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CREDIT IN DEPTH
IMF Loan Repayments Strain Pakistans Finances The government of Pakistans fifth loan repayment occurs against the backdrop of a sluggish economy and looming external and fiscal risks. Although the countrys official international reserves will cover debt payments that are due in 2013, Pakistans buffer to external financial shocks or a loss of domestic confidence is thin, thus highlighting its reliance on multilateral or bilateral funding. 23
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Hurricane Sandy
Kevin Cassidy Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +1.212.553.1676 kevin.cassidy@moodys.com Janice Hofferber, CFA Senior Vice President +1.212.553.4493 janice.hofferber@moodys.com Linda Montag Senior Vice President +1.212.553.1336 linda.montag@moodys.com
1 NOVEMBER 2012
Margaret Taylor Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +1.212.553.0424 margaret.taylor@moodys.com John Paul McMullen Associate Analyst +1.212.553.7295 john.mcmullen@moodys.com
1 NOVEMBER 2012
Paul Bauer, CFA Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +1.212.553.1334 paul.bauer@moodys.com
Hurricane Sandy Dashes P&C Insurers Hopes for a Quiet End to Year
Insured loss estimates from Hurricane Sandy are still in the early stages, although catastrophe modeling firms have released preliminary estimates. EQECAT published an estimate of $5-$10 billion on 29 October, while on 30 October AIR Worldwide published an estimate of $7-$15 billion. Assuming that ultimate losses are not dramatically beyond these ranges, the event will not jeopardize capital for major property and casualty (P&C) insurers, although it will negatively affect fourth-quarter earnings, and may cause capital volatility for smaller regional insurers (which we generally do not rate). We expect the companies in Exhibits 1-3 to bear the brunt of the losses based on their market shares for particular lines in heavily exposed states on or near the coast and in the center of the storms path. State Farm (unrated), The Allstate Corporation (senior debt A3 negative), The Travelers Companies Inc. (senior debt A2 stable), and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (surplus notes Baa2 stable) all have high market shares in the affected areas. However, as large national writers, these companies have diversified exposures and strong capital bases to withstand weather-related volatility. Top 10 Homeowners Insurers in States Heavily Exposed to Hurricane Sandy
Insurance Financial Strength Rating Market Share (2011) Direct Premium Written 2011 ($000s)
EXHIBIT 1
State Farm Allstate Travelers Liberty Mutual Chubb Nationwide Mutual Erie Insurance Group USAA Tower Group MetLife
Unrated Aa3 negative Aa2 stable A2 stable Aa2 stable A1 stable Unrated Aaa stable Unrated Unrated
17.2% 13.9% 9.6% 7.6% 6.2% 5.6% 4.6% 3.4% 2.1% 1.6%
$1,863,939 1,497,084 1,026,658 792,385 666,111 618,760 478,689 354,617 230,998 178,212
Note: Reflects premiums for Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC. Sources: SNL Financial LC, Moodys
1 NOVEMBER 2012
Top 10 Commercial Property Insurers in States Heavily Exposed to Hurricane Sandy (Fire, Allied, Non-Liability Commercial Multi-Peril, Inland Marine)
Insurance Financial Strength Rating Market Share (2011) Direct Premium Written 2011 ($000s)
EXHIBIT 2
Liberty Mutual Travelers Chubb AIG FM Global Assurant CNA Hartford Financial Nationwide Mutual Farmers (Zurich)
A2 stable Aa2 stable Aa2 stable A1 stable unrated A2 stable A3 positive A2 stable A1 stable A2 stable
8.4% 8.1% 6.0% 5.3% 3.9% 3.6% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1%
$761,631 733,095 540,137 479,747 348,482 325,392 314,716 301,188 291,593 279,815
Note: Reflects premiums for Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC. Sources: SNL Financial LC, Moodys
Top 10 Automobile Insurers in States Heavily Exposed to Hurricane Sandy (Personal and Commercial Auto Physical Damage)
Insurance Financial Strength Rating Market Share (2011) Direct Premium Written 2011 ($000s)
EXHIBIT 3
GEICO (Berkshire Hathaway) Allstate State Farm Liberty Mutual Nationwide Mutual Progressive Erie Insurance Group Travelers USAA NJ Manufacturers
Aa1 stable Aa3 negative unrated A2 stable A1 stable Aa2 stable unrated Aa2 stable Aaa stable unrated
15.9% 14.9% 13.3% 6.2% 5.9% 5.8% 5.5% 4.4% 4.1% 2.8%
$1,705,420 1,596,006 1,426,026 658,783 626,713 615,846 590,752 471,031 434,537 300,016
Note: Reflects premiums for Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington DC. Sources: SNL Financial LC, Moodys
The P&C industry as a whole is currently at a level of relative capital strength, with good risk-adjusted capitalization, moderate financial leverage, and earnings that have benefited from price increases and relatively low weather-related losses through the first three quarters of the year. So, despite the negative earnings effect of Hurricane Sandy, we expect that major insurers can absorb such losses without harming capital strength. In addition, the event will likely help support price increases going into 2013. We expect the majority of insurance losses to stem from homeowners policies, commercial property coverages and business interruption (e.g., commercial multi-peril, allied, fire, inland marine), and to
1 NOVEMBER 2012
some degree automobile policies. Storm surges cause significant economic losses, but flood damage is typically not covered by homeowners policies, although this often becomes an area of dispute when the immediate cause of loss (wind versus flood) is unclear. Generally, homeowners losses make up a large portion of hurricane/storm losses. However, in this case, the relatively moderate wind speeds involved should limit structural damage to houses. Instead, damage to homes will likely be primarily from falling trees or minor damage to roofing and siding, rather than the destruction of complete buildings. Power outages will lead to secondary claims such as sump pump failure (an optional coverage in most homeowners policies) causing water damage. In addition, the need to evacuate multiple coastal areas will lead to insurance payments to cover additional living expenses. Water damage to automobiles could be higher than normal owing to flooding. Commercial lines insurance will face losses from flooding, which is typically an optional commercial coverage. In addition, business interruption and direct damage to property from wind will be sources of loss. For Hurricane Irene in 2011, which also caused extensive flooding on the East Coast, commercial losses accounted for roughly one third of total insured losses, which tallied to $5.3 billion, according to Swiss Re Sigma. Commercial losses could make up a larger portion of total losses from Hurricane Sandy, given the widespread storm surge, extended period of rain, and concentration of damage in New York City and other urban areas. For large national insurers, we expect that losses from Hurricane Sandy for the most part will remain within primary layers, so that little earnings or capital relief will be gained through reinsurance covers.
1 NOVEMBER 2012
Dan Seymour, CFA Associate Analyst +1.212.553.4871 dan.seymour@moodys.com Bill Fitzpatrick Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +1.212.553.4104 bill.fitzpatrick@moodys.com
Upfront cleanup costs exceed budgeted contingencies. Excess costs not offset by immediate revenues will force issuers to use reserves or cut other expenditures. These excess costs will reduce fund balances. A lag in aid from higher levels of government. Even for eligible issuers whose costs are mostly reimbursed, the aid often comes months and sometimes more than a year after the costs are incurred. For issuers with sufficient liquidity, we do not expect such instances to significantly affect long-term ratings. Delays in insurance reimbursements. Elevated risk of mortgage delinquencies or foreclosures as homeowners seek to finance repairs while awaiting insurance funds for damaged properties securing state housing finance agency programs.
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Hospitals in affected areas are likely to report negative effects from the hurricane. Those negative effects include a significant decline in patient volume this week, the closures of outpatient clinics and physicians offices, and inpatient admissions only handling emergency cases. In addition, there will be expenses for overtime staffing of emergency workers and the immediate costs of cleanup. Insurance may cover a lot of the costs associated with storm-related damage, but is unlikely to cover all of what will likely be higher expenses for the period. Vulnerability of several classes of debt. Classes of debt, including sales and special tax revenue bonds, and revenue bonds supported by the operations of healthcare, educational, housing and other enterprise entities may be more vulnerable owing to factors such as appropriation risk and the cyclical nature of revenue streams. Issuers of revenue bonds will be most immediately affected by increased expenditures.
1 NOVEMBER 2012
Corporates
Kelvin Tsui Associate Analyst +852.3758.1532 kelvin.tsui@moodys.com Kaven Tsang Vice President - Senior Analyst +852.3758.1304 kaiyin.tsang@moodys.com
Hong Kongs Curbs on Property Investments Are Credit Negative for Developers
Last Friday, the Hong Kong government announced that it would introduce a new buyers stamp duty (BSD) and amend current special stamp duties (SSD) that it first imposed in November 2010. These measures are credit negative for Hong Kong property developers because the new SSD will slow down property sales, which in turn will weaken developers cash flow. Affected developers include Sun Hung Kai Properties (Capital Market) Limited (A1 negative), Nan Fung International Holdings Limited (Baa3 stable), Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. (unrated) and Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited (unrated). Under the new scheme, the government will introduce an additional 15% BSD for foreign and corporate homebuyers on top of the SSD. The holding period for property projects that are subject to SSD will extend to three years from two years. In addition, the government will raise the existing SSD for residential properties by five percentage points across all three holding periods (see exhibit). Changes to Hong Kongs Special Stamp Duties
Holding period Less than 6 months 6-12 months 12-24 months 12-36 months
EXHIBIT 1
15% 20%
10% 15%
5% 10%
Nil
The new BSD, which targets non-local and corporate buyers, aims to curb investment demand from mainland China investors, who have been one of the major driving forces behind the rise in property prices in the past few years. Under the new scheme, these buyers would have to take a more cautious approach because the changes would require them to speculate on market trends for a longer period and at higher transaction costs, thereby discouraging purchases. In addition, many homebuyers for whom these properties are their main residences will likely stay on the sidelines given the uncertainties about how the amendments would affect property prices, and the possibility the government will take further measures to cool the property market. Preliminary data from property agents indicate that property sales dropped or slowed down over the weekend following last Fridays announcement. According to Midland Realty, the number of transactions recorded from the top 15 housing estates decreased by 52% to 13 on 27-28 October versus the previous weekend. When the Hong Kong government first introduced the SSD, transaction volume within a month (including first and secondary transactions) decreased 26%, while the consideration paid for properties declined 28%, according to the statistics of Land Registry (Exhibit 2).
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The Effect of the Special Stamp Duties on Transaction Volume and Prices
Agreements for Sale and Purchase of Building Units December 2010 November 2010 Month-over-Month Change
EXHIBIT 2
11,790 53,412
15,967 74,026
-26% -28%
The higher stamp duties will likely affect developers performance if they have recently launched new projects or do so in the near future. Sun Hung Kai Properties, which has several projects planned for sale in the near term, is among those that would be affected. Nevertheless, we do not expect a substantial drop in property prices immediately for two reasons. First, home demand in Hong Kong remains strong amid a low supply of new flats during the past few years, and the SSD could increase investors holding period, which in turn would lower supply in the secondary market. Second, interest rates will remain low in light of the ample market liquidity after the US Federal Reserves recent round of quantitative easing, which encourages investment in fixed assets.
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Infrastructure
Niel Bisset Senior Vice President +44.20.7772.5344 niel.bisset@moodys.com
E.ON and RWE Sell UK Nuclear Joint Venture and Reduce Debt, a Credit Positive
Last Tuesday, E.ON AG (A3 stable) and RWE AG (A3 negative), the giant European power groups, agreed to sell their 50/50 UK nuclear power joint venture, Horizon Nuclear Power (unrated), to Hitachi, Ltd. (A3 stable) of Japan for 696 million (roughly 866 million). The deal, which will net each partner 433 million, is credit positive for both companies because it will reduce debt and is a further step towards completion of their asset disposal programmes. The transaction follows RWEs sale two weeks ago of its 20% licence interest in the Edvard Grieg oil and gas development in Norway for up to 283 million, including a contingent payment of up to 35 million based on achievement of certain operational milestones. On Tuesday, RWE also completed a 658 million sale of its indirect 24.95% stake in water utility Berliner Wasserbetriebe (unrated). RWEs aggregate proceeds of 1.374 billion from the three deals is just under 20% of its 7 billion disposal target, and will reduce the companys approximately 14 billion net debt (as of the end of June) by roughly 10%, a credit positive for RWE. The deal is also credit positive for E.ON because its 433 million share of the proceeds from the sale of Horizon will reduce its approximately 21 billion net debt (as of the end of June) by roughly 2%, and will bring it closer to completing its target of 15 billion of disposals by the end of 2013. Combined with other asset sales, including this years sale of OGE, its gas transmission network,1 proceeds from the programme will have reached almost 13 billion upon completion of the deal, which the companies expect will occur in the fourth quarter. RWEs and E.ONs progress on their asset disposal programmes is credit positive because it reduces their leverage in response to the negative earnings pressure both companies are facing. As with other European utilities, lower electricity prices and narrower margins on gas-fired generation will likely reduce E.ONs and RWEs cash flows from power generation over 2012 and 2013 versus 2011. In addition, like other nuclear power producers in Germany, E.ON and RWE will be required to pay the nuclear fuel rod tax that we estimate will be in the range 700-800 million a year for E.ON and 400 million a year for RWE in 2012-13. The sale also benefits the UK government because it restores momentum to plans to attract investment in new nuclear power plants to replace the UKs ageing nuclear fleet. Hitachi will continue to pursue plans to build new nuclear power stations at Wylfa in Wales and Oldbury-on-Severn in Southwestern UK.
See E.ON Sells Its Gas Transmission Network, Reducing Debt, Weekly Credit Outlook, 21 May 2012.
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Banks
Oscar Heemskerk Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +44.20.7772.5532 oscar.heemskerk@moodys.com
2 3
The bank ratings shown in this report are the banks deposit rating, its standalone bank financial strength rating/baseline credit assessment and the corresponding rating outlooks. See Banks Will Need Significant Capital To Meet New Basel III Requirements; A Credit Positive, Weekly Credit Outlook, 20 September 2010.
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Tax on Term Deposit Interest Will Be Credit Negative for Bulgarian Banks
On 25 October, the Bulgarian Parliament approved at first reading4 the introduction of a 10% tax on interest earned on term deposits, effective in January. This tax is credit negative for Bulgarian banks because it will reduce households incentives to save at banks, thereby increasing banks funding costs. The tax would be imposed on interest earned on term deposits, with depositors paying at the end of the month following the quarter for which interest was due. The banks would be responsible for withholding the tax and paying it to the government. The government estimates that the tax will generate around BGN120 million (61 million), or approximately 0.4% of term deposits in the system. As term deposits are predominantly sourced from the household sector, which composed 79% of the systems term deposits as of June 2012 versus 21% for the corporate sector, household depositors would be most affected by the new law. DSK Bank PLC (Baa3 negative; D/ba2 negative)5 and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD (Ba1 stable; D-/ba3 stable) are equally vulnerable given the predominance of term deposits in their deposit base at around 56% and 59%, respectively. By comparison, Corporate Commercial Bank ADs (Ba3 stable; D-/ba3, stable) term deposits are 38% of its deposit base. Banking system deposits grew by 34% between the end of 2008 and August 2012, supporting the systems liquidity, reducing banks reliance on wholesale funds, and improving the ratio of gross loans to deposits to 100% from 120% during the period (see exhibit below). In an attempt to maintain these deposits against the backdrop of the new tax, banks may raise interest rates, although such a move would hurt interest rate margins and profitability. Shorter term deposit inflows could also increase maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, while lower deposit growth would increase banks reliance on more volatile interbank funding. Year-over-Year Changes of Bulgarian Banks Deposit Balances and Loan-to-Deposit Ratios
Deposit Growth Year-over-Year - left axis 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2008 2009 2010 2011 Aug-2012 Loans/Deposits - right axis 125% 120% 115% 110% 105% 100% 95% 90% 85% 80%
4 5
Approval at first reading means that Parliament approved the measure at the first hearing. Before year-end, Parliament will hold a second hearing to approve the 2013 state budget and revote on the adoption of the taxation on deposits. The ratings shown are the banks deposit rating, its standalone bank financial strength rating/baseline credit assessment and the corresponding rating outlooks.
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The bank ratings shown in this report are the banks deposit rating, its standalone bank financial strength rating/baseline credit assessment and the corresponding rating outlooks.
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1 NOVEMBER 2012
Sherry Zhang Associate Analyst +852.3758.1392 sherry.zhang@moodys.com Sonny Hsu Vice President - Senior Analyst +852.3758.1363 sonny.hsu@moodys.com
New Hong Kong Property Stamp Duty Is Credit Positive for Banks
On 26 October, the Hong Kong government announced new measures aimed at curbing speculative demand for residential properties and stabilizing prices. The new measures, effective 27 October, introduced for the first time a 15% buyers stamp duty (BSD) on residential property purchases by non-local persons and local and overseas corporations. In addition, the government also raised the rates of a special stamp duty (SSD) already in place, and extended its coverage period (see Exhibit 1). New or Adjusted Property Taxes in Hong Kong
Buyers Stamp Duty New Old
EXHIBIT 1
Buyers Stamp Duty on residential properties acquired by non-Hong Kong permanent residents and local and overseas corporate entities Special Stamp Duty Properties purchased and resold within six months Properties purchased and resold between seven and 12 months Properties purchased and resold between 13 and 24 months Properties purchased and resold between 25 and 36 months
Source: Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department
15%
N/A
These latest measures are credit positive for banks because they reduce the risk of further fund inflows into an already overheated residential property market that could set the stage for a subsequent crash. The government last month tightened its property lending rules7 immediately after the latest monetary easing by the US Federal Reserve. These latest measures are a meaningful follow-up. The BSD directly targets non-local buyers, who have absorbed a significant portion of Hong Kongs new home supply. According to Centaline Property Agency, one of the largest property agencies in Hong Kong, non-resident buyers from mainland China between January and September accounted for 23.1% of primary home transactions, and 8.6% of secondary home transactions. Meanwhile, nonresident buyers from mainland China accounted for 28.3% of all transactions in the luxury sector, compared with 10.4% in the mass market sector. We expect the new BSD to reduce the participation from foreign buyers, thereby moderating overall demand. The increase and extended coverage of the existing SSD will add to the transaction costs of buyers making speculative bets. We also note that the BSD applies to corporate purchases of residential properties regardless of nationality, an attempt to close a potential loophole in which speculators set up companies to trade properties to bypass the SSD levies. Residential property values in Hong Kong have appreciated 17% in the first eight months of 2012, according to governments statistics (see Exhibit 2). Property values have risen further since early September. These follow-up measures are a response to the renewed risks of further property price appreciation.
See New Prudential Measures in Hong Kong Are Credit Positive for Banks, Credit Outlook, 20 September 2012.
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EXHIBIT 2
220
During 19-24 October, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the territorys de facto central bank, sold a combined HKD14 billion in exchange for US dollars in four intervals as the local currency hit its upper bound under the currency board arrangement. The strength of the Hong Kong dollar is a manifestation of the inflow of funds into the territory following the latest round of the US Federal Reserves monetary easing. Monetary conditions in Hong Kong remain very accommodating, and quantitative easing measures in the US will likely further contribute to excessive liquidity conditions in the Hong Kong banking system. The latest government measures to dampen demand for residential properties will make banks less vulnerable in the event of a severe property market downturn in the future.8
According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority statistics, residential and commercial property related loans accounted for 51.5% of domestic bank loan exposure as of June 2012.
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Insurers
Shachar Gonen Assistant Vice President - Analyst +1.212.553.3711 shachar.gonen@moodys.com
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1 NOVEMBER 2012
Insurers Year-End 2011 Holdings of Non-Agency RMBS and CMBS as a Percentage of Regulatory Capital
Insurance Group Insurance Financial Strength Rating [1] Carrying Value $ millions Carrying Value as Percent of Year-End 2011 Statutory Capital
American Financial Group Inc. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Phoenix Companies Inc. CNO Financial Group Inc. Allianz SE Great-West Insurance Group Jackson National Life Group Ameriprise Financial Inc. Delphi Financial Group Inc. Americo Life
A3 positive A3 negative Ba2 positive Baa3 stable A2 stable Aa3 stable A1 stable Aa3 stable A2 stable A3 stable
$5,230 1,504 1,842 3,319 9,412 2,850 4,861 5,071 899 544
417% 332% 191% 190% 178% 173% 166% 166% 134% 133%
[1] Insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings and outlooks are for the lead US life insurance subsidiary as of 30 October 2012. Source: Moodys and SNL Financial LC. Contains copyrighted and trade secret materials distributed under license from SNL, for recipients internal use only.
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EXHIBIT 1
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)
Metlife Mxico Grupo Nacional Provincial AXA Seguros Seguros Inbursa Seguros BBVA Bancomer Seguros Monterrey New York Life Seguros Banamex Qulitas, Ca. de Seguros Seguros Banorte Generali Mapfre Tepeyac
36,365 31,488 28,055 19,342 15,922 13,569 12,388 11,236 10,176 9,440
4,253 701 413 843 3,096 709 1,279 835 665 177
103,609 65,694 55,808 55,866 46,082 49,549 41,317 14,925 15,919 15,595
23,016 6,177 7,928 7,601 7,064 4,715 5,587 2,564 2,701 1,899
12.6% 10.9% 9.7% 6.7% 5.5% 4.7% 4.3% 3.9% 3.5% 3.3%
EXHIBIT 2
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)
Fianzas Monterrey Fianzas Guardiana Inbursa Afianzadora Aserta Afianzadora Sofimex Afianzadora Insurgentes Primero Fianzas Chubb de Mxico, Ca. Afianzadora Fianzas Dorama Fianzas Atlas Mapfre Fianzas
3,175 4,025 1,681 2,043 2,319 1,014 776 842 1,473 158
21.0% 18.6% 15.5% 14.1% 9.2% 6.0% 4.9% 3.7% 3.7% 1.1%
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Sovereigns
Tom Byrne Senior Vice President - Regional Credit Officer +65.6398.8310 thomas.byrne@moodys.com
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IMF Fiscal Monitor October 2012. See Censure and Political Stalemate in Japan Are Credit Negative, Credit Outlook, 3 September 2012. See Japans Support for Regional and Local Governments Is Credit Positive, Credit Outlook, 10 September 2012.
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Sub-sovereigns
Adrian Javier Garza Assistant Vice President - Analyst +52.55.1253.5709 adrianjavier.garza@moodys.com Ximena Rubio Associate Analyst +52.55.1253.5743 lauraximena.rubio@moodys.com Alejandro Olivo Vice President - Senior Credit Officer +52.55.1253.5742 alejandro.olivo@moodys.com
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CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
Tom Byrne Senior Vice President - Regional Credit Officer +65.6398.8310 thomas.byrne@moodys.com
12 13
See Moody's Downgrades Pakistan's Government Bond Ratings to Caa1, Outlook Negative, 13 July 2012. See default tables in Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2012H1, 30 July 2012.
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CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
EXHIBIT 1
Trends in Real GDP Growth and the CPI (% Year over Year)
GDP (%YoY) 20 15 10 5 0 CPI (%YoY, Avg)
Balance of Payments Is Becoming Precarious Pakistans current account has historically been in deficit for over a decade, barring a few years. However, averaging 1.4% of GDP during fiscal 2000-10, deficits are limited in comparison with the B-median average of 4.7% (Exhibit 2). Following a small surplus in fiscal 2011 ( 0.1% of GDP), the current account slipped back into deficit in fiscal 2012 (2%). This was on the back of a contraction in export growth owing to lower cotton prices (Pakistan is a net exporter of cotton and textiles), coupled with a continued rise in oil-related import growth. Remittances, which were up 17.7% in fiscal 2012, offset to some extent the widening trade deficit, thereby limiting the deterioration in the current account balance. Trends on the capital account also weakened, with foreign direct investment (FDI) flows slowing to less than $1 billion, and portfolio outflows (both debt + equity). This resulted in a reserve drawdown of $3.3 billion. We think that prospects for fiscal 2013 are unlikely to show an improvement. Latest trends on the current account point to a surplus during July-September period of fiscal 2013. But with export growth in low single-digits and a contraction in import growth, it is too soon to call this a trend exports dipping back into the red, or oil prices edging higher could result in the current account posting a deficit yet again. Moreover, trends in remittances need to be closely tracked, with growth moderating to 9.2% during July-September period of fiscal 2013 from 24.6% during the same period in fiscal 2012. On the capital account, a thawing of relations with the US resulted in a disbursement of long-delayed coalition support funds (CSF)14 in August 2012 totaling $1.1 billion. These, coupled with auction proceeds from 3G licenses worth $850 million, will provide some buffer. However, much of this is likely to be offset by loan repayments to the IMF, which total $2.8 billion in fiscal 2013. Even assuming some recovery in FDI and portfolio flows, the BoP is likely to stay under pressure: we expect to see a further drawdown to reserves to the tune of $3.4 billion during the financial year.
14
The CSF was established in 2001 to support US allies for costs incurred in the fight against extremist violence. In 2011, the US froze $800 million of funding to Pakistan, or 40% of its military support, owing to policy disagreements
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FY13F
FY07
FY10
FY01
FY00
FY08
FY04
FY06
FY09
FY03
FY05
FY02
FY12
FY11
CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT 3
FDI
Capital A/c
Equity Flows
Debt Flows
FY07
FY10
FY01
FY00
FY08
FY04
FY06
FY09
FY03
FY05
FY02
FY12
-2
FY13F
Oct-12
FY11
FY07
FY10
FY08
FY04
FY06
Although reserves remain more than adequate to fulfill external debt payments coming due over the next year, a continued deterioration in the current account coupled with weak capital flows would ultimately weigh on reserve adequacy. While the External Vulnerability Indicator (EVI) was at a prudent of 32.3% in fiscal 2012, it could climb rapidly if reserve hemorrhaging continues. IMF Repayment Schedule (SDR millions, $ millions)
Principal Interest Total Total in USD millions
EXHIBIT 4 EXHIBIT 5
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
Fiscal 012 Fiscal 2013 Fiscal 2014 Fiscal 2015 Fiscal 2016
104 67 24 7 0
FY09
FY03
FY05
Oct-11
Dec-11
Oct-10
Dec-10
Aug-11
Feb-12
Apr-12
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jun-12
Jun-11
Source: SBP
Fiscal Slippage Is Likely to Continue in Fiscal 2013 Fiscal deficits have been high and persistent over the last decade (averaging close to 5% of GDP between fiscal 2000 and fiscal 2010 versus the B median average of 2.8%). This is because of structurally weak revenue collections the revenue to GDP ratio is at a very low 12.4%, the lowest in our rating universe after Guatemala (Ba1 stable) and Bangladesh (Ba3 stable); and sticky expenditure on subsidies, defense and interest payments. Circular debt of the energy sector has further strained public finances. These arise as lower tariffs and delayed payments from consumers prevent power generation/distribution companies from paying suppliers, and are estimated at about 3% of GDP.
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Aug-12
FY12
FY11
CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
For fiscal 2012, provisional numbers peg the deficit at 6.6% (excluding debt consolidation of 1.9% of GDP), unchanged from fiscal 2011, but a large slippage from the governments original budgeted target of 4% (which was revised twice during the course of the year, to 4.7% and then 5.5%).
EXHIBIT 6
The budgeted deficit for fiscal 2013 appears equally ambitious. Targeted at 4.7% of GDP, assumptions factor in revenues rising to 13.7% of GDP due to higher non-tax revenues ( from 3G license auctions15). We expect expenditures, which were up 14.2% in fiscal 2012, to rise only 3%, based on an optimistic decline in subsidies and a contraction in pensions, even when government pensions have been raised. We expect the deficit to come in at 6.4%, owing to lower revenues and an expenditure overshoot. Adding to the Debt Burden High deficits in recent years have stopped the past reduction in the debt burden. As a percent of GDP, total government debt had moderated to less than 60% in fiscal 2007 from 78.9% in fiscal 2000, but since then the debt burden has crept above 60%. However, the general moderation in debt/GDP has largely been a result of higher nominal GDP stemming from rising inflation rather than a moderation in absolute debt levels, which have nearly quadrupled during the same period. Local-currency denominated debt as a share of total debt has been steadily rising over the years, from 52% in fiscal 2000 to 60% currently. This largely represents a rise in floating debt, which comprises short-term issuances of T-bills. Coupled with high gross financing requirements (estimated at 30% of GDP in fiscal 2012), this results in high rollover risks and has added to the interest rate burden. Foreign-currency denominated government debt, which has moderated from 48% of total debt to less than 40% currently, is predominantly long-term.
15
The Ministry of Finance classifies proceeds from license auctions as revenue, while IMF guidelines call for its classification as financing.
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FY13F
FY07
FY10
FY01
FY00
FY08
FY04
FY06
FY09
FY03
FY05
FY02
FY12
FY11
CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
EXHIBIT 7
FY00
FY08
FY04
FY06
FY09
FY03
FY05
FY02
FY07
FY10
FY11
Although external debt has nearly doubled over the last decade to $65.5 billion in fiscal 2012, trends in percent terms have moderated significantly to 28.5% in fiscal 2012 from 43.5% of GDP in fiscal 2000. A substantial portion is long-tenor debt provided by official multilateral and bilateral creditors. However, continued currency depreciation, the termination of the IMFs stand-by arrangement and unstable relations with other bilateral and multilateral lenders have resulted in financing pressures. Higher Government Borrowing, Deficit Monetization Is Adding to Inflation Pressures Given lower development assistance from the US and other multilateral lenders, deficit financing has shifted away from external sources towards domestic bank financing. The share of the latter has increased to 3.4% of GDP in fiscal 2012 from less than 1% of GDP in fiscal 2005. In fiscal 2012, the government borrowed PKR700 billion from the banking system (versus the budgeted PKR300 billion and PKR600 billion in fiscal 2011) and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Higher borrowing is in fact a breach of the SBP Act, which stipulates zero-quarterly government borrowing from the SBP and also entails the government to retire its borrowings over the next seven years. It has also adds to inflationary pressures, through a sharp rise in both reserve money and broad money growth . Although inflation, as measured by the CPI, has moderated from 13.7% in fiscal 2011 to 11% in fiscal 2012 and further to 8.8% as per the latest print (September 2012) this is largely because of lower food and oil prices. Core inflation remains high at 10.5% year over year. In a bid to revive growth and supported by the deceleration in inflation, the SBP recently reduced the key policy rate by 50bps to 10% in October (this is the second rate cut this fiscal year after a rate reduction of 150bps in August); but this could likely act to unhinge inflation expectations. If commodity prices remain benign, the SBP could meet its inflation target of 10%-11% for fiscal 2013. However, shifting to a sustainably lower inflation path would entail resolving energy sector problems and adhering to the SBP Act, by reducing government borrowing from the banking sector. We think inflation will average 10.7% in fiscal 2013.
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FY01
1 NOVEMBER 2012
FY12
CREDIT IN DEPTH
Detailed analysis of an important topic
EXHIBIT 8
Feb-10
Nov-10
May-10
Aug-09
Aug-11
Feb-12
Feb-11
May-12
Aug-10
Nov-11
Nov-09
Source: SBP
Economic Structure and Performance Nominal GDP (US$ Bil.) Population (Mil.) GDP per capita (US$) GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$) Nominal GDP (% change, local currency) Real GDP (% change) Inflation Rate (CPI, % change eop) Unemployment Rate (%) Gross Investment/GDP (%) Gross Domestic Saving/GDP (%) Nominal Exports of G & S (% change, US$ basis) Nominal Imports of G & S (% change, US$ basis) Openness of the Economy (%) [1] Government Effectiveness Indicator Government Finance Gen. Gov. Revenue/GDP (%) Gen. Gov. Expenditures/GDP (%) Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP (%) Gen. Gov. Primary Balance/GDP (%) Gen. Gov. Direct Debt (US$ Bil.) Gen. Gov. Direct Debt/GDP (%) Gen. Gov. Direct Debt/Gen. Gov. Revenue (%) Gen. Gov. Int. Pymt/Gen. Gov. Revenue (%) Gen. Gov. FC & FC-indexed Debt/Gen. Gov. Debt (%) Gen. Gov. Guaranteed Debt (US$ Bil) 14.7 18.4 -3.7 -0.3 74.1 58.6 398.7 23.2 46.8 15.4 19.3 -3.9 0.3 81.0 56.5 367.6 27.7 46.0 14.9 22.2 -7.3 -2.5 91.0 60.7 406.2 32.0 45.9 14.7 19.9 -5.2 -0.2 96.3 61.6 418.4 34.1 49.2 14.4 20.3 -5.9 -1.6 108.0 62.4 433.6 30.2 47.9 12.7 19.1 -6.4 -2.5 127.9 61.0 478.3 30.4 43.8 12.6 19.1 -6.5 -2.2 136.6 62.6 496.6 34.2 40.1 13.0 19.3 -6.3 -2.1 146.8 60.5 463.5 31.9 38.0 127.5 161.5 838.0 2,309.6 17.3 5.8 7.1 6.2 22.1 14.2 12.9 38.1 38.5 -0.40 143.2 164.4 933.7 2,467.9 13.8 6.8 7.4 5.5 22.5 15.4 4.6 3.2 35.5 -0.45 163.9 167.4 972.6 2,516.0 18.1 3.7 19.3 5.4 22.1 11.0 3.7 28.1 36.7 -0.68 161.8 170.5 992.1 2,606.5 24.2 1.7 9.6 5.5 18.2 10.7 -1.2 -15.6 33.3 -0.8 176.5 174.0 1,110.9 2,687.6 16.3 3.1 11.8 5.6 15.6 9.7 15.1 3.8 33.0 -0.8 210.2 177.6 1,238.9 21.8 3.0 13.3 13.1 8.0 24.2 17.9 33.4 229.9 181.2 1,312.3 14.5 3.7 11.3 12.5 4.4 -3.7 17.3 33.1 245.7 184.8 1,404.4 14.0 3.3 10.0 11.2 3.5 5.4 3.6 32.3 -
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Aug-12
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Detailed analysis of an important topic
Pakistan
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F
GG Direct Debt Owed to Private Creditors/GG Direct Debt (%) GG Direct Debt Owed to Non-residents/GG Direct Debt (%) Short-term GG Direct Debt/Total GG Direct Debt (%) Total GG Direct & Guaranteed Debt (US$ Bil.) Total GG Direct & Guaranteed Debt/GDP (%) Total GG Direct & Guaranteed Debt/GG Revenue (%) External Payments and Debt Nominal Exchange Rate (local currency/US$) Real Eff. Exchange Rate (% change) Current Account Balance (US$ Bil.) Current Account Balance/GDP (%) External Debt (US$ Bil.) Public Sector External Debt/Total External Debt Short-term External Debt/Total External Debt (%) External Debt/GDP (%) External Debt/CA Receipts (%) [2] Interest Paid on External Debt (US$ Bil) Amortization Paid on External Debt (US$ Bil.) Net Foreign Direct Investment/GDP (%) Net Int'l Investment Position/GDP (%) Official Forex Reserves (US$ Bil.) Net Foreign Assets of Domestic Banks (US$ Bil.) Monetary, Vulnerability and Liquidity Indicators M2 (% change, Dec/Dec) [8] Monetary Policy Rate (%, Dec 31) [8] Domestic Credit (% change, Dec/Dec) [8] Domestic Credit/GDP (%)[8] M2/Official Forex Reserves (X) Total External Debt/Forex Reserves (%) Debt Service Ratio (%) [3] External Vulnerability Indicator (%) [4] Liquidity Ratio (%) [5] Total Liabilities due BIS Banks/Total Assets Held in BIS Banks (%) [8] "Dollarization" Ratio (%) [6] "Dollarization" Vulnerability Indicator (%) [7]
Notes: [1] Sum of Exports and Imports of Goods and Services/GDP (%) [2] Current Account Receipts [3] (Interest + Current-Year Repayment of Principal)/Current Account Receipts (%)
47.7 21.3 60.3 5.0 -5.0 -3.9 37.2 95.0 0.5 29.2 117.6 0.9 2.0 2.7 -26.1 10.8 2.1 14.9 9.0 19.6 39.5 5.3 345.8 9.1 23.1 36.4 314.3 7.3 24.4
46.7 22.6 60.5 0.1 -6.9 -4.8 40.3 93.8 0.2 28.2 122.4 1.1 1.8 3.5 -33.1 13.3 3.2 19.0 9.5 16.8 40.6 5.0 302.3 8.7 18.2 38.4 347.2 6.4 20.0
47.3 27.1 68.3 -2.0 -13.9 -8.5 46.2 93.3 1.6 28.2 124.4 1.2 1.9 3.3 -32.1 8.6 2.7 11.9 12.0 32.9 45.6 7.7 538.2 8.6 15.0 30.7 199.7 6.6 32.7
50.7 25.0 81.4 -2.1 -9.3 -5.7 52.3 93.3 1.2 32.3 148.4 1.2 3.6 2.3 -32.4 9.1 3.3 9.5 14.0 15.9 42.6 6.7 574.0 13.5 50.3 39.5 240.7 6.6 26.0
49.6 26.7 85.5 1.0 -3.9 -2.2 61.6 87.0 2.2 34.9 161.9 1.0 3.6 1.2 -30.6 13.0 3.0 13.0 12.5 11.1 40.6 5.1 475.1 12.1 46.6 43.9 274.5 7.2 24.0
45.3 29.9 86.0 5.9 0.2 0.1 66.4 87.2 1.9 31.6 139.6 1.1 2.9 0.8 -27.9 14.8 2.9 16.7 14.0 13.2 37.8 5.2 448.9 8.3 32.6 57.3 278.6 6.7 23.2
40.9 32.3 94.6 -4.6 -2.0 65.6 85.2 2.5 28.5 137.4 1.0 3.5 0.3 10.8 13.4 12.0 19.9 39.5 7.3 607.1 9.4 32.3 51.1 204.8 6.9 31.6
38.9 32.7 97.0 -5.3 -2.2 66.5 85.8 2.6 27.1 135.6 1.2 4.0 0.3 9.5 665.0 10.6 52.0 -
[4] (Short-Term External Debt + Currently Maturing Long-Term External Debt)/Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (%) [5] Liabilities to BIS Banks Falling Due Within One Year/Total Assets Held in BIS Banks (%) [6] Total Foreign Currency Deposits in the Domestic Banking System/Total Deposits in the Domestic Banking System (%) [7] Total Foreign Currency Deposits in the Domestic Banking System/(Official Foreign Exchanges Reserves + Foreign Assets of Domestic Banks) (%) [8] Fiscal years beginning July 1
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1 NOVEMBER 2012
Insurers Argentina's Workers' Compensation Insurers Get New Credit Positive Law Sovereigns Laos-China Rail Link Will Be Credit Positive for Laos Sub-sovereigns Montrals Labour Contract Addresses Pension Contributions, a Credit Positive Reform to Mexicos General Accounting Law Is Credit Positive for States and Municipalities Securitization Australian Regulators' Proposals on Securitisation Are Credit Positive for RMBS
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EDITORS
News & Analysis: Jay Sherman and Elisa Herr
PRODUCTION ASSOCIATE
David Dombrovskis
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