S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR

10 February 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abul Khaled al-Baydani Current/True Name and Aliases: Abd al-Khaliq Ahmad Salih al-Baydani, Abd al-Khaleq al-Hosaisi, Abd al-Halak, Abu Khalud, Abu Barak, Bara, Abu Ubaydah al-Asadi Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date of Birth: 1983 Citizenship: Yemen (YM) Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000553DP

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2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 16 December 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable member of al-Qaida who admittedly traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to receive militant training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora, and possibly served as a fighter of Usama Bin Ladens (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade. 1 Detainee
Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBLs primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330210

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) was listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents and he has expressed his encouragement for and desires to engage in further hostilities against US forces. Detainee admitted residing at multiple al-Qaida and extremist guesthouses and was identified by al-Qaida members. JTFGTMO determined this detainee to be: . A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. Of LOW intelligence value.

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainees assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Evaluated detainees membership to be probably al-Qaida Added reporting of detainees desire to engage in jihad Assessed detainees reported Afghan guesthouse to be the Daftar Taliban

4. (U) Detainees Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainees own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 1990, detainees family moved from Saudi Arabia to Yemen to avoid the first Gulf War. 2 Detainee attended school in Sanaa, YM, but stopped attending in the 6th or 7th grade in 1997. Approximately 1998, detainee gained employment as a construction wood trader for two months. From 1998 to 2001, detainee worked in the aluminum business. During this time period, detainee attended the Abu Bakr Mosque in the al-Hassaba neighborhood of Sanaa. At the urging of his friend Abu Rahman, in approximately May 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) to purchase fabric to sell in Yemen. Abu Rahman gave detainee $500 US for the trip.3

aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026) had primary operational command of the Arab Brigade, serving as UBLs military commander in the field. 2 Analyst Note: A visiting Saudi delegation to JTF-GTMO identified detainee as a Yemeni citizen. If an individuals parents are Yemeni, even though he was born in Saudi Arabia, he does not automatically qualify for Saudi citizenship; thus, making him a Yemeni citizen. Detainee has claimed both Saudi and Yemeni citizenship. 3 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, TD-314/29199-02, Analyst Note: Detainee provides a time frame based on the number of days, months, or years from an event. Approximations are provided based on analysis of the dates.

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In Karachi, detainee stayed at the Sarawan Hotel where he met Abu Muhjin. 4 Abu Muhjin suggested detainee travel to Afghanistan for one month of militant training. Detainee then traveled to Kandahar, AF, via Quetta, PK. Detainee stayed in Quetta for approximately 20 days in an Afghan guesthouse. While in the guesthouse, detainee met Abu Fidaa. Approximately June or July 2001, detainee, Abu Fidaa, and a third, unidentified person traveled with an Afghan guide to a guesthouse in Kandahar, where they stayed for about ten days. A Saudi named Zubayr operated this guesthouse. 5 While in Kandahar, detainee heard about a guesthouse in Kabul, AF, where individuals went to coordinate training. 6 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Kabul and stayed at a guesthouse operated by Hamza al-Ghamdi for approximately one month, where he met Abu Thabit. 7 The US bombing campaign began while detainee was in Kabul. 8 He was told if he tried to return to Pakistan, he would be arrested. Detainee and Abu Thabit fled in Abu Thabits vehicle to Jalalabad, AF, where they stayed for approximately ten days in a guesthouse. The guesthouse was next to the Shaif al-Hana Hospital and was operated by a North African named Abu Zubayr. Detainee stated when the bombing began in Jalalabad, about a week before Ramadan, he and Abu Thabit fled with six or seven Arabs to a small mountain range where they joined 20 to 30 people. Detainee stayed with these individuals for two days before moving up the mountain range to enter Pakistan. Detainee spent two months transiting what he believed was Tora Bora and stayed at several centers, including the Markaz Qital and Markaz Hamza. 9 While in Tora Bora, detainee was told by the group of Arabs if the Northern Alliance captured him, he would be killed. At Markaz Qital, detainee was issued an AK-47. Detainee saw others carrying rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and heard the group also had surface-to-air missiles. 10 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) According to detainee, at the end of Ramadan he and a group of approximately 60 other Arabs attempted to escape to the Pakistan border. Detainee was injured by shrapnel
Analyst Note: Abu Muhjin was an acquaintance of detainee from the al-Khayr Mosque in Sana. Reportedly, an individual named Abu Muhjin was an al-Qaida or Taliban recruiter. It is possible detainees associate is this recruiter. 5 Analyst Note: Zubayr is assessed to be Abu Zubayr al-Haili, the senior al-Qaida operative who was in charge of guesthouses that supported al-Qaida trainees, fighters, and operatives in Afghanistan. This guesthouse was probably the Hajji Habash Guesthouse. 6 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002, 000553 KB 12-MAY-2002 7 IIR 2 340 7121 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Thabit is Thabid. 8 IIR 6 034 0837 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Hamza al-Ghamdi is Hama al-Jamada. 9 Analyst Note: Literally center, markaz is translated as unit, position, and camp. Ramadan began 17 November 2001 and ended 16 December 2001. 10 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) in a US helicopter attack during the attempt. Detainee was arrested by Afghans and taken to Shaif al-Hana Hospital for treatment. Detainee remained at the hospital for approximately two and a half months before being transferred to US forces no later than 2 February 2002. 11 Detainees account describes the first attempt by al-Qaida forces to escape from Tora Bora. Following failed negotiations with anti-Taliban Afghan commanders, UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212, transferred), directed Afghan guides to lead a large group of fighters out of Tora Bora into Pakistan to escape. The group of about 60-70 fighters departed and that night the group was attacked from the air. The guide and many others were killed or wounded. The survivors straggled back and LY-212 instructed the wounded that could walk to seek help with local villagers or enemy forces. 12 b. (S) Property Held: Koran

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c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 5 May 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Arab extremist guesthouses in Kandahar, Kabul, and Jalalabad Al-Qaida and Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator, Abu Muhjin

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainee has provided a logical, but unlikely timeline, which includes gaps and contradictions that require further investigation. Detainees extensive use of guesthouses and admitted intention to participate in training, which he claims he never received, indicate he may be withholding information regarding his activities in Afghanistan. Detainee spent two months in Tora Bora, but provides no details of his activities beyond saying he was moved from one cave to another cave. Detainee has provided no reportable intelligence and is routinely non-cooperative during interrogations. Although detainee is identified as desiring to engage in hostilities against US forces, he is not assessed to possess advanced training, special skills or leadership abilities. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002 TD-314/14605-04, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S)

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer for Continued Detention in Host Country: Detainee is an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan to receive militant training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and is listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents. Detainee has expressed his encouragement for and desires to engage in further hostilities against US forces. Detainee admitted residing at multiple al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses and was identified by al-Qaida members. (S/NF) Detainee is an al-Qaida associated fighter and a probable member of alQaida. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and is listed on al-Qaida affiliated documents. (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged being in Tora Bora during hostilities. Detainee spent two months in Tora Bora and stayed at several centers, including the known alQaida fighting positions he identified as Markaz Qital and Markaz Hamza. 13 (Analyst Note: Markaz Qital was commanded by both Qital and Abu Muhjin. Markaz Hamza is probably the Hamza Fallata Center.) (S//NF) Detainee stated he was wounded by a helicopter while attempting to escape from Tora Bora along with approximately 60 other Arabs at the end of Ramadan 2001. (Analyst Note: Detainees account mirrors those provided by JTFGTMO detainees Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, ISN US9YM-000627DP (YM627), and Walid Said Bin Said Zaid, ISN US9YM-000550DP (YM-550). YM-550 has photo-identified detainee.) 14 (S//NF) Detainee fled from Jalalabad to Tora Bora in a vehicle with Abu Thabit. 15 Abu Thabit was second in command of a front line unit north of Kabul. It is likely detainee retreated from the front lines with Abu Thabit indicating detainee was a fighter in the 55th Arab Brigade. In Tora Bora, Abu Thabit commanded a multi-national camp called the Thabit Center. The camp was occupied by a 20-man group composed of Algerians, Yemenis, Saudis, and Kuwaitis. Detainee remained under the leadership of Abu Thabit until Abu Thabits death. 16 (S//NF) Detainees alias was found on an al-Qaida associated document recovered from raids on safe houses in Karachi. The list identified the contents of detainees trust account as a Yemeni passport and a plane ticket. 17 (Analyst Note: Detainee is listed as Abdul Khaleq al-Hosaisi, aka (al-Bara). Detainee acknowledged

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Analyst Note: Literally center, markaz is translated to mean unit, position, and camp. Ramadan began 17 November 2001 and ended 16 December 2001. 14 IIR 2 340 6549 02, IIR 6 034 0857 04, IIR 6 034 0118 04, TD-314/16880-02, TD-314/14605-04, IIR 6 034 0925 02 15 IIR 2 340 7121 02, 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 SIR 09-FEB-2002 16 COLISEUM ANS-I005-04-0132, IIR 2 340 6120 02 17 TD-314/40693-02, number 153; 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002; 000533 KB 12-May-2002

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) his alias was al-Bara and previously identified himself as Khaliq. Detainee reported he belonged to the Hosasi Tribe, a sub-tribe of the Baydani.) (S//NF) Such lists are indicative of an individuals residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individuals personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity (S//NF) A phone number possibly belonging to detainees family was found in recovered al-Qaida documents in Kabul and Helmand Province, AF. These documents included an entry reading 612604 al-Badani, a variant of the detainees last name. 18 (S//NF) This phone number was also recovered in the telephone book belonging to al-Haj Ali, leader of a radical Islamic cell in Frankfurt, Germany. The entry in al-Haj Alis phone book read Ahmad Basari 612604. 19 (Analyst Note: Provided these numbers belong to detainees family, detainee was probably the source of the number found in Afghanistan, while his father would be the most probable source for the one found in Germany. Detainees father is named Ahmad. Basari can be a transliteration error for detainees name Baydani.) (S//NF) Detainee has expressed his encouragement for and desires to engage in further hostilities against US forces. (S//NF) Abd al-Majid Muhammad, ISN US9IR-000555DP (IR-555, transferred) reported detainee wished to perform jihad against the US. 20 (U//FOUO) A note addressed to Abd al-Hamid Ibn Abd al-Salim Ibn Miftah alGhazzawi, ISN US9LY-000654DP (LY-654), was recovered during a search of detainees JTF-GTMO detention cell. The note contained a poem which included the verse rise up against the infidels and kill them. 21 Detainee has directly threatened to kill JTF-GTMO guard staff. 22 (U//FOUO) In a letter to Bakri Awad Bakri al-Sumayri, ISN US9SA-000274DP (SA-274, transferred), detainee discussed SA-274s hunger striking and violent fights with the guards, calling the events wonderful. (Analyst Note: Detainee addressed the letter to his Paternal Uncle, sending it through probably SA-274s relatives in

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TD-314/52648-03 TD-314/36021-02 20 000555 FM40 25-OCT-2002 21 JDG INTREP Dated 10-DEC-2007 22 JDG INTREP Dated 11-Jun-2003, 3-Nov-2003

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) Saudi Arabia. There is no known familial link between detainee and SA-274 who detainee identified with a previously unknown alias.) 23 (S//NF) In an act which could be interpreted as jihad against the US, detainee was reported as attempting to hang himself in order to make a statement about his religion. 24 (Analyst Note: Suicide is not condoned in Islam, however, suicide is seen by Islamic extremists as a continuance of their jihad against the infidels.) (S//NF) Detainee admitted residing at al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses. (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar.25 The Hajji Habash Guesthouse was also known as the Zubayr Guesthouse, the al-Ansar Guesthouse and the al-Nebras Guesthouse. 26 (S) Hajji Habash was reportedly owned by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and operated by Abu Zubayr al-Haili, a high-level al-Qaida operative, among others.27 (Analyst Note: The Hajji Habash Guesthouse served as an administrative inprocessing facility for new recruits en route training at the al-Faruq Training Camp. The recruits surrendered their passports and valuables to the guesthouse administrator for safe keeping. The guesthouse also served as a waypoint for extremists traveling to and from Pakistan, or between east and west Afghanistan. It was located across the street from the Islamic Institute operated by UBLs religious advisor Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, aka (Abu Hafs al-Mauritani).) (S//NF) Detainee stayed at Hamza al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Qaiti Guesthouses, al-Qaida facilities in Kabul. Detainee claimed he was in Kabul to attend training when the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks occurred.28 (C//REL USA AND GCTF) Hamza al-Ghamdi was an al-Qaida operative in charge of the guesthouse. Hamza al-Ghamdi was also highly trained in battlefield tactics and in charge of caring for wounded personnel coming from the frontline. 29 (C//REL USA, AUS, CAN, AND GBR) Hamza al-Qaiti established a large camp in Afghanistan for mujahideen and managed the guesthouse in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul. 30 (Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area was a former diplomatic district occupied by the Taliban and al-Qaida for quarters and training.)

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000553 GUAN 2007-T04630 18-Oct-2007 000274 SIR 14-Jun-2007 25 IIR 2 340 6543 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Hajji is Hagi. 26 001457 SIR 20-OCT-2004, IIR 2 340 6317 02, Analyst Note: A variant of al Nebras is Anabras. 27 000252 FM40 09-NOV-2004, IIR 6 034 0459 02 28 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, IIR 2 340 6528 02, IIR 2 340 6543 02, Analyst Note: Variant of al-Qaiti is al-Gayedi. 29 IIR 6 034 0297 05 30 IIR 6 034 0077 06, IIR 6 034 0088 05,

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) (S) Detainee stayed at the Zubayr, aka (Mugharibah) Guesthouse in Jalalabad. 31 (Analyst Note: Mugharibah is a distortion of the Arab word Maghrebi, meaning Western, used to identify the people and countries of North West Africa. Zubayr al Maghrebi was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) security committee responsible for production of false identification.32 ) (S//NF) Detainee reported he stayed in an Afghan guesthouse in Quetta for 20 days. 33 This is assessed to be the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse, a known transit point for al-Qaida recruits. It was common for the recruits to spend an extended time at the guesthouse in order to let their beards grow out, allowing the recruits to blend in with the population in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee has been identified by al-Qaida members. (S//NF) Qasim Yahya Mahdi Abd al-Rimi, aka (Abu Hurayrah), aka (Doctor Hurayrah), identified detainee as an individual he believed was present at JTFGTMO. 34 (Analyst Note: Abu Hurayrah was associated with Abd al-Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al-Nashiri, ISN US9SA-010015DP, the senior al-Qaida maritime gulf operations planner responsible for the attack on the USS COLE. Abu Hurayrah belonged to a cell that planned attacks against US citizens and an assassination plot against the US ambassador to Yemen in retaliation for the death of senior al-Qaida member Abu Ali al-Harithi. Abu Hurayrahs identification of detainee indicates an association requiring further investigation.) (S//NF) Assessed al-Qaida member Ranam Abd al-Rahman Ghanim al-Harbi alHuwaymadi, ISN US9SA-000516DP (SA-516, transferred), identified detainee as Abdul Halak, a variant of detainees alias. 35

c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been noncompliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 96 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 9 January 2008, when he participated in mass disturbance and flooding his cell. He has 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most
IIR 2 340 6543 02, IIR 6 034 0355 05, Analyst Note: This is likely a reference to a guesthouse operated by North African extremists associated with the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN), known to have operated in Jalalabad. The GJSN and the LIFG are National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 counterterrorism targets. Priority 1 targets are defined as Issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction. 32 IIR 6 034 0047 05 33 000553 302 25-FEB-2002, 000553 INITIAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002, 000553 KB 12-MAY-2002 34 TD-314/19614-03, Analyst Note: Abu Hurayrah was one of 23 detainees affiliated with the al-Qaida organization who, on 3 February 2006, escaped from Yemen's Political Security Organization (PSO) detention center. 35 IIR 6 034 0925 02
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330210 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000553DP (S) recent occurring on 24 September 2007, when he threw milk on a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, threatening guards, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 27 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in 2008. 8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of LOW intelligence value. Detainees most recent interrogation session occurred on 19 December 2006. b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and stayed in alQaida-affiliated guesthouses (Hajji Habash Zubair, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Gayedi, and Zubair). Detainee had direct access to residents and training conducted in these locations. Detainee traveled through Tora Bora during his attempted escape from Afghanistan and had contact with several individuals who were affiliated with al-Qaida or the Taliban. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee possibly has information on individuals using and managing al-Qaida guesthouses. As a result of his time in these guesthouses, detainee could provide information on individuals en route to training camps, as well as activities at guesthouses. Detainee probably can provide information on the groups he traveled with while attempting to escape from Afghanistan. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Guesthouses in Afghanistan Terrorist recruiter and facilitator Abu Muhjin Individuals involved in document forgery Other detainees including as of yet un-attributed aliases Al-Qaida commanders/operatives including Abu Thabit and Abu Hurayrah Ingress and egress routes in Afghanistan Support to terrorist organizations in Yemen Terrorist biographical and psychological info Terrorist recruitment of juveniles

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S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O33O2IO JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Recommendation Transfer for Out of DoD Control(TRO)for Guantanamo Detainee, US9SA-000553DP (S) ISN 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status reassessed 20 September was on 2004 andhe remains enemycombatant. an Ir

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