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The Peri()rmance 0[' Play,
the "Great Poem," and Ethics
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T EXT AND PERFORMANCE Q ARTEKLY
t23
HYDE AND SARGENT
Completeness forever extends beyond our finit e grasp. T he contingency of
human exi stence makes sure of thal. In the experimenlal game call ed life,
"objective uncertainty" is ever present. and thus so is play. '
The understanding of the performance of play emphasized here heads one in
an ontological directi on for appreciating the scope and fun cti on of the phenom-
enon. Most of the famili ar research on play admits a much less " philosophical"
bent. Especiall y in the field of speech communi cati on. play is typicall y ap-
proached as a strategy for managing and manipul ating int eracti ve episodes.
6
Recentl y, however1 a conversati on anal yst concerned with developing a "science
of speech" has turned things around a bit. I n the essay, "Speech Errors and the
Poeti cs of Conversati on," Robert Hopper emphasizes how such errors give ri se
to "play episodes" that admi t " poetic inAuences," and that the aAinity between
these episodes and inAuences shou ld not be ignored.' As he puts it, "The poetic
influences at play within and following speech errors may not inevitably over-
ride other aspects of language use, but nevertheless we shou ld att end to what
these associati onal coi ncidences may teach us." For here. in the poetics of play
and the play of poetics, Hopper suggests, li es "evidence"that not onl y " proyides
routes through aestheti cs to ethi cs." but also "reveals fragments of the great
poem speaking us into being."
Hopper provides a powerful warrant for research in conversation analysis
since hi s suggesti ons encourage li S lO bel ieve that wilh thi s type of inquiry we
may catch a glimpse of a phenomenon thaL nOL only informs the playfu l ways of
human communi cation but also presents it self as a source of ethi cal guidance.
9
But at the same Lime he also leaves us to confront something of an ontological
impasse: "the great poem speaking us into being'" Strange talk from nne who is
committed to building a "science of speech." What exactl y is thi s poem of which
Hopper speaks? If it is somet hing that is "speaking us in to being," then one
might presume that it is somehow related to the performance orpla}' that marks
human existence. Is thi s why ethics enters the pict ure'
In what foll ows we develop our d iscussion of the per formance of play as a way
of coming to grips with Hopper' s provocati ve and questi onable suggestions.
Our di scussion leads to an appreciati on of play as something that is more than a
strategy for manipul ati ng and managing interactive episodes and thus as
something that transcends the realm of subjectivit),. We trace a path of inqui r y
made possible by th ree phil osophers-Martin Heidegger, J acques Den-ida, and
Hans-Georg Gadamer- who, each in his own way, would have us appreciate the
performance of playas defining a phenomenon that is nOt si mpl y th e play of
someone who is playing but thal is nevertheless funda mentall y related to ", ho
we are as language-users. as creatures of conversation, as beings who make the
world meaningful and ethical by way of ou r d iscurs ive prdCl iccs. We beli eve that
thi s j ourney is responsive to Hopper 's suggestions and thus pertinent to those
communication researchers who mi ght want to think furt her about the li fe-
giving performance in question. to The j ourney, however, is not without its
problems for anyone who wants to buil d a science of speech on "the great poem
speaking us into being." T hese problems surface with each of the three philoso-
phers' thinking on play and its relationshi p to a communicative ethi cs; although
124
TEXT AND PERFORMA:"-!CE (lL'ARTERLY APRIL 1993
as we move from Heidegger, through Derrida, to Gada mer the problems
become less imposing.
HEIDEGGER AND T HE PLAY OF BEING
Heidegger' s ph ilosophy unfolds as an answer to a question: what is the
meaning, the truth, of Being' In his critique of the metaphysical tradition,
Heidegger agreed that the meaning of Being lies in its occurrence as the
"presellci ll g" of what is. He stressed, however, that this occurrence presupposes
a concepti on of temporali ty that eludes metaphysics and its emphasis on the
"present" existence of beings. I I Heidegger thus maintained thaL if
the meaning of Being is to achieve "genuine" clarification, then one must
account for its temporality by investi gating how Being becomes present and
therefore truthful. The question of Being and "the problematic of Temporality"
go hand in hand. As demonstrated in the magnum opus Being and Time,
Heidegger's initial way of working out this problematic was to offer a phenome-
nologi cal and hermeneuti cal account of the constituti on
of" Dasein" (or human being). With Heidegger , then , one begins answering die
Sei'llSjrage by paying carefu l att enti on to what was referred to above as the play of
conlingency, of objecti ve uncertainty, characterizing our everyday existence.
Heidegger speaks to us of thi s playas the "primordial time" of a human
being's "authenti c temporality" which " li es in advance" of our commonplace
understanding of lime. I:! For exampl e, the terms "future," "past, " and "present"
are those of common, everyday time. They sugges t what time is in a language of
meas urement. and slandardi zati on: a language that separates time into a linear
progression of discrete units; a language of seconds, minutes, hours , days, years,
and so on; a language that spatiali zes time by representing it as an infi nite
succession of "instants" or "nows"; a language that makes its appearance in
clocks . calendars. and m"lps . Such a language, howe-ver, does not account for the
actual nature of human temporality, for the way thi s phenomenon happens
before it is transfor med, segmented and reined by expressions that compose
common parlance. The way of temporality is that of a unity where future, past,
and presenl are irllerpenelrating and inseparabl e "ecstases" rather then juxta-
posed dimensions defined within an objectifi ed spatio-temporal coordinate. " A
human being is not a "lhing" that merel y Jives "in" time; it does not exist just
" now" and "then" as does a wa tch in a pocket. Rather, a human being exists as
lime, as one who is presentl y li vi ng its "having been" what once was its future and
who, al the same lime, is preseml y living-out the possibilities that are yet to
come. The temporality of a human being is a " unitary phenomenon. " The
"future," "past," and "present" presuppose the ecstatic character ofthis phenom-
enon's existence. Hence, Heidegger writes, ' 'The character of ' having been'
arises from the future, and in such a way that the fUlure which 'has been' (or
better, whi ch 'is in the process of having been') rel eases from itself the Present.
This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process
of having been; we designate it as 'temporality.' "14
In his lecture ''Time and Being," Heidegger offers an expanded and, for the
purposes of this essay, crucial description of the "presencing" or Being of
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY
temporality. He states:
125
HYDE AND SARGENT
In the approaching of whilt is no longer prescnt and cvcn in thc prescnt itself. there
always plays a kind of approach and bringing abDUl , thal is a kind of presencing. We
cannot attribute rhe presencing to be thus thought t.o onc of the three dimensions of
lime. 1O the present , which would seem obvious. Rather, the uni ty of time's th,ee
dimensions consists in the interplay of each LOward each. This interplay proves LO be
the true extending, playi ng in the vcry hean of ti me, the fOll rt h dimension, so to
speak- not only so to speak, but in the nalu,c of th e mattel".
True time is fourdimcnsional.
Blu the dimension which we call the fourt h in our count is. in the nature of the
maller, the first , that is, the givi ng that determines all. Ei
The ecstatic nature of time, the "true extending" of its three dimensions, is itself
a dimension: a " playing in the very heart of time" that simultaneously differenti-
ates and unites the "future." "past." and "present." that "holds [these dimen-
sions] apart" and "holds them toward one another."' fi For Heidegger. this
playing is the "source" of time; it is that which "gives" time and thereby makes
possibl e the temporality of human being.
With this descripti on of the playing that happens in the ve ry heart of time.
Heidegger provides hi s most telling answer LO die Seinsfrage: the truth of Being
is revealed as something at play. Heidegger stresses. however . that this revealing
is at the same time a concealing. for the play of Being is also that whi ch "holds
itself back and withdraws" whenever one attempts to grasp the reason for its
happening. for its Being the way it is. "The play is without 'why ... writes
Heidegger. " It plays si nce it plays. It simply remains a play: the most elevated
and the most profound ."
17
Hence. following Heidegger. it may be said that the
play of Being-which gives itself to us by way of the presencing of all that li es
before us-is itself a "mystery," for it is never without an element of "absence."
The play of Being " names a presence of absence ... ,.
Human temporality exhibits thi s presence/ absence phenomenon. thi s play of
Being. in the way in which the " present" is given immediacy (presence) in its
ecstatic relationship with the "past" and the "future." with what is no longer
present (absence) and with what is not yet present (absence). The phenomenon
also manifests itself in the "being of language." that is. in the fundamental way
that "language speaks. " According to Heidegger. language is not first and
foremost "a mere human faculty"; rather, its essential nature comes to it from
the play of Being. Language speaks the "Saying" (Logos) of this play. which "is
not anything human."'9 This "speaking oflanguage" shows itself in the way that
words both reveal and conceal their subject matter; in the way that they. in their
presenting ("naming") of things. also name "a presence of absence." an
"otherness" that "holds itselfbac k and withdraws" from the calculating power of
the word. We. at times. may play with words. but it is always the case. says
Heidegger, that "the nature ofl anguage plays with U5."20
The play of Being permeates the being of language. Heidegger stresses.
however . that if our response to thi s "call of Being" is to be performed in the
most caring and genuine manner possible. we must relinquish the ways of
."calculative thinking" and involve ourselves. instead. with a "meditative think-
ing . .. which contemplates the meaning which rei gns in everything that is.'''1
Calculative thinking is willful . practical . and deli berative; as such. according to
126
TEXT AN D PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY APRIL 1993
Heidegger, "its own great usefulness" can only take place as it discloses beings in
terms of its own purposive inclinations and everyday activities. Meditative
thinking, on the other hand, does away with this imposition of the self's will to
power so to engender a poetic "releasemenl toward things," a "letting go" of
beings such that they can be what they are, unfettered by practical concerns
22
For Heidegger, to be sure, it is the poet who affirms "the proper dignity of
man," his most essential and thus "authentic" calling, by bringing into the
language of "mortal speech" a heightened sense of this call of Being. The poet
does this not only as one who has entered into a state of reieasement, but also as
one who has developed a sensitivity to the being of language, to its playful
nature. The great poet is forever tr ying to have language reveal more than it
conceals so that she or he can say what it is that the call of Being places before us
butthat remains unthought and unsaid by those who have yet to learn how their
instrumental ways of thinking and speaking close them off to the "Saying" of this
call. Indeed, claims Heidegger, this is what poets are for: they are the "more
venturesome" ones who have released themselves from the everyday prosaic
dealings of our sociopoliti cal existence so that they might maintain a thoughtful
"conversation" wilh Being.
23
Poetry is language in the process of becoming more attuned with the way
things are di sclosing themselves, with the way the play of Being is happening at
the time. The word of the poet gives voice to the call of this play; it thus performs
a function that is lacking in our common, everyday use of language. For
"everyday language," writes Heidegger, " is a forgotten and therefore used-up
poem, b'om which there hardly resounds a call any longer. "24 The "conversation"
between Being and the poet replenishes and revitalizes language. The play of
Being call s. The poet responds to thi s Saying. Language is born, time and again.
Heidegger puts the matter this "va)':
.. poetry is the ina ugural naming of bei ng and of the essence of all th ings-not just
all Y speech, but that particular kind which for the firs( time bl'ings into the open all
that which we then di scuss and deal with in everyday language. Hence poetry never
takes language as a raw material rcad}' to hand. rather it is poetry which first makes
language possible. Poet ry is the [primordiailiallguagc ora historical people .... The
foundation of human existence is conversation. in wh ich language does truly become
acrual.
2j
Perhaps it would be fair to say that this playful, poetic, and ongoing conversa-
tion defines what Hopper terms "the great poem speaking us into being. "
Holding onto thi s possibility, one cou ld accommodate Hopper's additional
interest in ethics. Heidegger thinks the topic of ethics in its most primordial
sense, as ethos, which means "abode" or "dwelling place."26 As noted above,
Heidegger would have us understand that we dwell on earth primarily as
temporal beings whose most authentic calling is to respond to the play of Being
by thinking its truth and bringing it into language. Such is the task of the poet.
To think and speak the truth of that which lies before us is, in Heidegger's
terms, to give expression to "the assignment of those directions" that "come
from Being itself" and "that must become law and rule for man."27 It thus may
be said that " the great poem" that unfolds in and through the conversation
between Being and poets does grant purchase to the question of ethics.
TEXT AND
127
HYDE AND St\RC ENT
The great poem speaking us into being: a conversation that takes form in li ght
of the play of Being, that is ad va nced by the word of the poet, and that has
ethical implications. Heidegger adds much to Hopper's way of stating the issue
at hand. Yet, with !-I eidegger a pmbl em a"ises, especiall y for one who would
have us learn more about the nature of thi s conversat ion by atlending LO the
" poeti c inAuences at play within and foll owing speech ermrs." For here we must
necessaril y concern ourselves with exampl es uf what Heidegger describes as the
"idle talk" or "chatter" (Cerede) of everyday language use, which "d iscourages
any new inquiry and any di sputation," encounlges people to foll ow "the route of
gossiping and passing Ih f Ulord along," and lllUS " releases one from the tas k of
genuinely understand ing" and responding to the call of Bei ng. "" Idl e talk is a
common practi ce that gets in the way of our true calling; hence, from a
Heideggerian perspective, the poeti cs of play and the play of poeti cs that are
brought about by speech errors must be seen as but a mere game compared to
the play of Bei ng and what thi s play call s for: the meditati ve t hinking and
language of great poetr y. T he great poem speaking us into being, counsel ing
our "abode" or "dwelling place" (elhos) , requires nothi ng less than thi s. T he play
of Being call s. The conversa ti on must continue fo r the sake of who we are-
creatures whose "essence" consists in thinking and "poeti zing" the "tru th of
Being. "
\Ve are now ready to take the next step on our j ourney, in the di rection of
J acques Derrida. Like !-Ieidegger , Den' ida has a passion for play; he, too, woul d
have us keep the conversati on going about thi s phenomenon and its relevance
for humankind. Yet, with Den' ida, there is a difference: the great poem does not
begin with the play of Being, and thus there is no need to " release" oneself from
the everyday prosaic deal ings of our sociopolit ical existence in order to appreci-
ate the " truth" of the poem' s playful call .
DERRIDA AND T H E PLAY OF LANGUAGE
In order lO think or play in : .. n:.dical war .. . o ne must think beyond the <lCl i\"i1r or a
subjecl manipulating objecls according to or agai nst the n des .... For a long ti me
now, it is this kind of lhinking .. bout play (which is no longer simply playing) th al has
interested me. This pia), is not li ke a game lhal o ne plays with. and, natu rall y, it mil)' be
ver)' risky. 29
Den'ida is interested in "(he economy" of" pl ay. a very vibrant economy that
forms the context for anythi ng meani ngful that call be said about who we are as
existing selves (subjects) and about the worl d in whi ch we live. !-I e uses the term
"differanee" when writing about the economy. For Den'ida, " the play o f dij/erallce"
defines the basic workings ofl3ll guage; it is the way ill whi ch language fun ctions
not onl y as a semioti c system of differ ences, of arbitrary and conventionali zed
signifier/ signified relati onshi ps and oppositi ons, but also as a "tempori zing" (or
"defer ring") movement of signi fications whereby any given semiotic system of
meaning, as it takes form, al ways enters into an "it1len extual" relati onship with
some other system or world view that it is currentl y transforming.
3o
Owing to
the play of differanee, there can be no world vi ew un to itself. T he same call be
said about "the self' of any individual: the selr is always situated in and comes
"to know itself" through the play of differanee that is at work within one's culture.
128
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY APRIL 1993
Hence, caught up in the texture of thi s play, the self perpetually finds itself
carrying some "trace" of the "other than self. " some trace of past systems of
meaning that, whether recognized or not, are there with the self as its constant
co-authors. Derrida therefore maintains that "Nothing-no present and in-
different being-thus precedes" the play of differance. "There is no subject [or
self] who is agent, author , and master of differance, who eventually and empiri-
call y would be overtaken by differance. Subjectivity-like objectivity-is an effect
of difJerance, an effect inscri bed in a system of differance."31
Den'ida encourages us to think about play in a non-humanistic way. Play is no
longer simpl y the play of someone who plays; it is not rooted in "the activity ofa
subj ect manipulating objects." Rather, the play directing Derrida's attention "is
what makes the movement of signification possible," a "movement by which
language, or any code, any system of reference in general, becomes ' histori call y'
consti tuted as a fabri c of differences. "32 This non-humanistic way of thinking
abou t play is not unlike what is going on when Heidegger speaks to us about the
play of Being and its presence (truth) in the being of language. Might it be said,
then, that the economy of play that interests Derrida is traceable back to, and
thus grounded in, that whi ch interests Heidegger: "the truth of Being"?
As animalia lIletat!hysica, we mi ght be tempted to make such a move, thereby
displaying our passionate desire for compl eteness, or what Derrida terms "an
ethic of nostalgi a for ori gins," for some ultimate referent or "transcendental
signified."33 Den-ida, however, cautions against thi s move because it involves
one in a "phantasm"-the " myth of logocentrism." T he myth of logocentrism
caters to ou r craving for origins and stabili ty by promoting the belief that the
truth of what is can somehow be captured in the presence of the word.
Heidegger held "hope" that such an occurrence could take place, but Derrida is
far more skeptical. Den-ida maintains that "[the truth of] Being must be
conceived ... on the basis of the possibility of[t he] play [of differance ] and not the
othe r way around. "34
This is not to say, however , that Derrida would have us think of the play of
diffnance as being itself a "foundation" for the presellci ng of all that lies before
us. On the contrary, he e mphasizes that the play of differance "is not a being-
present, however excellent, unique, principal , or transcendent one makes it. It
commands nothing, rules over nothing, and nowhere does it exercise any
authority. It is not marked by a capital letter.">5 In other words, the play of
differa1lce does not have the attributes that Heidegger associates with the truth of
Being. There is "no realm of differance," writes Denida, for its play is but a
process or "movemen t," a performance or "function" that animates the working
economy of language.
36
Hence, Derrida emphasizes that we must think of the
play of differance "without nostalgia" and affirm its ongoing performance as that
which is "without fault , without truth , and without origin. "37 From a Derridian
perspective, Hopper's notion of "the great poem speaking us into being" would
be nothing more or less than thi s specifi c performance (although Derrida would
undoubtedly want to rephrase the notion to read "the great poem 'writing' us
into bei ng").38
T he play of differance is forever working to call into question one's attempt to
achi eve simple uni vocity of meaning. According to Derrida, ''This is obviously
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY
129
HYDE AND SARGENT
what makes it threatening and necessaril y dreaded by ever yt hing in us that
desires a realm, the past or future presence of a r ealm."39 We must therefore
recognize that the play of differance brings to language a constant capacity for
"deconstruction," a capacity whose operation inevitably serves to destabilize the
semiotic systems of meaning constructed by a culture from out of the play of
differance so as to counter the play's lempori zi ng movement and bring it to a hall.
But this attempt at "stabili zati on" does not put an end to the play. For in doing
what it does, thi s play always holds open the possibility for expressing things
differently, for announcing what the presence or some system of meaning
marginalizes and leaves unthought and unsaid when attempting to const itute its
own coherence and truth in some fashion ."o
Following Derrida, there is something subve rsive about the deconstructive
capacity of language that is made poss ibl e by the pl ay ofdifferal1te and that must
necessaril y be a part of the rhetori c of any text. " Deconstruction" and
"destabilization" go hand in hand. Yet Derrida would also have us remember
that "Destabi li zation is required for ' progress' as well " since it alerts us to "what
remains to be thought" beyond the reiF,ed dogmas of some instituti onali zed
discourse.
41
Den'ida alerts us to diffe rences-meanings and values that have
been excluded by the di scourse in questi on, that li e beyond the borders of its
intelligibilit y, but that still are needed by the discourse ifits li velihood and cl aims
to truth are to be maintained. If these differences were to di sappear totally, so
would the discourse that opposes them and deni es them their due. Indeed , the
play of differance cannot be sil enced. Al ong with its capacity for deconstruction , it
emerges and develops as a determination oflan guage Iiom which it is insepara-
ble. Destabilization is now on the scene, working it s way in and through texts,
intervening in the "official politi cal codes governing reality," pointing to what is
absent in them, to their "other," and thus providing a space for " s e l f ~
interrogation. " The possibility of " progress" is al hand , a possibility that "calls
for deci sion in the order of ethical-polit ical responsibility": should we maintain
Ollr codes or revise them?42
A call is issued. It comes not from the play of Being (Heidegger) but from the
play of differance; it thus doesn' t require one to " release" herself or himself from
the everyday discursive practi ces of sociopoliti cal existence in order to perceive
and respond to it in an "authentic" manner " Derrida takes this call very
seriously. He reads and interprets texts in strict accordance with the call 's
deconstructive ways. He is, to be sure, a deconstructionist. That, he admits, is his
"vocation. " The practice of deconstruct ion is "a response to a call."14 He also
admits that offering this response is a " ri sky" endeavor . T here is much at
stake-in panicul ar , the fate of the "other," of all that is being repressed and
denied by our political codes. In taking this risk he necessaril y involves himself
in an activity that serves as "a political ferment or anxiety, a subversion of fixed
assumptions and a privileging of disorder. "" Indeed , that is what the play of
differance calls for : "destabili zation. " One sees such a thing going on in Derrida' s
writings whenever he intervenes in and interrogates the rhetoric of texts.
So, for example, Derrida would have us suspend judgment of some of the
"apparently" pro-Nazi and anti-Semiti c writings of his deceased friend, Paul de
Man, that were published during World War II in the Belgian collaborationist
130
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUART ERLY APRIL 1993
newspaper Le Sois. He would have us not draw any hard and fast conclusions
about such sca ndalous words as these:
... one sees thal a soluti on o f the Jc wi sh problem thal would aim 3llhc creation ora
Jewish colony isolaled from Europe would not entail , lor the literary life of the West.
deplorabl e conscquclH.':CS. The laucr would lose, in all , a few personalities of mediocre
value and would continue. as in the past, to develop according to its great evolutive
la\\'s:16
These words marginali ze some "other," a peopl e whose blood flows through
Derri da's veins. Was de Man once ~ Nazi sympathi zer and anti-Semite? Abiding
by Derri da's deconstructive reading of de Man's wartime writings, the question
must remain open to debate. For these writings , as Den'ida tries to show as he
atlends to the play of differance at work in them, bring together ideas about the
"J ewish Probl em" that are "constantl y split, di sj ointed , [and] engaged in inces-
sant conflicts," thereby making it difficult , if not impossible, to say for surewhat
de Man truly meant when he composed in some stable fashion the words quoted
above. Derrida thus asks his readers, " if they still have some concern for justice
and ri gor, to take the time to re-read , as cl osely as possible, " the past words of
one who would imer become a fell ow deconstructi onist.<l7 Den'ida must there-
fore tell us of ways of reading de Man that are "other " than the one that would
"simpl y" remain "on the surface," answer "yes" to the question, and then add a
word or two abou t the author 's total lack of moral decency.
T he "decision" to res pond to what the play of difJemnce calls for gives
expression LO an "ethi cal-politi cal " rhetori c that emphasizes how matters of
"truth" are " undecidable." T here is, to be sure, something quite " risky" about
sll ch a deconstrucli ve rhetori c. For although it mi ght serve to open us to
"better" ways of coming to terms ",iIh iss ues that warrant careful consideration.
its continual and pl ayful refusal l u commit itself to the "truthfulness" of any of
these ways mi ght also provide a space for the creati on of something much
worse:
H1
lfwe think of Hopper's "great poem" in terms of what Derrida tells us about
the play of di!fera.// ce, there is no need to degrade the everyday conversational
p,acti ces that give di rection to the poem as being nothing but "idle talk" or
"chatter" inhibi ting us from our " true" calling. Derrida gets Heidegger off the
back of the conve rsati on analyst. The pl ay of differa.nce is the economy of
language at work-and nothing more. The poeti cs of play and the play of
poetics that are brought about by speech errors are as much a part of this
economy as anything else. Yet Derrida rai ses another problem for a poetics of
conversati on. As detail ed above, Derrida would have us understand that the
play of difJemnce "call s," and primaril y in a never ending deconstructive way-
one that "prevents any word, any concept, any major enumeration from coming
to summarize and to govern from the theologi cal presence of a center the
movement and textual spacing ofdifTerences."49 [fthis is what the "great poem"
is all about, then, continuing with Derrida, we would have to see it as calling for a
discursive response whose ethical-political stance is itself deconstructive and
thus criti cal of the supposed stability of any truthc1aim. As far as we can tell , the
"poetic influences at play within and following speech errors" do not appear to
function in thi s way; their performance seems to be out of sync with the "great
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY
131
HYDE AND SARGENT
poem" of which Hopper speaks and that, from a Derridian perspective, goes by
the name of the play ofdijferance.'o
But perhaps the performance of play ought to be thought of in a way that is
different than what Derrida recommends, a way that is more constructive and
perhaps more accornmodating to the concerns of the conversation analyst. With
this possibility in mind, we take our final step on our journey and turn to the
theory of play that informs Hans-Georg Gadamer's project of philosophical
hermeneutics.
GADAMER AND THE PLAY OF UN DERSTANDING
Gadamer would have us appreciate the "essence" of play. He offers such
observati ons as these:
lW] e find talk of the play of li ght, the play of W<lVCS, (he play of gears or parts of
machinery. thc illlcrplay of limbs, the play of forces, thc play of gnats, even a play of
words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal
that would bring it to an end .... The movement of play ... renews itself in constant
repetition. The 1ll0ve mClll backward and forward is obviousl y so celllral to the
definition of play lhal it makes no difference who or whal pcrforms Ihi s movement.
The movement of pl ayas stich has, as it were, no substrate. The play is the
occurrence of the movement as such .... Hencc. the Illode of being of play is nOt such
t hat , for t hc game to be played , there must be a subjeCl who is behaving playfu ll y.
Rather, the primordial sense of playing is the medial one. Thus we say that something
is "playing" (spieil) somewhere or at some time, thill somclhing is going on (im Spielf'
or that something is happenin g (sicl/ abspielt), 51
Gadamer echoes both Heidegger and Derrida who, as noted above, do nol
restrict the phenomenon's occurrence to the sphere of subjectivity. Play is not
simply the willful activity of "a subject who is behaving playfull y." For Gadamer,
however, the significance of this point has more to do with the exist.ential and
hermeneutical phenomenon of human understanding than with either the
question of Being per se or with that which can be called diffemnce. Gadamer
maintains that "play is so elemental a function of human life that culture is quite
inconceivable without this element."52 The essence of play defines the modus
opemndi of the phenomenon of understanding in all of its modes, scientifiC and
non-scientific alike.
"Understanding," writes Gadamer, "is to be th.ought oj less as a suhjective act than as
participating in an event oj tradition, a process of transmission in which past and
present are constantly The phenomenon of understanding is not
first and foremost a deliberate product of self-conscious reflection but instead is
essentially something that is always "going on," always "happening," always
"playing" itself out in our everyday existence before such reflection takes place
and thus before it might assume the form, for example, of some technique or
procedure of science, 54 At its most primordial level, understanding is meaning-
ful existence on the move-a "movement" whose "constant repetition" is
defined by how past interpretations permeate and influence the thought and
praxis of present-day life. The influence of this "event of tradition" shows itself
as soon as we are born and from then on as we are subjected to the manners in
which the members of our community employ its historicall y informed customs,

132
TEXT AN D PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY APRIL 1993
rules, and norms so to maintain a world of common sense and common praxis, a
world of understanding. It is such a world that provides the necessary back-
ground for coming to terms with who we are first and foremost as social beings.
As Gadamer notes, "Long before we understand ourselves through the process
of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family,
society, and state in which we live .... That is why the Inejndices of the individnal,far
more than his judgments, con.stitute the historical reality of his being. "55
As employed here, the concept of "prejudi ce" must be understood in a
positive manner. The prejudices of understanding that mark a culture's world
view are the products of interpretations that have been delivered over from the
culture's historical traditi on and appropriated by its members. Hence, for
Gadamer, "Prejudices are not necessaril y unjustified and erroneous, so that
they inevitably distort the truth"; rather, as he puts it, "the historicity of our
existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the
initi al directedness of our whole ability to experi ence."56 Prejudices are a
necessary experienti al feature of everyday existence; they help to orient the
concernful preoccupations of one's daily affairs, thereby bringing order and
intelligibility to what would otherwise be a state of chaos and confusion. The
prejudices of understanding "are biases of our openness to the world. They are
simply conditions whereby we experience something-whereby what we encoun-
ter says something to us."" Owing to our prejudices, we have a basis from which
to perceive, interpret, and become meaningfull y involved with things and with
others.
The play of understanding is this process of meaning-formation happening
time and again , its constant repetition being the way in which we go about
sustaining and revi sing the prejudices of tradilion. "Tradition," writes Gada-
mer, "is not simpl y a permanent precondi ti on: rather, we produce it ourselves
inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evol ution of tradition, and hence
further determine it ourselves.":':; This ongoing process, wherein past and
present are constantl y mediated, also entai ls a fUllIre-oriented dimension that is
forever opening us to as yet unreali zed possibil iti es of understa "ding that may
call into question the disclosive capabi liti es of one's current interpretive prac-
tices (or prejudices). Following Gadamer, it may thus be said that the "openness"
characteri zing the play of uncI e rst an ding "has the st ruct ure ofa question" since
it is always encouraging us to wonder whe ther the meaning of something is truly
"this or that. "59
Gadamer makes much of this last point when discussing how we might best
participate in the evolution 01" tradition so to determine its course in the most
"genuine" way. For Gadamer, as we exist in relation to the future so must we be
with the past. The most authentic way to participate in the evolution of tradition
is to open ourselves to its poss ibilities, a nd this can be done only to the extent
that we engage tradition through "the art of questioning." Such a "dialectical"
art, Gadamer notes, "proves its value because only the person who knows how to
ask questions is able to persist in hi s questioning, which involves being able to
preserve hi s ori entation toward openness. "60 To preserve this orientation to the
highest degree requires that as we question tradition we also allow it to do the
same to us. How we have come to understand some past "text"-be it a work of
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLV
133
HYDE AND SARGENT
art, a book, or an event, for example-is never without the possibility that this
text may have something different to say to us as our present circumstances
change over time, thereby providing other contexts for interpretation and thus
other contexts for developing a new understanding of what the text "truly"
means. The play of understanding calls for the art of asking and answering
questions, an art that Gadamer identifies with the practice of conducting a
conversation in a very open-minded manner. He writes: "To conduct [such] a
conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter to
which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires that one does not try
to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of the
other's'Opinion. "61
Gadamer refers to a conversation whose participants are totally devoted to
disclosing the "truth" of some matter of interest, who thus are \villing to assume
the risk of being shown how their current understanding of the matter is
somehow deficient, and who are therefore obli ged to keep the conversation
going by being "far less the leaders of it than the led."';2 It is this manner of
conversation that Gadamer sees as being most in tune with the existential and
hermeneutical function of the play of understanding. Hence, it is also this
manner of conversation that he believes must be employed as the means for
coming to terms with the teachin gs of tradition. To relate to tradition in this way
is to all ow it to be "a genuine partner in dialogue." Tradition warrants our
concern and respecl.
63
With tradi tion comes language. exhibiting how olhers
saw fit to concretize the play of understanding in all types of lexts. And with
language goes tradition, sent on its way once again by further efforts in dealing
with the play of understanding'"" Ie as with Hopper, there is to be any talk of
"the great poem speaking us into being," then , following Gadamer, one would
have to be referring to this ongoing movement of tradition, this playing out of
understanding in and through the medium of language.
Making a Heideggerian turn at thi s point in ollr discussion would head us
back in the direction of the play of Being since, for Heidegger , the essential
nature of language comes to it from this play. Turning in a more Derridean
direction, the topic would be the play of differance and the way in which it defines
for Derrida the basic economy of language. Gadamer's interest in language
heads us in neither of these directions , for he is committed to the view that
language is first and foremost a "living operation," that "its real being consists in
what is said in it," and that what is said in it is constituti ve of tradition.
55
With
Gadamer, then, we are encouraged LO associate the life and essential functioning
of language with a particular performance of play that forms the practical basis
for making the world meaningful and for cultivating tradition: the play of
understanding. Language is the medium of this play, but it is the play that puts
language to work in the everyday world. And lhat's what counts lor Gadamer.
The truth of tradition must be cultivated; hence, his praxis-oriented claim that
"What man needs is not just the persistent posing of ultimate questions, but the
sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now."66
For Gadamer, developing this sense requires more than what Heidegger
allows for with his theory of meditative/ poetic thinking. Releasing oneselffrom
the everyday prosaic dealings of sociopolitical existence so to maintain a thought-
134
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY
ful conver sati on with Being is not enough. Nor is it enough lO approach the task
at hand with only a deconstructive outlook. For although the language of poetry
may certainly provide us with " truths" that are worth appropriating, at least for
the t ime being, and although the language of deconstruction can alert us to how
the time has come to destabili ze such truths, the culti vation of tradition requires
that sooner or later we commit ourselves to the everyday sociopolitical task of
using language lO construct understanding in the company and with the help of
others."7 For the sake of tradition, the conversation with it must extend to "the
realm" of the community-"a realm as indispensible lO human life as the air we
breathe. 'G8
Gadamer sees this extended conversation as defi ning a "moral phenomenon"
because it engages people in an activity that lends itself lO the development of
phronesis, of "ethi cal knowledge" that can inform the truth of tradition by
speaking on behalf of what is beli eved to be "good" for human beings. Certainly
we need such knowledge, for as Gadamer notes: " Man always finds himselfin an
'acting situation' and he is obli ged to use ethical knowledge and apply it
according lO the exigencies of his concrete si tuati on."69 The "great poem" and
ethics are related. Moreover, the relationship is such that it authorizes the very
thi ng that conversation anal ysts anal yze: conversat ion. Thus, with both Gada-
mer' s and Hopper's proj ects in mind, it seems fair to ask: are "the poetic
influences at play within and foll owing speech errors" ethi cal occurrences' Are
they productive of the type of knowledge that is needed to inform the truth of
tradit ion with notions of " the good'" As noted at the beginning of this essay,
Hopper would have us beli eve that the "play episodes" arisi ng from speech
errors not only provide "routes through aesthetics to ethics," but also reveal
"fioagmems of the great poem speaking us inlO being." In li ght of thi s claim, and
abiding by what Gadamer has lo tell us about the play of understanding,
affi rmative answers lo the questions would appear lo be in order; although
Hopper's most developed illustration or the poetics of play surroundi ng speech
errors does, in our eSlimation, encourage some doubtJo We thus are left to
wonder at the end of our j ourney: is the study of the poetic influences at play
within and foll owin g speech errors a credible way of coming lo terms with "the
great poem speaking us into being'"
CONCLUSION
To answer this question requires that we first have an answer to another one:
what is " the great poem" of which Hopper speaks' We dealt with this questi on
via an interest in the performance of play-a performance that, on Hopper's
account, has much to do wit h the "episodes" arising from speech errors in
conversation. Theories of play drawn from the works of Heidegger, Derrida,
and Gadamer were di scussed so as lo indi cate possible answers to the questi on.
These answers take form as we are al erted lo how the performance of play is
related lo such matters as Being, temporality, poetry, conversation, the decon-
structive nature of language, the Other, politics, traditi on, di alogue, rhetoric,
and truth. Play, it seems, is a compli cated phenomenon. The theories also
enabled us lo deal with Hopper's suggestion that the playful call of "the great
poem" and ethics are somehow related. Developed in terms of Heidegger's
TEXT AND PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY
135
HYDE AND SARGENT
theory of the play of Being, the relati onship between "the great poem" and
ethics is one that works to discredit a sLudy of speech errors for the purpose
advocated by Hopper. Den' ida's theory of the play of dijJeronce ends up being
less critical, although the deconstructive ethics that follows from his theory still
cast doubt on Hopper's project. With Gadamer's theory of the play of understand-
ing, a more constructive view of ethics is offered which leaves open the possibil-
ity that the play episodes arising from speech errors in conversat ions ma y
indeed reveal fragments of the "great poem speaking us inLo being."
It seems to us that a metaphysical impulse must be at work whenever a person
decides in a moment of seriousness to pia), arou nd with a notion like " Lhe greaL
poe m." As ani111aiia 1Ilpla/J/tysica, we are prone to such momentary considerations
of some all-encompassing phenomenon that we hope is he re La bring at least a
modicum of order LO our lives. But should those who are inlerested in building a
"science of speech" concern themselves with a phenomenon that most likely will
forever continue to play wilh their minds and rruslrate the desired comprehen-
siveness of Lheir methodologi cal designs' For example. if the greal poem is
anyt hing like the play of Being, the play of dijJerollCP, or the pia), of understand-
ing, then its "happening"-as Heidegger, Denida. and Gadamer make clear-is
nOI somet hing rooted in the realm of subjectivity bUL instead is consLantl y
transcending this realm's presence and thus al \\'ays working to call into question
Lhe self-assuredness of any of its prejudices. be Lhey scienlific or otherwise. But
maybe thai ' s why "the grcat poem" should be menti oned and ta ken into
account.
For some, rai si ng the question of "the great poem" and its relationship to
ethics may be a sign of wisdom; for others. iL ma)' be nothing more than an
exercise in wrongheadedness. This essay was stimulated by what we interpreted
to be a sign in need of furth er undersLanding. WhaL we ended up suggesting was
that when it comes to revealing fragments of "the great poem." the study of play
episodes arising from speech errors in conversations ma), be off the mark. The
problem here is one of ethics. But who is to say that Heidegger, or Den'ida, or
Gadamer provide the best routes toward such a determination? When it comes
to understanding "the great poem speaking us into being," one is wise to keep
an open mind and play along for as long as one can. The effort here is not
inappropriate for creatures who go b)' such names as homo ludens and hOlllo
[oquens.
ENDNOTES
I Homo LlUitms: A SI!4dy of the Play-Elemn,lm Cllltllrt ( Boston. MA: Beacon P, [955) 5.
' The social psychologist Ellen L:lI1gcr makes much ol lhis pOilU in her cxpcr'imcnl,d studies on lile.: topit. of
"uncertainty" and how it can COnlribwe to one's qualit) oflile. Sec he r MIIIlIj"III1'H (New Yurk: Addisoll-Wt:slq.
1989). Also Huizinga: and Gregory Bateson, S(pps /0 (HI wIQg)' of Al liin (New \'01'1, ; Ihll:lIltine Books. 1972)
177-193.
' Karl Jaspers, WaJ lo Wtl(/om, lrans. Ralph Manheim ( 'cw lIaH:n. C:"-l: Yale L' J\ 1970) 125.
4 Kenneth Burke. PtrmIlrinlU (mil Change: AlI Anatom.v of PurpoS#' (New York: 1965) 256.
Kierkegaard, Concluding UrucUllt,fic Post-Senpt, tr.l.llS. D.F. Swenson and \\' . Lowrie (PrincelOll. NJ:
PrincclOn UP, 1971) 182.
6Sec. for example. Phillip J. Glenn and Mark L. Kllapp. "The Interacti ve Fnlllling of Play in Adult
Conv(:rsalions," CommunicatIOn Quartfrly 35( 1987): 48-66: Sandra L. Regan, "Verbal Play and Multiple Goals in
the Gyne<:ological Exam Interaction," JOllmal oj l..imguagt ami Socull Ps)'ch%lD' 9( 1990): 67-84: Mara B.
Addman. "Play and Incongruil Y: Frami ng Safe-Sex Talk," /-"II/Ih (;01llmllml(ll101/ 3(1 991): 139--155. Also sec