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Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33:4354 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-004-9054-2 JONARDON GANERI

Springer 2005

TRADITIONS OF TRUTH CHANGING BELIEFS AND THE NATURE OF INQUIRY

A serious sociology of the [Sanskrit] knowledge-systems needs to grasp more fundamental understandings, the sources of truth, for example, or the meaning of tradition, that helped to shape the way science and scholarship were conducted. (Pollock 2002, 437).

1 Traditions are governed by norms: there are standards of delity and determinants of faithfulness. When the tradition exists for the sake of the propagation or perpetuation of a cultural artifact, for example a ritual practice or a sacred text, the norm governing the tradition is a norm of preservation. Preservation need not imply ossication: sometimes, the best way to preserve is not by ash-freezing but by planting in the garden. That will be true, as the metaphor suggests, if what is being preserved is living, and a living tradition is a tradition governed by norms for the preservation of living things. (A dead tradition is the fossilisation in habit of a form of life drained of meaning.) Not all traditions, however, are traditions of preservation. The traditions this project1 is concerned with are traditions of knowledge and belief, the diverse systems for the manufacture, dissemination and revision of knowledge that go to make up the Indian intellectual disciplines. Traditions of knowledge are governed by a dierent norm, the norm of truth. Truth governs rst and foremost by being the goal towards which the tradition is directed. In one sense, we might say that traditions of preservation too are traditions of truth, for we can speak of being true to a memory, a person, a past event, a text. How, then, did truth gure in the minds of the Indian intellectuals? Would they have agreed with the Nietzsche who said truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to be sacriced to it?2 Or were they concerned more with being true, for example to the doctrinal and categorical

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commitments of their school? How did truth gure in their conception of the nature and function of inquiry? Was inquiry for the sake of the truth, or was truth for the sake of inquiry, and inquiry for the sake of something else (attaining the greatest good, for example)? The idea of newness and in this project we are interested especially in the new intellectuals conception of themselves as new is an idea that is available only in a tradition of the second sort, a tradition aiming at and directed towards truth. Perhaps the newness of the new intellectuals consisted precisely in this: that they came to recognise that the disciplines in which they participated were traditions of truth and not traditions of preservation. Perhaps it is simply that, in a tradition governed by the norm of truth, newness, a reappraisal of the methods and inquiry and the categories in terms of which it is to be pursued, is an everpresent possibility, a necessary corollary of the fact that the governing ideal falls outside the institution being governed. (The distinction between traditions of preservation and traditions of truth is a distinction between traditions governed by a norm internal to the tradition, and traditions governed by a norm external to the tradition.) Perhaps, and this is the possibility I shall most be interested in, the newness of the new intellectuals consisted instead in an acute self-consciousness of the diculty in knowing what it means to be governed by the norm of truth. For that idea is itself problemmatic in the extreme, and it is by no means clear what a norm of truth is and in what its governance consists. The old way was to exploit exegetical license to the full, a procedure through which delity to the texts combined with a desire for the true. Jayanta was modest enough to say: How can we discover a new truth? So one should only consider our novelty in the rephrasing of words,3 but his very modesty betrayed a highly original mind (and more than a hint of irony). One needs only to consider the tortuous reinterpretations of the clauses in the Ny"yas"tra denition of perception (NS 1.1.4) to see the procedure a u at work, a procedure whose resources are noted by Radhakrishnan:
While employing logical methods and arriving at truths agreeable to reason, they were yet anxious to preserve their continuity with the ancient texts. They did not wish it to be thought that they were enunciating something completely new. While this may involve a certain want of frankness with themselves, it helped the spread of what they regarded as the truth.4

I shall suggest that one of the key debates of the period was a debate over just this question, the question of what it means for the norm of

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truth to govern. That is the pr"m"nya-v"da debate a debate about a a: a whether the apprehension of truth is instrinsic (svatah) or extrinsic : (paratah), whatever those terms might mean. I shall see this as a : debate over the question what do we mean when we say that our beliefs aim at the truth? It is no surprise that in this debate, the M" amsakas guardians of the absolute authority of Vedic truth m" : are pitched against the Naiy"yikas representatives of empiricism in a the pursuit of knowledge. Surprising indeed though, to nd how uid are the lines of engagement, and how dicult it is to see, at the end, who has the better claim to the truth about the nature of traditions of _ truth. My reconstruction of that debate will largely follow Ganges a, the rst of the new Naiy"yikas, and his discussion in the chapter on a pr"m"nyav"da in his Tattvacint"mani (TC). a a: a a : 2 A methodological principle endorsed by, and in part denitive of, the Indian knowledge systems is that a sound grasp of the sources of true belief (pram"na) is a necessary prerequisite in the fullment of lifes a: aims, mundane or ultimate. The opening stanza of the Ny"ya-s"tra is a u programmatic if partisan: attainment of the highest good in life derives from knowledge of the true nature of the categories and methods enunciated in the Ny"ya system.5 The principle rests on a a pair of assumptions: (i) that a persons projects and plans depend for their success on a grounding in a stable body of true belief, and (ii) that the possession of a stable body of true belief requires a sound grasp of the sources of true belief. Neither assumption is unproblematic. The rst correlates true belief with successful activity, but raises dicult issues about the relationship between truth and utility. The second is, however, the more dicult of the two. Why should someone who has largely true beliefs but is otherwise unreective and ignorant of the origins of those beliefs or the reasons for their truth not be able to lead an at least moderately successful life? Admittedly, the range of projects the deeply unreective person might select for themselves is limited; they could not engage themselves in anything that required investigation or exploration, their life could not be a voyage into the unknown. But still, epistemologists are not the only ones able to lead rewarding (and rewarded) lives. _ Ganges a, founder of the new Ny"ya, asks what is, if anything, an a even more searching question of the old epistemological principle. We

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cannot, he says, possibly demand that a sound grasp of the sources of true belief is a prerequisite for the accomplishment of our highest ends unless we also have the capacity to identify and distinguish true beliefs from false (a capacity to discern the property of truth in a belief).6 A key theoretical issue for the scholars of the new period is whether any sense can be made of the attribution of such a capacity, and if so what; in particular, is the identication of true belief instrinsic (svatah) or extrinsic (paratah). Before entering into the details : : of that debate, let us try to get clear what is at issue. Why might I think that my knowledge of the sources of true belief rests upon an ability to classify my beliefs as true or as false? Presumably, some form of inquiry such as the following is envisaged. First, I survey the totality of my beliefs, and identify among them, those that are true. Then I examine the causes of each of my true beliefs, the specic manner by which each one came into existence. Finally, I search for commonalities in those specic aetiologies, underlying general patterns of causation common to the production of true beliefs and absent in the production of false ones. The result of the inquiry is a set of generalisations about the causal origins of my true beliefs. If this is the picture, then it is clear, rst of all, that the claim cannot be that knowledge of the sources is necessary for the production of true belief, for that knowledge is itself the result of a survey and study of my true beliefs. The claim is rather that it is the identication of my beliefs as true which makes possible my knowledge of their sources. My ability to identify my beliefs as true or false is prior to and necessary for my acquisition of knowedge of the sources of true belief. At this point, however, the epistemological project already threatens to unravel. For if I must already be able to identify my true beliefs, in advance, as it were, of a knowledge of the general causes of true belief, then how can that knowledge be required for the possession of a stable body of true belief? This was, recall, the leading methological principle to which the Indian knowledge systems are committed. Yet it seems now that such knowledge of the sources comes too late if it is useful for anything, then it is to help me distinguish my true beliefs from my false, and yet I must already have that capacity if I am to acquire knowledge of the sources. To put the matter another way, my capacity to identify my beliefs as true or false is built into my knowledge of the sources of true belief: there is really just one capacity here, dierently described. The puzzle stems from Sr" : a, and indeed it was Sr" : as blistering attack on the hars hars meta-epistemological foundations of the knowledge systems that

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presaged and necessitated the rise of the new epistemologies. Ac hars cording to Sr" : a, neither the intrinsicist nor the extrinsicist has an adequate reply to this problem.

3 The intrinsicist theory of truth states that whatever makes me grasp a a one of my beliefs (jn"na-gr"haka) is sucient to make me grasp the a a a: truth of that belief (jn"na-pr"m"nya).7 This thesis might seem to be a straightforward consequence of two mundane but important facts about the nature of belief. First, believing that p and believing that it is true that p are one and the same thing it is of the nature of belief that it is an attitude of commitment to the truth of what is believed.8 Second, a suspicion about the truth of a belief is fatal to that belief, in the sense that one cannot sustain a belief and simultaneously entertain a question about its truth.9 As soon as such a doubt arises, the belief ceases to be a belief, and is replaced instead by something else, a wish or hope or hypothesis. The intrinsicist thesis looks to be nothing more than a second-order version of these facts: my believing that I believe that p is sucient for my believing that my belief that p is true. What the intrincisist theory seems to insist is that there is no intelligible form of inquiry which begins with my forming beliefs and proceeds by my asking myself whether those beliefs are true or false. My commitment to the truth of my beliefs is part and parcel of what it is to have the belief at all. There is no further project, the project of identifying which of my beliefs are true and which false, over above and additional to the base-level project of forming the beliefs themselves. There are more substantive readings of the intrinsicist thesis than the minimal intrinsicism so far described. I have said that it is the thesis that whatever makes me believe that I have a belief is sucient to make me believe the truth of that belief. According to one stronger reading, what the thesis claims is rather that whatever makes me know that I have a belief is sucient to make me know the truth of that belief. The Sankrit root grah, to grasp or be aware of or apprehend something, is read factively, as implying the truth of that which is grasped or apprehended. If we concede that it is possible, in principle, for me to know that I have any belief which I do in fact have, the stronger reading entails that all my beliefs are true! This need not be as implausible a proposal as it rst seems, but it is

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revisionary and restrictive of the term belief. We are owed now an account of cognitive error which does not analyse error in terms of states of false belief. Here is one way to pursue that possibility it might be that so-called false beliefs are not mental items of the same kind and type as true beliefs. They are false in the sense of being mock or phoney, like a false promise or a false friend. The inquiry might be in order to ascertain of some mental item whether it was a real belief or a phoney, and this might be discernable from the shape and form of the item within the realm of the mental. Prabh"kara, for a instance, argues that what is referred to as a false belief is not a single item in mental space at all, but a pair of cognitions, a memory and a sense impression. Falsity is the result of a complex of mental items coalescing to produce something that masquerades as a belief.10 A condition on action is that there is a non-perception of a dierence between what is presented and what is remembered as desirable. I see a face in front of me, and remembering a good friend, go towards the person whose face it is, failing all the while to notice that this person is not in fact my good friend at all. No attribution of a false belief along the lines here is my good friend seems required for the explanation of my mistake in action. Kum"rila Bhatta has an ingenious alternative. He argues that a :: when something is believed, it is marked by the property being-bea a lieved (jn"tat"). I can investigate the things themselves and see if they have this among their various properties. That way I can nd out which among the things in the world are the things believed by me. And that inquiry does not involve any simple recapitulation of the process of belief, for jnatat" is a secondary quality and a cambridge " a property a property that can change without there being any real change in the object to which it belongs. When I infer that I believe that p on the grounds that the fact p is marked by the property being-believed-by-me, it follows that I am in a position to infer too that my belief that p is true that is what is meant by saying that p is a fact. By this method, therefore, I could never discover within myself a false belief, because, being false, there is no fact that the false belief could mark as believed-by-me. So the implication of Kum"rilas theory would seem to be that false beliefs, if there are any, a never come to the surface of consciousness. Here again the cost of intrinsicism is to incur an obligation, this time to a substantive account of the subdoxastic. There is second, perpendicular, way to derive a more substantive reading of the intrinsicist thesis. On this reading, the claim is that

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whatever makes me grasp that I have an awareness is sucient to make me grasp the truth of that awareness. This reading turns on the a a use of the Sanskrit term jn"na. Ny"ya classies under this term any mental state or disposition that is not one of desire, aversion or volition; in other words, any attitudinal rather than motivational state. a The category jn"na includes memories, doubts, true beliefs, illusions, dreams, conjectures and hypotheses. In particular, it includes states of hesitation (samsaya, tarka) as well as states of commitment (nis: caya). The intrinsicist thesis now is that to be aware of being in any attitudinal mental state at all is to be aware that that state is one of commitment. The thesis is revisionary in a dierent way: it implies that I am self-conscious only of my beliefs, all other items in my mental life remaining at the sub-doxastic level.

4 I began by saying that a certain conception of the project of inquiry was untenable, the conception according to which I rst form my beliefs and then inquire into their truth or falsity. If we continue with a the idea that the term jn"na should be construed as referring to any attitudinal state and not only states of belief, then the extrinsicist is represented as envisaging a rather dierent project. The formation is not, initially, of beliefs states of commitment, but rather of doubts, hypotheses, conjectures states of hesitation. There is indeed now a project distinct from and additional to the project of hypothesis formation, and that is the project of hypothesis-conrmation: establishing whether my hypothesis is true calls for an inquiry whose causes and conditions do not overlap with those of hypothesis-formation. If the rst move is taken to be one of doubt rather than belief, room is made for a distinct project of inquiry into the truth.11 This hypothesis and conrmation model does not, however, sit well with the viewpoint of an Indian knowledge systems theorist. For it does not give due weight to the centrality and primacy of the beliefforming processes, and to the fact that the rst move is one of belief production and not hypothesis formation. In their daily life, human beings are not scientists; our rst reex is to believe what we hear or _ see or infer. Ganges a has a far more uid and psychologically real account of the dynamics of belief-formation and revision.12 If the rst moment is to believe, the second is to question. Questioning a belief is, as we have seen, fatal to its persistence as a belief our attitude shifts

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from one of commitment to one of hesitation. At the third moment we reect upon the grounds available, a reection that will typically consist in cross-verication against subsequent behaviour. If all goes well, the attitude shifts again, from hesitation back to commitment; and so on in a perpetual interplay of spontaneous acceptance and reective questioning. When I infer that an initial, uncritical, belief, is true on the basis of subsequent successful behaviour, I distance myself from that belief. In this model, a model in which I continually monitor the beliefs arising within me, commitment lasts only for a _ moment. Ganges as account of the psycho-dynamics of belief is in important respects richer than a mere conjectures and refutations model of inquiry. A standard objection to intinsicism is that, if true, there will be _ no possible opportunity to doubt what one believes.13 Ganges a observes that such a consequence would be unacceptible, particularly in situations that do not resemble past circumstances of belief-formation. Did I really just see that? Did that really just happen? are all too natural questions to ask. The objection, however, highlights an important contrast, and reveals how, underpinning the debate is a dierence in conceptions of the nature and function of inquiry. If to believe is precisely to believe in the truth of what one believes, it necessitates no further inquiry into or testing of that belief (the desire to test reveals that one does not, after all, believe). That does not rule out the possibility that ones belief will be defeated if I later nd out or begin to suspect that the source of my belief was subject to a fault or misre (dosa), I will begin to question : its truth, a circumstance that is fatal to the persistence of the belief.14 This leaves open, of course, the possibility that for certain beliefs there are no and never will be circumstances in which a fault can be disclosed; as would be the case, for instance, with authorless testimony, on the supposition that human error alone is the source of testimonial misre. But if the norm of truth is intrinsic and so forstalls inquiry, if beliefs once formed live unchallenged except by adventitious defeat, then the burden of epistemic responsibility lies in the formation of belief a conservatism of assent will follow. Guard youself against giving your assent too easily, because once given, it is not easily withdrawn (there are no cross-checking mechanisms, no internal knowledge police). A belief once formed has the freedom of the city, so do not hand the keys to one and all. A belief is withdrawn only if a fault (dosa) in the original process of production is later : discovered.

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If the norm of truth is extrinsic, the burden of epistemic responsibility falls on the other side, with the revision of beliefs. False beliefs come and go, the important thing is to make sure they do not survive for long. And, we may add, that they do not get passed on; assertion carries its own share of the epistemic burden. Not so for the intrincisist, for whom to believe is a complete entitlement to assert. Two models, then, of the way inquiry aims at the truth. On one model, truth regulates inquiry by imposing obligations on the formation of belief and the giving of assent; on the other, the obligations fall on conrmation, verifying that our assent was worthily given. One model constrains the act of assenting, the other the persistence of assent. One embodies an ethics of commitment, and implies epistemic caution; the other embodies an ethics of trust, and implies an obligation to cross-check and a readiness to withdraw ones consent.

5 A conceptual confusion lurked within the epistemology of the old school. They thought that one could investigate the truth and falsity of ones beliefs by, as it were, taking ones belief in one hand, and the world in the other, and comparing the two. They forgot that belief itself is the way one takes the world in ones hand, thinking instead that one could somehow step outside of ones beliefs and take a sideon glance. It was, perhaps, Sr" : a who rst exposed the myth; in hars any case, the newness of the new Ny"ya consists in large measure in a an attempt to think through from the beginning the nature of an _ inquiry governed by truth. In the new epistemology of Ganges a, attri butions of truth are always provisional and go hand in hand with assessments of the worth of belief-forming processes. A constant mutual adjustment leads in time to a condition of reective equilibrium.15 The myth of the side-on glance is decisively cast aside.16 The intrinsicists underwent an analogous process of reconstitution. The old idea that some beliefs are self-evident and self-certifying is transformed into a new claim, that certain beliefs are superassertible, immune to the possible uncovering of a condition that would necessitate the withdrawal of assent (i.e. a dosa).17 Earlier I : distinguished three varieties of intrinsicism. A mimimal intrinsicism follows from the facts of belief; an extrinsicist who denies this much falls straight into the fallacy of the side-on glance, thinking that there is a way to creep around his beliefs and have a peek at the world.

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Conversely, an intrinsicism which claims that the truth of any awareness whatsoever is apprehended instrincally denies the facts from which extrinsicism derives its motivation, that we are able to assume a reective stance with respect to the workings and deliverances of our epistemic apparatus. That is why we are human beings and not epistemic automata or measuring instruments (and its why, too, we are capable of deceit). hars Sr" : a was right, then: the old schools were trapped in an oscillation of errors. A return to the basics of epistemological inquiry was called for. Radhakrishnan, again, put it well when he said:
The progress of philosophy is generally due to a powerful attack on a historical tradition when men feel themselves compelled to go back on their steps and raise once more the fundamental questions which their fathers had disposed of by the older schemes.18

_ What, for a new Naiy"yika like Ganges a, counted as delity to the a tradition? It was to reapproach and reconstruct the old tradition, having rst freed it of a conceptual myth that had lurked for too long within. It was to think though the old problems again, from the beginning. A revolution, yes, but also a return. If we cannot step outside of our beliefs, and get a sneak glimpse of the world from the side, then we can at least attend to the structure of those beliefs, to the visayat" and visayat"vacchedaka, and seek within the structures of a a : : thought itself reasons why there should be a match with the true structure (vaisistya) of the world. :
NOTES

Sanskrit Knowledge-Systems on the Eve of Colonialism (SKSEC). This project is supported by the National Science Foundation Under Grant No. 0135069. I would like to thank Phyllis Grano, and the participants at the SKSEC panel in New York , April 2003, for their comments. 2 Nietzsche (1888, Section 5). 3 NM (1936, 1; verse 8): kuto v" n"tanam vastu vayam utpreksitum ksam"h / vaa u : : : a: coviny"savaicitryam"tram atra vic"ryat"m // a a a a 4 Radhakrishnan (1929, 21). 5 NS 1.1.1: pram"na-prameya-samsaya-prayojana-dr: : anta-siddh"nt"vayava-tarkaa: a a : : st " a a a a a a a a: tattvajn"n"n nirnaya-v"da-jalpa-vitanda-hetv"bh"sa-cchala-j"ti-nigrahasth"n"n"m a : : : " _ nihseyas"dhigamah. a : : 6 TC (1897, 1157): tatra preksavatpravrttyartham pram"nadisodasa-pad"rth"n"m a: " : a a a: :" : tattvajn"n"n nihseyas"dhigamah ity"d"vas"trayat / tesvapi pram"_nadh" a sarvesam a a a a a u a : " n" : : : : ": vyavasthitir iti pram"natattvam atra vivicyate / nanu pram"nad" am tattvam praa: a : " n" : : tip"dayac ch"stram paramparay" nihsreyasena sambadhyate iti na yuktam a a a : : : pram"natattv"vadh"ranasy"sakyatv"t / taddhi pram"tattv"vadh"ranadh" : / tac ca a: a a : a a a a a : " nam svatah parato v" na sambhavati vaksam"nad": anaganagr"s"t // a aa : : a : us : :

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TC (1897, 121122): jnanapr"manyam tad-apr"many"gr"haka-y"vaj-jn"nagr"haa : ": : a : ": a a a a a " kas"magr" ahyam / The clause tad-apr"many"gr"haka seems designed to exclude a -gr" a : ": a a what I am describing as the third reading of the intrinsicist thesis. 8 Williams (1973, 137): To believe that so and so is one and the same as to believe that that thing is true. Compare TC (1897, 224): tatas ca pr"m"nya-niscaye bhraa a: matvasamsayena tadvisaye pr"m"nya-samsaya iti phalito rthah / a a: : : : : 9 Williams (2002, 67): It is an objection to a belief that it is false. In fact, in the case of a belief, it is a fatal objection, in the sense that if the person who has the belief accepts the objection, he thereby ceases to have the belief, or at least it retreats to the subconsious: if a person recognizes that the content of his belief is false, in virtue of this alone he abandons his belief in it. The Indian term is pratibandhaka. Compare TC (1897, 176): na caivam anuvyavas"yasya y"vad-vyavas"ya-visaya-visayakatve a a a : : _ bhr"ntabhr"ntijna-sankara iti v"cyam b"dh"navat"radas"y"m tasyes: atv"t, tadaa a a a a a a a: :t a vat"re tasyaiva pratibandhakatv"t / a a 10 a a a See the clear discussion of Prabh"karas view in S"likan"tha, Prakaranapancik" a : (PP, 1961). 11 We might hear an echo of the contrast William James draws between the absolutist way and the empiricist way of believing the truth (James, 1897). 12 _ Ganges a (TC, 1897, 194215). 13 TC (1897, 184): siddh"ntas tu pr"manyasya svato grahe anabhy"sadasotpannaa a : ": a a a: a a a a jn"ne tat-samsayo na sy"t jn"nagrahe pr"m"nya-niscay"t/ : 14 _ " TC (1897, 207208): atha p" : sankha adarse mukham ity"dibhramo vitah a sesadarsanepi yath" dosantar"t, tath" niscitepi pr"m"nye dosantar"t tatsamsaya iti a :" a a a a: a : :" : cet / Compare Um"pati (Colas-Chauhan 2002, 321): jn"ne dosajanyatvasamsay"d eva a a a : : _ sam sayopapatteh. The examples cited by Ganges a are interesting. In both the ex: : amples that of seeing a (white) conch-shell as yellow because of jaundice, and of seeing a face reected in a mirror the illusion persists even if we know that it is an illusion, produced by explicable causes. Nevertheless, although I may continue to see a face in front of me, my belief that there is a face in front of me does not survive the discovery that there is a mirror. This is what Gareth Evans has called the beliefindependence of informational states: the subjects being in an informational state is independent of whether or not he believes that the state is veridical (Evans 1982, 123). 15 On this use of the concept of reective equilibrium, see Ganeri (2001, 162167). 16 _ In a similar vein but on dierent grounds, Matilal (2002, 145) credits Ganges a as having struck at the root of what is called the third dogma of empiricism the dualism of scheme and content. Um"patis argument against the extrinsicist, that in a the inference this belief is true because it has led to successful activity the probandum is true is aprasiddha, is closely related. (Colas-Chauhan, 2002, 326): parastvan tu nopapadyate / pr"thamikapr"m"ny"numiter anvayin" v" vyatirekin" v" asambhav"t / a a a: a a a a a a : pr"m"nyar"pas"dhyasya p"rvam aprasiddhatven vy"ptigrah"sambhavena a a: u a u a a : 17 I borrow the notion of superassertibility from Crispin Wright, who denes it as follows: A statement is superassertible if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbit rarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information (1992, 48). 18 Radhakrishnan (1929, 17).

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Colas-Chauhan Usha (2002). Um"pati on pr"m"nya. Journal of Indian Philosophy a a a: 30, 305338.

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Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon. Ganeri, J. (2001). Reason in equilibrium. In Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. Routledge. Ganeri, J. (forthcoming). The Concealed Art of the Soul: On Truth, Concealment and the Self in Indian Thought. James, W (1897). The will to believe. In The Will To Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Longmans, Green & Co. Matilal, B (2002). Some issues of Ny"ya realism. In Mind, Language and World: a Collected Essays, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. _ Mohanty, J.N. (1989). Gangesas Theory of Truth. Motilal Benarsidass (2nd revised edn.) Nietzsche, F. (1888). The Antichrist (Translated by W. Kaufmann). In W. Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking 1954. u NM (1936). Ny"yamanjar" In Sr" S"rya N"r"yana Sukla (ed.), The Ny"yamanjar" of a . aa a Jayantabhat: a, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. 106. Benares. :t NS (1997). Ny"yas"tra. In Anantalal Thakur (ed.), Gautam" a u yany"yadarsana with a Bh": ya of V"tsy"yana. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. as a a PP (1961). Prakaranapancik". In A.S. Sastri (ed.), The Prakaranapancik" of a a : : " Salikan"tha with Jayapura N"r"yana Bhat: as Ny"yasiddhi, Dars ana Ser. No. 4. a aa : a :t Banares. Pollock, S. (2002). Introduction: working papers on Sanskrit knowledge-systems on the eve of colonialism. Journal of Indian Philosophy 30, 431439. Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli (1929). Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. 2nd ed. George Allen & Unwin. TC (1897). Tattvacint"mani. In K"m"khy"n"tha Tarkav"g" a (ed.), The a : a a a a a s _ Tattvacint"mani of Gangesa Up"dhy"ya with the commentary of Mathur"n"tha a : a a a a Tarkav"g" Vol. 1 Pratyaksakhanda. Calcutta: Bibilotheca Indica. a sa. : : Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to believe. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. (2002). Truth & Truthfulness. Princeton University Press. Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.

Department of Philosophy University of Liverpool 7 Abercromby Square Liverpool L69 7WY UK

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