F R E D E R I C K J.

S T R E N G

THE

BUDDHIST

DOCTRINE

OF TWO TRUTHS

AS

RELIGIOUS

PHILOSOPHY

3. In ultimate reality (paramarthata~) there is neither an illumined one nor object of illumination. Ahl you are indeed the one who illumines the reality most difficult to illumine. 7. No sound at all was uttered by you, O Master, And [yet] all disciplined people were satisfied [or 'refreshed'] by the dharma-rain. 1 These stanzas from a h y m n attributed to Ngg~trjuna reflect a problem recognized in m a n y Buddhist attempts to express the truth. The problem basically is how to use language to release human beings from their attachment to deceptive (false) mental and emotional habits. The Buddha and his followers claimed they could provide a path, a means, of release from life's anxieties and frustrations. This meant that the Buddhist teachers (therapists) had to entice their hearers into trying the Buddha's remedy, but without diluting its cathartic power to the point where it became simply a narcotic or worse, a poison. Thus, in expressing the truth (dharma) the spiritual teachers recognized, on the one hand, that the truth which illumines must be appropriate to the spiritual condition of the hearer, and on the other, that there is a criterion of truth which distinguishes salutary teachings from perversions. One way of explaining how there could be a variety of truth statements - some appearing to be mutually contradictory - while also affirming that there was a criterion of truth which applied to all truth claims was to assert that there were two kinds of truth: conventional or world-ensconced truth (savhv.rti-satya), and ultimate or highest truth (paramdrtha-satya). While this distinction solved some problems in relating different Buddhist statements, it raised new questions at another level of explanation. For instance, if there are two kinds of truth, what is the relationship between them? Are these kinds of truth simply two kinds of statements having their own linguistic (i.e. logical) structures that apply to different realms of discourse (as in the difference between metaphorical and anaJournal of lndian Philosophy 1 (1971) 262-271. All Rights Reserved Copyright 1971 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-l-lolland

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lytical statements; or between theological statements, empirically justifiable statements, and descriptions of personal experience)? Or is the conventional truth simply either an illusion or first suggestion in the direction of truth, which should be discarded for a radically different truth realized only when the conventional truth is rejected? Or is the conventional truth also an expression of the ultimate truth at least to the degree that it is a necessary participant in the reality expressed in the ultimate truth? A study of different expressions of Indian Buddhism indicates that the question of the relation between conventional thought and highest insight was handled in a number of ways. 2 The question is complicated by the fact that Buddhists used a variety of terms referring to different kinds of knowledge (consciousness, or truth), that have overlapping but not identical meaning, e.g. j~dna, praj~d, abhij~dna, vij~dna, vidyd, satya, dharma, d.r.s.ti, vikalpa, sam.kalpa, parikalpita, paratantra, parini.spanna-lak.san,a. We should also note, as K. N. Jayatilleke has pointed out, that 'the two words, sammuti- and paramattha- are nowhere contrasted in the [Pali] Canon' and that while the Theravfida commentaries distinguish between conventional (sammuti-) and absolute (paramattha-) truth they nowhere imply that the former is false or even that the latter is superior, a In contrast, R. Robinson reminds us, the Prajfi~tparamit~t Sutras differentiate the conventional and absolute truths with the claim that "what is true from one standpoint is false from the other."4 With this recognition of the complexity inherent in discussing the relation of conventional truth to the highest insight in Buddhism I want to focus on statements about this problem made by the second/third-century Buddhist philosopher N~g~trjuna. My interpretation of the way in which N~garjuna understood the 'two truths' is informed by two methodological assumptions. The first is that the statements are made in the context of religious philosophy; that is, the highest purpose for formulating any statements is soteriological, not speculative. Thus 'truth' can refer to a development of an attitude as well as a judgment about a proposition. The second is that the meaning or significance of the most profound religious statements includes reference to, though not limited to, commonly recognized experience of reality. To the extent that the latter assumption is correct we can understand the religious significance of the statements without claiming that we have attained the highest spiritual insight. Based on these assumptions I hope

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to show that in affirming 'two truths' Nftggrjuna recognized two functions o f religious speech: (1) The first is that conventional truth (which includes the use o f concepts like 'emptiness', 'dependent co-origination', and 'the middle way', as well as the use o f logical inference) is a positive force in attaining the highest insight. (2) The second is that the awareness o f the highest truth requires an attitudinal change within a person in which he frees himself f r o m his attachment to an illusory self-image. Thus, the basic difference between conventional a n d ultimate truth is n o t simply the conceptual content o f statements, nor the accuracy with which one identifies notions with their assumed objective referrents, but a difference o f the perspective o f the user o f truth-statements: whether he is attached to, or free from, the distinctions he makes for purposes o f communication. I. UNDERSTANDING ~PRATiTYASAMUTP-~DA' IS NECESSARY FOR ATTAINING NIRV/~.~A I n one o f N~g~rjuna's m a j o r works, M~lamadhyamakakdrikSs, we find several stanzas that deal with our problem. Chapter 24 considers the way in which the N o b l e Truths (Sryasatya) as well as everyday activity are i m p o r t a n t when one realizes that all things are ' e m p t y ' . Some o f the pertinent stanzas are as follows: 24.40. He who perceives dependent co-origination (pratityasamutp~tda) Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction as well as the path. 18. The 'originating dependently' we call 'emptiness'; This apprehension [i.e. taking into account] through dependence, is [the understanding of] the middle way. 14. When emptiness 'works', then everything in existence 'works'. If emptiness does not 'work', then all existence does not 'work'. 36. You deny all mundane and customary activities When you deny emptiness [in the sense of] dependent co-origination. 8. The dharma-explanation by the Buddhas has recourse to two truths: The world-ensconced (sarhvrti) truth and the ultimate truth. 9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhSgam) of the two kinds of truth Do not know the profound reality (tattva) in the Buddha's teaching. 10. The ultimate truth is not taught apart from conventional practice (vyavahara), And without having attained the ultimate truth one cannot achieve nirv~toa.5 I n the first two stanzas quoted, there is an appeal to specific Buddhist teaching a b o u t the nature o f existence, namely that the world arises and dissipates n o t by the will o f a deity nor because an eternal Oneness desired a second, b u t because o f interrelated conditions. This was elaborated in

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various sgtras and abhidamma texts in early Buddhism in different ways, but each attempt reflects an effort to remain true to the position given in Sarhyutta-Nikdya 22.90 where the Buddha explains to Kacc~na that the right view is in a 'middle doctrine' between a belief in a self-substantiated being (eternalism) and a belief in non-being (nihilism). Nagftrjuna argues for a correct understanding of this teaching in the Kdrikds, Chapter 15, when he says:
6. Those who perceive self-existence (svabh~va) and other-existence (parabh~va), and an existent thing and a non-existent thing, D o not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching. 7. In 'The Instruction of K~tyhyana' both 'it is' and 'it is n o t ' are opposed By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of 'existent' and 'non-existent'.s

Here we see a clear concern to interpret the Buddha's teaching correctly in order to have a correct conceptual apprehension of existence; so N~g~trjuna does not hold that all conceptual formulations are equally good or bad. In the second pair of stanzas quoted above from Chapter 24, i.e. 14 and 36, we see that 'emptiness' (~nyatd), when it is a term for 'dependent co-origination', applies as much to conditioned existence as to freedom from pain. Everyday experience is not a reality different from 'emptiness'. 'Emptiness' (or 'dependent co-origination') is the basic term for N~g~trjuna through which one can understand both the arising and cessation of pain; it is a situation that is in itself neutral, allowing for both the production of illusion and its cessation. To realize 'emptiness' as the highest insight into the nature of life is not to reject conditioned existence (sarhsk.rta) as if it were reality qualitatively different from unconditioned reality (asarhsk.rta). Rather, a different kind of distinction must be made to account for the difference between pain and release from pain: namely, between conceptual formulations assumed to describe self-substantiated reality (svabhdva) which result in delusion, and formulations that are used in a practical and relative sense but recognized to be 'empty' of any

svabhdva.
Most human perception and conceptual formulation is illusory because it is formed by the assumption of self-substantiated reality, and this experience binds a person to his own emotional and conceptual habits. Whether man lives in everyday painful consciousness or in the highest insight, the situation that makes either possible is the reality labeled

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'dependent co-origination'. The only situation there is is the empty (nonsvabhdva) interdependent conditions; but most people exist inappropriately in this situation by acting as if one's 'self', some existing 'thing', or idea were self-existent, and then seizing an aspect of reality as if it were absolute. Actually, many conditions present for the arising of illusion and pain are also present for the release from pain and the realization of truth. The formation of conditioned existence does not automatically carry with it a unique quality (svalak.sa.na) of evil by comparison to an unconditioned reality. So far we have tried to point out that Naggrjuna affirms that some teachings and conceptual formulations contain a useful criterion of right views, and that phenomenal experience is not in itself evil and thus by nature opposite to 'emptiness'. These claims support his statement in the third group of stanzas quoted from Chapter 24, stanzas 8-10, namely that the Buddha's teaching has recourse to two kinds of truth and that the ultimate truth is not taught apart from the practical (conventional) truth. NftgSrjuna uses the techniques of conventional discourse in his own expression of 'the middle way' not only in using notions common to the Buddhist tradition but also in the justification for his arguments, and in an appeal to logic in his negative dialectic. When he argues against his opponents in the K~rikds and Vigrahavy~vartan~ he appeals to a common denominator of phenomenal experience, namely the experience of all men that existence comes and goes. He recognizes that it is appropriate to request evidence for what is claimed in the highest insight (paramdrtha). Likewise, it seems to me, he is willing to be persuaded that he is wrong if given adequate evidence that contradicts his position. Such evidence would arise if one could logically account for the arising of phenomena through an appeal to absolute, unchanging entities (svabhava), or if one could find even a single existing phenomenon that both remains without change and which at the same time causes something else to change. When he uses his negative dialectic to refute his opponents, Ngtgftrjuna accepts the principles of formal logic and uses terms indicating logical necessity, e.g. 'upapadyate', 'yujyate', and 'prasajyate'. 7 More important to our analysis here is that the dialectic is not simply a destructive force that clears the ground for a constructive formulation of truth. The dialectic itself provides a positive apprehension, not of a 'thing', but of the

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insight that there is no independent and absolute thing or unconditioned reality. By rejecting concept after concept as absolute, and by denying the counterthesis as well as the thesis, Nftg~rjuna attempts to develop an indifference to grasping after a supposed essence. In this way the negative dialectic is an effective force to break a person's mental and emotional attachment to phenomenal and ideal entities without positing an unconditional eternal source of all phenomena behind the phenomena; for, according to Nfig~rjuna, there is nothing more beyond 'emptiness', or dependent co-origination, s The notion of 'emptiness' and the use of the dialectic, then, are useful tools for fulfilling the first function of dharmateaching: to distinguish between views and describe most accurately the nature o f existence. II. THE HIGHEST INSIGHT REQUIRES NONATTACHMENT TO NOTIONS OF ULTIMATE TRUTH OR TO SUPPOSED REFERRENTS TO THESE NOTIONS I f N~g~rjuna appealed to conventional truth in his articulation o f ' e m p t i ness' it is also true that he was aware that as long as 'truth' is regarded as an idea, a 'thing' referred to by an idea, an experience, or an object o f feeling it can destroy a person 'like a snake wrongly grasped or magical knowledge incorrectly applied' (Kdrikds 24.11). Certainly, at the practical level 'emptiness', 'dependent co-origination', 'the middle way', 'the Noble Truths' are useful antidotes for h u m a n pain when applied correctly; but if they function as objects to be grasped, as 'things' to be attained in distinction to other 'things' that are supposedly essentially different, they are simply more sources for self-deception and pain. This is the basis for his repeated warning that 'emptiness' should not be regarded as another 'viewpoint' or some self-substantiated reality opposite to non-emptiness. This is made clear in the following stanzas of the Kdrikds: 13.7. If something would be non-empty, something [logically also] would be empty, But nothing is non-empty, so how will it be empty? 8. Emptiness is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all viewpoints; But those who hold "emptiness' as a viewpoint - [the true perceivers] have called those 'incurable' (asadhya). 22.10. Thus 'what is acquired' (upadana) and 'one who acquires' are completely empty (g~nya). How is that empty Tathfigata known through that which is empty?

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11. One may not say that he is 'empty', nor that he is 'non-empty', Nor both [empty and non-empty], nor neither. But the purpose for saying ['empty'] is to convey knowledge.9 One of the basic functions of the negative dialectic used throughout the Kdrikds is to avoid any attachment to a self-existing reality. Thus the distinctions between even 'purity' and 'impurity', between 'salutary' and 'unsalutary', and between nirvdn.a and sarhsdra are relative (i.e. 'empty'), just as the distinction between ' e m p t y ' and 'non-empty'. Similarly the distinctions that were carefully observed in the Abhidharma texts regarding causes of action and results of action; the origination, duration, and cessation of constructed things in existence (sarhsk.rta); the actor, action, and product of action; past, present, and future; or the production of pain by oneself, by another, or both - all these are regarded by N5garjuna as empty of self-existent reality. Likewise, the experiences of anger, greed, and fear are not self-substantiated entities or forces; they are simply the experiential patterns resulting from habits of mentally and emotionally constructing sameness or opposition where there really is none. The negative dialectic found in the Kdrikds together with meditation-practice were of cleansing the mental-emotional habits. F r o m the perspective of ultimate truth the statement that all things are empty, the negative dialectic, and meditation are themselves without self-existent reality. The development of non-attachment to any of these aids for insight is part of the illumination (i.e. also 'non-illumination') of the reality most difficult to illumine. The significance of recognizing that all things are empty (from the highest perspective) is not that it substitutes one idea for another, nor that it gives new information (though this may also be true); rather, this recognition is a freeing and purifying power. To the degree that someone realizes the highest truth he is free f r o m bondage to self-imposed limitations. When a 'person' is unattached to his own mental and emotional fabrication he cart transcend his 'person-ness'. In Chapter 18.4-5 of the Kdrikds N~tg~trjuna says this in the following way: 4. When T and 'mine' have stopped, then also there is not an outside or an inner self. The 'acquiring' [of karma] (up,dana) is stopped; on account of that destruction, there is destruction of very existence. 5. On account of the destruction of the evils (klega) of action there is release; for evils of action are constructed.

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These evils result from phenomenal extension (prapa~ca); but phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.10 These verses are like those quoted before on the articulation of 'emptiness' in that none of them should be interpreted to mean that they refer to entities that exist independent of other things. There is no self-existent 'cessation', or 'I', or 'release' or 'evils'. There are, however, empty (relative) experiences, ideas, and situations identified for communication purposes as 'cessation', 'I,' 'release', and 'evils'. In denying that any view or any term is a necessary or apriori expression of truth N~tgarjuna exposes the second o f the two functions of his dharma-teaching: to develop an attitude which frees one from attachment to any single idea or experience without rejecting all ideas and experiences for some projected opposite. The highest truth (paramarthasatya), then, is not the total rejection of conventional truth (sathvrtisatya). The realization of nirv~n.a is not attaining a self-existent reality opposite to sarhsara. Rather it is the realization that all distinctions are 'empty', i.e. 'dependently co-originated'; and this realization requires a transformation of self-awareness much more drastic than eliminating all constructed entities (including ideas or interpersonal relationships) in favor of an undifferentiated transcendent reality. To realize 'emptiness' as the basis for both sarhsdra and nirvdn,a is to recognize also that sarhv.rti- and paramartha-truths are empty of self-existence. The highest wisdom, then, is not simply rejection of some mental formulations and 'possession' of others, nor rejection of all mental formulations in expectation that there is a self-existent, absolute reality described as non-mental-formulations; rather, the highest wisdom is an attitude or mental-psychic condition which permits one to function without pain and with great joy. This condition can be compared to health as a condition of the body which permits it to function properly. The sarhvrti truth has the capacity to point beyond the limitations inherent in the distinctions that pertain to it; thus it is useful for pointing to a condition o f freedom from the tendencies of distinctions to break up the flux of existence into entities and crystallize them into expectations that result in delusion and pain. Likewise paramdrtha-truth is the situation of being illumined about the dependent co-origination of all things which devoids a 'person' o f anger, greed and fear in regard to any conditioned entity. The deepest illusions are dissipated through the highest insight, and these

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illusions are n o t simply faulty identification o f existing entities b u t attachm e n t to the n o t i o n t h a t identification of entities c a n ensure absolute truth. A b s o l u t e t r u t h is n o t only a definition of 'the way things a r e ' ; it is a situation of freedom, of health, of joy.

Southern M e t h o d i s t University, T e x a s
NOTES 1 From 'The Hymn to the Incomparable One' found in G. Tucci, 'Two Hymns of the Catuh.-stava of N~gfirjuna', J. Roy. Asiatic Soc., New Series XXVIII (1932), pp. 312 and 314: na boddh~ na ca boddhavyam astiha param~rthata.h/ aho param, durbodhSffa dharmatfirh buddhavfinasi//3 nod~h.rtaria tvay~tkificid ekam apy ak~arafia vibho/ ~..tsna.s ca vaineyajano dharmavar.sen.a tarpita.h//7 z See L. de Vall6e Poussin, 'Les Deux V6rit6s', in Mdlanges Chinois et Bouddhique V, pp. 163-5; and K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp. 363-8. s Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 364-6. 4 R. Robinson, The Buddhist Religion (Belmont, Calif., Dickenson, 1970), p. 53. 5 yah. pratityasamutphdarh pa~yatidarh sa payati] duh.kham samudayam c~iva nirodharh m~trgam eva ca//40 yah. pratityasamutp~tdah. ~3nyat~riataria pracak.smahe/ s~t prajfiaptirup~d~tya pratipatsaiva madhyam~//18 sarvarp, ca yujyate tasya ~3nyath yasya yujyate/ sarvam, na yujyate tasya 0nya.m yasya na yujyate//14 sarvasarp,vyavah~tra.m~ ca laukikan pratib~dhase] yatpratityasamutpada~!3nyafftm pratib~tdhase//36 dve satye samup~ritya buddh~nfirft,dharmade~an~/ lokasarhvTtisatya.m ca satyam, ca param~rthatah.//8 ye 'nayor na vij~nanti vibhagaria satyayor dvayoh./ te tattvarp, na vijfinanti gambhira.m buddha~hsane//9 vyavahfiram ana~ritya param~rtho na de~yate/ param~trtham an~gamya nirv~0a.m n~dhigamyate//I0 svabh~tvam parabh~val~, ca bh~vavh c~bh~tvameva ca/ ye pa~yanti na pa~yanti te tattva.m buddhafisane//6 k~tty~yan~vav~dec~stiti n~stiti cobhayaria/ prati.siddhar0, bhagavatfi bh~v~bhfivavibhavin5//7 See R. Robinson, Early Madhyamika In India and China (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), pp. 50-8 for a discussion on N~tg~rjuna's use of logic. 8 See T. R. V. Mufti, The CentralPhilosophy of Buddhism (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1955), Part II 'The Dialectic as System of Philosophy'; F. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville, Abingdon, 1967), Chs. 9 and 10; K. Venkata Ramanan, N~g~rjuna's Philosophy as Presented in The Mah~-praj~p~ramit~stra (Rutland, Vermont, Tuttle, 1966), Ch. 7 for further discussion of the significance of Nag~rjuna's negative dialectic.

B U D D H I S T D O C T R I N E AS R E L I G I O U S P H I L O S O P H Y 9 yady afifinyam bhavet kirhcit syfic chfinyam iti kirhcana/ na kimcid asty a~finyarh ca kutah. ~finya.m bhavi.syati//7 ~finyat~ sarvad.r.s~inS, proktfi ni.h~aran.arh jinail~./ rh y e ~ m tu ~finyatfidr..st.istfin as,~dhy~n babhfi$ire//8 evam fifinyam upfidfinam up~dfitfi [ca] sarvaa.h.] prajfiapyate ca ~fmyena katha .m fifinyas tathfigatah. //10 [~O, nyam iti na vaktavyam] a~Ctnyam iti vfi bhavet/ ubhayaro, nobhayam, cetiprajfiaptyartharh [tu] kathyate//11 lo mametyahamiti k~trje bahirdhfidhy~tmameva ca/ nirudhyata upfidfinarh tatksayfij janmana.h k.sayal~.//4 karmakle~ak.sayfin mok.sa.h karmakleifi vikalpata.h/ te prapaficfit prapafieas tu ~myatfiy~rh nirfidhyate//5

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