When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use is abandoned the

public land is not returned to the previous owner. ATO v. Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. G.R. No. 158563 June 30, 2005 FACTS : Respondent was an owner of a lot which were expropriated by the government for the expansion of Lahug Airport. Subsequently, President Aquino ordered the closure of Lahug Airport. Respondet then filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership of the said expropriated property alledging that by virtue of the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had therefore reverted to him. The trial court dismissed the case holding that the when real property has been acquired for public use unconditionally, either by eminent domain or by purchase, the abandonment or non-use of the real property, does not ipso facto give to the previous owner of said property any right to recover the same. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal which reverses the decision of the Trial Court. ISSUE : Whether or not property expropriated for public use unconditionally, and that public use is abandoned, returned the said property to its former owner? HELD : No, When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

When an expropriated property was not yet fully paid the previous owner cannot recover the said property. Reyes v. National Housing Authority G.R. No. 147511 January 20, 2003 FACTS : The trial court ordered the National Housing Authority (NHA) to expropriation the property of the petitioners and payment of just compensation. For the alleged failure of the NHA to comply with the order petitioners filed a complaint for forfeiture of rights and reverting back the property to them alleging that the NHA violated the stated purpose of the expropriation and non- payment of just compensation as fixed by the court. In its Answer, NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. he complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court. The same was also dismissed on appeal to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE : Whether or not non-payment of just compensation is a ground to recover expropriated property? HELD : No, non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated property. It is a recognized rule that although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to payment, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, it is submitted that NHA should pay the value of the property from the time the property was taken plus interest until such amount was paid in full.

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification.

Phil. Rural Electric Coop. Assn. v. DILG Secretary G.R. No. 143076 June 10, 2003 FACTS : Petitioner, Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA), was a cooperative organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended. Under such law, cooperatives are entitled to tax incentives such as exemption from payment of income tax and other governmental taxes and fees which includes payment of property tax. When the Local Government Code was passed it withdraw exemption from payment of tax previously granted or presently enjoyed by all person, whether personal or juridical, which includes payment of property tax except only those registered under R.A. No. 6938. Petitioner filed a Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unscontitutional sections 193 and 194 of the Local Government Code alleging that Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code discriminate them, in violation of the equal protection clause. ISSUE : Whether or not the classification is not valid, thus, violated the equal protection clause of the constitution? HELD : Yes, the classification is valid and there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under RA 6938. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of funds. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.

Extra judicial confession when made on a language not known to the accused is inadmissible as evidence. .

People v. Rapeza, GR 169431 April 3, 2007 FACTS : Appellant, Jerry Lapeza, was charged with the muder of Spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. The Trial Court sentenced him of reclusion perpetua for committing said offense solely on the ground of his extra judicial confession made by the police officer during his investigation. On appeal to the Supreme Court appellant stresses that he was not informed of his rights during the time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect as the police had already received information of his alleged involvement in the crimes. And although the right was read to him there is no showing that it was explained in a way that an uneducated person likes him could understand. ISSUE : Whether or not the confession made by the appellant is admissible in evidence to prove his guilt? HELD : No, the extra judicial confession of the appellant is not admissible in evidence. The confession made by the appellant is flawed. Though he was informed in tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used in evidence for or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall provide one for him. However, there is no showing that appellant had actually understood his rights because at that time he was illlerate and not well versed in tagalog. During the custodial investigation he was not represented by independent and competent counsel of his choice. He was only represented by counsel picked by the police officers.

When sworn statement made during a administrative investigation does not violate Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

People v. Ting Lan Uy G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005 FACTS : Appellant, Jose B. Ochoa, a public officer was charged in the the Sandiganbayan for malversation through falsification of commercial documents. The prosecution believes that he diverted the fund for the payment of a loan obligation by inserting in the managers/cashiers check account of private respondents. For this reason he was sentence by the Sandiganbayan for the said crime. In his defense he stated that he did not insert said account and that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation while he was confined in the Philippine Heart Center. And he was not assisted by counsel and was not informed of his constitutional rights when it was executed. ISSUE : Whether or not the constitutional right of the appellant was violated in not informing of his right to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel? HELD : No, the right granted by the constitution under Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated. The Miranda Right is not applicable to all types of investigation. The investigation under Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution refers to a custodial investigation. The statement was taken during the administrative investigation by the NPCs audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.

When extrajudicial confession admissible as evidence and when not.

People v. Baloloy G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002 FACTS : Accused-appellant, Juanito Baloloy, was charged with the death of Genelyn. He confess his guilt to the barangay captain when he was not yet arrested by the police and another admission was made when Judge Dizon swears his affidavits with regard to the death of Genelyn by questioning if all the what contained in the affidavit of the barangay captain was true and he answer in the affirmative. But, during the arraignment he pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits he was sentence to death on the basis of his confession and other circumstantial evidence. On automatic review of the case to the Supreme Court accused-appellant questioned the admissibility as evidence of his confession. ISSUE : Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant was admissible as evidence? HELD : With regard to the extrajudicial confession made by the accused-appellant to the Barangay Captain it is admissible as evidence because it was given before he was arrested or placed under custody . The constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. However, with regard to the confession made to Judge Dicon his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Thus, such confession was inadmissible as evidence.

Right to bail available even to an extradite.

Gov't. of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 FACTS : Republic of the Philippines has an extradition treaty with the Government of Hong Kong. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court, thus, requested Department of Justice for a provisional arrest of Muoz. DOJ then forwarded the said request to the NBI, which in turn file before the RTC a provisional arrest of Muoz, RTC grant said provisional arrest. Private respondent then filed a motion to the court of Appeal to invalidate said order, which CA granted. However, it was reversed by the Supreme Court upon the petition of the DOJ. Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC for the extradition of private respondent, Private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. Judge Bernardo of the RTC denied the petition for bail. However, Judge Bernadro inhibited in the hearing of the case. Thus, it was raffled to the sala of Judge Olalia. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent in the order denying his application for bail, which Judge Olalia granted. An urgent motion to vacate the order was filed but was denied. ISSUE : Whether or not right to bail is applicable to an extradite? HELD : Yes, right to bail is available even to an extraditee. The right to bail which was only applicable to a criminal proceeding has been lax by the Supreme Court due to the modern trend in the public international law that the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

A conviction without finality or pending appeal does not loose the presumption of innocence of the accused

. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008 FACTS : Judge Adoracion Angeles, RTC Judge of Caloocan City was convicted of crime of child abuse by the RTC of Quezon City which he appeals to the Court of Appeal. Senior State Prosecutor, Emmanuel Velasco, wrote a letter to Chief Justice Panganiban to suspend Judge Angeles from hearing and adjudicating cases under his sala because of this conviction. Because of this letter the higher court issued a resolution suspending Judge Angeles indefinitely. Judge Angeles then filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that his suspension was unjust because he is not accorded due process and that his conviction is not yet final, thus he should be considered as innocent. ISSUE : Whether or not conviction of a crime pending appeal destroys the presumption of innocence of the accused? HELD : No, if the case is currently on appeal and the same does not yet attained finality accused still enjoys the pressumption of innocence. The existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client

People v. Bermas G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999 FACTS : Rufino Bermas was charged with a crime of rape. On the day of the arraignment he has no counsel, thus, the court appoint a counsel de oficio. He then pleaded not guilty. The complainant takes the witness stand for direct examination the counsel for the accused waived the cross-examination and asked the court to relieve him as counsel de officio. The request was granted and appointed another counsel de oficio, Atty. Roberto Gomez. While the new counsel allowed to cross-examine, he has no time to prepare for such because he is only accorded 10 minutes to do the cross-examination. When the time the defense turn to present its case Atty. Gomez does not appear on the court, the court then appoint another counsel de officio, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame. However, on the day of the hearing Atty. Lozame asked himself to be relieved as counsel de offico but retracted when confronted by the judge. But, for one reason or another had ceased to appear in behalf of the accused which the defense counsel, Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva took over. Judge of the lower court sentenced him guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death. Said decision reached the Supreme Court by way of automatic review. ISSUE : Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to counsel was violated? HELD : Yes, the right to counsel of the accused must be more than the presence of a lawyer in the court but it means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. In the case at bar, the accused was given a counsel de officio which fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused. The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons.

Evidence obtain in violation of the right of the accused in custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence.

People v. Tulin G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001 FACTS : M/T Tabungao was hijacked by seven fully pirates led including the respondent. The pirates order to paint the vessel with Galilee. Galilee then proceeded to Singapore to transfer the cargo from M/T Tabangao to the Navi pride upon the order of Cheong San Hiong. After the transaction was finished M/T Tabangao returned to the Philippines but the vessel remained at the sea. The crew of vessel was released in three batches. The crew then reported the incident to the PNOC and to the National Bureau of Investigation. After the investigation, a series of arrest was effected. An information charging qualified piracy was filed to the court which the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The accused was convicted of the crime charged. The accused appealed the decision contending that during the trial they were represented by a non-lawyer and during the custodial investigation custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence and forced to signed statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights. ISSUE : Whether or not the statement obtain without the assistance of a counsel in a custodial investigation is admissible as evidence? HELD : No, evidence obtain during a custodial investigation without the assistance of a counsel is inadmissible unless the right to counsel during custodial investigation is waived in writing and in the presence of counsel. , The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accusedappellants make them invalid. . In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree which means that once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them. However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. With regard to the appearance of a non-lawyer,tThe rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of a non-lawyer, Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made