A CRACK IN THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Marcus Abundis1

Abstract This paper analyzes David Chalmerss Hard Problem and his argument against natural selection in the formation of a human Psyche. It identifies specific weaknesses in Chalmerss reasoning and evidence from his published articles over the years. As counterpoint, the paper then offers three examples to illustrate a functionalist information theory remedy to Chalmerss Hard Problem, developed herein as General Information Theory (GIT). GIT is then contrasted with Giulio Tononis Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Terrence Deacons common dynamical logic (CDL), for a short survey of information theory views in modeling Psyche. The paper closes with a brief note on likely paths for advancing information theory type solutions. Background This paper distills four years of experience in presenting on this topic at 14 international academic conferences. In general, this work was accepted at roughly 25 conferences during this time (2007-2011). This study began as an exploration of human creativity, but evolved into a study of human and general consciousness. Recent progress now suggests a notion of general information theory and spontaneous creative systems (GIT), as presented at Towards a Science of Consciousness, Stockholm University, May 2011, and Science and Non-Duality, October 2010 (see: www.vimeo.com/evolv). The author has roughly 20 years experience in diverse hightech businesses (1st generation industrial robots, systems analysis, 1st hedge fund, 3rd generation robots, data encryption, medical technologies, computer networks). The authors last formal position was managing the European market for SynOptics Communications (SNPX), with a key technology of the Internet explosion the Ethernet port built into almost all computers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
A CRACK IN THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS...............................................1 TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 2 SEEKING A USEFUL FRAMEWORK Statement of Problem and Proposed Approach...........2

1 Organizational Behavior (GFTP), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

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CHALMERSS VIEW AGAINST A DARWINIAN FRAMEWORK Review of Literature.....3 CHALMERSS FRAMING Discussion of Literature.................................................................. 5 ALTERNATIVE FRAMING Three Functionalist Accounts Supporting Natural Selection.......8 SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................24 FROM KEPLER TO BATESON AND BEYOND Going Forward.......................................... 24 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 26

INTRODUCTION The essence of the human condition, a natural question for any member of our species, haunts us today as it has from our first primitive sense of this thing we call humanity. We believe that our humanity, as an individual and a collective state of diverse experience, has a common lens for viewing all life and death matters, a notion we typify in diverse ways mind, brain, psyche, cognition, consciousness, soul.2 The study of this essential human self-awareness, regardless of its label, origin, or orientation, grasps at the engine of all human adventure. It measures our self-regulating, self-organizing, and, most importantly, self-transforming roles within this unique human state. SEEKING A USEFUL FRAMEWORK Statement of Problem and Proposed Approach The first formal discourse on this topic is ascribed in Western thought to Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a fifth-century BCE Greek philosopher (Allen 1985, p. 14). From here, the ensuing 2,500 years produce many discoveries. While this journey of the Mind has informed us powerfully, it has also ironically sharpened the unfathomed depths of this seemingly basic matter. Framing concepts for a truly insightful exploration of this topic, which I will call Psyche, still elude us despite the matters obvious universal gravity. In contrast, Anaxagoras is also credited with contributing to the founding thoughts of Atomism (ibid.). This atomic notion, within its 2,500-year course, still produces many new advances for our species. The atomic arc and its ever-unfolding lineage of serial discovery now find us investing over $9 billion in the largest scientific instrument yet conceived, the Large Hadron Collider (Agence Science-Presse 2009). Yet, as we refine our concepts of Psyche, do we boast of parallel success or confidence in this most central human aspect? Clearly not. A long-standing
2 Any of these terms may appear when citing other literature, but Psyche is principally used herein to represent a totality of the conscious and unconscious human mind.

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void in basic framing concepts for Psyche now prompts such muddled debate that, for many, the topic has become an uninteresting riddle to attempt a fools errand. We have strong feelings about the matter, molded by tradition, religion and law. But we have no objective, rational method, no step-by-step procedure [for studying Psyche] . . . we lack a coherent framework. (Koch 2009) Still, if we imagine how a successful framework for Psyche might look, two examples can guide our thoughts: Evolutionary Theory and Quantum Mechanics. Both concepts are often seen as humanitys greatest or most successful scientific work to date. Quantum mechanics is well known for its acute predictive ability, and evolutionary theory is notable for its broad general acceptance. We can guess that a useful model of Psyche likely has similar bearing and gravity, given the grand scale of problems the topic presents (Morris 2002, Rosenblum & Kuttner 2010). That similar scales imply that we might use one model to help answer questions on a second front is unsurprising. If we accept Darwinian and quantum views as key scientific models of Natures True Order (Natural Law), we must also see them as robust enough to help solve other like-sized problems, in a complementary serial manner. Such serial robustness, in fact, defines any models true success. Furthermore, if this formalized Natural Law is indeed not useful or serially relevant, only a frank and thoughtful exploration of the models lapses would allow further progress. This is our general pattern in advancing a heritage of serial discovery. Therefore, to posit a successful framework for Psyche as a test case, we must first see how evolutionary theory and quantum mechanics apply to the problem, or we must grasp exactly how they fail to help. Either course will take us forward in a serial manner. This paper covers the question of Psyche vis--vis evolutionary theory alone. It surveys David Chalmerss argument against natural selection in the formation of Psyche, following it with three examples supporting a functionalist Darwinian view of Psyche, presented herein as a type of information theory. The second test case of Psyche vis--vis quantum mechanics, which is covered in a later paper, expands on concepts introduced herein. Nothing in science as a whole has been more firmly established by interwoven factual information. Nothing has been more illuminating than the universal occurrence of biological evolution. Furthermore, few natural processes have been more convincingly explained than evolution by the theory of natural selection. (Wilson 2009) CHALMERSS VIEW AGAINST A DARWINIAN FRAMEWORK Review of Literature

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That a Psyche evolved via natural selection is an obvious necessity for many, but this view is not unanimous; some see it as highly debatable. Furthermore, to develop the test case suggested above, this contrary view must be seen as a real possibility and explored as such. Despite the huge range of diverse opinion, I think it is fair to say there is now something of a . . . mainstream view . . . as [consciousness] being conditioned by the evolution of neurological behavior control systems in co-evolutionary development with more capable sensory systems. Consciousness thus emerged as a product of increasing biological complexity, and from non-conscious precursors. (Seager 2007, p. 11) David Chalmers (1996), in The Conscious Mind, is well known for naming a Hard Problem in the study of Psyche, commonly taken from Descartess early work, Meditations, as separation of body and mind, those terms having interrelated functional roles, but where mind has no specific physical identity and body has a specific physical form. This supposed separation of a material world from a nonmaterial world, for Chalmers, presents an irreducible problem a logical gap, unbridgeable by scientific thought. But buried in this simple framing is a larger question, easy to overlook: Do we, in fact, claim that the thing we examine has dual traits, or is our manner of examining the thing, itself, in fact, dualistic? This larger informational riddle of signal vs. signal interpretation is returned to at the papers end, but for now the most common view of dualism is taken as meaning that the thing itself has dual attributes (Robinson 2011). Chalmers, in making this argument for a Hard Problem, summarily dismisses natural selection as having any role in the development of consciousness (or Psyche). He states: The process of natural selection cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin. Evolution selects properties according to their functional role, and my zombie twin performs all functions I perform just as well, (emphasis added, Chalmers 1996, pp. 120-21). A zombie is defined earlier as physically identical to me . . . molecule for molecule . . . but lacking conscious experiences altogether . . . all is dark inside . . . empirically impossible (ibid., pp. 94, 96). Chalmers offers this essentially functionalist notion of Psyche in setting up a non-Darwinian view he later expands throughout his book. Yet, surprisingly, these are his only express comments on natural selection, which he supports with no further explanation or outside references. He uses this zombie argument alone, and proceeds from there. This cursory view of Psyche vis--vis natural selection seems odd if Chalmers hopes to treat Psyche using established scientific thought. But Chalmers is not alone in using zombie-like devices to portray problems of Psyche (Kirk 2012, Deacon 2011), so this zombie view is, at times, a useful tool. Yet Chalmerss use of zombies here to rebut natural selection is rather singular in the literature.

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A survey of Chalmerss other work, while not offering further comment on natural selection, continues in this non-Darwinian vein. In Strong and Weak Emergence, Chalmers (2006) argues that strong emergence of high-level truths like consciousness are not conceptually or metaphysically necessitated or deducible by low-level truths like survival (ibid., p. 244ff). This negating tone contra evolution (e.g., the rule of survival) builds over the course of his essay. Further, Chalmerss non-deducible claim for consciousness conflicts with Seagers deduced evolving-emergence noted above as something of a . . . mainstream view. Lastly, Chalmers supports his claim for a strongly emergent (the non-physical arrival of) Psyche by again pointing to his zombie argument: I have argued this position at length elsewhere (ibid., p. 246, therein indicating Chalmers 1996). Later, Chalmers (2010, p. 103) begins Consciousness and Its Place in Nature with the following: Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature (emphasis added). Here, Chalmerss argument continues to emphasize a dual view, but he now echoes the motif of this papers test case, with emphasis on challenging our notions of Natural Law. His admittedly well-reasoned mistrust of the current science of Psyche (Koch 2012), or even of Natural Law, ultimately drives his call for new psychophysical laws, a regular feature of his work (Chalmers 1996, 2006, 2010). These argued-for laws are posed as an alternative to evolution, natural selection, etc. But they are never developed, only alluded to as needed to solve persistent questions about Psyche.3 There is something extremely puzzling about the claim that consciousness plays no evolutionary role, because it is obvious that consciousness plays a large number of such roles. (Searle 1998, p. 63) CHALMERSS FRAMING Discussion of Literature One can hardly fault Chalmerss desire to challenge and improve our scientific grasp of Natural Law, which seems his ultimate goal. Yet he never offers a real framework toward this end. Rather, he denotes a problem in myriad ways which I reduce to Psyche and a Hard Problem and then leaves the intellectual heavy-lifting (formulating a useful framework) to others. What Chalmers does offer is, in the end, a bare label, psychophysical laws, with a little flesh thrown over a few bare bones.
3 Koch (2012, p. 124) calls this view a crude type of information theory.

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How, then, do we relate this to natural selection in the attempt to frame questions around Psyche? Plainly, Chalmerss position is that we cannot. To justify this evolutionary exclusion his sole evidence is a zombie, a fictional device found in Chalmerss only express comment on natural selection. So, if we are to accept that evolutionary theory cannot help in framing problems of Psyche, it seems we must first accept a logical superiority of fictional devices over scientific theory. This is a rather odd gambit, when one is presumably interested in using scientific reason. propos of Chalmerss use of zombies, Frigg and Hartmann (2006, p. 11) have noted: The drawback . . . is that fictional entities are notoriously beset with ontological riddles. This has led many philosophers to argue that [such devices] . . . must be renounced. And yet other problems arise in using zombie-like devices, noted elsewhere in the literature (Kirk 2012). Specifically, Terrence Deacon (2011, pp. 40, 45) states that the use of homuncular representations, which Deacon equates to zombies, can be an invitation for misleading shortcuts of explanation . . . although [the map] is similar in structure to what it represents it is not intrinsically meaningful . . . the correspondence . . . tells us nothing about how it is interpreted . . . . Appealing to an agency that is just beyond detection to explain why something happened is an intellectual dead end in science. It locates cause or responsibility without analyzing it. Regardless, Chalmerss argument is a thought experiment, which must use fictional devices and may still prove useful. The problem is that his particular zombie device is imprecisely drawn. As an example, Chalmers defines his zombie as lacking conscious experiences altogether . . . all is dark inside, while also claiming this zombie twin performs all functions I perform just as well. Does Chalmers then envision his zombie twin in a functional role writing a piece on consciousness just as well as he? And with what for content? Its empty inside. Such complex functionality cannot be explained absent any experiential or informational content. Further, in the whole of Chalmerss (1996) volume, he never defines consciousness. The closest he comes is this: What is central to consciousness, at least in the most interesting sense, is experience. But this is not a definition. At best, it is a clarification . . . to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions is fruitless (ibid., p. 4). So, when he deprives his zombie twin of consciousness, its denied what, exactly? If this zombie has no functioning sensorium for experience, how then does it exist, eat, walk, or talk? Again, even simple selfregulation cannot be explained absent any ontologic, epistemic, or operative framing. Since Chalmers, in fact, never defines consciousness, so too he never defines his zombie in any delineated way that allows for a clarifying argument. He can make whatever zombie claim he wishes with impunity. It is an argument impossible to refute, simply because it has neither

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bounds nor logic. Later, he even uses the phrase has the consciousness of a zombie (ibid., p. 254). So a firm sense of what this zombie is, conscious or otherwise, seems absent. Finally, the lack of even a working definition for consciousness deprives us of the practical taxonomy needed for a formal study of Psyche, taxonomic naming being prerequisite to all scientific or formalized endeavors (Ford 2007, p. 91). Some even think a precise naming of Psyche is logically impossible (Greenfield 2009, Koch 2012). But if no formal name for Psyche is likely, there seems little hope of studying that which we cannot even name. Ascribing such unnamable traits to Psyche is oddly reminiscent of our mystical pre-scientific era; moreover, it hinders the honest appraisal of possible flaws in ones framing of the core matter. Chalmerss use of zombies, as Frigg and Hartmann suggest, only offers us impossible riddles. His zombie twin begins to sound more like a conjurers ploy of misdirection, rather than a genuine effort at clarification. This intellectual sleight-of-hand diverts us from that which is right before our eyes natural selections likely relevance in framing questions of Psyche. Chalmers and others argue for zombies as logically possible (Kirk 2012), as with any good science-fiction device. Such plausibility indeed enhances any concepts believability and its entertainment value. Yet zombies are not even remotely logically verifiable, or comparable, as scientific modeling demands, especially in the way Chalmers invokes zombies here. Another problem arises in Chalmerss (2006) comments on emergence. While Chalmerss zombie trope is clearly imaginative, his imagination runs weak when it comes to deducing consciousness. If Seagers evolving-emergence noted above indeed suggests a mainstream view for Psyche, how does Chalmers miss this? Deduction is a highly varied skill, driven by three relative factors: available base data, the range of data one allows, and skill in recombining that allowed data. Thus, one might fault Chalmers for weak imagination or for being poorly informed in failing to find consciousness deducible. But his insistence on treating consciousness as strongly emergent seems more about fortifying his earlier stated position. Finally, Chalmers never offers an alternative framework to natural selection. It is this complete absence of a workable framing for Psyche that, in fact, makes his Hard Problem hard. Chalmers denies us natural selection as a likely scientific tool, and then provides no substitute beyond his empty psychophysical laws. Yes, this is indeed a hard problem. His zombie trope abruptly plants us within a fictional terra incognita, an informationally spare state defined only by the authors allowances. Its unclear how even Chalmers hopes to advance his own psychophysical laws in a serially coherent manner. Still, to be quite clear, none of the foregoing denies any specific factor(s) Chalmers names in defining a Hard Problem in studying Psyche, however we may label these factors. This critique

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suggests only that natural selection remains available to us, as tested against Chalmerss zombie argument, for framing possible solutions to questions about Psyche and, by extension, for addressing Chalmerss Hard Problem. Thus, the present test case of natural selections relevance for developing possible models of Psyche remains open, but as yet unfulfilled. ALTERNATIVE FRAMING Three Functionalist Accounts Supporting Natural Selection The essence of man is his paradoxical nature, the fact that he is half animal and half symbolic. (Becker 1973, p. 26) At the heart of Chalmerss Hard Problem is a paradox a base duality in the nature of material things. This duality is seen by Socrates, Plato, and Descartes, and carries well into the modern era.4 Chalmers (1996) clearly senses this duality: I even argue for a form of [naturalistic] dualism, (ibid., p. xiv). Yet, well-reasoned alternatives to this long-lived dualist sense of Psyche, such as an otherwise unified material-duality, seem rather hard to capture. Ad rem of this unified material-duality, Chalmers notes: It is widely agreed [that nonphysical] consciousness [derives from] the physical in some sense; the real question is how tight the connection is. Discussions that ignore these issues avoid the hardest questions about consciousness (emphasis added, ibid., p. xvii). So, to rebut Chalmerss dualist Hard Problem, the proposed framework must cogently unify this duality while answering a parallel question on connection. To begin postulating this unified material-duality, the two topics of a dualist Hard Problem and the question on connection are explored below via three examples. Example One: A Computer Hard Drive Mechanical View To reframe this dualist Hard Problem as a unified material-duality, consider the simple example of a computer hard drive. In a materially reductive way, computer neurology may tell us everything possible about electron exchanges, circuits, and mechanics of a hard drive, down to minutely inscribed bits on an iron-oxide disk. But regardless of how minute this physical examination may be, any abstract information held therein is never revealed. Yet ironically, storage and retrieval of such information are, in fact, a hard drives main functions (Figure A). So to paraphrase Chalmerss zombie twin, in this nave reductive materialist example all hard drives are physically identical, molecule for molecule, but lacking [informational] experiences altogether. Yet unlike Chalmerss zombie, we have practical knowledge for these devices. Still,

4 Duality as used herein refers to two facets for one object with distinct-yet-related traits. Socrates spoke of visible (oraton) and invisible (noeton) worlds. Plato spoke of idealized Forms as the archetypal root for all imperfect material forms (e.g., a human soul, which he called Psyche, existing apart from its body).

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at what precise moment do we say, Hey! Theres information on this thing!? When does a certain abstract informational function (quasi-consciousness?) arise within a given hard drive?
Figure A: Cutaway view showing standard hard drive components, including nonmaterial data bits (upper right).

All hard drives are materially identical. But without some nonmaterial framing (metadata, bitmap, data about content5) for how Individual Bits are physically organized (logically ordered) as information on the drives platter, all is dark inside. Its effectively a zombie. Some nonmaterial informational schema is needed to convey the natural material order of Bits as functional information (Table 1). Without metadata, any informational traits a hard drive might exhibit would seem quite mysterious. Even a skilled technician searching a hard drive for missing files would find the presence of any useful information, without metadata, unlikely.
Binary (base 2, 8-bit bytes) 00000000 00000001 00100011 11000010 Octal (base 8) 000 001 015 034 Decim al (base 10) 0 1 13 28 Hexadeci mal (base 16) 0 1 D 1C HTM L Cod e n/a n/a n/a n/a ASCII Control/Characte r NUL (null) SOH (start of heading) CR (carriage return) FS (file separator)

5 Taxonomically, metacontent is more accurate than metadata, but metacontent is a little-used term.

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11111111 > 1 byte > 1 byte > 1 byte

071 100 101 172

57 64 65 122

39 40 41 7A

&#5 7; &#6 4; &#6 5; &#1 22;

9 (number nine) @ (at sign) A (capital letter a) z (lower case letter z)

Table 1: Sample schema of how ASCII codes transcribe low-order binary data (left; see Figure A, Individual Bits) to high-order functional information (right: Control/Character). Here, schema is the tabular form used to present ordered data, and the content held within are metadata (re duality). Each column captures a distinct logical order, which, when related to neighboring logical orders (re unity), via the table, serves as functional information. Lastly, note how hexadecimal data, using mixed complex terms (16 unique characters), more concisely represent ASCII Controls and Characters than do binary data with their comparatively simple dual terms (2 unique terms).

So for computer hard drives, metadata, in fact, bridge these perceived material and nonmaterial worlds (re the Hard Problem), by mapping individual Bits as functional information. With no universalized schema to map the natural material order of things, as with any formalized Natural Law, the drives minute iron-oxide Bits would remain a scatter of chaotic blips. A Hard Problem (logical gap) would exist in explaining any informational content. This ordered relating of material and nonmaterial aspects, via metadata, is so well known and exploited within the computer industry that hard drive capacity doubles every one or two years, even faster than the processor advances typified by Moores Law (Farrance 2006, Hitachi GST 2006). A hard drives underlying notional sense of Information as schematized chaos (reduced disorder/uncertainty) first arose in Immanuel Kants (2007) Critique of Pure Reason, but also shows up in the later work of others (Heidegger & Krell 1991, Shannon 1948, Bateson 1972, pp. 16, 43, SIL 1999). To expand on this basic informational sense as relative disorder, within information theory simple data structures seem orderly and easy to identify (1010011: binary, two unique characters, low entropy). Complex data structures seem chaotic and hard to decipher, while also holding more information (1D3C49AB: hexadecimal, sixteen unique characters, high entropy, informationally dense). Others believe that, as a rule, something will be assessed as being more orderly if it reflects more constraint [in its expressive range] (Deacon 2011, p. 123). For all hard drives, then, and for information in general, the more precisely metadata reflect an objects true material order, in an abstract and derivative way (re connection), the more functional the metadata become. The objects chaos (data) is mapped, making it operatively coherent as functional information. Thus, the whole object seemingly affords ever-more functional roles, as object and metadata become tightly bound (informationally) in a materialnonmaterial aspect.

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The role of metadata in mapping a de facto unified material-duality (a resolved materialnonmaterial paradox, with form and content) is clear for hard drives. Metadata are central to modeling any object in a functionally recurrent (scientifically repeatable) manner. Even DNAs bio-informatic form illustrates a de facto unified material-duality, although a complete map of DNAs functionality remains elusive. And in mathematics, type theory names a role for metadata in resolving paradox, as data of a different logical order. Metadatas placement external to data sets from which they are constructed, a qualitative difference in informational type (information hierarchy), naturally transcends issues of recursion and paradox innate to the underlying data. Still, this hard drive cum metadata model, with in situ pieces of end-directed technology (by and for human design), is not elemental enough for modeling Psyche. Mechanically, the example is too simplistic to compass Psyches broad functionality. Somehow, a core design (base character) for this unifying material-nonmaterial interrelating must be made explicit before Chalmerss real question [of] how tight the connection is for Psyche can be wholly addressed. Despite obvious problems in likening Psyche to a hard drive, one thing is plain: a unified material-duality is neither odd nor foreign to information technology. Computers routinely capture a representational essence for a wide range of phenomenal events as audio, video, etc., encoding experiences within material substrates and then restoring this recorded essence as phenomenal playback that we qualitatively and quantitatively assess as having low-fidelity, highfidelity, etc. A truer Hard Problem thus lies just beyond Chalmerss now-bridged dualist view to name a metadata equivalent, an informational essence, for Psyche. Abiding by evidence from the hard drive example, this improbable task seems well-suited to information theory. Information seems to have become a key concept to unlock several philosophical problems. . . . The problem is that we still have to agree about what information is exactly. (Floridi 2011, p. 41) At this point, affiliating the hard disk example with the original topic of natural selection requires too grand a leap in reasoning. Still, two basic connections are possible here. First is the selective value computer users give to more data storage in smaller and lighter spaces (increased capacity). Second is DNAs informational design, which has an accepted role in the natural selection of species. Innate to DNAs design is that some information strategies (its complex recombinant structure) hold a selective advantage over other strategies. The naturally selective survival utility innate to a range of diverse informational strategies is this papers main cause. Baseline: A Functionalist Re-Vision of Information Roots of General Information Theory

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. . . information theory of consciousness could be completely wrong. But it challenges us to think deeply about the [dualist] mind-body problem in a novel, rigorous, and mathematically and empirically minded manner. (Koch 2009) I believe that information theory, properly formulated and refined, is capable of such an enormous feat, analyzing the neuronal wiring diagram of any living creature and predicting the form of consciousness that that organism will experience. It can draw up blueprints for the design of conscious artifacts. And, surprisingly, it provides a grandiose view of the evolution of consciousness in the universe. These are bold, ambitious, and bombastic claims. Bear with me as I justify them. (Koch 2012, p. 115) A sense that information theory might apply in modeling Psyche has grown recently, as seen in these contrasting comments from Cal Tech researcher Christof Koch, written three years apart. But what does this interest in information theory mean? How does information theory relate to Psyche, metadata, and a de facto unified material-duality? Kochs (ibid.) recent book notes many advances in neurology, while also reflecting on basic deficits in neurologic approaches to questions of Psyche. After more than two decades of work, while not wholly abandoning neurology, Koch throws in the towel on defining Psyche vis-vis neurological views, observing that it is subject to different laws [embracing dualism]. I see no way for the divide between unconscious and conscious creatures to be bridged by more neurons(ibid., p. 119). He then points to Giulio Tononis Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a more tenable approach. Tononis IIT focuses on the implicit differentiation and integration of a systems disparate parts, e.g., neural networks. In brief, the more massively integrated and differentiated the system is, the more conscious it is. Yet algorithmic computation of such massive, systemic consciousness, per Koch is fiendishly difficult (ibid., p. 128). Among various information theory approaches to Psyche, IIT is only one of three recent efforts. Terrence Deacons (2011) common dynamical logic (CDL) uses thermodynamic law to offer the most ambitious of the three approaches naming a spontaneous dynamic order for all matter, including the emergence of Life and Psyche. The third is General Information Theorys (GIT) minimalism. A reductive view that posits an information baseline for all logic operations, it proposes elemental metadata for modeling Psyche, much as Bits serve for a hard drive. All three methods have different foci, but they also complement each other in various ways. To expand on this informational perspective, I now examine GITs information baseline, while also offering brief contrasts with IIT and CDL.

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The thoughtful study of information, from any perspective, begins by accepting a wide range of roles for this one basic term. Our usage of information runs a gamut from mathematics to system studies, biology, language, and well beyond. But, despite this diverse usage a General Definition of Information as an operational standard (Floridi 2011) is often seen as: data + meaning = information. So, to realize any type of information theory for Psyche, we must first see just how information is being modeled, which also means understanding how data and meaning are employed therein. First, here is some needed perspective: GITs information baseline strives to name core design elements innate to all phenomenal events6 as a type of a priori data (Baseline Data). The logic of naming Baseline Data for all phenomenal events is to allow a likely mapping of Psyches reciprocal phenomenal functionality (re Psyche vis--vis natural selection) again, as Bits serve for a hard drive. In short, GIT asks, Does Mind mirror Matter? (or vice versa) in a practical, unified functional manner. To this end, while a General Definition of Information uses the term data in ways similar to GIT, its further use of meaning is problematic in modeling Psyche. Meaning can arise only after some value, function, or role (a posteriori) is found for a priori data. Meaning first requires some processing of data that necessarily relies upon an in situ Psyche to perform the work that ascribes meaning. Meaning is thus a type of information (output of Psyche), needed in advance of defining information, which makes the General Definition of Information recursive. This one logical conundrum is the reason why many formal institutions discourage the regular study of Psyche, because Psyche and information, as we now see them, have recurrent internal and external aspects. This means that a General Definition of Information, while perhaps useful elsewhere, is not viable for modeling Psyche, since it: already embodies elements of Psyche; holds no clear separation between meaning and information; and falls prey to Deacons (2011, ch. 2; see above) recursive Homuncular Problem. An alternate framing for information is therefore needed before a well-reasoned information theory of Psyche is possible. CDL supports a similar view, using a rather extensive analysis. Developing this alternative informational framework, a Baseline Definition of Information (per GIT) begins with the initial paradox a common statement of the basic issue. The earlier paradox is now reframed as a base data duality in the nature of material things. This primitive assertion implies, in a most reductive a priori manner, that all matter directly embodies two types of low-order data. This simple statement permits five things:

6 Phenomenal event: any energy-matter exchange occurring within the common space-time continuum.

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1) it directly links matter to data, thereby allowing discussion on two types of data rather than material and nonmaterial worlds alone; 2) this matter-data link, in turn, opens a reductive analytic track as the functional logic innate to all data (and/or matter); 3) next, following from the original material/nonmaterial framing, all material things, as one type of data, have a distinct (direct) logical order; 4) and, as proxy for what appears nonmaterial, all abstract things, in a materiallyderivative way (re connection), have a related (indirect) logical order; 5) last, there is the supposition that practical links between these logical orders exist. In this distinct-yet-related (material-nonmaterial) framing, metadata would map all material and nonmaterial things as one general informational type (e.g., Table 1). And if, in fact, no a priori distinct-yet-related order exists, the attempt to name such metadata would fail (testability). What then remains is to define a vernacular (core structure, phenomenal essence) for Baseline Data. As an example of a distinct-yet-related framing for a hard drive, binary code has two distinct terms, 1 and 0 (Table 1). As a practical matter these two terms can appear alone (1, 0), in a field of like terms (111 . . . , 000 . . . ), or as mixed terms (11000101. . . ). But only by using mixed terms is a reference to, or construction of, data and information possible (re ontology), caused by relating (contrasting) the distinctness (differences) of the two terms. This implies two universal properties for Baseline Data (proto-information, Data), specified thus: distinct + related = proto-information (Data absent any attributed meaning); same + related information or Data: disorder or uncertainty (entropy) in terms; distinct + not-related information/Data: disorder, or uncertainty in terms, and last; distinct + related = proto-information, where reads increasing, with 0 < < . - Alternatively, the third bullet may indicate a perceptual/evolutionary terminus in the evaluating entity, if not-related is sensed when, in fact, relatedness exists. As an example, not to make a functional (related) link between a sense-state of freezing to death and a subjective-objective circumstance of fording a chest-deep river with floating ice is likely fatal. Sentience (content)7 thus provides targeted (survival-directed) functionality for diverse circumstances (form) this parallels metadatas use of data (content) and schema (form), to define practical functions. - Further, the last bullet denotes differences in simple vs. complex data (binary vs. hexadecimal code, Table 1), and/or like vs. unlike data. This simple vs. complex framing echoes IITs notion of the more integrated [related] and differentiated [ distinct] the system is, the more conscious [information] it is.
7 Content arises when an entity sensately engages with a phenomenal event or some other base referent.

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The reductive analysis of What exactly allows information to be information? begins to separate the three views. IIT uses a classic view with reduction of uncertainty as its basis in defining information (per Shannon 1948, p. 1), where tellingly semantic [or content] aspects of communication are [seen as] irrelevant to the [specific] engineering problem [of form]. Shannon calls this view a communication theory, not a theory of information. IIT thus focuses on an informational form (integrated and differentiated), while largely ignoring what the contents may be or be about; moreover, its reduction of disorder makes it a subtractive view.8 Inversely, CDL and GIT are additive, where any event affecting or indicating the state of a dynamic system (note 6) might serve as Data, a view that innately emphasizes functional content (re symbolic referents). While IIT is neutral on content, CDL and GIT argue Datas first trait is that a thing must have some referential aspect to even appear as Data.9 The referent, perforce, then bestows those Data (content) with an inherent form or forms (there may be many, Table 1). CDL and GIT employ Batesons (1972) informational notion of a difference which makes a difference, where compounding differences and likenesses furnish an innately additive model. CDL and GIT thus address content and form, where IIT considers only form. Therefore, IIT can say little about Psyches origins or contents only making linkages between form and various types of Psyche, while necessarily silent on the Hard Problem, subjectivity, and unique personal identity. As a contrast, Table 1 uses form (schema), and content (ordered data), with that content ranging from simple to complex (various types/forms), to denote a hard drives basic functional character. Despite their diverse formal origins, in the end all three models converge upon geometric differentiation and integration as a central form, which has both subtractive and additive facets, although the manner in which each model accomplishes this geometric form varies greatly. Complex problems (Data) often first seem paradoxical. In facing a paradox we may suffer its hardness and live in perplexity, or we may see it in a thoughtful manner, as a solvable puzzle. For the present paradox, the terms Parameter and Relatability are used as a priori Data for two facet types of one distinct-yet-related logical order (re type theory). Parameter and Relatability thus serve as universal solvent for reducing (informationally parsing) all phenomenal events. They define a proto-content, that Psyche may act upon in adaptively creating its own realized content (e.g., selectable survival = meaning, survival as the ultimate functionality). Here, Parameter is distinct and Relatability is related, with the following specific characteristics:

8 Creative endeavors are often seen as subtractive or additive in nature (e.g., sculpture or painting and assemblage), or as having negative spaces and positive spaces. 9 A fact easy to overlook, since humanity generally sees all things as having some referential aspect.

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Parameter denotes the most basic physical properties of an object. It is a priori data of an abstract type, exclusive of environment, external meaning, context, or function. It names the objects immediate material aspect in a most reductive, isolated, physical state. For the hard drive example, Parameter denotes the specific material of one Bit, a group of iron-oxide molecules with a charge that might be construed as a Bit. Yet these molecules are not a Bit, since Bit implies a meaning or function not yet present. This thing thus exists as a yet unnamed, abstract, isolated object of distinct finite dimensions (Parameter) alone. Its solus deprives Parameter of logical order (as one Bit has no logical order), and makes the term purely descriptive (epistemic). Parameter arises as part of the natural material and energetic dissolution we see as decay, death, and thermodynamic entropy. In the human intellectual lineage, Parameter appears as an analytically divisive impulse, the endless phenomenal reduction of The All to its smallest constituents. Once an abstract smallest particle is materially realized, we visualize an even smaller particle. It evinces as the science that gives us the Large Hadron Collider, and CERNs present search for ever smaller elementary particles an endless smashing of atoms, protons, and neutrons; a reductive material lineage of distinct (archetypal) destructive tenor (Table 3).

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Table 3: The Standard Model (metadata) in physics successfully explains the cosmos, in that it never gives a faulty prediction and maps specific elementary (sub-atomic) particles (PBS 2010). But important here are items marked no under Observed?: the graviton, and the Higgs boson. CERNs present focus on a Higgs boson aims to better model mass (i.e., mass: electron = .51, top quark = 174,000, why such a large mass difference, given an identical size?). But the Standard Model may change if Super String Theory proves correct in positing a cosmos instead made entirely of even smaller vibrating fundamental strings, oscillating at diverse frequencies to manifest all material differences (particles) in the cosmos. Furthermore, dark energy and dark matter, 96% of the known cosmos, are entirely omitted from this table, suggesting yet other likely expansions and/or revisions to the Standard Model.

Relatability is the latent material potential innate to Parameters capacity for interaction, lying inert until two or more Parameters actually meet. Relatability has no immediate material aspect but exists only as a dynamic referential index (re connection, ontology, Figure B) for two or more Parameters. Relatability denotes Parameters innate latency as a priori data of empirical potency. Relatable encounters between multiple Parameters (diverse and alike) bring about all causally organized events and processes, codifying the cosmos in a universal qualitative fit or no fit (Table 3) the logic innate to all matter/data; a purely generative (ontological) habit. Relatability affords Parameter an ab initio geometry that creates the cosmos from a few physical constants: a fine-tuned Universe, or anthropic principle (Table 3). Any shift in any

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given Parameter (altering its Relatability) marks the border between cosmic existence and void. For the hard drive example, Relatability enables some order (any order!) to exist amongst iron-oxide molecules; those likely Bits still not known as Bits. These unnamed Parametric things now move from abstract isolation to an expansive environmental potency an environment from which functional Bits may at last arise, at some far-distant (furtherordered) point. As a human impulse, Relatability arises hopefully as commercial enterprise: the functional production, selling, and consumption of parsed-and-reformed bits of The All. It is a ceaseless cycling of matter, energy, and data, the stuff of Life. It evinces as the technology we use to brush our teeth and hair, to shop in markets, to make a phone call or a spreadsheet. It enfolds almost everything we assume as constituting modern reality any phenomenal event not already extant on bare Earth. Relatability affords humanity its creative lineage and has a distinct (archetypal) constructive tenor an endless adaptive quest to innovate, produce, and reproduce.
Figure B: Practical and Scientific (systematic biology) views of four distinct-yet-related Parametric objects (metal fasteners: rivet, nail, etc. family: individuals), each with an established material potential (Relatable meaning, known functionality). Relatability is what exists (latency) before a meaning or function is referentially linked to a Parametric object. Missing in this illustration is the presence of a complementary Parametric object to illustrate each objects function. Each object, in turn, has its own innate material latency that can scalably contribute to more complex Parametric objects in a distinct-yet-related manner (e.g., bolt: used in trucks, ships, airplanes, etc.). These secondary objects (trucks, ships, etc.), again, have their own distinct-yet-related order (transportation: by land, sea, and air). Importantly, a bolt can be also used in an ad hoc manner (door stop, fishing sinker, etc.), in addition to its more formal roles. The images at right show two possible phylogenetic trees for classifying the informational characteristics of these objects: phenetic (similarity), and cladistic (derived, simple complex) (Meyer 2009).

Rivet Nail Bolt Screw

Rivet

Nail Screw Bolt

The above use of Parameter and Relatability facilitates expanding the earlier General Definition of Information to something more appropriate for modeling Psyche. First, the word data is now re-defined as:

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Parameter + Relatability = Baseline Data (Data, proto-information, proto-content). Next, this re-defined Data is placed in the original General Definition of Information: (Parameter + Relatability) + meaning = information. An operator is changed to reflect multiple facets (forms) of any Parameter + Relatability pairing: (Parameter + Relatability) meaning = Information. Then, Psyche is made explicit (via survival) in the selective creation of some functional meaning, and/or the appearance of useful Information: (Parameter + Relatability) Psyche = Information. Finally, the equation is shown alongside the definitions of: metadata, the General Definition of Information, and IITs calculated value of Phi or (Tononi 2008, p. 1): content + form = metadata, data + meaning = information, Data Psyche = Information , or (Parameter + Relatability) Psyche = Information , where quantifies how much information is generated (uncertainty is reduced) when a system enters a particular state through causal interactions among its elements. IITs account of information generated is already disputed (sidebar above), as it defines information by form and not by content. Thus, is more likely a useful measure of an entitys informational capacity. This doesnt invalidate as a measure of form, but narrows its claimed computational scope. As an example of s likely limitations, we can accept that all humans have similar brain forms, while also accepting that the content of these brains varies wildly. Yet seems to argue for correlations in ones knowledge and synaptic structures, as measured against other more-and-less informed entities. But the cultural bias innate to such (IQ) tests is already known. One wonders how such bias is transcended by when comparing humans to each other or to other species. Again, how content is defined here becomes the main issue. Further, argues that uncertainty reduced generates information. Yet Shannon (1948, p. 1) presupposes an already existing content (message), since the fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point . . . a message selected at another point (emphasis added). IIT distorts Shannons view by suggesting that content already exists within Psyche (as with Shannons content message). But then does reduced uncertainty somehow cause even more content to arise? IIT seems unclear on what content is, or when and how, exactly, content comes into existence. Shannon focuses on improved content transmission, not on content generation.10 Or, perhaps IIT means to suggest that to access humanitys preexisting informational content (soul?) we need only reduce our confusion (uncertainty) about the matter until, at some point, bing, we have complete knowledge (a completed message per
10 Shannon uses information in a very narrow sense (preceding sidebar), which has been inadvisedly enlarged over the decades (Floridi 2011).

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Shannon). While perhaps possible (a claimed benefit of some meditative traditions), this isnt how many of us experience information generation it seems more likely to be a laboriously incremental additive process, with a few subtractive elements. Developing a Baseline Definition of Information (re-visioned General Definition of Information) promotes five things: A robust common sense view of Information, as diverse Psyches often have diverse experiential content (i.e., necessarily individuated) for identical phenomenal events; A broad matching of phenomenal events (as Parameter and Relatability) against the likely adaptive operations of Psyche (re natural selection, Does Mind mirror Matter?); Indexable facets (Parameter and Relatability) to use in measuring and formulating a metadata equivalent for Psyche; A glimpse into the formative constituents (Parameter and Relatability) of practical human creativity (re evolution, invention); and A formalized definition for Psyche, which neither Chalmers, IIT, nor CDL offer, is given as an operating schema for engaging in spontaneous energy-matter exchanges (phenomenal events) upon the evolutionary landscape (space-time continuum). Worth noting here is Chalmerss (1996, pp. 145-144) indirect assent to such a framework for Psyche: It is perhaps worth mentioning separately [a model where] phenomenal [or Relational] properties are identified with the intrinsic properties of physical entities [or Parameters] . . . I have some sympathy with it myself. I have included this as a version of type C . . . [type C being one] of three main classes of views of conscious experience. The next two examples build on the earlier hard drive example (mechanical view), to expand on the practical functionality of this distinct-yet-related informational framing. Example Two: A Natural Adaptive Means Behavioral View A second example of this de facto unified material-duality (distinct-yet-related framing) is as behavior. Any organism capable of Parametrically witnessing tab A fits neatly into slot B might satisfy some functional need in this A-B Parameter Relatability. This interrelating of objects by a functioning sensorium allows unique subjective states to arise for the organism, tied to that organisms specific objective circumstance. This uniquely personal, objective state is rather like the unique data sets that arise on diverse hard drives. To state this as a parallel driveorganism model: each hard drive (organism) has its distinct content (personal experience) driven by its specific context or task, while also sharing a related material form (physiognomy) and information processes (Psyche), along with all other hard drives (similar organisms).

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One can imagine how, in the hands of early humans, a Parametric Rock must physically and Psychically be made Relatable as a missile, hand ax, nutcracker, hammer, hide scraper, etc. And a Parametric Stick must be made Relatable as a back scratcher, fruit whacker, club, boomerang, fish spear, etc. Individuals not seeing a dexterous behavioral (Relatable) function for their environments available Parametric objects are seriously disadvantaged. They collect less fruit, prey, grubs, etc. and, in a naturally selective manner, reproduce at lower rates. But those who make this happy association find evermore Parameter and Relatability invention rewarded. Example Three: Design Criteria Conceptual View Deacons (2006, 2011) work suggests that any objects shape gives that object inherent logic, shape mediated biases or order for free, so-to-speak, as with a round peg fitting best into a round hole. Apart, neither peg nor hole has any function (Relatability), just objective Parameters. Theyre merely potentially Relatable objects. Its only in a practical Relating of peg and hole to each other, or to other likely objects, that a functional role might be revealed. This quality of Relatability encompasses practical matters of fit and fit-ness, such as the fit between peg and hole or tab A and slot B being tight, snug, or even very loose, where each fit supports different likely functional roles. Here, the practical fit-ness of each mechanical, aesthetic, and/or functional fit is subject to the niche dynamics of natural selection. This means qualitative (subjective?) fit objective fit-ness natural select-ability (survivability). To expand on this innately tiered fit fit-ness survivability unfolding (re meaning), ensuing secondary Parametric features (Parameter born as Relatability of a now) fixed peg and hole object can, in turn, qualitatively fit with other fixed objects, in an endlessly scalable manner, for ever-more complex functionality (Figure B).
Figure C: Figurative view of Parameter (top) and Relatability (bottom). One drop (Parameter is inert, having ) minimal dimensions. Two drops (Poly-Parameter) interact, producing multiple interference patterns (Relatability). While Parameter is stable, Relatability is ephemeral, changing one Poly-Parameter event to the next. Later, Relatability serves as a next higher-order Parameter (i.e., Parameter is born as Relatability). Figure-ground reversals (Figure D) occur in each successive order of Parameter and Relatability, a naturally compounding paradox. CDL is based entirely on the naturally tiered reversing dynamism innate to such interactions.

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Finally, elements from each of the foregoing examples (mechanical, behavioral, conceptual) can be placed in a modern context. An engineer might ponder (behavioral) a range of Relatable Parameters in which he/she is educated (conceptual), with certain product goals (mechanical) in mind. Eventually, his/her product must objectively Relate to, or satisfy, certain functional needs of others, and if not, that product and engineer will fail in the marketplace (niche fit-ness). An engineer demonstrating a niche superiority, by subjectively acting upon the available Relatable Parameters, will likely receive career advances, which may contribute to enhanced lifestyle options and a possible increase in offspring.
Figure D: Example of figure-ground reversals: simple (left); recurrent and complex (right and below, M. C. Escher, Moebius Birds, Sky and Water I). Such imagery is typical to Gestalt psychology and Eastern philosophy, portraying a paradoxic-reciprocal characteristic of distinct-yet-related logical orders. Although lacking formal training in math or science, Escher was well known by mathematicians, scientists, and crystallographers for his intuitive skill in transforming geometric shape into a workable and adapting scheme (JOC/EFR 2000). Here, each example illustrates distinct-yet-related forms. While superficially dualistic, three distinct elements are plainly evident (Black + White + Boundary, or ParameterB + ParameterW + RelatabilityB-W). CDL labors over the natural dynamics of these inverting boundary states to formulate its basis for a model.

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These three examples speak to the accepted general classes of functionalism: machine functionalism, psycho-functionalism, and analytic functionalism. Functionalisms central claim is that Psyches traits can be realized in a variety of material forms (multiple realizability, possible in many system types), and what makes something a mental [or phenomenal] state of a particular type does not depend on its [material] constitution, but rather on the way it functions . . . in the system of which it is a part (Levin 2010). While nothing presented here satisfies this

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immediate functionalist goal, a distinct-yet-related framing (de facto unified material-duality), as presented herein, makes the realization of this lofty goal possible. SUMMARY Here is a brief review of what this paper has covered: 1) It argues that an historic problem exists in framing questions of Psyche that is best approached using established scientific thought, specifically natural selection. 2) It probes Chalmerss Hard Problem argument against such a role for natural selection in modeling Psyche. 3) Next, the Hard Problems innate material-nonmaterial dualism is recast as an informational view, using a computer hard drive to illustrate a unified material-duality (distinct-yet-related logical order). 4) This informational view is then expanded in terms of a hard drives metadata that have both form and content, arguing that content necessarily precedes and defines form. 5) Notional differences of content vs. form are expanded by discussing modern views of information and how these differences are addressed by three recent information theory approaches to Psyche (IIT, CDL, and GIT). 6) The terms Parameter and Relatability are then introduced to expand on content and to further formalize a distinct-yet-related informational framing. 7) Finally, to support a functionalist view of multiple realizability and natural selections likely relevance in modeling Psyche, two more examples are given of how Parameter and Relatability perform as a practical (evolutionarily necessary) informational framing. FROM KEPLER TO BATESON AND BEYOND Going Forward The foregoing notion of Parameter and Relatability is not new. Relatability was first used as a tool for science by mathematician Johannes Kepler in the early 1600s. Keplers Laws of Planetary Motion gave humanity its first accurate model of planetary movement, defining natural elliptical orbits based on interrelating planetary forces. This then-novel approach was archetypal in its profound effect on the development of all physical sciences . . . to formulate physical laws in mathematical form, [using] the language of algebra and geometry, [becoming a] . . . prototype of most laws in physical sciences (Holton 2001, p. 47). Later, the 20th centurys first cybernetic formulations of . . . Whorf, Korzybski, and Bateson saw Relatability as the interface . . . [lying] between the physical and the conceptual, at a place where both can be seen to meet in the notion of information. (Bardini 2000, p. 53). Bateson (2002, p. 9) remarked, the key [is] never quantities, always shapes, forms, and relations. Relatable patterns, he said, are the necessary outward and visible sign of the system being organized (May 1976). But then Bateson attacked modern science for not studying Relatability

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as a prime causal force. He believed, instead, that science emphasized Lifes quantitative objective facets (Parameter), which are easier to name, test, and measure than Lifes innately qualitative Relational aspects. As Batesons complaint suggests, in advancing the human condition we seem forever haunted by dueling dualist dichotomies. This is evident nearly every day in Lifes common events. Even in this papers notions of a unified Psyche, metadata (content and form), and Parameter and Relatability seem to peal back ever-more layers of this dualistic stuff. Yet information technology plainly shows that such simple-minded dualism is basic wrong thinking. And what is Psyche, if not an information technology of sort? Psyches roles span from simple homeostatic regulation to the creation of profound intellectual insights and moving works of art. Whether Psyche is conscious or unconscious, or resides entirely within a brain or is smeared across some vast neuronal network in fulfilling these diverse roles, at some level, at some point, all must interconnect (unify) informationally. This is the only way possible for humanity to capture the continuous sense-of-self we all personally experience, regardless of how fractured these diverse experiences may seem at times. One wonders why wrong thinking persists in modern views of Psyche, why information theory has been so long in coming to the fore. Philosopher Barry Smith (2012) suggests that maybe nothing would satisfy [us] because we want to find it puzzling and mysterious . . . and if we explain [it,] its no longer the puzzling and mysterious thing were after. Adding to this likely unconscious ambivalence, the basic question of how is consciousness possible?, is so badly framed . . . we still dont know what would constitute a good answer, or even who should answer that question. Regardless, the study of Psyche must begin with a dualist framing, if for no other reason than that is how we presently understand the matter. But after 2,500 years, with little advance in our grasp of the basic matter, this dualist framing seems highly suspect. Perhaps dualistic thinking affords us answers to one type of Life challenge, while it causes us problems for another type of challenge (re type theory). This returns the question Do we in fact claim that the thing we study has dual traits, or is our manner of studying the thing, itself, in fact, dualistic? This riddle-of-rationale begins to unwind once this irresolvable duality is bridged. Often in evolutionary processes a species must adapt to new conditions in order to survive [where events have] altered profoundly the nature of the world as we knew it, the human race consequently finds itself in a new habitat to which it must adapt its

and

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thinking. In the light of new knowledge . . . this must be the central fact in all our considerations . . . otherwise we face certain disaster. (Einstein 1946) Parameter and Relatability, representing one distinct-yet-related logical order, provide such a bridge and allow us to shift focus to the next turn in the road, to take a next step. This paper has mainly focused on dualistic matters in order to set out a basis for Psyches contents. But with this question of content now addressed, ones focus naturally shifts to questions of form. Despite the superficial duality of Parameter and Relatability, some may notice that a dualist (2node) view is not at all what is presented in this paper. Instead, a 3-node triune framework is what is offered (Figure E). While the paper is not explicit about this 3-node logic, Figure C and Figure D broach this triune form in some detail. GITs triune logic argues that the ground of existence, or Relatability, arises from two or more interacting Parameters reality exists entirely as interference patterns, an endless cycle of energy-matter exchanges (recurrent, iterating phenomenal events). CDL studiously belabors this prolific font of content to define its own reductive thermodynamic a priori basis, which also embraces a triune order of sorts.
Figure E: A necessarily unified three-part structure, where no one part empirically exists without the other two.

Relatabilit y

Parameter
That reality (Relatability) arises from interacting Parameters is somewhat reminiscent of quantum principles. Quantum mechanics, with its wave-particle duality and wave-function collapse, argues for a type of material reality roughly parallel to what CDL and GIT propose. This quantum connection recalls the second test case of Psyche vis--vis quantum mechanics the next turn in the road. REFERENCES (1) Abundis, M. (2011). General Information Theory and Spontaneous Creative Systems, Towards a Science of Consciousness Conf., 37 May 2011, Stockholm: Stockholm Univ. [online] Available at: <http://vimeo.com/evolv/genrl-info-theory> [Accessed 1 August 2011]. Allen, R. E. (1985). Greek philosophy: Thales to Aristotle. New York, NY: Free Press.

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Agence Science-Presse (2009). LHC: Un (trs) petit Big Bang, Dec 7 2009. [online] Lien Multimdia. Available at: <http://www.lienmultimedia.com/article.php3?id_article=22468> [Accessed 1 January 2011]. Bardini, T. (2000). Bootstrapping: Douglas Engelbart, coevolution, and the origins of personal computing. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York, NY: Ballantine Books. Bateson, G. (2002). Mind and nature: A necessary unity. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: Free Press. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. (2006). Strong and weak emergence, in Clayton, P., & Davies, P. C. W. (eds.) The re-emergence of emergence: The emergentist hypothesis from science to religion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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(10) Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. (11) Deacon, T. (2006) Emergence: the hole at the wheels hub, in Clayton, P., & Davies, P. C. W. (eds.) The re-emergence of emergence: The emergentist hypothesis from science to religion. Oxford, Engalnd: Oxford University Press. (12) Deacon, T. (2011). Incomplete nature: How mind emerged from matter. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. (13) Einstein, A. (1946). Cited in "The Real Problem is in the Hearts of Man," by Michael Amrine, from the New York Times Magazine (23 June 1946). (14) Farrance, R. (2006). Timeline: 50 Years of Hard Drives A look at the history of hard drives, PC World, Sept. 13, 2006. [online] Available at: <http://www.pcworld.com/article/127105/timeline_50_years_of_hard_drives.html> [Accessed 1 January 2011].

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