WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

General Council 10 February 2003

RESTRICTED WT/GC/M/78 7 March 2003

(03-1315)

MINUTES OF MEETING Held in the Centre William Rappard on 10 February 2003 Chairman: Mr. Sergio Marchi (Canada)

Subjects discussed: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Page

Iran Request for Accession ............................................................................................... 2 Ethiopia Request for Accession ........................................................................................ 2 Council for TRIPS Report on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health .................................................. 8 Committee on Trade and Development Report by the Chairman of the Committee in Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment in Pursuance of Paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns .................................................................... 9 Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration Progress report on the Committee's review of methodologies for future pay adjustments .................................. 26 Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee ...................................... 27 Work Programme on Small Economies Report by the Chairman of the Dedicated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development ................................... 30 Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 ...................... 31 Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO Agreements Communication from Chile ........................................................................ 32 Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference Administrative matters ............................ 36 Annual report of the General Council to the Ministerial Conference Statement by the Chairman ....................................................................................................................... 36 Attendance of observers from governments and international intergovernmental organizations Statement by the Chairman .......................................................................... 36 Attendance of non-governmental organizations Statement by the Chairman....................... 37 Election of Officers for the Fifth Session Statement by the Chairman ................................ 38 WTO Pension Plan Election of an Alternate to the Management Board Proposal by the Chairman ................................................................................................. 38 Appointment of officers to WTO bodies ........................................................................... 39 Meeting of the General Council on Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking ................................................................................................................................ 40

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. (a) (b) (c) (d) 11. 12. 13.

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14. 15. 16.

Improving the services provided by the Secretariat to Members ..................................... 40 Possibility of a short break prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference ............................. 41 Election of Chairperson ..................................................................................................... 41

1.

Iran Request for Accession (WT/ACC/IRN/1)

1. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Iran in WT/ACC/IRN/1 requesting accession to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII. He recalled that the General Council had last considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002, and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting. 2. The representative of the United States said that the issue of Iran's accession to the WTO continued to be under review by his Government, and his delegation had nothing to add to its statement at the December meeting of the General Council. 3. The representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries, said that these countries took note of the statement by the United States. They noted with regret that the United States was not in a position to respond positively to this issue and continued to hope that a positive response would be forthcoming from the United States at the next meeting of the General Council. 4. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next meeting. 2. Ethiopia Request for Accession (WT/ACC/ETH/1)

5. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Ethiopia in WT/ACC/ETH/1 requesting accession to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII. 6. The representative of Ethiopia, speaking as an observer, said that his Government was fully convinced that the best way to accelerate economic growth and development was to integrate its economy into the multilateral trading system. To be a Member of the WTO was to be part of the rules-based multilateral trading system, and this would create confidence for investors and serve as an instrument to attract foreign direct investment for diversifying the production base and expanding the supply capacity of the country. It would also help to secure predictable and transparent market access. The effective participation of the least-developed countries in the decision-making process of the multilateral trading system would encourage them that the speed, nature and direction of globalization would be compatible with their developmental needs. These, among others, were some of the reasons which had led his Government to decide to start the WTO accession process and to be part of the multilateral trading system. 7. Ethiopia had had observer status in the WTO since October 1997, and this had been renewed in May 2002. During this period the Government of Ethiopia had exerted every effort to acquaint and familiarize itself with the WTO agreements and the working of the multilateral trading system, as well as to enhance its negotiating capacity. The Government had also commissioned a study to determine the full implications of the WTO agreements on Ethiopia's economic policy and sectoral strategies. In addition, in order to create awareness among different stakeholders about the multilateral trading system and the WTO framework, two national workshops had been organized in 1998 and 1999 in collaboration with the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats. Despite these efforts, Ethiopia's institutional capacity to deal with the complex WTO agreements, procedures and decisions had not yet reached the level desired. It therefore needed further technical assistance and capacity building that covered all

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phases of the accession process, and called upon all its development partners to provide it with the necessary assistance and support in this regard. 8. With a surface area of 1.1 million square kilometres and with a population of 67 million in 2002, Ethiopia was the third most populous country in Africa. The country had a long-standing history, diverse cultural heritage and reasonably good resource potential for development. However, during the years from the mid-1970s until the fall of the military government in 1991, the country had undergone a period of turmoil and economic stagnation. The performance of the economy during these periods had revealed deterioration in the socio-economic condition at an accelerating pace. GDP growth rate was on average 1.5 per cent, but in contrast, the population had grown at about 3 per cent per annum, resulting in a stagnation of per capita income and hence a worsening of living conditions. The macro-economic balance was also in crisis, with a very low saving rate and inflation reaching 21 per cent. This situation had come about as a result of the command economic policies that had restricted the role of the private sector, the protracted civil war and the recurrent drought, all of which had left the economy in deep crisis. This situation had severely hampered the much-desired socio-economic development of the country, resulting in widespread poverty among the vast majority of the population. After the fall of the military regime in 1991, and the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and later the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995, Ethiopia had witnessed a marked departure on the political and economic fronts. 9. The political transformation had consisted mainly of changing the hitherto unitary state into a federal system, the one-party system into a multiparty system, and instituting human rights buttressed by an independent judiciary. These developments had provided a huge peace and stability dividend to the nation. On the economic front, the Government had initiated and implemented a series of successful economic reform programmes supported by the multilateral financial institutions and other multilateral and bilateral development partners. The economic reform programmes were aimed at reorienting the economy from a command to a market economy, rationalizing the role of the State and creating legal, institutional and policy environments to enhance private sector development. The adoption of the Agricultural-Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy provided a long-term framework and direction to the reform programmes. In addition, a number of structural adjustment policies had been carried out, including full liberalization of prices and markets, removal of subsidies, and implementation of civil service reform in order to improve and ensure efficiency and accountability. There had been liberalization of the foreign exchange regime and of the foreign trade regime by removing quotas and the progressive reduction of import tariffs the latest reduction had been implemented in January 2003 and had brought the weighted average tariff to 17.5 per cent. There had also been privatization of most of the public enterprises and reorganization of the remaining ones so that they operated purely on a commercial basis, and promulgation and revision of liberal investment codes, with the latest revision in July 2002. These had been buttressed with fiscal and monetary policy disciplines. The favourable policy environment created by economic reform coupled with macro-economic stability had invigorated the private sector, which had been suppressed during the previous regime. The country had also designed and implemented a number of sector investment programmes. Moreover, cognizant of the fact that poverty reduction necessitated multidimensional and well-integrated approaches to development, the Government, by consolidating the economic results achieved so far, had designed and was implementing the country's Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP). 10. As a result of these and other measures Ethiopia's economy had attained an annual average growth rate of 5 per cent over the past 10 years, with inflation being contained below 5 per cent on average, thereby representing a marked improvement compared to the situation in the 1980s. These results would have been much better had it not been for the erratic weather, external trade shocks and unfortunate border conflict caused by the regime in Eritrea. His Government believed that the reform measures it had been undertaking autonomously conformed in a number of respects with the requirements of the WTO agreements. It was also confident that they would serve as a springboard in Ethiopia's accession negotiations. In this connection, his Government wished to request WTO

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Members, in due course and as appropriate, to give credit to Ethiopia for the liberalization measures it had implemented within the framework of the structural adjustment programme. His Government recognized that accession to the WTO was a complex, lengthy and challenging process for all acceding countries, and especially the least-developed ones. Lack of understanding of WTO agreements and their implications for the development of a country, weak enforcement mechanisms, absence of a professional administration and judicial system and extremely limited human and financial resources just to mention a few were some of the challenges these countries faced. While acceding LDCs should leave no stone unturned to overcome these challenges, WTO Members on their part should take the necessary steps to facilitate the accession process and to provide technical assistance to acceding LDCs. In this regard, the Decision on the accession of LDCs adopted by the General Council in December 2002 (WT/L/508) was a major step in the right direction. He expressed his Government's appreciation to all Members for the efforts they had made to adopt this Decision, and called upon all Members to ensure its full implementation, from which Ethiopia looked forward to benefiting. The benefits, both to existing Members and to acceding countries, of ensuring universal membership was clear. 11. He assured Members of his Government's strong commitment to comply with established procedures for the accession process. In this connection, Ethiopia had established a WTO unit within the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a national committee, composed of various ministries, agencies and other stakeholders, to look after the accession negotiations. These were some of the preliminary steps that demonstrated his Government's commitment to speed up the accession process. It was Ethiopia's hope that this commitment would be complemented by the individual and collective support of Members to achieve the desired result. Ethiopia looked forward to interacting with the working party in the multilateral and bilateral discussions leading to the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory protocol of accession and schedule of WTO commitments. His Government remained at the disposal of Members to provide any information that might be useful regarding its application for accession. 12. All delegations who spoke warmly welcomed Ethiopia's statement, and supported its request for accession and the establishment of a working party to examine it. 13. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group, congratulated Ethiopia on its statement. These countries fully supported the request for accession by Ethiopia, which had already undertaken considerable efforts since 1997 to comply with the WTO agreements. As an LDC, Ethiopia should benefit from the new procedures agreed by the General Council to facilitate and, above all, accelerate the accession of LDCs, and in particular African LDCs. This should go hand in hand with the technical assistance required to strengthen the capacities of the Ethiopian Government in multilateral trade matters, so that it could carry out the accession negotiations under the best conditions. The African Group appealed to Members to reply positively to Ethiopia's request for technical assistance. It attached particular importance to this request since it knew the positive impact trade could have in efforts to reduce poverty, especially in Africa, as had been noted and highlighted in the latest report on LDCs prepared by the LDCs and UNCTAD. These countries hoped that Ethiopia's request would be given the priority importance it required and, above all, hoped that it would be dealt with under an accelerated and facilitated procedure, since Ethiopia had expressed its interest in accession since 1997. 14. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs, said that from the perspective of these countries, Ethiopia's decision to accede to the WTO was very significant. It reaffirmed the principle that smaller countries had to integrate into the multilateral trading system as quickly as possible, in order to benefit from the potential gains such participation offered. Ethiopia's decision clearly reflected its commitment to abide by the rules-based multilateral trading system, and the LDCs congratulated Ethiopia on its decision. Ministers at Doha had put a special priority on LDCs' accession. In paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration, they had attached great importance to concluding accession proceedings as quickly as possible, particularly those of LDCs. In addition, in

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paragraph 42 of that Declaration, Ministers had agreed to work to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs. Following on those decisions, Members had worked under the very committed Chairman of the Sub-Committee on LDCs to draw up Guidelines for the quick accession of LDCs, which the General Council had adopted at its meeting in December 2002. The LDCs looked forward to working within the scope of those Guidelines to deal with the accession request of Ethiopia. 15. The LDCs were the weakest link in the chain that bound Members in the WTO. They faced daunting challenges to their development. They had recognized these serious handicaps, and were committed to reversing their marginalization. At Doha, Ministers had reiterated their commitment to improving the effective participation of LDCs in the multilateral trading system. The efforts of the LDCs to integrate into that system needed to be complemented by the cooperation and support of the entire membership. The LDCs hoped that Ethiopia and other acceding LDCs would receive expeditious and adequate technical assistance so as to accede speedily to the WTO. With Ethiopia, there were now 10 LDCs in the process of WTO accession. Not all of these were in advanced stages of accession. The LDCs urged Members to collectively assist the LDCs in their accession negotiations. As with Ethiopia, they hoped that the accession of all LDCs desiring membership would be on a fast track, and on simplified terms that were consistent with their level of development and administrative and institutional capability. The LDCs eagerly awaited Ethiopia's joining the WTO as a full Member, and asked that Members immediately establish a working group for Ethiopia's accession. 16. The representative of the European Communities, said that as an LDC, Ethiopia should fully benefit from a speedy accession process in line with the General Council's Decision to facilitate the accession of LDCs. The Community was committed to apply these Guidelines fully during its future negotiations with Ethiopia. It stood ready to continue providing technical assistance to Ethiopia in areas of relevance to WTO accession, and was in contact with the Ethiopian authorities on this matter to identify priority needs. In addition, Members could also draw on the experience in the Integrated Framework, in which Ethiopia was a participant. 17. The representative of India said that the very comprehensive statement by Ethiopia outlined the various reform measures Ethiopia had already undertaken, which would augur well for its faster accession. India had strong and long-standing economic and commercial relations with Ethiopia. It was obvious that Ethiopia had felt encouraged by the General Council's Decision on faster accession for LDCs, and had decided to apply for membership. He recalled Ethiopia's constructive contribution in the discussions in the Sub-Committee on LDCs when this draft decision was being discussed. India was confident that the spirit of the Decision would guide Members in the entire process of Ethiopia's accession. Ethiopia's statement had referred to the need for assistance and support, and his delegation strongly endorsed that request and felt that Ethiopia deserved all the necessary support and assistance in its accession process. 18. The representative of Israel welcomed the start of Ethiopia's accession process and hoped it would be speedy. Israel and Ethiopia had enjoyed a history of friendly relations for millennia, and it was therefore a special pleasure for Israel to fully support Ethiopia's request and to wish it a speedy accession. 19. The representative of Kenya said that apart from sharing a common border, Ethiopia and Kenya were both members of the African Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Ethiopia, with a population close to 70 million and an LDC, had undertaken substantial market reforms through the structural adjustment programme. It was hoped that Ethiopia, by joining the WTO, would derive the benefits associated with the multilateral trading system. WTO membership would help boost its industrial production growth rate, currently estimated at 7 per cent, and thereby expand its industrial base beyond food processing, beverages, textiles, chemicals, metal processing and cement. Kenya urged Members to

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consider favourably the establishment of a working party on the accession of Ethiopia. In view of the complexity and costs of the accession process, Ethiopia needed, and had requested, technical assistance to speed up its accession, and her delegation hoped Members would be forthcoming in that regard. As a neighbouring country, Kenya looked forward to participating actively in Ethiopia's accession process. 20. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation fully endorsed the previous statements. The reforms outlined in Ethiopia's statement were very significant, and Pakistan felt that Ethiopia had already unilaterally prepared itself to meet WTO membership requirements. In view of Ethiopia's enthusiasm and paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration, Pakistan hoped that Ethiopia would be able to join the WTO as soon as possible. 21. The representative of China said that China had a long friendship and close trade and economic relations with Ethiopia. It believed that integrating Ethiopia into the multilateral trading system would make a positive contribution to the trade, economic and social development of that country. At the same time, Ethiopia's accession to the WTO would also make the WTO more universal. Given that Ethiopia was an LDC, Members should bear in mind the Decision on LDCs' accession, which set out guidelines to be followed by Members in their negotiations with acceding LDCs. Members should faithfully implement this Decision in the accession negotiations with Ethiopia, and China sincerely hoped that Ethiopia would become a Member in the near future. 22. The representative of the United States welcomed Ethiopia's decision to move to align its trade regime with the WTO, and hoped that Ethiopia would lose no time in supplying the information required to activate accession negotiations. The General Council had recently agreed on Guidelines to help simplify and streamline the accession process for LDCs like Ethiopia. This should help relieve Ethiopia of some of the procedural and resource burdens that normally came with accession negotiations, without undermining the ability of the accession process to build trade capacity and promote economic and trade reform. The WTO accession process presented acceding countries, and especially LDCs, with an exceptional opportunity to promote investment and economic growth, including through the establishment of greater transparency, predictability and the rule of law in the application of trade measures, and by expanding market access for goods and services, minimizing non-tariff barriers and reducing the cost of international trade. The United States looked forward to the accession negotiations and to welcoming Ethiopia as a Member at their conclusion. 23. The representative of Peru, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, said that these countries, like others who had spoken, considered that in Ethiopia's accession process, account should be taken of its status as an LDC. It was also important that it be given all the necessary technical cooperation during this process. 24. The representative of Japan said that Japan enjoyed close ties with Ethiopia, had been cooperating with and contributing to its economic development, and stood ready to strengthen this relationship. The accession of Ethiopia would strengthen the multilateral trading system and would further contribute to the development of the international trading regime. At the same time it would be beneficial to the promotion of Ethiopia's economic reform in the context of the international economy. Japan was prepared to actively engage in negotiations in accordance with the recently adopted Guidelines on LDCs' accession. 25. The representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Members, said that they had listened carefully to the statement by Ethiopia, and firmly believed that its accession would contribute to the strengthening of the multilateral trading system by bringing all trading partners together under the same set of rules and disciplines which provided equality to all Members. Two national workshops had been organized with the support of the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats with the objective of creating awareness and building understanding among the stake-holders in Ethiopia about the multilateral trading system and WTO framework. It was essential for Ethiopia to build the

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necessary human and institutional capacities and to better acquaint itself with the WTO agreements. WTO accession remained a major challenge, particularly for LDCs. A lack of the necessary infrastructure, legislative and enforcement mechanisms, and trained personnel had hampered accession. However, the urgency of addressing this problem had been recognized by Ministers in Doha. Paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration stated that the accession of the LDCs remained a priority. The ASEAN Members sincerely hoped that Ethiopia would be successful in its accession process. 26. The representative of Bahrain said his delegation hoped that the accession of Ethiopia would be speedy. As an LDC, Ethiopia's request deserved to be given priority. 27. The representative of Botswana congratulated Ethiopia on its statement and on its painstaking efforts to fulfil the accession requirements of the WTO. This was an example of an LDC which had queued for a considerable length of time to fulfil the WTO accession requirements. It was also gratifying that Ethiopia would be one of the first LDCs to benefit from the recently adopted Guidelines on LDC accession. Ethiopia was the seat of the African Union, and Botswana wished it a speedy accession. 28. The representative of Canada said his delegation wished to restate its commitment to the application of the recently agreed Guidelines for the accession of LDCs, which aimed at facilitating the accession of countries like Ethiopia. 29. The representative of Turkey congratulated Ethiopia for its outstanding statement. Turkey was ready to extend its support to Ethiopia in its accession process. It was convinced that the accelerated accession of Ethiopia to the WTO would have a positive effect on Ethiopia's economy as well as on the daily lives of its people. 30. The representative of Slovenia, speaking also on behalf of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic, wished Ethiopia a speedy inclusion as a WTO Member. 31. The General Council took note of the statements and of the expressions of welcome and support, and agreed to establish a working party with the following terms of reference and composition: Terms of Reference: "To examine the application of the Government of Ethiopia to accede to the WTO Agreement under Article XII, and to submit to the General Council recommendations which may include a draft Protocol of Accession." Membership: Membership would be open to all Members indicating their wish to serve on the Working Party. Chairmanship: The General Council would authorize its Chairman to designate the Chairperson of the Working Party in consultation with representatives of Members and with the representative of Ethiopia. 32. The General Council so agreed.

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33. The Chairman invited the representative of Ethiopia to consult with the Secretariat as to further procedures, in particular regarding the basic documentation to be considered by the Working Party. 34. The representative of Ethiopia, speaking as an observer, thanked delegations for their warm welcome and support for Ethiopia's request. He assured Members that Ethiopia would do its best to speed up the accession process. In thanking Members for their confidence in its efforts, he said that Ethiopia would do its best to be the right type of Member. 35. 3. The General Council took note of the statement. Council for TRIPS Report on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health

36. The Chairman recalled that the General Council had considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002, and had invited the TRIPS Council to resume work on this matter promptly at the beginning of 2003 to resolve the outstanding issues in the Chairman's text of 16 December and to report to the General Council, so that a decision implementing a solution to the problem identified in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was taken at the first General Council meeting in 2003. 37. Mr. Prez Motta (Mexico), Chairman of the Council for TRIPS, reporting on that Council's further consideration of this matter, recalled that the General Council had agreed on 20 December that the TRIPS Council should resume work promptly at the beginning of 2003 to resolve the outstanding issues in the text he had circulated on 16 December, and to report to the General Council so that a decision implementing a solution to the problem identified in paragraph 6 could be taken at the first General Council meeting in 2003. In line with these instructions he had been actively engaged in consultations aimed at resolving the outstanding problem. His impression was that there was a widely shared desire to find a solution as soon as possible and to be willing to look positively at proposals aimed at providing the level of comfort necessary for the text of 16 December to be acceptable to all. Indeed, he sensed that a certain momentum towards finding a solution had been generated in recent days, and felt it was important that advantage should be taken of this. He had been exploring certain ideas with Members and had had positive reactions, but it was too early to be able to report on whether these would be able to lead to a final solution. In these circumstances, he requested the General Council to consider providing an additional period for further deliberations in capitals and consultations in Geneva. His aim was to have something more concrete to report to Members by the end of the TRIPS Council meeting scheduled for the week of 17 February. 38. The Chairman proposed that the General Council take note of the progress report by the Chairman of the TRIPS Council on the status of his further consultations, and agree to suspend discussion on this item and to revert to it at a reconvened meeting to be held shortly. 39. The General Council so agreed. 1

In a communication dated 3 March 2003 (JOB(03)/46) the Chairman informed Members that for reasons indicated therein, and in light of a letter addressed to him from the Chairman of the TRIPS Council, the General Council meeting of 10 February would be considered closed unless any delegation informed him by 5 March of its wish to have the General Council reconvene in the coming days. No such communications was received.

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4.

Committee on Trade and Development Report by the Chairman of the Committee in Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment in Pursuance of Paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns

40. The Chairman recalled that the General Council had considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002 and had authorized the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session to continue its work towards finalizing its report on special and differential treatment in pursuance of paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, and to report back to the General Council at its first meeting in 2003. 41. Mr. Smith (Jamaica), Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session, reporting on this matter, recalled that when the General Council had met in December, he had indicated that the Special Session had not been able to finalize its report and was therefore unable to report, in accordance with its mandate, to the General Council with clear recommendations for decision. He had drawn attention to the draft report that was under consideration by the Special Session and had indicated that there were two main outstanding elements the Special Session had not been able to agree on (i) a package of Agreement-specific proposals, and (ii) the Way Forward. The General Council had instructed the Special Session to continue work towards finalizing its report and to report to the present meeting. The Special Session's finalized report was contained in TN/CTD/7, which was before the Council. The report had two main sections. The first part recounted factually in summary form the proceedings of the Special Session since July 2002, when the previous report had been submitted to the General Council. Since then, the Special Session had met formally nine times and on numerous occasions in informal sessions. It had received 15 submissions from Members, and had considered during its meetings Agreement-specific proposals, systemic and cross cutting issues, the Monitoring Mechanism and, preliminarily, the incorporation of special and differential treatment into the architecture of WTO rules. 42. The second part of the report made recommendations on the Way Forward. The Special Session recommended that the General Council take note of the agreement in principle that had been reached on 12 Agreement-specific proposals, and revert to the question of the adoption of these proposals at a later date. It also recommended that the General Council "provide clarification, as it considers appropriate, regarding paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns, and the means to give effect to the mandate." Finally, it recommended that, in the intervening period, the Special Session suspend further work. As a brief background to these recommendations, he said that a large number of Members, and particularly those who had submitted Agreement-specific proposals, had expressed disappointment with the missed deadlines that had attended the work of the Special Session, and with the outcome of the consideration of the Agreement-specific proposals. They had expressed the view that progress would not be possible unless issues relating to the mandate of the Special Session were clarified. It had also been proposed by these Members that work on all matters before the Special Session be suspended, pending such clarification. Other Members had been of the view that some progress had been made in the Special Session's work, including on the Agreement-specific proposals. They considered that the source of difficulty related mainly to the nature of some of the Agreementspecific proposals and the expectations by proponents regarding the outcome of their consideration. These Members had expressed willingness to continue working on the issues before the Special Session. The recommendations to the General Council for its consideration reflected the concern raised by a large number of Members that clarification of the paragraphs containing the Special Session's mandate was required, and that work should be suspended on all matters before the Special Session while this was undertaken. 43. All delegations who spoke expressed their deep appreciation to the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session for his tireless efforts and for his determination to move the work of that body forward in very difficult circumstances.

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44. The representative of Pakistan said that had it not been for the patience and personal initiative of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, even the little progress made would not have been possible. As Pakistan had stated in the CTD in Special Session, it had tried to facilitate the discussion and the process by not insisting on decisions on proposals put forward by a group of developing countries, including his own. It had patiently awaited a meaningful outcome on the LDC and African Group proposals. The results, however, had not been as encouraging as had been hoped. The reasons were obvious from the report just made by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. Pakistan was willing to commence work in the Special Session meaningfully as soon as the clarification being sought was provided by the General Council. It was hopeful that given the collective wisdom of the General Council, Members would be able to infuse fresh impetus and renewed vigour and dedication into the work of the CTD in Special Session, so that a meaningful and substantive report could be presented to Ministers at Cancn, and to restore confidence of the LDCs and developing countries that the Doha mandate was indeed a development agenda. 45. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs, said that while submitting their proposals on S&D provisions, the LDCs had made their best efforts to take on board the concerns of the membership. The LDCs' concerns were very specific they wanted to integrate into the multilateral trading system as soon as possible. The S&D provisions were key to this process, and were what enabled these countries to slowly take on their responsibilities. The key to this process was the latitude the membership allowed LDCs during the period of their integration. In this area, the LDCs felt that their development partners had to take the lead role. Taking into account their needs, the LDCs had suggested proposals for making S&D provisions more precise, effective and operational. Their latest suggestions had been submitted on 30 January and they were contemplating submitting a few more. While the LDCs appreciated the progress on some of the proposals they had submitted. However, the proposals that contained substantive elements and had economic value had not been given due consideration. In fact, the proposals of critical importance to LDCs had not been included in Annex III of TN/CTD/7. The LDCs wished to see their proposals considered in their entirety, and wished to emphasize that the Annex III proposals could not be considered in isolation of other proposals submitted by LDCs. Further, they felt there was scope for improvement to the proposals in Annex III. 46. From the report of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, it was clear there were divergent views regarding the interpretation of some aspects of the Doha mandate. The only way to make S&D provisions precise, effective and operational was to convert the "best endeavour" provisions into action-oriented language. The LDCs had hoped that after Doha, their development partners would consider implementing S&D provisions in the spirit reflected in the Doha documents, and had hoped that others would join them in implementing the mandate from Ministers. Despite the extension of the mandated deadline for resolution of this matter, not much progress had been achieved. He emphasized that the LDCs still maintained an open mind on this subject, and wanted serious engagement and meaningful progress. It was therefore necessary for the General Council to provide clarification of paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration as well as paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. The LDCs requested the General Council, which discharged the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals between meetings of the latter, to clarify the Doha mandate as recommended in the report presented by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. All past Ministerial Declarations had reiterated that LDCs were the least integrated group of countries in the multilateral trading system. The existing S&D provisions were aimed at halting their increasing marginalization in world trade. Unless these provisions were made precise, effective and operational, the LDCs would not be able to effectively integrate into the multilateral trading system. 47. The representative of Cuba said that for Cuba, S&D was a fundamental part of the Doha Declaration and an integral part of the WTO agreements. World trade statistics indicated that the under-developed countries continued to face growing obstacles to their trade, which made their full integration into the trading system more difficult. Because of this, the incorporation of the

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development dimension into the multilateral rules as had been decided in Doha was an unavoidable necessity. Nevertheless, Cuba noted with great dissatisfaction that in spite of the proposals submitted by the African Group, the LDCs and other developing countries, more than 70 issues were still awaiting a decision and, even worse, attempts were being made to use delaying tactics by trying to introduce new interpretations which limited the scope of the principle underlying S&D treatment. This was not in compliance with the Doha Declaration. Her delegation deplored the fact that the proposals submitted had not been favourably received. For Cuba, the only way to implement the Doha mandate was to produce language on S&D provisions to make them more operative, more functional and more effective. It was difficult to make any progress on other areas of the work programme without a substantial and sustained result on S&D treatment, which was a fundamental issue. Cuba supported the statement by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs. 48. The representative of Brazil said that the Doha mandate on S&D represented a consensual commitment by Members to correct imbalances and prevent actual disadvantages that developing countries faced in the multilateral trading system. Brazil had hoped that Members would actively engage in these negotiations. Rebuilding the confidence of developing countries in this organization had, after all, been a major objective since Seattle and one of the pillars of the Doha mandate. However, after more than one year of work Members were forced to recognize that no results were forthcoming. Increasing frustration among developing countries as to the overall negotiating context in the WTO should thus not be surprising. However, Members had to insist, and Brazil was prepared to continue seeking further clarification of the Doha mandate in the General Council as recommended in the report of the CTD in Special Session, with a view to allowing concrete and effective results for developing countries, in particular the LDCs. Brazil supported the Director-General's initiatives in this regard. It remained committed to fulfilling Ministers' mandate and appealed to those who were still resisting a solution to this very important and urgent problem to fully engage in the negotiations. 49. The representative of China said it was obvious that after the extension of the deadline of the work of the CTD in Special Session, the outcome of the discussions was far from a satisfactory solution to the relevant issues. Little substantial progress had been made in the implementation of the mandate in the Doha Declaration on the improvement and strengthening of existing S&D treatment provisions of the WTO agreements. As a developing-country Member, China attached great importance to the negotiations on the issue of S&D treatment. A successful result of work in this regard was of paramount significance to the confidence-building of the developing-country Members in the multilateral trading system and in the ongoing negotiations. It was also a touchstone, as to whether Members really wanted to make the Doha Development Agenda a development round. His delegation was of the view that the essence of the whole matter was political will from Members. Negotiations in the past year had proved that, without a will, Members could never accomplish anything. China therefore appealed to Members, particularly the major trading partners, to demonstrate their will and adopt a more positive and flexible attitude towards the S&D issues of great concern to the developing-country Members, thus paving the way for the negotiations in other areas. Regarding the interpretation of the Doha mandate on S&D, China felt that this was clear enough to implement. However, since there were big differences on the way to fulfil this mandate, and this constituted a major obstacle in the Special Session's deliberations on Agreement-specific issues, China agreed that the General Council should give further directions in this regard. His delegation was of the view that changing the existing language, wherever necessary, of relevant S&D treatment provisions was part of that mandate and the best way to make these provisions more precise, effective and operational. If the General Council could give clear directions, the discussions in the CTD in Special Session should continue in order to make clear recommendations before the Cancn Ministerial Conference. 50. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation welcomed the report in TN/CTD/7 which reflected the status of the negotiating process on S&D treatment, which was the essence of the Doha Development Agenda. That report allowed Members to measure the major effort still required and the limited degree of progress achieved so far. Paraguay considered S&D treatment to provide an

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opportunity for countries to participate and integrate in the multilateral trading system. It was therefore not a coincidence that ever since the launch of the work programme under paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, his delegation had been actively involved in these negotiations in the constructive spirit needed to reach understandings which were beneficial to all Members, while taking a firm and resolute line to ensure that the Doha Ministerial mandate was fulfilled. Testimony to this was the number of proposals Paraguay had tabled, as listed in Annex 1 of the report. Several of its proposals had been submitted with a view to reaching an understanding on and ensuring effective implementation of S&D treatment. It was his delegation's understanding that S&D treatment was not an end in itself, but rather a means to help establish freer and fairer trade, and that it should therefore provide positive responses for the benefit of all developing countries. For this reason, his delegation had repeatedly claimed that no S&D treatment should cause prejudice to another developing-country Member. In this context, Paraguay accepted the principle of flexibility, but the limit of flexibility was precisely that such differential treatment did not cause prejudice to other developing countries. This position was clearly embodied in the first part of paragraph 12 of the report in TN/CTD/7. 51. In December 2002 Members had reached a particularly important understanding on the Enabling Clause, and Paraguay hoped that this Clause would be implemented in spirit and in letter as agreed in 1979, i.e. S&D treatment which was "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory". This was confirmed in Annex III of the report. However, yet another deadline would have to be extended. Paraguay had voiced its concern over this to the TNC the previous week and wished to do so again at the present meeting, since this would be the third time that a new deadline had been established. Similarly, the progress which had been made was not sufficiently encouraging to spark discussions, which in itself explained the lack of political will on the part of developed countries to proceed further. His delegation was committed to the implementation of what had been established at Doha. Members had agreed that S&D treatment provisions should be strengthened and made more precise, effective and operational. However, the discussions in the CTD in Special Session had led to a consensus that significant clarifications by the General Council were required, as clearly stated in paragraph 18 of the report. Paraguay hoped that at the end of this process an understanding would be reached that S&D treatment should not cause prejudice to developing countries not receiving such treatment, and that it should, above all, prevent discrimination. He reiterated that his delegation was committed to the negotiating process currently under way and that it was hoping for more indeed, a great deal more given that the results to date were unsatisfactory. 52. The representative of the European Communities said his delegation was somewhat disappointed by the report of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. The Community had been working hard and in good faith on Agreement-specific proposals. Work on these issues had taken more time than might have been required, and the result might have been more substantive. Nonetheless, there was agreement on 12 measures, and in the Community's view Members should take a decision on these at the present meeting. It was demotivating to be unable to decide on matters where there was agreement. The fact that there was apparently no agreement on the way forward should not be an excuse to renounce taking decisions wherever that appeared possible. Members should try to highlight the areas of agreement rather than avoiding progress on a broad front. The Community was fully committed to making the Doha Development Round a success, and therefore the need to specifically address development needs in each and every one of the negotiating areas. The Community had been doing so in its proposals on agriculture and industrial products. In its services offers it would specifically take account of developing countries' interests, and would do so in any other sector. The Community remained fully committed to taking whatever decision was necessary on the basis of paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration with a view to strengthening S&D provisions, and remained of the opinion that more Agreement-specific measures could be decided before Cancn. The Community attributed an important role, as others, to the CTD in Special Session, which should continue to monitor and give overall guidance to the work on S&D. However, Members needed to be realistic and follow the earlier advice of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session to rationalize future work on S&D.

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53. No one could deny that part of the 85-odd proposals fell in the remit of the Negotiating Groups which, as a matter of fact, had already started to deal with S&D related issues, for example, the Agriculture Committee. One could not deny either that, on some matters, further input of technical subsidiary bodies appeared to be not only useful, but sometimes essential. At the same time, however, all agreed that it remained up to the CTD in Special Session to have the overall overview and to give guidance. His delegation did not understand the reluctance of Members to make full use of the CTD in Special Session in addressing, as well, cross-cutting issues which might be of value to give guidance to the work in the various Negotiating Groups. Members needed to develop a clear S&D strategy in the interests of developing countries, and it would therefore be necessary to link up effectively S&D, capacity building and domestic development, a point made by South Africa at the February meeting of the TNC. Under these circumstances, his delegation was not pleased with the recommendations included in the report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session which implied a standstill in future work in that body. Members urgently needed to find ways and means to break the present deadlock in the work on S&D, and to seek whatever clarification was necessary. He reiterated his delegation's suggestion at the February meeting of the TNC to organize a kind of retreat to discuss in-depth how to link up effectively S&D, capacity building and domestic development, and to clarify what should be done in the short term and what could be done in the medium and longer term. Such a discussion should be at the level of Heads of Delegations and might contribute to the necessary clarifications. This could be done either in the CTD in Special Session or in the General Council in Special Session. Members needed to speak clearly to each other, putting aside technical considerations, in order to increase mutual understanding in a result-oriented way and to see how they could make enough progress, both in the short and longer term. 54. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group, noted with satisfaction that progress had been made since the last meeting of the CTD in Special Session, and noted also that these results had been obtained as a result of the tenacity and determination of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. Nevertheless, in view of the mandate in paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, the results did not meet the expectations of the African Group, which had submitted more than 80 proposals. The more proposals they had submitted, and the more flexible they had been, the fewer responses and political will they had received from the other side. However, in order to enable the Special Session to continue its work in a positive spirit, he hoped that the General Council would clarify the interpretation of paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration and also paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. Only this clarification, which should be clear, precise and totally unambiguous, would make it possible to end the deadlock in this work and enable Members to work on a common consensus interpretation with a view to the Cancn Conference. Consequently, the African Group supported the recommendation by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session to suspend the work of the Special Session until that clarification had been provided by the General Council. 55. The representative of Kenya said that her delegation supported the statement by Morocco on behalf of the African Group. In spite of the efforts of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session and the numerous formal and informal meetings of that body, the outcome had been unsatisfactory. This had been stated by others, including the Community and China, and Kenya shared their disappointment. It was concerned that only 12 Agreement-specific proposals had been concluded, and that further work was required even on some of these. Her delegation was extremely frustrated that of the 80 proposals the African Group had submitted, only three had been agreed, after nearly a year of intensive consultations and discussions. At this rate, more than 20 years would be needed to go through the 80 proposals made by the African Group, and probably another 10 years to go through all the other submissions. This was not encouraging, nor did it send the right signal regarding Members' seriousness to conclude the work under the Doha mandate on time. As her delegation had stated previously, it had expected that the CTD in Special Session would focus on Agreement-specific proposals in order to fully realize the mandate that had been given to it. This had not been the case and, as could have been expected, it had been difficult to agree on a clear future work programme or

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on the issues and proposals themselves. Members were unable to agree either on process or on substance. 56. It was clear from the factual report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session that because of the differences in the interpretation of the Doha mandate, Members had not been able to agree. Kenya therefore supported the proposal that the General Council clarify this mandate so that all could have a common understanding on what should be done to strengthen and operationalize the S&D provisions. The clarification sought in the Chairman's report should not be seen as a challenge to instructions given at Doha, but rather as a way of bridging Members' thinking on this issue so that the CTD in Special Session could resume its work and complete its mandate before Cancn. Her delegation wished to stress that the mandate of the CTD in Special Session under paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration had been stated with a degree of urgency. The intention was to conclude the review of all S&D treatment provisions in order to strengthen and operationalize them before the Fifth Ministerial Conference. That urgency had unfortunately not been respected. However, Kenya remained hopeful that once the General Council had clarified the mandate, Members would embark on this work with a sense of seriousness and urgency. Although Kenya was committed to this process and stood ready to engage, it had to caution that its resources were limited and its ability to engage in multiple negotiations and consultations was under serious strain. This was a result of the slipping deadlines and the lack of political will to move the process forward. 57. The representative of Venezuela said that incorporating S&D treatment into the multilateral trading system was necessary in order to balance the vast differences between Members resulting from the Uruguay Round. The developing world's interest in maintaining the validity of this principle, an important one within the system, had once again been reflected in the Doha Declaration as one of the concessions made, so that developing countries would accept a new round of negotiations. Consequently, developing countries and LDCs had been treating these issues very seriously and had made constructive proposals for identifying ways of implementing their obligations and exercising their rights in a manner consistent with the postulates of development. However, since work on this matter had begun, one group of developed countries had maintained that the mandate from Ministers did not include introducing any amendments to the agreements in order to render S&D treatment provisions effective, operational and mandatory, and had sought to portray S&D treatment as limited to a few horizontal issues. Venezuela believed that an adequate balance of rights and obligations between such diverse Members might well require recourse to re-interpretation or some other approach, including amendment of the texts, to ensure that the S&D treatment provisions were operational, mandatory and effective. The General Council was being called upon to give renewed impetus to the task entrusted to Members. Venezuela therefore appealed to the General Council to work constructively and not to repeat the sterile discussion which had taken place in the CTD in Special Session. Incentives were needed to keep spirits high in the run-up to Cancn and to guarantee the success of that Conference. 58. The representative of Canada said that Canada was fully committed to and engaged in fulfilling the mandate of the Doha Declaration on S&D treatment. It believed that the report presented by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session represented a comprehensive account of the work in that body, and demonstrated that some progress had been made in the consideration of the Agreement-specific proposals. However, this had been rejected by some Members as insufficient. This rejection was unfortunate, as some of the agreed proposals would have set Members on a path to reducing some of the problems identified by developing-country Members, and in particular the leastdeveloped. Having reached this impasse, the CTD now turned to the General Council for guidance as to how to proceed. Canada believed the General Council should draw from the experience of the work of the CTD in Special Session to date, and suggested that the following four points be taken into account to ensure that the work proceeded more efficiently and more productively than it had to date. First, many of the Agreement-specific proposals related to trade-related technical assistance (TRTA). Canada, along with many other Members, was working actively to enhance TRTA and capacity building. His delegation could not, however, commit its Government to undertaking in the WTO to

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deliver mandatory and open-ended technical assistance. Canada believed that technical assistance proposals should be examined in the context of the WTO's integrated TRTA plan. Second, Canada was prepared to give sympathetic consideration to proposals for extensions of transition periods or other S&D provisions. In the interests of transparency, it believed that such extensions should be reviewed on their individual merits and therefore should not operate on an automatic or selfdetermined basis. 59. Third, Canada was willing to examine proposals for amendment of WTO agreements in the appropriate WTO bodies. To that end it supported the active engagement of the CTD in Special Session as set out in paragraph 51 of the Doha Declaration. Fourth, and more specifically, Canada was working actively with developing-country Members to assist them in meeting WTO-agreed health and safety standards. It believed that the SPS and TBT Committees had achieved a considerable measure of success in meeting this objective, but wished to make clear that it was not able to agree to proposals which would compromise health and safety standards in Canada. Canada supported the report presented by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, and regretted that it had not been possible to harvest agreement on the set of proposals set out in Annex III of that report. Canada agreed that faced with this impasse, Members needed guidance from the General Council as to how to proceed more effectively to meet the mandate on S&D treatment set out in the Doha Declaration. 60. The representative of Argentina said that the report submitted by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session showed the enormous difficulties that had confronted the work of that body and which were reflected in the very meagre results achieved. This had been in spite of the enormous input of energy, imagination and diplomatic talent the Chairman of that body, with the excellent assistance of the Secretariat, had injected throughout the process. In addition, Members had spared no energy or resources during this process. Proof of this was the large number of proposals that had been made and the great number of meetings, both formal and informal, that had taken place. There was no doubt that only very powerful factors could explain the lack of progress in spite of this enormous amount of resources and energy that had been devoted. The main reason delegations had highlighted was the differing interpretations of the Doha mandate, particularly regarding paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration and paragraph 12.1 of the Decision on Implementation. While there clearly were differences, it was important to pinpoint the basic factors underlying the different approaches. In the final analysis, and as some delegations had said, what defined substance and the direction of action was political will in this case the political will to produce changes in the multilateral trading system necessary for a fair, balanced and beneficial integration of the developing and least-developed countries. 61. Members were supposed to be dealing with a development agenda, and the Doha round was a development round. However, it was the issues of most interest to the developing countries which were being postponed and not being resolved. There had been a succession of circumstances which were becoming a trend, and which applied to all areas of the negotiations. It could be discussed in the General Council whether paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration or paragraph 12.1 of the Decision on Implementation made it possible to amend the agreements or not. Positions for or against would be eloquently defended with serious arguments on both sides. However, this discussion would not resolve the current difficulties. Apart from an exchange of views, it was necessary that all actors, particularly the main ones, recognized that the health, flexibility, and solidity of the multilateral trading system imperatively required the active involvement of the developing countries and the LDCs, and that this involvement required that the system involve them as actors and protagonists, so that as a result of their interaction with other actors, they could fulfil their needs and meet their expectations. Lack of progress on these issues did not affect just the developing countries, but the multilateral trading system as a whole. Based on these considerations, his delegation would support any initiatives, and would make all the necessary efforts to ensure that in the context of the recommendations by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, these were based on the considerations Argentina had outlined.

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62. The representative of Indonesia recalled that at the General Council meeting in July 2002, developing and least-developed countries had again shown flexibility in accepting an extension of the deadline to continue the discussion of S&D treatment provisions. In light of the discussions held thus far, especially in the past two months, what had been achieved had been really insignificant. Indonesia agreed with others that progress had been made on some S&D provisions. However, if one compared the number of Agreement-specific proposals submitted by the African countries, LDCs, and a group of developing countries, including Indonesia, what had been agreed was far short of the expectations of many delegations. His delegation was deeply disappointed with the slow progress of the discussions on S&D provisions. Regarding the issue of the way forward and paragraph 22 of the report in TN/CTD/7, where the General Council was asked to give further clarification and directions on how to deal with the different views and perceptions regarding the mandate, Indonesia supported previous speakers who had reiterated what Ministers had stated in the Doha Declaration, namely that they attached importance to the issue of the S&D treatment, and agreed to seek a prompt solution and to take concrete actions on these issues. His delegation believed therefore that this subject had the highest priority in the work programme, and that it had to be concluded before the Cancn Ministerial Conference. 63. The representative of Colombia said that his delegation had been carefully following the work of the CTD in Special Session and wished to state its disappointment over the lack of any concrete results to the benefit of the developing countries. Colombia very much regretted that some countries had put on the table issues that, rather than strengthening the position of developing countries, had promoted differences among those countries. His delegation wished to stress the factual nature of the first part of the report. Colombia supported the discussions that would take place in the General Council on the Special Session's scope and mandate, and would take part in them in a constructive way. He said that it might be useful for the General Council to try to find different ways of undertaking the process that would lead to more productive discussions in the CTD. In particular, one could examine which provisions relating to S&D had actually been applied in an effective way to the benefit of the developing countries, and the impact and benefits on those countries. In the same way one could identify those provisions that had not been applied, or had been applied only in a marginal way, and these analyses could help Members determine what type of S&D treatment was being applied by developed countries and to understand why certain provisions were applied and others not. This might shed light on how to make operational more effective S&D treatment which at present was an integral part of WTO agreements and was essential for the strengthening of the multilateral trading system. The imbalances of the Uruguay Round in view of world circumstances were now acquiring greater dimensions. It was extremely important that the multilateral system continued to support the difficult situation in which many developing countries found themselves, and their lack of capability to face on their own the great challenges involved in participating in world markets and meeting major international challenges. 64. The representative of Uganda said that whatever little and it was indeed very little had been achieved in the CTD in Special Session was due to its Chairman. He associated his delegation with the statement by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs and Morocco on behalf of the African Group. Both the LDCs and Africa remained very much marginalized in the multilateral trading system. It was therefore not surprising that they had a special interest and had made enormous efforts with regard to the question of S&D treatment. These countries were a clear example of those needing S&D treatment. They had had high expectations from the adoption of paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration and paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation, regarding the review of S&D treatment provisions to make them more precise, effective and operational, and that had been their objective. He recalled the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on measures in favour of LDCs, paragraph 1 of which stated that, "notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the leastdeveloped countries and for as long as they remain in that category, while complying with the general rules set out in the aforesaid instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and institutional capabilities". Paragraph 2(v) of that Decision also stated that,

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"[l]east-developed countries shall be accorded substantially increased technical assistance in the development, strengthening and diversification of their production and export bases including those of services, as well as in trade promotion, to enable them to maximize the benefits from liberalized access to markets". 65. These had guided the LDCs in their presentations. The LDCs had engaged constructively and had been willing to be flexible, but regrettably in some cases their developed partners had diluted the Decision taken by Ministers in Marrakesh. They regretted that agreement had been reached on only a few of their proposals. Suggestions had been made that some of the issues should be taken up either in negotiating groups or in specialized subsidiary bodies. However, as his delegation had said at the February meeting of the TNC, the LDCs' stance on this issue had been born of their experience with implementation issues, which had taken a similar route and on which no progress had been achieved to date. Thus, it was understandable why these countries were very apprehensive to take that route. Moreover, most developing countries, in particular LDCs, would require more resources to follow these issues in many of the subsidiary bodies, whereas in the CTD in Special Session they had been able to be more focused and to put their manpower where they felt it would have maximum effect. It was their hope that S&D issues would not suffer the same fate as implementation issues. The CTD in Special Session had requested the General Council to clarify the mandate from Ministers, and Uganda hoped this would be possible, since it seemed that some were revisiting that mandate. His delegation would remain engaged. 66. The representative of Hungary said that the report unfortunately indicated there was no possibility of even a partial outcome at the present time on the issues on which agreement had been reached. Hungary was concerned about this situation, as it agreed with those who had emphasized that S&D was one of the most important elements of the Doha Development Agenda. Hungary had taken an active part in this work, had made proposals and had tried to carry the negotiations forward, and was concerned that there might be implications from the kind of stalemate Members were in. From paragraph 22 of the report it was clear that all work in the CTD in Special Session would be suspended pending clarification of the mandate by the General Council, which meant that work could not continue even in areas where the mandate was not an issue, and that no further progress could be made. Hungary very much regretted this situation, as it had been ready to go further and to look for solutions acceptable to all. However, Members had to recognize that there was no possibility to continue the work if there was no consensus on the mandate, especially in the absence of agreement from those countries which would be the beneficiaries of the provisions in question. 67. He wished to make three remarks about the present situation. First, Hungary was concerned over the possible precedent Members were setting with this kind of decision, i.e. asking for clarification by the General Council regarding paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. As all were aware, the negotiation and agreement of this Declaration had taken basically three years and a major effort. First there had been the failure in Seattle and the need to agree on the language of a mandate on which the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) could be launched. Hungary was concerned that by asking the General Council for clarifications about certain aspects of the Doha mandate, Members would be stepping back to a pre-Doha situation. Many delegations, including Hungary, were unhappy with various aspects of the Doha Ministerial mandate. In other cases, the provisions of the Doha Declaration were ambiguous, which was either intentional or the outcome of difficult negotiations. Hungary was concerned that based on this precedent, some countries might ask for clarification of, for example, the meaning of non-trade concerns in agriculture. He could list other controversial subjects. Members were at a major cross-roads in their negotiations and had to think about the implications of any such decision. 68. Second, there was no deadline set for this clarification, which meant that the issue of the meaning of the mandate would be like a Damocles' sword dangling above Members, who would not know whether or when it would fall, damaging negotiations in other areas. Third, there was a need for balanced progress, and he recalled the Director-General's statement at the recent TNC meeting that

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uneven progress would endanger the whole set of negotiations. The route being considered would leave one of the most important aspects of the negotiations in a kind of frozen state, with no progress on any aspect. This would clearly affect progress in other areas. Members had to recognize this situation and look for all possible ways and means to carry this work forward. In Hungary's view, it would be useful to continue work in the CTD in Special Session, including on the implications and implementation of the mandate. Those issues which had been put forward in the CTD in Special Session and which were covered by negotiations in other bodies could and should be taken up in those bodies. Lastly, Hungary could support the Community's idea of Members dealing with this issue in a targeted way at a retreat. What it could not do was to sit back and leave this issue unattended. 69. The representative of Japan said that without the able guidance and hard work of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session over the weekend as well as the support by the Secretariat, the report could not have been approved. Japan had been working with other Members, both developed and developing, to solve as many Agreement-specific proposals as possible and to contribute to the discussions on broader issues such as cross-cutting issues, including the Monitoring Mechanism. Since the General Council meeting in December 2002, Members' collective efforts had brought eight additional Agreement-specific proposals to the list of these for final approval of the General Council. His delegation was deeply disappointed that the report of the CTD in Special Session failed to recommend the Annex containing the list of 12 Agreement-specific proposals for approval by the Council. It was regrettable that the very countries which had made these proposals now opposed their approval by the Council. Japan, together with other Members, was ready and willing to continue the work in a manner which did not cause serious difficulties for Members with small missions in Geneva, in order to make a final push towards adding some Agreement-specific proposals to the list, while focusing the work on the broader issues following the present meeting. However, work depended on the action of the General Council on the points of major disagreement among Members. Japan noted that many delegations took the position that unless the General Council clarified the interpretation of the Doha mandate on S&D, meaningful work would not be possible, and that this mandate included amending the existing S&D provisions. The same group of countries also claimed that it was not until all Agreement-specific proposals were solved that other issues, such as cross-cutting issues, would be addressed. Japan could not share these views, but would actively participate in the discussions in the General Council in order to enable all Members to resume work as soon as possible on this very important issue. 70. Japan believed that the mandate was clear and unambiguous, and it had been working in the CTD in Special Session to carry out this mandate. Obviously, Members were free to make any proposals, including amendments to the existing S&D provisions, but the mandate did not provide that the proposals be accepted as proposed. Japan believed that those proposals calling for amendments of the existing S&D provisions would be most appropriately addressed in the relevant negotiating bodies. It also believed that the proposal seeking the automatic application of S&D provisions would jeopardize the existing procedures and damage the transparency of work in the WTO. Binding commitments to duty-free and quota-free treatment for all LDC products, and introduction of obligations to extend technical assistance to unknown or indeterminate needs of the developing countries would not be accepted, for well explained and clear reasons. However, these views had largely been neglected or opposed. It took two to tango, and 144 Members to carry out a mandate. Japan was of the view that all Members should focus on how much they could achieve on this important issue of S&D under the Doha mandate and should be aware of their collective responsibility in this endeavour. 71. The representative of Switzerland said that despite enormous efforts, Members had come up with what was in his delegation's view an unsatisfactory result. Switzerland regretted this turn of events. His delegation felt that real progress had been achieved in recent weeks on specific proposals submitted by developing countries and LDCs. It had been possible to reach agreement on 12 proposals, which Switzerland did not consider to be a mean result. This result was especially significant because it would probably have been possible to reach consensus on other proposals had

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Members had more time and had they been more ready to compromise. Unfortunately, this process had now been interrupted because of a disagreement about the meaning of the mandate given by Ministers in Doha. In his delegation's view, the difficulties encountered did not necessarily mean that Members had to go back and examine the meaning and content of the mandate. If they could not agree on the responses to specific proposals, this was not because the mandate from Ministers was ambiguous. Rather, the difficulties stemmed from the fact that Members judged the merits of the proposals in different ways. This could occur in any negotiation process and in any exercise undertaken within this organization. It was a fact of WTO life and one of the rules of the game. If it had not been possible to reach agreement, it was essentially because Members differed on the substance of what was involved in these problems, and this had little to do with the mandate from Ministers. 72. There were also differences of view on the appropriate place to conduct such an exercise. Some, including Switzerland, felt that proposals which involved amendments to WTO agreements could only be successful if they were dealt with in their proper context, i.e. within a negotiating group. In addition, the claim that all issues raised regarding WTO agreements had to be resolved before moving on to anything else, such as cross-cutting issues or those related to the architecture of the WTO, was excessive. The problems which had arisen essentially had to do with differences about substance. It was clear that certain claims could not be satisfied, and as negotiators, Members had to accept this. His delegation had continued to push forward as much on specific issues as on more general, cross-cutting and horizontal issues which had to do with the architecture of S&D in the context of the WTO. The problems of development were fundamental to all that had been done in Doha, and there were various contexts in which Members could express their views on such matters. Some contexts, for example the respective negotiations on certain issues, were perhaps better suited than others to achieving the results sought. His delegation hoped that developing countries could benefit from the opportunities open to all Members to express their views. The decision to suspend the work of the CTD in Special Session would not prevent any Member from voicing its claims or making its proposals in the existing bodies of the WTO, especially in the negotiating bodies. 73. The representative of the United States said that the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session had made such dedicated use of his time that this had undoubtedly been at some cost to his ability to follow other issues, and all owed him a debt of gratitude. As others had said, the dearth of progress on these issues had in no way been the fault of that Chairman. His delegation shared the disappointment of others that more had not been achieved in the process, since many hours had been dedicated, both in Geneva and in capitals, to produce results. From the beginning, the United States had seen the Special Session process as an opportunity to engage in real problem solving, and to determine where existing S&D provisions were and were not working. His delegation agreed with Colombia that a useful starting-point for the work of this group would be to look at the utilization and actual experiences with existing provisions. For that reason, the United States had been disappointed when its proposals at the beginning of the process had not been met with much interest. However, when specific proposals had been made, his delegation had welcomed them as a means for Members to focus their work and to share their interests. 74. The United States had consistently seen this as a qualitative process, not a quantitative one. Success could not only be measured meaningfully by the number of proposals ultimately agreed upon. The United States had taken this exercise seriously and had dedicated many hours to examining proposals, providing comments in formal meetings and engaging in active dialogue on them. In a number of cases, where it could not agree on proposals, the United States had suggested alternatives. However, on many other proposals, it had not been able to do so for several reasons. First, it had found that a number of proposals dealt with issues that were inextricably intertwined with matters under consideration in negotiating groups and did not see how they could be dealt with separately from those groups. On some proposals, his delegation believed that acceptance would have negative implications for the trading system itself. For example, his delegation did not believe it was constructive to agree that any WTO Member could unilaterally change its WTO obligations through

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automatic extensions at its request, by allowing that Member to have a waiver without further examination of its merits. Nor did it believe that the fundamental transparency obligations of the WTO should be eliminated in perpetuity for any set of countries. Similarly, the United States had strongly supported advancing technical assistance in the WTO through the establishment of the Global Trust Fund. However, proposals that called for binding commitments to technical assistance or the piecemeal meeting of objectives were inappropriate and unwise. 75. The United States was committed to continuing work on making S&D provisions more precise and meaningful to developing countries, in particular the LDCs. However, it did not believe that changing every "should" to "shall" was a meaningful way of accomplishing this goal. Success would not be measured by how many of any group's proposals were accepted. Rather, it would be measured by what Members had done to make the system function more effectively for all. The United States remained committed to that goal. His delegation was disappointed with the report of the CTD in Special Session and its call for the suspension of work. It was particularly disappointed although there had been difficulties on specific proposals that Members had not agreed to continue at least some work on the monitoring mechanism and architectural issues which were clearly part of the mandate or other horizontal issues. Time was a precious commodity and even if Members felt that they might not be in a position to reach closure on some issues, the United States believed it was a waste of resources and time not to have continued, or at least to begin discussion of these issues which Members had barely spent any time on. Regarding the recommendation of the Special Session to the General Council, the United States did not see the problem as one of interpretation of the mandate, but rather as honest differences of views on substance. Nevertheless, it would join in the work of the General Council on these issues in the hope of moving work forward. 76. The representative of Australia said his delegation welcomed the agreement the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session had been able to achieve in presenting a report to the General Council, but was very disappointed that Members had not been able to make more progress. One of the areas many delegations had spoken about was the fact that there had been agreement on 12 proposals, but there was no consensus to adopt them. This was particularly unfortunate. Members had made some progress, and his delegation did not understand why they could not inscribe that progress. The notion of everything or nothing would not stand Members in good stead in the negotiations. In fact, Australia had been in a position to agree to some additional proposals, which the Chair of the CTD in Special Session had put forward, but progress had not been possible. Australia wanted to continue to work on this, and was very disappointed that the conclusion of the Special Session was that it should suspend its work, as this was a very retrograde step. His was one of the delegations which was very sceptical about the need to clarify the mandate for the Special Session's work. For the reasons Hungary had put forward, even though the General Council might be entitled to look at this mandate, the idea of revisiting any one particular paragraph of the Doha Declaration had all sorts of implications that would not make the task of achieving the results Ministers wanted any easier, and would undoubtedly complicate the whole process of the preparations for Cancn. 77. Australia was one of the delegations which thought that the problem of making progress on the Agreement-specific proposals involved the proposals themselves, not the mandate. For the reasons set out by Switzerland, Canada, the United States and others, Australia believed that obtaining progress on these was a matter of political will, but that the political will would have to come from all sides. In the next few months in the negotiations, delegations were going to focus on some key core areas of the WTO, i.e. in market access. These were the areas which, in Australia's view, were going to deliver some real and meaningful development results for developing countries elimination of agricultural export subsidies, a substantial reduction in the agricultural support policies rich countries maintained, and the elimination of tariff escalation and tariff peaks on tropical products, fishery products, forestry products, electrical products and leather goods. 78. That was not to say, nor did Australia wish to imply in any way, that it did not attach importance to paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration. What he was trying to suggest was that there

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were synergies between what Members were trying to achieve on the core issues of market access and what they were trying to achieve on paragraph 44, and there was no reason why these should not go together. Members should be very reluctant to accept the recommendations of the CTD in Special Session to suspend its work. To the contrary, delegations should ask the Special Session to get back to work, try to push ahead with negotiations both on Agreement-specific proposals and on crosscutting issues, while perhaps not at the break-neck speed of recent weeks, but this work should proceed in parallel with the work in other areas. It would be very useful if developing countries could, amongst themselves, work out some priorities in terms of the Agreement-specific proposals put forward. Australia would be happy to put priority on proposals from LDCs or countries in Africa. His delegation wished to reiterate that nothing much would come of a debate in the General Council to try to interpret the meaning of paragraph 44. What was important was that delegations got back to the work in the Special Session and made some progress across the board. 79. The representative of Norway said his delegation felt that in the present situation it seemed that the beneficiaries of this work developing countries and LDCs wished to reflect further on what Members were doing in the CTD in Special Session before taking decisions on these issues. His delegation too was disappointed that the important work of the CTD in Special Session could not go forward in a clear and dedicated way. Norway felt that the requests of the beneficiaries to think through what was going to be achieved in this work had to be taken seriously. This was why his delegation felt there was no alternative but to accept the recommendation which had come from the CTD in Special Session. It was normal to make a clarification of the mandate in a negotiation setting. However, Members should not paint the devil on the wall. While this was the first time that any of the negotiating groups had asked a superior body to express a view on a mandate, in at least a couple of negotiating groups there had been an active discussion on how to interpret the mandate, for example, in the Committee on Trade and Environment and to some extent in the Negotiating Group on Rules. In itself, this was just a way to help the issues progress. 80. Having said this, his delegation felt that perhaps "clarification" was not the right word. What Members were really looking for was some guidance in order to see how they could deal with some of the underlying issues that were holding up the process. Members had to be honest with themselves. For example, the discussion on the cross-cutting issues, described in paragraphs 10-12 of the report, showed that on some of the fundamental cross-cutting issues, it would be very difficult to agree on the level of ambition regarding the Agreement-specific proposals, because this was the crux of the matter. Some Members had said that some of the Agreement-specific proposals, which had a very wide context, were really less committing than the original S&D provisions in the agreement. The question was how to approach these issues. The Community's proposal for a dedicated session was obviously linking some of the more fundamental development issues to the work on S&D, and there should be follow up on how that could be done. Whether the discussion was in a dedicated session or a special session of the General Council, it was very important to have more guidance on the crucial issues which could help remove the present bottle-neck. Norway believed that if Members could find a greater level of understanding on some of these crucial issues, which basically were some of those mentioned under the paragraphs on cross-cutting issues, work would be able to continue, including on the Agreement-specific proposals, in due course. 81. The representative of Haiti said that Bangladesh, on behalf of the LDCs, had already explained the reasons why S&D treatment was important for the LDCs, and many delegations had repeated them. In light of the statements made at the present meeting, and aside from the recommendations of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, it seemed necessary for Members to see more clearly where they were going. As his delegation saw it, the mandate was clear. It was to examine and analyze all the provisions relating to S&D treatment and make them more operational and more effective, with all that this implied. Having heard Members' statements under this item, the question was should these provisions be made more binding on Members, and this became more urgent when Members examined how to implement what Ministers had decided in paragraph 12.1 of the Decision on Implementation. He had even heard several delegations say that Members should not

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deal with cross-cutting issues, but this paragraph specifically said that such issues all issues relating to S&D treatment had to be examined. Members were now deadlocked. Haiti understood the reactions of many Members, and especially of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. Should explanations be given every time Members found themselves in a deadlock, this would hold up and make impossible the organization's work. 82. His delegation had followed the discussions in the Special Session as far as it had been able. It supported those who had said that the heart of the problem was the lack of political will. Some had said there was a difference of views as to substance. If this were so it was important that the General Council take note of this and help to break the deadlock. This would have consequences for the Ministerial Conference in Cancn. It would have consequences for small delegations such as his own, which were unable to go to all of the meetings where Members repeated their positions again and again. This was a dialogue of the deaf and there was no political will. As Norway had said, some guidance was needed. The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session had asked the General Council for clarification, but was not calling for an interpretation. It was being asked to indicate the way forward, and it was the General Council that was in a position to provide guidance on this. Without a methodology, Members would lose their way, and as the United States had correctly pointed out, time was money. It was time for the General Council to take a decision. If it could not or did not want to point the way forward, Members would have to go to the Ministerial Conference, as this was the highest body. If Members had to take this failure to the Ministerial Conference, it would be to their shame. However, this was not a desirable course, and Members should try to find appropriate means to get out of this deadlock. The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session was asking for light to be shed on this matter, and the General Council should try to do that in the way its Chairman felt was most appropriate, so that this mandate which was so important not only for the LDCs but for all Members would be given the treatment it deserved. Haiti, despite its weakness, was prepared to contribute to a successful outcome, and could be relied upon to do everything to try to find a solution to this problem. 83. The representative of Korea said that his delegation had mixed feelings about the results thus far of the S&D review. It shared with many developing countries their disappointment that the CTD in Special Session could not fully meet what Ministers had mandated, even with the extension of the deadline at the end of July 2002. At the same time, it was also disappointed that Members could not harvest some of the meaningful progress they had made. Agreement had been reached in principle on 12 proposals and an additional 21 proposals were in the final stage of discussion. There had also been limited but substantial progress in other areas, such as cross-cutting issues, the monitoring mechanism and technical and financial assistance and training. The General Council was about to be entrusted with the difficult and daunting task of providing a clarification on, and the legal and practical means to give effect to, the mandate. Korea hoped this exercise would be conducted not only in an expedited manner so as to avoid overburdening the Cancn Ministerial, but also in a positive manner so that Members could contain its spill-over effect on the negotiations in other areas. His delegation would support any initiative which could lead to an early and constructive solution. 84. The representative of India said it was a tribute to the patience of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session that Members had been able thus far to engage in constructive work, and a tribute to his perseverance that they were close to agreement on at least 12 of the Agreement-specific proposals. His delegation agreed with many of the statements made earlier by the proponents of various proposals and also the statements by some other developing-country delegations that had taken an active part in the discussions in the CTD in Special Session, namely China, Brazil and others. His delegation shared the disappointment expressed by so many at the present meeting. The lack of sufficient progress was not, in India's view, in consonance with the development dimension of the Doha Development Agenda. China and Paraguay had pointed out that the lack of progress was due to the lack of political will. Many Members at the previous General Council and TNC meetings had observed that implementation issues and S&D issues were the litmus test for the development complement of the DDA. One now had the results of that litmus test, and it was there for all to

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evaluate and draw their own conclusions. The problems developing countries had faced in the CTD in Special Session had been highlighted in the report submitted by its Chairman. The road blocks were also clearly identified therein. India looked forward to early clarification and guidance from the General Council which would help Members to restart the work in the CTD in Special Session. 85. The Chairman said that the results reported at the present meeting were a disappointment for all of the reasons Members had stated, but that care should be taken in simply referring matters to the General Council. While this sometimes appeared to be easy or convenient, nothing could be further from the truth. He recalled, for example, the experience of sending the rules of origin issue to the General Council, which had been supposed to deal with it at the political level, by engaging Ambassadors, turning a new page, and sending a message to capitals. While he was not saying that this issue was similar to the rules of origin issue, it was a fact that in the General Council discussions on the latter, it had proved to be very difficult to get more than four or five Ambassadors at any one meeting. That exercise had not yielded very different political value. In his view Members should think twice about sending matters to the General Council, which already had a full plate with issues going to Cancn. While he was in delegations' hands, he would advocate that, rather than adopting the report with the repercussions that would have, Members consider taking note of it. This would allow a period of reflection. There would obviously be a need for consultations, but he would be more comfortable, as Chairman, proposing that the General Council take note of the report, given the great trepidation many Members had expressed about formalizing the issues of clarification of the mandate and suspension of the Special Session's work. The action he suggested would perhaps do better justice to all Members' positions at the present meeting. He was prepared to do whatever the membership wanted, but wished to invite Members to consider taking one small step back, in order to allow for some flexible reflection. He did not know how the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session might feel about this suggestion, and invited the latter's thoughts. 86. The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session said that he too was in Members' hands on this question. The recommendations in TN/CTD/7 were those of the Special Session itself, and it was for Members to decide whether or not they were prepared to take the step back the General Council Chairman had, in his wisdom, suggested. He would be comfortable with either course of action, given that this matter had been discussed exhaustively in the Special Session, which had decided, after great consideration, on the recommendations in the report. There had been many thought-provoking statements under this item at the present meeting, and if Members were of the view that they should take a step back, as Chair of the CTD in Special Session he would not and could not have difficulty with that. 87. The representative of India said that his delegation had also listened carefully to what others had had to say. There was an essential difference between the mandate on other negotiating subjects and the mandate on S&D issues. A specific deadline was mentioned in the Doha Declaration for completing the work of the Special Session by 31 July 2002. That deadline had been extended to 31 December and again later to the present meeting. Despite these two extensions, India did not think Members had progressed meaningfully in the Special Session. He took the General Council Chairman's suggestion in the right spirit, but needed some time to consult other proponents of the proposals, in order to see whether it would be desirable to adopt the report or to take note of it. He thus requested that consideration of this item be suspended until after the upcoming lunch break or perhaps until the end of the meeting. 88. The General Council agreed to suspend consideration of this item, and to revert to it following the lunch break. 89. Following the lunch break, the Chairman recalled that delegations had been asked to reflect on this issue, and said that he had done some reflecting himself. As Chair, he would be disposed to propose taking note of the report and of all the statements, and that there be consultations, which his

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successor would have to conduct, in collaboration and cooperation with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. 90. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs, recalled that their views on the text prepared by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session was reflected in that text. They had also expressed their position in their earlier statement at the present meeting. They had heard the options presented, and wished to reiterate that they would prefer adoption of the report by the General Council. 91. The Chairman asked if Bangladesh's preference for adoption meant it would be opposed to taking note of the report. 92. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs, replied in the affirmative.

93. The Chairman proposed, on this basis, that the General Council adopt the report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session and take note of the statements. 94. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had participated quite actively in the discussions in the Special Session and agreed that the Chairman of that body had done excellent work. As he had not been at the meeting of the CTD in Special Session when the report had been adopted, he had only seen the report that morning. Throughout the discussion at the present meeting his delegation had felt disappointment, like many others. However, his delegation felt uncomfortable at being obliged to adopt a report in a situation where there seemed to be no reasonable way out, and when Members were doing so without having had time to reflect or for him to consult with his capital. Thus, what the General Council Chairman had suggested earlier seemed to make very good sense, as it would provide a breathing space which did not have to be very long. This would allow Members to think things over again and see whether they really wanted to adopt the report and find themselves set on a course of action which might make things more difficult. Chile would feel much more comfortable if Members could have this breathing space and be able to reflect on this matter more calmly. This would not harm the development of events or any Member's interests, and would provide a more solid foundation on which to take a decision. 95. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group, said these countries wished to see the report adopted. 96. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation was in the same position as Chile. It would feel extremely uncomfortable with a recommendation that would suspend work on S&D treatment, as provided in the last paragraph of the report. Members had to make their best efforts to find ways and means to make progress on S&D treatment. There had been several suggestions from delegations at the present meeting, including the Community, to go into more depth in the discussion and to make progress. It was only fair to ask the incoming Chairman of the General Council, in close contact with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session and in consultation with the membership, to consult on how to make a breakthrough in the existing deadlock. 97. The Chairman said that he was obviously in delegations' hands. While two delegations had responded in the negative concerning taking note of the report, two others were concerned about adopting the report. Thus, there seemed to be no clear consensus to adopt the report. Under the circumstances, all the General Council could do was to take note of all the statements, including the report, and ask his successor to hold consultations as soon as possible in conjunction with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session. 98. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation also considered it necessary to adopt the report, and drew attention to the fact that one of the two delegations in favour of adoption represented a large number of Members, namely, the African Group. If the report were not adopted, this issue

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would be left in a kind of limbo. Cuba did not think it would be fair to transfer the issue to the incoming General Council Chairman. 99. The representative of India said that the two delegations who had requested adoption of the report were speaking on behalf of two large groups, the LDCs and the African Group. His delegation had also considered very carefully what the General Council Chairman had said, and wished to have the report adopted. The Chairman had made the very pertinent point that there was no consensus on adoption. However, he respectfully wished to note that there was no consensus either on taking note of the report. 100. The representative of Japan supported the statements by Chile and the Community that work had been done and there was a need for some breathing space to think about the recommendation from the CTD in Special Session. Thus, Japan supported the suggestion to take note of the report. 101. The representative of Hungary noted that some delegations had said that only two delegations were against adoption of the report while numerous others supported adoption. Having regard to the situation his country would be in in just over a year's time, he said that Hungary was very much disturbed by the reference to the Community as "one delegation", when it represented a group of 15 and soon to be 25 countries with roughly 30 per cent of world trade. Aside from this, one delegation had referred to the danger that if Members followed this route for this particular subject, it might set a precedent for all difficult subjects and every subject under the DDA was difficult to stop negotiations and to send the issue back to the General Council for clarification of the mandate. Hungary remained of the view that it would be a momentous decision from the General Council at this point in time to take this route which was a rather slippery slope. He proposed that as there was apparently no consensus either for adoption or taking note, Members would perhaps have to consult informally and come back to this issue. This was just a procedural step, but for the reasons he had outlined, Hungary also did not consider adoption of the report to be a good idea. 102. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation supported adoption of the report.

103. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation's view was the same as Hungary's. In the circumstances, where delegations were positioning themselves on the report per se and what should be done with the report, the only option was to take note of the statements and to keep this issue on the agenda for the General Council's next meeting. 104. The Chairman said it was his view as Chair that there was no consensus to adopt the report. He therefore wished to ask the Secretariat, in order to provide clarity for the Indian delegation and others, what action, if any, the General Council took when there was no consensus. 105. Mr. Rogerson, Director of the Council and TNC Division, said that, on the technical point, taking note of reports or statements before the General Council was simply the basic act of the General Council to show that it had heard the reports or statements. This did not imply either approval or disapproval of any reports or statements, but simply showed that the Council had heard the reports or statements. 106. The Chairman said that as Chair, he felt he had no other option but to say essentially that there was no consensus for adoption of the report, and to propose therefore that the General Council revert to this matter, after having taken note of the report and of the statements, and invite its incoming Chairman, in coordination with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, to undertake consultations immediately on how to take this very important matter forward. 107. The representative of India said that he was not quite sure as to what decision the General Council had taken on the TRIPS issue earlier that day. If the intention had been to suspend the discussion on that item and to come back to it, once the TRIPS Council had taken a view, at a

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reconvened meeting of the General Council, then Members could discuss the present issue also, prior to which some informal consultations could be held on this particular aspect. 108. The representative of Kenya said that her delegation supported the statement by India. Members should perhaps consider continuing consultations and putting this item on the agenda of the next Council meeting, instead of taking note of the report. Kenya would not find it easy to accept that after having actually adopted the report in the CTD in Special Session, Members were now only willing to take note of it. Thus, perhaps Members should continue consultations until such a time as there was a consensus. 109. The Chairman said he thought the net effect was the same. India was basically saying that if the General Council suspended its consideration of the TRIPS item and anticipated coming back to it, perhaps it could also come back to the present item. Kenya was suggesting that Members keep it informal and consult. His own suggestion before the lunch break had been to take a step back, take a deep breath and proceed. In his view, Members were now basically converging around the same position. 110. The General Council agreed to the Chairman's proposal that the General Council revert to this matter, after having taken note of the report and of the statements, and invite its incoming Chairman, in coordination with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, to undertake consultations immediately on how to take this very important matter forward. 5. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration Progress report on the Committee's review of methodologies for future pay adjustments

111. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in December 2002, the General Council had adopted the recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration contained in document WT/BFA/62. The Committee's recommendation on the salary adjustment for the Secretariat recommended a 3 per cent salary increase as from 1 January 2003, a 1 per cent increase as from 1 July 2003, and such further adjustment as was necessary to restore parity with equivalent grades in the UN Common System. It further recommended that the Committee carry out a review of the methodologies for future pay adjustments, to be completed by 31 March 2003. The General Council had also taken note of his statement suggesting certain elements to help guide the Committee's work on this matter, including that the Committee be requested to make a progress report on this review to the General Council at the present meeting. 112. Mr. McMillan (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, reported on the Committee's progress on the review. The Committee had met twice since the December meeting of the General Council to examine the question of methodologies for future pay adjustments for the Secretariat, and a further meeting was scheduled for 17 February. It had examined a number of documents, including one provided by the WTO Staff Council, which had been introduced in the meeting by a representative of the Staff Council. In addition, it was his understanding that the Staff Council would present another paper at the Committee's next meeting. The Committee would continue to keep the Staff side informed of its discussions and allow them to present from time-to-time their views to the Committee. The information which had been presented by both the WTO Secretariat and the Staff Council had provided the Committee with a good basis for its discussions. While it was too early in the process to foresee what shape the final recommendation to the General Council would take, he sensed on the part of Members a very real determination to put this issue on a firm footing so that both Members and WTO staff would have a fair and equitable methodology for pay adjustments which was based on predictability and a mutually-acceptable process. The Committee would undoubtedly need to hold a number of meetings in order to come to a consensus on this question, but he assured the General Council that no effort would be spared to meet the deadline of 31 March 2003 for completion of the review.

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113. He then informed the General Council on three points which he felt might be of interest and which were before the Committee but were not strictly related to the question of pay. The first related to a paper which had been circulated to delegations (CRP(03)03) which proposed to set up a Trust Fund to facilitate the participation of LDC Members and observers at the Ministerial Conference in Cancn. In this connection, Members might wish to consider making donations to this Trust Fund, and a resolution of the Committee was attached to that paper asking Members to consider doing so as quickly as possible in order to allow the bookings to be made early, thus saving money. The second point was that the Committee was following up on its discussions, begun in the review of the budget proposals for 2003, regarding the reliance on temporary assistance for long-term staffing needs in the WTO, and also on a move to biennial budgeting. 114. Regarding the state of Technical Assistance Funds, he recalled that in December the General Council had approved a target of Sw F 24 million for the Doha Global Trust Fund. The Council Decision of 2001 required 25 per cent of the funds available to be remitted by 1 January and for the Budget Committee to report to the General Council on that. By 31 March a further 50 per cent was to be remitted, i.e. 75 per cent of all of the funds should be made available. There had been a significant balance at the end of 2002 of Sw F 6.5 million, which would be used in 2003 to finance the implementation of the 2003 Technical Assistance Plan. However, Sw F 2.3 million of pledged contributions had still not been paid to the Secretariat, and the Committee hoped that the cash would be paid in soon to allow the Secretariat to finance the implementation of the 2003 Plan. A further Sw F 1.1 million of contributions pledged for 2003 had already been paid by Canada and by Denmark into the WTO's bank account. This had brought total pledges registered for 2003 up to Sw F 6.7 million. Therefore, with the contributions pledged already paid into the WTO bank account, there was an amount of Sw F 19.5 million. The figures on this were included in document CRP(03)05. This amount should be measured against the target amount of Sw F 24 million. Therefore, the cash position of the Trust Fund was satisfactory at the moment and the 25 per cent target had been met. The next threshold would come at the end of March when there should be Sw F 18 million in the bank, and unfortunately Members were still some way from that. It was thus his duty to remind donors that, the pledges having been made, it would be very useful to have those cash amounts in as quickly as possible. 115. 6. The General Council took note of the statement by the Chairman of the Budget Committee. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee

116. The Director-General, Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, reported on the TNC's activities since the last report to the General Council in December 2002. The TNC had met on 4-5 February and had taken up two agenda items. The first concerned reports by the Chairpersons of bodies established by the TNC, of which there were four, since the other bodies had not held any meetings since the TNC meeting in December. Although some progress had been noted by participants in some areas, Members seemed to agree generally with his assessment that progress continued to be uneven. In comparison to the situation in December, the overall imbalance was now even more noticeable and preoccupying. He sensed that Members were accumulating unresolved issues as the next deadlines approached. The necessary political will to move forward on substance was yet to be seen in most areas, and genuine engagement among participants to explore avenues of convergence had not yet materialized. Given this situation and with only seven months remaining before Cancn, Members would need to intensify this process very rapidly. All knew what had and what had not been achieved so far. All knew as well what had to be done to ensure a successful Conference in Cancn, and the danger of going to Cancn with an overloaded agenda. 117. Members were now a third of the way through the time Ministers had given them to conclude the negotiations, and had now entered a more intensive phase the phase of real negotiation. This was when one had to start building positive linkages, and maintain the perspective of what one was trying to achieve. It was now that Members had to start to honour the commitment of Ministers at

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Doha to place development at the heart of the Round. He had suggested that the recent TNC meeting should signal a change of gear. Some important deadlines had been missed in 2002, positions remained far apart on many issues, and Members were moving too slowly in some negotiations. However, he remained guardedly optimistic. Members had not missed everything yet, and he was confident that progress was possible across the board. This was the message he conveyed to Ministers in his contacts with them. He had found that, whatever their misgivings about the results so far, political leaders in all regions were clear about the value of the WTO system as a vital element of stability and security. He had also found, in the private sector in both industrialized and developing countries, a renewed and very welcome positive interest in the WTO's agenda. He believed it was Members' job to build on this interest in the negotiations. The DDA had the potential to offer much to each and every participant, regardless of their level of development. The gains from a successful outcome to this work, and also the systemic stability that would result, were becoming increasingly necessary in the face of growing international uncertainty. 118. Under the second agenda item, he had reported on his informal consultations on possible next steps towards resolving outstanding implementation issues under paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Since the TNC meeting in December, he had undertaken a number of consultations on possible steps forward, including with the Chairpersons of the eight Councils and Committees which had been handling implementation issues in 2002. The objective of these discussions had been to seek a way in which the framework of five options, which he had outlined at the December TNC, could assist in the pursuit of mutually agreeable solutions. In this context, he had asked these Chairpersons to assist him in carrying out his further consultations as TNC Chair. In particular, he had asked them to consult and advise him further as to how they saw the possibilities for progress on their respective issues in terms of the five categories. At the TNC meeting, he had emphasized that this was not the same as just referring the issues back to the respective bodies. In other words, he had asked the eight Chairs to act as "Friends of the TNC Chair" and to consult on an informal basis, under the aegis of the TNC, in order to provide him with their best advice and assessment of possible ways forward. The Chairs would be assisted in their task by the Deputy Directors-General. He would make a further report on his consultations to the TNC at its meeting in March. 119. He also wished to report that the formal meeting of the TNC had been complemented by an informal exchange of views on the overall situation of the work. He believed this had provided a useful opportunity for participants to inject some fresh thinking into the debate and to respond more directly to each other. He felt that this format would prove conducive to a more dynamic and interactive exchange on some of the issues requiring attention, so that the TNC could better carry out its function of guiding the negotiations. It would perhaps be fruitful to focus on a few key areas in a similar informal segment at the next meeting, scheduled for 4-5 March. He also wished to mention that he had informed the TNC that he was considering convening a future TNC meeting at senior capital-based officials' level, to underline the importance of the negotiating targets and to increase the breadth as well as the depth of capitals' involvement. Such a meeting could take place in early April, and perhaps another in mid-year, as Members entered the home stretch to Cancn. 120. The representative of Botswana, speaking on behalf of the ACP Members, said that the ACP countries consisted of a fairly significant constituency of the WTO membership, as they included some 56 Members of the WTO and 10 observers. In addition, about half of these countries were LDCs. The collective concerns and interests of these countries therefore warranted serious and special attention. The ACP countries were faced with two sets of simultaneous negotiations one relating to the Doha Development Agenda and the other relating to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement. As Members would recall, negotiations on the EPAs had been launched in Brussels in September 2002 and were due to be completed by 31 December 2007. These countries therefore had to ensure that there was coherence between the Geneva and the Brussels negotiation processes, particularly in the light of the overlap in the subjects for negotiation. These included agriculture, services, market access, intellectual property

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rights, S&D treatment and rules. It therefore went without saying that negotiations on these issues in the WTO were of paramount importance to the ACP countries. They fully shared the deep sense of disappointment and frustration already expressed by many other developing-country delegations regarding the lack of any meaningful progress in the negotiations on many of the issues of priority to developing countries. 121. He then highlighted some of these issues as follows. On TRIPS and Public Health, it was generally acknowledged that many ACP countries currently faced major public health challenges, whose scale was unprecedented. According to UNAIDS/WHO Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics of 2002, out of the 42 million adults and children living with HIV/AIDS in the world, 29.4 million were in Africa, 440,000 in the Caribbean and 300,000 in the Pacific. There was therefore an urgent need for effective measures to assist ACP countries to cope with these public health challenges within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement. These countries were disappointed that an expeditious solution to the problem faced by countries with no or insufficient manufacturing capacity for pharmaceutical products had still not been found. The sticking point continued to be the scope of diseases to be covered under the compulsory licensing solution. As far as the ACP countries were concerned, the parameters of this issue were defined by the words "the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries" which appeared in paragraph 1 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. This was therefore not an issue for negotiation by delegations in Geneva. Ministers had conclusively negotiated this issue at Doha. It was only fair and proper that Members should stick to the broad scope of diseases agreed by Ministers. The ACP countries therefore wished to appeal to their trading partners in the developed world to exercise the necessary flexibility in order that agreement could be reached on this issue which was of vital importance to some countries where thousands of lives were lost on a daily basis. These countries welcomed the positive spirit of the Community's proposal, but it unfortunately fell short of their needs and expectations. There was a moral compulsion to find a sustainable, legally secure multilateral solution to this problem. The ACP Members remained hopeful that this could be achieved. 122. On S&D treatment, it was important to bear in mind that the objective of S&D treatment provisions in WTO Agreements was to facilitate the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system so as to avoid their marginalization. For the ACP countries, the strengthening and operationalization of S&D treatment provisions was not only a core element, but a top priority in the Doha Work Programme. They again wished to place on record their disappointment with the painfully slow rate of progress so far recorded on this matter, and were even more concerned over the prospect of missing yet another deadline on this issue. They therefore wished to appeal to their developed-country partners to demonstrate greater political will and commitment with respect to S&D treatment issues in the WTO. On regional trade agreements (RTAs), the ACP Members were very concerned with the slow pace of negotiations, particularly as they had a bearing on the EPA negotiations in Brussels. The ACP Members therefore wished to see meaningful progress in this area.. For the ACP countries, it was crucial that the negotiations should clarify and improve WTO rules covering RTAs between developed and developing countries, and take adequately into account the development dimension for developing countries. Regarding agriculture, this was an area of crucial importance to the economies of most ACP countries. They believed that current negotiations on agriculture should lead to real and meaningful reforms in the Agreement on Agriculture. There were essentially two areas of reform one was the effective and rapid decrease of protectionism in the developed countries, and the other was effective S&D treatment for developing countries. 123. In the first area, it was important that all forms of domestic subsidies and support in developed countries should be subject to discipline, as otherwise there would only be a substitution of one type of subsidy for another, and the net result would be continued distortion with detrimental effects on their countries. All forms of export subsidies should also be subject to a time-frame for elimination. The ACP countries were concerned in particular about their farmers' livelihoods, as they might be overwhelmed by cheap subsidized imports. Finally, high tariffs, tariff peaks and escalation

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in developed countries should be subject to rapid reduction in order to facilitate market access for developing countries. In addition, for the purposes of achieving rural development, poverty alleviation and employment creation, products of small farmers in developing countries for consumption within the country should not be subject to reduction commitments in relation to tariffs and domestic subsidies. The developing countries should also be allowed the use of the special safeguard mechanism for their agricultural products, and it was important that the procedures for using this mechanism be simple and not burdensome. 124. On market access for non-agricultural products, the negotiations were at an important phase, as the decision on the modalities would influence the course of the whole negotiation. The needs and interests of developing countries had to be taken into account. These interests could be summarized as follows: greater access to developed countries' markets for developing countries' products, and the ability of developing countries to set appropriate levels of import tariffs in line with their domestic conditions and policies. Many of the ACP countries had already faced problems where local firms had closed as they could not compete with cheap imports. If the modalities did not incorporate these considerations, the consequences could be detrimental and contrary to the stated purpose of the Doha Declaration. Tariff revenues as a percentage of government revenues for developed countries were negligible, at about 1 per cent for the OECD countries. Therefore, while complete or significant elimination of tariffs might have no negative impact on developed countries, it would deprive many developing-country governments of an important source of revenue. The modalities had to take into account the level of strength or weakness of local industries in the ACP countries, which could be affected by too rapid or too steep a rate of import liberalization. These modalities could not be in the nature of a one-size-fits-all approach or formula. Therefore, developing countries which did not have competitive local industries should not be pressured to reduce their tariffs below what they could reasonably bear. The modalities should guarantee sufficient flexibility for developing countries so that they could set their tariffs in line with their domestic industrial capacity. Thus, developing countries should not be subject to common formulas or to other approaches that imposed tariff reductions on them which could cause injury to their local industries. 125. In order to inspire confidence in the ACP countries that the Doha Agenda was indeed a development agenda, meaningful progress should be made in the negotiations on areas which addressed the development concerns and interests of the ACP and developing countries. As things currently stood, there was a real danger that the status of the entire post-Doha work programme could be thrown into jeopardy. Indications were that the road to Cancn was also most likely to be rough and bumpy, and with the potential to reverse the gains made at Doha. This had to be avoided at all costs. He assured Members that the ACP Members remained committed to the negotiations. As the negotiations progressed, these countries would be submitting proposals on the various aspects of the Doha Work Programme which were vital to their interests and concerns. 126. 7. The General Council took note of the Director-General's report and of the statement. Work Programme on Small Economies Report by the Chairman of the Dedicated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development

127. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in February and March 2002, the General Council had taken note of a framework and procedures for the conduct of the Work Programme on Small Economies, under which this Work Programme would be a standing item on the General Council's agenda. The framework and procedures also provided that the Committee on Trade and Development would report regularly to the General Council on the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on this subject. 128. Mr. Thompson-Flres, Deputy Director-General, on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development, reported on the Committee's activities in this regard. He said that a substantial report on progress on the Work Programme on Small Economies had been made at the

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December meeting of the General Council. This item appeared on the General Council's agenda as a standing item, and was very important to a large number of countries. Since the December 2002 General Council meeting, the Committee on Trade and Development had not met in Dedicated Session to discuss the issue of small economies. Therefore he did not have much to report. The next Dedicated Session had been scheduled for 10 March. He hoped that Members by then would have had enough time to consider the various documents before the Committee, would have new proposals to make, and would be ready to move the process forward. A preliminary date for another Dedicated Session had also been reserved. However, as a desire had been expressed to schedule the Dedicated Session during the Geneva Weeks in order to permit the participation of many non-resident missions that had an interest in this topic, the next Dedicated Session would most likely be held during the summer, and the date would only be announced once the dates for the Geneva Week had been fixed. As the Work Programme on Small Economies regularly appeared on the agenda of the General Council, it provided Members the opportunity to make statements to indicate their interests and views. He would greatly value any input interested delegations could provide, which would facilitate work in the coming months. 129. The General Council took note of the report by Deputy Director-General Mr. ThompsonFlres on behalf of the Chairman of the Dedicated Session of the CTD. 8. Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 (WT/L/512)

130. The Chairman recalled that paragraph 3(a) of the GATT 1994 provided an exemption from Part II of GATT 1994 for measures under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by a Member before it became a contracting party to GATT 1947, which prohibits the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in national waters or waters of an exclusive economic zone. On 20 December 1994, the United States had invoked the provisions of Paragraph 3(a) with respect to specific legislation that met the requirements of that paragraph. Paragraph 3(b) of the GATT 1994 called for a review of this exemption five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and thereafter every two years for as long as the exemption was in force, in order to examine whether the conditions which created the need for the exemption still prevailed. The General Council had last considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002, and had agreed, inter alia, as follows: first, that under the two-yearly cycle provided in paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994, this exemption would have to be reviewed again in 2003; second, that the General Council would come back to the issues raised at previous meetings of the General Council in the context of the review to be conducted under the next cycle in 2003; and third, that this review would be on the Agenda of the present meeting. 131. Interested delegations were also invited to submit comments and questions to the US regarding the operation of the legislation under the exemption, to which the US was invited to respond. These questions and responses, together with the annual report to be provided by the US under Paragraph 3(c) of GATT 1994, would form the basis for the review. It had also been agreed that for the purposes of the review, this matter would be on the Agenda of subsequent General Council meetings in the course of 2003 as the Chairman deemed appropriate or at the request of a Member. Further, at its meeting in December 2003, the General Council would be invited to take note of the discussions held in the course of the review until then, take any other action it might agree on, and take note that the subsequent review would normally be held in 2005. He drew attention to the annual report circulated by the United States in WT/L/512. 132. The representative of the United States said that as the Chairman had already noted, his delegation had submitted the notification required under paragraph 3(c) of GATT 1994, which included statistical information the United States was required to provide pursuant to this measure. His delegation did not have anything to add to the information in the notification, and stood ready to answer any questions Members might have.

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133. The representative of Panama thanked the United States for having introduced its communication in WT/L/512, but said that the introduction of the document should not be interpreted as discharging all of the United States' obligations under paragraph 3 of GATT 1994. Since Panama's statement at the December 2002 meeting of the General Council, there had been no new developments which might change its position a position it had defended for almost a year. Panama again invited the United States to examine questions of interpretation of the exemption for the notified legislation which was damaging the interests of his country. Only once these issues were resolved could it be considered that the review under paragraph 3 had indeed been carried out. 134. The representative of Chile endorsed the statement by Panama.

135. The representative of Australia said that as Members entered the third scheduled review of this matter, his delegation hoped that all parties with an interest would have the opportunity to have a more meaningful discussion and exploration of the circumstances behind this very long-standing derogation, and that this exchange would be far better than it had been in the past. A more rigorous review process would ensure that there would not be the rather sterile exchange which had characterized discussions in the past. As Australia had said on many occasions, its concerns on these issues were not only of principle but of important commercial interests for its shipbuilding industry. 136. The representative of Japan said that his delegation had noted that despite the Chairman's suggestion to proceed on an informal basis and to deepen the review in question, this process had not borne much fruit to date. In this new review cycle, Members would pose questions, and it was hoped that the US delegation would be forthcoming in responding to those questions and to the process Members would be following. He understood that in the informal consultations there had been some good ideas from the United States, and his delegation looked forward to discussions of an informal nature. 137. The representative of the European Communities fully supported the statement by Australia.

138. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that his delegation wished to echo the views of previous speakers. It looked forward to the United States' active engagement in a meaningful and substantive review of this exemption. 139. The representative of the United States said that his delegation shared the interests of others in not spending time in sterile debates. While it was clear that Members held differing views on the nature of the review provided for under paragraph 3, the United States was looking forward to finding ways to make these reviews a more satisfactory and, hopefully, less protracted experience for all concerned, without prejudice to any Member's position. 140. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this item at a future meeting. 9. 141. Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO Agreements Communication from Chile (WT/GC/W/489) The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Chile in WT/GC/W/489.

142. The representative of Chile said that in the months since his delegation had first raised this issue, it had been able to reflect on a number of points. First, as time passed, new examples of inconsistencies were appearing in the texts, and this was even starting to become an issue in some of the negotiations. Second, Chile recognized that in dealing with this problem, there was a potential danger of opening a Pandora's box and seeking to use its proposal to renegotiate the Uruguay Round Agreements. That was certainly not Chile's aim. Third, the past months had given his delegation time to submit a document which contained two very straightforward examples of how to resolve the most

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common cases of inconsistency in a practical manner. Chile was proposing that the General Council adopt decisions which would establish the primacy of certain versions of the texts where inconsistencies existed. In the case of Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the notion of a time element which existed in the English and French versions had, by mistake, been omitted in the Spanish version. This was not a matter of interpretation, but of merely filling the gap in one version in order to harmonize its meaning and scope with the other two. In the example of Article 18.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the binding and mandatory nature of the three versions was clear, at least in relation to Appendix 3 on Working Procedures. Therefore, the use of the term "podr", or "may" in English, in the Spanish version appeared to be a simple error of translation. Some Members had reacted to this proposal by asking why Chile had opted to use a decision by the General Council rather than the Council's authority to interpret the Agreements. Its reply was simple: in the cases cited, as in many others, the meaning and scope of the obligations assumed by Members, or rather of the issues negotiated in the Uruguay Round, were clear and required no further clarification. The only problem was that they had been reflected more clearly in some languages than in others, which was why textual harmonization was now needed, so that no doubts remained regarding the negotiators' intent. 143. Chile recognized that in some cases, the inconsistencies could give rise to problems of interpretation, for example, if all three versions, or at least two of them, led to interpretations that were different, absurd or patently contradictory. In such a case, it might be necessary to resort to the authoritative interpretation of the General Council. His delegation wished to propose that the Chairman, or one of the Deputy Directors-General, hold consultations with Members in order to seek common wording for the draft decisions, as well as to analyze other inconsistencies Members might identify. The document in WT/GC/W/489 also reflected the need to be aware of the consequences of the existing inconsistencies in the Agreements, some of which, in Chile's opinion, could be resolved in the course of the current negotiations. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the need to establish mechanisms to obviate further inconsistencies in the texts produced at the conclusion of the current Round a point not included in the proposal, but which Members should begin thinking about. In fact, in less than four months the exercise of clarification and amendment of the DSU an Agreement already replete with discrepancies in the three language versions would be nearing completion. 144. The representative of Argentina said there was no doubt that given the enormous number of areas where there might be differences in understanding among Members, the possibility of eliminating one of them that relating to the different language versions of the WTO texts was a praiseworthy initiative. It was also praiseworthy, given the large number of important issues Members were charged with, that Chile had taken this initiative on a matter of systemic interest to all. His delegation believed in the merits of this initiative, and that the organization should pay special attention to the translation of documents into the WTO official languages. The fact that the type of inconsistencies identified by Chile existed showed that it would be appropriate to be vigilant in order to avoid these inconsistencies recurring. Correcting these errors might require the cooperation of the delegations whose language was involved, and his delegation was prepared to collaborate in this regard. 145. Argentina wished to make two comments on this subject. One was specifically linked to the example submitted by Chile and the other was more general. There was no doubt that the initiative was in some respects rather complex, and these complexities arose precisely in the example in Chile's document relating to Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Chile proposed harmonizing the text and pointed out the alleged difference in meaning between the text in Spanish, and the texts in English and French. The document indicated there was a time element in the French and English versions which in Chile's document was perceived as being the correct version of the rule that would result in the possibility that if the exports of a developing country, at any moment the safeguard measure was in force, were to exceed 3 per cent of the total imports of the product concerned, the safeguard measure would be applied to that country. Argentina did not agree with that interpretation.

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It did not believe there was a time element in the text which gave permission to apply a safeguard measure to a developing country if it had been determined from the outset that its exports did not exceed 3 per cent, as indicated in the Article. First of all, this was so because both the term "as long as" in English and the term "tant que" in French were open to more than one interpretation not connected with any time element. In actual fact, these terms related to a condition. For example the new Oxford Dictionary of English indicated "provided that" as one meaning of "as long as". There was no doubt that this was one meaning in harmony with the Spanish version of Article 9.1 which read "cuando", or "when" in English. In Argentina's opinion, in this case there was no difference between the texts in Spanish and English. In addition, it was logical to provide that in the time-period during which the safeguard measure was applied, the exports of developing countries excluded from the safeguard could increase. This was almost a logical consequence of the safeguard measure applied to other countries. In fact, if the interpretation proposed by Chile in WT/GC/W/489 were accepted, a developing country that was originally excluded from a safeguard measure could find itself subsequently affected by the application of that measure to third parties. This had obviously not been in the minds of the drafters. 146. His delegation did not at present wish to engage in a substantive discussion of the safeguards issue, but did wish to indicate that of the two examples Chile had identified among the whole range of matters in WTO documents, his delegation already had a difficulty with one of them. This indicated that what was apparently a simple matter of definition might become something more complicated. As Chile itself had said, this might become a concern when Members considered the size of the task they were being asked to tackle. On the one hand, the scope of this exercise caused Argentina concern because all of the specific rules that would have to be the subject of this harmonization had not yet been identified. This indicated that Members would be embarking on an exercise with no limits. In addition, the legal consequences of an exercise of harmonization of texts might be multiple, and the harmonization of many of the rules requiring this might open up the interpretation of the obligations and rights contained therein. While Argentina agreed it would be necessary to be extremely careful in the future so as to avoid this type of difficulty arising, it wished to warn Members about the major difficulties of trying to achieve an objective retrospective of the texts of the organization. 147. The representative of Cuba said that since Chile's initial proposal on this issue in 2002, her delegation had strongly supported it, and considered it to be deserving of attention as it could change the balance of Members' rights and obligations. Her delegation considered that the type of error or inconsistency identified by Chile occurred in most cases because the documents were negotiated in a language which was not the native language of many Members. The documents were adopted without having been translated, and this had led to the present problems. In addition, her delegation considered that sometimes last-minute decisions led to this type of fatal error, which Members should try to eliminate, particularly when there were only a few months left before the next Ministerial Conference. Cuba therefore supported the initiation of consultations on this subject and wished to participate in them, and thanked Chile for its proposal. 148. The representative of the United States thanked Chile for bringing this issue before Members and for sharing the evolution of its own thinking on this issue. His delegation had only received the document in English the previous week, and due to the demands of other work was not in a position at present to take a view on how best to proceed. However, he would report back on the complexity of this issue, which had been underlined by the fact that even two Spanish-speaking delegations had difficulty agreeing on how one might interpret one of the two provisions cited in Chile's document. 149. The representative of Chile expressed his delegation's appreciation to Argentina for its statement, which illustrated the point Chile was trying to make. Chile had seen an inconsistency in the two texts and Argentina had said there was no inconsistency. This immediately made the problem one of interpretation in other words, it was no longer a problem of inconsistency, and Chile thus would not insist on continuing to approach this as a matter of adjusting the inconsistencies in the text.

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That task should perhaps be entrusted to the Safeguards Committee or the DSB. Thus, Argentina had solved 50 per cent of the problems Chile had raised, because it was clear that this particular case did not involve a problem of inconsistencies but of interpretation. Therefore, the type of action chosen to solve the problem would have to be different, and this could be crossed off the list of problems of inconsistency. There were other issues, and it was perfectly feasible and prudent and possible to examine them on a case-by-case basis, resolving the problems of inconsistency, but not the problems of different interpretations. 150. The representative of Australia said that his delegation appreciated the work Chile had done in addressing an issue which should concern all Members, i.e. to ensure that whatever Members came up with in terms of legal texts, there was consistency among the WTO official languages. What concerned Australia a little at the present stage was the idea of entering into a phase of open-ended and informal processes and exactly what these might address. He understood Chile to have said that there were two issues. The first was an issue where there were apparently some inconsistencies between the Spanish version and the English and French versions, and thus an issue from the past that Members needed to resolve. Australia was happy to look at this type of issue on a case-by-case basis and try to resolve the problems. However, it was very hesitant about setting up a big discussion that might invite all Members' legal experts to point out any inconsistencies between any of the official language versions of WTO texts. In other words, if it was just a problem with the Spanish version of a text, his delegation could understand, but if it involved revisiting all of the official language versions of the texts, he was not sure where that would lead. 151. The second point he had understood Chile to be making was that there was a prospective problem, in that Members did not want to get into this situation in the future. At the end of 2002 Members' legal experts were already suggesting, with the aid of the Secretariat, the need for a legal drafting group in order to ensure that whatever was negotiated was subject before it was finally agreed to Members' legal experts. At the time, many had felt it was not the time for such an exercise. Regarding Chile's second example, on the DSU, this could be examined in the context of the DSU review, because Members were now starting to talk about legal texts. While he knew that Chile felt this was a little premature, inconsistencies in the current texts was something that could be addressed in those negotiations, as the mandate was to review the current Agreement. He reiterated his delegation's qualms about setting up an open-ended informal process which might involve Members in any legal inconsistencies between any of the texts. Australia agreed on the need to think carefully about how to ensure there was legal consistency and that there were as few ambivalent provisions in any agreements that might be negotiated. The particular example Chile had identified on the DSU might be addressed in the context of the DSU negotiations. 152. The representative of Norway joined in thanking Chile for having raised this potentially important issue. He also agreed with Chile's comments that Members should not open a Pandora's box on issues which were not purely translation issues. His delegation supported Australia's statement. There was a procedure under the Vienna Convention for correcting translation mistakes in multilateral agreements. This could be done by a note from the Depository on a no-objection basis, and he seemed to recall that Members had used this procedure to reinsert a Member on a list on which it should have figured. This had been resolved by the Director-General circulating a note on a noobjection basis. If a genuine translation mistake was first agreed in the respective Committee or Council, and if there was consensus that this was a translation mistake, one could use the procedure he had just referred to. 153. The Chairman thanked Chile for raising what was obviously a significant issue by virtue of the interventions made. Australia had raised some pertinent issues, as had Argentina and others. Chile had requested his successor to hold consultations, perhaps along with a Deputy DirectorGeneral. The General Council would clearly revert to this issue at a future meeting. However, given some of the concerns that had been registered by a number of delegations, it might be wise for

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Members to reflect on the statements made at the present meeting and to allow his successor to reflect and consult with them on the most efficient way forward. 154. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this item at a future meeting, and that in the meantime the Chairman would consult with Members on the most efficient way forward. 10. (a) Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference Administrative matters Annual report of the General Council to the Ministerial Conference Statement by the Chairman

155. The Chairman recalled that under the procedures for an annual overview of WTO activities, adopted by the General Council in November 1995 (WT/L/105), the Ministerial Conference was to carry out an overview of WTO activities over the previous two years on the basis of annual reports of the General Council and its subsidiary bodies. This overview by Ministers was part of the Agenda item entitled "Overview of WTO Activities", under which general statements were made. Normally, when Ministerial Conferences had been held in November or December, the full annual reports of the General Council and its subsidiary bodies for that year were made available as part of the documentation for the Conference. This year, however, there was a nine-month interval between the General Council meeting in December 2002 when the Council had conducted the end-of-year review of WTO activities and the Fifth Session in September 2003. In order to avoid a duplication of work, he wished to propose that, as had been done for the Second Ministerial Conference in May 1998, the General Council submit to the Fifth Session a brief update to its annual report for 2002 which would describe developments since December 2002. He was referring only to the routine annual reports of a factual nature that all WTO bodies were required to make under existing procedures, and not to any specific reports that Ministers at Doha had requested to be submitted to them. The Ministerial Conference would therefore have before it, as the annual report of the General Council, a compilation of the 2002 Annual Reports of all the WTO bodies, together with an update report concerning developments in 2003. He proposed that the General Council take note of his statement and agree to follow the procedure he had just outlined, as had been done for the Second Ministerial Conference. 156. (b) The General Council so agreed. Attendance of observers from governments and international intergovernmental organizations Statement by the Chairman

157. The Chairman recalled, regarding Government observers, that 39 Governments had participated as observers at the Doha Ministerial Conference in accordance with the Guidelines in Annex 2 of the General Council's Rules of Procedure (WT/L/161). A list of these Governments was set out in WT/MIN(01)/INF/5/Rev.3. Out of these 39 Governments, 3 had since acceded to the WTO Agreement, namely Armenia, China and Chinese Taipei. Thirty-one of these Governments currently had observer status in the General Council and were therefore automatically invited to attend the Ministerial Conference in that capacity, pursuant to the Guidelines. Five other Governments had, at their request, previously been accorded observer status only at Ministerial Conferences: Comoros, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya and San Marino. He proposed that these Governments also be invited to attend the Cancn Ministerial Conference as observers in keeping with the agreed Guidelines. Requests from any other Governments for observer status, either at the General Council or at the Ministerial Conference, would have to be considered on their merits in accordance with the Guidelines when they were received. None had so far been submitted. 158. The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed.

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159. With regard to International Intergovernmental Organization observers, he recalled that the Guidelines for Observer Status for IGOs in Annex 3 of the General Council's Rules of Procedure, provided that "[i]n addition to organizations that request, and are granted, observer status, other organizations may attend meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council or subsidiary bodies on the specific invitation of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council or subsidiary body concerned, as the case may be." The Guidelines also went on to state that if for any two-year period after the grant of observer status, there had been no attendance by the observer organization at Ministerial Conferences, such status shall cease. 160. Members would recall that prior to each of the past sessions of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council had agreed to invite IGOs as observers to the Ministerial Conference on the basis of the following elements: (i) organizations that were observers to the General Council would be automatically invited; (ii) organizations that were observers to subsidiary bodies would be invited if they requested to attend; and (iii) consultations would be held to determine which other organizations that were not observers to the WTO, and who requested attendance at the Ministerial Conference, should be invited. A list of the IGOs that had been invited to attend the Doha Ministerial Conference on the basis of these elements was set out in WT/MIN(01)/INF/5/Rev.3. 161. He proposed that these organizations also be invited to the Ministerial Conference in Cancn as observers, in keeping with the agreed Guidelines. Requests from any other IGOs that had not already been observers at the Ministerial Conference in Doha, and who were neither observers in the General Council nor in other WTO bodies, would of course have to be considered on their merits in accordance with the Guidelines when they were received. None had so far been submitted. If such requests were received in the future, the General Council would revert to them at a subsequent meeting. He said that one delegation had suggested to him that there should perhaps be a deadline for the consideration of any such requests from other organizations, which might be set at three months prior to the date of the Conference. He suggested that Members reflect on this and return to it at a subsequent meeting if necessary. 162. The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab Members, thanked the Chairman for his statement proposing a procedure for accepting the requests of or extending invitations to IGOs wishing to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference as observers. Egypt believed, however, that any procedure should ensure equal treatment for the relevant organizations, probably through fixing a deadline for receiving such requests. The General Council could then consider all such requests at an appropriate time later in the year. Egypt also wished to highlight the importance it attached to all relevant IGOs, particularly those involved in regional integration activities and in promoting trade liberalization, as well as assisting acceding countries in many trade-related areas. Her delegation hoped that this time all requests to attend the Ministerial Conference would be accepted, including the request of the League of Arab States. It looked forward to participating in any consultations in this regard. 163. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to follow the procedure outlined by the Chairman. (c) Attendance of non-governmental organizations Statement by the Chairman

164. The Chairman recalled that in preparing for the previous Ministerial Conferences, the General Council had agreed on the following procedure regarding registration and attendance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the Conference: (i) NGOs would be allowed to attend only the Plenary Sessions of the Conference, without the right to speak; (ii) applications from NGOs to be registered would be accepted on the basis of Article V, paragraph 2, of the WTO Agreement, i.e. NGOs "concerned with matters related to those of the WTO"; and (iii) a deadline would be established for the registration of NGOs that wished to attend the Conference. In order to deal with the requests from NGOs to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference, he proposed that Members adopt

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similar criteria to those which had been adopted by the General Council for the four previous Ministerial Conferences held in Singapore, Geneva, Seattle and Doha. 165. Following this practice, NGOs that wished to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference would be requested to supply, in detail, all the necessary information indicating how they were concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. The large and growing number of NGOs with WTOrelated activities had made the registration procedure for WTO Ministerial Conferences more and more burdensome. In order to facilitate the registration process for NGOs and the WTO Secretariat, he proposed that the detailed presentation of activities be waived for those NGOs who had been duly registered for at least two previous Ministerial Conferences, and that registration for them be granted automatically. NGOs that qualified would still be obliged to officially request registration and would be subject to all other procedures and deadlines that applied to NGOs requesting to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference.2 166. Concerning deadlines, he suggested that all NGOs be invited to submit their requests for registration not later than 30 April. Registration forms should be sent by 31 May to all NGOs which fulfilled the registration criteria, and all registration forms returned duly completed by the NGOs to the External Relations Division of the Secretariat not later than 30 June. Based on the information provided, the Secretariat would process a list of registered NGOs. He proposed that in line with past practice, this list be circulated to all WTO Members for information during the course of July. Confirmation of registration would then be sent to the NGOs as from 1 August. He proposed that Members agree to follow the procedure he had outlined in order to allow sufficient time for the NGOs to be informed and to make the necessary arrangements for their attendance at the Fifth Ministerial Conference. 167. (d) The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed. Election of Officers for the Fifth Session Statement by the Chairman

168. The Chairman recalled that Ministers at Doha had requested the General Council to hold consultations with a view to determining the presiding officers i.e. the Chairperson and three ViceChairpersons of the Ministerial Conference who would hold office until the end of the Fifth Session. As the date of that Conference was quickly approaching, the General Council would need to take a decision on the election of these officers soon. In keeping with customary practice, the General Council would elect a representative of the host government in the present case, Mexico to chair the Conference. He proposed that his successor hold consultations with regard to the election of the three Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, and that the General Council revert to this matter at a future meeting in order that the full slate could be agreed at the same time. 169. 11. The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed. WTO Pension Plan Election of an Alternate to the Management Board Proposal by the Chairman (WT/GC/W/488)

170. The Chairman recalled that Article 4(a) of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan provides, inter alia, for the election by the General Council of four members and four alternates, each for a three-year term. The current composition of the Management Board, as set out in WT/GC/W/488, included Mr. Mark Linscott (United States) as an alternate. As also indicated in that document, Mr. Linscott was no longer available to serve on the Management Board. His intention to propose the candidature of Ms. Rachel Schub (United States) to replace Mr. Linscott had been communicated to all Members in a fax sent on his behalf by Deputy Director-General Mr. Abbott in

These procedures were subsequently circulated in WT/MIN(03)/INF/1.

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January. Accordingly, he proposed the election of Ms. Schub to hold the office of alternate on the Board during the remainder of the three-year term, expiring on 7 July 2005. 171. The General Council so agreed.

172. The Chairman then said it had recently come to his attention that Mr. Wang (China) who was also an alternate on the Board would no longer be available to serve in this capacity, and that a suitable replacement for him would need to be found. 173. 12. The General Council took note of the statement. Appointment of officers to WTO bodies

174. The Chairman said that in accordance with the Guidelines for appointment of officers to WTO bodies approved by the General Council in December 2002 (WT/L/510), he and his two colleagues, Mr. Bryn (Norway) and Mr. Prez del Castillo (Uruguay), had conducted consultations with delegations on this matter. On the basis of these consultations, he considered that there was a consensus on the following slate of names: General Council H.E. Mr. Carlos PREZ DEL CASTILLO (Uruguay) H.E. Mr. Shotaro OSHIMA (Japan) H.E. Mrs. Mary WHELAN (Ireland) H.E. Mr. Milan HOVORKA (Czech Republic) H.E. Mr. Ousmane CAMARA (Senegal) H.E. Mr. Vanu Gopala MENON (Singapore) H.E. Mr. Peter BRO (Slovak Republic) H.E. Mr. Mohamed Saleck OULD MOHAMED LEMINE (Mauritania) H.E. Dr. Manzoor AHMAD (Pakistan) H.E. Mr. Jaynarain MEETOO (Mauritius) Mr. Joshua C.K. LAW (Hong Kong, China)

Dispute Settlement Body

Trade Policy Review Body

Council for Trade in Goods

Council for Trade in Services

Council for TRIPS

Committee on Trade and Environment Committee on Trade and Development Committee on Balance-ofPayments Restrictions Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration

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Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance

H.E.Mr. Luiz Felipe DE SEIXAS CORRA (Brazil) Prof. Frdric JENNY (France)

H.E. Mr. Ronald SABORO SOTO (Costa Rica) H.E. Mr. Stef'an Haukur JHANESSON (Iceland) H.E. Mr. Hernando Jos GMEZ (Colombia)

175. These appointments would formally be made by the WTO bodies concerned at their subsequent meetings in 2003. 176. The General Council took note of the statement and of the consensus on the slate of names.

177. The Chairman, on behalf of all Members, congratulated the incoming Chairpersons of the various bodies and wished them every success. He also expressed sincere appreciation to all of the outgoing Chairpersons for their very dedicated work in chairing their respective bodies during the past year, which had been a particularly demanding period, given the heavy work load all had faced in the aftermath of the Doha Ministerial Conference in addition to these bodies' regular work. Their wisdom and commitment had contributed to the considerable work Members had been able to accomplish. He was certain Members would continue to receive the same dedicated guidance and service from the new slate of Chairs. 178. 13. The General Council took note of the statement. Meeting of the General Council on Coherence in Global Economic Policy-making

179. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that the General Council had met from time to time in the past on the subject of Coherence in Global Economic Policy-making, most recently in January 2001. These meetings had provided an opportunity for the Director-General to report to the General Council on WTO cooperation with international organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters, pursuant to Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO and to the General Councils 1996 Decision on Agreements between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank (WT/L/194). The Director-General considered that a further meeting in the spring would be timely, and that it would be valuable for him to inform Members of his consultations with the Managing Director of the IMF and the President of the World Bank, both of whom would be invited to participate. The date in mind for this meeting was 13 May. 180. 14. The General Council took note of the statement. Improving the services provided by the Secretariat to Members

181. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", reported that he had been working with the Secretariat over the past few months on several possible approaches to using new and existing technologies to improve the services provided to WTO Members, and in particular to enable the

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increased involvement in the WTO's work of smaller delegations. Among the several projects that had been considered, he was pleased to be able to report that the following should be possible to implement in the very near future. The first proposal was to establish a Delegates' Cyber Room in which delegations would have at their disposal a number of high-speed computers together with Internet facilities and easy access to relevant document databases. Delegations would be assisted in their work as necessary by staff from the Language Services and Documentation Division. Second, as a complement to the Delegates' Cyber Room, the Secretariat would start to provide two types of oneday training courses in English, French and Spanish, one aimed as an introduction to online documentation services and the other an advanced course on legal and documentary research online. These courses, as well as the Cyber Room, could be integrated with other initiatives aimed at connecting smaller delegations to the Internet. 182. Third, as part of other short-term projects, several enhancements were being introduced by the Secretariat to the Documents Online facility, such as an easy link between meetings and documents so as to enable Members to retrieve all documents associated with a particular meeting. Fourth, a new project was being started by the Secretariat to provide Members with enhanced access to the Central Registry of Notifications which would give them the possibility of consulting the CRN online. Finally, the Secretariat was also considering ways of harnessing new technologies to improve existing conference services in areas such as accreditation, registration, access rights, and security. He believed that these initiatives would prove most useful in the day-to-day work of Members, and trusted that delegations would support and make use of the proposed projects. He was confident that the Secretariat and Members would continue to work together to fully exploit future possibilities to assist their work. He wished to express gratitude for the support shown by the Director-General, and to Mr. Prez Motta (Mexico) for his enthusiasm early on for examining ways to harness new technologies to enhance the efficiency of Members' work. He also wished to thank the Secretariat for its invaluable assistance in examining the implications, technical challenges and cost-effectiveness of various possible improvements, and in designing, developing and progressing the more promising of these to a stage where their implementation could be considered within existing resources. 183. 15. The General Council took note of the statement. Possibility of a short break prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference

184. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", said that since the TNC meeting the previous week, a number of Members had raised with him the importance of deciding sooner rather than later whether to designate a one to two-week period prior to the Cancn Ministerial as a summer break. He said that it would be far more efficient to resolve this issue soon, so that all involved might be in a position to plan accordingly. He therefore asked that his successor, together with the DirectorGeneral and Deputy Director-General Mr. Abbott, reflect on this matter, and hoped that an understanding could be reached relatively soon. 185. 16. The General Council took note of the statement. Election of Chairperson

186. The Chairman said that he wished to say farewell by saying three thank yous first, to all Members and colleagues for an extraordinary cooperative joint venture. He had enjoyed the privilege of serving delegates in the capacity of General Council Chairman and had also enjoyed a very thoughtful cooperation, with a sense of humour, from all. He was certain this same courtesy would be extended to the incoming Chairman. Second, to the Council and TNC Division of the Secretariat for truly working as a solid and efficient team and for going beyond the strict demands of their work. And lastly, to the Canadian delegation who had had to carry most of the load of his delegation during his tenure as Chairman. He looked forward to regaining both his freedom as well as his Canadian

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voice to join in the great opportunities that lay ahead, and wished Mr. Prez del Castillo every success as he led Members to Cancn and beyond. 187. The General Council then unanimously elected Mr. Prez del Castillo (Uruguay) to the Chair.

188. The newly elected Chairman, on behalf of all Members, thanked the outgoing Chair for his excellent work at the head of the General Council. That work had been very efficient, and all particularly himself had drawn lessons from it which would guide them in their future work. Mr. Marchi's work would be a source of inspiration to him in the work that lay ahead. He wished to thank all for his appointment as General Council Chairman, which was a great personal honour for him and for his country. In particular, he wished to thank the Latin American Group for having endorsed his nomination, and all the Members of the organization for their firm and warm support. The Chairmanship of the General Council was the highest post to which a WTO Ambassador could aspire, and he was very satisfied with his nomination and the opportunity it offered him. He realized that he was taking on this post at a difficult time. The progress achieved to date had not been very encouraging and many agreed deadlines had not been met. There were still important differences in position in key areas of negotiations. All this had contributed to a feeling of frustration and low morale among many Members. To this picture one had to add the very little time available before the Fifth Ministerial Conference. 189. He recognized the seriousness of the situation and was not underestimating the size and extraordinary complexity of the task ahead. There was no doubt that this situation posed an enormous challenge and responsibility for him as Chairman. He wished to assure Members that he was taking on this post with humility, but also with optimism and an enormous conviction that Members could reverse the current process. This could be done if all committed themselves to doing so and to agreeing to do it together. His task would essentially be that of guiding and facilitating the process. He was committing himself, and would make his best efforts, to work towards a successful meeting at Cancn. Three main criteria, which were based on the mandate given by Ministers at Doha, would guide all of his actions. First, he would ensure that the development dimension was present in all areas of negotiation and that it was clearly reflected in the results. Second, he would ensure that results in all areas of negotiation faithfully reflected the agreed mandates. And, third, he would ensure that Members sought a balance in the global context of negotiations and not in sectors or specific areas, and that the final results or solutions agreed on should be acceptable and provide benefits for all parties. For these purposes, he committed himself to an open-door chairmanship. He would always be available and prepared to listen to the objectives, interests and concerns of each Member. 190. He also wished to state now that he would accept invitations to meetings or consultations at various different levels that would enable him to have a clearer picture of positions or situations Members were confronting, whether these were positions of regional groups, or those corresponding to a specific area of negotiation open to all Members, or possibly confined to certain Members only. He assured Members that he would do this without compromising his post as Chairman. He considered that it was part of his duty to listen to all sides. This knowledge and a better view of the situation could be very useful if the Members decided to request his services to find compromises or to put on the table some draft declaration for Cancn. He realized that this chairmanship would not have any honeymoon. Time was pressing and he would have to take an active position immediately, together with the Director-General. He wished to confirm his full determination to work together with the Director-General to contribute to the search for answers that would strengthen confidence and achieve the necessary agreement on positions that would push forward the process. This activism was one he would take on with serenity, objectivity and the care that the post of General Council Chairman required, but with the firmest determination, creativity and courage demanded by circumstances.

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191. He said that he would prefer, at the end of his term of office, that he be judged by his initiatives and actions, whether these were good, so-so, or bad, rather than by laziness or lack of leadership that might contribute to a continued postponing of opportunities for dialogue, negotiation or even confrontation that was necessary and inevitable. Throughout his life he had fought for the causes in which he believed, and on the present occasion he was convinced that the solution to all Members' problems, however difficult they might appear, could be found if Members were prepared to work to solve their differences. He wished to repeat his sincere thanks to the Members for the trust they had placed in him at this crucial juncture in the negotiations. He hoped not to disappoint, and to be able to rise to the circumstances. Members could rely on his best efforts to find a satisfactory solution for all, and he hoped that he could rely on the support of Members to continue to contribute to a reality that would be the success of all Members and would lead to the strengthening of the multilateral trading system to which all were committed. 192. The General Council took note of the statements.

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