence in the sense of not residing in a subject must be a necessary condition in order for the contradiction to arise. Second, Descartes's claim that 'anything that can exist separately in this way [i.e. 'separately from any other subject'] is a substance, not an accident' just is to use not residing in a subject as a sufficient condition for being a substance. Therefore, Descartes uses self-subsistence as both a necessary and sufficient condition for being a substance in this passage as well.
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Further support for the definitive nature of the Principles account of substance is found in both the Third Meditation and another portion of the Fourth Replies. In the Third Meditation, Descartes claims that 'I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of existing per se' (AT VII 44: CSM II 30). The context of the passage indicates that the capacity for existing independently (per se apta est existere) is just what it is to be a substance. Descartes makes basically the same claim, albeit in a less careful manner, in the Fourth Replies: 'the notion of a substance is just this (hoc est) that it can exist by itself (per se), that is, without the aid of any other substance' (AT VII 226: CSM II 159). It is first important to note that Descartes's claim that the notion of substance 'is just this' (hoc est) means that what follows is supposed to be definitive. However, commentators such as Loeb and Bernard Williams understand this definition to be blatantly circular since Descartes is defining substance by means of existing without any other substance.28 Although this is not Descartes's most careful formulation, it is not circular despite appearances to the contrary. For, in this passage, Descartes is merely expressing the contrast between self-subsisting things or substances and non-subsisting things or modes: a substance does not require some other substance to exist in that substances, by definition, do not reside in some other thing as in a subject as is the case with modes. Based on these textual considerations, self-subsistence or being an ultimate determinable is both necessary and sufficient for being a Cartesian substance. The definition of created Cartesian substances offered here can be formulated as follows: CS: x is a created substance if and only if x is an ultimate determinable. This, of course, requires a definition of'ultimate determinable': UD: x is an ultimate determinable if and only if (1) x is a determinable, i.e. x is a subject in which modes reside; and (2) x does not determine a higher order determinable, i.e. x can exist without residing in any other thing as in a subject. So, given the bi-conditional nature of CS and UD, it follows that: CS*: x is a created substance if and only if (1) x is a determinable, i.e. x is a subject in which modes reside; and (2) x does not determine a
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higher order determinable, i.e. x can exist without residing in any other thing as in a subject. Interestingly enough, CS* takes into account Markie's point that the Second Replies and Principles accounts of created substance are flipsides of one another in that the former 'defines' substance by its ontological support of modes, while the latter defines it by its ontological independence.29 Moreover, although modes can reside in other modes, substances provide their ultimate support, and this is why selfsubsistence is so important. For if nothing self-subsisted, then there would be nothing but modes all the way down ad infinitum, which is an unacceptable result for Descartes.30 As such, Principles 1.51 provides Descartes's only truly definitive account of substance as self-subsistent being, and it is substance's self-subsistent nature that makes it not just a substratum for modes but their ultimate substratum. Therefore, the role of substrata played by created Cartesian substances is, in some sense, a derivative of their ontological independence very much like its scholastic counterpart.31
1.8 CARTESIAN vs SCHOLASTIC SUBSTANCE The considerations of this chapter have laid the groundwork for a brief comparison of the scholastic and Cartesian conceptions of substance. While self-subsistence defines substance for Descartes, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the scholastics. The per se unity of form with matter into a complete specific nature is also required. This indicates the following relationship between these two conceptions: all scholastic substances are also Cartesian substances but not all Cartesian substances are scholastic substances. So, although a pile of stones is not a scholastic substance because it lacks per se unity, it is a Cartesian substance since it self-subsists or is an ultimate determinable. Finally, since self-subsistence is required for being a complete scholastic substance any such substance satisfies CS* and is, therefore, a Cartesian substance. This last point will prove especially important when determining whether or not mind-body unions are substances. For whether or not they are scholastic substances composed of form and matter, they could still be Cartesian substances. Now that his conceptions of substance, mode and their relation have been explicated, the next step is to take a
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look at an often neglected aspect of Descartes's ontology, viz his doctrine of attributes and their conceptual distinction. NOTES
1 ST, 1, 45, 4. See Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols, trans. Anton C. Pegis (NewYork: Random House, 1945), pp. 438-9. 2 My translation: SPQ, I, 1, 96-7. 3 Suarez's Metaphysical Disputations was sometimes a source of Aristotelian terminology for Descartes. See AT VII 235: CSM II 164. 4 Francisco Suarez, On the Formal Cause of Substance, trans. John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000), p. 77. 5 Aristotle, Physics II.8.26-34. 6 For more on Suarez's notion of per se unity with regards to substantial natures, see John Kronen, 'The importance of the concept of substantial unity in Suarez's argument for hylomorphism', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 335-60 and Denis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 134-8. 7 MD, 6, 1, 5. See Francisco Suarez, On Formal and Universal Unity, trans. J. F. Ross (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 32. 8 Scotus had several reasons for holding this position. But to enumerate and explain them here would lead us too far astray. For more on this see Bertrand James Campbell, The Problem of One or Plural Substantial Forms in Man as Found in the Works ofSt Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (1940), pp. 60-88, and also Scotus, Opus Oxoniense IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 45. 9 Efram Bettoni describes the form of corporeity as 'not just the form of corporeity in general, like that admitted by the old Augustinian school, but a determined, specific and individual form proper to the body of each living thing. It is the kind of form that confers on a certain material compound the actuality of being the body of this or that particular material thing.' Efram Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy, trans, and ed. Bernardine Bonansca (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), p. 69, and also Scotus, Opus Oxoniense TV, d. 44, q. 1, n. 3. 10 MD, 33,1,1. See Francisco Suarez, Suarez on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle, trans. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), glossary. 11 ST, 1, 77, 6. See Aquinas, Basic Writings, pp. 128-9. 12 Some of the more recent scholarship has given up the attempt to define or, at least, precisely characterize Descartes's notion of substance. Joseph Almog, for example, prefers to deploy the various uses of 'substance' in Descartes's mind-body metaphysics. He argues that two entities can be distinct subjects each with its own set of modes but existentially dependent
36
13
14
15 16 17
on one another. Accordingly, mind and body are two categories of thing without the ability to exist without one another but only together in a fullfledged human being. See Joseph Almog, What Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 70 and 116. This, of course, undermines Descartes's project of proving that the mind can exist without the body, and so, although Almog's position is interesting, it is not an accurate account of Descartes's position. Desmond Clarke argues that Descartes's conception of substance was not clear or coherent enough to count as a technical term, and that Descartes kept the scholastic term 'substance' in name only but could have just as easily used the less technical term res or thing. For Clarke's views on Cartesian substance see Desmond Clarke, Descartes's Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 207-34. However, Clarke's reasons for holding this position fall prey to several of the issues addressed in this chapter. It is the contention here that Descartes is more precise than his scholastic counterparts and even though he modifies the term 'substance', it is close enough to the scholastic usage such that they would be able to understand his use of it. Louis Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 78-82. Peter Markie, 'Descartes's concepts of substance', in John Cottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 78-9; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 10-12; Matthew Stuart, 'Descartes's extended substances' in Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (eds) New Essays on the Rationalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Other reasons for rejecting the bare particular reading given in the main text of this paper are intended to provide further support for this conclusion. The claim that these 'properties', 'qualities' or 'attributes' are synonymous with 'accident' or 'mode' for Descartes is discussed in 1.5. Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 69. This account of determinates and ultimate determinables is basically Secada's. For more on this see Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 14, 125, 190, 296 n. 30. Also see John Searle, 'On determinables and resemblance', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 33 (1959): pp. 141-58. It is also interesting to note that some of the near contemporary philosophical lexicons of Descartes's time also describe the term modus as a determination (determinatio) of a thing. See Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, first published 1613 (Hidesheim: Grog Olins Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964), p. 694; and Johannes Micraelius, Lexicon Philosophicum, first published 1662, ed. Lutz Geldsetzer (Dusseldorf: SternVerlag Janssen and Company, 1966), p. 783.
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18 This chapter is primarily interested in unpacking the term 'substance' as it is used with reference to creatures. However, since God is the paradigmatic substance for Descartes, reference to his absolute ontological independence from everything else can be helpful in shedding light on Descartes's conception of created substance. 19 Clarke finds it difficult to see how the self-subsistence condition can work for basically these reasons. See Clarke, Descartes's Theory of Mind, pp. 216-17. 20 More is said about the real distinction in 2.2. 21 Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, pp. 96-7. 22 Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, p. 79. Bernard Williams also believes that causal independence is the sort of ontological independence at work here. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), pp. 126 and 136. 23 See Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, pp. 92-3 and 96-7. 24 Markie also concludes that causal independence is not sufficient and adds not residing in a subject as a necessary condition for being a created Cartesian substance. But he uses the dependence of divine ideas on God as his counter-example. See Markie, 'Descartes's concept of substance', p. 68. However, as noted above, God's ideas are not modes, strictly speaking, since he is immutable. Therefore, although Markie's conclusion is correct, it is not based on a legitimate counter-example. 25 Markie and Secada both reach what amounts to the same conclusion but each from his own perspective. As mentioned in the previous note, Markie discovered that causal independence is not sufficient for distinguishing between substances and modes. He then appends 'x can exist without being a quality of some other thing' into his formulation of the Principles account of substance based on the letter to Hyperaspistes cited above (AT III 429: CSMK 193). See Markie, 'Descartes's concept of substance', pp. 68-9. But Markie does not unpack the mode-substance relation by means of the determinate-determinable relation as Secada later did in his work. See Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, p. 194. 26 See Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, p. 1094 and Micraelius, Lexicon Philosophicum, p. 1303. 27 This passage is discussed in more detail at 5.3. 28 See Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, p. 94 and Williams, Descartes, pp. 124-5. 29 Markie, 'Descartes's concept of substance', p. 73. 30 Support for this claim is found in the argument for God's existence in the Third Meditation. There Descartes assumes that an infinite regress is impossible when he argues 'If, on the other hand, it derives its existence from another cause, then the same question may be repeated concerning this further cause, namely whether it derives it existence from itself or from another cause, until eventually the ultimate cause is reached, and this will be God' (AT VII 50: CSM II 34). This straightforward version of the cosmological argument assumes that an infinite regress is impossible and so an ultimate cause of the causal series must exist. Since Descartes considered
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infinite regresses impossible, he must consider an infinite regress of modes to be impossible as well. 31 Some similarities and differences between this formulation and the accounts of substance offered by Secada and Markie should be noted. First, Secada never attempts to discover the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a created Cartesian substance, although he characterizes them as ultimate determinables. Also, even though Secada is correct in characterizing created substance in this way, he does not provide any sustained argument for his position. In fact, he states it as a matter of fact without any independent support. See Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, p. 14. Second, Markie's formulation includes some superfluous conditions while also maintaining that substances can exist without determining a higher order determinable. His formulation is as follows: D8: x is a secondary substancd = df (1) x is necessarily dependent upon the power of God to remain in existence; (2) x can exist and not be dependent on the causal power of any other created thing to remain in existence; and (3) x can exist without being a quality of some other thing. The first two conditions are superfluous because they apply to every created thing and do no work in distinguishing these kinds of creatures, i.e. substances, from the other kind, i.e. modes. As such, these conditions are not included in CS or CS*.
CHAPTER 2
Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction
Another element of Descartes's fundamental ontology that has received even less attention than his substance-mode ontology is his technical sense of the term 'attribute' as distinguished from the notion of a 'mode'. The standard account maintains that Cartesian attributes, such as being, order, duration and number, are merely conceptually distinct, i.e. they are just different ways of conceiving one and the same thing. Accordingly, these attributes are not discovered in things themselves but are products of the mind's activity. In this chapter, Descartes's doctrine of attributes is examined through his notion of a conceptual distinction and concludes, contrary to the common view, that Cartesian attributes are discovered in things themselves. On this account, all substances possess the most general attributes of existence, order, duration and number. Since all substances possess a plurality of different attributes, metaphysical space is made for a theory of mind-body union that results in one substance composed of more than one principal attribute, which can be a serious obstacle for the account of mind-body union offered here. It also makes an important distinction between attributes that are formally and those that are really identical. Both of these points will help to make intelligible the claim that a human being is a substance composed of both principal attributes, extension and thought. Let's begin with a brief summary of the standard account of Cartesian attributes and their conceptual distinction.
2.1 THE STANDARD ACCOUNT: A SUMMARY The standard account is based largely on a letter to an unknown correspondent dated 1645 or 1646 where Descartes claims that the existence and essence of a triangle are only conceptually distinct, and as such they 'are no way distinct' in the triangle itself:
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It seems to me that the only thing which causes difficulty in this area is the fact that we do not sufficiently distinguish between things existing outside our thought and the ideas of things, which are in our thought. Thus, when I think of the essence of a triangle, and of the existence of the same triangle, these two thoughts, as thoughts, even taken objectively differ modally in the strict sense of the term 'mode'; but the case is not the same with the triangle existing outside our thought, in which it seems to me manifest that essence and existence are no way distinct. (AT IV 350: CSMK 280) This passage is commonly understood to mean that the foundation of the conceptual distinction is the modal distinction between ideas in the mind, while there is no distinction to be found in re. So, on the standard account, the essence and existence of the triangle are merely two ways of conceiving one and the same thing.1 The following passage from Principles 1.63 has also been used in support of the standard view: Thought and extension can be regarded as constituting the natures of intelligent substance and corporeal substance, they must then be considered as nothing else but thinking substance itself and extended substance itself - that is, as mind and body . . . For we have some difficulty in abstracting the notion of substance from the notions of thought and extension, since the distinction between these notions and the notion of substance itself is merely a conceptual distinction. (AT VIIIA 30-1: CSM I 215). This passage indicates that the principal attributes of extension and thought are nothing but extended substance and thinking substance themselves, because the principal attributes and substance are only conceptually distinct. So, extension and substance, for example, are two ways of conceiving one and the same thing. Hence, on the standard account, Cartesian attributes are merely different ways or manners of thinking (i.e. mental modes or ideas) about one and the same thing.
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2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF DISTINCTIONS This section is devoted to a brief examination of Descartes's theory of distinction insofar as it is based on the implicit distinction between exclusion and abstraction first noticed by Dugald Murdoch in order to bring the ontological import of each into clearer focus.2 Murdoch finds evidence for this distinction in a letter to Mesland dated 2 May 1644: There is a great difference between abstraction and exclusion. If I said simply that the idea which I have of my soul does not represent it to me as being dependent on the body and identified with it, this would be merely an abstraction, from which I could form only a negative argument which would be unsound. But I say that the idea represents it to me as a substance which can exist even though everything belonging to the body be excluded from it; from which I form a positive argument, and conclude that it can exist without the body. (AT IV 120: CSMK 236) Clearly and distinctly understanding a thing's independent existence is marked by the exclusion of all that pertains to one of the things under consideration from the understanding of the other. For example, all that pertains to the mind, e.g. understanding, willing, affirming, denying, etc., is completely excluded from the understanding of body. Likewise, all that pertains to body, e.g. shape, size, position and motion, is completely excluded from the understanding of mind. So, the understandings of mind and body are clear and distinct, because whatever pertains to one can be excluded from the other (AT VII 78: CSM II 48 and AT VIIIA 29: CSMI213). But, abstraction occurs when a part of a complete idea is considered in isolation from the rest of that idea. This is made apparent in a 19 January 1642 letter to Gibieuf, in which Descartes claims that one may consider shape in abstraction from an extended substance (AT III 475: CSMK 202). Shape can be considered without attention to extended substance, which would be to consider shape in abstraction, but it cannot be conceived without an extended substance, because extension cannot be excluded from the idea of shape. Accordingly, shape is only modally distinct from the thing shaped. So, abstractions are vague conceptions of entities considered in isolation. The notion of exclusion is implicit in Descartes's formulation of the real distinction at Principles 1.60 in that it is the criterion by which it is
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determined whether or not x can be clearly and distinctly understood without y and vice versa: Strictly speaking, a real distinction exists only between two or more substances; and we can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other. For when we come to know God, we are certain that he can bring about anything of which we have a distinct understanding. (ATVIIIA 28: CSM I 213) The claim that substances can be clearly and distinctly understood 'apart' from one another implies that all that pertains to the understanding of one substance can be fully excluded from the understanding of the other and vice versa. So, the clear and distinct understanding of mind as separate from body and vice versa shows that it is metaphysically possible for minds and bodies to exist separately from one another, because God can bring about whatever can be clearly and distinctly perceived or understood. Therefore, based on this passage from the 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes's notion of a real distinction can be formulated as follows: RD: If all that pertains to the understanding of x can be excluded from all that pertains to the understanding of y and vice versa, then x and y are really distinct. The exclusion criterion is used throughout Descartes's theory of distinction. Its ontological significance regarding RD is that full exclusion of all that pertains to the understanding of x from the understanding of y and vice versa means that x and y are ontologically independent of each other, because it is metaphysically possible for each to exist on its own with only God's concurrence in accordance with the second prong of CS*. Hence, substances are the proper distinguenda of the real distinction (see Principles 1.60 at AT VIIIA 28: CSM I 213).3 The criterion of exclusion is also used in the modal and conceptual distinctions. Let us begin with the description of the modal distinction found in the Principles: A modal distinction can be taken in two ways: firstly, as a distinction between a mode, properly so called, and the substance of which it is a mode; and secondly, as a distinction between two modes of the same
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substance. The first kind of modal distinction can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance. Thus there is a modal distinction between shape or motion and the corporeal substance in which they inhere; and similarly, there is a modal distinction between affirmation or recollection and the mind. (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 213-14) Here Descartes recognizes two kinds of modal distinction. Each one will be discussed in turn. First, under the criterion of exclusion, if full exclusion does not obtain, then the entity under consideration is ontologically dependent on what cannot be excluded from it. In this case, not all that pertains to the understanding of a substance can be excluded from the understanding of a mode. Hence, a mode is ontologically dependent on its underlying substance as a determinate depends on its determinable as discussed in 1.4, and as such it cannot exist without an ultimate determinable or substance. But all that pertains to the understanding of that particular mode can be excluded from the understanding of that substance. So, the first kind of modal distinction obtains when: MD1: If not all that pertains to the understanding of y can be excluded from the understanding of x, but all that pertains to the understanding of x can be excluded from the understanding of y, then x is modally distinct from y} This distinction indicates a one-way ontological dependence of a mode on its substance but not of a substance on any particular mode. The second kind of modal distinction is that between two or more modes of one and the same substance. In this case, all that pertains to the understanding of one of the distinguenda is excluded from the understanding of the other and vice versa, but neither excludes all that pertains to the understanding of a third entity that fully excludes them (AT VIIIA 29-30: CSM I 214). For example, the understanding of the shape of a particular body fully excludes the understanding of that body's motion and vice versa, but not all that pertains to the understanding of the body can be excluded from the understanding of its shape or the understanding of its motion. Accordingly, the criterion for the second kind of modal distinction is:
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MD2: If all that pertains to the understanding of x can be excluded from the understanding of y and vice versa, but the understanding of x and the understanding of y cannot be excluded from all that pertains to the understanding of z, and all that pertains to the understanding of x and y can be excluded from the understanding of z, then x and y are modally distinct as two modes of one and the same substance, namely z. Therefore, full exclusion can be obtained between two or more modes of the same substance, thereby indicating that they are ontologically independent of each other. For example, a body can have some shape but without any particular quantity of motion, and some quantity of motion does not presuppose any particular shape. But not all that pertains to the understanding of the substance can be excluded from the understanding of these two modes, and so they depend on it for their existence. Descartes's formulation of the conceptual distinction is found at Principles 1.62:
Finally a conceptual distinction is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single substance. Such a distinction is recognized by our inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the substance if we exclude from it the attribute in question, or, alternatively, by our inability to perceive clearly the idea of one of the two attributes if we separate it from the other. For example, since a substance cannot cease to endure without also ceasing to be, the distinction between substance and its duration is merely a conceptual one. (AT VTIIA 30: CSM I 214) For this distinction to obtain only some but not all of what pertains to the understanding of one can be excluded from the understanding of the other. For example, a substance just is a self-subsisting thing, whereas duration just is continued existence. Something can endure without selfsubsistent being as do modes. Hence, some but not all of what pertains to the understanding of substance can be excluded from the understanding of duration, namely the idea of self-subsistent being. But none of what pertains to the understanding of duration can be excluded from the understanding of substance, because existence is part of its definition or nature and all existent things must endure. So, the first kind of conceptual distinction can be formulated as:
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CD1: If some but not all that pertains to the understanding of y can be excluded from the understanding of x, but nothing that pertains to the understanding of x can be excluded from the understanding of j>, then x is only conceptually distinct from substance y. Of course, duration is not the only attribute. Descartes also lists existence, number and order as general attributes found in all classes of things (ATVIIIA 22-3: CSM I 208). Some of these may exclude some but not all of what pertains to the understanding of the other and vice versa. For example, to be number is (roughly) to be a countable unit and to exist is to be actual. Now, being a countable unit is different from being actual and vice versa, but something cannot be a countable unit unless it exists and an existent thing must be countable.5 In this way, these two would be conceptually distinct attributes of one and the same substance. Hence, the second kind of conceptual distinction can be formulated as: CD2: If some but not all that pertains to the understanding of x can be excluded from the understanding of y and some but not all that pertains to the understanding of y can be excluded from the understanding of x3 and x and y satisfy CD1 in relation to z> then x and y are only conceptually distinct attributes of one and the same substance, namely z. One cannot have a clear and distinct understanding of one attribute or substance without all the other attributes, although any one attribute or substance may be considered in abstraction. So, in general, the distinguenda of the conceptual distinction are mutually dependent beings.6 An interesting consequence of this is that a substance is ontologically dependent on its attributes. This might seem to contradict Descartes's definition of substance as something requiring only the concurrence of God to exist as expressed more formally in CS*. The standard account would explain this apparent inconsistency by claiming that substance and duration, for example, are identical. This 'mutual dependence' of substance on an attribute and attributes on each other is really the 'dependence' an entity has on itself for its existence, since substance, existence, duration, number and order are all different ways of conceiving one and the same thing. However, further consideration of the conceptual distinction in Descartes's works indicates that its ontological import is richer and more subtle than the standard account allows.
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Rather, it marks a distinction between entities that are identical in a given nature but have non-identical definitions or natures. My resolution of this apparent inconsistency is based on the issues discussed in the next section.
2.3 DESCARTES'S CONFUSION AND THE FORMAL DISTINCTION Another interesting fact about the conceptual distinction is its somewhat confused and tangled history in Descartes's works. In the letter to the unknown correspondent, Descartes corrects his previous account of the conceptual distinction as a kind of modal distinction: Accordingly I say that shape and other similar modes are strictly speaking modally distinct from the substance whose modes they are; but there is a lesser distinction between the other attributes. This latter can be called modal - as I did at the end of my Replies to the First Objections - but only in a broad sense of the term, and it is perhaps better called formal. But to avoid confusion, in article 60 of Part One of my Principles of Philosophy where I discuss it explicitly, I call it a conceptual distinction - that is, a distinction made by reason ratiocinatae. (AT IV 349: CSMK 280)7 Descartes's confusion, then, began in the First Replies where he lumped it together with the modal distinction. In this passage, Descartes is defending the real distinction against the charge that the criterion used to establish it is really that of Duns Scotus' formal distinction: [L]et me say briefly that this kind of distinction [i.e. Scotus' formal distinction] does not differ from a modal distinction; moreover, it applies only to incomplete entities, which I have carefully distinguished from complete entities. It is sufficient for this kind of distinction that one thing be conceived distinctly and separately from another by an abstraction of the intellect which conceives the thing inadequately. (AT VII 120: CSM II 85-6) Descartes continues on to show how motion and shape can be considered in abstraction from the body but not in a clear and distinct manner. Here Descartes also uses the example of a body's shape and motion as
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he did at Principles I 1.62 and, therefore, as Norman Wells correctly pointed out, he identified the formal distinction with the modal (MD2) distinction.8 Prior to the letter to the unknown correspondent, Descartes, at Principles 1.62, acknowledged this confusion: I am aware that elsewhere I did lump this type of distinction with the modal distinction, namely at the end of my Replies to the First Set of Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy; but that was not a suitable place for making a careful distinction between the two types; it was enough for my purposes to distinguish both from the real distinction. (AT VIIIA 30: CSM I 215) So, Descartes, in the letter to the unknown correspondent, distinguishes the conceptual distinction from the modal (MD2) distinction, characterizing it as a rational distinction ratiocinatae, which can also be called formal. Thus, an examination of Scotus' formal distinction and its close cousin the rational distinction ratiocinatae should shed much light on Descartes's conceptual distinction. Furthermore, Descartes's confusion of these various distinctions is no surprise given the confused accounts of the formal distinction among the Scotists themselves and the conceptual relation of this distinction with the rational distinction ratiocinatae. A brief discussion of Scotus' formal distinction, some of its different formulations, and Descartes's confusion of it with a modal distinction will point toward a correct understanding of the conceptual distinction and its ontological import. Scotus' formal distinction was intended to stand between a real distinction and a rational distinction ratiocinantis; that is, a distinction of 'reasoning reason', which does not have a foundation in re. Scotus, like Descartes, understood a real distinction to indicate the separabililty of the distinguenda in the thing itself, whereas the rational distinction ratiocinantis was understood to indicate a separability that was in a thinking mind only without a corresponding ability for separation or independent existence in re. So, while separability of the distinguenda exists antecedently to the operation of the intellect in the case of the real distinction, the separability of the distinguenda is brought into existence by the activity of the intellect in the case of the rational distinction ratiocinantis. The formal distinction was intended to occupy a middle ground between these two.9 On the one hand, a formal distinction has a foundation in re that exists prior to the operation of the intellect; but, on the
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other hand, the distinguenda are not separable in re. It is not that the distinction is brought about by reason, but rather the non-identity of the distinguenda is discovered or perceived in re by reason despite their inseparability. However, Scotus' scattered and sometimes cryptic remarks on the formal distinction led many scholastic thinkers to reinterpret, reorganize and rename it in multifarious ways. By Descartes's time, it had been so carved up and saddled with various names and formulations that it is no wonder he became confused. But there are certain common threads running throughout these various formulations, which Descartes incorporated into his notion of a conceptual distinction. For example, Suarez reports that the followers of Scotus himself were not in agreement on the correct formulation.10 He points out that some Scotists maintained that a formal distinction is a rational distinction ratiocinatae; that is, of the 'reasoned reason', which has a foundation in reality: For some think the formal distinction in the work of Scotus to be no other than a distinction of reason ratiocinatae, in the sense and manner explained by us, which they claim to be called formal, because diverse definitions or formal reasons [rationes] are observed there, they also claim the distinction is to be called ex natura rei, because it has a foundation in the things themselves and is virtually in themselves, even though it may not precede in act.11 While other Scotists maintained that the formal distinction was a 'true and actual' distinction: [O]thers of Scotus' disciples understand this to be said of a true and actual distinction; which would be in the thing antecedent to the understanding, which they think is to be discovered not only in creatures but also in God, at least between the divine relations and essence . . . Also many things can be referred to in support of this opinion, which admits distinction between various things ex natura rei and [is] not [a] real [distinction], as between existence and essence, nature and supposit, quantity and substance, foundation and relation, and the like . . .12 So, some Scotists at Suarez's time interpreted the formal distinction either as an actual distinction found in re between entities that are not really distinct from each other, while others interpreted it as a rational
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distinction ratiocinatae, because the distinction is based on the observance of diverse definitions found in re. For ease of reference, FD1 will refer to the rational distinction ratiocinatae formulation and FD2 will refer to the 'true and actual' interpretation. At first glance, FD1 and FD2 might seem very different, because the former is merely a rational distinction while the latter is 'true and actual'. But they do bear at least one important similarity: both maintain that the formal distinction has a foundation in re, but the distinguendar are not 'real' in the sense that they are not really distinct from one another. This is reflected in the claim made by both interpretations that the distinction is ex natura rei, i.e. from the nature of the thing. An interesting difference between FD1 and FD2 is found in the emphasis placed on the roles of the intellect and the thing. The former places primary emphasis on the perception by the intellect while the latter places primary emphasis on the non-real entities found in re. But the common thread is that the formal distinction's distinguenda are discovered in things themselves by the intellect and are not brought into existence by the intellect's activity as is the case with the rational
distinction ratiocinantis.
A further ambiguity regarding the formal distinction is found in Eustachius' textbook formulation of two kinds of formal distinction instead of just one, viz the essential and the pure: The essential formal [distinction] is that by which diverse essences or entities are distinguished, whether simple or composite, and it belongs to those things which have different essences or entities of this sort, or are so related to one another in such a way that something of the essence or the entity is included in the one that is not included in the other. In this way are distinguished the nature or essence of Men and Horses, of Peter and Paul, and also Man and Horse, Peter and Paul, Animal and Man, Sensation and Reason.13 Notice that the essential formal distinction obtains between essences where one essence contains something of another but not the other way around. For instance, the essence of human being contains the essences of rationality and sensation, but the essence of animal contains the essence of sensation but not rationality. In this way, the essence of human being contains something of the essence of animal, but the essence of animal does not contain or include something of the essence of human being, namely rationality. Thus sensation can exist in the essence of different kinds of things.
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The pure formal distinction obtains between essences that include each other in some way: The pure formal [distinction] is that by which many things are distinguished by their rational formal objectivity, even though the essence and existence do not differ, because nothing of the one being or essence includes a bit of what the other would not include, in which manner [not only] the Divine Persons are distinguished amongst each other but also the personal relations themselves. It is not the case that they are distinguished to the degree of reality but yet with respect to the nature of the thing and a certain formality in this sense.14 Entities distinguished purely formally include each other in that all of one is contained in all of the other and vice versa. For example3 essence and existence are purely formally distinct, because any existing thing must be some kind of thing (i.e. have an essence or nature), whereas some kind of thing must contain contingent or necessary existence, if it is to exist at all. Interestingly enough, Eustachius considers the formal and modal distinctions together under the heading of distinctions a natura rei, which might lead one to consider the formal and modal distinctions to be very similar. A further possible source of Descartes's confusion could be that Suarez cites Scotus as maintaining a 'formal or modal' distinction between essence and existence. Descartes appears to have succumbed to Suarez's misidentification of these two distinctions in the First Replies, but he untangles this formal/modal distinction in the Principles. He relocates the First Replies version of the formal distinction to the category of a modal distinction (i.e. MD2), and then gives the formal distinction a category of its own. He renames it a 'conceptual distinction' in order to avoid confusion as indicated in the letter to the unknown correspondent where he continues on to identify it more precisely as a rational distinction ratiocinatae: 'I call it a conceptual distinction - that is, a distinction made by reason ratiocinatae' (AT IV 349: CSMK 280). Descartes's primary example of a conceptual distinction or rational distinction ratiocinatae is the distinction between the attributes of God found at Principles 1.62. This was also an example provided by Eustachius of this sort of rational distinction: The other is a rationis ratiocinatae, which may be discovered by the intellect in things themselves in accordance with varied opportunity;
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in which manner the warming power in daylight is distinguished from [its] drying [power]; and the Theologians distinguish the Divine attributes both with respect to the Divine essence and alternatively with respect to themselves.15 It is interesting to notice that Scotus himself claims that the formal distinction could be called a rational distinction. However, he intended the world 'ratio' to express what is in re insofar as it exists in the intellect (i.e. its objective being to use Descartes's terminology) and not a being created by reason. This amounts to calling it a rational distinction ratiocinatae. In other words, the distinction is found in the thing being reasoned about and is not a product of reason's activity. Also, the distinction among the attributes of God was a stock example of the formal distinction for Scotus as well.16 Descartes, along with the Scotists endorsing FD1, emphasizes the role played by the intellect in his formulation of the conceptual distinction as indicated by his claim that it just is a rational distinction ratiocinatae. Moreover, Descartes is also explicitly concerned with the objective content of his ideas, i.e. things insofar as they exist in the intellect (AT VII 102-3 and 160: CSM II 75 and 113-14).Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Descartes's conceptual distinction is fundamentally a formal distinction understood as a rational distinction ratiocinatae in very much the same way as the FD1 Scotists and Eustachius' rational distinction ratiocinatae. But this is not to say that it does not bear any relation to the FD2 interpretation or Eustachius' notions of essential and pure formal distinctions, for all of these formulations concern the containment or inclusion of one definition, essence or nature in another ex
natura rei.17
This containment or inclusion is the key to understanding the sense in which the distinguenda of the formal or rational distinction ratiocinatae and, in turn, the conceptual distinction, are identical but with a distinction based in re. This is the result of two kinds of identity that form the basis of Scotus' formal distinction, viz real and formal. Given Descartes's reference to the formal distinction, an account of these two kinds of identity promises to shed more light on how the distinguenda of this sort of distinction are found in re. A real identity is the identity enjoyed by a nature simply united such that the thing cannot exist without those beings that are proper to it, because the removal of one of them is contradictory. For example, animality and rationality are really identical in human being, because the removal of one of these proper features is
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contradictory in the sense that a rational animal cannot lack either rationality or animality and continue to exist. So, the simple per se unity of a nature signifies the real identity of that nature or essence, for Scotus. Notice that this is reminiscent of our inability to exclude the understanding of one attribute from that of another in that what cannot be excluded from something can be said to be contained in it. More will be said about this below. The notion of formal identity is: two beings are formally identical when they have exactly the same essence.18 So, something can be really identical in that the removal of one feature results in a contradiction, but formally distinct in that those features do not have exactly the same nature or essence. For instance, the essence of rationality is not the same as the essence of animality, although these two essences together form the essence of human being. Hence, the essences of rationality and animality are really identical with the essence of human being, but they are formally distinct from each other in that what it is to be an animal is different from what it is to be rational. Scotus called these really identical but formally distinct entities 'formalities'. Maurice Grajewski defines a formality as 'a positive entity, which, antecedently to the operation of the intellect, is inseparably and really conjoined with the being or essence within which is it is found'.19 So, formalities are not creations of the intellect but are realities found in re. These formalities are inseparable from each other, even by the power of God, although any one can be considered in abstraction from all the rest. Hence, formalities are really identical in that the removal of one results in a contradiction. In this way, the essence of human being is really identical with the essences of both animality and rationality. But, animality and rationality are formally distinct from human being and each other in that their essences are not exactly the same, which provides the formal distinction's foundation in reality. In sum, Descartes's conceptual distinction is basically a formal distinction understood as a rational distinction ratiocinatae. Accordingly, the conceptual distinction is ex natura rei in that it obtains among the features constituting the nature or essence of a thing as well as between those features and that nature itself as is the case with God's attributes. Moreover, those essences are observed in re upon inspection of the objective reality of our ideas by the intellect, and as such they are not products of the intellect.20 This suggests further that Descartes's attributes are really identical with and within a given nature in much the same way as Scotus' formalities. Recall that Descartes gives the example at
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Principles 1.62 of substance and duration: substance cannot exist without duration, because then there would be a self-subsisting or independently existing thing without continued existence, which is a contradiction. This amounts to the real identity of duration with substance. Finally, although attributes are really identical, they are formally distinct in that they have different essences or natures in the same way as Scotus' formalities. A further explication of Descartes's doctrine of attributes is the subject of the next section.
2.4 CARTESIAN ATTRIBUTES Descartes defines the notion of an attribute in the following passage from
Principles 1.56:
[FJinally, when we are simply thinking in a more general way of what is in a substance, we use the term attribute. Hence we do not, strictly speaking, say that there are modes or qualities in God, but simply attributes, since in the case of God, any variation is unintelligible. And even in the case of created things, that which always remains unmodified - for example existence or duration in a thing which exists and endures - should be called not a quality or a mode but an attribute. (ATVIIIA 26: CSM I 211-12) Indeed, there are places where Descartes uses the term 'attribute' to mean 'mode'. However, for the sake of clarity, these terms will be sharply distinguished in accordance with the cited passage. Recall from 1.5 that modes are determinate but changeable ways or manners of being some kind of thing, and as such they depend on a substance as a determinate depends on its determinable. But, attributes are unchangeable properties of things that do not bear a determinate-determinable relation to some substance. This section is concerned only with the relations among the most general attributes of existence, duration, order and number (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 208) and their relation to substance. The main difference between modes and attributes for present purposes will be that the former are extrinsic to the nature of substance, whereas the latter are intrinsic to that nature. As noted in 2.2, the conceptual distinction implies that Cartesian attributes are mutually dependent for their existence. The passage from the First Replies cited above at 2.3 (AT VII 120: CSM II 85-6) indicates
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that a formal distinction obtains between incomplete beings, which Descartes claims to have 'carefully distinguished' from complete beings. Here he is referring to his previous discussion of a triangle inscribed in a square. Although a fuller explication of this discussion will figure prominently in Chapter 6, here it is only important to notice the implicit distinction Descartes makes between something being a complete being when considered in itself but incomplete when considered in relation to some other thing of which it is a part as expressed later in the Fourth Replies ( (AT VII 222: CSM II 156-7). For Descartes, a triangle and a square are complete beings in themselves but incomplete when considered as two parts constituting the figure 'triangle-inscribed-in-a-square' (AT VII 117-18: CSM II 84).21 Attributes, however, are not complete beings in themselves, because they are not ontologically independent from one another. Rather, they are incomplete beings in that they are parts of the essences or natures of all things insofar as they exist such that the removal of one results in a contradiction and therefore in the thing's ceasing to be. Thus, Descartes's general attributes are really identical in all existing things. However, they are not formally identical, because these general attributes do not have the same essences. Consideration of the following proposed definitions (i.e. expressions of these essences) and their relations will help to illustrate this point. x is a substance if and only if either (a) x requires absolutely nothing else in order to exist (i.e. x is God), or (b) x is an ultimate determinable (i.e. CS*). 2 x exists if and only if x is contingently or necessarily actual. 3 x endures if and only if x continues to exist either for some time or from eternity. 4 x is numbered if and only if x is a countable unit. 5 x is ordered if and only if x bears certain spatial, temporal, logical or metaphysical relation to itself or some other thing. The first definition is, of course, just a restatement of Descartes's considered definition of substance as discussed in 1.7. Definition 2 is supported by Descartes's claim in the Second Replies that contingent existence is found in the concept of a limited being and necessary existence is found in the concept of a supremely perfect being (AT VII 166: CSM II 117). And definition 3 is suggested by Descartes's example of the conceptual distinction between substance and duration at 1
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Principles 1.62 (ATVIIIA 30: CSM I 214). However, definitions 4 and 5 do not enjoy the textual support of the others, but they at least possess a certain intuitive appeal and will serve nicely to illustrate my point. In what follows the ways in which these conceptually (CD1) distinct attributes are contained in the definition or essence of substance are explained. This is made explicit by some of the entailment relations among these general attributes and substance. If x is a created substance, then it follows that x exists, because being a created substance just is to exist independently from any other creature as discussed in Chapter 1. It also follows that x endures, because any creature that exists must continue to exist for some time. Also, x is numbered follows from x's being a substance, because something cannot exist without being a countable unit. In other words, anything that exists can be counted, even the one indefinitely extended universe, or the number of modes found in some particular thing, or the one infinite God. Finally, created substances must be ordered in at least one of the ways listed in definition 5 with provisions for kinds of substances, e.g. a thinking, unextended substance cannot be spatially ordered. In fact, if there was only one created substance, then that substance would bear a relation of created thing to creator (i.e. God), which is a kind of metaphysical ordering. Also, that thing would be self-identical, which would be a logical ordering it has with itself. So, the attributes defined in 2 through 5 are necessary conditions for being a created substance on this account. Does this contradict Descartes's requirement for a created substance to need nothing else to exist but God's concurrence? No, it does not, because these attributes just are the supports provided by God's concurrence, since he is the one who creates and preserves all things. Indeed, Descartes claims that creation and preservation are only conceptually distinct (AT VII 49: CSM II 33), indicating that God brings things into existence and preserves them for some period of time. Accordingly, since continual existence just is duration, and since God is the preserver of existence, God's concurrence provides a substance's existence and duration. Furthermore, something cannot exist without also being numbered and ordered as shown below. Therefore, this account of the relation between attributes and substance is not inconsistent with Descartes's requirement that all created substances must exist independently of any other creature, because this dependence just is its dependence on God's concurrence included in that definition. So, the definition of substance contains the definitions of existence, duration,
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number and order due to God's concurrence. In this way, they are incomplete beings that are really identical with substance, because the removal of one results in a contradiction and, therefore, in that substance's ceasing to exist. But, they are formally or conceptually (CD1) distinct, because these different definitions are entailed by (or contained in) the definition of created substance. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the other general attributes defined in 2 through 5 are really identical, because no one of them can exist without all the others. If x is numbered or ordered, then x exists, because counting and ordering nothings is unintelligible. Also, if x exists, then x endures as shown above. So, if x is numbered or ordered, then x exists and endures. Finally, the definition of order contains the definition of number, because order just is the ordering of countable things, and the definition of number contains the definition of order, because whatever is numbered bears a relation of order to itself, other creatures, or God. Therefore, Descartes's general attributes do not have identical definitions or essences, although each is somehow contained in the other in a way similar to Eustachius' pure formal distinction. Accordingly, the general attributes are really identical but formally or conceptually (CD2) distinct in all existent things. The considerations of this section indicate that, contrary to the standard view, these general attributes are not different ways of conceiving one and the same thing but are unvarying, incomplete beings that are really identical entities found in the natures or essences of things themselves insofar as they exist.
2.5 SOME TEXTUAL OBJECTIONS One might object to this account of the general attributes based on Descartes's comments at Principles 1.55, 57 and 58, which seem to indicate that they are mere modes of thinking. This section shows that this account of Cartesian attributes is consistent with, if not supported by, these passages. Let us first consider Principles 1.55: We shall also have a very distinct understanding of duration, order and number, provided we do not mistakenly tack on to them any concept of substance. Instead, we should regard the duration of a thing simply as a mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist. And similarly we should not regard order or number as anything separate from the things which are ordered and numbered,
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but should think of them simply as modes under which we consider the things in common. (ATVIIIA 26: CSM I 211) Lawrence Nolan uses this passage as partial support for his claim that attributes are not found in re but are modes of thinkings because it indicates Descartes's warning against reifying attributes. Nolan takes this warning to indicate that attributes are not in things at all but only in our thought.22 However, a closer reading of this passage indicates otherwise. In the first clause of the last sentence, Descartes is claiming that order and number are not things separate from ordered and numbered things, thereby indicating that these attributes are found in re. Descartes's warning not to attach the notion of substance to the notions of order and number, in addition to his claim that we 'should think of them simply as modes under which we consider the things in common' indicates that he is not claiming that order and number do not have any extra-mental existence but only that they should not be considered as substances themselves. Therefore, this passage is a statement of Descartes's conceptualism with regards to universals (i.e. ways in which we consider things in common). Also, it is a warning against making attributes substances, which amounts to a warning against a Platonic account of universals. The account of attributes offered here is also consistent with Descartes's claims at Principles 1.57: Now some attributes or modes are in the very things of which they are said to be attributes or modes, while others are only in our thought. For example, when time is distinguished from duration taken in the general sense and called the measure of movement, it is simply a mode of thought. For the duration which we understand to be involved in movement is certainly no different from the duration involved in things which do not move. (ATVIIIA 27: CSM I 212) Here Descartes is maintaining that duration in the general sense (i.e. as a universal) is a mode of thinking. Also, duration is called the measure of movement when considered in moving things, but it is not different from the duration found in things that are not moving. This means that the duration found in each of these things falls under the same mode of thinking. In other words, there is not one mode of thought for duration qua the measure of movement and another for the duration found in unmoving things, but rather the duration found in each of these things falls under the same concept. This is what Descartes means when he says
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that 'some attributes or modes are only in our thought'; duration qua measure of movement is merely a mode of thought, because it is no different from duration qua continued existence found in things themselves. Thus, although duration in general or as a universal is a mode of thinking, duration itself is an attribute found in re. Furthermore, the account of attributes provided in this chapter is consistent with Principles 1.58: In the same way, number, when it is considered simply in the abstract or in general, and not in any created thing, is merely a mode of thinking; and the same applies to all other universals, as we call them. (ATVIIIA 27: CSM I 212) According to this passage, number, and presumably all of the general attributes, are modes of thinking when considered in general or as universals, but this occurs when they are not being considered as in created things. Hence, number is in numbered things but can be considered on its own only in abstraction, because the understanding of number does not exclude the understanding of the numbered thing as indicated at Principles 1.55 cited above. This is also the case with the understanding of duration, which does not exclude the enduring thing and so on. Thus, number, duration and all the general attributes can be considered in themselves only in abstraction, because they cannot exist independently of things themselves as indicated by our inability to fully exclude numbered, enduring, etc. things from our understanding of them in accordance with the conditions for the conceptual distinction. These passages are not only consistent with the account offered here of Cartesian attributes but support this account, because they all indicate that duration, order and number themselves are found in enduring, ordered and numbered things, i.e. they are found in re. Also, Descartes claims in the letter to the unknown correspondent that 'I make a distinction between modes, strictly so called, and attributes, without which the thing whose attributes they are cannot be . . .' (AT IV 348-9: CSMK 279-80), which indicates that things require the general attributes in order to exist. If attributes were merely modes of thinking or mere manners of speaking, as Nolan contends, then things would not have these attributes, which means that no creature would exist. Rather, the attributes themselves are in re, but they are modes of thinking when considered in general or in abstraction (i.e. as universals). The next two sections of this chapter are devoted to showing how the standard account
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of the conceptual distinction as a rational distinction ratiocinantisisis inconsistent with both the text and with certain central tenets of Descartes's metaphysics.
2.6 THE TEXTUAL INCONSISTENCY One problem with the standard account is that it commits Descartes to a rational distinction ratiocinantis, which does not have a foundation in re since the separability of the distinguenda is brought into existence by the operation of the intellect. This goes contrary to Descartes's explicit rejection of this kind of distinction in the letter to the unknown correspondent: I call it a conceptual distinction - that is, a distinction made by reason ratiocinatae. I do not recognize any distinction made by reason ratiocinantis - that is, one which has no foundation in reality - because we cannot have any thought without a foundation. (AT IV 349: CSMK 280) Descartes's rejection of distinctions made by reason ratiocinantis provides a good reason to reject the standard account, because the modal distinction between ideas in the mind is not sufficient to establish this foundation, as the standard account contends. The text of Father Eustachius will show why this is so. It is well known that Descartes utilized Eustachius' textbook Summa Philosophia Quadripartite published in 1609 to refamiliarize himself with scholastic philosophy and considered it to be the best of its kind (AT III 232: CSMK 156). Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he understood distinctions ratiocinantis and ratiocinatae in ways similar to their standard scholastic usage as expressed in Eustachius' textbook. Here Eustachius says that conceiving one thing in two or more different ways is a distinction produced by the intellect and therefore is a rational distinction ratiocinantis:
The third kind of distinction is the distinction of reason, which exists through the intellect alone, and is twofold . . . One, which has no foundation in things for things would be made many, which are in no way many; as you might distinguish Socrates himself insofar as he is the subject in that proposition, Socrates is Socrates, from himself insofar as
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he is an attribute in the same proposition. Likewise in the same way the concept of the concrete object is distinguished from the abstraction of the universal substances; as you would distinguish Humanity itself from Man. This same kind of distinction distinguishes nonbeings [from] each other; and moreover beings of reason [from] each other. And I call this distinction alone rationis ratiocinantis.23 As such, Descartes would be committed to a rational distinction ratiocinantis, i if the foundation for the conceptual distinction is the modal (MD2) distinction between ideas in the mind, while the distinguenda are really one and the same in re. This contradicts his claim that he does not recognize them. So, is Descartes committed to a blatant inconsistency in this letter? One way of resolving this alleged inconsistency is to appeal to the hurried manner in which the letter was composed. At the end of the letter, Descartes apologizes for a possibly confused account, because he was hurrying to finish it in order to give it to the postman who was just about to leave (AT IV 350: CSMK 281). So, what is confused in the letter needs to be discerned from what is not. Descartes's mention of the formal distinction or rational distinction ratiocinatae as alternative names for the conceptual distinction is not confusion, because it is corroborated by texts from the First Replies and Principles cited above. Perhaps Descartes inadvertently reversed the terms ratiocinantis and ratiocinatae} This is highly unlikely, for if this were the case, then he would really be denying the existence of distinctions with a basis in reality, which no one would deny, especially someone who maintains a real distinction between mind and body. But a confusion arises with the claim that the existence and essence of a triangle 'are no way distinct', because he is not precise in his use of the phrase. The standard account takes it that there is no distinction or difference at all obtaining in re. Given Descartes's rejection of distinctions ratiocinantis, & more plausible interpretation of this phrase is that existence and essence are not really or modally distinct. They are not really distinct, because an essence cannot be conceived except as contingently or necessarily existing (AT VII 166: CSM II 117). Also, substance cannot be clearly conceived as an existing thing, because existence alone has no effect on us, and therefore existence and substance can only be known through any of its attributes but is best known through one of its principal attributes (i.e. extension or thinking) (AT VIIIA 25: CSM I 210), which are the natures or
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essences of the two ultimate classes of things. Accordingly, all that pertains to the understanding of existence cannot be excluded from the understanding of essence and vice versa. Therefore, RD is not satisfied, and since full exclusion does not obtain between any of the distinguenda, they are not modally MD1 or MD2 distinct either. Hence, Descartes's statement that essence and existence 'are in no way distinct' need not be read as indicating that the distinguenda are one and the same in re. Rather, this could be Descartes's hurried way of expressing that essence and existence are not self-subsisting things or substances as is the case with one or more of the distinguenda of the real and modal distinctions. Further support for this reading of 'are in no way distinct' is Descartes's reason for rejecting the rational distinction ratiocinantis, 'because we cannot have any thought without a foundation' (AT IV 349: CSMK 280). A similar claim about the foundation or cause of ideas is also made in the French version of Principles 1.62: And in general all the attributes which cause us to have different thoughts concerning a single thing, such as the extension of a body and its property of being divided into several parts, do not differ from the body - or from each other, except in so far as we sometimes think confusedly of one without thinking of the other. (ATVIIIA 31: CSM I 2 1 5 n . 1) The letter to the unknown correspondent indicates that each of our ideas requires some cause or foundation in reality. The claim from the Principles is that 'different attributes cause us to have different thoughts concerning a single thing', which indicates that our ideas of attributes are caused by different attributes obtaining in re. So, one and the same entity does not cause two different ideas in the mind. For example, the attribute of existence cannot cause both the idea of existence and the idea of number, but rather the attribute of existence causes one to have an idea of it, while the attribute of number causes one to have an idea of it. So, if there are two different ideas (i.e. two ideas with different objective content), which are modally (MD2) distinct in the mind, then each idea has its own cause. One might object that this passage also indicates that these are 'different thoughts concerning one single thing'.The account of attributes offered here is consistent with this claim in that these attributes would be really identical with that thing, because they compose its nature or essence. So, formally distinct attributes cause different ideas of
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them in the mind, but they are ideas of a single thing in that they are really identical with the thing itself. The second sentence of this passage expresses the claim that extension and the property of being divided into parts do not differ from the body or from each other. This passage is also consistent with the account of attributes offered here in that extension and the property of being divided into parts are incomplete beings constituting the essence of body, and therefore they are really identical with it. But sometimes we confusedly think of one without the other, which is to say that sometimes one may be considered in abstraction from the other. However, some but not all that pertains to the understanding of one can be excluded from the understanding of the other and vice versa in satisfaction of CD2. Therefore, this passage supports this account in that it indicates that each idea with different objective content has a different cause or foundation in reality. In sum, the foundation of the conceptual distinction cannot be the modal (MD2) distinction between ideas in the mind, as maintained by the standard account, because it commits Descartes to admitting a rational distinction ratiocinantis, which contradicts his explicit rejection of such distinctions without a foundation. Also, the claim that existence and essence 'are in no way distinct' need not be understood to mean that existence and essence are one and the same thing. Rather it can be understood to mean that they are not really or modally distinct in that no one of the distinguenda can self-subsist. My account avoids committing Descartes to a rational distinction ratio cinantis, because the conceptual distinction just is a formal distinction or a rational distinction ratiocinatae, which has a foundation in the formal non-identity or distinction of the distinguenda located in re antecedently to the operation of the mind. Also, the letter to the unknown correspondent and the addition to Principles 1.62 in the French edition indicate that if there are two different ideas in the mind, then each has its own cause such that one and the same thing does not cause two ideas with different objective content. The standard account does not take this claim into consideration, which provides good reason for rejecting it. The account offered here, however, is consistent with Descartes's account of the cause of different ideas by explaining these passages by means of the real identity but formal distinction among attributes found in re.
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2. 7 THE METAPHYSICAL INCONSISTENCY The standard account leads to another inconsistency, which is metaphysical in nature, namely the formal identification of extension and thought. For Descartes, extended things constitute one ultimate class of things and thinking things constitute the other, and as such extension and thought are the two principal attributes constituting their respective natures (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 208 and AT VIIIA 25: CSM I 210). Descartes also claims that extension and thinking should be considered nothing but extended substance and thinking substance themselves, because they are only conceptually distinct from all the other attributes (see Principles 1.63; AT VIIIA 30-1: CSM I 215). This passage, in addition to the claim in the letter to the unknown correspondent that existence and essence 'are in no way distinct', have led commentators to conclude that the principal attributes are identical with substance and the attribute of existence. This raises the question: In what sense are the principal attributes identical with substance and existence on the standard account? As mentioned above, the claim that existence and essence 'are in no way distinct' is often taken to mean that they do not differ in any way. In fact, it is common for commentators who endorse the standard account to claim that the conceptual distinction marks two or more ways of conceiving 'one and the same thing'. Nolan is, perhaps, most explicit: 'I want to claim that part of what it means to say that two things are merely rationally [i.e. conceptually] distinct is that they are identical in reality, that they are not two things but one.'24 He continues on to claim that 'the diversity of a substance's attributes does not arise in the substance itself but from our abstract ways of regarding it'.25 These claims indicate that the words 'substance' and 'extension', for example, are equivalent in that they have the same definition, i.e. they are formally identical. Bearing this in mind, consider the following argument where = means 'is formally identical with': 1 Extension = Substance 2 Thinking = Substance 3 Therefore, Extension = Thinking According to this argument, the formal identification of the principal attributes with substance implies that the principal attributes themselves are formally identical with each other. That is, thought and extension
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have exactly the same essence or definition, and as such thought and extension are exactly the same. The same argument works mutatis mutandis for the identification of the principal attributes with the attribute of existence, and with their formal identification with any of the other general attributes. So, the metaphysical inconsistency lies in the fact that the standard account implies the formal identification of the principal attributes, which contradicts Descartes's conclusion that they are really distinct. Indeed, if the standard account is correct, then full exclusion of all that pertains to the understanding of mind from the understanding of body and vice versa could not be obtained, because all that pertains to the understanding of one is included in all that pertains to the understanding of the other - to exclude one is to exclude both. Hence, on the standard account, RD cannot be satisfied in contradiction to Descartes's conclusion that it is satisfied. As a result, one must either reject the claim that mind and body are really distinct or reject the claim that the principal attributes are formally identical with substance. Since Descartes is quite explicit about the real distinction between mind and body, the only option is to reject the formal identification of the principal attributes with substance and the general attributes, which amounts to rejecting the standard account. One might object that Descartes is not speaking about, for instance, extension and duration simpliciter, but he is speaking about the extension and duration of this or that particular thing. Nolan, while recognizing the equivalence of attribute terms, continues on to observe that sentences such as 'a body is extended' or 'my soul is thinking' are really disguised identity statements where 'is' should be understood as 'is identical with'. But, he claims to avoid the identification of extension and thought by carefully formulating the identity claims involved. For instance, '[w]hen I say that a substance and its existence are identical in re, I must be careful to specify its existence (or its duration, etc.)'.26 This indicates that one must be careful to make these identity claims about particular things. For example, 'this particular body is its extension' would be a carefully formulated identity statement for Nolan. However, this response does not extricate the standard account from the refutation of it offered above. To show this, further consideration of Nolan's response in terms of the equivalency of attribute words and their substitutivity in identity sentences about particular things is in order. Let X andY be any two particular things and consider the following two carefully formulated identity statements:
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1 X is identical with its extension. 2 X is identical with its duration. Thus, since both 'extension' and 'duration' are equivalent, it follows that: 3 X's extension is identical with X's duration. Now consider the following two sentences concerning Y: 4 Y is identical with its thought. 5 Y is identical with its duration. Thus, since both 'thought' and 'duration' are equivalent, it follows that: 6 Y's thought is identical withY's duration. Recall from 2.5 that the duration found in any particular thing falls under one and the same mode of thought such that there is only one kind of duration found in all classes of particular things. Also, according to definition 3 above, 'duration' just means 'continued existence' such that the duration of any particular thing just is its continued existence. In this way, 'continued existence' can be substituted for 'duration': 7 X's extension is identical with X's continued existence. 8 Y's thought is identical withY's continued existence. Recall further that all attribute terms are equivalent on the standard account. This means that 'extension' or 'thought' can be substituted for 'continued existence', since 'continued existence' was substituted for 'duration': 9 X's extension is identical with X's thought. 10 Y's thought is identical withY's extension. Thus, thought and extension are formally identical with each other in particular things. This does not mean that X and Y are identical with each other, for they could have other affections or modes that distinguish them, but extension and thought are identical in each one of them individually. Hence, since X and Y could be any two particular things, it follows that all particular extended things are also thinking things and all
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particular thinking things are also extended things, because thought just is extension and vice versa by definition, i.e. they are formally identical. In this way, all created things are extended/thinking things. As a result, there I only one ultimate class of things instead of two as stated at Prinis ciples I 1.48 (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 208). Finally, since all attributes are formally identical in all particular things, it follows that all that pertains to the understanding of extension cannot be fully excluded from the understanding of thinking and vice versa. Accordingly, RD is not satisfied contrary to Descartes's conclusion that it is. Hence, Nolan's attempt to avoid this inconsistency fails. The account of the conceptual distinction provided in this chapter avoids this inconsistency, because it implies that the principal attributes, substance and the most general attributes do not have exactly the same definition or essence. The real identity but formal distinction obtaining among attributes allows them to be contained in really distinct essences or natures, i.e. the principal attributes. Since all that pertains to the understanding of thought can be excluded from all that pertains to the understanding of extension and vice versa, all of the attributes contained in one principal attribute are excluded from the other and all that it contains as well. Therefore, the possibility of the real distinction is preserved on this account.
2.8 SUBSTANCE AND A PLURALITY OF ATTRIBUTES Descartes's conceptual distinction should be understood as a formal or rational distinction ratiocinatae, because its foundation is in the nonidentical definitions, essences or natures of really identical entities or attributes existing in re. This account gives attributes a deeper metaphysical significance in Descartes's thought than previously supposed. The ontological import of Descartes's conceptual distinction is its indication that the general attributes are mutually dependent, incomplete beings comprising the essences or natures of all things insofar as they exist, and accordingly their natures are contained in the nature of substance itself. Hence, the nature of substance contains a plurality of different attributes, viz existence, duration, number and order. Now, since substances are composed of a number of attributes, there is metaphysical space for the existence of a substance with not only all of the general attributes, but also the attributes of extension and thinking such that these natures or essences are contained in the nature of human
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being but not contained in each other's nature. On this account, the complete substantial human nature would be conceptually distinct from its metaphysical parts, i.e. mind and body, and as such the human substance would be really identical with these attributes. Yet, mind and body are not just formally or conceptually distinct from each other in that each has a different nature or definition, but they are completely different, and as such mind and body are really distinct from each other. More will be said about the possibility of a substance with both principal attributes in Chapter 6. NOTES 1 This distinction has received very little discussion (or even mention) in the literature. I call this the 'standard account', because most Descartes scholars who mention this distinction understand it in the way sketched here. Some endorsers of the standard account are: Denis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 364; Jean LaPorte, Le Rationalism de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 190-1; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 11 and 221 n. 19; Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 198, 214 and 230. Lawrence Nolan offers a sustained argument for a nominalist account of attributes in 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes', Topio1 16 (1997a): 129-40. His position is singled out for criticism later in the chapter. Finally, Jean-Luc Marion considers the identification of a principal attribute and substance to be a requirement for making the inference from 'I think' to 'I am' and 'I am a thinking substance.' See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur le prisme metaphysique de Descartes(Pa (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), p. 161. One exception is found in Paul Hoffman, 'Descartes's theory of distinction', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 57-78. Hoffman also argues that the conceptual distinction has a foundation in re but for different reasons than those offered here. 2 See Dugald Murdoch, 'Exclusion and abstraction in Descartes's metaphysics', The Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1993): 38-57. I sketch his position here. 3 This occurs only if x and y do not refer to some other entity, which they partially but do not fully exclude as is the case with the second kind of modal distinction discussed below. 4 This point is reiterated in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (ATVIIIB 350: CSMI298). 5 More is said about the various relations among the attributes and between them and substance in 2.4.
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6 Nolan provides a similar summary of Murdoch's insight into the distinction between exclusion and abstraction. See Nolan, 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes'. He concludes that, although the notion of exclusion marks an ontological distinction among the distinguenda of the real and modal distinction, the conceptual distinction is an exception. Nolan does not accept the claim that attributes are mutually dependent beings as implied by the criterion of exclusion because of his adherence to the standard account. However, Nolan's exception of the conceptual distinction from this implication of ontological dependence is unwarranted, because he never really argues that the conceptual distinction is, in fact, an exception to the rule, and so there is no reason to believe that ontological dependence does not also result from the inability to exclude all that petains to the idea of x from the understanding of y and vice versa. 7 It is important to note that 'conceptual distinction' is the Cottingham, et al. translation of 'distinctio rationis', which could be translated more literally as a 'distinction of reason'. Of course, this does not decide the issue as to whether this distinction has a foundation in reality or is a mere product of the intellect, because the term 'distinctio rationis' is itself ambiguous between a distinctio rationis ratiocinantis and a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae. The former sense means that the distinction of reason is a distinction of 'reasoning reason', which is a distinction produced by the activity of the intellect without any foundation in re. The latter sense means that it is a distinction of the reasoned reason, which is a distinction found in the object reasoned about and so would have, in a sense to be clarified later in the chapter, a foundation in re. The standard account understands Descartes's conceptual distinction to be a rational distinction ratiocinantis, whereas in this chapter the argument is made that it is a rational distinction ratiocinatae. The Cottingham, et al. translation of 'distinctio rationis' is maintained here in order to clearly designate Descartes's distinction and to avoid misunderstandings that might arise due to this ambiguity. 8 Norman Wells, 'Descartes on distinction', Boston College Studies in Philosophy 1 (1966): 104-34. 9 Allan B. Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 28. 10 For more on this issue see Norman Wells, 'Suarez, historian and critic of the modal distinction between essential being and existential being', The New Scholasticism 36 (1962): 425-7. 11 My translation, Suarez, MD, 7, 1, 13. 12 My translation, Suarez, MD, 7, 1, 13. 13 My translation, Eustachius, SPQ, Metaphysics, 3, 7, 42. 14 My translation, Metaphysics, 3, 7, 42. 15 My translation, Eustachius, SPQ, Metaphysics, 3, 8, 43. 16 See Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, p. 35. For Scotus' own arguments that the attributes of God are formally distinct see Ordinatio I, d. 8, q. IX, 636-755. Also see Maurice Grajewski, The Formal Distinction
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17
18 19 20
21
22 23 24 25 26
of Duns Scotus:A Study in Metaphysics (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 180-91. Notice that the FD1 Scotists refer to 'diverse definitions' observed in re, whereas Eustachius speaks of the inclusion or containment of essences or entities discovered in re. So both definitions and essences were said to be in re on these accounts. But the twenty-first-century philosopher is more likely to think of definitions as mental or linguistic entities of some kind. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that Descartes's criterion of exclusion as it is used in CD 1 and CD2 is reminiscent of Eustachius' claims about the inclusion of one essence in another. For these reasons, the inclusion or exclusion of essences or natures shall be used with regards to the conceptual distinction while definitions will be considered linguistic expressions of these essences or natures. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus, pp. 33-6. See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 444 VIII, 603. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus, p. 76. This account is further corroborated by Suarez in his distinction of the rational distinction ratiocinatae,' [The rational distinction ratiocinatae] can be understood as pre-existing in reality prior to the discriminating operation of the mind, so as to be thought of as imposing itself, as it were, on the intellect, and to require the intellect only to recognize it, but not to constitute it' (MD, 7, 1, 4). So, for Suarez as for Descartes (discussed below) the distinguenda of the rational distinction ratiocinatae cause us to have ideas of them (i.e. impose themselves on the intellect), and they do this when they are observed in re by the intellect. For this translation, see Francisco Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinction, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ, STD (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947 and 1976), p. 18. For more on the notion of complete vs. incomplete being in Descartes, see Paul Hoffman, 'Cartesian Composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 251-70 and Tad Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mind-body union', Philosophical Review (April 1992): 281-325. This issue is also discussed with reference to human nature at 5.3 and composite natures in general at 6.2. Nolan, 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes', pp. 132 and 136. My translation. Eustachius, SPQ, Metaphysics, 3, 7, 43. Nolan, 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes', p. 130. Nolan, 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes', p. 137. Lawrence Nolan, 'Descartes's theory of universals', Philosophical Studies 98 (1998), 164-5.
CHAPTER 3
Cartesian Bodies
The previous chapters clarified certain aspects of Descartes's fundamental ontology and theory of distinction in order to shed further light on other opaque aspects of his metaphysics. One such opacity is his metaphysics of body in general and of the human body in particular. This is especially important for the study of Descartes's metaphysics of human nature, because the traditional understanding of his account of particular bodies as modes of the entire extended universe would pose some serious concerns for his theory of mind-body union. For if the human body were a mode or cluster of modes, then a union of mind and body would be that of an extended mode (i.e. the human body) united with a mental substance. The difficulty posed is twofold. First, such a mode-substance relation cannot occur between an extended mode and a non-extended substance, which would preclude any intelligible account of a Cartesian theory of mind-body union. Second, even if such a union of an extended mode with a mental substance could take place, any account of a per se union of mind and body would be precluded, since such an entity could only be a way or manner of being a substance and not a substance itself.1 This, however, is not the only issue addressed in this chapter, for it is intended to address several aspects of Descartes's metaphysics of body germane to his theory of mind-body union. First, this chapter concludes that particular bodies, including human bodies, are Cartesian substances in satisfaction of CS*, and therefore an account of mind-body union resulting in an ens per se cannot be precluded on these grounds. Second, the configuration and motion of parts replaces the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms as establishing a species of body. Third, the configuration and motion of parts of a real or true human body disposes it for union with a human mind or soul, and it is this disposition that distinguishes it from an automaton or a cadaver. These last two conclusions provide the basis for the claim made in 5.3 that the configuration and
Cartesian Bodies
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motion of parts of the human body constitute his 'form of corporeity' in accordance with the fundamentally pluralist account of mind-body union offered in Chapter 5.
3.1 THE MONIST POSITION A prevalent view among scholars is that, although individual minds are substances for Descartes, individual bodies are mere modes of the entire extended universe. Following Edward Slowik, this thesis will be labelled the 'monist position'. This position is generally based on two concerns: one textual, the other philosophical. The textual issue is addressed in this section and rests on an interpretation of a passage from the Synopsis in which Descartes speaks about 'body, taken in the general sense (in genera sumptuni), is a substance'.The philosophical issue will be discussed in 3.2 and stems from Descartes's rejection of the vacuum or empty space. After examining these issues, CS* is applied to this case to show that Descartes considered particular bodies to be created substances. Interestingly enough, the passage on which the monist position is based is also the passage that led Markie to conclude that Descartes has not two but three conceptions of substance. This section will take a look at aspects of this passage relevant to both concerns. The passage in question reads as follows: [W] e need to recognize that body, taken in the general sense (in genera sumptum), is a substance, so that it too never perishes. But the human body, in so far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of any accidents in this way, but is a pure substance. (AT VII 14: CSM II 10) The differences in interpretation, even among those maintaining the monist position, are too numerous and diverse to explicate here. So, only a very general summary of it will be provided. As Slowik has recognized, the monist position understands 'body, taken in the general sense, is a substance' to mean 'body, taken as all pervasive extension, is a substance'.2 This interpretation implies that the entire extended universe is the only extended substance for Descartes. Endorsers of this reading then proceed to marshal further textual evidence in support of this interpretation. Williams, for instance, deploys
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several passages in the second part of the Principles where Descartes asserts a strong assimilation between matter and physical space. For example, at Principles 11.10, Descartes claims that the extension of body is exactly the same as that of space (AT VIIIA 45: CSMI 227) and Principles 11.23 where he claims that 'the matter existing in the entire universe is thus one and the same' (AT VIIIA 52: CSM I 232). Hence, only allpervasive space is an extended substance while particular bodies are clusters of modes inhering in it.3 This conclusion, or something quite like it, is the conclusion commonly reached by commentators. This understanding of the Synopsis passage, however, is inconsistent with Descartes's explicit statements that particular bodies are substances. For instance, a particular mind and a particular stone are both categorized as substances in the Third Meditation: Although I conceive myself to be a thinking thing and not an extended thing, I truly conceive a stone to be an extended thing and not a thinking thing, and so there is the greatest difference between the one concept and the other. But, they seem to agree when considered in the category of substance. (AT VII 44: CSM II 30 modified) Whereas the monist position implies an asymmetry between particular bodies and minds regarding the category of substance, this passage explicitly states that both minds and particular bodies are substances; they are just of different kinds. He also claims at Principles 1.60 that all the parts of extension, i.e. particular bodies, as delimited by us in our thought, are substances (AT VIIIA 28-9: CSM I 213). At Principles 1.61, Descartes again uses a stone as an example of a substance in which the modes of shape and motion reside (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 214). He also calls a hand a complete substance when considered on its own because it can self-subsist (AT VII 222: CSM II 157). Finally, in a letter to Gibeuf dated 1642, Descartes claims that '[fjrom the simple fact that I consider the two halves of a part of matter, however small it may be, as two complete substances . . . I conclude with certainty that they are really divisible' (AT III 477: CSMK 202-3). It is also noteworthy that modes are not parts constituting a substance (AT VII 433: CSM II 292), which would have to be the case with the entire extended universe on the monist position, since everyone agrees that particular bodies are its constituent parts.4 Some endorsers of the monist position, such as Secada and Martial Gueroult, see the inconsistency between their interpretation and
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passages such as these and try to remedy the situation. Although their respective views are different, they both take basically the same approach by claiming that, strictly speaking, particular bodies are merely modes of the one extended universe but Descartes calls them 'substances' in a derivative or subaltern sense. For instance, Secada uses the Synopsis passage to ground his claim that 'substance' is being used in a derivative sense when applied to particular bodies. He notices that the identity of particular bodies is established by their determined parts, but then claims that this is not the strict or primary sense of the word. However, given the less than clear nature of this passage, Secada needs much more to support his position. Gueroult takes a different tack by arguing that particular bodies are really distinct from one another in that they are several things of one and the same nature, i.e. extension, individuated by motion (see Principles 11.23, AT VIIIA 52-3: CSM I 232-3). But particular bodies are modes, because they cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without their substance, i.e. extension, but extension can be clearly and distinctly understood without them. Accordingly, particular bodies are modally (MD2) distinct from the whole extended universe. In this way, Gueroult concludes that particular bodies are substances when considered among themselves but modes when considered in relation to extension.5 Gueroult's account of the real distinction among the parts but not among the parts and the whole, however, does not yield his desired conclusion. The crux of Gueroult's position is that particular bodies can be clearly and distinctly understood apart from each other but not apart from some third thing, viz the whole extended universe. This does not imply that particular bodies are substances in one sense but modes in another but satisfies the condition for being modally MD2 distinct as two modes of one and the same substance. So, Gueroult's account does not allow particular bodies the designation 'substance' in the Cartesian sense of the word, and as such he does not adequately resolve the inconsistency of the monist position with the texts where particular bodies are called 'substances'. In fact, a closer look at the Synopsis passage indicates that it does not provide any support for the monist position, since it is based on a misinterpretation. The sentence from the Synopsis stating 'body, taken in the general sense (in genere), is a substance' should not be understood to mean 'body, taken as all-pervasive extension, is a substance' but rather as 'body, taken not as being in individual creatures but as what all bodies have in common, is a substance'.This is made evident by Descartes's use
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of 'in genere' here and in his brief explication of his conceptualist theory of universals at Principles 1.58 and 59 mentioned in 2.5. 'Genere', as it is used here, is the ablative singular of the term 'genus' which can be used to mean 'kind' or 'in the general sense of a word'. A good example of Descartes's use of in genere is found at Principles 1.58: [N] umber, when it is considered simply in the abstract or (sive) in general (in genere), and not in any created things, is merely a mode of thinking; and the same applies to all the other universals, as we call them. (ATVIIIA 27: CSM I 212) As discussed in 2.5, the feature of being numbered is intellectually isolated from the numbered thing such that it can be applied to any set of numbered things. Hence, the idea of number insofar as it can be applied to many things just is 'number when it is considered simply in the abstract or in genere'. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Descartes's use of 'in genere' in the Synopsis passage refers to what all particular bodies have in common qua body, or body in general, viz extension (see Principles 1.53 and 54; ATVIIIA 25-6: CSM 1210-11 and Principles II.4; ATVIIIA 42: CSM I 224). Therefore, 'body, taken in the general sense, is a substance, so that it too never perishes' should be understood to mean that extension is a substance or an ultimate determinable. Hence, the general kind or genus of substance that is extended does not perish but can only be annihilated by the removal of God's concurrence. Thomas Lennon provides another interesting version of the monist position based on this passage. Although Lennon does not fall prey to this misinterpretation, he finds support for his version of the monist position in the following portion of the Synopsis passage cited above: But the human body, in so far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of any accidents in this way, but is a pure substance. (AT VII 14: CSM II 10) Based on this passage, Lennon concludes that 'individual corporeal bodies stand to extension or body taken generally as do thoughts or volitions to the mind - as accident to substance'.6 But, although the human body is made up of a configuration of limbs and other accidents, it does not follow that the human body is itself a mode or accident of the entire extended universe. Much more is going on here. First, the human
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body is 'made up of or 'moulded from' {conflatum) a configuration of limbs and other accidents. Second, this configuration is how human bodies differ from other kinds of bodies. So, it is the configuration of limbs that distinguishes the human species of body from, for example, the bovine, oak or granite species of body. Third, a change in some bodily parts causes the human body to lose its identity. This just means that when the configuration, mould or pattern of certain bodily limbs is changed, that body is no longer that species of body but another, and therefore it ceases to exist qua that kind of body. But this does not mean it ceases to exist qua body in general, i.e. as an extended thing.7 This speaks to the contrast drawn between substances that are pure and those that are not. The species of thinking thing that is the human mind is not made of a configuration of parts but is simple, and so it is a pure substance, while the human body is not a pure substance because this species of extended thing is made out of a configuration of parts. This distinction eventually leads to the conclusion that the human body ceases to exist when some of these parts change so that it is no longer configured in that way, thereby losing its identity as that species of particular body. This loss of specific identity is the cause of the human body's ceasing to exist, since it would no longer be what it was. But, the human mind cannot perish in this way, since it is not made up of such a configuration but is a simple nature. Yet, a part of extension that has lost one configuration in favour of another is still a part of extension. That is, it has not lost its identity as generic body or extension but only its identity as a species of body. Therefore, a closer look at this passage indicates that Descartes is not standing the human body to the extended universe as accident to substance, as Lennon contends. Rather, Descartes is attributing the configuration of limbs and other accidents to a part of extension as that which makes up that species of extended thing. In sum, the monist position is undermined on two counts. First, the term Hn genere' does not mean that Descartes is talking about 'allpervasive extension', as some scholars maintain, but about body in the general sense of the term, viz extension. Second, Descartes is not attributing the human body to the entire extended universe as an accident is attributed to a substance. Rather, he is claiming that the configuration of limbs and other accidents makes up species of bodies such that one configuration makes up, e.g., a stone, another a bird and another a human body, etc. Third, given the numerous texts where Descartes explicitly states that particular bodies are substances, in
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addition to this failure of the main textual evidence for the monist position, the preponderance of the textual evidence points towards Descartes's considered view being that particular bodies are created substances. Finally, this interpretation undermines Markie's claim that this passage offers a third definition of substance, because the distinction drawn is between pure or simple and 'impure' or complex substances, which is a distinction occurring within the category of substance. Here Descartes is not speaking about substance in general but is distinguishing those species of created substance or ultimate determinable whose nature or essence is composed of a configuration of parts from those species of substance whose essence is not so composed. Therefore, this is not a definition of substance in addition to those offered elsewhere in the Second Replies and the Principles.
3.2 THE VACUUM AND THE PROBLEM REAL D DISTINCTION
OF THE
One way of resolving the issue of whether or not particular bodies are created Cartesian substances would be to show that parts of extension are really distinct from one another and from the entire extended universe. This would involve showing that some part of extension could be clearly and distinctly understood apart from all other thinking and extended things (see Principles 1.60; AT VIIIA 28-9: CSM I 213). Many take this to mean that one body is to be clearly and distinctly understood apart from some other body with an empty space between them. But Descartes rejects the notion of an empty space or vacuum, and so two bodies cannot be clearly and distinctly understood apart in this way. This section provides brief explications of Descartes's rejection of the vacuum, the problem it poses for concluding that particular bodies are really distinct from each other, and Slowik's version of a real distinction argument that avoids this difficulty. In a 1638 letter to Mersenne, Descartes claims that 'it is, I think, just as impossible that a space should be empty as that a mountain should be without a valley' (AT II 440: CSMK 129). This implies that just as the conception of a mountain without a valley is unintelligible so also is the conception of an empty space, for it is the notion of a part of extension that is not extended. Further elaboration can be found at Principles II. 18 where Descartes uses the example of the space or extension inside a concave vessel to make the same point. A vessel that is considered empty
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is not really empty because there must be extended substance inside it. This is because the sides of the vessel are a certain distance from each other and, since distance is a mode of extension, it follows that there is extended substance present inside the vessel. If, for example, God were to annihilate all the extension within the vessel, then there would be nothing capable of having a mode of distance in it, and therefore there would be no distance between its sides. As a result, the sides of the vessel would touch (ATVIIIA 50: CSMI 230-1).This is precisely the difficulty that arises for showing that particular bodies are really distinct. Two particular bodies cannot be clearly and distinctly understood with an empty space (or vacuum) between them. If there were no extension between them, there would be no distance between them, and so they would touch.8 Slowik offers an argument for the real distinction of particular bodies that avoids this problem. His argument can be formulated as follows: Pick any particular body, which is a finite part of extension, and suppose that God annihilates all parts of extension except for this one. Let's call it b. On this account, b would be the only existent constituting this possible world. As such, b is clearly and distinctly understood apart or independently from all other parts of extension and the entire extended universe. The great benefit of this argument is that it does not require two parts of extension be understood with an empty space between them, but rather one particular body, namely b, is clearly and distinctly understood all by itself without anything else. Hence, the problem posed by the vacuum is avoided altogether, because b is being understood apart from all other particular bodies and the entire extended universe without supposing any empty space between it and some other body. Finally, since b could be any particular body or finite part of extension, it follows that any body is really distinct from any other body and the entire extended universe. Therefore particular bodies are substances. Slowik's argument does a splendid job of avoiding the problem of the vacuum, but it runs up against a different difficulty resulting from Descartes's account of the surface of particular bodies as expressed at
Principles 11.15:
[E]xternal place may be taken as being the surface immediately surrounding what is in the place. It should be noted that 'surface' here does not mean any part of the surrounding body but merely the boundary between the surrounding and surrounded bodies, which is no more than a mode. (ATVIIIA 48: CSM I 229)
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The basic point is that surface is a mode shared by a body and the bodies surrounding it. This indicates that a body must be surrounded by some other body or bodies in order for it to have a limiting surface. Now the finitude of a part of extension stems from the fact that it has a limiting surface, which it cannot have unless it is surrounded by some other body or bodies. Therefore, since it would no longer have a limiting surface, b would no longer be a finite part of extension, contrary to Slowik's supposition that it is. This leads to the further result that b would be indefinitely extended, since there would literally be nothing beyond it. So, whereas b has a finite, and therefore discoverable, border in the actual world, it would no longer have a discoverable border in this supposed possible world. Hence, b would no longer be finite but indefinite (see Principles 1.26 and 27; ATVTIIA 14-16: CSM I 201-2).This would be to replace one indefinitely extended universe, i.e. the physical universe as it actually is, with another indefinitely extended universe, i.e. b.9 Slowik, however, is aware of this difficulty and offers a response based on the following letter to Mesland dated 9 February 1645 about the miracle of the Eucharist: This surface intermediate between the air and the bread does not differ in reality from the surface of the bread, or from the surface of the air touching the bread; these three surfaces are a single thing and differ only in relation to our thought. That is to say, when we call it the surface of the bread, we mean that although the air which surrounds the bread changed, the surface remains always numerically the same, provided the bread does not change, but changes with it if it does. And when we call it the surface of the air surrounding the bread, we mean that it does not change with either, but only with the shape of the dimensions which separate the one from the other; if, however, it is taken in that sense, it is by that shape alone that it exists, and also by that alone that it can change. (AT IV 164: CSMK 241-2)10 This passage reiterates Descartes's notion of a surface as an extended mode shared by both the surrounded and surrounding bodies. However, Slowik points out what he takes to be a more important aspect, namely that the surface of some surrounded part of extension is invariant under a change of the surrounding bodies. This suggests that b, which was surrounded by other parts of extension but is now the sole extended existent in this possible world, retains its surface even though the surrounding bodies have been annihilated by God. Slowik recognizes that this
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inference is problematic and proposes that such a 'neighborless' part of extension might possess a sort of vestigial possibility of a common surface or, on a mathematical metaphor, it is the limiting case of a common surface as the existence of the surrounding bodies goes to zero.11 However, Slowik's response is inadequate for at least two reasons. First, he does not fully appreciate the difference between a change in the surrounding bodies and the annihilation of all surrounding bodies. A change in the surrounding bodies means only that one set of surrounding bodies is replaced by another. The surface continues to exist precisely because some set of bodies has replaced the previous set of surrounding bodies. But, the annihilation of all surrounding bodies results in there being no set of surrounding bodies. Descartes's relational account of a body's limiting surface implies that no such surface could exist, if there were no surrounding bodies. Second, Slowik's 'vestigial possibility' amounts to admitting that an isolated part of extension potentially has a surface even though it does not have it actually. This is true, but it does not solve the problem, because this possible world is supposed to contain an actually finite part of extension. A set of surrounding bodies is required for b to have an actually limiting surface. So, as argued above, since b has no actually limiting surface, it would be an indefinitely extended universe unto itself. Slowik, however, rejects this formulation of the difficulty, because it would lead to the further problem of how a particular body would retain its identity, since it is now indefinitely extended. But again Slowik fails to appreciate the severity of the problem. Instead, he wants to continue to maintain that a part of extension can still be 'delimited by us in our thought' in accordance with Descartes's claim at Principles 1.60 even though no actual limiting surface could exist in that possible world. But this loss of b's identity is a severe consequence, since the point of the argument is to show that actually finite parts of extension are substances. Although b, now an indefinitely extended universe itself, would still be a substance, b would no longer be actually finite and so it has not been shown that such a part of extension (i.e. a particular body) is a Cartesian substance. In the final analysis, Slowik's argument, although it avoids the problem posed by the vacuum, cannot overcome the problem posed by Descartes's relational account of a limiting surface.
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3.3 PARTICULAR BODIES ARE SUBSTANCES The preceding sections indicated some of the problems faced by any attempt to show that particular bodies are really distinct from each other and, therefore, are created Cartesian substances. However, this outcome does not indicate that Descartes did not consider particular bodies to be substances. In fact, 3.1 showed that the preponderance of the textual evidence indicates that Descartes did consider them to be substances. Furthermore, particular bodies or parts of extension satisfy CS*. First, finite parts of extension are determinables for modes of size, shape and motion, as everyone agrees, and so the first condition is satisfied. Second, particular bodies are the parts constituting the whole extended universe, which is not a relation of determinate to determinable but of parts to whole. Since they cannot be modes of thinking or of God, it follows that particular bodies are ultimate determinables. Therefore, particular bodies satisfy CS* and are created Cartesian substances. Here it is important to emphasize that this result indicates only Descartes's considered view but does not claim that he can legitimately maintain this position given his relational account of bodily surfaces.
3.4 THE REJECTION OF SUBSTANTIAL FORMS Recall from 3.1 that Descartes accounts for the species of a particular body by means of the configuration and motion of its parts. But, as discussed in 1.2, this function was performed by substantial forms for scholastic thinkers, which, among other things, were the principles of organization or configuration of quantified matter. Yet, Descartes is famous for his rejection of substantial forms even though he still maintains that the species of body is determined by the organization or configuration of its parts. This section focuses on Descartes's reasons for rejecting substantial forms and his replacement of final causal explanations with those based on efficient causes. This then will be used to ground the conclusion reached in 3.6 that a disposition for unity with a human mind is required for being a true or real human body. Here the reader is asked to recall the examination of the Synopsis passage in 3.1 indicating that 'the human body, in so far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents of this sort'. This was shown to indicate that human bodies differ from other bodies, e.g. dogs, trees, stones, etc., in that the
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configuration of this part of matter or particular body differs in important ways from the configuration of other kinds of particular bodies. Accordingly, species of bodies are distinguished from each other by means of their respective configurations of parts. A few lines later on the Synopsis states that 'a human body loses its identity merely as a result of a change in the shape of some of its material parts' (AT VII 14: CSM II 10). Hence, a change in some of a particular body's configuration of parts results in a loss of specific identity, and as such that particular thing insofar as it is a species of thing would cease to exist. Yet, it would still be a thing in the genus of extension, since it is still an extended part, even though it had ceased being that species of body. What is surprising about Descartes's account of the species of bodies in the Synopsis is that it is virtually indistinguishable from the scholastic conception of substantial forms in material things. This is surprising because the Cartesian and scholastic doctrines concern the organization or configuration of material parts, yet the replacement of substantial forms with the configuration and motion of parts is commonly thought to be a radical divergence from the scholastic position. Indeed, given this fundamental similarity between these two doctrines, it is difficult to see what it is about substantial forms Descartes so vehemently rejects.12 The following passage from the Meteorology provides a clue as to why and to what extent Descartes rejected substantial forms in his philosophy:13 Bear in mind too, that to avoid a breach with the philosophers, I have no wish to deny any further items which they may imagine in bodies over and above what I have described, such as 'substantial forms,' their 'real qualities,' and so on. It simply seems to me that my arguments must be all the more acceptable in so far as I can make them depend on fewer things. (AT VI 239: CSM II 173 n 2) Here Descartes claims to have provided a simpler, and therefore better, explanation of certain physical phenomena than explanations offered by those with recourse to substantial forms or real qualities. This, of course, does not deny the existence of such entities but only that more fruitful explanations can be discovered by other, clearer means. This is also the crux of his remarks to Jean-Baptiste Morin in a letter dated 13 July 1638: Compare my assumptions with the assumptions of others. Compare
all their real qualities, their substantial forms, their elements and countless
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other such things with my single assumption that all bodies are composed of parts. (AT II 200: CSMK 107) Descartes goes on to emphasize the ease of understanding his assumption and how he has used it, along with other, easily demonstrated theses, to clearly demonstrate things about various physical phenomena, e.g. vision, salt, the rainbow, etc. The thrust of these remarks is that his mechanistic way of doing physics is clearer, and therefore better, than the physics practised by those subscribing to the existence of substantial forms. Another related reason for rejecting substantial forms and real qualities as principles of explanation stems from their obscure or occult nature, which is recognized even by those employing them: The ordinary philosophy which is taught in the schools and universities is by contrast merely a collection of opinions that are for the most part doubtful, as is shown by the continual debates in which they are thrown back and forth. They are quite useless, moreover, as long experience has shown to us; for no one has ever succeeded in deriving any practical benefit from 'prime matter,' 'substantial forms,' 'occult qualities' and the like. So it is quite irrational for those who have learnt such opinions, which they themselves confess to be uncertain, to condemn others who are trying to discover more certain ones. (AT VIIIB 28: CSMK 221) In this excerpt from a May 1643 letter, Descartes scolds Voetius and other schoolmen for condemning him and his followers. This is because they are seeking principles that are more certain than the admittedly uncertain and mysterious principles of prime matter, substantial form and occult qualities usually invoked by scholastic philosophers as explanatory principles in physics. Hence, Descartes argues that deductions from the configuration and motion of bodily parts is clearer and more certain than these scholastic principles, because the principle that all bodies are composed of parts 'is visible to the naked eye in many cases and can be proved by countless reasons in others. All that I add to this is that the parts of certain kinds of bodies are of one shape rather than another' (AT II 200: CSMK 107). So, the configuration and motion of parts is a clear and certain principle from which clear and certain explanations of physical phenomena can be derived. At this point it is clear that Descartes rejected the use of substantial forms and real qualities in explanations of physical phenomena for at
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least two reasons. One was that his explanations based on the configuration and motion of parts provided more elegant and, therefore, better explanations, because they depended on fewer entities than those offered by the scholastics. The other was that the natures of substantial forms and real qualities were obscure and doubtful. Clear and certain explanations should not be based on principles that are not themselves clear and certain. But surely more is at stake here since substantial forms are also principles of bodily configuration in order to form a species of thing. But, Descartes's configuration and motion of parts is supposed to be a clearer principle than these scholastic principles of configuration. Yet, so far there is no discernable difference between the two doctrines even though both Descartes and his scholastic opponents take them to be fundamentally different. What is this difference? A clue can be found in the texts just cited: Descartes is interested in the clarity and intelligibility of scientific explanation. But what distinguishes Descartes's scientific explanations from those employing substantial forms? The answer to this question is found at Principles 1.28, which has the heading, 'It is not the final but the efficient causes of created things that we must inquire into': When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them and we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes. (AT VIIIA 15: CSM I 202; see also Fourth Meditation AT VII 55: CSM II 39) Recall from 1.2 that for the scholastics the nature or form of all things is ultimately traced back to the main purpose or end of that species of thing. So, for example, a swallow's nest-making activity was caused or explained by its disposition for engaging in that activity. The existence of this disposition was in turn caused or explained by the substantial form of 'swallow-ness' in that nest-making is a characteristic activity directed at the goal of being a swallow. As a result, an answer to the question 'Why do swallows build nests?' would be something like 'because that's what swallows do for the sake of being a swallow'. This explanation of the swallow's nest-making activity is true but only trivially so. Surely nest-building is an activity to which swallows are disposed by virtue of being swallows, but such explanations do not tell us anything new about them. Another, classic example of such an explanation is 'Opium puts people to sleep, because it has a dormitive power.'
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All this says is that the cause of opium's activity of putting people to sleep is its disposition or power for doing so, which again is only trivially true; it tells us nothing about how it puts people to sleep. So Descartes rejects final causal explanations, because they do not provide any new or useful knowledge, and therefore our efforts are better directed at the discovery of efficient (i.e. mechanistic) causal explanations. This suggests that the obscurity and absence of explanatory force attributed to substantial forms and real qualities by Descartes can be traced to their final causal component. In fact, the rejection of this essential feature of these scholastic explanatory principles implies that these entities themselves do not exist. This is because ascribing final causality to entirely material things is an illicit ascription of mental properties, i.e. will and knowledge, to wholly non-mental things. Descartes is most explicit about this in the following passage from the Sixth Replies: But what makes it especially clear that my idea of gravity was taken largely from the idea I had of the mind is the fact that I thought that gravity carried bodies toward the centre of the earth as if it had some knowledge of the centre within itself. For this surely could not happen without knowledge, and there can be no knowledge except in a mind. Nevertheless I continued to apply to gravity various other attributes which cannot be understood to apply to a mind in this way for example its being divisible, measurable and so on. (AT VII 442: CSM II 298)14 The scholastics understood gravity to be a quality existing ultimately for the sake of being a bodily kind of thing. This quality just is the tendency for moving towards the centre of the earth such that it would move in this direction unless impeded by some external force. Given the final causal nature of this sort of explanation, it implies that an inanimate body somehow intends or wills to move towards the centre of the earth, which implies further that the body somehow has knowledge of it. But only minds can have knowledge, and so those explaining physical phenomena by means of substantial forms, real qualities and their entailed final causes are illicitly ascribing mental properties to entirely non-mental things, e.g. a stone. Descartes then goes on to reject the existence of substantial forms and real qualities based on the observation that this is to confuse the ideas of mind and body, and that these ideas should be clearly distinguished (AT VII 442-3: CSM II 298).15
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This confusion of the mental with the physical did not stop here but was also based on the fact that the scholastics considered them to be immaterial substances. First, substantial forms and real qualities were considered res by the scholastics insofar as both were thought to be really distinct from matter in accordance with RD. Since, on this account, substantial forms and real qualities did not require matter for their existence, it follows that they, like minds or souls, were immaterial things. This is made evident in the draft of an open letter to Voetius along with a passage from part four of the Principles: It is inconceivable that a substance should come into existence without being created de novo by God; but we see that every day many so-called substantial forms come into existence; and yet the people who think they are substances do not believe that they are created by God; so their view is mistaken . . . Hence, since the other 'forms' are not thought to be created in this way, but merely to emerge from the potentiality of matter, they should not be regarded as substances. (AT III 505: CSMK 208) The point is that the adherents of the doctrines of substantial forms and real qualities also adhere to the doctrine that these immaterial forms of material things come into being through their emendation from the potentiality in matter and not from God creating them de novo (see also AT VI 59: CSM I 141).The problem with this is that: there is no way of understanding how these same attributes (size, shape and motion) can produce something else whose nature is quite different from their own like substantial forms and real qualities which many suppose to inhere in things. (AT VIIIA 322: CSM I 285) This passage from Part IV of the Principles indicates that the difficulty mentioned in the open letter to Voetius stems from the inherent unintelligibility of any explanation of how an entirely material thing can bring into existence (i.e. be an efficient cause in the broad sense of the term) an immaterial thing. So, Descartes here is recognizing an intelligibility problem with a material thing being the efficient cause of an immaterial thing. This will also be important in discussing Descartes's dissolution to the mind-body problem in Chapter 6, but for now it is sufficient to note that substantial forms and real qualities were also
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considered mind or soul-like because they were thought to be immaterial substances. Thus far it has been shown that Descartes levelled at least three criticisms of the use of substantial forms and real qualities in scientific explanations: (1) better explanations of physical phenomena can be obtained without them and with recourse only to the configuration and motion of parts; (2) substantial forms and real qualities are themselves obscure and so cannot shed any real light on the phenomena they are employed to explain; and (3) the scholastics mistakenly conceived them to be immaterial substances with faculties of willing and knowing, which is to project the idea of the mind onto completely non-mental, material things thereby confusing these two ideas. Notice that the lack of explanatory force possessed by substantial forms and real qualities stems from their final causal aspect: explaining some physical phenomena by means of the disposition of that sort of thing to act in that way does not explain much of anything. And, moreover, their obscurity stems from the fact that there is no explanation of their 'mechanisms', i.e. how they do their causal job; they just act and that's it. Finally, the existence of such entities in the entirely physical world should be rejected altogether, because they are mistaken conceptions based on a confusion of the mind, i.e. an immaterial thing with intellect and will, with an entirely extended, non-mental thing. So, Descartes's main point of contention with the scholastics on the issue of substantial forms and real qualities has to do with their alleged mentality and entailed final causal component. But, Descartes thinks that final causes should be ignored in favour of efficient or mechanistic causes. Therefore, the main difference between scholastic substantial forms and Descartes's doctrine of deriving explanations from the configuration and motion of parts is his shift from final to efficient causal explanations in physics. This shift is also the fundamental difference between scholastic and Cartesian doctrines of material forms. On the scholastic account, the organization or configuration of matter is the effect or result of a striving to achieve the goal of being that species of thing, e.g. a swallow. Hence, the goal is supposed to explain why a certain body has a resultant configuration and set of dispositions. But Descartes argues that the causal relationship goes the other way; that is, the configuration and motion of material parts is the efficient cause or source of the existence of a resultant species of thing with a given set of dispositions. So, on the Cartesian account, the form or species of a thing is not the cause of
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material configuration, but rather the form or species is an effect resulting from the configuration and motion of parts. This also means that the characteristic dispositions for being that species of thing, e.g. the disposition for nest-building found in the species 'swallow', are effects following from the configuration of parts. In other words, dispositions depend for their existence on the configuration and motion of parts and not the other way around (see AT III 503: CSMK 208).
3.5 MATERIAL FORMS AND THE HUMAN BODY The previous section argued that Descartes's main bone of contention with his scholastic counterparts had to do with their mentalistic conception of the substantial forms of entirely material things. Descartes then went on to transform the scholastic doctrine in an efficient causal or mechanistic light in an effort to conceptually divorce the mental from the physical in order to discover clear and certain explanations in physics. This also involved denying such forms any existence independent of matter such that they could be neither immaterial nor self-subsistent entities, i.e. created Cartesian substances in satisfaction of CS*. This led to Descartes's further claim that these material forms were not themselves substances but mere modes (AT III 503: CSMK 208). As briefly discussed in 1.5, all this means is that his principles of material configuration or forms cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without matter, and as such they cannot exist without the matter they configure. These configurations are accidental to the particular body they configure, since that part of extension can be conceived without being configured in any particular way. In other words, a part of extension is still a part of extension, i.e. an entity within the genus 'extension', regardless of whether it is configured so as to result in a stone, a bush or a swallow. But, it is also important to recognize that being configured in such and such a way just is what it is to be that species of body for Descartes. For example, a part of extension configured in one way would result in a swallow species of body, while that same part of extension configured in another way could result in a stone species of body. So, these configurations, although modes of extension in one sense, are themselves essential or necessary for being a resultant species of body. This conclusion is borne out by further consideration of the passage from the Synopsis that has been the centerpiece of this chapter. In the following excerpt, Descartes claims that this configuration and motion of
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parts serves as the principle by which a particular body (in this case the human body) maintains its identity: For even if all the accidents of the mind change, so that it has different objects of the understanding and different desires and sensations, it does not on that account become a different mind; whereas a human body loses its identity merely as a result of a change in the shape of some of its parts. (AT VII 14: CSM II 10) So, although the identity of the mind does not change despite any change in its modes, since it is a pure substance, the identity of the human body (or any particular body for that matter) remains only when there is no change in the shape of some of its parts. Surely, the change of not just any part will cause a body to lose its identity. For example, someone may chip a piece off a stone, but surely that is not sufficient for it to lose its identity as a stone. The word 'some' is crucial here, for it indicates that a change in the shape of some parts but not others results in a loss of identity. The question becomes: What parts need to change shape in order for a particular body to lose its identity? Provided that this configuration and motion of parts determines or designates the species of body, it is likely that this changed part or parts would be essential to being that species of thing. Descartes calls such modes 'qualities' at Principles 1.56: 'when the modification enables the substance to be designated a substance of such and such a kind, we use the term quality' (ATVIIIA 26: CSM I 211). This passage is especially germane to the case of bodies because, as emphasized in the Synopsis^ species of mind are not determined by any such modification. The point is that a set of qualities (in this technical sense) permits the designation of a substance as a kind or species of substance. This indicates that the parts required for a body to lose its identity would need to be one of its qualities as explained here. Further examination of the identity of particular bodies as this doctrine pertains to the human body is provided in a February 1645 letter to Mesland but with an interesting twist: First of all, I consider what exactly is the body of a man, and I find that this word 'body' is ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, we mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were removed, we would judge without more
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ado that the body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter were changed, we would at once think that the body was no longer quite the same, no longer numerically the same. (ATIV166:CSMK243) Here Descartes maintains that any change in a particular body or determinate part of matter results in a loss of its numerical identity. This means that a body at time t + 1 would not be numerically the same body as at t, if any particle of its matter had changed during that time. Descartes goes on to discuss how this is not the case for the human body: But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of matter, or one that has a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of the matter which is united with the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, 'numerically the same' body, so long as it remains joined and substantially united with the same soul. (AT IV 166: CSMK 243) Descartes reiterated this claim in another letter to Mesland dated 1645 or 1646: [I]t is quite true to say that I have the same body now as I had ten years ago, although the matter of which it is composed has changed, because the numerical identity of the body of a man does not depend on its matter, but on its form, which is the soul. (AT IV 346: CSMK 278-9) These excerpts, however, are at odds with the account of a human body provided in the Synopsis on at least two counts. First, the earlier letter to Mesland indicates that a body loses its 'numerical identity' when any one of its parts changes, while in the Synopsis only a change in some of those parts, i.e. its qualities in the technical sense, results in a loss of identity. Second, in the Synopsis the human body is described to be nothing but a configuration of limbs and other accidents, which seems to contradict his later claim to Mesland that a human body is not a determinate part of matter. How are these passages to be reconciled? A clue to this reconciliation is found in the portion of the first letter to Mesland where Descartes contends that in the case of a human body the term 'body' is ambiguous. The first sense of the term concerns the
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human body qua body in that all bodies are determinate parts of matter whose species is determined by some configuration and motion of its parts. The second sense concerns the human body qua human such that its numerical identity is preserved so long as it is united with one and the same mind or soul, for '[n]obody denies that we have the same bodies as we had in our infancy, although their quantity has much increased and . . . there is no longer in them any part of matter which then belonged to them' (AT IV 166-7: CSMK 243). So, a human body is considered a body in two different senses of the term: 1) it is a determinate part of extension; and 2) insofar as it is the body of a particular human being, i.e. a human body substantially united with the same soul. This point is illustrated further later in the first letter to Mesland in which Descartes discusses the senses in which a human body is both divisible and indivisible: In that sense [i.e. a human body qua human] it can even be called indivisible, because if an arm or a leg of a man is amputated, we think that it is only in the first sense of 'body' that this body is divided - we do not think that a man who has lost an arm or a leg is less a man than any other. (AT IV 167: CSMK 243) So, the human body qua human is indivisible in that the loss of some limb does not mean that the one who lost it is any less of a human being. But the human body qua body is divisible, because the amputation of a limb would lessen its quantity and would, therefore, be less in this respect. In this case, the human body qua body would not be numerically the same body as before the amputation, but the human body qua human would be numerically the same, since he would not be any less of a human being without the amputated limb. So, the human body is truly human only when it is substantially united with a soul (see AT III 461: CSMK 200), and 'we think that this body is whole and entire so long as it has in itself all the dispositions required to preserve that union' (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). Hence, a quality (in the technical sense) of a human body is that the configuration and motion of its parts results in a disposition for union with a mind. This disposition for union will become especially important later in the section. But for now it is sufficient to notice how it reconciles the first difficulty resulting from an apparent conflict of claims made in the letter to Mesland and the Synopsis. As stated in the Synopsis, the configuration and motion of parts determines the species of a body as human. One result of this configuration is
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this disposition for union. This disposition, then, makes it possible for this body to be substantially united with a soul and, therefore, become a human body qua human. But, if some part of this body decays such that it no longer has the requisite configuration and motion of parts on which this disposition depends, then that body is no longer a human body qua human. It would be a cadaver, which is only a determinate part of matter that only resembles a truly human body, since it lacks one of its essential qualities. This is supported further at Passions of the Soul 1.6 where Descartes compares the difference between a living and a dead human body to the workings of a watch or other automaton. A living body, i.e. a human body qua human, is like a wound watch with its principle of self-motion intact, whereas a dead body is like a broken watch with its principle of selfmotion inactive (AT XI 330-1: CSMI 329-30). Accordingly, death does not occur as a result of the soul leaving the body but because of the decay of some essential quality of the body, which then results in a loss of its disposition for union with the soul or mind.16 Hence, the account of the identity of the human body in the Synopsis should be understood as applying only to the human body qua human and not qua body, since only the former has the requisite disposition for union in order to be truly human. Interestingly enough, the second difficulty points toward one of the main conclusions of this work; namely that the configuration and motion of parts constitutes a 'form of corporeity' for Descartes while the soul is the substantial form of the human being. This will be discussed in more detail in 5.1. But for now it is important to notice that the species of body is determined by the configuration and motion of limbs as described in the Synopsis. What the letters to Mesland add to this is that an essential quality of a truly human body is that this configuration and motion of parts must be able to sustain a disposition for union with the soul. And it is this configuration and resultant disposition that distinguishes the human body qua human from other species of bodies, including cadavers. Another interesting and important point about the human body qua human and its difference from other species of body should also be mentioned, viz its difference from human automata. In the fifth part of the Discourse, Descartes summarizes some of what he said in the Treatise on Man about the workings of the human body and those bodily motions not governed by the will (AT VI 55-6: CSM I 139). The point was that these physiological functions occur in the human body like a machine
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such that if any machine had these organs with the 'outward shape of a monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals' (AT VI 56: CSMI 139).17 But, if such an automaton were made with the outward appearance of a human being, there would be two ways of distinguishing it from a real human being. The first mark is that this automaton would not be able to offer meaningful answers to any question posed to it but could only be designed to make the sounds of words when, for example, some part of it is touched. The second mark is that, although this automaton may be able to perform some functions better than a real human being, it would not be able to perform others. This is because it would require a disposition of parts for every possible action and would not be operating from understanding. Accordingly, these marks distinguishing a human automaton from a real human being are marks of understanding, which can only be found in something with a mind (ATVI 56-7: CSM I 140). Hence, this disposition for union with an intellectual soul or mind is not found in such automata but only in the bodies of real human beings.18 Accordingly, a real human being results from the appropriate union of the mind with the body, which Descartes claims to have showed in a part of the Treatise on Man now lost (ATVI 59-60: CSM I 141), and in the union argument of the Sixth Meditation examined in Chapter 4.
3.6 CONCLUSION This chapter examined aspects of Descartes's metaphysics of body germane to the study of his theory of mind-body union. One conclusion was that, despite the standard view among commentators, particular bodies are Cartesian substances in accordance with CS*. Although this conclusion runs up against a serious philosophical problem resulting from his relational theory of bodily surfaces, the preponderance of the textual evidence indicates that this was Descartes's considered view. It is just that neither he nor anyone else had noticed this difficulty until recently. This conclusion is sufficient for cutting off the potential criticism that mind and body cannot be united per se because such a union cannot occur between an immaterial substance and a material mode. Another important conclusion was discovered in the investigation of Descartes's rejection of substantial forms and real qualities. The crux of
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his rejection of these entities as explanatory principles in physics focused on their final causal component. It was then shown that the essential point of difference between these scholastic principles and Descartes's doctrine lay with his rejection of final causal explanations in favour of those based on efficient or mechanistic causation. This resulted in a reverse of the explanatory order such that dispositions for action were not the final cause of something's configuration of parts, but rather that thing's configuration of parts was the efficient cause of those dispositions. As such, the configuration and motion of parts results in the form or species of particular bodies. Hence, the configuration and motion of parts constituting a human body resulting in a disposition for union with the mind can, in a particularly Cartesian sense, be said to be the human 'form of corporeity'. The final conclusion is that this disposition for union with the soul is an essential quality (in the technical sense) for being a human body qua human. It is this disposition and the actualization of it by a human soul that results in a real human being and not an automaton. However, in the letters to Mesland on which this account is based, Descartes claims that this union is 'substantial'. If this term is understood as it was used among Descartes's contemporaries, then it would imply that mind and body are united per se so as to form one, whole scholastic substance. But this runs counter to the traditional view that mind and body are two substances connected by a relation of causal interaction so as to form merely an ens per accidens. Yet, despite appearances to the contrary, there are textual and philosophical reasons for rejecting this traditional view in favour of the view that mind and body are united per se. The first and crucial piece of evidence is found in Descartes's argument for the per se unity of mind and body in the Sixth Meditation.
NOTES 1 Hoffman also addresses this concern. See Paul Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', The Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 347. 2 Edward Slowik, 'Descartes and individual corporeal substance', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (2001): 7. 3 See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), pp. 127-9. It is interesting to note that R. S. Woolhouse provides a different but interesting interpretation of the Synopsis passage. He takes it to indicate Descartes's considered view that there is only extended substance as such and not only one extended substance, contrary
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to the monist position explicated in the text and endorsed by Williams, Secada and Gueroult. Woolhouse's point is that bodies are pieces of extended substance just as there are pieces of lead and not 'leads'. So Woolhouse understands 'substance' in the sense of a kind of stuff rather than in the more traditional sense of a self-subsisting thing. So, on this account, particular bodies are not kinds of stuff but are pieces or parts of that stuff. See R. S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 22-3. Harry Bracken and Henry Burke hold views similar to Woolhouse: see Harry Bracken, 'Some problems of substance among the Cartesians', American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964): 129-37 and Henry Burke, 'Substance and accident in the philosophy of Descartes', The New Scholasticism 10 (1936): 338-82. 4 Hoffman makes this point. See Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', p. 349. 5 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza (Paris: Aubier-Montagne, 1974), vol. 1, p. 538. See Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 208 for his position. 6 Thomas Lennon, The Battle of Gods and Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 194. Lennon provides further justification for his version of the monist position on pages 202-5, which is based on a plethora of concerns intended to establish Descartes's idealism with regards to body and motion but lie beyond the scope of this paper. Although he does not address most of the passages stating or implying that particular bodies are substances, Lennon does address one from Principles 1.60 where Descartes claims that parts of extension, as delimited by us in our thought, are substances. Lennon argues that Descartes is using an inaccurate example in order to make a heuristic point, and that Descartes's intention is not to determine instances of the real distinction but to explain the real distinction itself. This line of reasoning, however, is not very convincing, for Lennon never tells us why Descartes would purposely use an inaccurate example to make the point here. Surely Descartes's intent is to explain the real distinction and accurate examples would serve to make this explanation clearer. Lennon claims further that this example does not count, because Descartes is really concerned with the mind and its knowledge in the first part of the Principles and only turns to material things in the second part. Although this is true, it does not mean that Descartes did not use parts of extension as accurate examples, or that he did not maintain that such parts are themselves substances. Indeed, the shortcomings of this argument, the misinterpretations of the Synopsis passage by Lennon and other adherents of the monist position, and the numerous texts where Descartes states or implies that particular bodies are substances puts the preponderance of the textual evidence in favour of the position argued here.
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7 This raises other issues about the identity of particular bodies both as they are distinguished from other species of bodies and their numerical identity over time. One issue is whether or not any particular body retains its identity given Descartes's account of the composition of bodies as a potentially infinite number of imperceptible particles in various states of motion and rest. Lennon discusses this issue further with reference to a 9 February 1645 letter to Mesland (AT IV 166: CSMK 241). See Lennon, The Battle of Gods and Giants, pp. 194 et seq. As with the problem of a limiting surface discussed below, these issues of identity do not undermine the interpretation offered here but are philosophical issues arising between Descartes's considered view and other aspects of this metaphysics. 8 Spinoza and Leibniz both obtain this result. Spinoza uses it to argue that extension cannot be divided at Ethics Ipl5s. Leibniz uses this difficulty to show that Cartesian bodies must be modes since they are not substances, which he considers to be a serious shortcoming of the Cartesian metaphysics of body. See letter to de Voider dated 20 June 1703, in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 174. 9 Slowik credits Roger Florka with making this point. See Slowik, 'Descartes and individual corporeal substance', p. 13 n. 20. 10 This account of surface and external place in general can be found at Principles 11.13 and 15. See AT VIIIA 47-49: CSM I 228-9. 11 Slowik, 'Descartes and individual corporeal substance', pp. 14-15. 12 This is contrary to the view held by Des Chene and Rozemond that the doctrine of principal attributes plays the role of substantial forms in Descartes's metaphysics: Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 27. The difficulty with their position is that extension and thinking are ultimate genera and not species. As shown in the main text, there are different species of things that fall under the genus of extension because of the differing configurations of parts required for being. Moreover, Descartes indicates at various places that the human species of mind is different from the angelic species, and that these two kinds of finite mind are different from the infinite mind of God. Therefore, since substantial forms constituted the species of a given substance and not merely its genus, the principal attributes cannot serve this function. 13 Desmond Clarke provides a nice account of Descartes's rejection of substantial forms and real qualities in scientific explanation. Much of the account offered in this chapter is indebted to Clarke's work. See Desmond Clarke, Descartes's Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 18-32. But a difference between my account and Clarke's is that he does not fully examine the role of final causes both in the scholastic version of scientific explanation and as a fundamental feature of a substantial form's activity. As a result, he does not come to the conclusion reached below that the obscurity of these sorts of explanations is a direct consequence of their final causal nature.
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14 This passage is studied in more detail in 5.4 with particular emphasis on the sense in which the soul is 'co-extensive' with the body. 15 Descartes makes this claim in several other places as well. For example, in a 22 July 1641 letter to De Launey, Descartes concludes that 'people commonly mingle the two ideas of body and soul when they construct the ideas of real qualities and substantial forms, which I think should be altogether rejected' (AT III 420: CSMK 188). A nearly identical claim is also made in a 26 April 1643 letter to Mersenne, 'I do not suppose there are in nature any real qualities, which are attached to substances, like so many little souls to their bodies' (AT III 648: CSMK 216). This observation will be crucial for showing in 5.2 that the human mind is the only substantial form left standing in Descartes's metaphysics. 16 Much of this account of the human body qua human is indebted to the examination of this issue in Thomas Prendergast, 'Descartes: immortality, human bodies, and God's absolute freedom', The Modern Schoolman 71 (1993): 32-4. 17 The relevant portions of the Treatise on Man can be found at AT XI 120 and 201-2: CSM I 99 andlO8. 18 These remarks about automata are then applied to the distinction between animals and human beings. Of course, one notorious consequence of this Cartesian doctrine is that animals do not have sensations but are only disposed to cry out when certain 'buttons' are pushed. This ability to have sensations like hunger, thirst and pain will become especially important when examining Descartes's argument for the substantial union of mind and body in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4
The Substantial Union Argument
In the Fourth Objections, Antoine Arnauld expressed his concern that Descartes proved too much with his argument for the real distinction between mind and body, because it seems to lead to a Platonic view of human nature. The difficulty with this account was that it implies that mind and body are not united to form one, complete human nature or ens per se but are heaped together as two, numerically distinct natures or essences to form an ens per accidens (AT VII 203: CSMII 143). Arnauld's concern raises an interesting question: Does the metaphysical possibility of minds existing without bodies preclude their union into a complete human nature? If an argument for a non-Platonic union of mind and body can be found whose premises and conclusion are consistent with those of the real distinction argument, then the answer to this question would be 'no'. Descartes utilizes just such a tactic in his response to Arnauld. In the Fourth Replies, he claims to have argued for the substantial union of mind and body into a complete human nature in the same place as his argument for their real distinction. Descartes is here referring to the argument in the Sixth Meditation with the conclusion that 'I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit (unum quid)' (AT VII 81: CSM II 56).1 Descartes goes on to say the real distinction argument does not prove too much, because it shows only that mind and body can be separated by God's power, which is the very least to be said. He also does not think the union argument proves too little, because this substantial union into a complete human nature does not preclude the clear and distinct understanding of the mind without the body (ATVII 228: CSM II 160). Hence, Descartes believes that just as much as needs to be proved about the mind's relation to the body has been proved since, on his account, he has provided two independent arguments whose premises and conclusions are consistent.
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Over the years the real distinction argument has received the lion's share of attention. However, this chapter focuses exclusively on the union argument in order to see whether Descartes did or did not prove too much by successfully rejecting the Platonic view in favour of a union resulting in an unum quid. First, a reformulation of the argument as it appears in the text is provided. Second, the analogy of the sailor in his ship is examined and clarified in order to draw the key distinction between a unity resulting in an ens per accidens and one resulting in an unum quid.2 The argument is then reformulated in light of this discussion and evaluated. But, most importantly for the issue at hand, this inquiry shows that Descartes sincerely maintained that mind and body are united per se even though they are capable of self-subsistent existence in satisfaction of RD.
4.1 THE SAILOR IN A SHIP ANALOGY Descartes argues for the unity of mind and body in the following passage from the Sixth Meditation: Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form one thing (unum quid). If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage by the pure intellect (puro intettectu),3 just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken. Similarly, when the body needs food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking, which arise from the union, and as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body. (AT VII 81: CSM II 56, modified) This argument can be formulated as follows: 1 2 Either I am present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, or I am not. If I am present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, then I would not have confused sensations of pain when the body is hurt.
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hunger when the body is hungry, or thirst when the body is thirsty, and would perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect (puro intellectu). 3 I have confused sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, and do not perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect (puro intellectu). 4 If I am not present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, then I am joined to my body so as to form one thing (unum quid). 5 I am not present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship (by 2 and 3). 6 Therefore, I am joined to my body so as to form one thing (unum quid) (by 4 and 5). Notice that one feature running throughout is the analogy of a sailor in his ship. The rejection of this kind of union expressed in premise 5 is inferred from premises 2 and 3. Moreover, the rejection of the union like that of a sailor in his ship, along with premises 1 and 4, implies that the mind (i.e. the 'I') is united to the body to form an unum quid. Hence, understanding this analogy is key to understanding the argument. For this reason, the role that the sailor in a ship analogy plays in each premise will be closely examined in order to reach a clear understanding of what Descartes rejects and accepts, and his reasons for doing so. The first premise is a tautology and, therefore, it is both necessarily true and uninformative. This seems particularly so here, because the meaning of the sailor in a ship analogy is not readily apparent to the modern reader. In fact, much of the commentary concerning this passage does not take it seriously or completely misunderstands its purpose. For example, William Seager mentions it only to point out the oddness of its rejection: When Descartes says in the Meditations that he is not lodged in his body like a pilot in a ship, only his words echo Aristotle. The Cartesian ontological view makes the pilot/ship analogy seem completely appropriate and thus the denial is more striking. The singular difference between an embodied soul and an 'unshipped' pilot is that the signals received from the body contribute directly to the preservation of that body and its nature which teaches us to interpret them.4 Seager's claim that 'only his [Descartes's] words echo Aristotle' indicates that he thinks Descartes is insincere, because the sailor in a ship analogy is an accurate illustration of his considered view. Seager makes this
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remark without argument and without serious consideration of the rest of the passage. But, there is no reason for believing Descartes is being insincere in the Meditations - his central philosophical work - and so there is no reason for the remarks in this passage not to be taken as a sincere expression of his considered view. Other scholars take the remark seriously but misinterpret it. Anthony Kenny, for example, understands the analogy as indicating that mind and body are connected so as to interact but not as a sailor in his ship, and the reason they should be connected in this way is for the conservation of the human being (AT VII 81: CSMII 56 and ATVII 88: CSM II 61). His complaint is that it does not show how mind and body interact given their completely diverse natures.5 Kenny, however, has missed the basic point of the analogy. In this argument, Descartes is not concerned with explaining mind-body causal interaction. Instead, he is trying to explain the existence of the confused modes of sensation as distinguished from the clear and distinct modes of intellectual perception. The union like that of a sailor in his ship is not sufficient for the existence of these confused modes. He, therefore, rejects it in favour of a union resulting in an unum quid. More will be said about this in 4.3. For now it is sufficient to note that Descartes is not intending to explain mind-body causal interaction in this argument, but rather he is interested in showing what sort of union is required for the confused modes of sensation to exist. Yet, despite these misunderstandings and a widespread neglect of the sailor in a ship analogy in modern commentary, it has precedents dating back to the early philosophers of Ancient Greece in the form of a cosmic steersman of the universe. For example, at fragment B41 Heraclitus claims there is a single wise thing steering all things through all things. Also, Parmenides claims at fragment B12 that the goddess steers all things. Plato, however, is the first to introduce the metaphor in relation to the human soul. In the Phaedrus, Plato's Socrates says that intelligence is the steersman of the soul. Later in the dialogue the analogy of an oyster in its shell is used to convey the relation of the soul as numerically distinct from the body but encased in it.6 Moreover, in the pseudoPlatonic work, Alicibiades, it is argued that a man is nothing but his soul, which uses his body.7 However, Aquinas later provided an argument against this account of soul-body union. He characterizes the Platonic view as follows: Accordingly, Plato and his followers asserted that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to
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movable, for Plato said that the soul is in the body 'as a sailor in a ship.'Thus, the union of soul and body would be by contact of power.8 He continues: But this doctrine seems not to fit the facts. For, as a result of contact of power, a thing unqualifiedly one does not arise, as we have shown, whereas from the union of soul and body there results a man. On Plato's theory, then, a man is not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor, consequently, is he a being unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by accident
{ens per accidens).9
Several features of these passages are germane to this study. In the first passage, Aquinas lays out the sailor in a ship view as that of the soul being united with the body by the relation of mover to movable. This would mean the soul is 'in contact' with the body by virtue of its power to move it. In the second passage, Aquinas rejects this kind of union, because a man would not be something that is one or a being unqualifiedly but an ens per accidens. Hence, the sailor in a ship analogy is used to express a union of soul and body by means of the mover-moveable relation resulting in an ens per accidens. Some remarks from Summa Theologicae provide further insight into the distinction between an ens per accidens and an 'unqualified being': If the soul were united to its body only as a mover, then nothing would prevent there from being - indeed it would be necessary, for there to be - certain dispositions serving as intermediaries between the soul and its body. On the soul's side there would have to be a capacity through which it would move the body; on the body's side there would have to be an aptitude of some sort, through which the body would be able to be moved by the soul . . . But if the intellective soul is united to its body as its substantial form . . . then it is impossible for any accidental disposition to lie as an intermediary between body and soul or between any form and its matter.10 Notice that this passage also contrasts the mover-moveable relation with the relation of form and matter just as the first passage from Aquinas cited above. For Aquinas, only the union of a substantial form with matter results in a genuine substantial essence or nature, whereas any intermediary disposition (e.g. the disposition to be moved) does not
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result in such a nature but in an ens per accidens. A composite of a substantial form with matter does not admit of any such intermediary dispositions and, therefore, results in an unqualified being. This means that Aquinas rejects the Platonic view because this kind of union does not result in a complete substantial nature within the species 'rational animal'. As will be shown in 4.2 and 4.3, Descartes rejects the Platonic view for similar reasons.11 Insofar as Aquinas set the stage for later scholastic thought, one may surmise that the account of the sailor in a ship analogy as an expression of the mover-moveable relation was most likely the standard account of it at Descartes's time. Accordingly, when Descartes argues against the sailor in a ship view, he is arguing against the Platonic view as Arnauld had noted (AT VII 203: CSM II 143). Hence, the first premise of Descartes's union argument should be understood as expressing the claim that the mind is united to its body by the mover-moveable relation to form an ens per accidens or it is not. Now that the metaphysical significance of this analogy has been explicated, it is important to take a look at the second and third premises in order to shed more light on it and on Descartes's reasons for rejecting it.
4.2 UNITY AND THE CONFUSED MODES OF SENSATION Recall that the second premise reads: 2 If I am present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, then I would not have confused sensations of pain when the body is hurt, hunger when the body is hungry, or thirst when the body is thirsty, and would perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect.
According to this premise, bodily states would be perceived by the pure intellect and sensations like pain, hunger and thirst would not exist, if the Platonic view were true. But what does it mean to perceive by the pure intellect? Margaret Wilson finds the analogy unhelpful in this regard, because the sailor would perceive damage to his ship by sense perception, which is the issue requiring an explanation.12 She mostly dismisses the analogy due to this concern. A fuller description of the analogy between a sailor in a ship and a union of mind and body resulting in an ens per accidens should help alleviate Wilson's concern.
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The sailor is analogous to the mind or soul and the ship is analogous to the body. A sailor directs his ship's movements by the motions of his hand on the wheel, and as such the sailor is using the ship as his vehicle. But when the ship is damaged, for example, the sailor does not feel pain, rather he comes to know of the damage through sense perception. Analogously, if the Platonic view were correct, then there would be no feeling of pain. Instead the mind would come to understand that the body was damaged through the inspection of those aspects of the body graspable by the pure intellect without feeling anything just as the sailor comes to understand that his ship is damaged through the inspection of those aspects of the ship perceivable by sight without feeling pain. In fact, Descartes claims that this is how an angel would perceive such bodily states, if it were joined to a human body, '[fjor if an angel were in a human body, he would not have sensations as we do, but would simply perceive the motions which are caused by external objects, and in this way would differ from a real man' (AT III 493: CSMK 206). Accordingly, an angel would not have sensations of pain, hunger and thirst as do human beings but would intellectually perceive motions caused by external objects. Furthermore, the intellectually perceivable aspects of the body are those pertaining to pure geometry such as the shape and motion of its parts (AT VII 80: CSM II 55). In this way, the intellect becomes informed about the states of the body without feeling any corresponding sensation. Hence, the confused modes of sensation would not arise if minds were united to their bodies as sailors are present in their ships. This brings us to the third premise: 3 I have confused sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, and do not perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect.
This is, of course, the denial of the second premise's consequent. This is supposed to state the fact that the confused modes of sensation exist, and so they are not perceived by the pure intellect as would be the case if an angel was united with a human body. Thus, premises 2 and 3 together imply the denial of the sailor in a ship or Platonic view of mind-body union: 5 I am not present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship.
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It is noteworthy that this tactic is found not only in the Sixth Meditation but also in other parts of Descartes's corpus. For example, in the Discourse on Method, he explains that he rejected the Platonic view in a portion of the Treatise on Man for basically the same reason: And I showed how it is not sufficient for it [the mind] to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship, except perhaps to move its limbs, but that it must be more closely joined and united with the body in order to have, besides the power of movement, feelings and appetites like ours and so constitute a real man. (AT VI 59: CSM I 141) Descartes makes a similar claim in a letter to Regius dated January 1642: You could do so, however, as I did in my Metaphysics, by saying that we perceive that sensations such as pain are not pure thoughts of a mind distinct from a body, but confused perceptions of a mind really united to a body. (AT III 493: CSMK 206) According to the Discourse passage, the mover-moveable relation may be enough for modes of voluntary bodily movement, but it is not sufficient for feelings and appetites to arise. He concludes that the mind must be united more closely to the body than the relation of mover to moveable in order to have modes of feeling and appetite and 'so constitute a real man'. His point in the letter to Regius is basically the same: mind and body must be 'really united' in order for there to be confused modes of sensation. In turn, premise 5 satisfies the antecedent of premise 4: 4 If I am not present in my body as a sailor is present in his ship, then I am joined to my body so as to form an unum quid.
So, the general tactic of the entire argument is to make an inference from the existence of the confused modes of sensation to a nature or essence with the capacity for having them. This is not an uncommon tactic for Descartes. In fact, he uses a similar strategy, albeit more directly, when inferring the existence of extended and thinking substances in the Meditations. The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of this tactic and its use in the union argument.
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According to Descartes, this kind of inference is based on the common notion that 'nothingness possesses no attributes': However, we cannot initially become aware of a substance merely through its being an existing thing, since this alone does not of itself have any effect on us. We can, however, easily come to know a substance by one of its attributes, in virtue of the common notion that nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no properties or qualities. Thus, if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed. (AT VIIIA 25: CSM 1210) It should be borne in mind that Descartes is not using the term 'attribute' in its strict sense discussed in 2.4 but in the loose sense of a 'quality' or 'mode' as in 1.4. In this way a legitimate inference can be made from the existence of a particular mode, which has an effect on us, to the existence of a substance based on the common notion that 'nothingness possesses no attributes'. For instance, the existence of extended substance may be inferred from the existence of modes of size, shape or motion as in the wax example of the Second Meditation (AT VII 30: CSM II 20). Moreover, the existence of shape, for instance, does not permit an inference to the existence of a thinking substance, because minds are incapable of having such modes due to their thinking, non-extended nature. Similarly, the existence of a mode of willing or understanding permits the inference to the existence of a thinking substance, for 'we cannot conceive of thought without a thinking thing, since that which thinks is not nothing' but not to the existence of an extended substance (AT VII 175: CSM II 123), for bodies cannot will or understand anything (AT VII 442-3: CSM II 298; also see 3.4). So bodies cannot have modes of thought. In other words, capacities for certain kinds of modes, e.g. shape and understanding, are propria resulting from extended substance and thinking substance, respectively, and neither substantial nature can have modes that are proper to the other. Accordingly, the existence of certain kinds of modes permits inferences to the existence of substances with natures capable of having them. In the union argument, the existence of the confused modes of sensation, which have an effect on us, is used to infer the existence of a substantial nature to which they may be attributed, i.e. a substance with a nature capable of having them. Such a substance cannot be a thinking substance alone, because its union with a human body is also required for sensation to take place.13 Also, it cannot be attributed to the human
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body alone, because such a substance would be a cadaver, for certainly, dead bodies are not capable of having sensations. A union of mind and body like that of a sailor in his ship cannot have these modes either, according to Descartes, because such a union admits only the pure intellectual perception of bodily states and not any feeling of pain, hunger or thirst. Accordingly, Descartes rejects the Platonic view in favour of a union resulting in an unum quid, because the latter results in a nature with the resultant propria for the various modes of sensation while the former does not. Hence, this inference rests on the supposition that sensations are the proper modes or propria of a human nature that is an unum quid.This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. However, it is now important to take a closer look at the type of unity of mind and body required in order for this unum quid to exist.
4.3 THE UNION RESULTING IN AN UNUM QUID The previous section showed that Descartes's rejection of the union of mind and body like that of a sailor in his ship is a rejection of the mover-moveable relation as an account of mind-body union. This is supposed to imply that mind and body are united to form an unum quid. This raises the question, What constitutes this kind of union? A clue is found in Descartes's use of the term itself. Cottingham, et al. translate unum quid as 'one unit'. Some have translated it as 'one single thing' or as 'one whole'. Although the latter more closely captures 'unum quid', a more literal translation would be 'one something'. So, why did Descartes use the term unum quid instead of unum res (one thing) or just unum in the conclusion to the union argument? A clue can be found in the fact that 'res' was commonly used to designate a substance. For example, Descartes uses 'res' in this way in the Third Meditation: [Q]uamvis concipiam me esse rem cogitantem & non extensam, lapidem vero esse rem extensam & non cogitantem, ac proinde maxima inter utrumque conceptum sit deversitas, in ratinoe tamen substantiae videntur convenire . . . (AT VII 44) Admittedly, I conceive myself to be a thinking thing and not an extended thing, while I truly conceive a stone to be an extended thing and not a thinking thing, so that the two conceptions differ enormously, but they seem to agree with respect to the classification 'substance'. (CSM II 30: modified)
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This passage indicates that a thinking thing (rem cogitantem) and an extended thing (rem extensam) are two different kinds of substance. So, in the union argument Descartes is probably not interested in the selfsubsistence of this 'one something', for otherwise he would probably have used 'res' instead of 'quid'. Interestingly enough, the term lunum quid1 was commonly used at this time to indicate that soul and body are genuinely united so as to form an ens per se.u Given the context of the passage, which just is an argument for the unity of mind and body, it is reasonable to conclude that Descartes is using this term in this way here. He uses the exact same term in the Synopsis when summarizing this result of the Sixth Meditation (AT VII 15: CSM II 11). So, the common use of the term itself indicates that the conclusion of the argument for substantial union just is the conclusion that mind and body are united so as to form an ens per se, which can only result from their per se unity. In addition to this linguistic concern, there is further textual evidence indicating that this unum quid is formed from the substantial union of a mind with its body. A very telling passage is found in the following excerpt from the Fourth Replies: For in the Sixth Meditation, where I dealt with the distinction between the mind and the body, I also proved at the same time that the mind is substantially united with the body. And the arguments which I used to prove this are as strong as any I can remember ever having read. (AT VII 228: CSM II 160) Here Descartes says the Sixth Meditation argument proved that the mind is substantially united with its body thereby implying that this kind of union results in an unum quid. Descartes also claims that mind and body are substantially united in a January 1642 letter to Regius: And whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give out that you believe that a human being is a true ens per se and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is united in a real and substantial manner to the body. You must say that they are united not by position or disposition, as you assert in your last paper - for this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, quite untrue - but by a true mode of union, as everyone agrees. (AT III 493: CSMK 206)
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This passage reiterates in different language Descartes's position. First, his claim that the 'mind is united in a real and substantial manner to the body' is in agreement with his claim to Arnauld. Second, Descartes claims that mind and body are not united by position or disposition 'for this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, quite untrue'. This rejection of a union of position or disposition is reminiscent of Aquinas' account in the Summa Theologicae quoted in 4.1. 15 Recall that Descartes also claims that mind and body are substantially united in the 9 February 1645 letter to Mesland discussed in 3.5 (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). It is clear from these passages to Arnauld, Regius and Mesland that Descartes accounted for the union of mind and body with the notion of a 'substantial union'. But Descartes never explains the meaning of the term. A closer look at the passage from the January 1642 letter to Regius (cited above) will explain the absence of this explanation. Descartes's statement that 'everyone agreed' the soul is truly and substantially united with its body shows his recognition of the term as part of the common philosophical terminology of his time. As such, the people reading his work would understand what he meant without explanation. If Descartes meant something other than its common meaning, then he would have redefined the term as he did with the scholastic distinction between complete and incomplete substances in the Fourth Replies (AT VII 222: CSM II 157).16The contention here is that for two things to be substantially united is for them to be united per se. Recall from 1.2 that per se unity implies a lack of division among the united parts. So, the question is now: Can the nature or essence of human being be divided or separated without contradiction for Descartes? If not, then mind and body are united per se; but if so, then they are united only per accidens. The answer is found in the following passage from the Fourth Replies: For if something can exist without some attribute, then it seems to me that that attribute is not included in its essence. And although mind is part of the essence of man, being united to a human body is not strictly speaking a part of the essence of mind. (AT VII 219: CSM II 155) The first sentence is key to understanding Descartes's point and is better understood contrapositively: if some attribute is included in a nature or essence, then that thing cannot exist without that attribute. In the next sentence, Descartes claims the 'mind is part of the essence of man'. It
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follows that man or human being cannot exist without the attribute of thought. That is, a human being without a mind is a contradiction, because there would then be a minded thing without a mind. A similar exercise can be carried out for the human body. A human being without a properly disposed human body results in a contradiction, because there would then be a bodily thing without a body. Hence, the Suarezian condition of a 'lack of division' required for per se unity is satisfied in the case of Descartes's human being.17 Therefore, Descartes's claim to Arnauld that the Sixth Meditation argument is a proof of the substantial union of mind and body just is the claim that it proves they are united per se so as to form a whole and complete substantial human nature. Hence, Descartes's human being is a scholastic substance and is, therefore, also a Cartesian substance as established in 1.8. The sailor in his ship or Platonic view does not result in a complete nature above and beyond the natures of the sailor and the ship (if artifacts have natures) - there is no such thing as the nature of sailor-ina-ship. An ens per accidens is a mere aggregate or conjunction of natures, and therefore its capacities for modes would be merely the conjunction of the capacities possessed by the parts. Hence, on the Platonic view, a human being would be capable of having only modes of willing and pure intellect, such as intellectual perceptions of the shapes and motions of the body, and modes of extension such as size, shape and motion. As mentioned above, neither of these substantial natures has the capacity for confused modes of sensation. For Descartes only a substantially united mind and body gives rise to a complete human nature that entails the proper accidents or propria of a human being, viz the capacity for sensation. So, the Platonic view is rejected, because it does not result in a complete human nature with its own set of modal capacities. Accordingly, only a mind and body united per se can result in an unum quid with this capacity for modes of sensation and not the mind alone, the body alone, or their mere conjunction.18
4.4 CAUSAL INTERACTION The rejection of the Platonic view and acceptance of the substantial union view has two significant consequences for Descartes's theory of mind-body union. The first concerns Descartes's rejection of the mover-moveable relation as an account of mind-body union. In the Discourse, Descartes says that the relation of mover to moveable may be
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sufficient for the mind to move the body but not for the body to move the mind. Given Descartes's commitment to mechanistic causation wherein the motion of one entity is supposed to bring about change in another, a Platonic union may facilitate mind to body but not body to mind causation.19 One might think Descartes rejects the Platonic view because mind to body efficient causation is not enough, and that mind and body must be united so as to facilitate two-way efficient causal interaction. But this is not so, because it is impossible for a material substance to be the efficient cause of an immaterial being (see 3.4). Furthermore, Descartes, like Aquinas, rejects it because this sort of union does not result in a complete human nature but in an ens per accidens. This means, contrary to contemporary scholarship, that efficient causal interaction does not constitute the union of mind and body for Descartes, since this just is the rejected mover-moveable relation.20 This implication of the union argument is pursued in more detail in Chapter 6. A possible criticism of this account of Descartes's conclusion to the union argument is offered by David Yandell based on the correspondence with Regius. In a letter dated December 1641, Descartes offers the following response to Regius's theses for disputation: 'I find nothing in them which I do not agree with' (AT III 454: CSMK 199).Yandell points out that this blanket expression of agreement includes the thesis that a human being is an ens per accidens, which contradicts the account of Descartes's conclusion to the union argument offered here.21 But, further examination of the correspondence with Regius shows this is true but only in a very broad sense of the term. This sense is specified in a January 1641 letter: For instance, when you said that a human being is an ens per accidens I know that you meant only what everyone else admits, that a human being is made up of two things which are really distinct. But the expression ens per accidens is not used in that sense by the scholastics. (AT III 492: CSMK 206) Here Descartes recognizes Regius meant only that a human being is composed of really distinct parts. This claim is nothing controversial if understood in this way, for it is a point of agreement between Descartes and his scholastic contemporaries. This also indicates that Regius's use of the term was unfamiliar to his scholastic audience, which was the basis for the tumult this claim caused at the University of Utrecht. Descartes had tried previously to remedy Regius's gaffe by telling him to say that the whole human being was being considered in relation to
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the parts and not the whole. He continues on to offer the following explanation: Say too that in your ninth you said that a human being comes into being per accidens out of body and soul in order to indicate that it can be said in a sense to be accidental for the body to be joined to the soul, and for the soul to be joined to the body, since the body can exist without the soul and the soul can exist without the body. For the term 'accident' means anything which can be present or absent without its possessor ceasing to exist. (AT III 460: CSMK 200) The central point is that the metaphysical parts of a human being can exist without each other. That is, the parts are 'accidentally' united in the sense that there is nothing in the nature of the mind requiring union with the body and vice versa. This just means that the mind can exist whether or not it is united with a body and the body can exist whether or not it is united with the mind. So, a human being is an ens per accidens for Descartes when a whole human being is considered in relation to the parts in the very broad sense that each part (i.e. mind and body) can exist whether or not the other is present to it. But, when the parts are considered in relation to the whole, as Regius had done in his tenth thesis, it is an ens per se (AT III 460: CSMK 200). Therefore, Descartes maintains that a human being is an ens per accidens in only a very broad sense of the term as it is applied to the parts constituting this whole. But, the whole human being is an ens per se, or a 'being unqualifiedly' as Aquinas would say, resulting from the substantial or per se union of mind and body into a complete human nature. The second significant consequence is that Descartes's acceptance of the substantial union view implies that mind and body are united as form is with matter. This is implied by his use of the term 'substantial union' in its common scholastic sense. Moreover, Descartes's rejection of any unity resulting in an ens per accidens leaves the substantial unity of form and matter as the only remaining option. Therefore, Descartes's considered view is that a human being is a substantial nature composed of form and matter entailing the proper accidents of the human substance, i.e. the capacity for having the confused modes of sensation. Yandell has contended that Descartes could be (and probably is) accounting for this substantial union as mind-body efficient causal interaction.22 However, Descartes's rejection of the mover-moveable relation through the analogy of a sailor in his ship precludes this speculation.
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4.5 EVALUATION This discussion of the union argument justifies the following reformulation: 1 I am united to my body either per accidens or per se. 2 If I am united to my body per accidens, then I would not have confused sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, but would perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect as would an angel. 3 I have confused sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, and I do not perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect as would an angel. 4 I am not united to my body per accidens (by 2 and 3). 5 Therefore, I am united to my body per se (by 1 and 4). This reformulated version makes more explicit the metaphysical import of the sailor in a ship analogy, and therefore it is a clearer expression of what is rejected and accepted in it. Now that the argument has been clarified, it is in a position to be evaluated so as to determine whether or not the rejection of the Platonic view and the acceptance of the substantial union view are sufficiently supported. The reformulated (as well as the original) argument is valid, so any criticism must be directed at the truth-value of its premises. The original premise 1 is a tautology, for something either is the case or it is not, but my reformulated version of it may seem to lose this aspect of the original. However, this is not the case, because mind and body are either substantially united (i.e. one per se), or they bear some other sort of relation to compose a human being. If the latter is the case, then the relation of mind and body does not result in a complete human nature, for if it did, they would be substantially united. For example, if God occasionally caused these sensations to arise in our minds when our bodies were in certain states, then mind and body would be united per accidens, for God would be mediating between two natures. In fact, if the relation of mind and body were mediated by any other sort of relation, including efficient causal interaction, then a human being would be an ens per accidens without a complete nature. Hence, either the mind is united per se with the body or it is not (i.e. it is united per accidens). So, my reformulated first premise is also a tautology thereby making it immune from criticism. Premise 3 is a statement of fact, which no one can sincerely reject, for everyone has experienced the existence of these confused modes of sensation. Premise 4 is a derived premise, and so it is not a legitimate
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target for criticism either. This leaves premise 2 as the only candidate for criticism. As mentioned earlier, most commentators do not give this argument much sustained attention. However, Williams offers a brief yet interesting criticism of premise 2. He finds that there is a gap in Descartes's reasoning from his own phenomenology of hunger, thirst and pain to the metaphysical claim regarding the ontological status of the human composite as a substantial union. He finds that further argument is required to make the connection between a phenomenological premise and an ontological conclusion, because 'how do we know what is metaphysically necessary to make such an experience possible?'23 Since Williams' criticism concerns the inference from the existence of these modes of sensation to the denial of the per accidens unity of mind and body, his criticism is better understood contrapositively: 2* If I have confused sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, and I do not perceive these bodily states by the pure intellect as would an angel, then I am united to my body not per accidens but per se. Williams' point is that Descartes does not make a legitimate inference from the existence of these confused modes of sensation to the denial of a per accidens unity, which permits the further inference to the per se unity of mind and body. So, if Williams' objection holds, Descartes has not adequately rejected the Platonic view. Williams' criticism, however, is mistaken with regards to the inferential gap between Descartes's phenomenology and the ontology of human being. Recall that in the original passage Descartes says that 'these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thought' (AT VII 81: CSM II 56). So, the sensations that are a part of Descartes's phenomenology are modes, and it is from the existence of these modes that he infers the existence of a complete human nature in accordance with the common notion that 'nothingness possesses no attributes'. Hence, Descartes is not skipping the gap between the phenomenological and ontological levels but, rather, his inference occurs on the ontological level alone from mode to complete substantial nature. To answer Williams' question: we know that the per se unity of a complete human nature is metaphysically necessary for the possibility of such experience by the fact that all modes require a substance with a complete nature capable of having them. The body alone and the mind alone are not capable of having these kinds of modes, because they do
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not have the right kind of nature. Furthermore, a mind and body united per accidens is not capable of having these modes of sensation either, because such a being does not have a complete nature with a capacity for modes not possessed by either of its parts taken individually. Therefore, Williams' criticism misses the mark insofar as Descartes's inference occurs on the ontological level alone and not between it and the phenomenological level.24 Williams, however, is correct in wondering, 'How do we know what is metaphysically necessary to make such an experience possible?' In other words, how do we know that a substantially united mind and body is required for the existence of the confused modes of sensation? Could it not be the case that mind and body are united per accidens3 but the sensations of hunger, thirst and pain still exist and are not perceived by the pure intellect? Indeed, this is a presupposition held by the likes of Malebranche and Leibniz. Neither would deny that we have these sensations but yet both maintained their status as entirely mental properties and provided other accounts of how they arise. For example, Malebranche would maintain that it is God who causes us (i.e. our soul or mind) to have these sensations on the occasion of our bodies being in certain states. Also, Leibniz's doctrine of pre-established harmony maintains that the world of souls acts according to the laws of final causation and that of bodies acts according to the laws of efficient causation, but they are in harmony with one another. In fact, they act as if they influenced one another but do not.25 For example, the intention of the soul to move the arm of its body coincides with the efficient causal chain of the body such that the arm moves in harmony with the soul's intention to move it. Accordingly, mind and body do not form one thing per se but, rather, an aggregate of two perfectly synchronized things. Hence, if pre-established harmony were true, then the sensations that arise in the soul would be in perfect harmony with those states of the body without there being any sort of connection between them, including substantial unity, and as such a human being would be an ens per accidens. So, the positions held by some of Descartes's near successors seem to provide counterexamples to the reformulated premise 2. An answer on Descartes's behalf can be found in his conclusion that God is not a deceiver, because it grounds his inference from the confused modes of sensation to the existence of a complete human nature and cuts off these proposed counter-examples. Recall that Descartes claims that ' [n] ature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on' (AT VII 81: CSM II 56) that I am not united to my body per
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accidens. The guarantee provided by God's non-deceiving nature applies not only to those things known by the natural light but also to those things taught by nature albeit in a limited way. To understand how God's veracity guarantees the truth of the reformulated premise 2, an explanation of what it is to be taught by nature is in order. Just prior to the union argument in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes makes the following point about the attenuated veridical guarantee of obscure and confused modes of sensation provided by God's nondeceiving nature: What of the other aspects of corporeal things which are either particular (for example that the sun is of such and such a size or shape), or less clearly understood, such as light, or sound or pain, and so on? Despite the high degree of doubt and uncertainty involved here, the very fact that God is not a deceiver, and the consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot be corrected by some other faculty supplied to me by God offers me a sure hope that I can attain the truth even in these matters [i.e. about external corporeal objects]. Indeed, there is not doubt that everything that I am taught by nature contains some truth. (AT VII 80: CSM II 55-6) After deducing that external, material objects exist based on the fact that God would be a deceiver if they were not the cause of his ideas of them, Descartes goes on to discuss what can be known of corporeal things from our obscure and confused ideas of them, which in general terms is the subject matter of pure mathematics (AT VII 80: CSM II 55). Furthermore, even though he may fall into error sometimes, God made him with faculties that can correct any such error. Accordingly, there is some truth in what is taught by nature. That is, even though sensory ideas are not clear and distinct, some truth can be discerned in them despite the possibility of error, for careful scrutiny by the appropriate faculty would be able to discover and correct any error that might arise. Hence, if one were mistaken about the nature of mind-body union, then one would have the ability to discover and correct that mistake. Further elaboration is found in Descartes's qualification of the word 'nature'. In its general aspect 'nature' is ambiguous between God himself and 'the ordered system of created things established by God' (AT VII 80: CSM II 56). Hence, there is some truth in what is taught by nature, because nature either is a non-deceiving God or his creation. Moreover, the totality of things given to him by God is what he means by his own
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nature (AT VII 80: CSM II 56). So, when referring to what is taught to him by nature in the context of the union argument, Descartes is referring to his own nature as an ordered system created by God. This nature is what teaches him that he has a body and that he has the confused modes of sensation. So, what is the truth to be found in these confused modes of sensation? It is not the subject matter of pure mathematics, because these modes of hunger, thirst and pain are not the sorts of things to have extension as part of their objective content. Some help can be found in Descartes's discussion of the sensation of heat: Similarly, although I feel heat when I go near a fire and feel pain when I go too near, there is no convincing argument for supposing that there is something in the fire which resembles the heat, any more than for supposing that there is something which resembles the pain. There is simply reason to suppose that there is something in the fire, whatever it may eventually turn out to be, which produces in us the feelings of heat or pain. (AT VII 83: CSM II 57) So, even though the objective content of our ideas of heat or pain do not tell us what it is in the fire that produces these modes, it does permit the inference that something or other in the fire caused that mode of sensation. Something similar is going on in the reformulated second premise. What is confused about these modes is their objective content, since they do not resemble the objects that caused them. Accordingly, the fact that the objective content of these modes of hunger, thirst and pain is obscure and confused (contrary to the clear and distinct content of our idea of God or a triangle, for example) does not mean that no truth can be discerned from them. Rather, careful judgements made by the pure intellect can detect some truth in them. A truth that can be found in these sensations is that they are themselves modes requiring for their existence a complete nature capable of having them. Descartes assumes in the argument that some sort of union of mind and body is required for the appropriate nature to exist. In the reformulated second premise, he makes an inference from a per acddens unity to the non-existence of these modes. But, since these modes do exist, the only other option is the per se unity of mind and body. So, Descartes makes the judgement that mind and body are united per se based upon the metaphysical reasoning of the pure intellect. But, if he were mistaken and a human being was an ens per acddens, then his God-given faculty of pure intellect would not be able to discover
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and correct this mistake. As such, God's nature, taken in the sense of the ordering of things bestowed on Descartes (and us) by God, would have led him to a falsehood. Hence, the inference expressed in the reformulated second premise is guaranteed, because if mind and body were not united per se but per accidens, then God would be a deceiver, which is impossible. Therefore, the reformulated second premise (and its original) is guaranteed by God's non-deceiving nature. The considerations of this section have shown that the union argument of the Sixth Meditation is sound on Cartesian grounds because of God's non-deceiving nature. Of course, if Descartes's argument that God cannot be a deceiver or the claim that such a conclusion provides an adequate foundation for knowledge were rejected, then all bets are off. That is, Malebranche's occasionalism and Leibniz's pre-established harmony do provide legitimate counter-examples to the reformulated second premise outside of a Cartesian metaphysics of knowledge, and therefore it is a false conditional. Certainly Descartes would be justified in inferring the existence of some complete nature with the capacity for having such modes. But, as Williams pointed out, he is not permitted to infer what kind of nature is required for this capacity to obtain, because it is logically possible for these modes to exist and to inhere in the mind alone as would be the case if occasionalism or pre-established harmony were true. In the end, this argument is unsound if it is removed from the security of Descartes's epistemological foundation.
4.6 PROVE TOO LITTLE/PROVE
TOO MUCH
This chapter has reconstructed and evaluated Descartes's famous sailor in a ship argument in the Sixth Meditation. A close examination of its premises indicated several important features of the Cartesian human nature. First and foremost, mind and body are united per se so as to form an unum quid or ens per se. This implies that they are united as form is united with matter and that the resultant entity is a scholastic and, therefore, a Cartesian substance. The next chapter is dedicated to an examination of the extent to which Descartes's metaphysics can sustain such an account. Second, only a complete substantial human nature (i.e. a mind and a body united per se) entails the propria or proper accidents of a human being, viz a capacity for having sensations. As such, modes of sensation are the determinates of this composite ultimate determinable or substance. Third, this indicates that the causal relation uniting mind
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and body is not an efficient or mechanistic kind of causal interaction as many have supposed but rather a formal causal relation. More will be said about this in Chapter 6. Before moving on, it is important to get an answer to Arnauld's concern: Does Descartes prove too much with the real distinction argument? No, Descartes does not prove too much for at least two reasons. First, the premises constituting both the distinction and union arguments are consistent, and therefore their conclusions must be consistent as well. So, Descartes believes he has shown just enough as needs to be shown. But, the real distinction argument is supposed to show that mind and body are two substances, whereas the union argument shows that they compose one substance. This brings us to the second reason. Given the scholastic nature of Descartes's human being, it is reasonable to suppose that he can maintain that mind and body are actually united per se to form a complete human nature, but they are potentially two. Indeed, 'the fact that one thing can be separated from another by the power of God is the very least that can be asserted in order to establish that there is a real distinction between the two' (AT VII 227: CSM II 160).Therefore, Descartes is a hard unionist and a soft dualist.
NOTES
1 L. J. Beck does examine this argument and, therefore, he is the exception, although he still accounts for the union in terms of efficient causal interaction: The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965), p. 270. 2 Some commentators who explicitly or implicitly maintain the efficient causal interaction view of Descartes's theory of mind-body union (in addition to Beck) are: Mark Bedau, 'Cartesian interaction', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 483-502; Daniel Garber, 'Understanding interaction: what Descartes should have told Elizabeth', Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 21 (1983): 15-32; Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968); Daisie Radner, 'Descartes' notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971): 159-70; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); William Seager, 'Descartes on the union of mind and body', History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (1988): 119-32; Jorge
Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philoso-
phy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Stephen Voss, 'Descartes: the end of anthropology', in Cottingham, John (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Bernard Williams, Descartes:
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4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13
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The Project of Pure Enquiry (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978); Margaret Wilson, Descartes (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); David Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism? The nature of the union of mind and body', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 199-217. Cottingham, et al. translate this phrase as: 'but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect'. The more literal translation of 'puro intellect^ offered above helps to avoid a misunderstanding based on the Cottingham translation. This reading might lead one to suppose that the intellect perceives the confused modes of sensation but just not purely. This would then require an account of an 'impure' intellectual perception of sensations. However, such a reading would misunderstand Descartes's point. In the union argument, Descartes wants to distinguish between having sensations (e.g. feeling pain) and the intellectual perception of the body's shapes and motions. An essential feature of the argument is that human beings have sensations and do not intellectually perceive the shape and motions of the body as would be the case if the mind were united to the body as a pilot is present in his ship. This issue will be discussed in more detail in 4.2. Seager, 'Descartes on the union of mind and body', p. 129. Kenny, Descartes, pp. 222-3. See Plato, Phaedrus, 247c and 250c. See unknown author, Alicibiades, 129e-130c. Also, see T.Tracy, 'The soul as boatman of the body', Diotima 7 (1979): 195-9, for more on the history of the sailor in a ship analogy. SCG, 2, 57, 2. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 169. SCG, 2, 57, 3; Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, p. 169. ST, 1, 76, 6. Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologica la 7589, trans. Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), p. 40. One might object that Aquinas' Unitarian metaphysics of substantial form and matter precludes using his insights into per se being in this context. This, however, is not so, since here the concern is only with the relation in general and what conditions are necessary for the relation of per se unity to obtain. Wilson, Descartes, p. 210. Descartes makes this claim in several places. See Second Meditations (AT VII 27: CSM II 18), Sixth Replies (AT VII 437: CSM II 294-5), Principles 1.48 (ATVIIIA 23: CSM I 209), Principles II.2 (ATVIIIA 41: CSM I 214), Principles II.3 (AT VIIIA 41-2: CSM I 224), an August 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes (AT III 424: CSMK 190), and an August 1649 letter to Thomas More (AT V 402: CSMK 380). Surprisingly enough this insight was made by Rozemond. She cites Eustachius, SPQ, Physics, 416. She also recognizes that the French translation of the Meditations translates unum quid as 'one whole' (un seul tout), which lends further credence to the claim that Descartes is using unum quid to claim that mind and body are genuinely united so as to form an ens per se. Rozemond brushes this off
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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature and chooses to focus on the technical term ens per se. See Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 253, n. 48. But surely this is a very important use of the philosophical language of the time. Given the context of the passage, it is reasonable to conclude that Descartes uses it in this way as well. A return to the sailor in a ship analogy will make Descartes's point clearer. The sailor is the mover of the ship only insofar as he is positioned at the wheel and the ship is moveable only insofar as it is disposed for movement. Analogously, the mind or soul is positioned to move its body only insofar as it is 'in contact' with the body by virtue of its power to move it. Moreover the body is moveable by the mind only insofar as it is disposed for such movement. So, this is another place where Descartes rejects the claim that a human being is an ens per accidens resulting from the union of mind and body by means of the mover-moveable relation. An objection to this reading is addressed below. Descartes's reformulation and use of the incomplete/complete substance distinction will be discussed in more detail in 5.3. Suarez's explanation of per se unity was discussed at 1.2. The claim that a substantially united mind and body is required for the existence of the modes of sensation is also consistent with his controversial doctrine about the lack of sensation in animals. Animals do not have sensations, because their 'souls' are nothing more than the configuration and motion of their parts; that is, animals, like human automata, are nothing but complex machines. See Fourth Replies (AT VII 230-1: CSM II 161-2); and a letter to Mersenne dated 11 June 1640 where he says that 'in animals it is these movements alone which occur, and not pain in the strict sense' (AT III 85: CSMK 148). For a very thorough account of Descartes's mechanistic doctrine of causation by means of motion and its laws, see Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and part II of Denis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). See note two above for a list of some commentators who maintain this view. Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism?', pp. 202-3. Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism?', pp. 210-11. Williams, Descartes, p. 280. One might object that even though the passage citing sensations as 'confused modes of thought' extricates Descartes from the difficulty of an inferential gap, it undermines the claim that sensations are modes of the whole, complete substantial human nature and not just of the mind alone. What is important to bear in mind for now is that, on both scholastic and Cartesian accounts, per se union of mind and body is required for sensations to occur. For example, one cannot see without an eye, which is a bodily thing. So, even if sensations are modes of thought in some sense, there is also a sense in which they are modes of the whole, since the whole is required for this sensory capacity to exist at all. More will be said about this in Chapter 6. See Monadology, in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, section 79, p. 223.
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CHAPTER 5
Cartesian Hylomorphism
The previous chapter showed that Descartes argued for the per se unity of mind and body so as to form a complete substantial human nature. But, despite this conclusion, it is still questionable whether or not Descartes's metaphysics can provide an intelligible account of this unity, especially given his rejection of certain central tenets of scholastic metaphysics such as the existence of substantial forms and the usefulness of final causal explanations in physics. This chapter shows that, despite these divergences from scholastic metaphysics, Descartes can still maintain a fundamentally scholastic doctrine of soul-body union in a decidedly pluralist vein but within his mechanistic physics. The chapter begins with a brief exercise in comparative philosophy wherein Descartes's doctrine is placed squarely within the pluralist camp. Next, Descartes's rights to appeal to the mind as the substantial form of human being, to the configuration and motion of parts as the 'form of corporeity', and to a slightly modified version of the pluralist distinction between complete and incomplete substances are established. Finally, Descartes's apparently conflicting claims that the mind is wholly in the whole body and wholly in any of its parts and that it is merely in the pineal gland are reconciled.
5.1 DESCARTES AMONG THE PLURALISTS Hoffman was the first working in the Anglo-American tradition to provide a sustained argument for the hylomorphic account of Descartes's theory of mind-body union.1 Much of his argument is based on a very interesting exercise in comparative philosophy wherein Descartes's theory is compared and contrasted with the two competing scholastic views of soul-body union - namely, the Unitarian and pluralist camps mentioned in 1.2. The most fundamental difference between these two
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camps concerned how many substantial forms unite with matter to make a complete substantial human nature. The Unitarians, represented by Aquinas, Suarez and Eustachius, argued that the per se unity of a substance dictates the existence of only one substantial form in the human composite, because two or more substances cannot unite per se but only per accidens. The pluralists, represented by Scotus and William of Ockham, argued that there is more than one substantial form in the human composite, and that two or more incomplete substances can unite per se to form one complete substance. Hoffman concluded that Descartes's theory is just like the pluralist theories of Scotus and Ockham which, in turn, provides a good reason for believing that Descartes held a hylomorphic theory of mind-body union in the pluralist tradition. But Rozemond uses a similar comparative method to come to a very different conclusion. She argues that if Descartes's theory is hylomorphic (although she believes it cannot be), it is most like a poor version of the Unitarian views endorsed by Suarez and Eustachius. The purpose of this section is to establish more precisely the similarities and differences among the Unitarian, pluralist and Cartesian theories in order to get a firmer grip on this issue, and on whether or not Descartes can consistently maintain such a position. Despite their differences, both Unitarians and pluralists agreed on several points about the metaphysics of human nature. For instance, they agreed that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of human being, that intellect and will are faculties of the soul, that the intellectual soul is the principle of human life, and that it can, to some extent, exist independently of the body. But their fundamental point of divergence concerns the form of the body. Aquinas and his Unitarian disciples held that the intellectual soul is also the form of the human body. This means that the intellectual soul not only has the faculties of intellect, will, sensation and appetite but it also endows prime matter with quantity and configures it for the sake of being a human body. Scotus, however, posits another substantial form as the configurer of the body, viz the form of corporeity. It is not the form of the body in general, as extension would later be for Descartes, but it is an individual form united per se with prime matter that organizes it for the sake of being a species of body with a set of dispositions appropriate for that kind of thing.2 In this way, the form of corporeity for living things configures matter for the sake of disposing it for union with the appropriate kind of soul. For example, the form of corporeity for a horse body organizes matter for the sake of being a horse body with the disposition
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or potential for receiving the horse's sensitive soul. But, since this horse body is not the complete nature or essence of a horse but only part of this complete essence, this substantial form does not result in a complete but only in an incomplete substance. The per se union of the sensitive soul of the horse, which is also an incomplete substance, with this incomplete substance of the horse's body then results in the complete substantial nature of the horse. Of course, the form of corporeity for the human body is a different species from that of a horse body. Accordingly, the human form of corporeity organizes matter for the sake of disposing it for union with the intellectual soul. Moreover, since the form of corporeity is the principle of that body's organization, it is not really distinct from the matter it configures, and so it perishes along with the body while the intellectual soul can continue to exist. So, is Descartes's theory closest to the Unitarian or pluralist theories? Rozemond argues that Descartes's theory is most like the Unitarian views of Suarez and Eustachius, if it is hylomorphic at all, for several reasons. First, both Suarez and Eustachius held that there is only one substantial form in human being, which is the principle of intellectual activity and is capable of subsisting independently of the body, which, on Rozemond's account, seems to be precisely Descartes's position. Second, both Suarez and Eustachius disagreed with Aquinas's position that a substantial form is united directly with prime matter. They argued instead that matter must first be quantified in order to take on any substantial form. Accordingly, Suarez and Eustachius both maintained that substantial forms can be united only with quantified matter. This seems most like a position that Descartes could hold, because the essence of matter for him is extension or quantification. Third, since Descartes has banished all substantial forms except perhaps the human soul, he is not entitled to appeal to a plurality of forms as did Scotus and Ockham. Therefore, Rozemond concludes, Descartes's theory is most like the Unitarian theories of soul-body union maintained by Suarez and Eustachius, if it is hylomorphic at all.3 However, Rozemond's arguments for her comparison are misplaced. First, her proposal that Descartes's theory, if it is hylomorphic, is most like the Unitarian theories of Suarez and Eustachius is based on superficial similarities. First, it is true that Suarez, Eustachius and Descartes all held that prime matter is unintelligible, and that matter must be quantified or extended in three dimensions in order to be the ultimate substratum of material change. But, since Suarez and Eustachius are Unitarians, they must also maintain that the soul is the form of the body
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in that it organizes quantified matter for the sake of being a human body. Descartes clearly does not maintain such a position given his account of the human body via the configuration and motion of its parts discussed in 3.5. Second, Suarez and Eustachius must also maintain that sensation and appetite are also faculties of the human soul. But Descartes maintains that intellect and will are the only faculties of the soul, which justifies his use of the term 'mind' for it. In fact, he relegates the sensitive faculty ascribed to the soul by Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez and Eustachius to the whole, complete substantial human nature as discovered in Chapter 4 and will be elaborated in Chapter 6.Therefore, the differences between the theories of Descartes and these Unitarians far outweigh their similarities. Rozemond's further point that Descartes cannot appeal to a plurality of substantial forms is also misplaced but in a different way. Recall from 3.3 and 3.4 that individual bodies are substances for Descartes, and that he replaced substantial forms in material substances with the configuration and motion of their parts. Accordingly, the configuration and motion of parts determines the different species of bodies and maintains a body's identity over time. Hence, the configuration and motion of parts serves the same function in Descartes's metaphysics of body as the substantial forms of material things but without the final causal component. Finally, as concluded in 3.5, the properly configured human body is disposed for per se unity with the mind. Therefore, if Descartes's theory is hylomorphic, he can appeal to a plurality of 'substantial forms' (i.e. two) if with regards to the human body it is taken in the modified, mechanistic sense established in Chapter 3. Contrary to Rozemond, Hoffman had argued that Descartes's theory is the same as Scotus's and Ockham's because of their shared pluralism on this issue.4 Although Hoffman is fundamentally correct, an adjustment should be made in order to refine his conclusion based upon the differences between Scotus' and Ockham's respective positions. Whereas Scotus argued that there are two substantial forms in a human being, Ockham argued that there are three. He argued (contra Aquinas and Scotus) that the faculties of appetite and sensation are really distinct from both the form of corporeity and the intellectual soul, although they are not really distinct from each other. So, the intellectual soul has only the faculties of intellect and will, the faculties of appetite and sensation comprise another substantial form, and then there is the form of corporeity. Accordingly, Ockham maintained that a human being is composed of three substantial forms and prime matter.5 My position is that
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Descartes's theory is not exactly like any of these scholastic thinkers but is most like Ockham's, although they have their differences as well. The main similarity is that both Ockham and Descartes maintain that intellect and will are the only faculties of the human soul. But their theories differ in at least two fundamental respects. The first is found in their different accounts of the forms of material things. Ockham retains Scotus's form of corporeity, which organizes matter for the sake of receiving the substantial form on the next level of completeness; for Ockham this is the substantial form of sensation and appetite, and for Scotus this would be the intellectual soul. Hence, the dispositions of the human body are explained teleologically for Ockham as for any scholastic thinker. But Descartes's rejection of final causes precludes him from using this account of the form of corporeity. For him the disposition the body has for union with the mind results from this configuration yet these parts are not configured for the sake of this end, but rather this disposition is an effect or consequence resulting from a certain bodily configuration. Accordingly, Descartes accounts for the form of corporeity in conformity with his mechanistic physics, while Ockham remains squarely within the scholastic tradition. The second difference in their theories is found in the location of the sensitive faculty. Interestingly enough, Descartes agrees with Ockham in that sensation is not a faculty of the mind or the human body alone but is in some third entity. For Ockham, this entity is an additional substantial form, but for Descartes this third entity is the complete substantial human nature. The preceding paragraphs indicate a close correlation between Descartes's theory of mind-body union and scholastic pluralism, especially in its Ockhamist manifestation. But Rozemond argues against any comparison of Descartes with the pluralists for two additional reasons. First, she points out that the pluralist conception of the intellectual soul makes it quite hard to conceive of it as the form of the body in any robust sense. 'That is to say, it is hard to do so if, as was common, the operations specific to the intellectual soul are regarded as not being located in the body.'6 It is difficult to see how this claim counts against a pluralist comparison. The fact that pluralists did not conceive the soul as the form of body in any 'robust sense' is to be expected since they are quite clear that the soul is not the form of the body in that it is not its principle of configuration. Moreover, as will be discussed in 5.4 below, the mind or human soul is the form of the body in the weak sense of being its principle of life, which results in a human body qua human endowed with the faculty of sensation. So, the human soul does perform one of its
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functions in the body, viz its function as the first principle of human life. Rozemond offers a second criticism based on a question raised for the pluralists regarding the per se unity of the composite: How can two substances unite to form something that is one per se} According to Rozemond, Descartes's view suffers from the same threat to the per se unity of the human being confronted by the pluralists but he does not address the issue.7 Rozemond, however, is mistaken. Arnauld was very concerned that Descartes's real distinction argument would lead back to the Platonic view of human being such that mind and body would be united merely per accidens. In Chapter 4, it was shown that Descartes argues for the compatibility of the real distinction between mind and body and their per se unity into a whole human being. It is also noteworthy that Descartes goes on in the Fourth Replies to give a fundamentally pluralist explanation of how this unity can take place through an (albeit qualified) distinction between complete and incomplete substances. So, Descartes does in fact address this concern. Rozemond provides further argumentation that Descartes is not entitled to this distinction. Her arguments and Descartes's use of this distinction will be discussed in 5.3. But it is important first to establish the claim that the mind is the last substantial form left standing in Descartes's metaphysics.
5.2 THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF HUMAN BEING Descartes's rejection of substantial forms based on their final causal component provides support for the claim that the mind is the only substantial form for Descartes. Recall that he argues that final causal explanations should not be sought in physics, because recourse to final causal explanations entails an illicit ascription of mentality, i.e intellect and will, to completely corporeal, non-mental things. The rejection of final causes in physics implies that these supposed substantial forms do not exist, since final causes are the cornerstone of this sort of entity as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. But, although final causes may have no place in entirely physical explanations, they do have a role to play in explanations of human behaviour in that people's goals, their knowledge of them and the means of achieving them often have significant explanatory force for understanding why human beings act as they do. So, the arguments for rejecting substantial forms based on their final causal component do not apply to minds. Indeed, Hoffman said it best: '[Descartes] is to be construed as beginning with the view that the
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human soul is a substantial form and as rejecting the attempt to use the human soul as a model for explanations of the non-human physical world.'8 Although Rozemond does not think the Cartesian mind can be a substantial form, she recognizes that Descartes's rejection of substantial forms in physics does not apply to the mind. Accordingly she recognizes that the arguments rejecting substantial forms cannot be applied to the mind, and as such further argumentation is required.9 But Desmond Clarke argues that the criticisms of substantial forms based on their lack of explanatory force apply equally to the explanations of mental phenomena. However, it is important to remember that the explanatory impotence of substantial forms is found in their final causal aspect. Descartes rejects this mode of explanation in favour of an appeal to the configuration and motion of parts as the efficient or mechanistic causes of these resultant dispositions. It is clear that the mind, which is an immaterial thing with the faculties of intellect and will alone, falls outside these concerns.10 Indeed, much of Clarke's concern with explanations regarding mechanistic explanations of 'mental' phenomena such as sensations and imaginings can be accommodated by the account of mind-body union offered here in that these are modes of the whole and not of the mental part alone. In fact, Descartes basically excludes the mind and the human composite from his criticisms of final causal explanations by ascribing a final cause to the whole human being. In the Sixth Meditation, soon after the argument for the per se unity of mind and body, he states that 'the proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful to the composite of which the mind is a part' (ATVII 83: CSMII 57).This passage indicates the teleological aspect of the composite's nature. In other words, the composite human being has an end for the sake of which the rest of the being is organized. This end just is the preservation of the composite human nature, viz a living human being, and a subsidiary end is carried out by sense perceptions in that its purpose is to give the mind the necessary information for making judgements about how best to preserve its union with the body. Descartes also ascribes a final cause to the composite in Passions of the Soul 11.137: Having given definitions of love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, and dealt with all the bodily movements which cause or accompany them,
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we have only to consider their function. Regarding this, it must be observed that they are all ordained by nature to relate to the body, and to belong to the soul only in so far as it is joined with the body. Hence, their natural function is to move the soul to consent and contribute to actions which may serve to preserve the body or render it in some way more perfect. (AT XI 429-30: CSM I 376)11 Again, the proper function or end for the sake of which the aforementioned emotions and bodily movements are ordered is for the preservation of the body, i.e. the human body qua human, or to make it more perfect. So, the purpose of these emotions and sensations is to avoid what is harmful and act in a way beneficial to the whole composite. Hence, Descartes's rejection of final causes and, therefore, substantial forms in physics does not undermine but support the mind's status as the only substantial form in Descartes's metaphysics. Another group of evidence can be found in passages where Descartes explicitly or implicitly states that the mind or intellectual soul is a substantial form. One passage is found in the Fifth Replies where Descartes addresses the concern raised by Gassendi about how the term 'soul' is to be applied to humans and beasts insofar as both have sensitive and nutritive or appetitive faculties. I was still in doubt about whether you preferred not to use the word 'soul' to apply to the principle responsible for the vegetative and sensory functions in both us and the brutes, but wanted instead to say that the soul in the strict sense was our mind. But since it is the vegetative and sensitive principle that is properly speaking said to 'animate' us, the only function performed by the mind is to enable us to think and this you do in fact assert. (AT VII 263-4: CSM II 184) Here Gassendi's concern is that the Cartesian mind is not really a soul, because it does not possess those faculties by virtue of which we are said to be alive or animated. The problem Gassendi raises is that, despite his claims to the contrary in the Discourse on Method, the Cartesian mind is not the principle by which we live but merely a faculty super-added to a body that already has these sensitive and nutritive faculties in virtue of the configuration and motion of its parts (AT VII 263: CSM II 183-4). Although Descartes does not address this specific objection, he explains that the term 'soul' was mistakenly used to apply to sensation and nutrition, and that the mind was the principal part of the human soul:
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I, by contrast, realizing that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly different - different in kind - from that in virtue of which we think, have said the that the term 'soul,' when it is used to refer to both these principles is ambiguous. If we are to take 'soul' in its special sense, as meaning the 'first actuality' or 'principle form of man,' then the term must be understood to apply only to the principle in virtue of which we think; and to avoid ambiguity I have as far as possible used the term 'mind' for this. For I consider the mind not as a part of the soul but as the thinking soul in its entirety. (AT VII 356: CSM II 246) First, when 'soul' is applied to animals and plants, it does not denote an immaterial principle of sensation and/or nutrition but only the configuration and motion of the parts of that body which give rise to those faculties. Accordingly, on Descartes's account, animals do not have souls strictly speaking and, therefore, they are not truly living things. Indeed, Descartes is famous for his claim that animals do not, strictly speaking, have sensations like hunger, thirst and pain.12 But human beings have an immaterial principle of life whose only faculty is thinking, i.e. understanding and will, and as intimated in Chapter 4 and discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, sensation is not a faculty of the soul alone but of the whole human being. So, the point is that, contrary to the common scholastic understanding, sensitive and nutritive faculties are not found in the human soul. Recall from the previous section that Ockham maintains a similar position, and as such Descartes's removal of these faculties from the mind or intellectual soul should not be too surprising. Second, the thinking soul or mind is nothing other than the 'first actuality' or 'principle form of man'. This is just a way of expressing that it is by means of the mind that a human being is what it is, i.e. it is the substantial form of human being. Given the likelihood that Descartes maintains a pluralist theory of mind-body union, this just means that the mind is the first principle that actualizes the potential in a properly disposed human body, which resulted from the configuration and motion of its parts, to become a human being. Hence, Descartes is here claiming that the mind is the intellectual soul and the substantial form of a human being. Another supportive text is in his draft of the open letter to Voetius. There Descartes is responding to Voetius' concern about how the rejection of substantial forms would affect people's beliefs in the immortality and immateriality of the soul:
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Yet, if the soul is recognized as merely a substantial form, while other such forms consist in the configuration and motion of parts, this very privileged status it has compared with other forms shows that its nature is quite different from theirs. And this difference in nature opens the easiest route to demonstrating its non-materiality and immortality, as may be seen in the recently published Meditations on First Philosophy. Thus one cannot think of any opinion on this subject that is more congenial to theology. (AT III 503: CSMK 207-8) Descartes goes on to explain why it is that only the human soul is a substantial form but not the 'forms' of material things: This is confirmed by the example of the soul, which is the true substantial form of man. For the soul is thought to be immediately created by God for no other reason than that it is a substance. Hence, since the other 'forms' are not thought to be created in this way, but merely to emerge from the potentiality of matter, they should not be regarded as substances. It is clear from this that it is not those who deny substantial forms but those who affirm them who 'can be forced by solid arguments to become either beasts or atheists'. (AT III 505: CSMK 208) The first passage quoted from the draft merely states that his rejection of substantial forms in non-thinking things actually helps support theological concerns about the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Indeed, this is because the supposed substantial forms of material things are not especially created by God but arise from the potentiality in matter. Hence, the 'substantial forms' of material things are not substances, because they depend on matter for their existence. But, the soul is not ontologically dependent on matter but only on God's creative and conservative activity, and so it is immaterial by its very nature. Therefore, Descartes argues that the mind or soul is the only true substantial form, while other such 'forms' are merely the configuration and motion of parts, which depend on the potentiality in matter for their existence in agreement with the conclusion of 3.4. Finally, Descartes was not the only one or the first to reject all substantial forms other than the human soul. Roger Ariew has pointed out that seventeenth-century anti-Aristotelians who rejected substantial forms always made an exception for the rational soul. For instance, Etienne de Clave, Jean Baitault and Antione Villon listed a thesis on a
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broadsheet for disputation on 24 and 25 August 1624 stating that they denied all substantial forms except for the rational soul.13 Moreover, the Catholic Church did not see any inconsistency in this thesis, even though they condemned it at Louvain in 1662: These [Principles 1.51 and 52] are censured by the Holy Faculty of Theology, since, as a consequence of these, there would not be any substantial forms, except for the rational soul; indeed there would not be any substantial forms in animals and plants, as signaled in various places.14 Therefore, this thesis was commonplace and recognized as consistent by both the moderns and those schoolmen who opposed it. Surely Descartes was anti-Aristotelian in his views regarding substantial forms, and so given its common place among modern, anti-Aristotelian theses and the evidence provided here, it is reasonable to conclude that the human mind is the only substantial form left standing in Descartes's metaphysics.
5.5 COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE SUBSTANCES The placing of Descartes's theory of mind-body union within the pluralist camp also requires an account of how two really distinct substances can unite per se to form a complete substantial human nature. Pluralists invoked a distinction between complete and incomplete substances in order to address this concern. They claimed that Aquinas's arguments against a plurality of substantial forms to ensure the per se unity of the composite substance applied only to a whole whose parts were composed of complete substances but not to a whole constituted by incomplete substances. An incomplete substance is a substance in the sense that it actualizes the potential in matter for being a species of substance. But, it is incomplete in that the resulting substantial nature is not yet complete in a given species. For example, pluralists maintained that the per se unity of the form of corporeity with matter is an incomplete substance, because being merely a properly disposed human body is not the complete nature of human being. However, configuring matter in this way disposes it (or provides the potentiality) for reception of some further substantial form. But, although this entity would not actually be a living human being, it would now have the potential for taking on the
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proper principle of life for that species of thing. This potential would then be actualized by the intellectual soul. The substance is complete only when it is informed by the intellectual soul, because only then does a rational animal, i.e. a substance whose nature is complete within the species 'human being', come into existence and its potential for substantial forms is exhausted. Several lessons can be drawn from this pluralist theory as found in Ockham's philosophy. One is that Ockham's substantial forms of corporeity, appetite and sensation, and the intellectual soul are ordered in a hierarchy from the naturally prior to the naturally posterior through higher degrees of completion until the substantial form of that species of substance completes it. So, the lowest rung of the hierarchy is that substantial form which first informs matter resulting in an incomplete substance with the potential for receiving the substantial form next up in the hierarchy, and its ranking is higher depending on the resulting level of completeness. So, on this Ockhamist example, the form of corporeity is the lowest, the form of sensation and appetite brings the substance one step closer to being complete in a species, and finally the intellectual soul is the highest, because it completes the specific nature of that substance. Hence, even though a human being is composed of more than one substantial form, the intellectual soul is still the substantial form of human being in that it completes the composite substance within a species thereby exhausting its potential for taking on further substantial forms. Another lesson is that this hierarchy is not only one of actualities but also of potentialities. Primary or even quantified matter cannot be actualized by the intellectual soul, because it is not disposed to or does not have the potential for it. Hence, the intellectual soul cannot unite or actualize matter that is in just any state of potential but only one that has the substantial form(s) required for actualizing a potential for it. So, for example, an intellectual soul cannot be united with an incomplete substance informed by a bovine form of corporeity, because this substantial form does not actualize a potential for the substantial form of human being but only for that of bovine being. So, the per se unity of this pluralist complete substance is not cashed out by means of the number of substantial forms found in a substance but by means of this hierarchically arranged potentialityactuality relation. Therefore, so long as the substantial forms found in a thing are ordered in accordance with this hierarchy, the resultant entity is a complete substance, because the whole being is hierarchically ordered for the sake of being that species of thing.
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An important result of these considerations is that certain substances are incomplete by their very natures, because their purpose is to provide the potential for the reception of another substantial form. So, one aspect of the pluralist distinction between complete and incomplete substances is that both the intellectual soul and the human body endowed with its form of corporeity (and the sensitive/appetitive soul on the Ockhamist account) are incomplete by their very natures, because neither is complete in a given species. Although Descartes also uses this distinction to account for the unity of mind and body, there is a very important difference: Descartes maintains that the human mind and the properly configured human body are complete substances by their very natures given their respective satisfaction of CS*. This raises the following question: Can Descartes legitimately invoke this distinction given this fundamental difference between his use of it and that made by the pluralists? Contrary to Rozemond's conclusion that he cannot appeal to this distinction to account for the union of mind and body, a closer look at Descartes's admitted qualified use of this distinction shows he has a legitimate claim to it. Descartes first deploys this distinction in his response to Arnauld: It is also possible to call a substance incomplete in the sense that, although it has nothing incomplete about it qua substance, it is incomplete in so far as it is referred to some other substance in conjunction with which it forms something which is a unity in its own right. (AT VII222:CSMII 157) Descartes continues to give a hand as an example of a substance that is complete when considered on its own but incomplete 'when it is referred to the whole body of which it is a part': And in just the same way, the mind and the body are incomplete substances when they are referred to a human being which together they make up, but if they are considered on their own, they are complete. (ATVII222:CSMII 157) Descartes elaborates a bit more in a December 1641 letter to Regius wherein he states that 'it follows from their [body and soul] being incomplete that what they constitute is an ens per se9 (AT III 460: CSMK 200). So, mind and body are complete substances in themselves but incomplete when referred to the whole human being that they constitute. From
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this it follows that a human being is an ens per se, which implies further that it is one per se. However, it is difficult to see how it is that Descartes's example of a hand supports his claim regarding the relative completeness and incompleteness of mental and bodily substances. Surely, the union of a hand with its body does not constitute an ens per se in the requisite sense, since a human body qua human has not been divided with the hand's amputation but only the human body qua body as discussed in 3.5. But the relevant feature of this analogy is the claim that a hand is 'a part of the body. The point is that mind and body are each parts of the whole and complete species 'human being' because, as discussed in 4.3, a human being cannot exist without either one of them. So, mind and body are incomplete insofar as they are each metaphysical parts constituting the whole human being. Yet, Descartes's claim that mind and body are complete substances when 'considered on their own' runs contrary to the pluralist dictum that only substances incomplete by their very natures can unite to make a substance that is one per se. How can the completeness of mind and body taken individually be reconciled with their roles as incomplete substances composing a human being? The answer to this question is found in the Fourth Replies where Descartes modifies the scholastic version of this distinction in light of his conception of substance: I am aware that certain substances are commonly called 'incomplete.' But if the reason for calling them incomplete is that they are unable to exist on their own, then I confess I find it self-contradictory that they should be substances, that is, things which subsist on their own, and at the same time incomplete, that is, not possessing the power to subsist on their own. (AT VII 222: CSM II 156-7) His point here is that mind and body are complete substances precisely because neither requires any other creature but only God's concurrence to exist. But, on the pluralist account, a cadaver, for instance, is an incomplete substance and cannot subsist on its own as shown by its tendency to decompose into the basic elements. So, mind and body are complete substances when 'considered on their own' insofar as each satisfies CS* which, as shown in 1.8, is a weaker conception of substance than the scholastics maintained. It is also interesting to note that mind and body are also complete natures themselves, as Descartes states in the next paragraph:
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For just as being extended and divisible and having shape, etc. are forms or attributes by which I recognize the substance called body, so understanding, willing, doubting etc. are forms by which I recognize the substance which is called mind. And I understand a thinking substance to be just as much a complete thing as an extended substance. (AT VII 223: CSM II 157) Here Descartes's point is that mind and body are complete kinds of things such that neither needs the other in order to complete its respective nature; that is, mind does not need body to be a thinking thing nor does body need mind to be an extended thing. Yet, mind and body taken individually are not a complete human being, and it is in this sense that they are incomplete 'when they are referred to a human being which together they make up'. In other words, mind and body are the two metaphysical 'parts' constituting a whole or complete nature, and they are incomplete insofar as each is a part but not the whole substantial nature. These considerations provide the starting point for a response to the concern about how Descartes can consistently maintain that two complete substances can be united per se to form another whole substance complete in a given species. Qualifying the senses in which mind and body are complete and incomplete means that mind and body are not incomplete by their very natures, as maintained by Descartes's scholastic pluralist counterparts, in that each is not what it is for the sake of being substantially united with each other. Descartes makes this point in the December 1641 letter to Regius cited in 4.4 in order to establish the broad sense in which the union is 'accidental'. But Descartes's claim that nothing in the soul or the body 'demands' union with the other is also important to consider here: [B]ut you should reply that these things can still be called accidental, because when we consider the body alone we perceive nothing in it demanding union with the soul, and nothing in the soul obliging it to be united with the body. (AT III 461: CSMK 200) The reason Descartes maintains the absence of a 'demand' for union with the other is found in the Cartesian conception of substance. Recall from 1.7 that created Cartesian substances do not require a composite nature of matter and form but only need to be an ultimate determinable. But recall further that the satisfaction of CS* is necessary but not
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sufficient for being a substance on the scholastic conception. The further condition of being a per se union of a substantial form with matter is also required. So, for the scholastics, the soul and the body 'demand' union with each other, or are incomplete by their very natures, because each is in itself only a part of a complete substantial nature, and because each was created for the purpose of union with the other. This does not occur in Descartes's system, because mind and body each satisfies CS* on their own and that is all it takes to be complete qua substance. But, even though each does not exist for the sake of union with the other, the human body is disposed, or has the potential, for union with the human mind and only the human mind can actualize this potential for being a human body qua human. One might object that 'demand' for union is a necessary condition for the per se unity of two incomplete substances.15 This, however, would be to misconstrue the notion of per se or substantial unity. All that is required for the per se unity of a substantial form with matter is that the latter has the potential for substantial union with the former which, in turn, has the capability of actualizing this potential. The doctrine of a substance being incomplete by its very nature is really a consequence of teleological explanations of the metaphysics of substance offered by the scholastics such that the end or one of the ends of an incomplete substance is its unification with its counterpart. Since Descartes's human body is not organized for the sake of this end, contrary to the pluralist form of corporeity, but is a consequence resulting from this organization, Descartes need not maintain that the body (or the mind for that matter: see AT VII 219: CSMII 155) is incomplete by its very nature. Therefore, all that is required for the per se or substantial unity of mind and body is the requisite act-potency relation.
5.4 THE WHOLE IN THE WHOLE AND THE WHOLE IN ANY ONE OF ITS PARTS So far this chapter has discussed various issues regarding how Cartesian mind and body can unite to form an ens per se. The mind is the substantial form of human being, and as such actualizes the potential in a properly disposed human body for being human. On their own, mind and body are each complete substances but are incomplete when referred to the whole human being, because each is a complete, selfsubsisting nature ,in itself, yet each is an 'incomplete' human being.
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But together they make up a complete human being with per se unity, which just is a scholastic substance. This implies further that it is a created Cartesian substance as discussed in 1.8. But the story does not end here. In other places, Descartes also goes on to illustrate how he believes the mind or soul is united with the body through the analogy of the scholastic conception of gravity. I saw that the gravity, while remaining coextensive with the heavy body, could exercise all its force in any one part of the body, for if the body were hung from a rope attached to any part of it, it would still pull the rope down with all its force, just as if all the gravity existed in the part actually touching the rope instead of scattered throughout the remaining parts. This is exactly the way in which I now understand the mind to be coextensive with the body - the whole mind in the whole body and the whole mind in any one of its parts. (AT VII 442: CSM II 298) Here Descartes is trying to illustrate the manner in which the soul is 'coextensive' with the body. It is noteworthy that his claim that the whole mind is in the whole body and the whole in any one of its parts is not new with Descartes but can be traced back at least as far as Augustine.16 This raises two questions. First, what does the phrase 'the whole in the whole and the whole in any one of the parts' mean? And second, how can the soul both be whole in the whole body and the whole in any one of its parts but just in the pineal gland as he is commonly understood by scholars? In fact, Descartes makes these two apparently inconsistent claims one after the other at Passions of the Soul 1.30 and 31 (AT XI 351-2: CSM I 339-40). A clue can be found in the passage from the Sixth Replies just cited: the soul is wholly in the whole body and the whole in any one of its parts but exercises its primary powers in the pineal gland just as gravity is wholly in the whole body and the whole in any one of its parts but can exercise all its power at any one point of the heavy body. So, a look at how the scholastics unpacked this doctrine should prove helpful. This scholastic doctrine is most readily found in Aquinas, who makes a distinction between a totality of power and a totality of essence or perfection: Since, however, the soul has no quantitative totality, neither essentially nor accidentally, as we have seen, it is enough to say that the whole
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soul is in each part of the body by totality of perfection, and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight it is in the eye, and with regard to hearing it is in the ear, and so forth.17 Since Aquinas is a Unitarian and Descartes is a (modified) pluralist, there are inevitably going to be some points of dis-analogy between this passage and the one from the Sixth Replies. But what is important here is the claim made by both that the sour is not extended, i.e. has no quantitative totality, as well as the distinction between a totality of essence or perfection the mind or soul has with the body in comparison to a totality of power. For Aquinas, of course, this extension of essence or perfection is tied up with his thesis that the human soul is also the configurer of the body: the whole body is configured or organized for the sake of being human, whereas the various sense faculties possessed by the soul are found in their respective sense organs, i.e. sight in the eye, etc. But sense can also be made of this from within a more Ockhamist framework wherein the soul does not have the faculties of sense and is not the principle of bodily organization.18 As mentioned in 5.1, the pluralists maintained that the human soul is the substantial form of human being and, even though it is not the only substantial form in the composite, it is the final form that makes the composite what it is. Here it is important to remember that the Cartesian mind, along with the Ockhamist intellectual soul, has only the faculties of intellect and will. However, in discussing and distinguishing the various faculties found in these different accounts of the soul, it is easy to forget that fundamentally a soul is a principle of life such that its function of animating or vivifying a body is recognized by both Unitarian and pluralist thinkers alike. Hence, on all accounts, the resultant whole is a living human being endowed with appetitive, sensitive and rational faculties. Descartes's view of the whole is no different.19 Descartes does not, however, mention this distinction between a totality of essence and that of power. But the context of the passage from the Sixth Replies indicates that Descartes is basing his account of the coextension of the soul squarely on the scholastic conception. So, barring evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose that Descartes used the phrase 'whole in the whole and the whole in any one of its parts' with its customary reference to a totality of essence or perfection. The Cartesian mind or soul perfects the whole of a properly disposed human body by animating it, i.e. making it truly alive. It is important to notice
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that the whole body is alive and not just one part of it for, as Eustachius pointed out, 'if the soul resided only in the heart, for example, only the heart would be said to be truly and essentially animate - which would be most absurd'.20 Hence, the claim that the whole soul is in the whole body and the whole in any one of its parts ought to be understood to indicate that every part of the human body qua human is equally alive. So, the Cartesian soul is coextensive with the body in that its essence, viz life, is found equally throughout it. This has a couple of consequences. First, although Rozemond is correct that the mind is not the form of the body in any robust sense, it is the form of the body in the weak sense of being the principle of the life of a human body such that it is truly human.21 This indicates further that if the Cartesian soul or mind were located only in the pineal gland, then only it would be truly alive while the rest of the body would not. In this way, the mind would be using the body as a sailor uses his ship in that some living thing would be directing the movements of an inanimate object. But, as shown in Chapter 4, Descartes explicitly rejects this view in favour of the per se unity of mind and body. Yet Descartes is also explicit that the soul has its 'primary seat' in the pineal gland. Despite appearances to the contrary, the pineal gland account can be reconciled with this 'whole in the whole' account just provided. Two previous points are germane to this account. First, although it is coextensive with the body by a totality of essence or perfection, the mind can be in only one part of the body by a totality of power. Second, recall from the Sixth Replies that the real quality of gravity can exercise all its power at one point even though it is whole in the whole and whole in any one of its parts. Based on these considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that the mind has its primary seat in the pineal gland in that this is where it exercises its primary powers, viz intellect and will. Therefore, the mind is whole in the whole and the whole in any one of the body's parts by a totality of essence or perfection such that every bodily part is equally alive and, therefore, equally human; but it is in the pineal gland by a totality of power, since that is where its primary powers or faculties are exercised.
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5.5 WHAT AM I? This chapter has fleshed out the conclusion of Descartes's argument for the per se unity of mind and body discussed in Chapter 4. Here it has been shown that: (1) Descartes's explanation of this per se unity should be understood to be fundamentally pluralist in nature; (2) the Cartesian mind just is the intellectual soul, is the substantial form of human being and is the only substantial form left standing his metaphysics; and (3) Descartes is entitled to use his modified distinction between complete and incomplete substance. In the end, the evidence indicates that Descartes's human being is not a mere aggregate of two substances - one mental, the other physical - united per accidens by an efficient or mechanistic causal relation but is composed of the per se unity of mind and body as metaphysical parts so as to form one, whole and complete substantial human nature. This account of the union of mind and body into a complete substantial human nature raises an interesting question: What am I? Descartes's response to this question in the Second Meditation was that 'I am a thinking thing.' Traditionally this has been taken to mean 'I am nothing but an immaterial mind.' This interpretation implies further that the human body is outside this nature or essence of what I am. But the hylomorphic account of mindbody union provided here seems to indicate that the whole human being is what I am and not just an immaterial mind. Joseph Almog has argued that what I am is a human being and that mind and body can only be understood as the mind and body of this particular human being such that this mind and this body are necessarily linked in this human nature and cannot be understood without it. Almog realizes that this does not square with the real distinction argument as it is traditionally understood, i.e. as marking the abilities of mind and body to exist without each other. Instead, he argues that the real distinction argument can be understood solely in terms of the characterization of substance as a subject of modes.22 Accordingly, on Almog's account, the real distinction argument marks the fact that these two necessarily connected things each have their own capacities for their respective sets of modes. So, returning to Chappell's distinction between hard and soft union and dualist doctrines, Almog claims that Descartes is a very hard unionist but a very soft dualist. Although Almog's account is incorrect in light of the argument made in 4.6 that Descartes maintained that mind and body are actually united
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per se but are potentially two substances, which is also a brand of hard unionism and soft dualism, he is at least partially correct that what I am is a human being. A clue is found in an addition to the French edition of the Meditations, 'that is, my soul, by which I am what I am'. The soul is not what I am but that 'by which' I am what I am. This squares nicely with the claim established above that the mind is the substantial form of human being. So, I am my mind insofar as by it I am what, i.e. the kind or species of thing, I am. But, since a fundamentally scholastic understanding of a complete composite nature is being used, it can also be maintained that the whole human being is what I am. This is because both form and matter are required for a complete definition, essence or species of a thing. Hence, strictly speaking, I am a human being, but in the attenuated sense of 'what I am' I am my mind, which is the principle by which I am the species of thing I am, viz a human being.23 Another important result of this account is its implications for the problem of mind-body causal interaction, which is traditionally seen as a fatal flaw of Descartes's metaphysics. Chapter 4 showed that the per se unity of mind and body cannot be explained by an efficient or mechanistic causal relation, while this chapter showed how a formal causal account by means of the mind's activity qua substantial form on a properly disposed human body unites them into an unum quid or complete scholastic substance. This means that conceiving the union as an efficient causal relation is mistaken, and as such the traditional problem of mind-body causal interaction is not really a problem for Descartes. This insight can be explicated through Descartes's correspondence with Elizabeth wherein he tries to get the princess to correctly conceive the mindbody union so that she can better understand how voluntary bodily motions are possible. This is the subject of the next chapter.
NOTES
1 Scholars working in the Anglo-American tradition who take the evidence to point towards hylomorphism are Roger Ariew, 'Mind-body interaction in Cartesian philosophy: a reply to Garber', Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 21 (1983): 33-7; Paul Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes' man', The Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 339-69 and 'Cartesian composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 251-70; and Marjorie Grene, Descartes Among the Scholastics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991). It is noteworthy that French commentators have traditionally taken Descartes to
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hold a hylomorphic view in contrast to their English-speaking counterparts.

See Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le Role de la Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien (Paris: Vrin, 1951); Martial Gueroult, Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons, 2 vols, trans. Roger Ariew
2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); Henri Gouhier, Le Pensee Metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1962); and Genevieve RodisLewis, L'Indiviualite selan Descartes (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1950). For more on this see 1.2 above and Chapter 1, note 8. Of course, this is merely a summary of Rozemond's arguments. For her full account, see Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 141-6. Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', pp. 363-4. Adams summarizes Ockham's position nicely: 'the substance Socrates is a composite of at least four, really distinct things; prime matter, the form of corporiety, sensory soul, and intellectual soul. The form of corporeity inheres directly in prime matter, the form of sensation either inheres directly in prime matter or in the form of corporeity, and the intellectual soul is whole in the whole composite and whole in each part.' See Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), vol. 2, p. 664, and also see pages 650 and 656. Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 145. Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 145. Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', p. 351. Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 152. Rozemond also recognizes the exclusion of explanations of mental phenomena from Descartes's arguments against the use of substantial forms in explanations in physics. See Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 152. The sense in which sensations are modes of the mind insofar as it is united with the body will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. In PartV of the Discourse on Method, Descartes argues that animal souls are completely different from human souls precisely because they do not have an immaterial faculty of intellection as supported by their inability to speak (AT VI 56-60: CSM I 139-41). At the end of this part, Descartes briefly summarizes an argument he had made in a portion of the Treatise on Man now lost that is basically the same argument as that for the per se union of mind and body discussed in Chapter 4. Recall that Descartes argues that only a substance composed of both mind (i.e. the rational soul) and body can have modes of sensation. This implies that material things without souls, such as animals, are not, strictly speaking, alive, because they cannot have true sensations, e.g. pain. Des Chene has argued that beasts are not, strictly speaking, alive on the Cartesian account. See Denis Des Chene, Spirits and
Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2001), pp. 2-3. Descartes makes basically the same point in a letter to Regius dated May 1641 (AT III 370: CSMK 181).
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13 Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Late Scholastics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 89. 14 See Roger Ariew, et al., Descartes's Meditations: Background Source Materials
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 255. 15 In fact, Descartes's denial of this 'demand' for union is one of Rozemond's main reasons for concluding that Descartes cannot make legitimate use of the complete-incomplete substance distinction. See Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, p. 156. Hoffman tries to square things with her by arguing for an attenuated sense of 'demand' for union. See Hoffman, 'Cartesian composites', pp. 263-4. However, as argued below, such a demand for union is not required for the per se unity of a substantial form with matter but only the requisite act-potency relation. Rather, this 'demand' for union required by the scholastics is a result of their stronger doctrine of substance and the teleological aspect of substantial forms. 16 See Augustine, 'On the immortality of the soul', 16, in Concerning the Teacher and the Immortality of the Soul, trans. George C. Leckie (New York and London: Appleton-Century Company, 1938). 17 Aquinas, ST, 1, 76, 8. 18 Ockham makes this claim about composite substances in general, and as such it would apply to the human being as well. See Adams, William Ockham, vol. 2, pp. 679-80. 19 Of course, the accounts of where the faculties reside differ for all the thinkers under consideration. Aquinas and Scotus believe that the faculties of appetite, sensation and intellect are all found in the soul, whereas Ockham maintains their existence in a substantial form distinct from the intellectual soul and the form of corporeity. Finally, Descartes locates intellect in the mind, appetite in the body, and sensation in the completed whole. But regardless of these various accounts, the point is that for all of them a whole human being is somehow endowed with all these faculties. 20 See Eustachius, SPQ, Physics, 1, 1, 2, pp. 249-50. Suarez maintains a similar view when he says that the soul is called 'spirit' insofar as it vivifies the body. See Suarez, MD, 15, 10, 24. 21 See Principles IV 189 wherein Descartes claims that the soul 'informs' the entire body, while nevertheless having its principal seat in the brain (AT VIIIA315: CSMI279). 22 See Joseph Almog, What Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially chapter 3. 23 Despite appearances to the contrary, this account of what I am is not undermined by Descartes's arguments that I am a thinking thing in the Second Meditation. First, in that meditation, his only conclusion is that he is absolutely certain that he is thinking while doubting that he has a body. This is merely an epistemological claim and cannot be used to infer the existential conclusion that 'I am nothing but a mind.' Moreover, in the Second Meditation, the issue as to whether or not the mind is immaterial is left open. Indeed, this claim is not made until the real distinction arguments of the
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Sixth Meditation. But it is important that the proposition 'I am a thinking thing' can be truthfully asserted of both an immaterial mind and a complete human being. In both cases, thinking is predicated essentially. The account offered in the main text is intended to explain (albeit briefly) how this can be so.
CHAPTER 6
Descartes's Dissolution to the Mind-Body Problem
In the Fifth Objections, Pierre Gassendi raises the following questions about the mind's ability to bring about movement in the body: How can there be effort directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual contact between what moves and what is moved? And how can there be contact without a body when, as is transparently clear by the natural light, 'naught apart from body, can touch or yet be touched.' (AT VII 341: CSM II 237) Gassendi's point is that the mind cannot bring about motion in the body, because its unextended nature precludes it from touching or coming into contact with the body. Princess Elizabeth raises precisely the same concern in a letter dated 16 May 1643: I beseech you to tell me how the mind of man (being only a thinking substance) can determine the spirits of the body in order to make voluntary actions. For it seems that every determination of movement is made by the impulsion of the thing moved by the manner in which it is pushed by what moves it, or else from the qualification and figure of the surface of the latter. Contact is required for the first two conditions and extension for the third. You entirely exclude the latter from the notion you have of the mind and the former seems incompatible with an immaterial thing. (AT III 661, my translation) These two contemporaries of Descartes were perhaps the first to recognize a problem with the causal interaction between two substances of completely diverse natures. Yet, despite the apparent obviousness of this problem and the amount of ink spilled on this issue by critics, Descartes never takes the issue seriously. In fact, he claims that there is no such problem, since it arises from a supposition that is false and
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cannot be proven, 'namely that, if the soul and the body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other' (AT VII 213: CSM II 275). As such, Descartes is loath to address this problem, because he believes it is not a real problem at all.1 Descartes, however, intimates to both Gassendi and Elizabeth that an account of mind-body union will put their concerns to rest (AT VII 213: CSM II 275 and AT III 664-5: CSMK 218). Although he does not provide so much as an outline of this account to Gassendi, he offers a brief, albeit vague, explanation of the primitive notion of mind-body union and its relation to the notion of voluntary bodily movement in a 21 May 1643 letter to Elizabeth. Chapters 4 and 5 have argued for a roughly pluralist account of the per se unity of mind and body into a complete substantial human nature. This chapter takes the inquiry a step further by examining how this account of Cartesian human nature avoids the problem of mind-body causal interaction traditionally attributed to him, and which is often seen as a fatal flaw of his metaphysics. This investigation is conducted mainly through Descartes's remarks to Elizabeth in their May and June 1643 correspondence about how to correctly conceive the union of mind and body. But some important points will also be drawn from Descartes's remarks to Caterus in the First Replies concerning true and immutable composite natures as distinguished from those that are mere inventions of the mind. In the end, Elizabeth's and Gassendi's problem lies in their misconception of the relation uniting mind and body as that of an efficient or mechanistic causal relation, and as such their conception of the nature of a human being is not true and immutable but merely an invention of the mind. This result will then be used to show that only a mind and body united per se constitutes a true and immutable human nature with the capacities for modes of sensation and voluntary bodily movement. The final conclusion is that modes such as sensations and voluntary bodily movements are not modes of the mind or body alone but only of a true and immutable nature composed of both. As such, the problem of mindbody causal interaction (understood as an efficient causal relation) is avoided altogether. The chapter begins with a close look at Descartes's remarks about 'certain primitive notions'.
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6.1 THE PRIMITIVE NOTION OF MIND-BODY UNION Descartes explains to Elizabeth that all human knowledge consists in clearly distinguishing certain primitive notions: First I consider that there are in us certain primitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions. There are very few such notions. First, there are the most general - those of being, number, duration, etc, - which apply to everything we can conceive. Then, as regards body in particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails the notions of shape and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of thought, which includes the perceptions of the intellect and the inclinations of the will. Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, we have only the notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the soul's power (la force) to move the body, and the body's power to act (d'agir) on the soul and cause its sensations and passions. (AT VIII 665: CSMK 218) The notions of being, number and duration are the most general, since they apply to every conceivable thing. The notions of extension and thought constitute the next lower level of generality. The notion of extension applies to bodies on their own and entails the notions of shape and motion; whereas the notion of thought applies to minds on their own and includes the notions of the perceptions of the intellect and the inclinations of the will. Finally, Descartes gets to the primitive notion of the soul and the body together, or mind-body union, and the notions depending on it. These are the notions of the mind's power to move the body (i.e. the notion of voluntary bodily movement) and the body's power to bring about sensations and passions (i.e. the notions of sensation and the passions).2 This notion is then on the lowest level of generality. There is a long and distinguished heritage of commentary on this passage concerning the primitive notions, their relationships to each other, and their relationships to those notions entailed by, included in or dependent on them. But there is no real consensus and these varying accounts have led to many equally diverse conclusions. Daisie Radner was perhaps the first in Anglo-American scholarship to give the letters to Elizabeth any serious attention. She argues that the notion of mind-body union is not primitive, because any primitive notion must be understood
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through itself alone and not through any other primitive notion. Radner draws a parallel between Descartes's primitive notions and his account of simple natures in his early work Rules for the Direction of the Mind (AT X 383: CSM I 22). Based on this comparison, Radner argues that only the notions of the simple natures, i.e. those of extension and thinking, can be understood through themselves, whereas the notion of mind-body union must be understood through the notions of extension, thought and their interrelationship.3 Radner then turns her attention to other passages in which Descartes addresses the union of mind and body. She eventually concludes that none of these accounts adequately explain mind-body causal interaction. Janet Broughton and Ruth Mattern take issue with Radner's interpretation. They object to her recourse to the Rules in interpreting it because of the temporal distance between the two works. They go on to argue that the placement of the notion of mind-body union among those of extension and thought indicates that union is the principal attribute of human being.4 But, despite this conclusion, they also recognize the problem with the primitiveness of the notion of mind-body union, because it does seem to require an understanding of the primitive notions of extension and thought as Radner observed.5 Broughton and Mattern then attempt to resolve this difficulty by showing that this union is the simple nature constituting the principal attribute of human being.6 On their account, the notion of mind-body union is the notion of a third kind of substance, in addition to extended and thinking substance, with its own principal attribute. Another interesting interpretation is offered by Daniel Garber. He argues that, although each primitive notion is intelligible through itself, the notion of mind to body interaction (i.e. the notion of voluntary bodily movement) is in fact more primitive than the notion of extension. He bases this claim on Descartes's remarks elsewhere that the notion of mind to body interaction is the pattern for the scholastic notion of causation (see Sixth Replies AT VII 441-2: CSM II 297-8) as well as for the notion of mechanistic causation (see the 15 April 1649 letter to Thomas More at AT V 347: CSMK 375). Hence, since scholastic and mechanistic notions of causation were the only options available to Descartes and his contemporaries, [m]ind-body interaction must be basic and intelligible on its own terms since if it were not, then no other kind of causal explanation would be intelligible at all; to challenge the intelligibility of mind-body interaction is to challenge the entire enterprise of causal explanation.7
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David Yandell argues that the notion of mind-body union is on the same level of primitiveness as the notions of thought and extension, because no other more primitive notion entails it.8 He also argues that the terms 'entails', 'includes' and 'depends' used to describe the respective relationships between each of these primitive notions and their respective subsidiary notions all have the same meaning given the context of the passage. He eventually concludes that union is, in some sense, an essential attribute of human being for Descartes but he stops short of reaching Broughton and Mattern's stronger conclusion that union is a third principal attribute. In fact, Yandell disagrees with them that the notion of mind-body union is that of a third kind of substance, because mind-body union is ontologically dependent on two finite substances for its existence.9 This mere sampling of the vast scholarship concerning this passage suggests the wide range of interpretations it has received.10 In the remainder of this section, it is argued in agreement with Broughton, Mattern and Yandell, and contrary to Radner and Garber, that the notion of mind-body union is primitive but in a qualified sense. Moreover, Yandell is correct that the words 'entails', 'includes' and 'depends' are synonymous; however, his reliance on context for this conclusion is surely not enough - further argumentation is required. Indeed, the synonymous nature of these terms is best explicated through Descartes's earlier remarks on absolute and relative things in the Rules. This approach is better than Radner's through the remarks on simple natures, because it better captures what counts as a primitive notion and the relations between them and their respective subsidiary notions. Broughton and Mattern's criticism that the chronological distance of the Rules (c. 1628) and the letter to Elizabeth (May 1643) is not sufficient in itself to preclude this tactic. In fact, the clearer understanding of the issues at hand provides sufficient justification for its use. Rule Six provides the following helpful points regarding absolute and relative things that are germane to this discussion: 1 I call 'absolute' whatever has within it the pure and simple nature in question; that is, whatever is viewed as being independent. (AT X 381:CSMI21) The 'relative', on the other hand, is what shares the same nature, or at least something of the same nature, in virtue of which we can relate it to the absolute and deduce it from the absolute in a definite series of steps. (AT X 382: CSM I 21)
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The concept 'relative' involves other terms besides, which I call relations: these include whatever is said to be dependent, an effect, composite . . . (AT X 382: CSM 121) For some things are more absolute than others from one point of view, yet more relative from a different point of view . . . Thus, a species is something absolute with respect to particulars, but with respect to the genus it is relative. (AT X 382: CSM I 22) We should, as I said, attend carefully to the simple natures which can be intuited in this way [i.e. by the light innate within us], for these are the ones which in each series we term simple in the highest degree. As for all the other natures we can apprehend them only by deducing them from those which are simple in the highest degree . . . (AT X 383: CSM I 22)
According to this absolute/relative schema, primitive notions would be absolute, and their respective subsidiary notions would be relative. I consider 'absolute' and 'primitive' to be correlative in this context, because the primitive notions of extension and thought are of independent things (i.e. substances), and so they are not deduced from any other notion (by 1 and 5). But the notions of size, motion, understanding and will are of dependent things (i.e. modes) requiring either extension or thought for their existence (by 2 and 3). Correlating these terms in this way permits several further inferences about the primitive notions in general and the notion of mind-body union in particular. It is important first to show that all of the subsidiary notions are implied by their respective primitives despite Descartes's use of different words to express this relation. First, Descartes is explicit that the notions of shape, size and motion are entailed by the notion of extension, which is to say that the notion of extension implies them. Second, the notions of understanding and will are included in the notion of thought. Presumably a notion entails all notions that are included in it. Descartes says just this in the Second Replies: 'When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a thing, this is the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be asserted of that thing' (AT VII 162: CSM II 114). Hence, the notion of thought entails the included notions of understanding and will. Finally, the notion of mind-body union implies its subsidiary notions, because whatever is dependent is relative (by 3), and whatever is relative is deducible from what is absolute (by 2). So, if the notion of mind-body union is primitive, then its subsidiary notions depend on it in the same way that a conclusion depends on its premises.
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The question that remains is whether or not the notion of mind-body union is really primitive. The absolute/relative framework leads to a qualified affirmative response. Radner was correct that the notion of mindbody union is not that of a simple but of a composite nature. Accordingly, it is a relative notion with respect to the notions of the simple natures, which means that it is deducible from the notions of extension and thought (by 2). But just because the notion of mind-body union is relative in this respect does not mean that it is not absolute in another (by 4). As the ordering of these notions indicates, the notions of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions are not deducible from the notion of extension alone or of thought alone but are deducible only from the notion of their union. Accordingly, the notions of extension and thought are not primitive with respect to these notions, because neither bears the appropriate entailment relation to them. Therefore, the notion of mind-body union is relative to the notions of extension and thought in that their conjunction is deducible from them, but it is primitive with respect to the relative notions entailed by it. This explanation of the notion of mind-body union may be criticized on the ground that it fails to take into account that primitive notions are not to be understood through any other notion but only through themselves. But it is also important to bear in mind that the notion of mind-body union cannot be understood through the notions of extension or thinking on their own nor through the mere aggregate of both. Something else is required, namely the relation of per se unity into a whole and complete substantial human nature. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, this relation is crucial to the entailment relation this primitive notion bears to its subsidiaries. So, a complete understanding of the notion of mind-body union cannot be achieved through an understanding of these other primitive notions. This complete understanding can only be achieved through the notion of mind-body union itself, because only it is the notion of the mind, the body, and their per se unity. These considerations yield at least two insights into Descartes's response to Elizabeth. First, since the subsidiary notions entailed by the notions of extension and thinking are the notions of their respective modes, the subsidiary notions entailed by the notion of mind-body union should also be considered the notions of the modes belonging to it as discussed in Chapter 4. Second, as Radner recognized, the notion of mind-body union is not the notion of a simple but of a composite nature. Hence, this passage suggests that the composite nature of mind-body union somehow entails these modes of voluntary bodily
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movement, sensation and passions. This is a result of the entailment relations among the primitive notion of mind-body union and its subsidiaries, but on the metaphysical level this is best understood through the scholastic conception of propria discussed in 1.3. A close investigation of Descartes's remarks in the First Replies on composite natures and the properties they entail will help clarify this point.
6.2 COMPOSITE NATURES AND THEIR PARTS In the First Replies, Descartes discusses the distinction between composite natures that are true and immutable and those that are inventions of the mind. However, it is not altogether clear that Descartes's remarks here can be applied to the problem of mind-body union, since he deploys this distinction in response to a very different concern, viz an objection raised against his version of the ontological argument. But, it is also important to bear in mind that this is an explicit account by Descartes of how two really distinct natures can unite to form a true and immutable composite nature. This is precisely the issue at hand with regards to mind-body union. So, although Descartes uses this account to address a different concern, it is relevantly similar to the issue of mind-body union to warrant its use here. However, this is not to say that the context of the ontological argument should be completely ignored. In fact, a better understanding of the context will help alleviate some misunderstandings about Descartes's distinction between invented natures and those that are true and immutable as well as achieve some insight into the primitive notion of mind-body union. The author of the First Objections, the Dutch theologian Johannes Caterus (Johan de Kater), had argued that Descartes did not make a legitimate inference from the containment of existence in the concept of God to his actual, extra-mental existence for two reasons. First, the argument only shows that the concepts of God and existence are inextricably linked and not that God actually exists. Second, an argument of the same form can be used to prove the extra-mental existence of a lion, since existence is contained in the concept 'existing lion' (AT VII 99-100: CSM II 72). Part of Descartes's response is to divide this latter objection into two difficulties. The first arises from the fact that people are so accustomed to distinguishing existence from essence that they neglect how closely they are linked in the case of God.11 Descartes goes on to resolve this difficulty by making a distinction between a concept
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containing possible and one containing necessary existence. The concepts of all creatures contain the concept of possible existence but only the concept of God contains the concept of necessary existence (AT VII 117: CSM II 83). As mentioned above, Descartes claims in the Second Replies that '[w]hen we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a thing, this is the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be asserted of that thing' (AT VII 162: CSM II 114). Hence, when Descartes says that necessary existence is contained in the concept of God he is saying that it is contained in God's nature. He does just this in the version of the ontological argument appearing in the geometrical exposition later in the Second Replies (AT VII 166-7: CSM II 117). So, the first difficulty is resolved by pointing out what really is and is not contained in the respective natures or concepts of God and his creatures. The importance of this observation will become apparent in the following discussion of the second difficulty. It is in addressing this difficulty that the distinction between invented natures and those that are true and immutable is invoked. This difficulty concerns how people do not distinguish between what is part of the true and immutable nature of a thing and what is attributed to it by an invention of the mind. He first provides a criterion for determining whether or not a nature is invented: an invented nature can be divided by a clear and distinct intellectual operation (AT VII 117: CSM II 83-4). For example, the nature of a lion can be conceived as not actually existing but only existing possibly, because the nature of a lion can be clearly and distinctly understood without existence. Similarly, a triangle inscribed in a square is invented, because its parts can be clearly and distinctly conceived apart from one another. Next, Descartes provides a criterion for determining whether or not a nature is true and immutable: But if I think of a triangle or a square . . . then whatever I apprehend as being contained in the idea of the triangle - for example that its three angles are equal to two right angles - I can with truth assert of the triangle. And the same applies to the square with respect to whatever I apprehend as being contained in the idea of a square. (AT VII 117: CSM II 84) Here Descartes is claiming that the concepts of true and immutable natures have ideas contained in them, which can be truthfully asserted
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about them. For example, the idea of the property of having three angles equal to the sum of two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, which means that these properties are entailed by this nature. So, the concept of a true and immutable nature contains the concepts of its demonstrable properties. Descartes then goes on to show that the concept or nature of a triangle inscribed in a square has its own set of demonstrable properties, and so it too is true and immutable. Moreover, if I consider a triangle inscribed in a square, with a view not to attributing to the square properties that belong only to the triangle, or attributing to the triangle properties that belong to the square, but with a view to examining only the properties which arise out of the conjunction of the two, then the nature of this composite will be just as true and immutable as the nature of the triangle alone or the square alone. And hence it will be quite in order to maintain that the square is not less than double the area of the triangle inscribed within it, and to affirm other similar properties that belong to the nature of this composite figure. (AT VII 118: CSM II 84) This passage makes two points germane to the understanding of composite natures and their parts. First, the properties of one part should not be attributed to the other part. For example, the demonstrable properties of a triangle should not be attributed to the nature of a square or vice versa. Second, true and immutable composite natures are marked by the fact that they are more than the sum of their parts. That is, they have a set of demonstrable properties not entailed by any of their parts taken individually. For example, the property of the square being double the area of the triangle inscribed within it is demonstrated of the whole triangle inscribed in a square and not of the triangle alone or the square alone. Yet, this account of a triangle inscribed in a square as a true and immutable nature seems to contradict Descartes's earlier claim that this nature is invented because its parts are really distinct. Some scholars, such as Edwin Curley and Anthony Kenny, claim that this is because Descartes himself was not clear on this issue.12 Yet others, such as Paul Hoffman and Tad Schmaltz, attempt to resolve this alleged contradiction by arguing that composite natures are invented in one sense but true and immutable in another. Hoffman and Schmaltz argue along similar (although not identical) lines that a composite nature is invented relative to the demonstrable properties of the really distinct parts but true and
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immutable relative to the demonstrable properties of the whole.13 However, a closer look at the passage itself in the context of Descartes's defence of the ontological argument indicates that there is no contradiction requiring resolution. As mentioned above, Descartes is here providing an answer to the following question: How can the containment of the concept of existence in the concept of God prove his actual existence? The first difficulty giving rise to this question was resolved by recognizing what is and what is not contained in the respective natures or concepts of God and his creatures. Returning to the lion example, a lion is a creature and so to attribute actual existence to its concept would be to attribute something to its nature that is not really contained in it. Rather actual existence is, as it were, something super-added to the nature of a lion by God's creative activity. Therefore, if a mind conceives a nature as including or containing something that is really external to it, then that nature is an invention of the mind. Accordingly, any argument proving the actual existence of a lion based on its concept would be fallacious, because it would be based on the concept of an invented nature. But, actual existence is truly attributed to the nature or concept of God, since his nature really contains it, and, therefore, it is not invented. The same considerations apply to the nature or concept of a triangle inscribed in a square. If the concept of the triangle were attributed to the concept of the square or vice versa, then that nature would be invented, because something would be considered contained in the nature or concept of the thing that does not really belong to it. If this were the case, then the demonstrable properties of one part would be attributed to the nature of the other. Conceiving these natures in this way would be an invention of the mind, because they can be clearly and distinctly conceived apart from one another. That is, the nature of the square can be clearly and distinctly understood without the nature of the triangle and vice versa. Rather, the demonstrable properties of a triangle inscribed in a square arise due to the conjunction of these two natures. The nature of one is not being conceived as contained in the nature of the other, but they bear a certain relation to one another that gives rise to a new set of demonstrable properties. So, the nature of a triangle inscribed in a square is true and immutable so long as it is being conceived as it really is and not mistakenly as the nature of one containing the nature of the other. This reading of Descartes's account of invented natures and those that are true and immutable avoids the charge of contradiction. To conceive
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the nature of a triangle inscribed in a square as the nature of the former in the latter or vice versa is to misconceive it, because attributing the nature of a square to the nature of a triangle, for example, would be an invention of the mind, since the concept of a square is not really contained in the concept of a triangle. But conceiving it as the conjunction of the nature of a triangle and the nature of a square bearing a certain relation to one another is to conceive it as it really is and so it is true and immutable. So, a triangle inscribed in a square is not invented in one sense but true and immutable in another, but rather it is only true and immutable. Invented natures arise when one nature is mistakenly thought to be contained in another. In this way, the two natures in question are not understood to be bearing the appropriate relation that results in the true and immutable nature in question. It is also worth noting that the parts of this composite nature are really distinct just as with a nature invented by the mind. But, this does not mean that a correctly conceived triangle inscribed in a square is invented, because the real distinction is between the parts alone and not between the parts and the whole. For instance, in the case of the lion, actual existence is not contained in the nature of a lion at all, and so it is really distinct from the lion's whole nature. In the case of the triangle inscribed in a square, the triangle is really distinct from the square and vice versa, but the whole triangle inscribed in a square cannot exist without the triangle, the square, and the relation of inscription of the former in the latter. As such, there is no real distinction between the whole nature and the parts constituting this nature, and so the nature of a triangle inscribed in a square is not invented as is the case with an existing lion. Therefore, the resolutions offered by Hoffman and Schmaltz, though well-intended, are not required, because the real nature of a triangle inscribed in a square is only true and immutable.
6.3 THE TRUE AND IMMUTABLE NATURE OF HUMAN BEING The reader may have noticed that many of the considerations concerning the primitive notion of mind-body union in the first section and those concerning true and immutable composite natures in the second map directly onto one another. First, the notion of mind-body union must be understood through an understanding of the notions of the mind, the body, and the relation of per se unity just as a triangle inscribed
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in a square cannot be truly conceived without the triangle, the square, and the relation of inscription of the former in the latter. Second, in both cases, the point is that the parts are really distinct from each other but not from the whole. So these wholes cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without one or more of their constituent parts, while these parts can be clearly and distinctly understood without each other. Third, just as the true and immutable nature of a triangle inscribed in a square gives rise to a set of demonstrable properties belonging not to any one part but to the whole, so also does the notion of mind-body union have its own set of demonstrable properties, viz the notions of voluntary bodily movement, sensations and the passions. Therefore, the notion of mind-body union is the notion of a true and immutable composite nature constituted by really distinct parts with its own set of demonstrable properties. This conclusion lends credence to the claim made earlier that these subsidiary notions are the notions of the modes of the composite nature of mind-body union, and as such they are the propria of a complete substantial human nature. This claim is also supported by other texts. For example, in the 21 May letter to Elizabeth, Descartes implicitly distinguishes the notions belonging to the soul alone, the body alone and those belonging to their union: In the Meditations . . . I tried to give a conception of the notions which belong to the soul alone by distinguishing them from those which belong to the body alone. Accordingly, the next thing I must explain is how to conceive those which belong to the union of the soul with the body, as distinct from those that belong to the body alone or the soul alone. (AT III 667: CSMK 218) This passage indicates that a further distinction needs to be made between those things referred to the mind or the body taken individually and those things referred to the composite nature of mind-body union. But, interestingly enough, Descartes had already done this in the following passage from the Sixth Meditation: In this context [i.e. being taught something by nature], I am taking nature to be something more limited than the totality of things bestowed on me by God. For this includes many things that belong to the mind alone - for example my perception that what is done cannot be undone . . . It also includes much that relates to the body alone, like the tendency to move in a downward direction, and so on; but I am
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not speaking of these matters either. My sole concern here is with what God has bestowed on me as a combination of mind and body. (ATVII82:CSMII57) In this passage, Descartes explicitly distinguishes what belongs to the mind alone and the body alone from what belongs to the combination of mind and body. He went on a few years later to make the same distinction at Principles 1.48: But we also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. These arise, as will be made clear later on, in the appropriate place, from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 209) Therefore, the evidence indicates that modes of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions are modes of the whole, true and immutable human nature or mind-body union. Yet, despite these passages indicating that sensations are modes of the whole composite, there are many other passages apparently stating that sensations are modes of the mind alone. For example, in the union argument examined in Chapter 4, Descartes says, '[fjor these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking' (AT VII 81: CSM II 56). Indeed, it is pretty standard that modes of sensation are entirely mental modes for Descartes. However, the following passage from a 19 January 1642 letter to Gibieuf points towards a reconciliation of these apparently inconsistent passages: I do not see any difficulty in understanding on the one hand that the faculties of imagination and sensation belong to the soul, because they are species of thoughts, and on the other hand that they belong to the soul only insofar as it is joined to the body, because they are kinds of thoughts without which one can conceive of the soul in all its entirety. (AT III 479: CSMK 203) The point for present purposes is that modes of sensation (and imagination) are species of thoughts; that is, they are a kind of thought that require the mind's per se union with the body. Indeed, Descartes states that sensations require a body to exist in the Second Meditation (AT VII 27: CSM II 18), and, in a letter to Thomas More dated August 1649, he
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states that 'the human mind separated from the body does not have sense-perceptions strictly so-called' (ATV 402: CSMK 380).These considerations support the claim that a mind united per se with a properly disposed human body is required for the modes of sensation to exist, and so these kinds of modes cannot exist without the whole and complete substantial human nature.14 Descartes's claims that they are 'species of thought' and modes of'the soul only insofar as it is joined to the body' can now be reconciled with his statements elsewhere that modes of sensation should be attributed to a whole human being. Recall from 5.5 that 'I am a thinking thing' can be truthfully asserted of both the mind alone and the mind-body composite, since the mind qua substantial form of human being is that by which I am what I am but what I really am is a human being and the soul is the source of this nature or essence. So, a mode of thought requiring union with the body can be said to be a mode of the whole human being, which is essentially a thinking, sensing thing as distinguished from the non-thinking, non-sensing animal world. Or, in other words, sensations are modes of a mind insofar as it is united with a body, i.e. insofar as that whole and complete human nature is a thinking and, therefore, sensing thing. So, either way you slice it, sensations are modes requiring a substantial nature composed of a mind united per se with a human body in order to exist.
6. 4 THINKING-EXTENDED COMPOSITES Before moving on to show how Descartes dissolves the mind-body problem by explaining it away through the notion of mindbody union, it is important first to put some possible objections to rest. First, one might object that there is a fatal point of dis-analogy between Descartes's discussion of true and immutable natures in the First Replies and the notion of mind-body union on account of the former being a nature composed of shapes, which are modes and not substances, while the latter is a notion of a composite constituted by two substances. Hence, the parallel drawn between these two accounts is not legitimate because it cuts across the mode-substance ontological divide. However, it is important to remember that modes of shape presuppose extended substance (see Principles 1.53, AT VIIIA 25: CSM I 210 and Principles 1.61, AT VIIIA 29-30: CSM I 213-14). Indeed, Descartes states that a triangle taken concretely is a substance having a triangular shape (AT VII
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224: CSM II 158). So, the example of a triangle inscribed in a square is that of two extended substances, one triangle-shaped and the other square-shaped, bearing a certain relation to one another. Therefore, since both cases concern the relation between two substances, the analogy does not cut across ontological categories. A second possible objection is that mind-body union is not composed of two extended substances but of an unextended, thinking substance and an extended substance. This, however, is not relevant to the analogy. All that is relevant is that both a triangle inscribed in a square and a mind-body union are wholes composed of really distinct parts and, because of this, these wholes give rise to a new set of demonstrable properties or propria that should not be referred to either one of these parts individually. The extended or unextended natures of the constituent parts have no role to play in the analogy itself. A third possible criticism arises from Descartes's remarks at Principles 1.53 and raises doubts about the possibility of Cartesian composite substances: A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. (AT VHIA25:CSMI210) The difficulty arising from this passage is twofold. First, Descartes's claim that 'each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature' indicates to many scholars that each Cartesian substance is constituted by one and only one principal attribute; either thinking or extension but not both.15 But human beings would be wholes whose natures would be constituted by both principal attributes. So, human beings are not whole or complete substantial natures constituted by parts, but rather mere aggregates or heaps of two substances, one thinking, the other extended, united merely per accidens. Second, this passage also indicates that all other properties are referred either to one or the other of these principal attributes. This suggests that all properties, including those of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions, must be referred to thinking alone or extension alone and cannot be referred to a composite constituted by both. As mentioned above, some scholars have gone so far as to posit union or substantial union as the principal attribute of mind-body union so that the modes of sensation can be referred to it.
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The first part of the difficulty stems from understanding 'each substance has one principal attribute' to mean 'each substance has one and only one principal attribute'. However, it is important to notice that the scope of Principles 1.53 had already been limited to the two ultimate classes of things at Principles 1.48: But I recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first intellectual or thinking things, i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; and secondly, material things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body. (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 208) So, thinking and extension are principal attributes constituting the natures of the two ultimate classes of substances. This does not imply that all substances have one and only one principal attribute but only that the two ultimate or principal kinds of substances are constituted by these two simple natures. Hence, there is, as it were, metaphysical space for some non-ultimate class of things with a nature composed of both principal attributes. The second part of the difficulty can be put to rest by noticing that these principal attributes mentioned at Principles 1.53 constitute the natures or essences of these ultimate kinds of things. So, strictly speaking, modes of thinking and modes of extension are referred to a substantial nature or essence. In the case of the ultimate kinds of substances, these are the simple natures of extension and thinking, but there is no bar against some modes being referred to a composite nature as indicated in the texts from the Meditations and the Principles cited earlier in this section. Finally, since referring some modes to a composite nature is not precluded by these concerns, there is no reason to postulate a third principal attribute, especially one without any explicit textual support. Therefore, Descartes's doctrine of principal attributes does not bar an interpretation that refers modes of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions to the whole, composite human nature. These considerations also help clarify two other passages about composite natures in Descartes's philosophy. The first to be considered is found in the Sixth Replies: Notice that if we have different ideas of two things, there are two ways in which they can be taken to be one and the same: either in virtue of the unity or identity of their nature, or else merely in respect of unity of composition. (AT VII 423: CSM II 285)
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Descartes then goes on to argue that shape and motion are the same thing in virtue of a unity of nature as are understanding and will: But . . . do we find between thought and extension the same kind of affinity or connection that we find between shape and motion, or understanding and volition? Alternatively, when they are said to be 'one and the same' is this not rather in respect of unity of composition, in so far as they are found in the same man, just as bones and flesh are found in the same animal? The latter view is the one I maintain. (AT VII 423-4: CSM II 286) One might take this to mean that mind and body are united as flesh is united with bone, which would result in an ens per accidens contrary to the conclusion of Chapter 4. But this would be to misinterpret the passage. Descartes's point is that thought and extension are not of one and the same nature as shape and motion are of an extended nature. In other words, mind and body are not formally identical as discussed in Chapter 2; that is, the nature of one is not contained in the nature of the other. Rather, mind and body are parts related in such a way so as to form one, whole human being just as flesh and bone are parts related in such a way so as to form one animal. Again, as with the example of a hand as an incomplete substance when referred to the whole body discussed at 5.3, the example of flesh and bone is not intended to get at the union relation itself but only at the fact that mind and body are parts of a whole. So, although mind and body are not formally identical, they are really identical, i.e. combined, in the same nature, and therefore they can be said to be 'one and the same' in this sense.
The second passage is found in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet:
As for the attributes which constitute the natures of things, it cannot be said that those which are different, and such that the concept of the one is not contained in the concept of the other, are present together in one and the same subject; for that would be equivalent to saying that one and the same subject has two different natures - a statement that implies a contradiction, at least when it is a question of a simple subject (as in the present case) rather than a composite one. (AT VIIIB 349-50: CSM I 298) Here Descartes is making basically the same point as in the First and Sixth Replies. Thought and extension are not in the same subject, i.e. the
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concept of one is not contained in the concept of the other, because this would mean that a simple nature would have two parts, which is contradictory. Accordingly, a human nature conceived in this way would be an invented nature. This, however, is not the case when the subject is composite, because one is not thought to be contained in the other, but each is conceived bearing the requisite relation so as to result in a whole. So, as with the flesh and bone example, the point is that mind and body are parts of one, whole composite nature.
6.5 DISSOLVING THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM The previous section posited and then defended the thesis that modes of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions are referred to the whole nature composed of a mind, a body, and their per se unity. These considerations have laid the groundwork for a better understanding of why Descartes did not consider the problem of mind to body causal interaction to be a serious problem, and how the notion of mind-body union explains or, more precisely, explains away this issue. The arguments for these two claims are given in this section. Now it is important to recall that the concern raised by both Gassendi and Elizabeth rests upon the supposition that two things must be able to come into contact with one another in order for one to bring about movement in the other. So, they understand the problem for mind to body interaction to stem from the fact that the unextended nature of the mind precludes it from touching or coming into contact with the body. This indicates that Gassendi and Elizabeth believed the interaction between mind and body was to be explained by an efficient causal relation. On this account, the mind brings about the modes of motion in the limbs of the body in the same way as one billiard ball brings about motion in another billiard ball. So, if the mind moves the body in this way, it would have to come into contact with the body in order to give it motion. Traditional Descartes scholarship takes what is commonly called 'body to mind interaction' to happen in a similar fashion such that the movements in the body are able to bring about sensory ideas and passions in the mind. This means that if Descartes understood mind-body interaction in this way, then he should have been seriously concerned about this problem of contact, for Gassendi and Elizabeth were correct that the inability to touch or come into contact with one another precludes the
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possibility of their efficient causal interaction. But, as mentioned earlier, Descartes does not recognize this as any serious problem. Further examination of his correspondence with Elizabeth explains this lack of concern. Descartes's exhortation not to use the primitive notions to explain each other or to explain what does not pertain to them should be taken seriously, because: the main cause of our errors is that we commonly want to use these notions to explain matters to which they do not pertain. For instance, . . . we try to conceive the way in which the soul moves the body by conceiving the way in which one body is moved by another. (AT III 666: CSMK218) Elizabeth's error is that she has 'confused the notion of the soul's power to move the body with the power one body has to act on another' (AT III 667: CSMK 219). So, Elizabeth's attempt to understand voluntary bodily movements by means of an entirely efficient causal relation is a mistake. This would be to try to understand a subsidiary notion of the primitive notion of mind-body union through the wrong primitive notion, viz the notions of extension and motion. Therefore, Descartes's remarks to Elizabeth indicate that mind and body do not efficiently or mechanistically causally interact as she and Gassendi supposed. In a 28 June 1643 letter, Descartes tries to help Elizabeth rectify this mistake by showing her how to correctly conceive mind-body union. He writes: It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd (ce qui se contrarie). (AT III 693: CSMK 227) Ruth Mattern understands this incapacity of the mind to be the result of a logical inconsistency among the claims themselves, which seems to contradict Descartes's earlier claim in the Fourth Replies that they are consistent (see AT VII 228: CSM II 160).16 But, as argued in Chapter 4, the two claims are consistent when understood properly. To conceive of the distinction of mind and body is to conceive a human being in terms
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of its parts, while to conceive of their union into one thing is to conceive a human being in terms of the whole. Accordingly, this inability is a result of the limitations of the human mind due to the fact that something cannot be conceived as both one (i.e. the whole) and many (i.e. the parts) at the same time. He then supposes that Elizabeth was trying to do just this: I supposed that Your Highness still had in mind the arguments proving the distinction between the soul and the body, and I did not want to ask her to put them aside in order to represent to herself the notion of the union. (AT III 693-4: CSMK 228) But this is exactly what she must do in order to correctly conceive mindbody union. He then goes on to explain to her how she can conceive of it on its own by attributing matter and extension to the soul. Then, upon further reflection, she will realize that the extension of the soul is not the extension of the body since the latter has a determinate location that excludes all other bodily extension, which is not the case with the soul. But then 'Your Highness will easily be able to return to the knowledge of the distinction between the soul and the body in spite of having conceived their union' (AT III 694-5: CSMK 228). Therefore, the problem Descartes finds is with how Elizabeth was conceiving mind-body union and not with any inconsistency between the claims regarding mind-body distinction and unity.17 These considerations indicate that mind-body union should not be understood as being constituted by an efficient causal relation between really distinct parts. Indeed, this would be to get off on the wrong foot entirely. Further insight can be found in Descartes's remarks about invented natures and those that are true and immutable discussed in 6.3. Recall that a nature is invented when something is attributed to that nature that is not really contained in it. For example, in the case of composite natures, such as that of a triangle inscribed in a square, it is a mistake to ascribe the demonstrable properties of one part, e.g. the triangle, to the other part, e.g. the square, for this would be to invent a nature of a square containing the nature of a triangle. Rather, the true and immutable nature of a triangle inscribed in a square is a nature composed of the nature of a triangle, the nature of a square and the relation of inscription of the former in the latter. Notice that on this account the natures of a triangle and a square taken individually are external to each other but internal to the whole nature of a triangle
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inscribed in a square. So, it is important to be clear about what is internal and what is external to the parts and the whole, respectively. Elizabeth and Gassendi's understanding of mind-body union is the understanding of an invented nature. Their mistake is to ascribe to the mind the capacity for efficiently causally producing motion in the body and (to extrapolate) the capacity of the mind for being affected by bodily motion. This is to ascribe a demonstrable property of the body, i.e. the capacity for motion, to the nature of the mind. But this would be an invented nature, since a demonstrable property is being ascribed to the mind alone that is not really entailed by it, i.e. the ability to efficiently cause bodily movement in the way that one body causes motion in another. Hence, Descartes is not concerned about the efficient causal interaction between mind and body, because this concern is based on a misconception of the nature of their union. In other words, this proposed problem is not really a problem at all, because it is not based on the true and immutable nature of mind-body union but on an invented nature. Many of Descartes's efforts in the May and June 1643 letters to Elizabeth are designed to get her to understand the nature of mind-body union as it really is, i.e. a substantial whole composed of the nature of the mind, the nature of the body, and their per se unity. Neither the nature of the mind nor that of the body is contained in the other, but rather they bear a certain relation to each other that results in the capacity for modes of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions. These considerations show that Descartes's appeal to the notion of mind-body union does not so much explain mind-body efficient causal interaction but explains it away. Descartes's point to Elizabeth is that she is misconceiving the mind-body relation. She misapplies her understanding of mechanistic or efficient causation in the entirely physical world, which is based on the notion of extension, to the case of our ability to voluntarily bring about the movement of some of our bodily limbs. In his attempt to redirect Elizabeth's understanding of the issue, he tries to turn her away from the efficient causal relation obtaining among bodies and toward the entailment relations among the primitive notions and their subsidiaries. The discussion of true and immutable natures indicates further that these entailment relations among these notions map onto the entailment relations among the things themselves. So, just as the notion of mind-body union entails the notions of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions, so also does the true and immutable nature of mind-body union have the demonstrable properties or entail the capacities for these kinds of modes much like
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scholastic propria. This entailment relation is the result of the parts bearing the appropriate kind of union so as to result in a whole that entails these demonstrable properties. If mind and body are not understood to be united per se so as to result in the true and immutable composite nature of a human being, then these capacities will not follow. Descartes, then, uses the notion of mind-body union to explain away any proposed efficient causal relation in favour of an entailment relation resulting from a correct understanding of the unity of the constituent parts, i.e. mind and body.
6.6 FORMAL CAUSAL INTERACTION To the dismay of many, Descartes was never very concerned about the problem of mind-body efficient causal interaction. His recourse to the notion of mind-body union has been taken by some to be an attempt to explain mind-body interaction to Elizabeth. This attempt has been largely found to be inadequate to the task. However, an examination of some of the remarks to Elizabeth and the discussion about invented natures and those that are true and immutable in the First Replies indicates that Descartes was not really interested in explaining mind-body efficient causal interaction but in getting his correspondent to understand mindbody union as it really is. Once this correct understanding is reached, it becomes evident that the capacities for voluntary bodily movement and sensations are the propria of a whole composed of the mind, the body and their per se unity. This indicates further that these sorts of modes are to be referred to the whole, composite nature and not to any one of the parts taken individually. Accordingly, the problem of mind-body causal interaction conceived as a problem stemming from their efficient causal interaction is to misconceive and, therefore, to invent the nature of human being. The union of mind and body ought to be conceived as a per se unity resulting from the union of the mind qua substantial form with a properly disposed human body. As such, the relation constituting this sort of unity is a formal causal relation. Hence, the problem of the efficient or mechanistic causal interaction of mind and body just does not arise for Descartes since this is not a correct understanding of the union relation. But, the question may still be posed: How can an immaterial substantial form act on the potency in an entirely extended thing (despite its 'proper' disposition for union)? This is still a problem of how
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mind and body causally interact but it is a problem of formal and not of efficient causation. Unfortunately, Descartes never offers a response to this problem, because 'nobody explains what this [union] amounts to, and so you [Regius] need not do so either' (AT III 493: CSMK 206). That is, nobody had attempted to explain this real and substantial unity. The reason for this is found in the fact that the act-potency relation was considered fundamental and, therefore, it could not be defined.18 The philosophical lesson is twofold. First, as argued in Chapter 4, those endorsing the real distinction of mind and body ought to seek an argument for the substantial union of mind and body into one, whole substantial human nature. As such, mind-body distinction can be maintained without the problem of their efficient causal interaction. Second, both endorsers and critics should focus on the real problem, namely that of mind-body formal causal interaction, and stop spending time on the invented problem of how mind and body can efficiently causally interact.
NOTES
1 Rozemond notes that Descartes's lack of concern is with mind to body causation but does not mention body to mind causation in these passages. She uses this unconcern to ground her thesis that even though Descartes was not concerned about the former, he was deeply concerned about the latter. The main point of this paper is to look at why Descartes was not concerned about what is traditionally called 'mind to body causation'. However, the problem Rozemond isolates as concerning Descartes is slightly different from this. She examines the problem arising from the dissimilarity between the objective or representational content of sensory ideas and the external things causing them. See Marleen Rozemond, 'Descartes on mind-body interaction: what's the problem?', Journal of the History of Philosophy3 37 (1999): 435-67. 2 Scholars commonly refer to these dependent notions as the notions of mind to body interaction and body to mind interaction, respectively. However, this formulation prejudices the issue in favour of Descartes maintaining an efficient causal relation between mind and body. But Descartes's appeal to the notion of mind-body union is an attempt to show that this is not the relation uniting mind and body. So, these notions have been labelled those of voluntary bodily movement, sensation and the passions in order to avoid this prejudice while also avoiding a formulation that would beg the question against this traditional position. 3 Daisie Radner, 'Descartes' notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of
the History of Philosophy 9 (1971): 163-4.
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4 Janet Broughton and Ruth Mattern, 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 25. 5 Broughton and Mattern, 'Reinterpreting Descartes', pp. 26-7'. 6 Tad Schmaltz also maintains that union is the principal attribute of mind-body unions. See Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mind-body union', Philosophical Review (April 1992): 285-6. However, some other scholars have maintained that the primitive notion of mind-body union is the notion of a composite entity and as such they do not posit a third principal attribute. See Paul Hoffman, 'Cartesian composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 251-70 and R. C. Richardson, 'The "scandal" of Cartesian interactionism', Mind 91 (1982): 20-37. 7 Daniel Garber, 'Understanding interaction: what Descartes should have told Elizabeth', Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 21 (1983): 29. 8 David Yandell, 'What Descartes really told Elizabeth: mind-body union as a primitive notion', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5 (1997): 250. 9 Yandell, 'What Descartes really told Elizabeth', p. 256. As argued in 1.6, the dependence of a whole on its parts does not preclude the whole from the category of substance, because this is not the correct kind of ontological dependence necessary for doing so. Rather, it would need to be shown that the whole human being somehow inhered or resided in mind and body as in a subject. But this is clearly not so within Descartes's metaphysics. 10 Other works addressing these issues but not summarized above include: Lilli Alanen, 'Reconsidering Descartes's notion of the mind-body union', Synthese 106 (1996): 3-20 and William Seager, 'Descartes on the union of mind and body', History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (1988): 119-32. Alanen examines these primitive notions from a decidedly epistemological perspective by examining the ways in which Descartes thought people could come to have knowledge about the mind, the body, and their union. Seager offers a sustained argument that, contrary to the suppositions of Broughton, Mattern and Radner, the notion of mind-body union is not an attempt to explain mind to body causal interaction, but rather mind-body union and mind-body causal interaction are correlative notions. Although Seager is correct that the notion of mind-body union is not intended to explain mind-body causal interaction, he is incorrect in believing they are correlative. 11 This distinction between essence and existence is traceable back to Aquinas, ST, 1, 54, 3. Apparently it had become a common opinion by Descartes's time. 12 Edwin Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 151-2 and Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 154. 13 Hoffman, 'Cartesian composites', 253-4 and Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mind-body union', pp. 290-2. 14 Rozemond argues that modes of sensation are not modes of the whole human composite but of merely the mind insofar as it is united with a body.
170
See Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), chapter 6. She goes to some pains to distinguish these two accounts, but, in light of the conclusions established so far about Descartes's theory of mind-body union, it is more reasonable to conclude that these apparently distinct accounts are really one and the same. For, in either case, the appropriate union between a mind and a properly disposed human body is required for the modes of sensation to exist, which just is to say that the capacities for these modes are entailed only by a complete substantial human nature, i.e. they are the propria of this kind of substance. 15 Stephen Voss argues along these lines. See Voss, 'Descartes: the end of anthropology', in John (Nottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 291-2. Vere Chappell also maintains this position but without argument. See Chappell, 'L'Homme cartesien', in JeanMarie Beyssade and Jean-Luc Marian (eds) Descartes: objecter et regarder (Paris: Vrin, 1994), p. 420. This is also the basis for Rozemond's account of the real distinction of mind and body. See Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism, especially chapter 1. 16 Ruth Mattern, 'Descartes's correspondence with Elizabeth: concerning both the union and the distinction of mind and body', in Michael Hooker (ed.)
Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1978), pp. 212-13. Wilson also sees this passage as an admission by Descartes that these two claims are contradictory. See Margaret Wilson, Descartes (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 207. 17 Yandell, 'What Descartes really told Elizabeth', pp. 264-71 comes to the same conclusion but based on a fairly detailed account of certain translation issues, especially how Descartes uses the word 'conceivoir' in this passage. 18 See Aquinas, Metaphysics, 9, 5, 1826 et seq.
Bibliography
PRIMARY Y SSOURCES Aquinas, Thomas (1945), Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols, trans. Anton C. Pegis, New York: Random House. (1975), Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (2002), The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologica la 75-89, trans. Robert Pasnau, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Augustine (1938), Concerning the Teacher and the Immortality of the Soul, trans. George G. Leckie, New York and London: Appleton-Century Company. Descartes, Rene (1974-1989), Ouevres de Descartes, 11 vols, eds Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Vrin. (1984-1991), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eustachius of St Paul (1609), Summa Philosophica Quadripartite, Paris: Carolus Chastelain. Goclenius (1964), Lexicon Philosophicum, first published 1613, Hildesheim: Goeg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung. Micraelius, Johannes (1966), Lexicon Philosophicum,firstpublished 1662, ed. Lutz Geldsetzer, Dusseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen and Company. Suarez, Francisco (1947 and 1976), On the Various Kinds of Distinction, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ, STD, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (1960), Metaphysical Disputations, Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosophia. (1964), On Formal and Universal Unity, trans. J. F. Ross, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
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(1982), Suarez on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle, trans. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (2000), On the Formal Cause of Substance, trans. John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
SECONDARY SOURCES Adams, Marilyn McCord (1987), William Ockham, 2 vols, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Alanen, Lilli (1996), 'Reconsidering Descartes's notion of the mind-body union', Synthese 106: 3-20. Almog, Joseph (2002), What Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ariew, Roger (1983), 'Mind-body interaction in Cartesian philosophy: a reply to Garber', Southern Journal of Philosophy SSupplement 21: 33-7. (1999), Descartes and the Late Scholastics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. , Cottingham, John and Sorell, Tom (eds) (1998), Descartes's Meditations: Background Source Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beck, L. J. (1965), The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bedau, Mark (1986), 'Cartesian interaction', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 483-502. Bettoni, Efram (1961), Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy, trans, and ed. Bernardine Bonansca, Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Bracken, Harry (1964), 'Some problems of substance among the Cartesians', American Philosophical Quarterly 1: 129-37. Broughton, Janet and Mattern, Ruth (1978), 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 16: 23-32. Burke, Henry (1936), 'Substance and accident in the philosophy of Descartes', The New Scholasticism 10: 33882. Campbell, Bertrand James (1940), The Problem of One or Plural Substantial Forms in Man as Found in the Works ofSt Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, unpublished dissertation. University of Pennsylvania.
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Chappell, Vere (1994), 'L'Homme cartesien', in Jean-Marie Beyssade and Jean-Luc Marion (eds) Descartes: objecter et responder, Paris: Vrin, pp. 403-26. Clarke, Desmond (2003), Descartes's Theory of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cross, Richard (1998), The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Curley, Edwin (1978), Descartes Against the Skeptics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Des Chene, Denis (1996), Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (2001), Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Garber, Daniel (1983), 'Understanding interaction: what Descartes should have told Elizabeth', Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 21: 15-32. (1992), Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gilson, Etienne (1912), Index Scolastico-Cartesien, New York: Burt Franklin. (1951), Etudes sur le Role de la Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien, Paris: Vrin. Gouhier, Henri (1962), Le Pensee Metaphysique de Descartes, Paris: Vrin. Grajewski, Maurice (1944), The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics, Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Grene, Marjorie (1991), Descartes Among the Scholastics, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Gueroult, Martial (1974), Spinoza, 2 vols, Paris: Aubier-Montagne. (1985), Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons, 2 vols, trans. Roger Ariew, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Hoffman, Paul (1986), 'The unity of Descartes's man', The Philosophical Review 95: 339-69. (1999), 'Cartesian composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37': 251-70. (2002), 'Descartes's theory of distinction', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 57-78. Kenny, Anthony (1968), Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy, New York: Random House.
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Kronen, John (1991), 'The importance of the concept of substantial unity in Suarez's argument for hylomorphism', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65: 33560. LiPorte, Jean (1950), Le Rationalism de Descartes, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Leibniz (1989), Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (*ds), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Lennon, Thomas (1993), The Battle of Gods and Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Loeb, Louis (1981), From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Marion, Jean-Luc (1986), Sur le prisme metaphysique de Descartes, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Markie, Peter (1994), 'Descartes's concepts of substance', in John Cottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 63-88. Mattern, Ruth (1978), 'Descartes's correspondence with Elizabeth: concerning both the union and distinction of mind and body', in Michael Hooker (ed.) Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 212-22. Menn, Stephen (1995), 'The greatest stumbling block: Descartes' denial of real qualities', in Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene (eds) Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Murdoch, Dugald (1993), 'Exclusion and abstraction in Descartes's metaphysics', The Philosophical Quarterly 43: 38-57. Nolan, Lawrence (1997a), 'Reductionism and nominalism in Descartes's theory of attributes', Topio 16: 129-40. (1997b), 'The ontological status of cartesian natures', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 164-94. (1998), 'Descartes' theory of universals', Philosophical Studies 98: 161-80. Prendergast, Thomas (1993), 'Descartes: immorality, human bodies and God's absolute freedom', The Modern Schoolman 71: 17-46. Radner, Daisie (1971), 'Descartes' notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 9: 159-70. Richardson, R. C. (1982), 'The "scandal" of Cartesian interactionism', Mind 91: 20-37. Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve (1950), LIndividuality selan Descartes, Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin.
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Rozemond, Marleen (1998), Descartes's Dualism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (1999), 'Descartes on mind-body interaction: what's the problem?', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37: 435-67. Schmaltz, Tad (1992), 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mindbody union', Philosophical Review April: 281-325. Seager, William (1988), 'Descartes on the union of mind and body', History of Philosophy Quarterly 5: 119-32. Searle, John (1959), 'On determinables and resemblance', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 33: 141-58. Secada, Jorge (2000), Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simmons, Alison (2001), 'Sensible ends: latent teleology in Descartes' account of sensation', Journal of the History of Philosophy 39: 49-75. Skirry, Justin (2001), 'A hylomorphic interpretation of Descartes's theory of mind-body union', Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75: 267-84. - (2004a), 'Descartes's conceptual distinction and its ontological import', Journal of the History of Philosophy 42: 121-44. (2004b), 'Does Descartes's real distinction argument prove too much?', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78: 399-424. Slowik, Edward (2001), 'Descartes and individual corporeal substance', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9: 1-15. Stuart, Matthew (1999), 'Descartes's extended substances', in Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (eds) New Essays on the Rationalists, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-104. Tracy, T. (1979), 'The soul as boatman of the body', Diotima 7: 195-9. Verbeek, Theo (1992), Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy 1637-1650, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Voss, Stephen (1994), 'Descartes: the end of anthropology', in John Cottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wells, Norman (1962), 'Suarez, historian and critic of the modal distinction between essential being and existential being', The New Scholasticism 36: 419-44. (1966), 'Descartes on distinction', Boston College Studies in Philosophy 1: 104-34. Williams, Bernard (1978), Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Sussex: Harvester Press.
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Index
accidents 13, 17, 19 proper (propria) 18-19, 25, 106, 109, 117, 152, 160, 167 real 25,32,85 act/actuality 11-12,14,118,129, 132, 136, 167 Almog, Joseph 35 n. 12, 140-1 Ariew, Roger 130 Arnauld, Antoine 97 Aquinas, Thomas Saint on soul-body union 100-2, 137-8 on substance 11-13,15 on totalities of essence and power 137-8 Arnauld, Antoine 97 attribute general 53-9 principal 63-4, 66, 160-1 Augustine of Hippo, Saint 137 body in general 71-2, 74, 75 in particular 76-80 as substance 72, 80 human 74-5, 88 surface of 77-8 Brought on, Janet 148 Caterus, Johannes (Johan de Kater) 152 causal interaction efficient 109-11,114,118,141, 146, 163-7 formal 118,141,167-8
see also form
cause efficient 28, 86, 93, 110, 112 final 14,83-4,86,93,114, 126-8, 136, 166 formal 118,141,167-8 material 28 Chappell,Vere 1, 140 Clarke, Desmond 35 n. 12, 95 n. 13, 127 Curley, Edwin 154 Des Chene, Denis 95 n. 12 determinable/determinate 26, 30, 31,33, 117 distinction, theory of conceptual (Cartesian rational) 44-6, 50-1, 52-3, 62 formal 2, 46, 47-51, 62, 66 modal 42-4 rational (scholastic) ratiocinantis 47, 49, 59-60, 62 ratiocinatae 2, 46, 47-51, 62, 66 real 41-2,64,66,97 dualism, hard and soft 1, 118, 140-1 Elizabeth of Bohemia, Princess 145 ens per accidens 16,101,107,109-10 perse 12,15,52,107,133 Eustachius of Saint Paul on accident and substance 13, 31 on formal distinction 49-50 on rational distinction, ratiocinantis 59-60 on soul 139
178
Index
as Unitarian 123-4 extended thing see body form 11 accidental 17-19 of corporeity 16-17, 91, 93, 125, 136 configuration and motion of parts 74-5, 80-1, 82, 87, 125 as species 3, 86-7 emendation from matter 85 material 87-8 substantial 12, 14-17, 126-31 and final causes 14-15, 16-17, 83-4, 86, 93 rejection of 80-7 Garber, Daniel 148 Gassendi, Pierre 128, 145 Gilson, Etienne 3 Glocenius, Rudolph 31, 36 n. 17 Gouhier, Henri 3-4 Grajewski, Maurice 52 Gueroult, Martial 72-3 Hoffrnan, Paul 121, 124, 126-7, 143 n. 15, 154-5, 156 identity formal 51-2, 56, 61, 63-4, 66, 162-3 real 51-2, 56, 61-2, 162-3 Kenny, Anthony 100,154
as soul 128-30, 138 as substantial form 126-31 Micraelius, Johannes 31, 36 n. 17 modes 23-6 as determinates see determinable/determinate and real accidents 25-6 of sense, confused 100 Murdoch, Dugald 41 nature, taught by 114-16 natures composite 165 invented 165-6 simple 149-50, 162-3 true and immutable 165 Nolan, Lawrence 57, 58, 63, 64, 66, 68 n. 6 notions, primitive 147-52, 164 Ockham, William 122, 124-5, 132, 142 n. 5 Platonic view of soul-body union 97-103, 109 pluralism, scholastic 16, 122, 126 potential 11-12,14,16-17,118, 132, 136, 167
see also matter propria/proprium
see accident, proper
qualities real see accidents, real as technical term 88-9 Radner, Daisie 147-8,151 Rozemond, Marleen 6, 21, 95 n. 12, 119 n. 14, 123-4, 127, 139, 143 n. 15, 168 n. 1, 169 n. 14 Schmaltz, Tad 154-5, 156 Scotus, John Duns and the formal distinction 47-8, 51 formalities 52 pluralism 16, 122 Seager, William 99-100, 169 n. 10
Lennon, Thomas 74-5, 94 n. 6 Loeb, Louis 20-1, 28, 33 Markie, Peter 19, 29, 34, 37 n. 24, 38 n. 31, 71,76 matter (scholastic) in general 11 prime 16, 123 quantified 123 see also potential Mattern, Ruth 148, 164 mind faculties of 125
Index
179
Secada, Jorge 26, 38 n. 31, 72-3 Slowik, Edward 71,77-9 soul as form of corporeity 122-3 as life principle 138 scholastic 122 as substantial form 124 Stuart, Matthew 21 Suarez, Francisco on accidents 18 on per se unity 15 on rational distinction, ratiocinatae 69 n. 20 on Scotists and the formal distinction 48-9, 50 on soul 143 n. 20 on substance 18 on substantial form 14 as Unitarian 123-4 substance and accidents 17-19 and attributes 55-6, 66 bare particular, rejection of 21 and body 72, 80 Cartesian 2, 19-23, 27-35 complete and incomplete 32 Cartesian 133-6 scholastic 16, 131-3 and mode 23-6, 150 scholastic 2,11-17,34-5 as self-subsistent 2, 12, 15, 27-30 as subject 2, 18, 19-23
as ultimate determinable see determinable/determinate thinking thing see mind unionism, hard and soft see dualism, hard and soft unitarianism, scholastic 16, 122-4 unity of essence 161-2 of composition 161-2
per accidens 16, 101, 112
perse 12, 15, 52, 108, 111, 112, 117, 137 substantial 107-8, 111,112 argument for 97-120 disposition for 90-1, 122-3 universals 57-8, 74
unum quid see ens per se
vacuum 76-7 Wells, Norman 47 Williams, Bernard 33, 71-2, 113-14, 117 Wilson, Margaret 102, 170 n. 16 Woolhouse, R. S. 93 n. 3 Yandell, David 4, 110-11, 149, 169 n. 9, 170 n. 17

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Chapter 2 was originally published as 'Descartes's conceptual distinction

Chapter 4 was published as 'Does Descartes's real distinction argument

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Substance and Mode

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Substance and Mode

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Substance and Mode

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

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Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature