USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1

5 AUGUST 2011

DOCTRINE
FOR

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

United States Special Operations Command 7701 Tampa Point Blvd. MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FOREWORD After ten years of continuous war, the special operations community can be proud of its service and the legacy of those who came before them. However, despite recent successes against long-time threats, we cannot grow complacent. Instead, we must remain vigilant against the complex emerging dangers that will continue to threaten our Nation for years to come. Many elements of the joint force are doctrine-based institutions whose capabilities range the spectrum of military operations. However, the unique challenges of todays global security environment frequently demand more than just a military solution. In most cases, responses to these challenges require a joint, interagency and multi-national approach. SOF have been and will continue to be key ingredients to these solutions, sometimes in a supporting role, but more recently, in a supported role. For this reason, it is imperative that all components of our force have a doctrinal reference from which to find the principles, the framework, and essential elements that define special operations.

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

US S O C O M P u b l i c a t i o n 1 , D o c t r i n e f o r S p e c i a l Operations, is the foundational special operations manual, and its publication is consistent with USSOCOMs legislated responsibility to develop SOF doctrine. It also provides the key linkage between SOF and joint doctrine while clarifying many definitions and misperceptions about special operations. While authoritative in nature, USSOCOM Publication 1 is designed to be adaptive enough to offer a point of departure to address the fluid nature of todays operational environment. This gives SOF the latitude to sustain the focus, wisdom, and intellectual agility that are hallmarks of our operations.

ERIC T. OLSON Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

PREFACE
Scope This publication is the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) doctrinal foundation for special operations. It describes the nature, operational framework, organization, employment, and synchronization of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their unique contributions to achieving national security strategy and objectives. Purpose U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167 and Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 assign the Commander, USSOCOM the responsibility and authority to develop special operations doctrine. Accordingly, this publication outlines the nature of special operations, force composition, command and control, and how best to synchronize and employ SOF to meet global challenges. Furthermore, this document enables SOF to speak with a common and understood voice by providing updated terminology and overarching concepts for the full range of special operations now and in the future. Application Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, the capstone USSOCOM doctrinal publication, applies to SOF at every level and informs the combatant commanders, combat support agencies, other Department of Defense, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and international military and civilian partners. Further, this document
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complements Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and is authoritative but not prescriptive. Due to the current dynamic security environment, special operations doctrine, terminology, and applications must be consistent yet adaptive.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section 1. Nature of Special Operations History Special Operations Imperatives USSOCOM Organizations and Functions Section 2. Special Operations Environment Strategic Appreciation Operational Framework Core Operations and Activities Section 3. Organizing for Special Operations Special Operations Force Generation Special Operations Command and Control Section 4. Employing Special Operations Forces Mission Selection Criteria Special Operations across the Range of Military Operations Global and Regional Campaigns Synchronizing Special Operations Forces during Global Campaigns Section 5. Conclusion Acronyms

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SECTION 1.

NATURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations are special because their success depends on long-term relationships with indigenous forces and populations and knowledge of the cultural, societal, economic, and political environments in which they occur. Special operations improve a nations security capabilities, foster or counter insurgencies, dismantle terrorist networks, counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and address other irregular adversaries. The greater the environmental knowledge and extent of relationships, the more likely the outcome will be successful. This, more than any other single factor, defines the nature of special operations. History Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been a significant U.S. military capability from their earliest days. During the French and Indian War, colonial rangers used guerrilla tactics to create chaos among the French and their Indian allies. Militia irregulars harassed supply lines and gathered intelligence against the occupying British Army and its Tory sympathizers during the Revolutionary War. In the Civil War, Mosbys Rangers gained fame for conducting lightning raids against Union Army lines of communication and infrastructure. Throughout World War II, many SOF operated in the European and Pacific theaters such as the combined Canadian-American force that fought in Italy and France.

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The first modern Ranger unit also fought throughout Europe and gained prominence for scaling the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc during Operation OVERLORD. In the Pacific theater, Merrills Marauders conducted deep penetration strikes against Japanese supply lines and infrastructure throughout Burma. In the Philippines and New Guinea, the Alamo Scouts gathered intelligence and raided enemy rear areas and are remembered for supporting the Cabanatuan raid that freed over 500 prisoners of war (POW). Further, World War II saw the beginnings of Naval Special Warfare and the development of naval scouts and raiders and establishment of the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT). In the Pacific, Marine Raider Battalions were organized, trained, and equipped to conduct strategic strikes and raids deep in Japanese held territory. Another World War II organization was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which is the direct predecessor of special forces and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). OSS personnel infiltrated behind enemy lines in Europe and the Pacific to support resistance movements, perform sensitive information operations, and collect intelligence against the Axis powers. Additionally, the OSS established clandestine capabilities to gather intelligence outside of theaters of war. After World War II, each of the Services developed special operations capabilities tailored to their requirements. During the Korean War, Naval UDTs supported amphibious landing operations. The Army established the
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United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, which operated in remote island bases adjacent to the North Korean coastline in support of North Korean Partisan raids, harassment of supply lines, and recovery of downed pilots. During the Vietnam War, Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force Air Commandos played critical roles in counterinsurgency (COIN) and advising and assisting indigenous forces. In other cases, units like Military Advisory Command-Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group penetrated hostile areas, gathered intelligence, and disrupted enemy logistics. Late in the war, an attempted rescue of American POWs at Son Tay prison in North Vietnam found no POWs but demonstrated successful execution of a highly complex special operation. The lessons of successful special operations in Vietnam were difficult to retain in the U.S. political environment in the late 1970s. SOF were ill-funded, remained under the purview of their parent Services, and seldom operated together. These conditions contributed to the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the attempted rescue of Americans held hostage by Iran in 1980, and to operational difficulties in Operation URGENT FURY, the rescue operation in Grenada. These operational problems resulted in a series of inquiries and led to the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the National Defense Appropriations Act of 1987. Nunn-Cohen required establishment of a joint headquarters for special operations and authorized a budget for it. Thus, on 16 April
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1987, the Department of Defense (DoD) established USSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. After its establishment, USSOCOM became a proactive, strategically focused headquarters with joint SOF employed worldwide in support of theater commanders in peacetime, a major theater war, multiple contingencies, and the counterterrorism effort. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, SOF were organized to support Afghan militias seeking to topple the Taliban regime. With only a few hundred U.S. personnel, and in less than 60 days from the start of major operations, SOF seized the country from Taliban and its terrorist allies. In March 2002, Operation ANACONDA combined elements of Afghan, SOF, conventional, and allied forces in theater to destroy enemy forces and capture senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. Major lessons were learned from the successes and failures of ANACONDA about unity of command, interagency coordination, and integration of SOF with conventional and allied forces. In Afghanistan and Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003), SOF were initially employed, in conjunction with the joint force, to support the national objectives of removing destabilizing regimes from power. However, in both theaters, the mission evolved with SOF leading the way in stabilizing the nations and fighting the remaining insurgency. SOF capabilities were applied to support civil authorities, train, advise and assist the new governments defense forces, and engage the popular movements supporting the new regimes.
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While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have dominated the landscape and demand for SOF capabilities and resources has soared, USSOCOM has maintained a watchful eye on the rest of the world and in 2006 was given responsibility by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to synchronize counterterrorism operations. Variants of ENDURING FREEDOM were implemented in the Horn of Africa, trans-Saharan Africa, and the Philippines. USSOCOM has taken a long-term approach of engagement throughout the world while forging enduring partnerships and contributing to regional stability. The balance of direct and indirect action, the combination of high-end tactical skills, and the understanding of the operational context of their application is the core of special operations. Special Operations Imperatives The nature of special operations is further defined by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who conduct them. SOF are carefully selected for physical excellence, maturity, judgment, adaptability, and ability to make good decisions under pressure. SOF are trained in languages and culture; special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures; and provided with equipment designed or modified for special operations. As the result of their selection, training, equipment, and cultural attunement, SOF are able to operate in small teams in friendly, politically sensitive, uncertain, or hostile
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environments to achieve U.S. objectives independently or with or through indigenous forces and populations. SOF are able to conduct a wide range of missions, often of high risk, and in a clandestine or low visibility mode when required. The 12 special operations imperatives are the foundation for planning and executing special operations in concert with other forces, interagency partners, and foreign organizations. The imperatives have informed special operations throughout history and will continue to shape them in the future. Understand the Operational Environment. SOF achieve objectives by understanding and developing plans to act within the realities of specific operational environments, including diplomatic, political, military, economic, financial, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, psychological, and others. They must know the friendly and hostile decisionmakers, objectives and strategies, and how they interact. SOF must remain flexible and adapt operations to changing realities, anticipate changes, and exploit fleeting opportunities. Re c o g n i z e Political Implications. Wh e t h e r co n d u c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o r i n coordination with partners, SOF must be aware of the political effects of their actions. SOF must anticipate an ambiguous strategic and operational environment where military factors are not the only concern. Special operations frequently create conditions for non-military activities
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to occur within indigenous populations and civil institutions to achieve U.S. and partner-nation (PN) objectives. Facilitate Interagency Activities. Most special operations occur in an interagency environment wherein U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies are working toward common national objectives as part of a country team effort. SOF must actively and continuously coordinate their activities with all relevant parties. Engage the Threat Discriminately. Special operations missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ SOF. Special operations may be applied with precision to minimize collateral effects, in a concealed or clandestine manner so that only the effects are detectable, or through the actions of surrogate or indigenous military or other security forces. Anticipate Long-Term Effects. SOF must view each discrete problem in its broader political, cultural, and military context. They must develop a long-term, problem-solving approach that considers shifting end states. They must accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF must not jeopardize the success of national and theater long-term objectives with their desire for immediate or short-term effects.
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En s u re L e g i t i m a c y a n d C re d i b i l i t y o f S p e c i a l Operations. There are significant legal and policy considerations for special operations. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. Legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition and includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. Legitimacy is determined by the people of the nation and the international community based on their collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SOF will not receive the support of indigenous elements that are essential to success. Anticipate Information Effects. Special operations have significant information effects that are amplified by the pervasive electronic media environment and growing influence of social networks. Some actions may be conducted specifically to produce a desired social or military outcome. SO F c o m m a n d e r s m u s t c o n s i d e r a n d i n c o r p o r a t e t h e potential impact of information into all their activities. Operate with and through Others. A primary role of SOF is to assess, train, advise, assist, and equip indigenous military, paramilitary, civil security forces, and civil institutions. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. Efforts must be seen as supporting a foreign
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government or group who retain primary ownership of the success or failure of the effort. Develop Multiple Options. Adaptability, flexibility, innovation, and the application of these characteristics enable SOF to maintain their strategic and operational agility. SOF develop a broad range of options and contingency plans enabling them to shift from one option to another before, during, and after mission execution to provide flexible national and regional options. Ensure Long-Term Engagement. SOF must recognize the need for persistence, patience, and continuity of effort. SOF programs should build capacity with the goal of enabling the partner to maintain them without further U.S. assistance. U.S.-funded programs can be counterproductive if a government or population becomes dependent on them and funding ends. Special operations must, therefore, be durable, consistent, and sustainable. Provide Sufficient Intelligence. Intelligence will remain an indispensible precursor to the conduct of special operations, whether they are kinetic or non-kinetic in execution. Intelligence support to the SOF operator requires a powerful combination of forward-based and robust reach-back capabilities as well as a blending of organic SOF capacity and external conventional force and national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Developing area expertise, providing persistent
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surveillance, and pursuing constant collaboration among networked intelligence units and interagency elements supporting SOF are crucial to mission success. Balance Security and Synchronization. Security concerns often dominate special operations, but over-compartmentalization can exclude key SOF and non-SOF personnel from the planning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security may compromise a mission; conversely, excessive security may jeopardize a mission.

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A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION

USSOCOM Organizations and Functions USSOCOM is a unified combatant command with Military Department and defense agency-like responsibilities. U.S. Code Title 10, Section 167 and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01 tasks USSOCOM with performing the department-like functions of organizing, training, equipping, and providing combat-ready personnel for employment by the geographic combatant commander (GCC). Additionally, the Unified Command Plan and other strategic guidance direct USSOCOM to synchronize DoDs global campaign planning against terrorist networks, including their use of WMD. USSOCOM may be directed to conduct global operations as well. As such, USSOCOM is a unified combatant command but also has authorities and responsibilities in common with the departments.
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USSOCOMs main responsibilities include programming and maintaining the Major Force Program (MFP)-11 budget; developing special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics; ensuring the interoperability of SOF; conducting pre-crisis planning; and commanding continental U.S. (CONUS)-based SOF. Furthermore, USSOCOM advises the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on the size and composition of the SOF provided by the Services. To accomplish these responsibilities, USSOCOM is comprised of five key subordinate organizations. Four are Service components, and one is a subordinate unified command. U. S . A r m y S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s C o m m a n d ( U S A S O C ) . Trains, equips, and provides Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). Special forces are experts in unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID). They are trained to operate in small teams, conduct raids and strikes, carry out reconnaissance and surveillance, and interdict hostile targets through, with, and by indigenous and PN forces. Rangers are special light infantry able to seize airfields in hostile environments, conduct raids and strikes, and conduct other high-risk missions. Special Operations Aviation helicopters infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF and conduct armed escort, reconnaissance and surveillance, and electronic warfare. Military information support operations (MISO) specialists provide support to GCC/ Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) information
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operations and chief of mission public diplomacy efforts through multimedia communications. Civil affairs (CA) support GCCs and chiefs of mission military and civil objectives by engaging indigenous populations and civil institutions. Na v a l S p e c i a l W a r f a r e C o m m a n d (NAVSPECWARCOM). Trains, equips, and provides SEALs who operate in small teams, conduct strikes and raids, carry out reconnaissance and surveillance, work with surrogate and indigenous forces, and counter WMD missions. SEALs have unique capabilities to engage hostile ships and execute missions in ground, maritime, or riverine environments. Their capabilities include submersible systems that deliver and recover SEALs and special boat units that operate a variety of maritime and riverine special boats. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Trains, equips, and provides highly trained Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF). AFSOF employ specialized airpower using unique fixed-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft to infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF and conduct precision aerial fire against fixed and moving targets. Further, they conduct specialized refueling; combat search and rescue; and radio, television, and short wave aerial broadcasts. Air crews use terrain following and avoidance systems to conduct low-level operations under the cover of darkness and/or adverse weather for clandestine, deep penetration of hostile, sensitive, or politically denied airspace. AFSOF provide a
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unique set of combat aviation advisors who assess, train, advise, assist, and equip indigenous military personnel, civil security forces, and civil institutions with fixed and rotary-wing aircraft as well as supported personnel. Additionally, AFSOF provide specialized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel and capabilities to provide SOF commanders with detailed near-real-time, all-source intelligence products. Finally, Special Tactics Teams control air traffic, establish air assault landing zones, direct close air support for strike aircraft and gunships, take meteorological and oceanographic observations, and provide advanced trauma care. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Trains, equips, and provides Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) to conduct strikes and raids and reconnaissance and surveillance. They also provide Marine Special Operations Teams that operate independently or as part of larger units to advise and assist foreign forces, including maritime, naval, indigenous, and surrogate forces. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Develops special operations doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces. JSOC conducts training, coordinates exercises, identifies acquisition requirements, and procures materiel to accomplish its integration responsibilities.
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SECTION 2.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

The character of conflict is changing the way state and non-state actors interact. Insurgents, violent extremists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies are exploiting gaps in rule sets developed for yesterdays more predictable world. In the evolving strategic environment, old paradigms are yielding to new forms of conflict with different preconditions and catalysts. The increasing complexity of the environment makes problem identification and definition difficult, ambiguous, and mutable. Problems once considered local or regional will increasingly become more global and interconnected, and parallel systems for governance and economics will compete with traditional systems. Strategic Appreciation Strategic appreciation is a way to think about complex, ill-structured problems generated by the convergence of meta-trends and strategic challenges. The evolution of the global strategic environment is driven by the convergence of meta-trends interacting with strategic security challenges. A meta-trend is a convergence of trends and is transformational in nature regarding the global strategic environment. Meta-trends assume new characteristics when placed in the perspective of the evolving speed, scale, scope, global reach, and other key drivers. Strategic appreciation recognizes that the dynamic nature of the environment requires using a
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different lens to view the interactions of a complex system and drives SOF strategy and requirements. Strategic appreciation informs how SOF can best contribute to national security. The overarching purpose of special operations is to protect the U.S. and its interests while promoting international security. Based on the current strategic environment, SOF possess unique capabilities to address four primary strategic challenges that threaten the U.S. and international security: Transnational violent extremist networks. Countering the transnational threat posed by violent extremist networks remains a national priority. SOF are uniquely suited to combat violent extremist organizations and contribute to the creation of a global environment inhospitable to transnational violent extremism. States disregarding international norms. The strategic landscape continues to be shaped by the nexus of powerful states and regional instability/weak states. This allows states to disregard international norms and conventions, directly threatening regional and international stability. Many of these states will continue to expand their global influence through illicit networks, requiring continuous preparation of the environment (PE) and assessment to determine appropriate actions. USSOCOM will continue to maintain capabilities and capacities to support USG efforts to dissuade, deter, coerce, disrupt, and, if necessary, defeat aggressor states that have not complied
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with the will of the international community. States that face internal collapse. An increasing intersection of crime with instability, including harvesting and trafficking of natural resources, will fuel conflict and degrade the rule of law. Failing and failed states are catalysts for further regional instability, afford safe havens for violent extremist and transnational criminal organizations, provide transit points for terrorist and criminal financing, are sources for extremist recruiting efforts, and threaten the security of nuclear weapons and material. USSOCOM will refine and develop capabilities and capacities supporting USG efforts to help prevent key states from failing and to increase their ability to provide security for their populations. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation. The strategic challenge for countering WMD proliferation and delivery lies in understanding the growing nexus of transnational crime, violent extremism, illicit trafficking networks, and cyber networks. Whether it is for states, violent extremists, or non-state actors, new deterrence and dissuasion rule sets are required. USSOCOM will refine and develop capabilities and capacities supporting USG efforts in WMD Proliferation.

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Operational Framework SOF provide unique capabilities to address the four strategic challenges described above. Their global perspective, understanding of transnational threats and non-state actors, and ability to operate in concert with U.S. and international partners make SOF ideally suited to address networked adversaries and the transnational nature of aggressor state influence. SOF engage with strategic regional partners, thereby establishing and strengthening the relationships required to defeat a network. By developing and strengthening these partnerships, SOF work to contain regional CT issues. SOFs unique ability to operate in remote locations and build capacity provides strategic options to meet the challenges of operating in failed or failing states. To address strategic challenges and enable ongoing engagement with host governments and USG interagency elements to predict and prevent conflict, SOF utilize the following approaches: An intelligence-enabled, networked force able to pursue terrorist threats and their supporting networks to deter, preclude, and preempt actions counter to USG national security interests. A population-focused, networked force to influence, enable, and integrate friendly nations, partners, and populations.
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A force to deter, disrupt, or defeat aggressor states and their surrogates. The SOF Operational Framework (Figure 1) depicts complex relationships in the context of meta-trends and strategic challenges. It emphasizes the networked nature of special operations to address the primary strategic challenges.

Figure 1. Special Operations Forces Operational Framework

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Core Operations and Activities SOF conduct Core Operations and Activities (Figure 2) within the Operational Framework using unique capabilities and under conditions in which other forces are not trained or equipped to operate. Core Operations are the operational contexts within which SOF operate while Core Activities are unique capabilities that SOF apply for that operational context.

Figure 2. Special Operations Forces Core Operations and Activities

Core Operations Core Operations are the military missions for which SOF have unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training to orchestrate effects, often in concert with conventional forces. The Core Operations are as follows: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). CWMD refers to nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation

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(CP), and WMD consequence management. WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties. CWMD excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapons where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapons. SOF has a role primarily in NP and CP by providing expertise, materiel, and teams to support GCCs to locate, tag, and track WMD; conducting interdiction and other offensive operations in limited areas as required; building partnership capacity for conducting CP activities; conducting MISO to dissuade adversary reliance on WMD; and other specialized technical capabilities. USSOCOM is the lead combatant command for synchronizing planning for operations against terrorist use of WMD and supports U.S. Strategic Commands synchronization responsibility for overall CWMD planning. Counterinsurgency (COIN). COIN refers to the comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat insurgency and to address core grievances. SOF are particularly suited for COIN operations because of their regional expertise, language, and combat skills, and ability to work among populations and with or through indigenous partners. Counterterrorism (CT). CT operations include actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments
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inhospitable to terrorist networks. SOF often conduct CT operations through clandestine or low visibility means. SOF activities within CT include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material, and non-kinetic activities to counter ideologies or motivations hospitable to terrorism. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID operations involve participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. SOFs primary role is to assess, train, advise, and assist host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. The goal is to enable these forces to maintain the HNs internal stability and to address the causes of instability. Stability Operations. Stability Operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations are aimed at reducing threats from state fragility and instability. Enduring stability operations -- consisting of high-quality, low-profile SOF
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engagement conducted in concert with U.S., interagency, international, and HN partners -- can mitigate the risk of lengthy post-conflict interventions. Stability operations also include tasks performed after a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based intervention or during major operations and campaigns to establish conditions that enable civilian authorities following cessation of organized hostilities. Support to Major Operations and Campaigns. These are operations in support of conventional forces as part of a GCC operation or campaign involving major combat forces. Although major operations and campaigns are characterized by armed conflict between nation-states, the character of these operations includes a hybrid of technologically advanced capabilities and conventional combat forces. Typical SOF support to major operations and campaigns includes UW, special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), MISO, and CA. Unconventional Warfare (UW). UW enables a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. UW can be conducted as part of a GCCs overall theater campaign or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological
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objectives. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however, the political and psychological implications remain. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements and represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. SOF assess, train, advise, and assist indigenous resistance movements to conduct UW and, when required, accompany them into combat. Core Activities Core Activities are operationally significant, unique capabilities SOF apply in different combinations tailored for an operational problem set. Core Activities can be applied independently or in combination as part of a commanders campaign, operation, or activity. The Core Activities are as follows: Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO enhance the relationship between military and civil authorities. CAO require coordination with other governmental agencies, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector. CAO
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include population and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to civil administrations, and civil information management. CAO performed in support of special operations are characterized by smaller CA teams or elements, generally without the support of larger military forces, acting in isolated, austere, and, in many cases, politically sensitive environments. Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments, which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Hostage Rescue and Recovery. Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions that include offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorist threats and incidents, including recapture of U.S. facilities, installations, and sensitive material. Interdiction and Offensive Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations. Special operations CWMD operations include two of the eight military mission areas: interdiction and offensive operations. Interdiction operations track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop the transit of WMD, its delivery systems, or related materials including dual use, technologies, and expertise. WMD

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offensive operations are actions to disrupt, neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat before it can be used, or to deter subsequent use of such weapons. Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the joint force commanders (JFC) objectives. Dramatic changes in information technology and social networking have added a new, rapidly evolving dimension to operations, and the ability to influence relevant audiences is integral to how SOF addresses local, regional, and transnational challenges. Preparation of the Environment (PE). PE is an umbrella term for actions taken by or in support of SOF to develop an environment for current or future operations and activities. SOF conduct PE in support of GCC plans and orders to alter or shape the operational environment to create conditions conducive to the success of a full spectrum of military operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence nations where the presence of conventional U.S. forces is not warranted. Refer to USSOCOM Directive 525-16, Preparation of the Environment, and Directive 525-5, Advanced Special
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Operations, for additional information. Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA involves DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. SFA supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of FSF, supporting institutions of host countries, and international and regional security organizations. SFA must directly increase the capacity and/or capability of FSF and/or their supporting institutions. SFA activities assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DoD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another countrys security forces or supporting institutions. Special Reconnaissance (SR). Reconnaissance and surveillance actions are conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. SOF Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). SOF units generally have limited organic CS and CSS elements, so they normally require additional
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Service-provided CS and CSS to accomplish missions. Due to the high-demand, low-density nature of CS, SOF request these assets through the chain of command or once in theater through the allocation process. With CSS elements, SOF usually deploy with enough CSS to internally support for limited durations of time until theater support structures can be established under the Common User Logistics agreements. Typical Service-provided CS and CSS capabilities required to augment or replace SOF CS/CSS organic capabilities are listed below: Combat Service Support Supply Maintenance Transportation Health service support Explosive ordnance disposal Field services Legal support Finance services Building and maintaining sustainment bases Assessing, repairing, and maintaining infrastructure Combat Support Indirect fires Chemical Engineer Intelligence Information Operations Military police Signal Aviation (recon, signals intelligence, mobility, strike, and IO)

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Due to the nature, scope, and remote environments in which SOF often operate, theater support structures are not always available. This is a significant challenge because SOF have limited organic CS and CSS support. Despite increases in SOF organic CS and CSS force structure, a gap remains due to escalating demands for SOF and the current operations tempo.

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SECTION 3.

ORGANIZING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SOF are organized and generated to support national strategies, global campaign plans, and theater plans. SOF also link force organization and generation to interagency strategies and plans as part of a whole-of-government approach. SOF are either assigned to GCCs, or Commander, USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM) may deploy forces in support of GCC/TSOC requirements. USC Title 10 assigns USSOCOM the function to validate and prioritize SOF requirements in support of global and theater campaigns and operations. Special Operations Force Generation As the Joint Force Provider for SOF, CDRUSSOCOM allocates SOF to address GCC requirements. USSOCOM plans to respond to GCC SOF requirements through a Special Operations Force Generation (SOFORGEN) process (Figure 3). Ultimately, SOFORGEN will serve to track the force generation cycles of its components as well as leverage existing Global Force Management processes to ensure predictable access to Service-provided capabilities. This will align, package, train, project, and sustain special operations force packages, including those critical Service-provided capabilities, to address GCC planned and contingency requirements across the range of military operations.
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SOFORGEN will generate a fully capable and enabled force package presented as a Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) in support of GCC crisis response, limited contingencies, and major operations and campaigns.

Figure 3. Special Operations Force Generation Process

Special Operations Joint Task Force A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF force package that allows USSOCOM to more efficiently provide integrated, fully-capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and JFCs. The modular nature of the SOJTF package permits its capabilities to be included/excluded as required by the TSOC/GCC. A SOJTF (Figure 4) is composed of four elements: Headquarters Element. This element provides the command and control (C2) of SOF. The SOJTF may augment existing structures (e.g., a core C2 capability created from a GCCs TSOC) or, if requested by the TSOC/GCC, provides the full C2 capability for the special operations force.
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SOF. This element includes ground and maritime SOF to augment any assigned Theater Mission Forces (TMF) and includes special operations air component assets to provide/expand theater SOF aviation capabilities. With SecDef approval, this element may also include a National Mission Force (NMF) TF that enables a theater SOF commander to coordinate and synergize TMF and NMF effects within the joint operations area. SOF Organic CS and CSS Capabilities. This element may include, but is not limited to, aviation, fires, intelligence and communications. These forces are limited in size and capability and often require augmentation from conventional forces. DoD Agency and Service-Provided Capabilities. This element may include intelligence, communication, fires, mobility, transportation, force protection, base operating support, and maintenance assets. Further, this element may include conventional combat units as required to accomplish the mission. DoD agencies and Service-provided capabilities are critical components of SOJTF packages, and their effects are optimized by integrating them with SOF units during planning, training, deployment, mission rehearsal, and mission execution. The final two elements of the SOJTF -- organic special operations CS and CSS capabilities and Service and DoD
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agency-provided capabilities -- integrate the critical enabling forces necessary for the special operations commander to direct and conduct joint or combined special operations. When provided to a GCC, the SOJTF force package will integrate within the established JFC special operations organizational construct. The SOJTF headquarters element in t e g r a t e s i n t o o r, i f r e q u e s t e d , e s t a b l i s h e s t h e operational-level special operations headquarters (e.g., Joint Task Force [JTF]). The other three elements of the SOJTF force package integrate as subordinate TFs and Special Operations Task Forces (SOTF). For GCC crisis response, limited contingencies, and major operations and campaigns, the operational-level headquarters will normally be led by a special operations flag officer. O-6 special operations officers usually command TFs, and O-5 special operations officers usually command SOTFs. The GCC or JFC may designate the senior SOF commander as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).

Figure 4. Elements of a Special Operations Joint Task Force 33

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Special Operations Forces Command and Control Special operations C2 needs to be flexible, innovative, and responsive given the dispersed, dynamic, and small-scale nature of special operations. SOF operational commanders, because of the depth of experience and regional expertise of their forces, exercise decentralized C2. Additionally, decentralized C2 facilitates the time-sensitive decisions often required for special operations. Organizations Theater Special Operations Command. To provide the necessary unity of command, each of the GCCs (except Commander, U.S. Northern Command) has established a TSOC as a subordinate unified command. U.S. Northern Command maintains a special operations division within its operations directorate that serves as theater special operations advisor to the commander. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities and is the organization through which a GCC exercises C2 over SOF. The TSOC commander is responsible for the day-to-day activities of assigned and attached SOF and is the senior special operations advisor to the GCC. Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the

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proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Joint Task Force. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing JTF commander. Special Operations Command Forward. A Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD) is a small, strategically placed operational level headquarters. The TSOC commander may establish SOC-FWDs in key locations to provide a persistent extension of the TSOC. CDRUSSOCOM may augment a SOC-FWD with personnel and forces as requested by the TSOC/GCC. If conditions warrant greater SOF engagement, a SOC-FWD can transition to a JTF. Liaison Elements Because SOF operations and activities cross areas under authority of others (battlespace owners, chiefs of missions, etc.), placing SOF Liaison Officers (LNO) to ensure the free flow of information is essential. These SOF LNOs must have a firm understanding of the SOF commanders critical
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information requirements and information management plan addressing appropriate vertical and horizontal information flow. In turn, battlespace owners and other operational units normally provide the SOF commander with LNOs who clearly understand their commanders intent and plans. Additionally, the TSOC extends their C2 through the use of distributed SOF operations that include Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO), special operations forces liaison elements, or other scalable SOF nodes. The TSOCs use of distributed, scalable C2 nodes assures access, understanding, and influence with PN military and U.S. missions. Unity of Command Achieving unity of command of SOF is challenging because of diverse missions and the small size of units that often operate across large geographic areas with indigenous forces and among populations. The guiding principle is to place all SOF under a single special operations commander with the requisite command authorities to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of command also requires that two commanders do not exercise the same authorities over a force at the same time. SOF command authorities derive from U.S. Code Title 10, Section 164, as implemented by Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. As with conventional forces, the SecDef assigns SOF to joint commands: CONUS-based SOF to USSOCOM and theater-based SOF to the respective geographic command.
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Combatant command (COCOM) lies with the combatant commander, who may delegate operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) or establish support relationships among subordinate commanders. Normally, the GCC assigns SOF and delegates OPCON to the TSOC. The TSOC commander may further delegate OPCON or TACON to subordinate special operations commanders to enable sufficient latitude for decentralized execution. CDRUSSOCOM may deploy and temporarily attach forces to the GCC. When this occurs, CDRUSSOCOM normally delegates OPCON or TACON to the GCC. Similar to command authorities, operational authorities to conduct activities and operations derive from U.S. Code Title 10, plus sections of Titles 22 and 50 as expressed in operational execution orders. SOF commanders at all levels seek authorities to fund and support advisory and assistance efforts with indigenous forces and facilitate operating procedures. An example of a relevant authority is Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1208 that funds SOF preparation and employment of traditional and irregular indigenous forces in support of counterterrorism operations. Further, SOF commanders may seek changes to rules of engagement to obtain supplemental permissions to address unique situations. Authorities enable operations and need to accommodate long-term sustained engagements as well as time-sensitive operations.
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Command and Control Architectures Exercising SOF C2 requires an architecture that is flexible, innovative, and integrated with other DoD information systems. The full spectrum of special operations, from staff functions to war, occur on the DoDs Global Information Grid (GIG). The SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) is the USSOCOM portion of the GIG. The SIE provides network independence, maintains connectivity into the GIG, and links SOF across the GCC AOR and around the world. This connectivity shortens the decision cycle for SOF commanders and operators, allows rapid information sharing, and enables efficient C2. Interagency Collaboration and International Engagement Inherent to SOF is their ability to operate as a member of an interagency and international team, which is required for effective synchronization of SOFs activities and operations within an interagency and coalition environment. SOF routinely work with the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other USG departments and agencies as well as foreign militaries and civil institutions to exchange information and intelligence, plan, and coordinate operations. At the heart of interagency collaboration and international engagement are Interagency Task Forces (IATF), Joint IATFs, and similar organizations composed of intelligence and operations
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personnel from the USG and international partners. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), where counterterrorism organizations work together, is the ultimate IATF because of its statutory tasking and multi-agency staff. USG organizations establish collaboration centers to conduct day-to-day coordination necessary for whole-ofgovernment solutions to counterterrorism and other national strategies. USSOCOM established an IATF to build and maintain relationships with other USG departments and agencies, the private sector, and international partners. The IATF improves deterrence and responds to specific threats or incidents. USSOCOM has three primary institutional mechanisms that promote long-term, mutually beneficial relationships: IATF. The USSOCOM IATF works collaboratively with the interagency community focusing on complex CT networks and problems. USSOCOMs IATF identifies discrete problems and opportunities to foster interagency collaboration for USSOCOM by leveraging unique interagency authorities, resources, and capabilities in order to expose, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat threats. Special Operations Support Teams (SOST), comprised of select SOF personnel working full time with designated interagency partners, facilitate whole-of-government approaches that are beyond the ability of SOF alone to execute. The IATFs access to USG departments and agencies provide agile reach back to forward-deployed SOF to assist in efforts to

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accomplish their mission in concert with interagency partners. The IATFs focus on the nexus of crime and terror extends the ability of SOF to leverage the authorities of other agencies. Regional expertise of special operations units and the ability to act with a small footprint frequently make SOF an ideal choice for interagency collaboration. Strategic Engagement Network. USSOCOM collaborates with experts from academia, think tanks, business, NGOs, and across the private sector to benefit from their knowledge of macro and micro-regional environments. The best information or approach is often found in unclassified venues. SOF identify, link, and leverage relevant experts. International Engagement Program (IEP). SOF nurture lasting relationships with priority PNs and build a global network to share understanding of the environment and provide interoperability. By maintaining an enduring presence in key areas, SOF prepare for future contingencies and build mutually beneficial relationships. One IEP initiative is the SOLO program. SOLOs are experienced SOF officers stationed in PNs to develop enduring relationships with HN SOF who are placed and resourced by CDRUSSOCOM and under OPCON of the TSOC commander. Similarly, SOF exchange officers from key PNs are stationed at USSOCOM and its subordinate commands. Other IEP initiatives include both Partnership Development Teams (PDT) and SOF representatives. PDTs are tailored
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staff visits in support of the TSOC to enhance HN SOF capabilities. SOF representatives are special operationsqualified officers who are members of the country team, work closely with the SOLO and PDTs, and serve as SOF subject matter experts in PNs where significant opportunities exist for bilateral SOF cooperation and synchronization. Overall, the efforts of SOF liaison representatives, SOST, IATF, Strategic Engagement Network, and IEP provide collaboration and exchange of intelligence, information, capabilities, plans, and operations to unify whole-ofgovernment efforts. SOF use their global communications capabilities, place personnel with the right language and regional knowledge, and use their relationships with other USG personnel and indigenous military and civilian partners to ensure that special operations contribute in consonance with U.S. theater and country team objectives. Of special importance to SOF is coordination with the DOS. Collaboration with DOS occurs at DOS Main, NCTC, the various IATFs, and with chiefs of mission at key embassies across the world. Placement of special operations representatives, as well as other members of the country team, in a U.S. mission for an extended period is normally accomplished through the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts. NSDD-38 places SOF representatives under the general direction and authority of the chief of mission; however, the individuals remain under the command of the respective GCC.
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SOF Sustainment The Departments of the Army, Navy, and U.S. Air Force provide Service-common logistic, financial, and administrative support as well as contracting and project management to special operations headquarters and forces as directed in DoDD 5100.3. CDRUSSOCOM, directly or through the USSOCOM Service component commands, provides MFP-11-funded administrative and logistic support to all CONUS-based, forward-assigned and attached SOF. For SOF personnel serving in U.S. missions under the authority of NSDD-38, the administrative and logistics arrangements are established within the NSDD-38 process.

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SECTION 4.

EMPLOYING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

To support global and regional campaign plans, commanders use SOF across the spectrum of conflict. Crucial decisions commanders and planners face are when, where, and how to employ SOF to achieve assigned objectives. Because of SOFs distinctive characteristics, their employment differs from conventional forces. Mission Selection Criteria To maximize SOF effectiveness, commanders should evaluate potential missions for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability based on the following criteria: Is this an appropriate mission for SOF? SOF should be applied against strategic and operational objectives that require SOF unique skills and capabilities. If the objectives are not of operational or strategic importance, then SOF should not be used. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. Does this mission support the campaign or contingency plan? SOF missions should directly support the JFCs plan. Is this mission operationally feasible? SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. Planners
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must take into consideration the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, heavily armed, or mobile forces. Are the required resources available to support the mission? Many SOF missions require integrated and interoperable support from other forces. Support includes protection, sustainment, air support, intelligence, communications, and logistics. Even though an objective may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in supportability may affect the likelihood for success. Does the expected outcome justify the risk? In analyzing acceptability, commanders must recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that missions potential benefits are measurable and in balance with its inherent risks. Risk assessment should consider potential loss of SOF, equipment, and the effects on U.S. diplomatic and political interests. Special Operations across the Range of Military Operations During military engagement and security cooperation activities, the TSOC develops supporting plans, conducts joint and combined training and exercises, and conducts other activities and operations with U.S. and foreign armed forces and civilian organizations. The purpose is to shape the environment by building trust and confidence, sharing information, coordinating mutual activities, fostering relationships, maintaining influence, developing allied and
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friendly military and civilian capabilities, and providing peacetime and contingency access to critical regions. In addition, SOF may conduct other operations such as COIN, FID, and UW during GCC engagement and security cooperation activities. During crisis response, the TSOC commander responds to time-sensitive threats or incidents. The TSOC may provide an element to the GCC survey and assessment team that deploys to the crisis site, provides on-site information, and coordinates with other U.S. organizations and host country officials. SOF are often part of noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, and rescue and recovery operations. For limited contingency operations, the GCC may direct the TSOC commander to employ SOF in small-scale, limited-duration operations or as a significant part of major operations of extended duration involving combat. The special operations command structure will depend upon the level of complexity, duration, and resources required by the circumstances. For smaller contingencies, the TSOC commander may exercise C2 from the TSOC headquarters or a SOC-FWD. Larger contingencies may require the GCC commander to request a SOJTF package to augment a SOC-FWD or create a JFSOCC or a Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF). Throughout major operations and campaigns, the GCC may direct the TSOC commander to employ SOF in support of large-scale combat operations. Operation IRAQI
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FREEDOM in Iraq and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan are examples of complex, large-scale operations. In consultation with the GCC, the TSOC commander develops command arrangements for special operations in major operations and campaigns. Global and Regional Campaigns CDRUSSOCOM and the GCCs employ SOF against adversaries as established in global and regional campaign plans. While regional campaign plans have been the planning norm, the advent of transnational adversaries added a new requirement for DoD: global campaign plans that synchronize efforts among the combatant commanders and combat support agencies. The SecDef tasked CDRUSSOCOM to develop the global campaign plan to counter Al Qaeda and similar transnational terrorist organizations. Understanding the global nature of the planning and synchronization environment is essential to employing SOF because of the agility and flexibility global campaigns require. The need to address national policy and strategies in a global framework versus regional requires a new level of war that has existed in practice since the SecDef first tasked development of global campaigns plans. The current three-level model -- strategic, operational, and tactical -places all campaign planning at the regional operational level. Global Employment of the Force and Global Force Management Implementation Guidance require a level of planning between the National Strategic and Operational
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Levels: the Global Strategic Level (Figure 5) wherein national strategy and objectives are addressed in a global, rather than regional, framework to plan for inherently transregional threats that exceed the authority of a single GCC. The Global Strategic Level of War is the level at which global campaigns are planned, resourced, sequenced, and synchronized to accomplish global national security objectives and guidance. Activities at this level link national objectives and guidance to global campaign plans, allocate military forces and other capabilities, and establish military objectives for regional campaigns and operations in support of global campaigns.

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Figure 5. Levels of War - The SOF Perspective

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Synchronizing Special Operations Forces during Global Campaigns Traditionally, SecDef employs SOF by directing the CJCS to issue deployment orders temporarily attaching CONUS-based forces to each geographic command. The SecDef normally delegates OPCON of SOF to the relevant GCC. Each GCC employs SOF independently to achieve theater operational objectives. Regional attachment, however, does not facilitate campaigns against global adversaries who are unhindered by GCC AOR boundaries and diminishes SOFs ability to synchronize and engage transregional adversaries. An alternative approach to commanding SOF in global campaigns is to use the Title 10, Section 167 and the Unified Command Plan authority for CDRUSSOCOM to command SOF missions. Exercising this authority within SecDef-established support command relationships enables global synchronization of SOF capabilities against transregional threats. The support relationship is, by design, unique and flexible because supporting forces are neither assigned nor attached to the supported command. Instead, the supporting commander, CDRUSSOCOM, and supported GCCs agree on tasks, priority of efforts, integration, and sustainment of the supporting force as set forth in SecDef establishing directives. This creates global unity of command because CDRUSSOCOM retains COCOM of CONUS-based SOF operating in GCC AORs. The GCC retains COCOM of assigned theater SOF. This support relationship facilitates
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coordination among the GCCs and enables CDRUSSOCOM to optimize the utilization of SOF across multiple theaters in pursuit of transnational threats. The supported GCC exercises general direction of the supporting effort, including designation and prioritization of targets and objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency to achieve a common goal. Normally, the supported GCC manages target coordination and integrates air support and joint tactical air strikes; provides reception, staging, onward movement, integration, basing, logistics, and force protection; and conducts information operations and strategic communications. CDRUSSOCOM ascertains the needs of the supported GCC and fulfills them within existing capabilities consistent with SecDef priorities and requirements. CDRUSSOCOM determines the intelligence collection plan, forces, tactics, methods, procedures, communications, and advises and coordinates with the supported GCC concerning the employment and limitations of support.

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SECTION 5.

CONCLUSION
SOF collaboration within DoD, with interagency organizations, and with foreign militaries and governments is essential to achieve the level of situational awareness necessary to understand complex environments and determine the effects needed to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The understanding of what, how, and why regional events occur relies increasingly on global perspectives and relationships. Integration of knowledge derived from a global perspective with nuanced regional and local understanding accounts for much of SOF success and will be crucial in the future. The challenges of complex and ambiguous future operating environments will be met with experienced and capable operators, commanders, and staffs leading and supporting a full range of activities and operations. SOF will meet the threats of today and the challenges of tomorrow with ingenuity, perseverance, skill, and professionalism. In a time of high operational tempo, SOF will continue to operate with and through indigenous forces, engage adversaries in the unlit spaces of the world well ahead of the sound of guns, and will remain a critical component of national strategies, global campaign plans, and theater plans. Cultivating innovation within SOF remains a priority and shapes their ability to influence the preconditions for conflict, adapt to the circumstances on the ground, and
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influence indigenous forces and populations where the outcomes of future conflicts will be determined. Future challenges require forward-thinking and institutional agility to improve and expand tactical and operational level skills, equipment, and systems. Innovative people and methods, efficient execution of budgets, and full use of authorities are critical to the continued agility and adaptability of SOF. Major General William J. Donovan, Director of the OSS, stressed that his forces have an eagerness to try things not tried before, an ability to think and act independently, and the flexibility to seek and pursue all effective means to defeat the enemy. As in the past, these words remain significant today and will carry SOF into the future.

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ACRONYMS
AFSOC AFSOF ARSOF C2 CA CAO CDRUSSOCOM CJCS COCOM COIN CONUS CP CS CSS CT CWMD DA DoD DoDD DOS FID GCC GIG HN IATF IEP Air Force Special Operations Command Air Force Special Operations Forces Army Special Operations Forces command and control civil affairs civil affairs operations Commander, USSOCOM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff combatant command counterinsurgency continental U.S. counterproliferation combat support combat service support counterterrorism countering weapons of mass destruction direct action Department of Defense Department of Defense Directive Department of State foreign internal defense geographic combatant commander Global Information Grid host nation Interagency Task Force International Engagement Program
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ISR JFC JFSOCC JSOC JTF MARSOC MARSOF MFP MISO NAVSPECWARCOM NCTC NGO NMF NP NSDD OPCON OSS PDT PE PN SecDef SIE
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance joint force commander Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander Joint Special Operations Command Joint Task Force Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Marine Corps Special Operations Forces major force program military information support operations Naval Special Warfare Command National Counterterrorism Center nongovernmental organization National Mission Force nonproliferation National Security Decision Directive operational control Office of Strategic Services Partnership Development Teams preparation of the environment partner nation Secretary of Defense Special Operations Forces Information Enterprise

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SOC-FWD SOF SOFORGEN SOJTF SOLO SOST SOTF SR TACON TF TMF TSOC U.S. UDT USASOC USG USSOCOM UW WMD

Special Operations Command - forward Special Operations Forces Special Operations Force Generation Special Operations Joint Task Force Special Operations Liaison Officer Special Operations Support Teams Special Operations Task Force special reconnaissance tactical control task force Theater Mission Forces Theater Special Operations Command United States Underwater Demolition Team U.S. Army Special Operations Command U.S. Government U.S. Special Operations Command unconventional warfare weapons of mass destruction

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