Int Ontology Metaphysics (2012) 13:2741 DOI 10.

1007/s12133-011-0090-6

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

Pierfrancesco Basile

Published online: 8 December 2011 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Russells critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinozas difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinozas proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russells interpretation of Spinozas theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinozas substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an eternally active, self-actualizing creative power. Eventually, Spinoza the Monist and Russell the Pluralist are at one in holding that process and activity rather than enduring things are the most fundamental realities. Keywords Russell . Spinoza . Substance . Monism . Attribute . Power

It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion, and I hold that the definition of being is simply power. A. N. Whitehead (1933:129)

1 Introduction Bertrand Russell greatly admired Spinoza, whose philosophy he praised as a noble attempt at liberating men from the slavery of fears and anxieties, passions incompatible with every kind of wisdom (Russell 1945: 578580). Still, he had significant reservations about the way the Dutch thinker of Jewish origins had achieved his grand metaphysical conclusion of the unity of all things. Spinoza, he wrote, is in many ways one of the greatest of philosophers, but his greatness is rather ethical than metaphysical (Russell 1927a: 249). Given that Spinozas ethics
P. Basile (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Bern, Lngassstrasse 49a, 3000-9 Bern, Switzerland e-mail: pierfrancesco.basile@philo.unibe.ch

28

P. Basile

can hardly be divorced from his metaphysics (one needs to understand ones place in the universe to lead a genuinely virtuous life), this is already a highly suspicious claim. But what precisely is wrong with Spinozas metaphysics?

2 The Turn to Process: Russells Critique of Spinoza From the time of his research in early modern philosophy that culminated in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900) to the very end of his career, Russell argues that traditional systems are flawed at a deep logical level. If one holds the logical theory that all propositions ascribe a predicate to a subject, one will be led to deny that relations possess any independent logical status. The counterpart of the logical theory that all propositions are subjectpredicate in form is the metaphysical view that substances are bearers of properties. On this view, there is no place for relations at a basic metaphysical level. The subjectpredicate logic, which all such philosophers in the past assumed, either ignores relations altogether, or produces fallacious arguments to prove that relations are unreal. (Russell 1945: 595) Thus, the only options open to a philosopher working with the concept of substance are either a universe of mutually isolated substances or a single substance of which everything else is a property. These alternatives have found their paradigmatic formulations in Leibnizs theory of monads and in Spinozas substance monism: It is a common opinionoften held unconsciously, and employed in argument, even by those who do not explicitly advocate itthat all propositions, ultimately, consist of a subject and a predicate. When this opinion is confronted by a relational proposition, it has two ways of dealing with it, of which one might be called monadistic, the other monistic. Of these views, the first is represented by Leibniz and (on the whole) by Lotze, the second by Spinoza and Mr. Bradley. (Russell 1903: 221; cf. also Russell 1956: 324) As Russell views things, these competing systems provide a reductio ad absurdum of traditional subjectpredicate logic: the doctrine that all propositions ascribe a predicate to a subject cannot be true, if it compels us to hold one of two equally incredible theories. This is just part of Russells argument, however, for in truth, Spinoza monism is the only legitimate outcome of the theory that all propositions are subjectpredicate in form. Leibnizs whole metaphysics can be summarized in the statement There are many monads. Where is the subject here? If Leibniz had further developed the implications of the subjectpredicate theory of proposition, he would have seen that the entire world of monads must be an adjective of an underlying subject. Hence, Leibnizs theory of monads collapses into Spinozas substance monism (Russell 1945: 595); as against this, Russell observes: Pluralism is the view of science and common sense, and is therefore to be accepted if the arguments against it are not conclusive. For my part, I have no doubt whatever that it is the true view, and that monism is derived from a faulty logic inspired by mysticism. (Russell 1927a: 264) This leaves much to be desired as an argument (among other things, science and common sense do not appear to be always consistent with one another), yet Russell is satisfied by these brief remarks; in his

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

29

view, they bring his critique of the subjectpredicate theory of proposition to a successful end. In attacking the subjectpredicate theory of proposition, Russell is also making an important ontological point. It is the very notion of substance as a bearer of properties (the metaphysical counterpart of the logical notion of subject of predication) that needs to be abandoned: Spinoza, we may say, had shown that the actual world could not be explained by means of one substance; Leibniz showed that it could not be explained by means of many substances. It became necessary, therefore, to base metaphysics on a notion other than that of substancea task not yet accomplished. (Russell 1900: 126) This is not the sole attack upon the concept of substance one finds in Russells writings. The concept is also said to be inconsistent with the fundamental ontology of modern science: The concept of substance, upon which Spinoza relies, he says in A History of Western Philosophy, is one which neither science nor philosophy can nowadays accept (Russell 1945: 578). Russells point here is that substances have been traditionally conceived as bearers of properties. And since a substances properties come and go in a world of changing things, a substance has been identified with that which remains identical through change. In this way, traditional metaphysics has explained all changes by reference to the concept of an enduring, permanent substratum. But contemporary science has now reversed this traditional explanatory order, making permanence subordinate to process: [T]he notion of substance, at any rate in any sense involving permanence, must be shut out from our thoughts if we are to achieve a philosophy in any way adequateto modern physics. Modern physics, both in the theory of relativity and in the Heisenberg-Schrdinger theories of atomic structure, has reduced matter to a system of events, each of which lasts for a very short time. To treat an electron or a proton as a single entity has become as wrong-headed as it would be to treat the population of London and New York as a single entity. (Russell 1927a: 254) Although the point is not explicitly developed by Russell, the analogy with the population of London and New York nicely illustrates his novel ontological approach. In a statement such as The population of New York has increased in the last five years one can hardly identify a subject (The population) that exists prior to its properties. The reality denoted by The population of New York depends for its existence upon its citizens. There is some elasticity to the kind of dependence that is here at stake, for individual citizens die and new ones are born; still, this does not prevent us from conceiving of The population of New York as a kind of entity that preserves its identity through change (we say that a population grows, not that it is replaced by another when new members join in). This shows that there are alternative ways of explaining permanence amid change than substanceproperty ontology. According to Russell, modern science has understood that the ontological model adequate for societies can be extended to a larger realm of natural phenomena. Philosophers (and metaphy-

30

P. Basile

sicians in particular) who take science seriously should follow their example: why not speculate that all permanence is grounded in a network of interconnected individuals, conceived as occurrences of limited temporal duration, rather than as Democritean (and ultimately Parmenidean) indestructible atoms? We need not only a new logic, but a new set of basic ontological categories as well; specifically, the traditional metaphysics of substance has to give way to a new metaphysics of process: as Russell makes the point, everything in the world is composed of events (Russell 1927a: 287). Russell made some significant steps towards the completion of this ambitious project in The Analysis of Matter (Russell 1927b), but it was his mathematical mentor, Alfred North Whitehead, who came closer to developing a metaphysics centered on the notion of event in his profound yet very difficult book of 1929, Process and Reality (Whitehead 1929). The present paper does not discuss either Russells investigations into the nature of the physical world or Whiteheads daring revisionary metaphysics. Its object is to assess Russells appraisal of traditional metaphysics by considering his critique of Spinoza. Does Spinozas argument for the startling conclusion that all things are one really rest on a faulty logical theory? And is Russell right in thinking that Spinozas metaphysics fails to do justice to the dynamical nature of things? In what follows, we will address these questions in turn.

3 Spinozas Monistic Argument: Attributes as Properties? To the best of my knowledge, Russell never supports his charges with detailed interpretations of selected passages in Spinozas Ethics. This should not come as a surprise, for he believes that the common opinion that all propositions consist of a subject and a predicate is often held unconsciously, and employed in argument, even by those who do not explicitly advocate it (Russell 1903: 221). This preventively insulates his interpretation from critical attacks, making careful textual exegesis virtually superfluous. As he also says in A History of Western Philosophy, the detail of Spinozas demonstrations is not worth mastering (Russell 1945: 572). On the contrary, a careful look at Spinozas argument in support of substance monism will prove to be a very instructive exercise. The proof is a way of articulating the very simple intuition that if an infinite God were to exist, then it would be so large a being that it would occupy all available space; nothing else could exist, except God and his states. The argument is cast in terms of Spinozas own ontological categories of substance and attribute and is based upon the following two propositions1: (1) No two substances can share one attribute. (Ip5, In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.) (2) A substance possessing all attributes necessarily exists. (Ip11, God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.)
1

In what follows, the five books of the Ethics are numbered I to V. The abbreviations p, a, d, c and s stand for Proposition, Axiom, Demonstration, Corollary and Scholium.

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

31

Taking (1) and (2) as his premises, Spinoza concludes that: (3) Only one substance exists. (Ip14, Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.)2 Premise (1) is Spinozas notorious No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis (a denomination introduced by Bennett 1984: 66) and will be considered more fully shortly (see Sections 45); premise (2) is based upon Spinozas version of Anselms ontological argument and will not be discussed any longer in this paper (for detailed analyses of this argument, see Doney 1980, Marcus 1993 and Basile 2010); finally, thesis (3) is Spinozas monistic conclusion. The basic concept in this proof is that of attribute, one of the most controversial in Spinozas entire metaphysics. One need not know what that concept stands for, however, in order to see that the argument is not valid: (3) would not follow from (1) and (2) if it were possible for a substance to have no attributes. In this case, the existence of a substance possessing all attributes would not suffice to make the existence of other substances impossible. Spinozas argument requires a supplementary assumption: (4) A substance needs at least one attribute in order to existi.e., there cannot be a substance that has no attributes. (This is not listed as an official proposition, yet Spinoza says in Ip10d that nothing is clearer than each being must be conceived under some attribute.) Thesis (4) is trivially true if one identifies attributes and properties. A substance need not have any specific property, but it needs to have at least some property: otherwise, it would be a bare substratum, hardly distinguishable from a mere nothing. As a matter of fact, attributes will have to be interpreted as properties if Russells contention that substance monism is based upon the subjectpredicate theory of proposition were true. But there is no need to speculate here, for Russell is explicit as to what he takes attributes to be: To Spinoza, extension and thought did not constitute two separate substances, but attributes of the one substance. In Spinoza as in Des Cartes [sic], the notion of substancewas not an ultimate simple notion, but a notion dependent, in some undefined manner, upon the purely logical notion of subject and predicate. The attributes of a substance are the predicates of a subject [my emphasis]; and it is supposed that predicates cannot exist without their subject, though the subject can exist without them. (Russell 1900: 41) However, Spinozas attributes can hardly be interpreted as properties of a thinglike substance. On this interpretation, his argument would remain formally valid, yet premise (1) No two substances can share an attribute would become equivalent to (1*) No two (thing-like) substances can share one property. Proposition (1*) is, to say the least, a very dubious claim and it is unlikely that Spinoza would have wanted to ground his monism on such a shaky foundation.
2 Spinozas claim is stronger than this: Ip14 says that it is necessary that only one substance exists. The point is irrelevant for the purposes of the present article.

32

P. Basile

Russells interpretation also conceals the fact that Spinoza works with a larger set of basic ontological categories than those one might derive from the subjectpredicate theory of proposition. For in Spinozas philosophy, substances have modes as well as attributes. Here are the relevant definitions: Id3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose conception does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed. Id4: By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence. Id5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived. These definitions are complex and their meaning will be unpacked as the discussion proceeds. Nevertheless, one easily sees that modes are better candidates than attributes for being interpreted as properties. According to Jonathan Bennett, the term mode had a double function in seventeenth century philosophy. To call something a mode was (a) a way of classifying it as an instance of a quality, as well as (b) to say that it was dependent for its existence upon something else (Bennett 1996: 68; cf. also Curley 1969: 3643, to which Bennett refers). Spinoza apparently retains both senses of the term in his philosophy. But if modes are to be interpreted as properties (a controversial point that can be conceded for the sake of the argument), they will have to be equated with property-instances or tropes rather than with universals. But none of this lends any support to Russells interpretation: even if modes are properties, the crucial notion in his monistic argument is that of attribute. Could it be argued that Spinoza has two kinds of properties, attributes and modes? If this were so, and given that modes can be construed as particular property-instances, attributes would have to be identified with universals. But to be a universal is to be something that can be had by many. Clearly, such an interpretation would make Spinozas No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis entirely unintelligible. The strongest piece of textual evidence that could be adduced in support of Russells interpretation is Axiom 1, Spinozas claim that only substances and modes exist (Whatever is, is either in itself [a substance] or in another [a mode]). Here, Spinoza may indeed seem to be saying that only substances and their properties exist. However, Spinoza appeals to this axiom to explain the transition from Ip14, the thesis that there is only substance (Except God, no substance can be or be conceived), to Ip15, the thesis that all other things must be modes or affections of the only one existing substance (Whatever is, is in God). Thus, Axiom 1 enters the scene only when the monistic conclusion has been already established. All this is hard to reconcile with Russells claim that Spinozas monism depends upon the logical doctrine that all propositions ascribe a predicate to a subject. This already answers the first of our two questions: all in all, it would seem that one can make little progress in understanding Spinozas proof if one tries to capture it in terms of substanceproperty ontology. Russell can be charged with the fallacy known as affirming the consequent: the point can be granted that a philosopher holding the subjectpredicate theory of proposition will have to be a monist; nevertheless, the fact that Spinoza was a monist does not by itself entails that he held that view or that it was the foundation of his metaphysics. The second question now

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

33

remains to be answered. Was Spinoza really oblivious to the active nature of things? In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to devote further attention to the details of Spinozas proof.

4 Getting Started: Attributes as Principles of Individuation What are attributes, then, if they are not properties? One main way to understand a philosophical concept is to see it at work. One might therefore hope to answer this question by considering Spinozas demonstration of the No-Shared-AttributesThesis, i.e., the claim that In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute (Ip5). Here is Spinozas explanation: If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference in their attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by p4). If only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by p1), if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself, that is (by d3 and a6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by p4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute]. (Ip5d) Spinozas reasoning in this dense passage can be outlined as follows: (1) Spinoza believes that What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself (Ia2). This is tantamount to saying that there is nothing in reality that lacks an explanation: either a thing can be explained by reference to something else, or it is self-explanatory. (Stated in Leibnizian terminology, Spinoza endorses the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the rationalistic belief that there are no brute facts.) (2) It follows from this that if two substances S1 and S2 are numerically different, there must be a way of accounting for their non-identity. (What makes two distinct substances distinct? This might seem a silly question to ask, like Platos question in Parmenides (132a15) as to what it is that makes two similar things similar. But it must be recognized as genuine by anyone who believes in the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Why should one hold to the Principle? Since the Principle is not a Leibnizian Truth of Reason (i.e., its negation does not yield a self-contradiction), it is not immediately obvious that it can be introduced as an axiom. How does Spinoza know that the Principle expresses an ultimate metaphysical truth?) (3) Given Spinozas threefold ontology of substance, attributes and modes, the explanation of why two substances differ must be provided either in terms of attributes or in terms of modes. Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes or by a difference in their affections. (Ip4) Spinoza now argues that modes cannot possibly explain why two substances differ. Why? This is because a substance is prior in nature to its affections, as Spinoza succinctly makes the point in the explanation

34

P. Basile

quoted previously. Substances explain modes, not vice versa: this follows immediately from Spinozas definition of a mode in Id5, where a mode is said to be that which is in another through which it is also conceived [my emphasis]. (But the point is also intuitively clear: it is because Spinoza was Spinoza, i.e., it is because he was the man he was, that he could write the Ethics; it is surely not his having written the Ethics that turned him into Spinoza.) Once modes are ruled out as principles of individuation, one knows that the required explanation of why two numerically distinct substances differ must be provided in terms of attributes: (4) The non-identity of two substances must be explained by reference to their attributesthat is, different substances (if there are any) must necessarily have different attributes. Although this is the conclusion of Spinozas reasoning, (4) is not identical to the No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis. If a substance could have no more than one attribute, and if one assumes two substances S1 and S2 of attributes A and B respectively, then (4) would make it impossible for A and B to be identical, for it is attributes that are supposed to differentiate substances from one another. But we cannot rule out the possibility of two substances being differentiated by different collections of attributes, while Spinoza gladly admits that a substance may possess more than one attribute (God, for instance, possesses all of them.) At this point, we still lack an understanding of why Spinoza believes that two substances with many attributes cannot have one attribute in common. Notoriously, this is a question that was originally posed by Leibniz: There seems to be a concealed fallacy here. For two substances can be distinguished by their attributes and still have some common attribute, provided they also have others peculiar to themselves in addition. (Leibniz 1999, VI.4b: 1768) This charge is sometimes regarded as unanswerable (see Nadler 2006: 62), and thereby as a conclusive refutation of Spinozas argument. As will be argued in the next section, however, this view is unduly pessimistic. In order to answer Leibnizs challenge, Spinoza needs another proposition (as noted by Sprigge 2001: 270): (5) If two substances have one attribute in common, they have all attributes in common. On this assumption, it becomes impossible to differentiate two substances S1 and S2 with one common attribute on the basis of their overall collections. And since attributes are the sole principles of individuation for substances (modes being unfit for this role, as shown in (3)), S1 and S2 will have to be numerically identical. No doubt, Leibniz would ask why (5) should be granted. In his explanation of the No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis, Spinoza says that if two substances are distinguished only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute, which is precisely what stands in need of elucidation. Spinozas reticence suggests that the truth of the NoShared-Attributes-Thesis must be evident from the concept of an attribute alone.

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

35

To have a genuine grasp of the concept of attribute is to see why attributes cannot be shared. This may seem a very modest result, but this examination of Spinozas explanation of Ip15 has not been in vain. For we now know what to expect from any viable interpretation of the concept of attribute. Specifically, this should: (a) account for the truth of the No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis (in a way that makes it appear obviously true); (b) explain why identity of one attribute entails identity of all attributes (the claim Spinoza needs to counter Leibnizs objection); and (c) explain how attributes can function as principles of individuation in the first place (given that, according to (4), they must do so). Clearly, (c) is the most important point, as it directly touches upon the question of the relation between a substance and its attributes.

5 Satisfying the Requirements: Attributes as Revelations of a Substances Essence In Id4 Spinoza defines an attribute as what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence. Two ways of reading this definition come immediately to the mind, and they have both found their advocates in scholarly literature. Since Spinoza says that attributes are perceived to constitute a substances essence, and since he acknowledges that a substance can have more than one attribute, attributes might be interpreted as a substances constituent parts. According to Curley (1969:16), Spinozadoes identify substancewith the totality of its attributes; this view of substance as a composite or bundle, however, strongly contrasts with Spinozas belief that God (the only substance there is) is an indivisible unity. Spinoza makes the point thus in Ip12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided. And elsewhere, he writes: A substance which is absolutely infinite [and Spinozas God is absolutely infinite] is indivisible (Ip13). Moreover, the bundle-theory of substance conflicts with the very definition of substance as what is in itself (Id3); paradoxically enough, since a whole needs its parts in order to exist, a substance turns out not to be ontologically independent on this interpretation. According to the so-called subjective interpretation (a classical version of which is in Wolfson 1962: 14656), attributes are a substances appearances. When Spinoza says that an attribute is what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence, he really meant as if it constituted its essence. This preserves the unity of substance (all plurality being a matter of the multiple ways in which the one substance is subjectively apprehended), but at the cost of turning Spinozas God into an unknowable thing in itself. This runs contrary to the spirit of the Ethics. Would a rationalist ever hold that substance differs from what the intellect perceives it to be? In principle, everything in Spinozas universe is transparent to the inquiring mind. Another major shortcoming of the subjective interpretation is that it makes Spinoza into an idealist of sorts, for the very existence of an attribute/appearance now depends upon the existence of an apprehending mind. In this way, the interpretation grants ontological priority to the attribute of thought, whereas Spinoza clearly holds that attributes are independent from one another. As he has it in Ip10, Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.

36

P. Basile

An alternative characterization of the concept of attribute is provided in premise (2) of the monistic argument sketched in Section 3: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists (Ip11). Spinoza characterizes the relation between the substance and its attributes in terms of the concept of expression in several other places, for example in Id6 (By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence) and Ip19d (by Gods attributes are to be understood what expresses an essence of the divine substance, that is, what pertains to substance; all emphases are mine). Thus, an attribute is neither a constituent nor an appearance of a substance, but one of its essences expressions. How does the concept of expression differ from the concept of appearance? The answer must be that an expression manifests or reveals what a substance truly is (its essence), whereas appearances hide a substances real nature. At the same time, the notion of expression need not carry any idealistic implication. Spinozas attributes are what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence. This could simply mean that a substances essence will become manifest to any intellect that satisfies the requirement of a perfected rationality. On this reading, a substances attribute would have to be knowable in principle, but it would not need to be actually apprehended in order to exist. This wholly agrees with Spinozas belief that Gods attributes are infinite in number, although we are acquainted solely with the two attributes of thought and extension. The others are up for grabs, available to intellects greater than ours. (Cf. Sprigge 2006: 3336 and Phemister 2006: 95 for recent interpretations along these lines.) An understanding of the concept of attribute in terms of the concept of expression satisfies all requirements identified at the end of the previous section. (a) Since attributes are revelatory of a substances essence, if two substances had one attribute in common, they would have the same essence. And since an essence is what makes a thing the thing that it is, the two substances would not be two after all, but the very same substance. This explains why Spinoza holds the No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis, the view that no two substances (if they really are two) can share one attribute. (b) Furthermore, if two substances having one attribute in common are the same substance, then, trivially, all their manifestations will be identical. This explains why two substances having one attribute in common must have all attributes in common, thereby answering Leibnizs challenge. (c) Lastly, and most importantly, this interpretation explains why attributes are capable of functioning as principles of individuation. They are capable of doing this in virtue of their privileged relation to essence. With this understanding of attributes in place, Spinozas argument for the No-Shared-Attributes-Thesis can be stated in the form of a reductio: (1) Let S1 and S2 be two numerically different substances that share one common attribute. (Thesis to be rejected.) (2) Since attributes are expressions/revelations/manifestations of a substances essence, if S1 and S2 have a common attribute, then they have the same essence. (3) Since a substances essence is what makes a substance the substance that it is, if S1 and S2 have the same essence, then they are the same substance.

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

37

Hence: (4) Two numerically different substances S1 and S2 sharing a common attribute would both be (since they have the same essence) and not be (since ex hypothesi they are two) the very same substancewhich is impossible. Premises (2) and (3) are true in virtue of the very concepts of attribute and essence; hence, it is the very possibility of a situation like that envisaged in (1) that must be rejected.

6 Spinozas Turn to Process: Attributes as Manifestations of Power As it has just been shown, interpreting attributes as revelatory of a substances essence has major interpretative advantages. But Spinozas position now appears to be threatened by an internal incoherence. How could the same substance be extended as well as mental, given that these attributes are so radically different from one another? The problem does not arise on the subjective interpretation. On that view, attributes are relative to apprehending minds; each attribute represents a perspective on a substances essence, yet this remains hidden from view. This way out of the difficulty is not available if thought and extension are revelatory of a substances nature. Clearly, the notion that attributes are expressions requires further elaboration to become fully intelligible. Greater clarity can be achieved by considering the concept of expression in light of Spinozas Ip34, Gods power is his essence itself. This is a striking proposition that can be interpreted in either of two ways: (a) Spinoza might be stating that God is a subject of activity or, much more radically, (b) that God is infinite power itself. The way Ip34 is formulated surely favors the latter interpretation (Spinoza also uses the locution Gods supreme power, or infinite nature in Ip17d), a point that can be reinforced by considering Spinozas definition of essence in IId2. This definition has two parts, the first of which goes as follows: I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is [also] necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily [also] taken away. The essence of a thing, Spinoza says here, accounts for the very existence of the thing it is an essence of. Accordingly, if the essence of God is infinite creative power, it is this power that grounds Gods existence. In his demonstration of Ip34 Spinoza refers to Gods power as that by which he and all things are and act [my emphasis]; again, Gods creative power is presented as grounding Gods very existence, which suggests that Gods power is the ultimate metaphysical fact. In the second part of IId2, however, Spinoza reverses the order of explanation. To the essence of any thing it now belongs that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing [my emphasis]. Instead of merely affirming the dependence of a thing upon its essence, Spinoza now says that an essence depends upon the thing it is the essence of. But if Gods

38

P. Basile

essence is power, then power appears to depend upon God as a subject of power. How is this surprising turn in Spinozas definition to be explained? The answer must be that things and essences are identical; hence, if all there is to Gods essence is power, this is all there is to God himself. Otherwise, Spinoza would be affirming the priority of the essence in the first part of the definition while denying this in the second, which is too blatant a contradiction. Moreover (and independently of the question of the role played by the concept of power in his metaphysics), the claim that things are prior to their natures is by itself a hardly intelligible one. Hence, one must read the second part of IId2 as a convoluted way of affirming the identity between things and their essences. In sum, there is good textual evidence in support of the view that Spinozas substances are not substrata, as Russell argued, but substantial powers. Contrary to Russells interpretation, Spinoza is all but oblivious to the dynamical side of things. He even defines the pivotal concepts of his ontology (the correlated notions of substance and attribute) in terms of agency. Is there anything in this interpretation of God as being infinite power rather than as having it that conflicts with Spinozas official definition of substance as what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose conception does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed (Id3)? Clearly, if there were any inconsistencies here, this interpretation would have to be rejected. The point one might want to seize upon is Spinozas claim that the concept of a substance does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed. How can there be free floating powers, such that do not require an underlying subject? The very notion of a subject-less power is offensive to common sense (not, of course, to Russell, who believes the world to consist of events). Now, Spinoza speaks of power as dependent upon the subject exercising it, as in the very phrase the power of God. But this is no proof that he held subjects to be prior to powers. Russell observed that the conception of substance as a bearer of properties acquired his hold upon philosophers partly through a hasty transition to reality of ideas derived by grammar (Russell 1927a: 253; cf. also Russell 1945: 595). We might find Spinozas notion that power requires no ontologically prior agent (power being that agent) difficult to grasp solely because ordinary language embodies a set of basic metaphysical presuppositions contrary to those he is trying to articulate. But surely, a violation of grammar need not be a metaphysical impossibility.3 The notion of power as an independent ontological principle is not new in the history of metaphysics. Aristotles God in Metaphysics (1071b3/1072a18) is pure act because it is pure form: deprived of matter (the locus of potentialities) God can only be thinking activity per se. Spinoza too denies that there are any non-actualized potentialities in God (and since according to Ip15, Whatever is, is in God, anywhere else in the universe). The concept of an attribute as an expression of power reverses the notion of unexpressed potentialities: expressed power simply is actualized power. Spinozas God is a power that manifests itself in all possible ways; as such, it exists only as expressed, i.e., as revealed in its realizations.
3 One important question remains open: how could the revisionary metaphysician ever hope to transcend the limitations of ordinary language without talking nonsense? This is a real difficulty, but it cannot be dealt with here at any length; cf. Simons (1998) for an insightful treatment of this issue.

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

39

Several interpreters have recognized the significance the concept of power plays in Spinozas metaphysics (most recently, Deveaux 2007: 7778), but it would be hard to find better words than those of Harold Joachim to characterize the relation between a substance and its attributes. In A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (1901) Joachim first defines attributes dynamically as lines of force in which Gods omnipotence manifests its free causality to an intelligence. Then, he goes on to say: God in his free causality, as natura naturans is absolute power which is always in action in all ways. It is his actuosa essentia which all things expressor rather, arein various determinate forms. The Attributes or forms of Gods omnipotence are not consequences of Gods naturethey are that nature: and each Attribute expresses the whole nature of God. (Joachim 1901: 6667) This truly goes to the heart of Spinozas view: God has an active essence (actuosa essentia) and each attribute expresses that essence entirely (not just in part); this is why two substances cannot have even a single attribute in common. In this passage, Joachim also mentions another way of interpreting attributes. Why could not attributes be consequences of Gods nature, rather than its expressions? Clearly, attributes cannot be said to be consequences in any ordinary sense of the word in a monistic universe. Spinoza God could not create another substance or act upon one already in existence. But even if per impossibile the universe could contain more than one substance, Spinoza would have to hold that such substances cannot interact. The reason is that two distinct substances cannot have any attribute in common; hence, any two numerically distinct substances will have to belong to different ontological types. This makes them as causally disconnected as are a mental and an extended substance in Descartes philosophy. On Spinozas basic ontological commitments, a pluralistic universe would closely resemble a Leibnizian world of self-enclosed, causally independent substances.4 This is in a sense a very trivial discovery. The very definition of substance as what is in itself (Id3) entails that, if there are many substances, they will not have to rely on one another in order to exist. But it sheds new light on the notion that attributes are expressions of substantial power. Once causation between different substances has been rejected, what sort of creative power can be ascribed to God? According to Ip18, God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. All that Gods active essence can bring about are his manifestations (i.e., the attributes and their concrete specifications, the modes). An interpretation of Spinozas conception of substance in terms of power has significant interpretative advantages. It is because substance is power that exists only in its actual expressions that Spinoza can use attributes and substance as if they were synonymous, as he occasionally does. There is no mention of attributes in Axiom 1 (Whatever is, is either in itself [a substance] or in another [a mode]), for example, which makes one initially wonder why Spinoza should deny that they have any place in reality. Most intriguingly, substances (!) too disappear from view at one point, as when Spinoza writes that an actual intellect, whether finite or infinite,
4 It would closely resemble Leibnizs universe, but the two worlds would not be identical: Leibnizs spiritual monads are all of the same ontological type.

40

P. Basile

must comprehend Gods attributes and Gods affections [my emphases], and nothing else (Ip30d). Clearly, if this is to be made consistent with Axiom 1, then a substance and its attributes will have to be the same thing. And indeed, this is what they are on the present interpretation: if power is necessarily actualized, then a substance (power) and its attributes (expressions) cannot be distinguished in reality, but only conceptually; in a way, to mention the one is already to have mentioned the other. Furthermore, we have seen in Section 3 that Spinoza needs the premise that there cannot be a substance that has no attributes in order for his monistic argument to be valid. As he has it in a passage that has already been quoted there: nothing is clearer than each being must be conceived under some attribute (Ip10d). But if substantial powers are necessarily actualized, then a Spinozistic substance (which is nothing but power) cannot exist without expressing itself. This is equivalent to saying that a substance (a power) requires at least one attribute (an expression) in order to be. And finally, if attributes are expressions of substantial power, greater powers must be expected to manifest themselves in a greater number of ways. Not surprisingly from the standpoint of the present interpretation, this is exactly what Spinoza says in Ip9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it. What about the objection that was raised at the beginning of this section, according to which two attributes as diverse as thought and extension could not be revelatory of an identical essence? Spinoza addresses precisely this difficulty when he says that it is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance (Ip10d). As he goes on to explain, it is evident, that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. (Ip10s) Spinoza is here suggesting that the objection can be answered by reversing the logic that underlies it; what the heterogeneity of the two attributes shows is that there is nothing in extension that conflicts with thought, not that they cannot coexist as attributes of the same substance. This is a strongly anti-Cartesian point: by itself, mere conceptual diversity (i.e., the fact that one may be conceived without the aid of the other) provides neither a reason for affirming identity of substance nor for denying it (cf. Della Rocca 2008: 5455 for an insightful articulation of this point). But an interpretation in terms of power bears an additional benefit, for it makes the view that substance can have heterogeneous attributes more intuitively accessible. Surely, we find no difficulty in the notion that a persons creative powers might manifest themselves in radically different ways as in sport, dance, music, literature, ordinary human intercourse, social action, family life, andwho knows?perhaps even in philosophy.

7 Conclusion An interpretation of Spinozas concept of substance in terms of pure power would require a more extended analysis of his Ethics to be fully established. Nevertheless,

Russell on Spinozas Substance Monism

41

what has been said suffices as a refutation of Russells interpretation of Spinozas theory of substance as naively modeled upon the subjectpredicate theory of proposition. Russell thinks that metaphysics must abandon the philosophical tradition he takes Spinoza to be a prominent exponent of and that makes all activity subordinate to permanence. As it has been argued, we can make better sense of Spinozas proof (and perhaps even of his overall metaphysical position) if we interpret him as a radically revisionary thinker whose basic ontology already lies outside of that tradition.5
Acknowledgments Thanks to Leemon McHenry for comments on a previous version of this paper.

References
Basile, P. (2010) Kant, Spinoza, and the metaphysics of the ontological proof. In: Metaphysica 11:1737. Bennett, J. (1984) A study of Spinozas ethics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Bennett, J. (1996) Spinozas metaphysics. In: Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Spinoza. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Curley, E. (1969) Spinozas metaphysics: an essay in interpretation. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. Deveaux, S. (2007) The role of God in Spinozas metaphysics. Continuum. London. Della Rocca, M. (2008) Spinoza. Routledge. London. Doney, W. (1980) Spinozas ontological proof. In: Kennington, R. (ed.) The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. The Catholic University of America Press. Washington, D.C. Joachim, H. (1901) A study of the ethics of Spinoza. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Leibniz, G. W. (1999) Smtliche Schrifte und Briefe. Akademie Verlag. Berlin. Marcus, R. B. (1993) Spinoza and the ontological proof. In: Modalities: philosophical essays. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Nadler, S. (2006) Spinozas ethics: an introduction. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Phemister, P. (2006) The rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Polity. Cambridge. Rescher, N. (1996) Process metaphysics. An introduction to process philosophy. State University of New York Press. Albany. Rescher, N. (2003) Process philosophy and monadological metaphysics. In: On Leibniz. Pittsburgh University Press. Pittsburgh: 232241. Russell, B. (1900) A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz. George Allen & Unwin. London. Russell, B. (1903) The principles of mathematics. George Allen & Unwin. London. Russell, B. (1927a) An outline of philosophy. Unwin Books. London. Russell, B. (1927b) The analysis of matter. Keegan Paul. London. Russell, B. (1945) A history of Western philosophy. Simon and Schuster. New York. Russell, B. (1956) Logical atomism. In: Logic and knowledge. Edited by Robert Charles Marsh. Routledge. London: 323343. Simons, P. (1998) Metaphysical systematics: a lesson from Whitehead. In: Erkenntnis, XLVIII: 37793. Spinoza, B. (1996) Ethics. Edited and translated by Edwin Curley. Penguin. London. Sprigge, T.L.S. (2001) The mind of Spinozas God. In: Iyyun. The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly. 50: 253272. Sprigge, T.L.S (2006) The God of metaphysics. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Whitehead, A. N. (1929) Process and reality: an essay in cosmology. Free Press. New York. Whitehead, A. N. (1933) Adventures of ideas. Free Press. New York. Wolfson, H. A. (1962) The philosophy of Spinoza: unfolding the latent process of his reasoning. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. The one philosopher who has made the most to vindicate the process point of view in recent years is Nicholas Rescher, especially in Process Metaphysics (Rescher 1996). In this book Rescher provides a survey of great process thinkers of the past from Heraclitus to Whitehead, yet he does not mention either Russell or Spinoza. Quite different is his estimate of Leibniz (cf. also Rescher 2003).
5