Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies Author(s): James Bohman Source: Political Theory,

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CITIZENSHIP AND NORMS OF PUBLICITY Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies

JAMESBOHMAN Saint Louis University

F ORALL OF THEIRMANY RECENTACHIEVEMENTS, democratic institutionsnow face increasinglystrongandoften contradictory culturaland social pressures.Even as the pressuresof social movementshavewidenedthe membershipof democraticcommunitiesand the scope of democraticpractices of governance,the attemptsto recognizeall the diversityamongcitizens often seem to producenew and sometimes deeper conflicts. While greater inclusion in wider rights of citizenship has been achieved, social and economic inequalitiesseem to have widened,andthe scope of politicaldecision making seems to have narrowedas the effectiveness of the availableregulatorymechanismsfor self-rulenow seems less likely to bringthe processes of globalizationand technoscienceundercontrol.Ratherthanconstitutingdistinct trends, my argumenthere aims at showing why these contradictory influences on democracyare two sides of the same coin and point to a common set of solutions. Although quite diverse in origin and character,their in unavoidableproblemspoint towardthe need for transformations the logic of publicityunderlyingthe role of democraticcitizenshipin complex, pluralare istic, and global societies. These transformations as fundamentaland wide reachingas those of the eighteenthcenturyout of which democracyand the modernpublic sphereemerged.The challenges of pluralization, globalization, and differentiationmean that a new form of publicity must emerge thatpreservesthe democraticvirtuesof the olderuniversalistic interpretation and increases its problem-solvingpower. By a "logic"of publicity,I meanthe politicalrole it has in establishingthe space for the exercise of citizenship, or more precisely, its usefulness as a norm that solves social and political problemswhile maintainingthe bases for cooperationandsolidarity. publicityis not Althoughoftencounterfactual, historical force is also used in particular only a regulativeideal;its normative and institutionalproblems.If normshave social contexts to solve particular differentpracticalconsequences dependingon the circumstancesin which
o
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they areapplied,categoricalskepticismaboutthe applicabilityof the normof circumstancesthatI havejust enumerated may be publicityto contemporary Defendersand critics of democracyalike too often think of pubmisplaced. meaning or practicalsiglicity as a univocal conception with one particular eitherbemoanor applaud nificance;in light of theirpreferred meaning,they or the social circumstancesthatlead to its disappearance to its degeneration. normbuta clusterof them,both sides of Even if publicityis not one particular the debate often overestimateits ideal status at the price of its problemof solving role. A more practicalinterpretation publicity is not necessarily more optimistic:the problems democraciesface may not be easily solved. Nonetheless, it allows us to see muchcontemporary skepticismaboutdemocfocuses on specific norms of publicity and ideals of public reason that racy are no longer adequateto emerging circumstances.Empiricalresearchalso supportsthis approachby showing thatvariantsof the normof publicity are effective in a varietyof circumstancesand societies and have theirown particular normativeand practical virtues. Without such an appreciationfor empiricalvariation,it is easy to dismiss the publicsphereas essentiallyEuropean and publicity with it as a norm with little problem-solving capacity. Such skepticism is neitherempiricallynor normatively justified. In the next section, I show why the contemporary discussions of demochave not developeda democracyin particular racyin generalanddeliberative rich and diverse enough notion of the public sphere to occupy the place between the democratic state and civil society that is necessary for any vibrantdeliberativedemocracy.In responseto manyof the social phenomena mentionedabove, deliberativedemocracyhas made the notion of the public use of reason centralto the prospectsof democraticreform.Unless it modifies and expandsits guidingnotion of publicity,deliberativedemocracy,too, is underminedby the consequences of pluralization,globalization,and differentiation.Deliberationaboutthem requiresa "wider"notion of publicity to guide effective citizenship and problemsolving.

AND PUBLICITY INCLUSION, ABSTRACTION, The guiding conception of publicity in deliberativedemocracyremains basically Kantian.For Kant,publicityis expressedin "theverdictof free and equal citizens,"who put everythingto the test of "free and open examination."'Placed in the context of Kant's analysis of the progressiveeffects of publicity as a universallyacknowledgednorm,such examinationrequiresa certain process of social abstractionfor substantiveroles and identities.

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Underthis versionof publicity,citizenshiprequiresadoptinga particular role and point of view, which abstractsfrom all contingentfeatures of oneself, such as social and institutionalroles, self-regarding interests,and particular and ethnic identities.The requirements such abstraction of religious explain the peculiar duality of Kant's injunctionof public reason: "Criticize, but obey!" Kantexplicatesthe meaningof this maxim throughvariousroles and audiencesimplied in public communication. When addressingthe members of their congregations,the clergy do not publicly use their reason. Rather, social role who is investedwith the they speak as a person with a particular moralauthorityof the church(and subjectto its authorityin turn). particular But the same personcan publicly criticize the very same opinions and practices thathe defends as a cleric, by adoptingthe abstractrole of speakingto public opinion and by addressingan indefiniteand cosmopolitanaudience. In one formor another, abstraction this fromsocial roles still guidesthe ideals of public reasonoperativein deliberativedemocratsas diverseas Rawls and Habermas,or Guttmanand Thompsonand Cohen and Arato, all of whom requirethat publicity no longer merely have indirecteffects but solve conflicts in political deliberation. This particularinterpretation publicity has specific practical conseof quences.Whenspeakingas a critic,each personspeakswithoutassuminghis social role andidentity,as a "private or herparticular person"whose opinions thanthe convictionsthey can awakenin otherprivate have no more authority persons. When speaking from this abstractidentity and impartialpoint of view, one participatesin the "publicsphere of privatepersons,"in a social space thattherebyestablishesconditionsof equalitybetween "the sons and from all social by daughtersof shopkeepersand the aristocracy" abstracting roles and identities.2The social space so created is a space inhabited by abstractpersons, who attemptto remove the culturally"thick"features of theirsocial identitiesin orderto achieveequalstandingandto solve the problem of "the perplexity of opposing claims" to authority.Expressing one's opinionsunderthese conditionsestablishesa logic for makingandcriticizing claims publicly:the opinionsof privatepersonscan be criticizedfor failing to of and The meet the requirements abstraction impartiality. sortof reasonsthat can be introducedare subjectto normativeconstraints,so that "nonpublic" reasonsoughtto be excludedfromdemocraticdeliberationanddebate.Such the "thin" publicitynarrows rangeof acceptablypublicreasons,which in turn can be widenedonly if publicityonce againbecomes socially dense andcontouredwithout losing the virtuesof democraticequality. This logic of "abstract" publicity is aimed at solving a particularset of endemicto problems:the conflicts of interestandthereligiousdisagreements modernsocial life. It mightalso be refinedinto a moredirectlypoliticalform,

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as when Rawls arguesthatthe public use of reasonhas to do with the role of citizens who can appealonly to the constitutionalessentials thatmake up the overlapping consensus of reasonable pluralism. The problem was that in practice it was actually much more specific and much less abstractthan its proponentsthought.Kant'spublic sphereis a bourgeoispublic sphereof private and literatepersons.ParsonsandMarshallhave shown thatthe achievement of abstract citizenshipwas a long andpainfulprocessby which political values and norms were generalized.Its results have not only been a wider membershipof personsin the political communitybut also the expansionof political claims so as to include social and economic rights as part of the claims of full citizenship.3 Moreover, increasingly substantive rights expanded the logic of publicity to many different areas of participationin social life: in access to schools, to the courts,to the means of public communication, to equal opportunityin employment and health care, and much more. While this logic of inclusion continues on in a wider conception of public reason, the process of abstractionis no longer useful in solving the Recentconceptions problemsof culturalpluralismandsocial differentiation. of publicity in the literatureon deliberativedemocracy do not adequately Considera resolve this Kantianconfusionbetweeninclusionandabstraction. few examples. Not only did the Kantianconceptionproveto be too specific as the public of private,bourgeois,and literatecitizens, it also provedto lack a clear connection to democraticpolitics. The solutionto the problemof specificity,the creationof a form of citizenshipthatabstractsfrominequalitiesof statusand role, served to create only a very specific connection of the public sphereto democpolitics via the formalpowers assigned to citizens in representative racy.This specific "politicalpublic sphere"is consistentwith the separation of citizenshipfromotherformsof social identity,as Kant's"thin" conception insulatedthe public spheresfrom all forms of identityotherthanparticipant in the public sphere.The specifically political public spherehas two consediscussions of deliberativepolitics. It restrictsthe quences for contemporary of publicityin ways thatareinconsistentwith deliberativedemocracy: scope either it results in an overly strongdistinctionof the public sphereand civil society or it gives the conceptionof publicityan overlyrestrictivecontentthat makesit less useful for solving the problemsof complex andpluralisticsocieties. The undesirabilityof both horns of this dilemma shows the need for a thicker,wider,andmoredirectlypoliticalnotionof publicityfor deliberation. Guttmanand Thompsonmove in this directionby making centraldeliberationon "middlepolitics" the stuff of ordinarypolitical debate aboutspecific issues andpolicies. Such deliberationinvolves the persistentmoraldisagreementsthatcharacterizemoderndemocraticsocieties. The "coreof the

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process of deliberation"is, on their view, the justification of policies and decisions througha process of arrivingat "mutuallyacceptablereasons"for those who will be boundby them. The achievementof such fair agreements when agentsdisagreerequiresthreemutuallylimitingprinciples:reciprocity, "Eachaddressesan aspectof the reason-giving publicity,andaccountability. process: the kind of reason that should be given, the forum in which they should be given, and agents to whom they should be given."4 accepting In these constraintsof reciprocity,publicity,and accountabilityas well as the inevitabilityof moral disagreementas a fact of social life, citizens in effect accept the limits of "reasonablepluralism"on deliberationwhere the conciliatory features of publicity are constrainedby the requirementsof reciprocity. For example, the constraintto reciprocity underminesclaims of in religious fundamentalists Tennesseenot to havetheirchildrenreadvarious books: "The parents'reasoning appeals to values that can and should be rejected by citizens of a pluralistsociety committedto protectingthe basic liberties and opportunities all citizens."5 excludingreligious reasons as of In the "unreasonable," substantiveprincipleof reciprocitybegins to look very muchlike the liberalprecommitment constitutional to essentials.Shouldcitizens (especiallyreligiousones) reasonablyacceptsuchex anteconstraints on the expression of public reasons? The problem with this view is that it confuses the abstractquality of acceptablereasons in fair procedurewith the inclusiveness of a democratic public. ForGuttmanandThompson,the formerconstrainsthe latter,thereby making it self-defeatingfor some to participatein such an exclusive public sphere. Joshua Cohen has put it this way: "If one accepts the democratic process, agreeing that adults are, more or less without exception, to have access to it, then one cannotaccept as a reasonwithinthatsame process that some are worthless thanothersor thatthe interestsof one groupare to count for less thanothers."6 argument This appliesto the public sphereas well. On a wider account of publicity,reciprocitycannotregulatepublicity to such an extent that some participants' reasons are worth less than others particular andthustakenless seriously.To thinkotherwiseis to denythatopen access to the public sphereis a requirement publicity.Thereis also an issue of freeof dom of expression. On the more "inclusive"and "wide view of public reason" without the ex ante limitations on publicity that Rawls previously defended in reasonablepluralism,thereis room for the use of religious reasons in "wide political culture" without restriction as to how they are expressed.In such a politicalculturepublicreason"is not one, butseveral."7 publicity is thatit depends on an underPerhapsthe problemwith "thin" of developedanddichotomousaccountof the social organization democracy below the level of the constitutionalstate.A more developedaccountwould

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have to include more thanjust a unifiedpublic sphereof citizens and the formal organizationsspecified by the constitutionthat organizedecision makpoliticalpower.CohenandAratohavearguedthatno social ing anddistribute of the democraticorganizationof society can do withoutthe mediattheory ing category of civil society between state and economic institutions.Civil society representsan autonomoussphere of "self-organizingassociations" that introducesprecisely the element missing in the more narrowlyKantian roles as citiroles andthe "public" dichotomyof individualsin their"private" zens or membersof the universalliterateaudience.According to this view, the public sphere resides in civil society, as both a larger public sphere encompassing all of civil society and a "politicalpublic sphere"organized institutions.The problemwith this account within and aroundparliamentary its is thatfor all its multidimensionality attemptto avoid "dedifferentiation" maintainsan overly strongseparationof the pluralismof civil society from the abstractnessand generality of the public sphere.8Such a distinction for makes publicity irrelevant solving the problemsof pluralizationand differentiation,since these areprocesses thatareindependentof the emergence of the public sphere.On the basis of these same social facts of moder, largescale, and complex societies, Habermasarguesthatthe only feasible form of deliberationoccurs in the interactionbetween formally organized institudebates tional decision-makingmechanismsandinformaland "anonymous" This interactionlimits the scope of pubanddiscussion in the public sphere.9 licity and makes its problem-solvingcapacity indirect:the informalpublic spherecan only influence the agendaand "poolof reasons"on which formal debatein the legislaturedraws.Such anonymity,however,representsan even more abstractform of publicity that leaves to other institutionalmeans the formulationof solutions to the problems of pluralism,differentiation,and globalization.Indeed,it leaves open exactlyhow channelsof communication across social and institutionalboundariesareto be establishedandregulated by the democraticnorms.Whatnormsareup to this taskif the publicsphereis anonymous and the role of the democratic state is to maintain such boundaries? Current conceptionsof the publicspherethattakeinto accountthe facts of and differentiation seem to founderon a dilemma.WhereasGuttpluralism man and Thompson provide too many restrictionsupon the public reason, anonymityprovidestoo little: here no one will have the reasonableexpectation of access to influenceor effective inclusionin politicaldeliberationeven if the public sphereof this type were functioningwell in supplyinga richpool of public reasons. Under currentsocial circumstances,then, civil society alone cannot bearthe weight of pluralism;indeed, membersof civil society cannot now be anonymous, but must enter the public sphere with all their

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identities and roles intact in order to solve the problems of inclusive democracy. This dilemmaof abstractness inclusion might make us thinkthat the and normof publicityhas lost its usefulnessin solving problemsin such a socially mapped and contouredspace for politics. But ratherthan leading to such skepticism, these new social circumstancesgive the public use of reason a new task:it now mustnavigateacrossthese same social andculturalboundaries. After examiningthe varietyof formsof publicityandtheiruses in problem solving and political criticism,I turnto two specific examples of thick and socially structured public spheres.First,the social differencesin the distributionof knowledge make it unavoidablethat participantsin the public sphereenterinto publicdebatewith theirepistemicroles andlocation intact. Publicity now serves to regulate exchanges across the expert/lay and agent/principaldivides that are typical in functionallydifferentiatedsocieties. Next, the problemof culturaldifferencedemandsthe always difficult taskof negotiatingandcrossingthemoralboundaries dividegroupsfrom that each other.In both cases, the public use of reasonis no longer dependenton the successful abstraction each groupwithin theirparticular of identity,but with the capacities of each to engage the otherfrom within its own cultural perspectives,epistemicresources,andsocial positions.The distinctiveforce of such "cosmopolitan publicity"residesin the creationof new conditionsof responsiveness and accountability:emerging from a differentset of social problems,new and emergentforms of publicity are successful to the extent thatthey establishnew formsof cooperationthatsolve problemsin ways that are agreeableto each of the partiesfromits own perspectiveas broadenedby its interactionwith othersin the public sphere.'? Differentforms of publicity unpackwhat it means to communicatea solution to a problemthat "all may accept."Whereas for abstractor thin publicity this means "what all may accept"(qua citizen and memberof the public sphere), for wide and thick publicityit means "whateach may accept"(andthus is answerableto aftera formsof publicprocess of free andopen discussion)."In this way, "thicker" createthe conditionswherethe force of publiccommunication createsthe ity reasonableexpectation of responsiveness,such that the expansion of perspectives is possible, opening up new practicalpossibilities of cooperative action.The problemfor deliberative democracyis now to elaborateandopen possibilitiesfor a new formof wide publicity.Before turningto the problems of differentiation globalization,I firstshowhow the problemof pluralism and becomes more tractablewith a "wide"conceptionof the public spherethat allows for many differentforms of publicity,each with its own normative force in establishingcooperationand solving problems.

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THE VARIETY OF THEPLURALITY FORMSOF PUBLICITY: OF OF REALIZATIONS AN IDEAL The appealof the abstractnotion of publicityis thatit bases the effects of force of universalnorms.At the same time, these publicityon the institutional norms have been criticized for their culturaland historical specificity. It is often claimedthatthe veryconceptionof the public sphereis by natureEuroIndeed,Haberpeanandmodernandthusculturallylimitedin its application. mas's historical analysis of the emergence and developmentof the modem public sphere seems to supportsuch a claim to historicaluniqueness.However,he carefullydistinguishesthe modernandbourgeois"publicmadeup of form of a "representative But public."12 privatepersons"fromthe premodern the significance of the distinctlymodem public sphereconsists neitherof its its membershipnorof the historicalprocessof its emergence.Rather, normative distinctivenesslies in its realizationof two conditions.It is a location for social and culturalcriticismand a distinctiveform of communicationaimed at an indefiniteaudienceacrossmanydimensionsof social difference.While this descriptionfavors wider over narrower membershipconditions, it does notdecide in advancehow reasonmay be publiclyused orexactlywhatpossible forms of communicationand interactionfit this description.Such communication,howeverindefiniteits audience,might only involve representatives in either the modernor the absolutistsense; it could be a "bourgeois" public sphere of privatepersons, or it could be a public sphere of educated and literatepersonsor scholars,or it could be participants within the public institutionsor transnational civil society. spheres of representative For all theirdifferences,the variantforms of the public spheremust have some minimal featuresin common for the term"publicity" have any norto mativesignificance.The audienceimpliedby each variant,howeverdefined, must be an indefiniteone; and the interactionand communicationthat goes on in it should be such thatit enables social andculturalcriticismin the context of those institutionsandsocial relationsthathelp makeup the public.We may develop the contoursof a specific conceptionof the public sphererelative to a purpose, or even defend a specific type of public sphere as best the approximating normativeideal of publicity.However,only if the conception of the public sphereis rid of the residueof historicalspecificity can it be broadenough to be empiricallygeneraland culturallyinclusive.13 Recent transcultural researchconfirmsa wide varietyof forms of publicin various societies and historical periods. I shall here only cite a few ity examples. Very much like Kant'speculiareducatedand literatepublic who simultaneously "Criticizebut obey!" Confucian scholars in late imperial

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China were committedto the ideal of "purediscussion"and free discourse, and exercisedboth by publishinga newspaperin which "pureminded scholars"could criticize the royal court.14 Similarly,in some Islamic societies, a public sphereemergedfrom the separationof religious andpolitical authority: religious authorities exercisingtheirpublicrole could criticizedecisions of the monarchby addressinghim as a fellow Muslim.'5Moreover,recent modificationsof Islamiclaw to the specific circumstances Indonesianculof turetook the formof an inclusiveprocess of public deliberation based on the ideal of consensus among the scholarlycommunity.16These and other nonWesternpublic spheresmeet the requirements the "general" of conceptionof the public sphere: they create a public space and form of communication addressedto an indefinite(albeitlimited)andliterateaudience,in which participantsare able to engage in social, cultural,and political criticism and to to challenge authorityso as to makeit accountable public opinionandneeds. solve particular of accountability the presenceof particular in They problems relationsof powerandauthority. hierarchical While the generalconditionsof publicitydo notmakepossible directpoliticalcontrolby membersof a public over decisions thataffect them, the open communicationof criticismat least establishes the possibility that the reasons for such decisions must be ones that could be addressedacross such social boundaries. However,it must also be said thatnot every society has a specific location in or space for social andculturalcriticism,even if communication thatsocibe public in certain contexts. The norm of publicity thus may be ety may applied at differentlevels. Recognizing these differentlevels broadensits rangeof applicabilityanddelimits the room for culturalspecificity and variability in each of them. In what follows, I organizethese levels in an ascending orderfroma lesser to a greaterdegreeof culturalspecificityandthusfrom a greaterto a lesser degree of empiricalgenerality.At the same time, I note thatgreaterculturalspecificity permitsa morenormativelystructured public space. How can we developa conceptionof the publicspherethatcan accommodate as much pluralismas possible? First of all, the conception of publicity has to be generalizedto such an extentthatit becomes an elementaryandpervasive form of social actionthatis foundin every culture.Such a generalizatoo tion avoidsanimmediatedifficultyof empiricalapplication: demandinga of publicityleaves us with the starkcontrastbetweenculturesthat conception have it andthose withoutit, andthusa dichotomythatdivides along the lines cultures.Publicityat the level of social action and of European non-European is most basic, in the sense that all other forms of publicity presupposeit. Social acts arepubliconly if theymeet two basicrequirements. First,they are not only directed to an indefinite audience but also offered with some

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and expectationof a response,especially with regardto interpretability justiThe descriptionof the second generalfeatureof publicity is domifiability. nated by spatial metaphors:public actions constitute a common and open with indefiniteothers.Or,as Habermas "space"for interaction putsit, publicity in this broadestsense is simply "thesocial space generatedby communicative action."17 However,at this level, we may speakonly of a "publicspace" in (ratherthan a public sphere),which can be broaderor narrower comparison with othersin termsof topics, availablesocial roles, formsof expression, requirementsof equal standing, and so on. Entering into any such social of space may be more or less difficult,dependingon the requirements backnormsandstyles groundknowledgeor the presenceor absenceof egalitarian of social interaction.Some arguethatwe may call this aspectof basic publicity a "publicculture,"which might include a wide varietyof practicesfrom to is performancesto demonstrations writingin which participation open to those who have masteredsome basic conventions.18 Beyond this generalandelementarylevel of publicityas a featureof some social actions and the space generatedby them, higher levels of publicity require two further nested features: first, not just the expectation of a to response,butactualresponsivenessandaccountability others;and second, the contextof a more socially structured often institutionalsettingthanis and availableby means of communicativeaction alone. With respect to responsiveness, higherlevels of publicitymust do more thanpresupposethatone is addressingan indefiniteaudience.The space of mutualaccountabilitythatis in opened up has a more egalitarianstructure: a public sphere,communicative exchangessuspendthe sharpdistinctionof audienceandparticipants and allow exchange of speakerand hearerroles across all social positions and identities. This reciprocityof roles introducesfurtheregalitarianfeaturesto audience-orientedcommunication:participationin the public sphere now means thatone mustbe responsiveto others;besides speakingto an indefinite audience, one is now accountable to their objections and answerable to demandsto recognize theirconcerns."9 recognitionof equal standingas The citizens in a political communityis one form that egalitarianpublicity has taken. Expanding and structuring such a social space for communication requires embedding it in a wider social context. A specifically egalitarian expansionof the public sphererequiresa more elaboratedinstitutionalstructure to supportit (such as that achievedby the moderndemocraticstate), as the social contexts of communicationare enlargedwith the numberof relevant speakersand audience.When such contextsincreasethe scale of public interactionand include more participants, communicativeaction alone cannot fully constitute or control the contours of the social space which it

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generates. In societies characterized social differentiation,the political by space forpublicityis delimitedin relationto othersocial domainsandinstitutions. It is with the differentiation society that we begin to see the emerof gence of what is specifically "the public sphere."Continuing the spatial that metaphor dominatesthinkingaboutpublicity,thepublicspherebecomes a space "inbetween"the stateandcivil society. Thus, the very existence of a distinctpublicsphererequiresa certaindegreeof social complexity,typically in the differentiation social spheres.ModernEuropean of societies with public spheres have been characterized a specific type of social differentiaby tion:centralizedadministrative institutions(the state),on the one hand,anda separatesphereof autonomousassociationsand economic activity (or civil society), on the other.In differentiatedsocieties (in whateverinstitutional form), one role of the distinctivecommunicationthat goes on in the public sphereis to raise topics or expressconcernsthatcut across social spheres:it not only circulates informationabout the state and the economy but also of establishesa forumfor criticismin which the boundaries these spheresare crossed, primarilyin citizens' demandsfor mutualaccountability. As public spheresemerge anddevelop, they become more structured and thanless, culturallyspecific. Forexample,the publicsphere thusmore,rather in which citizenshipis exerciseddependson a framework particular of prinand proceduresestablishedin a specific constitution.Such a ciples, rights, social space analopublic spherenot only emergesout of some differentiated to civil society, it also develops by interactingwith other,largersocial gous structuressuch as the state and the market.First of all, a developing public sphere respondsto and changes variousinstitutionaland social supporting and structures cannotexist withoutthem:coffeehouses,universities,publishinstitutionsof a litering houses, andnewspapersaresome of the supporting become conscious of Second, it requiresthatparticipants ary public sphere. themselves as a publicwho developsandextendsexisting forms of publicity. Thus, a public sphererequiresnot only a social space for communicationto an indefiniteaudiencebut also thatdiversemembersof a society interactin distinctiveways and therebycome to regardthemselves as a public which is concernedwith each other's opinions and endorses some explicit norms of as publicity.The public's self-identification a publicconcernedwith free and open communicationpushes the public spheretowardan egalitarianplateau of inclusive andgeneralizedformsof publicity.But the otherside of this generalizationhas to be recognized as well: such a generalizationis necessary precisely because the public spherehas become less socially and culturally into homogeneousandmore internallydifferentiated diversenormativeperspectives and social positions. To returnto the metaphorsthat I used in the introduction,it is now no longer a flat andabstractspace, but one with more social andculturalcontoursandboundariesthatneed to be crossed apparent

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to maintainthe sense of self-identificationand standingin a public. Such a public now develops in new social contexts, some of which may even be transnational. Even given such a public supportedby sufficientinstitutionalstructures, internaldifferentiationrequireseven more of the public: engaging in such requiresthe developmentof a comcomplex acts of reflexivecommunication plex set of critical abilities and practices, which, however egalitarianand best fulfilled by participation wide in scope, have certainentryrequirements in a particular publicculture.This specificity consists not only in background generalandcommon culturalknowledgebutalso in the capacityto employ a varietyof conventions,institutions,andmedia for communicativepurposes. Such entryrequirements place new andmore demandingepistemic and norin mativeconstraintson participation the existing public sphere.Besides the normative constraints of reciprocity (which include accountabilityto all other membersin the public), a functioningpublic spheremakes epistemic Given these increasedepistemic demandson the reflexivityof participants.20 also know thatreflexive forms of public communicademands,participants tion require complex institutional mediation (such as legal protections), which in turndemandsgreaterknowledgeof such background conditions,as well as highly developed abilities among public sphereparticipants that are needed to cross the many boundariesof such a complex social world.While it culturalspecificitydoes not disappear, is mitigatedby protectionsof speakIn ers from culturalbiases andrestrictionsthataffect theirparticipation. this way, actorsare forcedto acquireabilitiesfor communicationandtranslation thatexpandthe scope of publicreason.Ratherthanbecominga more abstract and neutral space, the public sphere becomes more mapped with cultural identities,social roles, andthe epistemicdivision of laborbeyondthe roles of These roles (such as scientist,patient,cultural "private person"and"citizen." minority) may, however, introduceasymmetriesin public communication thatseem to underminethe equal standingof all to initiateand test contributions to public debate, the core democraticnorm of abstractpublicity.

EXPERTISE AND THESOCIALORGANIZATION OF PUBLICITY: AND CITIZENS AGENTS,PRINCIPALS, For institutionalconditionsset by "abstract" publicity and its citizenship role, science and democracygo handandhand.Both seem dependenton the same consequences of abstractionand impartialityto form an inclusive social space, by contrast,sci"republic"of science. In a thickly structured ence and democracyare competing, if not conflicting, forms of publicity.21

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Neitherview denies thatexpertsare organizedinto theirown wider and narin rower subpublicswith high entry requirements: them, equal standingis only if participantsmeet certain epistemic presuppositionsthat acquired The wider and require a large investmentof training and apprenticeship. more inclusive the public spherebecomes, the more asymmetricthe condiof tions of the social distribution knowledgebecome (especially if the opinions under scrutinyare ones based on contingentempiricalknowledge not had by everyone).We may wish to dismiss the problemand simply separate science fromthe largerpublic sphere,the participants which have nothing of substantiveto say about issues of scientific work. But this picture presupknowledge. poses thatthe largerpublic sphereexcludes socially distributed in Scientists then participate their own subpublicsphereas privatepersons, in ratherthanas citizens. If they were to participate the largerpublic sphere with their social roles intact,it is sometimes argued,some of their opinions shouldthenbe owed deference.This epistemicdeferencereintroduces asymthe metricsocial roles andthusundermines conditionsfor egalitarian publicon ity. But the image of lay/expertinteraction this model is flawed,basedas it is on the model of the one-way disseminationof informationfrom expertto lay public. This sort of scientific publicityis certainlywidespread.However information it is notthepublicitydemanded is, open to view such asymmetric exercise the when citizens enter the public sphere where some participants roles that they acquire in the division of labor. Economists distinguish with regardto specific who areresponsibleto "principals" between "agents" to of interests(as whenwe routinelyassignthe assurance the safety of aircraft roles they generallysee as in a relationof hierarspecific agents/inspectors), were to be accepted,then suchroles would seem to chy. If this understanding be inadmissiblein the publicsphereof equalcitizens. I wantto show thatthis inferenceis too hasty. Dewey was amongthe firstto considerthe problemof the effects of expertise on the civic public sphere,embracingits necessity in light of scarcecogIf nitiveresourcesas well as its valuein creatingsocial interdependence. each of the membershas to know everythingthatthe groupas a whole knows and thus all become "omnicompetentindividuals"criticized by Walter Lippmann, then they all know less than a group characterized the epistemic by The division of labor.22 division of labor recognizes these cognitive limitations of individualagents and providesa way to overcomethem to a certain degree by specializationthatreduces costs of acquiringinformationfor the whole. But so thatall collectively may know more thaneach membersingly, agentsmustideally cooperateby engagingin inquiryas ajoint venture:for all to know more, independentactions of each of them are necessary,and these actions may not be monitoredby the others without loss of knowledge or

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efficiency. The advantageof the division of laboris to makeeach social actor dependenton the actionsof manyothers,so thatthe outcomeof the collective enterprisedependson the necessaryactionsof othersthatcannotbe immediThis situationrequirestrustof the ately controlledorpredictedwith certainty. sort that is quite pervasivein all cooperativeenterprises.23 Nonetheless, the case of expertsmakesspecial demandson cooperatorsin the cognitively organizedgroup. What is unique to expertise is that others may not be in a position to monitorand scrutinizethe experts even if there were the opportunity. Most expertsmay not be able to judge the findings of Thus, the epistemicdivision of labor expertsoutside of theirown subfields.24 creates pervasive asymmetries of competence and access to information. These asymmetriesfilterinto many situationsof ordinary life, from stepping on an elevatorto takingprescription drugs.The problemis not only in access to informationbut also in interpreting since most of us are "unableto renit, der medical diagnoses, to test the purityof food and drugs before ingesting tests of skyscrapersbefore enteringthem, or to them, to conduct structural make safety checks of elevators,automobiles,or airplanesbefore embarking on them."25 These tasksareleft to the assessmentsof experts:herelaboris not dividedby simply delegatinga taskwe could do ourselvesat the cost of time, butrather giving overa taskto othersthatwe could not do at all. The prolifby eration of such agent/principal relationshipsin modernsocieties may actually work to underminethe putativeadvantagesof the division of labor for democracy,creatingthe potentialfor a passive citizenryof principals/clients deferringto agents/expertsthe control over vast areasof social life. Thereis, however,alreadya social space for suchcommunication thus and for democraticnegotiationwithin scientific practice.The division of labor andexpertknowledgewithinit has a largersocial context-the contextof science as a large-scale social enterpriseinvolving more than simply professional scientists and experts.Science is effective not only because it can use the impersonalforces of natureand machines;it also enlists the aid of many differentgroupsandoccupations,all of whom arenecessaryparticipants a in large collective project.The case of AIDS activismin the UnitedStatespresents a particularly rich example of this process of democraticinquiry.It is a case of the relationbetween an emergentpublic of those affected by AIDS and a set of institutionsthatwere not initially responsiveto them. However, the important point of the activismwas not to challengeexpertiseor the division of labor.Rather,it challengedthe advantagesof expertsin defining the of cooperativeenterprise producingknowledgeaboutAIDS. Moreover,what is particularlyinterestingin this context is thatAct-Up and other organizations challengedexpertson their own ground,and not merely in the broader political arena.The publicdebatesspurred theiractivismhadverymuchto by

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do with epistemic criteriaand experimentalvalidity, such as the necessary The measuresof statisticalsignificance for tests of drug safety.26 continued and betweenresearchers theirpublicdepended,perhapssurpriscooperation ingly, upon publicly deliberating about epistemic norms. The fact that patientsmust cooperatein trials (for example, by not taking other drugs or treatmentssimultaneously)gave activists the leverage of a credible threat sufficient to challenge the nonpublicagenda setting of medical researchby expertsalone. In this case, continuedcooperationon acceptabletermsto both is patientsandresearchers the outcomeof a wide use of publicreasonacross social roles and epistemic boundariesin which democraticaccountabilityis exercised. In the absence of the converginginterestsamong agents andprincipals that made the conflicts in the AIDS case resolvable, the feasible requirementfor public deliberationbecomes accountabilityto ratherthan directcontrolby the democraticprocess.The demandfor accountability may over into democratic control, however, if the democratic process change breaks down and the basic norms of cooperationon which the division of labor is based are once again up for public debate. the One possible responseto this difficultyis to be thoroughlypragmatic: of the democraticdivision of labor do not requirea general soluproblems tion, but rathercan only be solved case by case. Public deliberationbegins with problematicsituations,and expertknowledge can enterinto the public process of defining such situations and their feasible solutions. If expert authorityis a problem,it is because the political institutionsin which it is embeddedareno longer open to the publicsthatareaffectedby them. In this inspiredsolution,we can shift the burdenfromexpertsto instipragmatically tutions(except for those cases in which expertknowledgeno longer works). As in the pragmatist's rejectionof skepticism,we cannotimprovethe quality of our deliberationby rejectingexpertauthoritytout court or by refusingto participatein decision makingthatmakes us dependenton socially derived maximofjudging accordingto knowledge.It is consistentwiththe pragmatic calls a "limited suspension of consequences to adopt what Mark Warren situaissues or in particular judgment"aboutexpert authorityon particular context derivesfrom "abackground in such "trust authority," however, tions; and Such of criticalscrutiny."27 an analysisshows why expertauthority deliberativedemocracyareconsistentwith each other.However,any such scrutiny into mustextendto testingof the veryepistemicnormsthatbackauthority the The wide use of public reasonidentifiesthe natureand scope public sphere. of such scrutiny:it does not simply reject the legitimacy of all epistemic authority,but ratherthose specific norms of cooperationnecessary for the division of labor.

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in It is important this contextto recallthatthe social distribution knowlof is itself a solution to a problem:the limitationsof resourcesandhuman edge cognition. Still, the pragmaticanswer leaves entirely open how crises in expertauthorityareto be resolved,crises which have become more andmore typical in the age where the results of science are not always seen as collectively beneficial or, when even beneficial, not widely available.Such crises signal the breakdownin communicationmediatedthroughthe public sphere between experts and affected citizens. Such communicationcan only be repairedby creating situationsof public dialogue in which the cooperative basis for the division of laborcan become an issue. Cooperatorsseek to redefine the practicalrelevanceof experts'knowledge when it comes to their own activities and consent. If expertsdo not incorporatesuch public definitions of their activities, the social basis for their knowledge becomes more and more uncertain.By defining expert activity throughits social consecan quences, lay participants shapethe very knowledgethatis producedand make it a sharedresource. Social movements in the public sphere are now doingjust that,with varyingdegreesof success. The problemof cooperation here is one of maintainingcredibilityandlegitimacymorethantrust;it is creating communication across divergent frameworks and interests among experts and the lay public ratherthan embeddingexpertise in larger social contexts of informalinteractionor civic engagement.Expertinstitutionsare alreadyembedded within their own patternsof informal social interaction; however, such interactionis often limited to the professionalcommunities, the normsof which providethe culturalbasis for scientific inquiry.The question for the democraticdivision of laboris how to establishcredibilityacross such communities,each with its own interestsand intersecting,but nonidentical, systems of relevanceand conflicting criteriaof judgment. that Knowledgehas particular properties makeit a plausiblecandidatefor a sharedresource.Underthe properconditionsof free andopen communication, it can be a publicgood: thatis, one thatis accessible to all andmade use of by all. It also has some featuresof whatHirschman calls a moralresource, in thatit is not exhaustedby use. But knowledgeis sharedas the outcomeof a cooperative and collective process. But what makes it distinct as a shared resourceis thatthe character knowledgeitself can be definedin a cooperaof tive way. For the epistemic division of laborto be democratic,it is precisely the definitionof knowledgethatmust be open to the inputof the public, that is, to all those involvedandaffected.Arrivingat the definitionof such knowledge often takesthe form of negotiatingthe basis for cooperationamongdifferent social actors. While actors or groups of actors can bargainfor better positions in the enterprise,they can resolve their cooperativeconflicts by

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challenging the legitimacy of underlyingnorms. The main problemfor the public is to gain access to the relevantforumsin which such definitions and termsarenegotiatedanddiscussed;they were initiallyclosed to patientactivists in ourexample.Challengesby the publicto expertcredibilityor to expert definitions of the epistemic enterprisedo more than make experts accountable;they makethe knowledgeso gainedgenuinelysocial andshared,even if Even if this sort of public use of reason depended differentiallydistributed. on the credible threatsof nonexpertcooperatorsto change the characterof scientific institutions,these movementsexemplify the public use of reason neededto cross social andepistemicboundaries functionallydifferentiated in societies. In a public spherein which the boundariesbetween expertand lay personsandagentandprincipalsarebridgedandnormsof cooperationnegotiated and established, there is no need for hierarchyor for deference to Such a "thick" authority. publicspherecan thereforebe socially structured by the cognitive division of labor withoutlosing equal standingin deliberation needed for democracy.The wide use of public reason has as its subject all normsthatarethe basis for ongoing practicesof cooperativeinquiry,including sometimes even epistemic norms when they must be negotiatedfor the accountabilityof experts.28

COSMOPOLITAN PUBLICITY AND CULTURAL PLURALISM Globalizationandexpertisemay seem to havelittle to do with each other. However, both have similar effects on citizenship and publicity and create similar problems for applying existing norms of publicity. Globalization usefulnessof abstract publicityandits narrow clearlyundermines conception As of citizenshipin the "politicalpublic sphere." in the case of religious conflict, the potential for cultural conflicts over standards of justification demandsa "wideview" of public reason.As in the case of expertiseand the division of labor,obvious social trendsseem to obviate the role of publicity andcitizenshipon the globalscale andto demandmuchof citizens'capacities to translateacross social boundaries.While the ideal of the "citizen of the world"is as old as the Stoics, therehave been few institutionalopportunities in which to exercise this role. Analogous to the suspicion that science is thereis also anuneaseabouteverhigherlevels of govinimicalto democracy, criticisms ernanceandforcedunificationreflectedin the manycontemporary For of "cosmopolitanism." manyof its political critics, cosmopolitanismhas even become a derogatoryterm.In Cosmopolis,for example, StephenToulmin identifies cosmopolitanism as a hidden and essentially oppressive

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by political agendaof modernity"dominated the Newtonianimage of massive power, exerted by sovereign agency throughthe operationof central This centralforce or apex of power is primarilythe modernnation force."29 state.However,globalizationis not a Newtonianprocess,noris it one thatcan be regulatedandcontrolledby any single apexthatcould be so powerfulas to processes and institutions.Othercriticisms of the conskip all intermediary sequences of globalizationfor democraticpolitics see it as overly unifyingin other ways, such as the effects of the mass media on local culturalvalues. Critics of globalizationoften contrastcosmopolitanismsharplywith pluralto ism. For example, Amy Guttmanopposes multiculturalism "the cosmopolitanview of most people sharinga similarmixtureof culturesthatassimilates everyone into one cosmopolitanculture."30 Similarly,Michael Walzer with no place for universalism" identifies cosmopolitanismwith an "abstract pluralismor local allegiances.31 Even if the termcosmopolitanismcan be reclaimedfor this type of pluralist politics, difficultpracticalissues of multiculturalism social complexand ity remain.First,cosmopolitanpolitics mustface the possibility of deep conflicts among these groupsand societies, conflicts for which it might be very difficultfor all to agreeeven to the methodsandprocedures which to adjuby dicate them.As the largestpoliticalcommunity,the communityof worldcitizens would be characterized many cross-cuttingand potentiallyconflictby ing allegiances and obligations.The forms of agreementthathold it together the would haveto be suitablypluralistic,withoutsurrendering basis for cooperative and peaceful relations.Moreover,such a society faces problems of size andcomplexity,both of which challenge the very idea of unprecedented democraticregulationoversocial processes.Thus,globalizationasks us to be morallyandpolitically innovative,to expandthe limits of ourpreviousideals and institutionsand to producewider variationsof them than are currently available.Such an expansionrequiresfirst and foremostextendingthe ideal of publicity to include many possible variants,as well as differentand often contradictory responsesto globalizationwithinthe public spheresof various cultures.Some of those public spheresare cosmopolitan,in which different problems emerge than can be solved by publicity created either by the to abstraction privatepersonsor by the restrictionof participation the pubto lic role and reasons of citizens. The first step in my argumentagainst more limited normsof publicityhas been to recognize the wide culturalvariations in forms of publicityandthen to see which forms arebest suitedto problems of intergroupcooperationand boundarycrossing. The next step is to show thatthis revised andthick formof publicitysolves problemsof effective citizenship in cosmopolitancontexts as well.

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While the mass and electronicmedia form the basis for global networks for the productionand distributionof information,they producea different kind of public space and hence develop a form of publicitydifferentfrom a "cosmopolitan" public sphere.To the extent that they can exist at all under conditions of wide cultural diversity, nonhomogeneous public spheres test formsof publicityfor culturalbarrirequirethatparticipants theircurrent ers by makingthem the theme of reflexive communication with diverse others. The relatively high entry level of backgroundknowledge and competence common in most literary and discursive public spheres presents a particular,if not paradoxical,difficulty for higher levels of publicity. By employing new technological means and by lowering epistemic entry electronicmediacan createa mass audienceof such a size as to requirements, be conceivablyglobal in scope. But the type of audienceso createdhas certain characteristics: more socially undifferentiated merely aggregathe and tive an audienceis, the less likely it is thatits memberswill be ablereflexively to use theirpublicreasonin communicating with each other.The audienceis thereforemore likely to be "anonymous," both to each otherand to the producers of publicly conveyed messages. The addresseesof such anonymous communicationarean indefiniteaudiencein a purelyaggregativesense: it is not an idealized audiencethatis addressed,butthe aggregateaudienceof all it those who can potentiallygain access to the materialand interpret as they wish. But this access makes no strongnormativeand epistemic demandson the audience,who may not, for example,see theiraccess to this public sphere as implying that the same access and standingbe grantedreciprocallyand equally to others. Such an assumptionwould in fact mean that those others areno longer anonymous,butarein factworthyof recognitionin ways analogous to the recognitionof each otheras citizens. This sort of anonymouscommunicationis not likely to increase understanding across various culturalboundaries.While many such images and in messages can be meaningfullyinterpreted manydifferentways and hence action films), are very portableacrosscultures(such as those in large-budget are constructedprecisely so as not to challenge potentiallyconflicting they local interpretations leaving open, for example, who the villains may be (by and thus increasingthe potentialaggregateaudience).It is also more likely thatthe audienceconsists of passive consumersof images: given the costs of media productiontechnology, high-entryrequirementsmake it less likely that any memberof thataudiencewill also be a producerof such images or and messages. Thus, this type of audienceand its mode of distribution communication reproduce asymmetric features of the representativepublic sphere, often working against them when they help to underminepublic accountabilityand responsiveness.32

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The featuresof anonymityand aggregationstructurea differentkind of social space thanis generatedin eitherof the two previousformsof publicity. The space generatedby communicativeaction opens up an indefinite space for interaction; the public sphere generates a place for communicative exchange with an indefinite but differentiatedaudience, any member of which may make a claim to publicity to which any other participantis accountable.We might instead here think of any international airportas an of a segmentedand aggregativepublic space that is quite different example from a space for mutualaccountability.It is here that the spatialmetaphors thathave been used to describepublicitybegin to breakdown: ratherthan a space, global media create a network,a form of publicity without a public sphere for interaction.While participantsin early modern literary public spheres consumed the books that they read in solitary acts of reading,they were addressedin ways thatexpecteda responsein the variousliterarymedia for forming and expressingpublic opinion (such as newspapersorjournals). By contrast,networksdo not have the expectationof responsiveness,much less the expectationthatothersinterpret themin a similarlypublic way. Their inhibitself-referential formsof communicaanonymousand serialcharacter tion, in which different issues regarding publicity (such as access and accountability)could be raised with regardto the networksof communication themselves. Anonymous networksof communicationmay sometimes interactwith public spheresthatarecritical.They are,however,unlikelyto be locations for social criticism, whateveradvantagesof speed and scale that they may have. They lack precisely the self-referentialfeatures that first emergedin the readingpublic andgiven normativeandinstitutionalstructure in the inclusive citizenship of democraticpublicity.Above all, they do not create access to the social processes of globalizationthemselves that affect the participants this space; such access can only be obtainedvia potential in or actualmechanismsof cooperationamong previouslyunrelatedactors. The contrastbetweenanonymousandcosmopolitanpublicityhelps explicate the requirements new formsof publicityin multi-or transcultural of contexts. The limitationson media-generated publicity have clear implications in this respect: this means that globalizationvia these mechanismswill not producea public sphereandthatwe oughtnot use "theglobal public sphere" as a spatial category. In contrastwith an aggregateand potentially global audience,a cosmopolitanpublicsphereis createdwhen at least two culturally rootedpublic spheresbegin to overlapandintersect,as when translations and conferences create a cosmopolitanpublic spherein variousacademicdisciplines. Such culturally expansive, yet socially structured,public spheres emerge as political institutionsandcivic associationsand includepreviously excludedgroups.Most of all, the formationof a cosmopolitanpublicrequires

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the developmentandexpansionof transnational civil society.The creationof such a civil society is a slow and difficult process that requiresthe highly reflexive formsof communication boundary and crossingandaccountability of developed public spheres.Thus, we can expect that underproper typical conditions andwith supportinstitutions,existing vibrantpublic sphereswill expandandbecome open to andconnectedwith otherpublic spheres.On the basis of their common knowledge of violations of publicity,their members will develop the capacitiesof publicreasonto cross andnegotiateboundaries anddifferencesbetweenpersons,groups,andcultures.By fosteringcommunicative interaction,such forms of publicity have already produced selfregulatingforms of cooperationamong those affected by global processes. Even in the absence of clear centralized institutions,internationalagreecould be the outcomeof interacments or "regimes" aimingat accountability tions under the norms of cosmopolitan publicity. Many such agreements (which include generalprinciplesand rules as well as decision procedures) policy, humanrights,comalreadyexist in areasas diverseas environmental munication, and the regulationof trade and financial markets.33 They are enforcedprimarily the powerof international by publicity,which makes viothe knownto everyonearound globe. Tothe extent lationsof such agreements thatsuch publicityhas cooperation-inducing effects, actorsin civil societies to have opportunities createegalitarianconditionsof access to and accountability in the social process, at least to some degree and on some issues. In theircurrent form,suchregimesarefarfromdemocraticandoften work economy. againstthe interestsof those who are worstoff in the international However,theirexistence alreadyrequiresa minimaldegreeof cosmopolitan To publicitybeyondthe model of "onenation,one public sphere." the extent with the differentlocationsin the globalization thatthey areformedby actors process, they at least raise the possibility of access to decisions concerning global processes in a cosmopolitanpublicsphere.As in the case of the emergence of the national public sphere discussed above, the emergence of a vibrantandpotentialcriticalpublic sphererequiresa certaindegree of social differentiationand institutionalization. Certainly,the cosmopolitan public out of interactionsamong variouscosmopolitan and local sphere develops public spheres based in an emerging internationaland transnationalcivil society. The associative networkof societies with global economies is now transnational and includes various nongovernmental organizations and associations. civil society only becomes a publicspherethroughthe emerInternational gence of institutionsaroundwhich the public sphereis organizedand which actorsin civil society can oppose or support.Fornow, the nationalstatecontinues to be a focus for a cosmopolitan public sphere even as publicity

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cooperation expandsbeyondit, becauseof new possibilitiesfor international and agreement. "Democracy and democratizationmay be sought across The states as well as in the state andagainst the state."34 greatestimpetusfor arenalies in a vigorouscivil society conmoredemocracyin the international tainingoppositionalpublic spheres,in which actorsorganizeagainstthe state or appeal to it when making violations of agreementspublic. As various institutionsemerge,they,too, can become the focus of a critical international civil society expandand maintainin public sphereas actorsin transnational their public interaction across various political, cultural, and functional boundaries.With the gradualprocess that involves the emergence of both transnationalcivil society and novel organizing and integratingpolitical institutions,a cosmopolitanpublic spherewill emerge thatwill be wide and pluralistic,not the thin and abstractpublic sphereof the eighteenthcentury imagination. As in the case of the cognitive division of labordiscussed above, globalization creates problems for public reason and democraticself-rule. Given their historical location in the nation state, democraticinstitutionscan no longer fully regulate the larger contexts in which political decisions are made. At the same time, those affected by decisions made within its institutions, and thus with legitimateclaims to violations of its principleof publicity, spill acrossits borders.This would seem to call for the creationof a public sphereof a new, global scale. The problemseems to demandthe creationof a with media systems of matchingscale thatoccupy public sphere "integrated the same social space as that over which economic and political decisions will have an impact."35 proposalseems to suggest creatinga wide, interThis national public sphere by matching the mass media with some system of democraticaccountabilityandthus a corresponding of regulatinginstituset tions. If my argument correct,such a projectionof the public sphereonto a is global scale is less the issue than new forms of social differentiationalong political institutions, cross-cutting associations, and new, thick public spheres. Ratherthanthinkingin the dualistictermsof a globalpublicsphererelated to centralizedglobal institutions,it is betterto projectthe effects of globalization on publicitysomewhatdifferently:as the gradualtransformation local of civil society organizedinstitutionsas public spheres throughtransnational they emerge at differentlevels, in which each public spherebecomes a location for the public use of reason in acts of criticism,translation,and mutual accountability across boundaries.Given the currentlack of international institutionalstructures the nascentstateof transnational and civil society, it is easy to think of the global public sphereas little more thana "phantom public" in WalterLippmann'scritical phrase.In this respect, the conditions of

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cosmopolitanpublicityarestill being workedout, so thatwe do nothave anything like the sort of accountabilitythat public access to global processes requires.Such accountabilityis not the same as political control;it operates on the force of publicopinionandthroughdemocraticinstitutionsandpublic spheresthatat least for now exist on morelocal levels. Giventhe manyproblems thatrequirethe cosmopolitanuses of publicreason(fromglobal warming to economic regulationto wideningdisparitiesin well-being), establishing the basis for suchcooperationin innovativeformsof publicityis an urgent task. Cosmopolitanpublicitycontributes the solutionto these problemsof to cooperation by creating conditions for democratic accessibility to the process of the formationof international regimesandultimatelynew institutions. Withoutsuch accessibility,therecan be no basis for accountabilityto transnational publics.

CONCLUSION: CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND PUBLICITY of These examplesshow thatannouncements the deathof democraticcitiandthe identificationof cosmopolitanismwith oppressivepower are zenship Suchclaims rely on two unwarranted that assumptions: the public premature. is a univocal ideal, ratherthan one with a wide variety of historical sphere realizations,and second, thatthe normof publicity needs to be so idealized function in solving the very problems that its that it can have no particular critics see as leading to its demise. In fact, the wide variationin culturaland historicalrealizationsof public spaces andspheresis due to the diverseproblems thatits normsaresupposedto solve. I have shownhow the normof publicity can be employedto solve problemsof citizenship:the social division of labor,as well as problemsof culturalpluralismandglobalization.Whatthese phenomenahave in common is thatthey point to trendsthatlead not only to social andculturaldifferentiation further beyondthe divisionsof the stateand and civil society butalso to differentiation pluralismwithinthe publicsphere. Citizens now use theirreasonpubliclyandsolve problemsin a socially structuredspace of interactionso long as they are "well informed"and "cosmopolitan." meansforpoliticalproblem The normof publicityhas long beena primary in modernsocieties, andI have arguedthatthe problemsto be solved solving are differentfor the abstract,inclusive civic public spheresthanthey are for cosmopolitanpublic spheres.Withthe emergenceof a society differentiated aroundstate and civic institutions,the public sphere offered an attractive

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ideal of a unity of opinions in a sphere of political discussion free from the growing power of the state. Inclusionoffered much the same ideal centered arounddiverse citizenry unifying themselves in a common public sphere. The historical changes that I have indicated do not mean that these civic normsof publicity have lost theirproblem-solvingability in many contexts. Rather,the practicalconsequencesof increasingdivision of labor,functional and differentiation, globalizationcreateproblemsthatthese forms of publicity cannoteasily solve. In new culturallydiverseand socially mappedpublic work out new normsof publicityand forms of commuspheres,participants nication as they solve these new problemsand therebychange the natureof citizenship. These solutions are based on establishingand maintainingnew forms of cooperation,across variousculturalboundariesin variousforms of publicity,in negotiatingthe conditionsof cooperationin the division of labor in the emergence of accessible and accountableinternational regimes. The signs of success for these new forms of publicity will be found in eventual changes in scientific, economic, andpoliticalinstitutionsaroundwhich more richly textured,socially and culturallydiverse, and normativelydifferentiated publics emerge and createnew forms, styles, and locations for egalitarian and deliberativepolitics.

NOTES
1. For an excellent accountof the centralimportance this remarkfrom Kant's"Preface," of to Critiqueof Pure Reason, see O'Nora O'Neill, Constructionsof Reason (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989), 42-8. 2. JiirgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformation the Public Sphere(Cambridge, MA: of MIT Press, 1989), 39. 3. T. H. Marshall, Citizenshipand Social Class (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1950); similarly,TalcottParsonsarguesthattheexpansionof citizenshipis the resultof the generalizationof values. See Politics and Social Structure(New York:Free Press, 1969). My argumentpresentsa variationon this theme with differentmechanismsfor value generalization than abstraction. 4 Amy GuttmanandDennis Thompson,Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1997), 55. 5. Ibid., 65. 6. Here I modify Cohen's argumentabout the "background condition of democracy"for restrictionson publicexpressionunderreasonablepluralism.See JoshuaCohen,"Procedure and Substancein DeliberativeDemocracy," DeliberativeDemocracy:Essays on Reasonand Poliin tics, ed. J. Bohman and W. Rehg (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1997), 418. 7. John Rawls, "Introduction" paperbackedition of Political Liberalism(New York: to Columbia University Press, 1996), xlii-xlvii; also Lawrence Solum, "Constructingan Ideal of Public Reason,"San Diego Law Review 30 (1993): 729-62. Recent discussion of Rawls's

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and reasonshave revolvedaroundthe problemof religious distinctionof "public" "non-public" expression, moving Rawls from an "exclusive"to an "inclusiveview" which rejects Rawls's own previousargumentin Political Liberalismthatthereis "butone public reason"of citizens. See Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Universityof Chicago Law Review 94 (1997): 765-807. 8. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1992), 431 ff. Farfromdemanding"dedifferentiation" the sake of democratizafor than tion, I am arguingthatpublic spherestoday are based on even more social differentiation createsconditionsfor Cohenand Arato'smodel suggests. At the same time, such differentiation a more, ratherthanless, democraticandinclusivepublic sphere,which in turnprovidesa possiat ble basis for more, ratherthan less, democratization the level of institutions. BetweenFactsandNorms(Cambridge, MA:MITPress,1996),chap.8. 9. Jiirgen Habermas, and 10. See JamesBohman,Public Deliberation:Pluralism,Complexity Democracy(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1996), chap. 1. 11. On this criticismof Habermas,see ibid., 178 ff. 12. See Habermas,StructuralTransformation the Public Sphere,for the variantsof the of genesis of the Europeanliterarypublicspheres;butwhatthey all havein commonis thatthey are personscome togetheras a public"(p. 27). Habermasalso concedes spheresin which "private thatthereare many otherpossible variants,includinga "plebeianpublic sphere"(p. xviii). Furthermore,while "representative publicness" does not have the presuppositionof "universal as accessibility"(p. 5 ff.), it is still characterized a form of publicness. 13. Foran informativediscussionof these issues in a transcultural context,see PhilipHuang, "'PublicSphere'/'CivilSociety' in China:The ThirdRealmbetweenStateandSociety,"in Modern China 19, no. 2 (1993): 216-40. On the possibilityof a transnational publicsphere,see James Bohman, "ThePublic Spheresof the WorldCitizen,"in PerpetualPeace, ed. J. Bohmanand M. Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1997), 179-200. 14. See WangHui, Lee Ou-fanLee, with MichaelFisher,"Isthe PublicSphereUnspeakable in Chinese?"Public Culture6 (1994): 603-4. 15. TalalAsad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1989). Often such phenomenaindicate the presence of what John Rawls calls "consultationhierarchies"ratherthan genuine public spheres in my broadersense of the term. Consultationhierarchiescharacterize"well-ordered societies."See Rawls, "TheLaw of Peoples,"in On HumanRights,ed. S. Shuteand hierarchical S. Hurley(New York:Basic Books, 1993), 63 ff. For criticismsof this conception,see Thomas Law of Peoples,"Philosophyand Public Affairs23 (1994): 214 ff. For a Pogge, "AnEgalitarian criticismbased on restrictionson the criticaluse of public reasonin such societies, see Thomas McCarthy,"A ReasonableLaw of Peoples,"in PerpetualPeace, 201-17. 16. See John Bowen, "LegalReasoningand PublicDiscourse in IndonesianIslam,"in New ed. Media and the Politics of Civil Society in the Islamic World, D. Eickelmanand J. Anderson (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress, forthcoming). 17. Habermas,BetweenFacts and Norms, 360. 18. The term"publicculture"usually denotesthose aspectsof culturalidentityand symbols thatbecome the subjectmatterfor public debateandopinion;the public spheredenotes a social space that emerges out of civil society and is outside of state control.On these debates and an analysis of sportsas partof public culturein China,see Susan Brownell, Trainingthe Bodyfor China(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1994), chap.3. Brownellshows the odd locations

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for publicity even in "statesaturatedsocieties," such as in criticisms of the Partyin Chinese sportsjournalism. to 19. Such mutualresponsivenessor answerability othersis crucialto thejustificatoryforce of public agreements.For an elaborationof this formof justificationin relationto makingone's to actions "answerable" others,see SamuelFreeman,"Contractualism, MoralMotivation,and PracticalReason,"Journalof Philosophy 88 (1991): 281-303. 20. For empiricalconfirmation the explicit awarenessamongcitizens of the operativedisof tinctions between privateand public forms of discourse,see William Gamson, TalkingPolitics (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), 19 ff. 21. For a competingpictureof early moder science to this standard abstract and Enlightenmentaccount,see StephenShapin,TheSocial Historyof Truth (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1994), for whom the very contingencyof empiricalknowledgerequired judgmentsof the personalcredibilityof witnesses. As Shapinhimself pointsout,the division of laborundermines this personaltrustand conversationallogic. 22. JohnDewey, ThePublic and Its Problemsin JohnDewey: TheLater Works, 1925-1953. Vol. 2 (Carbondale: Universityof SouthernIllinois University,1988), 334. 23. BernardWilliams, "FormalStructuresand Social Reality,"in Trust,ed. D. Gambetta (London:Basil Blackwell, 1988), 7. 24. KennethArrow,"TheEconomics of Agency,"in Principals and Agents,ed. J. Prattand R. Zeckhauser(Cambridge,MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1985), 37-51. 25. Susan Shapiro,"TheSocial Controlof ImpersonalTrust," AmericanJournal of Sociology 93 (1987): 627. 26. StephenEpstein, ImpureScience: AIDS,Activism,and the Politics of Knowledge(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1996), 243-50. 27. Mark Warren,"DeliberativeDemocracy and Authority," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 58. 28. For furtherdiscussion of the cognitive division of labor in deliberativedemocracy,see AmericanJournalofPolitical Science 43 (1999): 590-607. my "Democracyas Social Inquiry," 29. StephenToulmin,Cosmopolis:TheHiddenAgenda of Modernity(Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1990), 209. 30. Amy Guttman,"TheChallengeof Multiculturalism PoliticalEthics,"Philosophyand in Public Affairs 22 (1993): 184. Guttmansees cosmopolitanismas a "comprehensive universalism" which "overlookscases of moralconflict where no substantivestandardcan legitimately claim a monopoly on reasonablenessandjustification"(p. 194). But this is precisely the type of as responsivenessdemandedin "cosmopolitan publicspheres" I definethem:withoutsuch a normative expectation,such a resolutionof moralconflicts has no normativeforce. 31. See Michael Walzer'sdescriptionof "abstract universalism" seeking a "moralEspeas ranto" in Interpretationand Social Criticism (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1987), 19. 32. For similar criticisms, see John Keene, The Media and Democracy (Cambridge,UK: Polity, 1991); BenjaminLee, "GoingPublic,"Public Culture5 (1993): 165-277. 33. For a fuller descriptionof regimes, see StephenKraser,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,"in InternationalRegimes,ed. S. Kraser(Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983), 1-22. 34. John Dryzek, Democracy in Capitalist Times(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 150.

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35. Nicholas Garnham,"TheMass Media, CulturalIdentity,and the Public Sphere in the Modem World," Public Culture5 (1995): 265.

James Bohman is Danforth Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University.He is authorof PublicDeliberation: Pluralism, ComplexityandDemocracy(MITPress,1996) and New Philosophyof Social Science: Problemsof Indeterminacy (MITPress, 1991). He has also recentlyeditedbooks titledDeliberativeDemocracy:Essays on Reason and Politics and PerpetualPeace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, both with MIT Press. He is currentlywritinga book on how pluralismrequiresnew interpretations of democraticideals of equality,publicity,andfreedom.