Do we need critical theories of International Relations? Why?

This essay attempts to explain whether and why we need critical theories of international relations. To answer this question, critical theory will be differentiated from another type of theorising, namely problem solving theories. Once this difference is established, the function of critical theory and therefore its use is easier to see. Critical theorys capacity for critique and promotion of alternatives from the prevailing order is the first basis for the need of critical theory. This conviction is bolstered on two related concerns, affecting the production of the human and in providing ideas and concepts for dissent. Cox (1981) understood theory as being dividable into two camps. Essentially, these two camps describe a theorys meta-theoretical orientation on social life, the life of humans. Problem solving theory takes the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised and seeks to solve a problem through this framework (Cox 1981:88). Importantly, the general pattern of institutions and relationships [are] not called into question (Cox 1981:88). This lack of reflexivity regarding the social field upon which it is deployed leads to a status quo orientation with that social field. This is not to suggest that a problem solving theory will not lead to a questioning of the validity of some power relationships or some structures, but that it is not normatively committed to such a project. Critical theory, alternatively, stands apart from the prevailing order (Cox 1981:88) and establishes an orientation that does not simply accept what is around the theorist, but questions it. The human subject, in its social, political and international relations its entire social field, however this is conceived- is viewed as historically contingent and subject to change (Cox 1981:89 and Roach 2008:xvi, for the mutability of the subject see, Foucault 1975, 1980, 1997 or Marcuse 1986). This can be seen as the simplest (or standard) charge of those who are critical: why this [social/political/economic relationship]; why now? A chief difference, therefore, is the role of critical theory in destabilizing static conceptions of social reality (Roach 2008:xix-xvi). From this critique, critical theory can provide alternative conceptions of social reality (Cox 1981:90). When we pair these theories next to each other, it becomes clear that problem solving theory is not conducive to social change, while critical theory is. Cox describes this status quo orientation or fixity as an ideological bias (Cox1981:89),

as change throughout history has occurred. The need for critical theory can be established based on this analysis, we need critical theories in international relations to realise and promote alternate ways of life. Take, for example, Wendts social theory of international relations (Wendt 1999). As a problem solving theory Wendts constructivism provides more room for alternatives than structural realism, noting that anarchy is what states make of it (1992:395). That is, unlike typical Waltzian analysis (see Waltz 1979), states are not so much constrained by the anarchic structure but can interpret anarchy and move within it. What a critical theory can and should point out, is that just like realism, Wendts theory provides an ideological function, legitimising an order in which only certain interests are realised - the interest of states and the state system (Roach2008:xviii, citing Hoffman 1987:238). This subordinates and de-legitimizes the concerns, interests and desires of individuals and groups and does not pass judgment on the state system itself, merely describing it as though it is an a-historical fact. This critique of Wendts theory brings to the fore that which might be missing, namely those people below the state (whose operation it affects, more on this later). It also asks us to reassess, or examine our relationship to states, the workings of the international order, and our relationship and position in the hierarchy of the prevailing order. So, we need critical theories to realise and promote alternative ways of life, how does critical theory achieve this? This implies two related concerns. Firstly, the production of the human subject and secondly, in providing ideas for dissent, for without a critical orientation, dissent from and therefore change to the prevailing order becomes all the more difficult. The first point may need some clarification, how the human produced at all, and why is this important? Human production refers to the creation of humans, of which conception and birth is only the beginning. We can identify how the humans behaviour and thoughts are linked to the historical period that we are in. For which world leader claims the Divine Right of Kings and where now is the state burning all the witches? The importance of human production is therefore that we can change or at least manipulate the thoughts and behaviours of people with intentionality. Without getting hung up on definitions, human production is the process of affecting thoughts and behaviour. This idea has a clear lineage, not least with the concept of socialisation and sanctioning bad behaviour. So, the human subject is constructed from the social and political field around them, therefore critical theory has a role in evaluating this field and changing the way the

human is constructed. A superficial reading of Foucault tells us that the human is produced by, and subject to knowledge (see for instance, Foucault 1975, 1980, 1997). We are the product and producer of various discourses, practises, institutions and disciplinary procedures and wars, and at the same time, we are implicated as an actor in this process. The individual can internalise the discourse and behave accordingly and play the role of the teacher, the prison officer, the judge, explaining that the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle (Foucault 1980:322). As an example of the effect of discourses on the human, Foucault describes how we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks and destined to live and die in certain ways by discourses that are true (Foucault 1997:25). In terms of the production of the human, law and action, life and death, are all subject to discourses of truth, carrying differing effects on the human and through the human, depending on their form (Foucault 1997:25). For instance, law codifies right and wrong behaviour and the body is subject to the discipline of the state (in the form of, death, rehabilitation, isolation, torture and/or imprisonment) if he transgresses these laws. In the international arena, societies across the world have been subject to the effects of knowledge production in economics, from Stalins Russia, Thatchers Britain and Nehrus India, to structural adjustment loans in the Third World and the construction of post-communist Russia. In a similar line of thought and drawing this point together, Galtung (1969) points out that in society there is a system of positive and negative influence on the human. Rewards are given for what is considered right and punishment for what is considered wrong (Galtung 1969:170). Consider, consumer society rewards he who goes in for consumption and thus delimits the desired actions of the populace (Galtung 1969:170). Rephrased, societys institutions and people reward what they consider right and punish, ignore or exclude that which they consider wrong, encouraging or discouraging certain thoughts and behaviour. Of course, this procedure is not limited to domestic society; consider the juridical, criminal and cultural implications of an international Trade Related Intellectual Property Regime. Galtungs production of the human suggests that it is possible to have certain structures encouraging and discouraging forms of action/behaviour and thought. These same views are carried forward in sociology, for socialisation is where people learn the way of life of their society (Giddens 1981:26); their thoughts along with their behaviour is continually shaped by social interactions (Giddens 1981:28). We could consider this a

superficial description of human production, while the former descriptions outline micro politics of human production. By recognising the methods and techniques of this phenomenon, we can change them. So, to repeat, if the human is produced by the social field around them, critical theory has a stake in altering this production by the advancement of alternatives and critique. These critiques should have an essentially enabling character, by providing critical concepts and critical analysis dissent becomes easier to imagine and practise. In this way, critical theory promotes change. Foucault is a good example for the effect of his analysis of local criticism (or dissenting/subjugated knowledge). Foucault vindicates local criticism whose validity is not dependant on the established regimes of thought (Foucault 1980:317). Such a vindication of criticism that does not depend on approval from the prevailing order has the effect of bringing an air of legitimacy to the claims of the marginalised human or group. This notion of creating legitimacy brings to the fore the real issue, the power relationship between those institutions, states and knowledges, which is an established power with established legitimacy, and of those who speak out and critique the effects of that power upon them. Foucault then, through analysis, reframes thought from the status quo orientation of the interrelationship among states (Cox 1981:85) or of established knowledge, to understanding and amplifying the concerns of those subjugated by (or are at least not of) the state or the prevailing order. The production of knowledge from local critiques, he argues, is a reality of autonomous, noncentralised theoretical production (Foucault 1980:317). This reflects Foucaults desire for ruptures in established regimes of power and thought, a destabilising critique with no centre of order, hierarchy or reason with which to assess it. Its validity is internal to itself and the people who advance it: Life over theory, reality over knowledge (Foucault 1980:317). Foucaults analysis can be seen as essentially enabling those who are subjugated. It attempts to give power to those who have little by making their claims legitimate in his work, and shrugging off the judgment of established power, knowledge, institutions and regimes. Critical concepts allow us to reframe our ontology, and therefore our knowledge, of the situation. We find that one cannot instigate change, nor can one dissent from the prevailing order, without, on some level, critiquing that order and providing an alternative description or explanation. In many ways this is analysis, but concepts are corollary to this practise. As an example, Mossadegh (the ousted Prime Minister of Iran) advances certain

concepts in his alternative (to the United States) description of the state system. After being overthrown in a coup in 1952 he sarcastically critiques the prevailing system of political and economic exploitation [and] colonialism (Hsiao & Lim 2010:193). It is the concepts of exploitation and colonialism that advances his ideas of what the state system looks like. By virtue of establishing these concepts in his description, Mossadegh implicitly advances certain notions of justice and ethics and therefore an alternative political and economic order. Concepts, in this light, are essentially rhetorical and functional. The concept of a class struggle is another example. The idea that there are sections of society that are in conflict with one another (Rummel 1977, Giddens 1981:670), provides an alternative vision of what society looks like and a critical impetus for dissent and critique. Or, take the notion of ideology. However it is conceived, whether as obscuring the position of more powerful groups (Giddens 1981:670) or the 16 different meanings Eagleton (1991:12) gives, the application of the concept allows for a critical appreciation of what it is applied to. It is the practise of analysis and the construction and deployment of concepts that has an enabling character, helping us to realise and promote alternatives. In conclusion, critical theory can be distinguished from problem solving theory with reference to its scope of analysis. Critical theory sees the subject and the prevailing order as mutable, while problem solving theory does not question the status of either. This leads problem solving theory to be status quo orientated. The need for critical theory can therefore be established on the basis that it advances alternative ways of living from the prevailing order, while problem solving theories, unintentionally (or not) are more conducive to stasis. In advancing change, it can be argued that we need critical theory to affect the production of the human, and to provide ideas for dissent. Human production, or socialisation will happen, it is a matter for critical theory to assess this production and suggest alternatives. Alongside this, critical theory can create critical concepts and ideas that explain reality and alter the way people view the world. In doing so, critical theory has a stake in, and can affect, how individuals think and behave hopefully advancing intentional change.

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