IAEA-TECDOC-1596-CD

Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials
Results of a Coordinated Research Project 20032006

July 2008

The originating Section of this publication in the IAEA was: Surveillance, Seals and Remote Monitoring Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramer Strasse 5 P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria

IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNICAL MEASURES TO DETECT AND RESPOND TO ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IAEA, VIENNA, 2008 IAEA-TECDOC-1596-CD ISBN 9789201563088 ISSN 10114289
IAEA, 2008 Printed by the IAEA in Austria July 2008

FOREWORD
Equipment to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials at borders and in a country has its own specific requirements and is very different from equipment used in other radiation monitoring cases. Automated and manual measurements need to be done in the field, often outdoors, at land or sea border crossing points or at airports. The free flow of goods and passengers must not be greatly impacted, thus requiring that the measurement time be short. The design needs to take into account that the users of the equipment are not experts in radiation detection, thus the results of the measurements should be easy to understand. This coordinated research project (CRP) on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials was undertaken in 2002 to address technical difficulties in these areas, and to form a consensus regarding the most important technical requirements for border monitoring equipment. A problem which proved to be very troubling to users of border monitoring equipment, was becoming obvious at the start of this CRP: the radiation detection systems routinely generated a considerable number of genuine radiation alarms (from, e.g. naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in the shipped materials), which were of no significance to illicit trafficking but nevertheless required a response. Without effective tools in the hands of the customs officers or border guards to quickly categorize the isotope, the entire process of border monitoring would not work. Many contract and agreement holders worked on ways aspects of resolving this problem. As a result, improved handheld instruments were designed (several of which have thus far been commercialized), a set of guidelines on simplifying user interfaces was developed, and techniques for categorizing alarms in various circumstances were studied. In addition to the above, other investigations relating to specific issues in border monitoring were undertaken, such as ways to detect shielded nuclear materials, and ways to verify the isotopic and activity level of contents of legal shipments. Specific proposals to achieve the desired goals were made, and demonstrated. The following is a compilation of the final results presented at the third and final research coordination meeting, held in Vienna, 2428 April 2006. In summary, one can say that this CRP has contributed significantly to the improvements of equipment needed to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. This CRP was supported by the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security with funds from the Nuclear Security Fund, and by the Division of Technical Support, Department of Safeguards. The IAEA officers responsible for this publication were R. Arlt and K. Baird, both of the Division of Technical Support, Department of Safeguards.

EDITORIAL NOTE
This CD-ROM has been prepared from the original material as submitted by contributors. Neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for the information contained on this CD-ROM. The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.

CONTENTS
Foreword Summary of the Coordinated Research Project DETAILED REPORTS Feasibility of Using Hand-Held Isotope Identifiers for Attribute Testing of Radioactive Sources in Shipment Containers N. Kravchenko, G. Yakovlev, D. Babich, V. Klyuchkin, A. Kravtsov, D. Danko, A. Lekomtsev, A. Churakov, M. Karetnikov Verification of the Design Information of Shipment Containers Using Gamma-Spectrometry S. Korneyev, A. Khlimanovich, B. Martsynkevich, E. Bystrov The vehicle monitor for the detection of radioactive materials Q. Zhang, J. Ma, M. Han, Y. Huang Development and Demonstration of the New Methods for the Detection of Hidden HEU L. Meskhi, L. Kurdadze, I. Takadze, G. Cirekidze, N. Gogitidze Comparative Study of New Scintillation Materials in Application to the Border Detection Equipment M. Moszynski, A. Syntfeld, M. Gierfik, A. Nassakski, T. Szczesniak Analysis of procedures of testing the technical means for detection, localization and identification of nuclear materials and radioactive substances G. Yakovlev, I.Bannykh, V. Bojko, V. Bezverbniy, I. Chirkina, A. Gromov, N. Kravchenko, D. Danko, a. Lekomtsev, I. Bryagin, M. Karetnikov Investigation of the Alternative Gamma-Spectropic Detectors for Quantitative Determination of Activity Isotopes "TYK" (Standard Shipping Containers) S. Ulin, V. Dmitrenko, K. Vlasik, Z. Uteshev, N. Kravchenko, I. Bannyh, I. Chirkina, Y. Popkov, A. Korotkov, A. Dorin, N. Ivanova, A. Ischenko, R. Ibragimova Using Associated Particle Technique for Detection ff Shielded Nuclear Material A. Kuznetsov, D. Vakhtin, M. Zubkov, D. Vakhtin, a. Evsenin, O. Osetrov, I. Gorshkov Elaboration of Methodical Recommendations on Application of Technical Facilities at Customs Control Over the Fissionable and Radioactive Materials Trafficking Across the Customs Border A. Borisenko, V. Kustov, L. Eliseenko, V. Temchenko, O. Aliokhina, B. Semerkov, N. Kravchenko, I. Bannykh, D. Danko Research and Development of a Hand-Held Neutron Monitor, and Feasibility Studies of a 6LiI(Eu) Crystal Based RID and SPRD M. Majorov, A. Lebedev, O. Kraev, A. Kazimov, S. Kolchev Radiation Monitoring with NORM Detection of Vehicles at Borders at Stand-Still V. Petrenko, Y. Karimov, N. Shipilov, A. Podkovirin, M. Fazilov, B. Yuldashev Ruggedized Detection Probe for Field Use with Large Volume Coplaner CZT Detector L. Grigorjeva, V. Gostilo, A. Loupilov, I. Lisjutin, R. Rjabchikov Investigation of Different Scenarios that can be Used to Mask Nuclear Material with Other Gamma Emitters M. Reinhard, D Prokopovich, D. alexiev, N. Dytlewski, D. Hill Reduction of the Frequency of Innocent Alarms in Border Monitors H. Boeck, M. Swoboda, M. Schrenk, S. Hengster, V. Schwarz Illicit trafficking: Monte Carlo modelling of shielded uranium source gamma spectra from the Nal detector S. Abousahl, P. Ragan Gamma Spectra Measurements of Various Radiation Sources Using a LaBr3 P. Mortreau, A. Fernandes, R. Berndt

SHORT SUMMARIES Feasibility Study of a Wrist Watch Based Radiation Survey Meter (Phase I) and Isotope Identying Gamma Spectrometer (Phase II) A. Wolf, F. Gabriel Procedures for, and Testing of, Border Monitoring Equipment R. Kouzes Testing and Analysing Instrumentation and Procedures for Radiation Detection and Identification P. Beck, G. Sdouz Capacity Building for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials M. Melich, M. Dobia Detection of Nuclear Materials, Including Concealed Highly Enriched Uranium, Using Enhanced Detection Methods J. L. Jones, D. R. Norman Inspection of Shipping Containers for Undisclosed Radioactive Materials V. Valkovi, S. Blagus, D. Sudac Characterization of Various Survey Meters through Car-Borne Survey in Java Island as a Basis Data for Searching Orphan Sources U. Pande Made, I. Yuwono, Y. R. Akhmad, S. Sjamsoe, S. Subiharto Development and Utilization of Nuclear Analytical Techniques for Analysis of Nuclear Forensic Materials H. Demirel, P. Arikan Development of Recommendation, Guidelines and Methods for Coast Guard Officers on Measurement Using Portable and Hand-Held Isotope Measurement Devices M. Divizinyuk, O. Bleshenko, T. Dudar, Yu. Sabulonov, V. Nasarenko, Yu. Kostenko, G. Lisitshenko ANNEX I: List of the Participants in the Coordinated Research Project ANNEX II: Usability Guide for Manufacturers of Radiation Monitoring Devices

Summary of the Coordinated Research Project

Radiation monitoring for safety and security purposes has a long history. The first detection systems were developed for, and used by, military and later civil nuclear facilities, as well as for geological uranium exploration. During the 1980s, the Chernobyl accident produced a major release, which added to the already widespread fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. This prompted many countries to use radiation monitoring systems on their territories. Automated radiation monitoring systems were also developed for, and installed in, nuclear facilities to monitor the material flow as a nuclear safeguards measure. In addition, many measurement stations were installed around the world to monitor airborne radiation, which would be an indicator of nuclear weapons tests. Starting in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the concerns over (i) abandoned radioactive sources in scrap, and (ii) reported cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, prompted the desire for additional development and deployment of specialized radiation monitoring equipment, with the main focus on border crossing points. These concerns were strongly enhanced after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the USA, as these events strengthened the fears that terrorists might combine explosives with radioactive sources (dirty bombs) or even improvised nuclear weapons to disrupt normal life in a society or cause severe damage. Equipment to detect illicit trafficking at borders and in a country, the topic of this coordinated research project (CRP), has its own specific requirements and is, although similarities exist, very different from equipment used in other radiation monitoring cases. Automated and manual measurements need to be done in the field, often outdoors, at land or sea border crossing points or at airports. Changing background conditions need to be taken into account when alarms are triggered. The free flow of goods and passengers should be impacted to the minimum extent possible, thus requiring that the measurement time be short. The equipment design needs to take account of the fact that the users of the equipment are not experts in radiation detection, thus the results of the measurements should be easy to understand: ideally, pass/fail messages would be given immediately and unambiguously a challenging task for developers and vendors. In 2003, shortly after the CRP had commenced, it had already been demonstrated that the sensitivity of portal monitoring systems had become adequate, in particular after a series of national and international tests. However, a new problem had become obvious, which was troublesome to the users. The sensitive detection systems routinely picked up a considerable number of radiation alarms which were of no significance to illicit trafficking but nevertheless required a response. They were caused either by medical isotopes in persons or naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in transported goods. Without effective tools in the hands of the responsible parties to quickly categorize the isotope which had caused the alarm the concept of border monitoring would not work.

Gamma spectrometry and isotope identification using hand-held gamma spectrometers or even automated spectrometric systems appeared to be the way to solve this dilemma. While gamma spectrometry under laboratory conditions was already a mature technology in 2003, this was not the case for small, manually operated hand-held gamma spectrometers. Early instruments were plagued by instabilities and nonlinearities of the energy scale, leading to failures in the identification of the isotopes. The identification software was struggling with the low statistics of the gamma spectra taken with short measurement time, with low resolution of the scintillation detectors used and small gamma peaks on a high background of scattered gammas. Therefore agreements and contracts to support the improvement of this important equipment class became a focus of the CRP. Furthermore, the slow throughput, two step detection/categorization response bothered users who wanted a combination of alarm and immediate categorization. This was particularly needed in cases where frequent innocent or nuisance alarms caused unnecessary delay and excitement of the public. Common examples include the highly visible response to the detection of a medical isotope in a person at an airport, or the high frequency of alarms at border crossing points caused by trucks transporting NORM. In addition the ease of use of the instruments was often quite poor, resulting in the frustration of the users at remote border crossings, etc., who were experts in other fields but not experts in radiation measurements. Under the CRP significant scientific/technical contributions were made by contract and agreement holders and invited experts to address the above described problems. Below is a list of topics investigated, with reference to the reports or summaries contained herein: Detection materials and detector response o Illicit trafficking: Monte Carlo modelling of shielded uranium source gamma spectra from the Nal detector (Abousahl et al.). o Gamma spectra measurements of various radiation sources using a LaBr3 (P. Mortreau et al.). o Comparative study of new scintillation materials in application to the border detection equipment (Moszynski et al.). o Characterization of various survey meters through car-borne survey in Java Island as a basis data for searching orphan sources (Pande Made et al.). o Investigation of different scenarios that can be used to mask nuclear material with other gamma emitters (Reinhard et al.). New instrumentation development o Reduction of the frequency of innocent alarms in border monitors (Boeck et al.). o Ruggedized detection probe for field use with large volume coplaner CZT detector (Grigoreva et al.).

o Research and development of a hand-held neutron monitor, and feasibility studies of a 6LiI(Eu) crystal based RID and SPRD (Majorov et al.). o Radiation monitoring with NORM detection of vehicles at borders at standstill (Petrenko et al.). o Investigation of the alternative gamma-spectropic detectors for quantitative determination of activity isotopes TYK (standard shipping containers) (Ulin et al.). o Feasibility study of a wristwatch based radiation survey meter and as a isotope identifying gamma spectrometer (Wolf et al.). o The vehicle monitor for the detection of radioactive materials (Zhang). Testing and implementation procedures for border monitoring equipment and support facilities o Testing and analysing instrumentation and procedures for radiation detection and identification (Beck et al.). o Elaboration of methodical recommendations on application of technical facilities at customs control over the fissionable and radioactive materials trafficking across the customs border (Borisenko et al.). o Development and utilization of nuclear analytical techniques for analysis of nuclear forensic materials (Demirel et al.). o Development of recommendations, guidelines and methods for coast guard officers on measurement using portable and hand-held isotope measurement devices (Divizinyuk). o Procedures for and testing of border monitoring equipment (Kouzes). o Capacity building for detection and response to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials (Melich). o Analysis of procedures of testing the technical means for detection, localization and identification of nuclear materials and radioactive substances (Yakovlev et al.). Verification of contents of sealed shipment containers (involving gamma radiation probes or detection) o Detection of nuclear materials, including concealed highly enriched uranium, using enhanced detection methods (Jones et al.) o Verification of the design information of shipment containers using gamma-spectrometry (Korneyev, et al.). o Feasibility of using hand-held isotope identifiers for attribute testing of radioactive sources in shipment containers (Kravchenko, et al.).

Verification of contents of sealed shipment containers (involving neutron radiation probes or detection) o Using the associated particle technique for detection of shielded nuclear material (Kuznetsov et al.). o Development and demonstration of the new methods for the detection of hidden HEU (Meskhi et al.). o Inspection of shipping containers for undisclosed radioactive materials (Valcovic et al.).

The yearly research coordination meetings (RCMs) were also used to develop a set of technical specifications for border monitoring instruments, discussing and agreeing them with a group of users, developers, including experts of the IEC and ANSI standards committees, and other standards drafting groups. This activity was supported by a workshop at the JRC Ispra, where multiple instruments were used to evaluate test specifications and associated test procedures. As a result of this work, a technical specifications publication, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 1, Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment (2006) was produced. In these same RCMs, it was repeatedly noted by uses that the instruments developed by manufacturers were not ideally suited for use by non-experts. Based upon these complaints, a usability guide for user interface design and instrument ergonomics was developed, presented and discussed. This document is included herein (Annex II). Identified needs for further research During discussions at the third and final RCM for this CRP (April 2428 2006), extensive discussions took place regarding the current state of the art for radiation border monitoring and the challenges that the community currently faces. As in 2003 the main issue involved the generation of alarms by non-threat isotopes. The possibility of discriminating against medical isotopes had been examined during this CRP, and initial successes were documented It was the consensus of the RCM meeting that the biggest problem at this time still is the discrimination of alarms caused by NORM from those due to illicit movement of materials. These NORM alarms, typically found at sites where cargo routinely passes, impede the natural flow of commerce and limit the effectiveness of the radiation monitors. Thus, improved equipment and techniques are needed to (i) reduce the number of NORM alarms and (ii) to allow inspection agents to more quickly and effectively determine the nature of radiation alarms. It is for these topics that the greatest need for further research was identified. Reducing NORM alarms through the use of spectroscopic portals, which investigate the isotopic signature of the alarm, was one identified method for achieving these goals. The spectroscopic portal has the advantages of larger detectors and more sophisticated algorithms over hand-held instruments. However, before these instruments can be deployed effectively, their limitations due to statistics and masking must be studied carefully. Masking is when the larger radiation signature of either NORM, industrial or medical material is used to cloak the smaller signature of illicit nuclear material. In-field installation of these instruments without understanding their limitations could result in the compromising the effectiveness of the entire illicit trafficking monitoring system.

Due to the large number of plastic based radiation portal monitors that have already been deployed worldwide, combined with their much lower unit cost, research to improve the information obtainable from plastic based radiation monitors should also be performed. The capability needs to be developed and implemented so that the inspection agent has more information at his or her disposal to quickly decide if further inspection of an alarming vehicle is warranted (such as accurately identifying which vehicle generated the alarm, cross-checking the cargo manifest of that vehicle, and the radiation profiles (time history of the measured radiation levels) of the individual detectors). The development of the capability of automatically supplying this information to the inspection agent would dramatically increase the agents ability to resolve alarms. Spectroscopic portals are not applicable to all monitoring situations and hand-held instruments will still play an important role in resolving radiation alarms. Thus, research to improve hand-held radioisotope identifier devices (RIDs) should also be continued. This research should include (i) the pursuit of better identification algorithms (both in identification capability and reliability) and (ii) the investigation of higher resolution crystals. The development of a hand-held neutron search instrument that further approaches the detection capability of the radiation portal monitor would also be of great assistance. Although there are no NORM neutron sources, the operation of neutron detector systems results in statistical false alarms that require verification. The radiation portal monitors have much more detection capability than existing hand-held instruments. Therefore, the verification of neutron alarms can only be quickly performed by passing the vehicle through the monitor a second time, which is not always practical. A hand-held neutron search instrument would be a significant asset in resolving these alarms. A final research area that was discussed was the need to increase the capability of the inspection agents to resolve alarms by developing improved reach-back capabilities. The agents desperately need an enhanced capability to acquire help from experts with a higher level of training in the use of radiation detection equipment and the interpretation of data from these devices. Operational experience has shown that no amount of training can prepare the field agent for all of the radiation alarm scenarios. The reach-back capability is essential to effective operation of the monitoring systems. The capability could be improved by developing better standardized data formats, data transmission proficiency, and data analysis tools. The establishment of an international database for radiation monitoring information was also discussed. A final topic of discussion, which is not related directly to research and development, was the need to establish guidelines and techniques of the measurement and documentation of the international shipment of commercial radioactive material. International commercial shipments of radioactive material can be used to hide the shipment of illicit isotopes or quantities of radioactive material. International agreements and techniques need to be developed to prevent these legal shipments from being used by nuclear terrorists to acquire illicit material. The conclusion of the discussions that took place during the final RCM was that, although significant progress has been made in the development of tools to combat nuclear smuggling, further research in several different areas is still required. The

detection capability of existing systems is not the area where more development is needed. The development of the capability to discriminate between real illicit trafficking and the movement of NORM material is the area that requires the most improvement. This research should not only concentrate on better isotopic identification systems but should also include the development of tools for better information distribution and communication. The IAEA has agreed to pursue those issues raised by the RCM and, to this end, has initiated a follow-up Coordinated Research Project in this area.

Feasibility of Using Hand-Held Isotope Identifiers for Attribute Testing of Radioactive Sources in Shipment Containers
N. Kravchenko Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, Moscow, Russian Federation Abstract The project Feasibility of using hand-held isotope identifiers for attribute testing of radioactive sources in shipment containers was being carried out in the framework of IAEA Research Contract # 12444\Nuclear Security Multi-donors Fund by Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute" from March 15, 2003, till May 31, 2006. The scope of work included: 1. Analysis of technical characteristics of hand-held isotope identifiers with respect to the determination of transport index and the verification of shielded sources. 2. Establishing the list of most frequently shipped radioactive sources and nuclear materials. 3. Analysis the design information of standard, approved shipping containers used for the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances 4. Performing test measurements on various containers using hand-held devices. Assessment of performance of the devices with respect to the scope of the project and draw conclusions with respect to the technical feasibility of: Confirmation of transport index of nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers; Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers; Definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations The results of the project execution are as follows: 1. The information on the most frequently shipped radioactive sources and nuclear materials and design of standard shipping containers for the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances was systemized; 2. The spectrometric analysis of most frequently shipped isotopes was carried out; 3. The spectrometer capabilities were verified in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations; 4. The spectrometer capabilities were verified in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides when placed in various protective containers. 5. The capabilities of spectrometers (identifiers) on transport index confirmation were verified.

SUMMARY The project Feasibility of using hand-held isotope identifiers for attribute testing of radioactive sources in shipment containers was being carried out in the framework of IAEA Research Contract # 12444\Nuclear Security Multi-donors Fund by Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute" from March 15, 2003, till May 31, 2006. The chief scientific investigator is Nikolay E. Kravchenko. The scope of work included: 1. Analysis of technical characteristics of hand-held isotope identifiers with respect to the determination of transport index and the verification of shielded sources. 2. Establishing the list of most frequently shipped radioactive sources and nuclear materials. 3. Analysis the design information of standard, approved shipping containers used for the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances 4. Performing test measurements on various containers using hand-held devices. Assessment of performance of the devices with respect to the scope of the project and draw conclusions with respect to the technical feasibility of: Confirmation of transport index of nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers; Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers; Definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations The results of the project execution are as follows: 1. The information on the most frequently shipped radioactive sources and nuclear materials and design of standard shipping containers for the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances was systemized; 2. The spectrometric analysis of most frequently shipped isotopes was carried out; 3. The spectrometer capabilities were verified in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations;

4. The spectrometer capabilities were verified in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides when placed in various protective containers. 5. The capabilities of spectrometers (identifiers) on transport index confirmation were verified. The results were reported on the Research Co-ordination Meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agencys Coordinated Research Project on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and radioactive Materials held in Vienna in 2003 and 2006, and in Dagomys (Russia) in 2004, on the Countering Nuclear Terrorism meeting in Yerevan (Armenia) in 2005, and on the Spectrometric Analysis and Data Processing seminars in Obninsk, Russian, in 2004 and 2005.

TABLE OF CONTENT 1. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HAND-HELD DEVICES FOR DETERMINATION OF TRANSPORT INDEX AND VERIFICATION OF SHIELDED SOURCES........................................................................................................6 1.1. Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401 .........................................................................................6 1.2. Survey device ISP-PM1401K-1...........................................................................................7 1.3. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1621 ......................................................................................9 1.4. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1203 ......................................................................................9 1.5. X-ray and gamma dosimeter EL-1119...............................................................................10 1.6. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01............................................................................11 1.7. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03.................................................................................12 1.8. Radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal......................................................................13 1.9. Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB.........................................................................................14 1.10. Radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K ...............................................................................15 1.11. Spectrometer MKS AT 6101 ........................................................................................16 1.12. Survey identifier (Smartphone) PM1802.........................................................................17 1.13. Semiconductor spectrometer SKS-50..............................................................................19 1.14. InSpector 1000.................................................................................................................20 1.15. Spectrometer IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target) .................................................................22 1.16. Identifier Exploranium GR-135 Radioactive Isotope Identification Device ................23 2. ESTABLISHING THE LIST OF MOST FREQUENTLY SHIPPED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS ...........................................................................25 3. SYSTEMATIZATION THE DESIGN INFORMATION OF STANDARD SHIPPING CONTAINERS FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS...............................28 4. TEST MEASUREMENT PROGRAM .....................................................................................32 4.1. General provisions .............................................................................................................32 4.2. Test conditions used for gamma-sources...........................................................................33 4.3. Test conditions used for neutron sources...........................................................................33 4.4. Requirements to the means of control ...............................................................................34 4.5. Requirements to radioactive and nuclear materials ...........................................................34 5. CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPORT INDEX OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHIPPED IN VARIOUS SHIPPING PACKING CONTAINERS ..................35 6. IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHIPPED IN VARIOUS SHIPPED PACKING CONTAINERS ..................................................................41 6.1. Experimentations in 2003 at RRC Kurchatov Institute on the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides........................................................................................41 6.2. Experimentations in 2005 at RRC Kurchatov Institute on the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides........................................................................................43 6.2.1. Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials in various packaging containers..45 6.2.2. Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials in their various combinations......54 6.2.3. Detection of nuclear materials by neutron emission ...................................................55 6.3. Additional processing of spectra using software ...............................................................57 6.3. Summary on capabilities of the devices for identification of nuclear and radioactive materials ............................................................................................................................81 6.3.1. Spectrometer InSpector 1000 ......................................................................................81 6.3.2. Spectrometer MKS AT 6101....................................................................................81 6.3.3. Spectrometer MKS-A03 ..............................................................................................81 6.3.4. Spectrometer IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target).............................................................82 6.3.5. Spectrometer Exploranium GR-135 ............................................................................83 6.3.6. Spectrometer MKS-PM1401K ....................................................................................83 6.3.7. Spectrometer Smartphone PM1802.............................................................................84 CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................................84
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ABBREVIATIONS ADC analogue-to-digital converter; FRM fissionable and radioactive materials; GS gamma-sources; IR ionizing radiation; SIR source of ionizing radiation; IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency; EDR equivalent dose rate; SW software; TAP total absorption peak; SCD semiconductor detector; PRC primary radiation control; FWHP full width at half peak; SPC shipping packaging container; FCS Federal Customs Service; NM nuclear materials.

1. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HAND-HELD DEVICES FOR DETERMINATION OF TRANSPORT INDEX AND VERIFICATION OF SHIELDED SOURCES 1.1. Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401
Survey microprocessor-based dosimeter DRS-PM1401 is intended for survey (detection and identification) of radioactive materials by recording gamma-rays emitted by them. The device is recommended for control of shipped nuclear and radioactive materials under conditions of sea and river ports, railway and motor transport, pedestrian and transport portals.

Fig. 1.1. Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401. Dosimeter measures the equivalent gamma-radiation dose rate. It is graduated in Sv/h units. The principal feature of the device is the detector (scintillator) type. The sensitivity of the detector is much higher for low energies (the sensitivity at the energy of 5060 keV is higher by the order of magnitude then that for 1.53.0 MeV). It makes possible to detect nuclear materials (NM) most efficiently. The scintillation unit of PM 1401 consists of CsI(Tl) scintillator, photodiode, and transducer amplifier. The vibrating indicator is withdrawn off the casing. It is connected to the dosimeter through the cable, and it induces mechanic shocks inside the indicator at the exceeding the certain operation threshold in the search mode. It makes possible to detect gamma-sources secretly or operate in very noisy conditions. The sound indicator is intended to alarm at the exceeding the preset alarm level in the testing and search modes. The sound indicator is disabled when the vibration indicator is switched on. The information on the test results, mode of operation, and measuring results in the test and search modes is displayed on the LCD panel. Three basic modes of dosimeter operation are 1) the testing, 2) calibration against background, and 3) search modes. Two additional modes are used for setting the standard deviation (n coefficient) and for the power supply control. The transition between various modes is handled sequentially and automatically. The testing mode starts just after power-up and used for testing the basic units of the device, especially, LCD, sound indicator, and processor. After successful testing (it takes about 7 seconds) the dosimeter passes to the calibration against background mode. But before this mode, LCD displays the value of standard deviation (n coefficient) set at the previous operation. Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Measuring time Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight 20% 0.063 MeV 0.25 sec From 30 to +50 C 22 x 82 x 120 mm 400 g

1.2. Survey device ISP-PM1401K-1

Survey dosimeter-radiometer MKS-PM1401K is designed for searching, detecting and localizing radioactive and nuclear materials by means of registering gamma- and x-rays (hereinafter referred to as the photon), neutron, alpha- and beta-rays, measuring the equivalent dose rate (EDR) of photon radiation, density of alpha- and beta-particles flow (control over the surface contamination), accumulating and storing gamma-spectra. MKS-PM1401K is a combination of a detector unit and processing unit (moderator of neutrons) designed to be hand-held. The processing unit is constructively and electrically connected to the detector unit. The device is shock-resistant and water-resistant, as it is designed to be operated in severe conditions. The dosimeter belongs to portable means of measurement of ionizing radiation and can be operated both in the laboratory and in the field environment. The dosimeter is designed as a portable device, with the front panel equipped with an LCD panel, four-button keyboard, IrDA port, and a removable clip. On the dosimeter top end side there is a scintillating detector of the scintillating detector unit. On the dosimeter back side there is Geiger-Muller counter of the gamma-ray detection unit with removable filters used for measuring alpha-, beta- or gamma-radiation, as well as spacer rings used for measuring alpha-, beta- or gamma-radiation. Neutron radiation detector of the neutron detection unit is located inside the dosimeter. On the dosimeter bottom end side there are: a socket to connect vibrating alarm indicator, audio alarm indicator, and a replaceable cover of the battery compartment, where a battery is located.

Fig. 1.2. Survey radiometer-spectrometer DRS-PM1401K. Device specifications

Energy dependency relative to the energy of 662 keV (Cs-137) in the photon radiation measurement mode within: - in the energy range between 0.015 and 0.045 MeV - in the energy range between 0.045 and 20.0 MeV Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Count time in the following modes: - search mode - calibration mode Operating temperature range Weight

40% 30% 152,000 keV 2 sec 36 sec From 30 to +500 C 0.65 kg

Various types of ionizing radiation are measured using the built-in detector units.
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EDR of photon radiation and the density of alpha- and beta-particles flow are measured using the built-in all-purpose detector unit based on the Geiger-Muller counter. Neutron radiation (count speed) is recorded using the built-in neutron radiation detector unit based on the slow neutron counter. Photon radiation (count speed) is recorded in the search mode using the detector unit based on the CsI scintillator. The same detector unit is used to record scintillation spectra of photon radiation. Each detector unit is operated by separate microprocessor controllers, whose information is transferred to the main microprocessor controller. The operation modes are selected and the dosimeter is programmed using a four-button keyboard through the screen menu. Measurement results and dosimeter operation modes are displayed on the LCD panel. If connected to a PC the operation modes are selected, the dosimeter is programmed, and the measurement results are transferred to the PC using an IrDA-compatible interface or a radio channel through Bluetooth. Dosimeter-radiometer MKS-PM1401K has the following basic operation modes: Testing mode (testing); Calibration mode (calibration); Menu display mode (menu); Search for gamma-ray and neutron sources (, n search); Neutron registration mode (n registration); Mode of search for gamma- alpha- and beta-ray sources (, , search); Mode of measurement of EDR of photon radiation ( measurement); Mode of measurement of density of alpha- and beta-particles flow (, measurement); Mode of registration of scintillation spectra of photon radiation (spectrum); Settings mode (settings); PC connection mode (IR exchange, Bluetooth).

The dosimeter monitors power voltage in any of the operation modes. LCD panel backlight is available in any of the dosimeter operation modes. Survey dosimeter-radiometer MKS-PM1401K has a pre-installed library with the following isotopes: for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, Np-237, Pu-239, Pu-241), for medical isotopes (Cr-51, Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-125, I-123, I-131, Tl-201, Xe-133), for industrial isotopes (Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Nl-204, Se-75, Ra-226, Am-241), for naturally occurring isotopes (K-40, Ra-226, Th-232 and daughters, U-238 and daughters. Complementary subgroup isotopes: (Bl-207, Cd-139, Eu-152, Ir-192, Mn-54, Na-22, Sn-113, Na-22, Th-228, Tl-44, Y-88, Zn-65).

MKS-PM1401K has the Cs-137 calibration source located inside the detector casing, which makes manual calibration unnecessary each time before starting spectrometric measurements. Minimization of an operators actions and the device operation simplicity in the express analysis mode are the main advantages of the device.

1.3. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1621

Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1621 is intended for continuous measurement of equivalent dose rate of external gamma- and X-radiation; continuous measurement of time for dose acquisition; continuous measurement of equivalent dose of external gamma- and X-radiation; transfer of obtained data stored in permanent memory to PC through the IR adapter.

The transition between various modes is handled sequentially and automatically. The testing mode starts just after power-up and used for testing the basic units of the device, especially, LCD, sound indicator, and processor

Fig. 1.3. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1621. Device specifications

Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight 30% 0.0120 MeV 5 sec From 20 to +60 C 87 x 72 x 60 mm 150 g

1.4. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1203

Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1203 is intended for measurement of equivalent dose rate (EDR) of external gamma-radiation; measurement of equivalent dose of external gamma-radiation; setting of alarm threshold of equivalent dose rate and equivalent dose. At crossing this threshold, the sound alarm is switched on. measurement of time for dose acquisition. tranfer of obtained data stored in permanent memory to PC through the IR adapter.

The built-in time indicator advances serviceability. The device is graduated in International units of equivalent dose (mSv) and equivalent dose rate (mSv/h). The accompanying sound and current time indication are provided. These devices are used for primary radiation monitoring and personal radiation control by custom officers.

Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Measuring time (automatically set) Operating temperature range 25% 0.061.5 MeV 1-36 sec From 20 to +60 C

The current equivalent dose rate is continuously displayed on LCD panel in the equivalent dose rate measurement mode. In the equivalent dose measurement mode, the LCD panel displays the value of equivalent dose obtained from time of power up, time of threshold setting or time of threshold crossing. At crossing the equivalent dose rate threshold, the device induces sound alarm and passes to the equivalent dose rate measurement mode. The device alarms until the equivalent dose rate will decrease below the threshold or the higher threshold will be set.

Fig. 1.4. Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1203.

1.5. X-ray and gamma dosimeter EL-1119

X-ray and gamma dosimeter EL-1119 is the multifunctional sensitive broad-band hand-held device with digital indication and microprocessor control. It is used for control of X-ray devices, inspection of luggage, goods, and for primary and additional radiation control of goods and carriers. The dosimeter is intended for measurements of: exposure dose rate; rate of dose absorbed in air; equivalent dose rate of gamma- and X-ray; exposure dose; dose absorbed in air;
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equivalent dose of gamma- and X-ray.

Fig. 1.5. X-ray and gamma dosimeter EL-1119. Device specifications

Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight 35% 203000 keV No more then 30 sec From 30 to +40 C 220 x 80 x 60 mm 800 g

1.6. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01

Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01 consists of main MKS-A02 unit with built-in gammaand neutron channels and remote alpha- and beta-detectors BDK-AB1. The device can be powered from 220 V or, optionally, from built-in accumulators to use it as hand- held device. The total weight of the radiometer is 3.6 kg. The device is operated with the keyboard on the front panel providing rather simple and informative menu. In the search mode, MKS-A02 uses both neutron and gamma-channels. MKS-A02 permits to measure exposure dose rate from neutron sources (Pu-Be only) as well as from gamma-ray sources. Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: At the identification mode At all other modes Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight No more then 8% 503000 keV No more then 30 min No more then 2 min From 20 to +50 C 290 x 160 x 135 mm 3.6 kg

The reference Th-232 gamma-source (included in the device kit) is used for the device calibration. The nuclide library in the memory of MKS-A02 can be refreshed and expended with data on gamma-rays emission of various nuclides. It makes possible to identify unknown nuclides in a short time if the data on these nuclides are in the library. The typical library for the custom control includes the following nuclides: Th232, Pu239, Ga67, I131, Cs137, Co60,
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Ra226, U233, U235, U238, Bi207, In111, Tl201, Pd103, Ba133, K40, Co57, Th99m, Am241, Y88. Optionally, the spectrum can be transferred to the external PC for analysis with the special software. In this case, MKS-A02 is operating as a full-scale spectrometer of Gamma 1C/NB type. The surface alpha- and beta-radioactivity are measured with the remote BDK-AB1 detector inserted with the cable to the special connector on the front panel of the device. The alpha- and beta-particles are recorded simultaneously, and the device does not need any special calibration. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02 is well adjusted for measuring the isotopic composition of the inspected object. For small size sources (when the source activity is low enough that it can be unpacked), MKS-A02 can define the isotopic composition and assess the activity of each nuclide with use of special software (supplied with the device).

1.7. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03

The radiometer consists of main MKS-A03 unit with built-in gamma- and neutron channels. The device can be powered from 220 V or, optionally, from built-in accumulators (providing for 16 hours of continuous operation) to use it as a quite convenient hand-held device. The radiometer is designed as a compact portable device with the front panel equipped with an LCD display, functional buttons, LED indicators, power adapter socket, and interface cable socket. The functional buttons designation depends upon the pre-installed software. Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: In the identification mode In all other modes Operating temperature range Weight No more than 8% 503,000 keV Not specified No more than 30 min No more than 2 min From 20 to +500 C 3 kg

In the search mode, MKS-A03 uses both neutron and gamma-channels simultaneously. MKS-A03 permits to measure equivalent dose rate from neutron sources (Pu-Be sources only) as well as from gamma-ray sources. The reference Th-232 gamma-source (included in the device kit) is used for the device calibration. One or several nuclide libraries can be added into the memory of MKS-A02 and expanded, as required, with data on gamma-rays emission of various nuclides. It makes possible to accurately identify nuclides in an unknown sample within a short time if the data on energy peaks of these nuclides are in the library. The library to be used for the express analysis includes the following nuclides: Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-131, Tl-201, Ag-110m, Bi-207, Cd-109, Cr-51, Na-22, Co-57, Co-57, Co-58, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-134, Cs-137, Eu-152, Eu-155, Fe-59, K-40, Mn-54, Se-75, Ir-192, Ra-226, Th-232, Am-241, U-238, Zn-65, U-233, U-235, Pu-239, Np-237, Pu-240. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03 is sufficiently well adjusted for measuring the isotopic composition of the inspected object. For small size sources (when the source activity is low enough that it can be unpacked), after measuring gamma-spectrum MKS-A03 can define the isotopic composition of the sample and assess the activity of each nuclide with the use of special software (supplied with the device). The radiometer has the following operation modes to search for gamma-ray and neutron sources and measure equivalent dose rate: Search/EDR, Analysis and Monitor. The radiometer enters the Search/EDR mode after being switched on. In this mode, it continuously measures and displays an equivalent dose rate of gamma-ray and neutron sources.
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Equivalent dose rates are presented both graphically and digitally. The measurement unit is Sv/h. The search is enabled by histograms in the bottom part of the display showing the nature of changes in the count speed of gamma-ray and neutron detectors. Count speed-dependent audio and visual alarm is available to simplify search procedures.

Fig. 1.6. Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03. In the Analysis mode the radiometer measures gamma-spectrum, searches for peaks in the spectrum and compares the positions of the identified peaks with the library data. In case of an exact match, the radionuclide name and type (industrial, natural or medical) is displayed. In the Monitor mode the radiometer continuously measures count speeds (in p/sec) for gammaray and neutron detectors, compares them with threshold values and switches on visual and audio alarm at crossing them. Threshold values are calculated during the calibration against background. In the search mode, the device constantly makes 1-second-long measurements and calculates count speeds for gamma-ray and neutron channels. The first 20 measurements are averaged to assess the count speed for the background and calculate the detection threshold (3 sigmas above the background), whereas the next measurements are compared against the threshold. Audio or visual alarm is switched on at crossing the count speed threshold. If the frequency of the indicator response increases to a level making any further frequency increase undetectable, one should pass to the next measurement range by pressing B and C buttons for gamma- and neutron radiation, respectively. The radiometer continuously measures an equivalent dose rate. The measured values are displayed in the Search/EDR mode.

1.8. Radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal

The device is intended for detection and identification of fissile and radioactive materials at the custom inspection or for use in the Customs mobile posts of radiating control (CMPRC), and also for the personal radiating safety control. The program incorporated in RSU-01 provides the following operations: Search of sources of ionizing radiation by external gamma- or neutron radiation. Definition of the source activity directly in-situ with the gamma-detection block. Definition of specific activity of inspected object.

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Definition of equivalent doze rate of gamma- and neutron radiation. Definition of density of alpha, beta particles and neutron fluxes.

In the "express analysis" mode the device allows to identify and determine activity of the following nuclides: s-137, h-232, Ra-226, K-40. The measured spectrum can be written down as a file and then analyzed with the special software at the external computer. In this case the radiometer is operating as a full-scale spectrometer of Gamma 1C/NB type. With the software "LsrmCustoms" the following problems can be also solved: measurement of open source activity, measurement of activity of the source inside the protective transport container, the expanded search of nuclides and their identification.

Fig.1.7. Radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal. Device specifications

Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight No more then 35% 2003000 keV No more then 15 min From 20 to +40 C 180 x 140 x 75 mm 1.5 kg

1.9. Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB

Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB is the portable hand-held gamma-spectrometer in dust-and-water proof embodiment. It is designed to work with a laptop computers. The spectrometer is based on the principle of transformation of gamma-ray energy to the electric pulses of proportional amplitude. The electric pulses are recorded by the multichannel peak analyzer and processed on a laptop computer. Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB is intended for: - search of sources of gamma-radiation; measurements of equivalent doze rate of gamma-radiation; measurements of effective specific activity of natural nuclides; measurements of gamma-spectrum; the analysis of the measured spectrum; storages of the measured data in non-volatile memory; data exchange with a computer.

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The device can be used for inspection of legally transported fissile materials with known parameters and isotope structure, and illegally trafficking materials with unknown isotope structure. Opening of transport and security packages is not required. The spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB provides the mode of searching the radioactive sources and measurements of exposure dose rate of gamma-rays. It allows using the spectrometer as the survey device for the additional radiation control and the profound radiation inspection. Besides, it can be applied for the express analysis of radiating cargo. For that task, the nuclide library in the memory of MKS-A02 can be refreshed and expended with data on gamma-rays emission of various nuclides. It makes possible to identify unknown nuclides in a short time if the data on these nuclides are in the library. The library for the custom control includes the following nuclides: Th232, Pu239, Ga67, I131, Cs137, Co60, Ra226, U233, U235, U238, Bi207, In111, Tl201, Pd103, Ba133, K40, Co57, Th99m, Am241, Y88. Optionally, the spectrum can be transferred to the external PC for analysis with the use of special software.

Fig. 1.8. Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB.

Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: Operating temperature range Weight 8% 503000 keV No more then 30 min From 20 to +50 C 20 kg

The spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB is supplied with the laptop computer with the specialized software for determination of isotopic composition and nuclide activity inside the special shipping packing container. Moreover, the software allows controlling the enrichment of uranium and uranium compounds without opening the transport containers and packages.

1.10. Radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K

Radiometer-spectrometer consists of main PM1401K unit with built-in gamma- , alpha- , betaand neutron channels and minicomputer PAL. The device can be powered from 220 V or from built-in accumulators to use it as hand-held device. The total weight of the radiometer is 0.65 kg. The device is operated with the keyboard on the front panel providing rather simple and informative menu. In the search mode, PM1401K can employ neutron and gamma-channels simultaneously. PM1401K allows to measure exposure dose rate of gamma-rays, flux density of alpha- and betaparticles. The built-in Cs-137 source of gamma radiation incorporated in the device casing is used for calibration.
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PM1401K can be used for nuclide identification. For express analysis, the memory of device contains more than 40 spectrums of gamma-emission of various nuclides. In the expert mode the measured spectrum can be written down as a file and then analyzed with the special software installed on the external computer. In this case the radiometer is operating as a full-scale spectrometer. Device specifications
Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: At the identification mode At all other modes Operating temperature range Overall dimensions Weight No more then 7% 153000 keV No more then 30 min No more then 2 min From 20 to +50 C 290 x 160 x 135 mm 0.65 kg

The measurements of surface alpha- and beta-radioactivity need not any additional calibration. Radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K is well adjusted for measuring the isotopic composition of the inspected object. It can assess the activity of identified nuclide at the known thickness of the transport package shielding.

1.11. Spectrometer MKS AT 6101

Spectrometer MKS AT 6101 is a portable gamma-radiation spectrometer. The spectrometer is based on the principle of transformation of gamma-ray energy falling within the sensitivity of the scintillating detector into the electric pulses of proportional amplitude, which are then recorded by the peak analyzer and processed by a computer. Spectrometer MKS AT 6101 is intended for: Search of gamma-sources; Radionuclide identification; Measurements of gamma-ray energy distribution; Equivalent gamma-radiation dose rate.

The MKS-AT6101 detector unit consists of NaI(Tl) scintillator. The detector is withdrawn off the casing and is connected to the spectrometer through the cable. Four basic modes of the spectrometer operation are: calibration against background, search, identification of radioactive isotopes, and spectrum. The transition between various modes is handled manually. The K-40 gamma-source (included in the device kit) is used for the device calibration. The spectrometric information is displayed on the LCD panel with a backlight function and resolution of 12864. There is an audio and visual alarm available, which is switched on at crossing the dose rate threshold during the search for gamma radionuclides and their identification. Spectrometric measurement of the dose rate is available using the Spectrum-dose transformation operator. Continuous automatic stabilization of the spectrometer energy scale is available using lightemitting diodes. Digital compensation of the spectrometric channel is available using the incorporated temperature sensor. The memory allows recording and storing up to 300 spectra.
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Fig. 1.9. Radiometer-spectrometer AT 6101. Device specifications

Energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Weight No more than 9% 201,500 keV Not specified From 20 to +500 C Less than 1.5 kg

MKS-AT6101 has a pre-installed library with the following isotopes: for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, Np-237, Pu-239, Pu-241), for medical isotopes (Cr-51, Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-125, I-123, I-131, Tl-201, Xe-133), for industrial isotopes (Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Nl-204, Se-75, Ra-226, Am-241), for naturally occurring isotopes (K-40, Ra-226, Th-232 and daughters, U-238 and daughters. Complementary subgroup isotopes: (Bl-207, Cd-139, Eu-152, Ir-192, Mn-54, Na-22, Sn-113, Na-22, Th-228, Tl-44, Y-88, Zn-65).

1.12. Survey identifier (Smartphone) PM1802

Two-channel survey device for the detection and identification of fissionable and radioactive materials PM1802, designed as a mobile phone (Smartphone) with identification and remote communication functions. The device features include: Serviceable by one specialist. Simultaneous gamma- and neutron radiation detection. Timer/counter mode for neutron and gamma-channels aimed at improving detection efficiency. Durable, designed to be used outdoors in a broad range of temperature and humidity conditions. Display backlight providing for operation in the darkness; also readable in bright sunlight. Battery charge is sufficient for at least 8 hours of continuous operation. Automatic (convenient) and manual (for specialists) operation modes, their switcher having special protection.

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Fig. 1.10. Survey identifier ISP-PM1802 Device specifications

Energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy (based on a special order) Actuation time Operating temperature range Weight 7.5% 253000 keV From 20 to +500 C 0.24 kg

Spectrum analyzer features of the monitor: At least 1,000 analog-to-digital converter (ADC) channels. Stabilization of dependency from the energy (e.g. that of temperature sensor, LED or radioactive source, and recalibration mode in the presence of naturally occurring radionuclides). Linearization of dependency from the energy for scintillating detectors. Energy calibration adjustment using a radioactive source, preferably a naturally occurring isotope. Memory for at least 50 spectra with 1,000 channels in each. Standard industrial PC connection, standard spectral data format. User-friendly PC-support software designed for specialists. Internal memory and PC connection. PC connection using standard interface with communications devices (e.g. RS232, USB, IR or WIFI, the port is protected from water drops) or adaptation with a PC-based device. Data transferability to another device, in particular using the mobile phone radio channel. It is desirable to store at least 100 measured values of alarm signal (e.g. date and time, signal value, etc.). Standardized information stored in a file, including all the relevant settings and diagnostic data, as well as measurement results.

Smartphone PM1802 has a pre-installed library with the following isotopes: for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, Np-237, Pu-239, Pu-241), for medical isotopes (Cr-51, Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-125, I-123, I-131, Tl-201, Xe-133), for industrial isotopes (Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Nl-204, Se-75, Ra-226, Am-241) and for naturally occurring isotopes (K-40, Ra-226, Th-232 and daughters, U-238 and daughters. Complementary subgroup isotopes: Bl-207, Cd-139, Eu-152, Ir-192, Mn-54, Na-22, Sn-113, Na-22, Th-228, Tl-44, Y-88, Zn-65).
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1.13. Semiconductor spectrometer SKS-50

Spectrometer SKS-50 is the most modern and powerful spectrometer available to custom control services. It is used for: - identification and control of activity of radioisotope sources crossing the customs border of Russian Federations in protective containers of shipping packing container (SPC) type and without them; control of enrichment degree of uranium compounds in protective containers of SPC type and without them; definition of nuclide composition of plutonium samples in protective containers and without them.

The software of the spectrometer provides automatic and manual modes of processing and analysis of the information in-situ.

Fig. 1.11. Spectrometer SKS-50. Device specifications

Relative energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line. Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time: Operating temperature range Weight 8% 503000 keV No more then 30 min From 20 to +50 C No more than 20 kg

The -50 system allows to define required parameters of radioactive and fissile materials inside SPC with the following accuracy: the error of definition of activity of radioactive materials in the range from 3 to 30% (depends on the nuclide and container types (the error of definition of activity depends on the decay scheme, completeness of the description of a controllable source, contaminations in the basic controllable material, completeness of data on time of manufacturing of controllable material, position of the source in the container, completeness of the description of parameters of the container, degree of conformity of the real container to its description, degree of external and internal pollution of the container with unwanted radioactive substances, etc.), the error of definition of enrichment of uranium from the uranium-235 isotope lays in the range from 0,5 up to 5% for well determined samples and items, for other 1015% (depends on completeness of data on physical parameters of measured material, the sizes of measured object, completeness of the description of parameters of the container, degree of conformity of the real container to its description, degree of external and internal pollution of the container with unwanted radioactive substances, etc.),
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 the error of definition of isotopic composition of plutonium from the plutonium-239 isotope lays in the range from 2 up to 5% (depends on completeness of data on physical parameters of measured material, the sizes of measured object, completeness of the description of parameters of the container, degree of conformity of the real container to its description, etc.) The -50 system is a gamma-ray spectrometer with high metrological and operational parameters. The spectrometer is equipped with the software package for qualitative and quantitative processing of complex gamma-spectrum. The usage of germanium detector provides high selectivity of recording individual gamma lines from which the nuclides are identified. The nuclide activity, enrichment of uranium and isotope composition of plutonium are determined through the quantitative processing of gamma-spectrum.

1.14. InSpector 1000

InSpector 1000 is a digital multi-channel analyzer, which can be used in field operations for: Search of radioactive sources; Measurements of equivalent dose rate (EDR) of gamma-radiation; Nuclide identification and measurements of effective specific activity level; Measurements of gamma-spectra; Analysis of the measured spectra; Storage of the measured data in non-volatile memory; Data exchange with a computer.

Fig. 1.12. Radiometer-spectrometer (identifier) CanberraInSpector 1000. The analyzer measures equivalent dose rate of gamma-radiation and is graduated in the following user-selectable units: Sv/h, mSv/h, R/h, mR/h, R/h, rem, and mrem. The detector unit consists of NaI scintillator, high voltage source, and transducer amplifier. Four basic modes of the device operation are: dose, search, nuclide identification, and spectrum. There is also an additional mode: adjustment. The Dose mode displays both the instant dose rate and the accumulated dose in one of the several display modes in such units as sieverts, roentgens or rems. If any other operation mode is on, all the functions of the Dose mode are still performed in the background mode, such as: continuous calculation of the dose and dose rate, monitoring of the alarm and warning thresholds, and activation of the alarm and warning signals at crossing this threshold.
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The dose rate display mode is operator-selectable and includes a simple, expanded, energy, logarithmic, and linear form. The Search mode displays a time-dependent histogram of the radiation rate registered by the device allowing for the localization of radioactive sources. The operator can also select a linear diagram of count speed or dose rate in this mode. At crossing the alarm threshold for the dose rate or the accumulated dose, the color of the linear scale changes and an audio alarm is signaled. The Nuclides mode provides for real-time identification of radioactive isotopes and calculation of their activity level in Bq or Ci. The results of the isotope identification are summarized in a table, while the selection of an advanced report form displays a linear indicator of the dose rate as well. The data contained in the advanced report can be sorted by atomic numbers in an ascending order, by data in a descending order, or by the magnitude of error in an ascending order. The Spectrum mode allows for acquiring and processing radionuclide spectra. If the first column is selected records are sorted by atomic numbers. The analyzer supports two types of spectra: directly acquired data (live spectrum) and data loaded from a file (previously acquired and saved spectrum). If two or more nuclides generate peaks with approximately the same energy, InSpector is unable to determine, which of the nuclides has caused the peak. In this case the ? sign is displayed in front of the nuclide name. The Adjustment mode allows for establishing the general system parameters and customized parameters for each of the four measurement modes. The device software envisages automated and manual processing and analysis of the information directly acquired at the place of measurement. Device specifications
Energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Weight 503,000 keV Not specified From 10 to +550 C Less than 2.2 kg

InSpector 1000 has the following pre-installed libraries: Nal-NORM.nlb for natural radionuclides (K-40, Ra-226, Th-232, U-235, U-238), Nal-SNM.nlb for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu-239), Naldemo.nlb for a typical mixed gamma-source (Co-57, Co-60, Sr-85, Y-88, Cd-109, Sn-113, Cs-137, Ce-139, Hg-203), Nal-MED.nlb for medical nuclides (Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-131, Xe-133, Ir-192, Tl-201), Nal-PeakLocate.nlb limiting the search of peaks for specified nuclides (Co-60, Cs-137) Nal-INDU.nlb for industrial nuclides (Na-22, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Eu-152, Ir-192, Ra-226, Th-232, Am-241), Nal-ANSI.nlb complying with the ANSI 42.34 standard (Ra, Th, K-40, Co-57, Co-60, Ga-67, Tc-99m, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-131, Ba-133, Xe-133, Cs-137, Tl-201, U-233, U-235, Np-237, U-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Pu-241). The advantages of the device include a multi-color sensor display and an ergonomic six-button keyboard, which allows easily selecting any of the operation modes and switching between the modes by pressing one button.

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Its disadvantages include the need to constantly re-calibrate the device during its operation to obtain correct measurements.

1.15. Spectrometer IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target)

The device consists of the main unit with built-in gamma- and neutron channels and is a digital multi-channel analyzer, which can be used in field operations for: Search of radioactive sources; Measurements of equivalent dose rate (EDR) of gamma-radiation; Nuclide identification and measurements of effective specific activity level; Measurements of gamma-spectra; Analysis of the measured spectra; Storage of the measured data in non-volatile memory; Data exchange with a computer.

In the search mode, the device uses both neutron and gamma-channels simultaneously. The device can be powered from 220 V or, optionally, from built-in accumulators (providing for 10 hours of continuous operation) to use it as a quite convenient hand-held device. The radiometer is designed as a compact portable device with the front panel equipped with an LCD display, 4 sensor buttons, LED indicators, as well as a power adapter socket and interface cable socket, which are located at its side. Measurement ranges of equivalent dose rate are from 10 nSv/h to 1 Sv/h and from 1 rem/h to 100 rem/h. Dose measurement ranges are from 10 nSv/h to 1 Sv/h and from 1 rem/h to 100 rem/h.

Fig. 1.13. Spectrometer (identifier) IdentiFINDER with NaI detector. The detector unit consists of NaI (Tl) scintillator, photoelectronic multiplier, spectrometric amplifier, and power unit. The spectrometer has the following basic operation modes to search for gamma-ray and neutron sources and measure equivalent dose rate: test, search, identification of radioactive isotopes, and spectrum analysis. The transition between various modes is handled manually. The spectrometric information is displayed on the LCD panel with a backlight function and resolution of 6143. There is an audio and visual alarm available, which is switched on at crossing the dose rate threshold during the search for gamma radionuclides and their identification.

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Temperature stabilization function is incorporated into the device. The memory allows recording and storing up to 100 spectra. Device specifications:
Energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Weight 203,000 keV From 15 to +550 C Less than 1.25 kg

IdentiFINDER (Target) has the following pre-installed libraries: for local inspectors (Ba-140, Cd-115, Ce-141, Ce-144, I-132, La-140, Mo-190, Nb-95, Nd-147, Pr-144, Nuc Pu, Ru-103, Sb-125, Te-132, Xe-131m, Med Xe-131, Xe-133m, Xe135, Zr-95, Med I-131, Tc-99m, Ga-67), for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, Pu-239), customs library (Med Xe-133, Med I-131, Med Tc99m, Med Ga-67, Med In-111, Med Pd-103, Med Tl-201, Am-241, Ba-133, Bi-207, Co-57, Co-60, Cs-134, Cs-137, Eu-152, K-40, Mn-54, Na-22, Ra-226, Th-232, U-238, Pu-239, U-233, U-235, Np-237), for medical nuclides (Ga-67, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-131, Tl-201), for industrial nuclides (Ag-110m, Bi-207, Cd-109, Cr-51, Na-22, Co-57, Co-57, Co-58, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-134, Cs-137, Cs-137, Eu-152, Eu-155, Fe-59, K-40, Mn-54, Se-75, Ir-192, Ra-226, Th-232, Am-241, U-238, Zn-65), for security (Nuc Pu, Med Xe-133, Med I-131, Med Tc-99m, Ga-67, Med I-123, Med I-125, Med In-111, Med Tl-201, Am-241, Ba-133, Bi-207, Co-57, Co-60, Cs-134, Cs-137, Eu-152, Ir-192, K-40, Mn-54, Na-22, Ra-226, Se-75, Th-232, Nuc U-238, Nuc U-233, Nuc U-235, Nuc Pu, DU-238, Nuc Np-237, Nuc Pu-240).

1.16. Identifier Exploranium GR-135 Radioactive Isotope Identification Device

This is a radioactive isotope identification device which can be used in field operations for: Search of radioactive sources; Measurements of equivalent dose rate (EDR) of gamma-radiation; Nuclide identification and measurements of effective specific activity level; Measurements of gamma-spectra; Analysis of the measured spectra; Storage of the measured data in non-volatile memory; Data exchange with a computer.

23

Fig. 1.14. Identifier Exploranium GR-135 Radioactive Isotope Identification Device. The device can be powered from 220 V or, optionally, from built-in accumulators (providing for 8 hours of continuous operation) to use it as a quite convenient hand-held device. The radiometer is designed as a compact portable device with the front panel equipped with an LCD display, one-button joystick switch, with a power adapter socket, and interface cable socket located at its side, and LED indicators located on the docking station. Measurement ranges of equivalent dose rate are from 1 R/h to 1 R/h or from 10 nSv/h to 10 mSv/h. Dose measurement ranges are from 1 R/h to 1 R/h or from 10 nSv/h to 10 mSv/h. The detector unit consists of NaI scintillator and Geiger-Muller counter. A neutron detector (solid state lithium glass) and cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector can be attached. The spectrometer has the following basic operation modes: search, identification of radioactive isotopes, stabilization, and spectrum analysis. The transition between various modes is handled manually. The spectrometric information is displayed on the LCD panel with a backlight function and resolution of 6565. There is an audio and visual alarm available, which is switched on at crossing the dose rate threshold during the search for gamma radionuclides and their identification. Temperature stabilization function is incorporated into the device. Device specifications
Energy resolution by the 662 keV (Cs-137) gamma-line Range of recorded gamma-ray energy Actuation time Operating temperature range Weight No more than 9% 503,000 keV From 10 to +500 C 2.4 kg

The reference Cs-137 gamma-source (included in the device kit) is used for the calibration. Exploranium GR-135 has a pre-installed 2-level library of nuclides: for special nuclear materials (U-233, U-235, Pu-239) and others (Bi-207, Cf-252, Cd-109, Ce-139, Cr-51, DEP-U, Eu-152, Eu-154, F-18, Fe-59, Ir-192, Kr-85, Mn-54, Mo-99, Na-22, Na-24, Pd-103, Se-75, Sm-153, Ra-226, Th-232, K-40, Co-57, Co-58,Co-60, Ga-67, Tc-99m, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-129, I-131, Ba-133, Xe-133, Sr-85, Y-88, Y-90m, Cd-109, Sn-113, Ce-139, Cs-137, Tl-201, U-233, U-235, Np-237, U-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Pu-241).
24

2. ESTABLISHING THE LIST OF MOST FREQUENTLY SHIPPED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Practice of custom registration and custom control of fissile and radioactive materials for last years shows that more than 50 types of fissile and radioactive materials cross the customs border of Russian Federation annually. The list of these isotopes is shown in theTable 2.1. Table 2.1. List of fissile and radioactive materials crossing the customs border of Russian Federation. n/n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Nuclide designation Americium 241 Americium 243 Actinium 225 Barium 133 Bismuth 207 Carbon 14 Calcium 45 Cadmium 109 Cerium 139 Cerium 144 Californium 252 Curium 244 Cobalt 56 Cobalt 57 Cobalt 58 Cobalt 60 Chromium 51 Cesium 137 Iron 55 Iron 59 Gallium 67 Gallium 68 Gadolinium 153 Germanium 68 Tritium Iodine 124 Iodine 125 Iodine 129 Indium 113 Iridium 192 Potassium 40 Krypton 85 Nuclide Symbol 241 Am 243 Am 225 Ac 133 Ba 207 Bi 14 C 45 Ca 109 Cd 139 Ce 144 Ce 252 Cf 244 Cm 56 Co 57 Co 58 Co 60 Co 51 Cr 137 Cs 55 Fe 59 Fe 67 Ga 68 Ga 153 Gd 68 Ge 3 H 124 I 125 I 129 I 113 In 192 Ir
40 85

Half-life 433 years 7.38103 years 10 days 10.7 years 38.0 years 5730 years 163 days 453 days 140 days 284 days 2.64 years 18 years 77 days 270 days 71 days 5.25 years 27.8 days 30 years 2.72 years 45 days 3.26 days 288 days 242 days 288 days 12.34 years 4.18 days 60 days 1.57107 years 130 days 74 days 1.28109 years

Exempt activity in SPC of A type (Ci) 0.008 0.008 0.003 10 10 100 40 70 100 7 0.002 0.01 5 90 20 7 600 9 1000 10 7 7 100 1000 1000 100 70 2 60 20 10

Kr
25

The List of Shipped Isotopes

100

Ratio, % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20

25,11

0,42 0,84 5,19 0,42 0,84 8,84 9,40

10,94 8,70 5,89 2,95 1,68 6,31 5,05 2,95 15,29 0,56
Am-241 Ni-63 0,00 I-125 P-33

10,38

Mn-54

Co-60

Tc-99m

Ru-106

Th-232

C-14

Na-22

Sr-89

Cs-137

H-3

Cm-244

Ba-133

Cd-109

Gd-153

Ir-192

Np-237

Co-57

Fe-55

Ge-68

I-124

Kr-85

Se-75

Fig. 2.1. Relative quantity of isotopes crossing the border. Table 2.2. List of most frequently shipped isotopes.
Natural uranium Enriched uranium Germanium-68 Carbon-14 Cobalt-57 Iodine-125 Cesium-137 Krypton -85 Europium-152 Radium-226 Tritium-3 Cobalt-60 Palladium-103 Iridium-192 Phosphorus-32 Selenium-75 Gadolinium-153 Yttrium-90 Barium-133 Curium-244 Plutonium-239 Prometium-147

Listed in Table 2.2 nuclides (shipped in transport packages) can be ranked by activity (in Ci) on the following groups: - nuclides with the activity of millions of Ci (Cobalt-60, Cesium-137); nuclides with the activity of hundreds of kCi (Iridium-192, Tritium-3); nuclides with the activity of dozens of kCi (Selenium-75, Prometium-147); nuclides with the activity of thousands of Ci (Krypton-85, Phosphorus-32, Yttrium-90); nuclides with the activity of hundreds of Ci (Carbon-14, Iodine-125, Palladium-103).

The activity of other nuclides (except those given in Table 2.2) are less then 100 Ci. This group has the following features:
27

Sr-85

Y-88

0,28 0,84

1,96 2,66 1,12

10

0,42 6,17 0,42 0,84

Cadmium-109, Cobalt-57, Cobalt-58, Iron-55, Galium-68, Germanium-68, Phosphorus-33, Ruthenium-106, Strontium-89, barium-133 are shipped regularly; Bismuth-207, Calcium-45, Cerium-139, Cerium-144, Californium-252, Curium-244, Galium-67, Nickel-63, Phosphorus-32, Radium-226, Strontium-85, Tangsten-188, Ittrium-88, Ittrium-90 are shipped periodically; Indium-113, Molybdenium-99, Sodium-22, Technetium-99m are shipped occasionally. Neptunium-237, Samarium-151,

Sources of radiation are widely used in industry, agriculture, medicine; they production is commercialized by manufactures of Russian Federation. Their customers include well-known firms from Great Britain, France, USA, Germany, etc. Thus the problems of custom inspection are rather urgent. For example, the alpha-sources are used in automatic systems for fire-fighting and smoke detectors, neutralizers of static electricity, gas chromatography, and gas analyzers. The beta-sources are applied in anti-icing systems for planes and helicopters, thickness meter, densimeters, radiation installations. Gamma-sources are used in medical radiation installations, industrial defectoscopy, control instrumentation, aviation and space systems. Neutron sources are employed for express-analysis of rocks and ores, humidity control, oil well logging.

3. SYSTEMATIZATION THE DESIGN INFORMATION OF STANDARD SHIPPING CONTAINERS FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
The standard shipping containers approved for transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances were analyzed. The results are summarized in Tables 3.13.3. Table 3.1. Stainless steal standard containers.
n/n Type of shipping packaging container 1. 2. 3. 4. Model 48Y Model 30B Mound 1 KW TK-S 15/1 Container design specifications Stainless steel, 21 mm wall thickness Stainless steel, 16 mm wall thickness Protective container is made of stainless steel, 38 mm wall thickness Stainless steel, 10 mm wall thickness Transported material Uranium hexafluoride with enrichment by U-235 up to 1,0% Uranium hexafluoride with enrichment by U-235 up to 5% Plutonium 238, 239 Fuel assemblies

28

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Manganese 54 Molybdenium 99 Natrium 22 Nickel 63 Neptunium 237 Phosphorus 32 Phosphorus 33 Palladium 103 Prometium 147 Radium 226 Ruthenium 106 Selenium 75 Samarium 151 Tin 113 Tin 119 m Strontium 82 Strontium 85 Strontium 90 Zinc 65 Technetium 99m Tungsten 188 Yttrium 88 Yttrium 90 Uranium (hexafluoride or other compounds) Plutonium 239

54 99 22

Mn Mo Na Ni Np P P Pd Pm Ra Ru Se Sm Sn Sn Sr Sr Sr Zn Tc W Y Y

312 days 67 days 2.4 years 100.1 years 2.1410 years 14.,3 days 25.4 days 17 days 2.6 years 1600 years 1 years 118.45 days 90 years 115 days 293 days 25 days 64.8 days 29 years 244 days 2.13105 years 69.4 years 107 days 2.67 days 7.04108 years 2.41104 years
6

20 100 8 100 0.005 30 100 700 80 0.05 7 40 90 60 100 80 30 0.4 30 100 40 30 10 0.2 0.002

63 237

32 33 103 147 226 106 75 151 113

119m 82 85 90 65

99m 188 88 90

U 239 Pu

235

Uranium hexafluoride, uranium oxides and other uranium compounds are the most frequently shipped nuclear materials. Americium-241 is also shipped in large amounts; for example, more then 20590 Ci of this isotope crossed the border in 2002. Some nuclear materials are shipped in a very low amount such as Californium-252 (only 1.52612 Ci/year), Neptunium-237 (0.007 Ci/year), and Plutonium-239. The materials most frequently crossing the border of Russian Federation are printed in bold in Table 1 and summarized in Table 2.2 that displays the list of isotopes that are shipped most frequently (90%). The data are also displayed in Fig. 14.

26

Table 3.2. Standard containers with lead shielding.

Container design n/n Type of specifications shipping packaging container 1. UKT1B-250M Lead protective container, 250 mm wall thickness 2. UKT1A-5 Lead protective container, 5 mm wall thickness Transported material Most frequently shipped nuclide -60 -57, Cd-109, Pd-103, P-32 Se-85, -57, Cd-109, Pd-103

3.

UKT1A-10

Lead protective container,10 mm wall thickness

4.

UKT1A-15

Lead protective container, 10 mm wall thickness

5.

UKT1A-20

Lead protective container, 10 mm wall thickness

6.

UKT1B-120

Lead protective container, 120 mm wall thickness

7.

UKT1B-100

Lead protective container, 100 mm wall thickness

8.

UKT1B-80

Lead protective container, 80 mm wall thickness

9.

UKT1A-60

Lead protective container, 60 mm wall thickness

Cobalt-60 Phosphorus-32 Al-26; P-32, Cr-51, Co-57, Fe-55, Ti-44 Cd-109, Mo-93, Pd-103, In-111, W-181, Au-195, Bi-207, As-73 Al-26; P-32, Cr-51, Co-57, Fe-55, Ti-44 Cd-109, Mo-93, Pd-103, In-111, W-181, Au-195, Bi-207, Be-7, Na-22, Ga-67,Ge-68, As-73,74, Y-88, Sr-85, Tc-95m, In-111, Sn-119, I-124,123, Ba-133, Re-183,184,Tl-201, Se-85 Al-26; P-32, Cr-51, Co-57, Fe-55, Ti-44 Cd-109, Mo-93, Pd-103, In-111, W-181, Au-195, Bi-207, Be-7, Na-22, Ga-67,Ge-68, As-73,74, Y-88, Sr-85, Tc-95m, In-111, Sn-119, I-124,123, Ba-133, Re-183,184,Tl-201 Al-26; P-32, Cr-51, Co-57, Fe-55, Ti-44 Cd-109, Mo-93, Pd-103, In-111, W-181, Au-195, Bi-207, Be-7, Na-22, Ga-67,Ge-68, As-73,74, Y-88, Sr-85, Tc-95m, In-111, Sn-119, I-124,123, Ba-133, Re-183,184,Tl-201 -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 Pu-239 -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 Pu-239 -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 Pu-239

Se-85, -57, Cd-109, Pd-103

Se-85, -57, Cd-109, Pd-103

Co-60, Y-90, Cd-109

Co-60, Y-90, Cd-109

Co-60, Y-90, Cd-109

Co-60, Y-90, Cd-109, In-114

29

10. UKT1A-50

11. UKT1A-51

12. UKT1B-ZG 13. 1U 180 14. TR-1/t 15. GT-2m

16. GT-3

17. GI-1

18. Shipping packaging container of Ga-67 generator

Lead protective container, -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 50 mm wall thickness Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 Pu-239 Lead protective container, -14 P-32 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Sc-46 5 mm wall thickness; Co-58,60 Ni-63 Zn-65 polystyrene with 24 mm Fe-55,59 Se-75 Sr-85,89,90 wall thickness Y-90 Cd-109 In-114 Pu-239 Lead protective container, Co-60 271 mm wall thickness s-137 Lead protective container, Ir-192 180 mm wall thickness Lead protective container, Sr-89,90 280 mm wall thickness Lead protective insert Tc-99m inside the generator, 35 mm wall thickness Lead protective insert Tc-99m inside the generator, 30 mm wall thickness Lead protective insert In-113m inside the generator, 30 mm wall thickness Lead protective insert Ga-67, Ge-68 inside the generator, 25 mm wall thickness

Co-60, Y-90, Cd-109, In-114 Pu-239

Co-60 s-137 Ir-192 Sr-89,90 Tc-99m

Tc-99m

In-113m

Ga-67, Ge-68.

Table 3.3. Standard containers with shielding from depleted urnium. n/n Type of Container design Transported material shipping specifications packaging container 1. UKT Protective container of Ir-192 1V-05/0050 depleted uranium, 53.3 mm wall thickness 2. UKT Protective container of s-137 Ir-192 1Vdepleted uranium, 57 mm 10000/0185 wall thickness 3. 3300A Protective container of Co-60 depleted uranium, 163 mm s-137 wall thickness Am-241 m-244 Cf-252 Protective container of 4. UKT PV (U) depleted uranium, wall (313-1) thickness of UKT PV (U) 313 mm, 495 mm, and (495-1) 725 mm, respectively. UKT PV (U) (725-3)

Most frequently shipped nuclide Ir-192

Ir-192

Co-60

Cf-252

30

5.

UKT 1V (U)96-7

6.

Protective container of depleted uranium, 70 mm wall thickness UKT 1V -60-1 Protective container of depleted uranium, 75 mm wall thickness

Co-58,60 Se-75 Ir-192 I-131 Mn-54 Fe-55,59 Mb-99 Tl-204 Ir-192 W-188 Cs-137 Ba-133 I-131 Ru-106 Zn-65 Cd-109, 115 Sr 85,89,90 Sn-113,117,119,121 Ni-63 Co-58,60 Mn-54 Cr-51 Ca-45 P-32 C-14 Co-60 s-137

Co-60 Ir-192 Co-60 Ir-192 Cs-137

7.

Protective container of lead with 226 mm wall thickness and depleted uranium with 25 mm wall thickness 8. ATEA 333/335 Protective container of depleted uranium, 55 mm wall thickness 9. D 80457 Protective container of (S 289) depleted uranium, 55 mm wall thickness 10. AmershamProtective container of Model-702 depleted uranium, 80 mm wall thickness 11. UK-50-S Protective container of depleted uranium, 98 mm wall thickness 12. UK-12-S Protective container of depleted uranium, 62.5 mm wall thickness Protective container of lead with 216 mm wall thickness and depleted uranium with 10 mm wall thickness Protective container of depleted uranium, wall thickness of 14 mm and 25 mm, respectively.

2843

Co-60 s-137

Ir-192

Ir-192

Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75

s-137 Ir-192 Se-75 Yb-169

Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75 Sr-90 Cs-134,137 Ra-226 m-241,243, mixtures Co-60 Se-75 Sr-90 Ir-192 Ra-226 Cs-134,137 -241,243, mixtures -60

13. Teatron

Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75 Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75 Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75 Cs137 Co-60 Ir-192 Se-75 Cs137 -60

14. HU-GP 20 HU-GP 40

15. UKT-PV-1

-14 P-32,33 S-35 Ca-45 Cr-51 Mn-54 Fe 55,59 o-58, Co-60 Ni-63 Zm-65 Se-75 Sr-85,89 Pd-103 Rh-106 Cd-109 In-113 Sn-113,117,119,121 Ba-133 Eu-152,154, U-235, -241,243 Pu-238,239 Cf-252 Gd-153 Additional shielding of Pu-238 Am-241 Cm-244 paraffin with 200 mm wall Cf-252 Po-210 thickness

Co-60 Se-75

Am-241 Cm-244 Cf-252 Po-210

31

4. TEST MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 4.1. General provisions

Test measurements of portable radiation control devices used by customs officers are made in order to assess technical characteristics of these devices in checking the compliance of radioactive cargo transported in various shipping packaging containers (SPCs) and bringing down the risk of illegal trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials: - Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers; - Verification of spectrometer (identifier) capabilities in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations; - Verification of spectrometer (identifier) top capabilities in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides when placed in various protective containers.

The tests are carried out by representatives of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) of the Russian Federation together with specialists of the RRC Kurchatov Institute, the commission being chaired by an FCS representative. The arrangement and test procedures are to comply with the requirements established based on those provided in GOST 15.001-88 national standard. The results of the test measurements are intended to be used in the development of recommendations concerning the application of various radiation control devices in solving the tasks of customs control of the fissionable and radioactive materials. Test measurements of radiation control devices used by customs officers are performed in the natural atmospheric environment of experimental room (at the site) of RRC Kurchatov Institute. The natural gamma background level should not exceed 0.2 Sv/h. Each test measurement is to be made within 3 minutes after the completion of the previous measurement. During the intervals between the measurements, the samples of radioactive (nuclear) materials are to be withdrawn from the room (site) for a distance of at least 5 meters. It is not allowed during the test measurements to make any adjustments to the radiation control devices, which are not envisaged in operational manuals. Any abrupt changes occurring in the natural background at the site during the measurements should not exceed 5% per minute. Radiation control devices are to be prepared for work in accordance with the requirements of the operational manuals (passports) for the selected modification. When working with radioactive sources and samples of nuclear materials, radiation safety requirements should be met, which are contained in the Rules and Regulations: - OSPORB-99 Basic Sanitary Rules for Ensuring Radiation Safety. SP 2.6.12.799-99; - NRB-99 Radiation Safety Regulations, SP 2.61.758-99. - Requirements of the Rules of Technical Operation of Consumers Electric Facilities (sections E1, E2, 13) approved by the Head of the State Inspection Agency for Energy (Glavgosenergonadzor) in 1992; - Requirements of the Inter-industry Rules on Labor Safety (Safety Rules) when Operating Electric Facilities. POT RM-016-2001, RD 153-34.0-03.150-00.

The following should also be complied with during test measurements:

32

All the results of test measurements are recorded in protocols, which are to be signed by those engaged in test measurements in the presence of the commission members.

4.2. Test conditions used for gamma-sources

Before taking spectrometric measurements, spectrometers may require energy calibration in accordance with Operation Manuals for the specific types of devices. Sample calibration gammasources included in device kits are used for these purposes. The procedures are accompanied by the assessment of the calibration convenience and its technological efficiency. When assessing spectrometric measurement procedures applicable to the customs control technologies the following principles should be followed: Maximum simplicity in operating the device; Maximum automation of adjustment procedures when making measurements; Maximum automation of calibration procedures; Minimum risk of an operators faulty actions.

The spectrum is measured at a distance of 10-15 cm from the source of radiation provided that the measurement dead time should not exceed 50%, whereas the measurement time, which depends upon the source activity level, protective layers thickness and material, as well as the detector type, should not exceed 5 minutes. Before performing each measurement, all sources of ionizing radiation are removed from the room except for the inspected one. The spectra of the inspected samples are measured successively by each of the tested spectrometers. The measurement results are recorded in a Protocol. One sample may be measured by several devices simultaneously provided that the measurement conditions are identical. Nuclides are automatically identified in the analyzed SPC without using any additional software processing.

4.3. Test conditions used for neutron sources

1) Neutron source samples are placed successively on a flat surface so that the minimum distance from the center of the source to the path of the detector geometrical center would be (10.01) m (to determine the detection threshold of the monitor neutron channel); 2) The device is moved away to such a distance from the source that the source radiation would not affect the neutron background at the device location, i.e. to a recommended distance of 5 to 10 meters. In order to prevent the response of the gamma channel, the source is placed into a lead container with the wall thickness of 5 cm. 3) The device is switched on and operated in accordance with the device Operation Manual; 4) In order to determine the detection threshold of the device neutron channel, the device is carried along the preset path after it has entered the search mode at a speed of 0.5 0.05 m/s against the neutron source. The speed should remain constant all along the path during the whole test series. Each time the device has completed the preset path it is moved away to a distance of 5 to 10 meters from the source for the device alarm indicators to go out and its count speed to set to values approximating the count speed level of the neutron background.

33

5) The devices are placed at the operators belt with their face to the source of radiation. The operators weight and size characteristics should approximate those of a polymethylmethacrylate phantom of a size of 30 x 30 x 15 cm. 6) The test results are considered satisfactory if the device gave at least nine alarm signals (audio or vibrating ones) when moved ten times along the preset path. 7) The said operations are repeated for all the above listed neutron sources to determine the minimum detection threshold of the device with regard to neutron radiation. 8) Before making detection tests using the neutron channels the devices should be calibrated in the natural neutron background (i.e. in the absence of neutron sources). 9) If negative result is obtained at a distance of 1 meter, the test conditions are repeated in an effort to determine the minimum distance making it possible for the device to detect the neutron source samples offered for the tests. Note. Such test conditions for the device neutron channel are taken from GOST R51635-2000 Russian national standard Radiation Monitors of Nuclear Materials keeping in mind that similar test conditions related to the movement of the device relative to the source most closely match the technology of applying such types of devices to detect illegal trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials and are actively used by the Russian customs.

4.4. Requirements to the means of control

The following equipment and means of control are used in making measurements: Set of samples of radioactive materials, plutonium and uranium; Standard dosimetric equipment to control gamma-radiation dose rates (gamma- and x-ray dose rate meter AT1121 (Belarus) is used); Stopwatch in accordance with TU 25.1819.0021; Ruler in accordance with GOST 7502 national standard.

Measurement devices and means of measurements used when making special measurements should have technical passports and be pre-checked, which should be confirmed by a record in the relevant documents.

4.5. Requirements to radioactive and nuclear materials

The work is carried out using various radioactive materials, which are sealed radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation, and NM consisting of plutonium and highly enriched uranium with an indication of their mass and isotope composition added by an indication of activity level for radioactive materials. Plutonium-based NM should contain at least 98% of plutonium mass fraction with a total mass of other impurities within 2% (no more than 0.1% of the impurities for elements with a number less than ten) and at least 20% of Pu-239. Uranium-based NM should contain at least 99.75% of uranium mass fraction with a total mass of other impurities within 0.25% and at least 0.1% of U-235. NM should be kept in a leak-proof manner. Plutonium-based NM should be placed in a one- or two-layer protective capsule produced out of corrosion-resistant steel or nickel with a total wall thickness within 3 mm. Uranium-based NM should be placed in a leak-proof protective aluminium casing with a thickness within 1.5 mm. Leak-proof protective casings produced out of other materials may be applied if the capsule wall thickness is equivalent to a 1.5-mm-thick Al wall in terms of weakening the basic U-235 gamma-line (186 keV).
34

The activity level of a wipe sample taken from the NM surface should not exceed 210-2Bq/cm2.

5. CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPORT INDEX OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHIPPED IN VARIOUS SHIPPING PACKING CONTAINERS
The objects of the investigations on control of transport index confirmation were the shipping packing containers (SPC) of various configuration, made of materials of various density with the following radioactive sources inside. The specifications of materials and containers are summarized in Table 5.1. Designation and specification of the devices for radiation control used for experimentation are given in Table 5.2. The results on measurements of exposure dose rate (EDR) are summarized in Table 5.3 and displayed in Fig. 5.15.3. The configuration of experimental equipment is given in Fig. 5.4. The problem of transport index verification is most correctly solved with devices measuring EDR by the reconstructed spectrum of gamma-radiation: Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01; Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB; X-ray and gamma dosimeter EL-1119, Radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K; Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1203; Personal dosimeter DKG-PM1621; Radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal. Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401; Survey device ISP-PM1401K-1;

And devices measuring gamma-radiation with the Geiger counters:

Theses devices measure the EDR correctly in the whole range of gamma-ray energies. Note: For the spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB and radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01, the measurements are correct only after required calibration of these devices by the calibrating gamma-sources (included in device kit). For radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal, the function of EDR measurement is called after device calibration. This function is available through the "alternative" menu, that essentially complicates actions of custom officers at the operative estimation of EDR with the help of this device. At the same time measurements are correct enough.

35

Table 5.1. Specification of sources used for experimentation.

Material and wall thickness of SPC 133 133 s137 s137 60+56 Eu152 Cm244 U-238 (U-235 0.1%) U-238 (U-235 0.2%) UO2 (U-235 0.71%) U3O8 (U-235 5.4%) U3O8 (U-235 21.6%) UO2 (U-235 36%) UO2 (U-235 36%) U3O8 (U-235 47.1%) Metal (U-235 75%) UO2 (U-235 89.1%) Uranium mononitride (UN) (U-235 93%) Uranium mononitride (UN) (U-235 93%) Plutonium dioxide (Pu-239 75.6%) Plutonium dioxide (Pu-239 88%) (Pu-239 93%)
36

n/n

Source designation Isotope designation 3.54105 3.54105 2.24104 2.24104 2.0104+1.2104 9.9107 9.9108

SPC type

Isotope activity (Bq)

Uranium weight

1 2 3 4 5

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5

S6

S7

KT 1-10 KT 1-10 KT 1-10 KT 1-15 KT 1-5 UKT 11v24 Cl-2.8 K3-1 (Alumin.)

S8

SU\013\B(U)

65 kg 65 kg 198 g 179 g 180 g 120 g 120 g 180 g 538 g 120 g 16 g 1106 g 5g 5g 7g

9 Steel, 6 mm Steel, 6 mm

S9

U\B(U)

10

S10

Lead, 10 mm Lead, 15 mm Lead, 10 mm Lead, 15 mm Lead, 5 mm Lead, 30 mm Steel, 10 mm Aluminium, 1 mm Uranium depleted by U 235 isotope down to 0.1%, 60 mm, Steel, 10 mm Uranium depleted by U 235 isotope down to 0.2%, 30 mm, Steel, 10 mm Steel, 6 mm

11

S11

12

S12

13

S13-1

14 15 16

S13-2 S14 S15 S16 S17-1

17.

S17-2

18. 19. 20.

S18 S19 S20

Lead, 3 mm Steel, 3 mm Steel, 1 mm Steel, 6 mm Brass, 3 mm Steel, 6 mm Steel, 1 mm Uranium depleted by U 235 isotope down to 0.1%, 60 mm, Steel, 10 mm Steel, 3 mm Steel, 3 mm Steel, 1 mm

Table 5.2. Designation and specification of the devices for radiation control used for experimentation. Specifications
Type of recorded radiation Detector type Actuation time Range of recorded gamma-rays 0.06-1.5 MeV 45 sec 5 sec Measuring time Possibility for express identification

n/n

Short designation of device

Full designation of device

D1

,X-ray
GM counter CsI (Tl) scintillator CsI (Tl) scintillator, neutron counter 0.063 MeV 0.0210 MeV 0.0610 MeV Plastic scintillator NaI (Tl) scintillator 0.063 MeV 0.0120 MeV No more than 41 sec No more than 41 sec Calibration time: 36 sec Calibration time: 40 sec Calibration time: 40 sec 0.110 MeV Calibration time: 120 sec

Geiger-Muller (GM) counter

1 min 0.25 sec No more than 41 sec

D2

Personal microprocessor-based dosimeter DKG-PM1203 Personal dosimeter of X-rays and gamma-rays DKG-PM1621

5 sec
No more than 5 min No more than 5 min

D3

Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401

, neutron ,X-ray , neutron,

alpha, beta

D4

Survey microprocessor-based signal dosimeter ISP-PM1401K-1

D5

X-rays and gamma-rays dosimeter EL-1119

20 4
: 120 sec 36 sec

D6

7
alpha

D7

Multi-purpose radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01 Hand-held radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal

, neutron, , X-ray,
alpha, beta

CsI (Tl) ZnS (Ag) LiF scintillators GM counter, thermal neutron counter, CsI scintillator NaI (Tl) scintillator Pure germanium detector

D8

Radiometer-spectrometer MKS PM1401K

0.01520 MeV 0.153.5 MeV (for measuring the flux density of beta-particles 0.053 MeV 0.053 MeV

40
300 sec 300 sec

D9

Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB

20

10

Reference

Semiconductor spectrometer SKS-50

No more than 5 min No more than 30 min

37

Table 5.3. Results on measurements of exposure dose rate from nuclear and radioactive materials by the radiation control devices adapted for custom inspection technologies. D4 1.98 0.4 0.58 0.44 0.96 37.3 3.9 15.16 11.1 1.5 1.7 4.1 4.46 4.7 20.9 9.1 20.63 9.86 11.4 2 D5 0.8 0.28 0.6 0.29 12.7 110 18.6 6.36 5.56 1.65 1.82 2.38 4.13 6.46 4.52 5.6 4.12 8.8 6.3 4.2 D6 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 13 110 18 6.5 6 1.7 1.8 2.4 4.1 6 5.5 5.6 4.4 8 6 4 D7 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.3 11 90 10 8 11 1.5 1 2.2 0.2 7 4.2 5.1 3 9 7 2.2 D8 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.3 12 90 11 9 11 2 1.5 2.4 3 7 7 5.4 3 8 7 2 D9 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 13 112 17 6 7 1.6 1.7 2.3 4 6 5.6 6 4 8.3 6 4.3

Measured value of exposure dose rate, Sv/h Source designation D1 D2 D3 S1 0.76 0.7 0.58 S2 0.22 0.166 0.21 S3 0.63 0.61 0.39 S4 0.38 0.29 0.156 S5 11.8 10.3 4.4 S6 111.6 66.3 31 S7 11.6 15.3 6 S8 8.4 9.76 13.3 S9 12.26 12.53 10.8 IS0 1.7 1.66 1.56 S11 1.26 1.76 1.75 S12 2.34 2.87 4.1 S13 0.23 0.23 4.26 S14 8.1 4.48 6.73 S15 7.3 3.6 16.82 S16 5.58 5 7.64 S17 3.54 2.18 4.46 S18 9.1 6.4 4.23 S19 7.07 4.53 1.23 S20 2.1 1.36 1.46

38

25

S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13

20

E D R , m k Sv /h

15

S14 S15 S16 S17 S20 S18 S19 S20

10

S17 S14

0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 S8

S11

Fig.5.1. Integrated diagram of EDR measurements by above devices.

2 E D R , m kS v/h 1,5 1 0,5 0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 10mm Pb 15mm PB 10mm Pb

Fig. 5.2. Results of measuring Ba-133 with activity of 0.354 MBq.

39

2 1,8 1,6 1,4 EDR, mkSv/h 1,2 1 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Cs137 15mm Pb Cs137 10mm Pb Ba133 15mm Pb Ba133 10mm Pb D8 D9 Cs137 15mm Pb

D6

D7

Ba133 10mm Pb

Ba133 15mm Pb

Cs137 10mm Pb

Fig. 5.3. Relative changes in EDR measurements. The devices least adapted for EDR measurement in the energy range from 50 keV up to 3000 keV are: Survey dosimeter DRS-PM1401; Survey device ISP-PM1401K-1. This is a result of usage of CsI (Tl) scintillating detector which is not compensated by energy. The last is adapted first of all for the detection of nuclear materials (NM). This fact that is well visible on considerably increased EDR values in the energy range typical for NM. At the same time the measured values of EDR are much lower in the 5060 keV energy range.

Fig.5.4. Configuration of experimental equipment.

40

6. IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHIPPED IN VARIOUS SHIPPED PACKING CONTAINERS 6.1. Experimentations in 2003 at RRC Kurchatov Institute on the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides
For study of identification of the nuclear and radioactive materials transported in various shipping packing containers (SPC), the following custom devices of the radiating control with the gammaspectrometer channel were tested: Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A02-01; Radiometer-spectrometer RSU-01 Signal; Spectrometer GAMMA-1C/NB; Radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K.

The work was performed with of various SPC configurations, made of materials of various density with the following radioactive sources inside (see Table 5.1): KT 1-10 (-133 source, activity: 3.54105 Bq); KT 1-15 (source: -133, activity: 3.54105 Bq); KT 1-10 (source: s-137, activity: 2.24104 Bq); KT 1-15 (source: s-137, activity: 2.24104 Bq); KT 1-5 (source: -60, activity: 2.0 104 Bq; source: -56, activity: 1.2*104 Bq) KT 11v-24Cl-2.8 (source: Eu-152, activity: 9.9107 Bq); K3-1 (aluminium) (source: Cm-244, activity: 9.9108 Bq) Container SU\013\B(U) of U-238 (enrichment by U 235: 0.1%), mass of U: 65 kg. Container U\B(U) of U-238 (enrichment by U 235: 0.2%), mass of U: 65 kg, U sample, enrichment by U 235: 0.71%; mass of UO2: 198 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 5.39%; mass of UO2: 179 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 21.6%; mass of U3O8: 180 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 36.0%; mass of UO2: 120 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 47.1%; mass of U3O8: 180 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 75. 0%; metall-538 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 89.19%; mass of UO2: 120 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 36.0%; mass of UO2: 120 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 93.0%; mass of uranium nitride (UN): 16 g; U sample, enrichment by U 235: 93.0%; mass of uranium nitride (UN): 1106 g; Pu-239 sample (75.6%); mass of plutonium dioxide (PuO2): 5 g; Pu-239 sample (88.0%); mass of plutonium dioxide (PuO2): 5 g; Pu-239 sample (93.0%); mass of plutonium dioxide (PuO2): 5 g;
41

and also samples of nuclear materials in various packages:

For identity of measurements, the devices were settled down on a circle around the object of control at the identical distance. The distance was chosen from the manufacturer recommendations on counting load for devices. As a rule, the distance from the package to the source was within 15-20 cm. A) All the devices were tested on the capability of the express - analysis in the "simplified" mode of measurement with the use of built-in nuclide libraries. The device capabilities on the further processing the measured spectrum through the computer were separately checked, using the additional software supplied with these spectrometers. The devices MKS-A02-01 and GAMMA-1C/NB require the special calibration by Th-232 prior to the express-analysis in the "simplified" mode of measurement with the use of built-in nuclide libraries. The device RSU-01 Signal needs the calibration by Na-22. At the same time for further processing the measured spectrum with the computer, the additional calibration by Eu-152 is required. It is sufficiently complicated the calibration and increases the spectrum processing time. The total statistics of identification at the express-analysis is given in Fig.6.1.
20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4

Fig.6.1. Statistics of identification in the express-analysis mode. B) After calibration, the devices MKS-A02-01 and GAMMA-1C/NB could identify only simple spectrums such as Cs-137 and Co-60. After additional calibration by Eu-152 and by processing the measured spectrum through the computer, all nuclides were identified excluding Cm-244 and Am-241. C) In the express-analysis mode, the device RSU-01 Signal could identify and assess activity of all four nuclides available in its Data Bank: Th-232, Ra-226, K-40, Cs-137. Other nuclides were not identified.
20 15 10 5 0

1 2 3 4

Fig.6.2. Statistics of identification at the additional software processing of measured spectrum. D) The total statistics of identification at the additional software processing of measured spectrum is given in Fig.6.2. The survey radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K has the calibration Cs-137 source inside the casing. It allows avoiding manual calibration. The main advantages of
42

the device are minimization of manual operations, simplicity of device operation in the expressanalysis and expert modes. In the express-analysis mode, the device could identify most control nuclides (17 from 22; all uranium samples were preliminary identified. At the same time, the samples from low- and highly enriched uranium were well distinguished which is unique for the device of this class). E) The measurements demonstrated that isotopes, which spectrum of radiation lays in soft energy area (highly enriched U-235, line 186 keV, Am-241, line 56 keV, etc.) are rather difficult for identification. Nevertheless, at the combined shielding with 3 mm of lead and 3 mm of steel the identification of uranium sample with enrichment of 36% (by U-235) is possible. For the sample (1106 g) of highly (93%) enriched U-235 (Fig. 6.3), at the shielding of reducedenriched uranium (thickness of 60 mm), the U-235 has not been identified.

Fig. 6.3. Measurements of highly shielded (thickness of 60 mm) enriched U-235.

6.2. Experimentations in 2005 at RRC Kurchatov Institute on the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides
The following radiation control devices used by customs officers and equipped with a spectrometric channel to register gamma-radiation are tested for the purpose of identifying nuclear and radioactive materials shipped in various shipping packaging containers: - Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03 (Russia); - Radiometer-spectrometer AT 6101 (Belarus); - Radiometer-spectrometer (identifier) CanberraInSpector 1000 (USA); - Radiometer-spectrometer (identifier) IdentiFINDER (Target) with NaI; - Radiometer-spectrometer (identifier) Exploranium GR-135; - Survey radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K; - Survey identifier (Smartphone) PM1802.

43

Spectrometric measurements are performed using radioactive sources and nuclear materials placed beyond various protection layers. The samples of uranium and plutonium sources used in the experiments ate given in Fig. 6.4 and 6.5.

Fig. 6.4. Uranium sources. 1) Ba-133 source, activity: 3105 Bq, 2) Cs-137 source, activity: 3104 Bq, 3) Eu-152 source, activity: 3105 Bq, 4) Co-60 source, activity: 3105 Bq, 5) Ra-226 source, activity: 2105 Bq, 6) Th-232 source, activity: 3103 Bq, 7) K-40 source, activity: 5102 Bq, 8) -U sample (reactor-type U with Cs-137) No. 5c, enrichment by U-235: 0.71%; mass of UO2: 187 g 9) -U sample (reactor-type U with Cs-137) No. 6c, enrichment by U-235: 4.4%; mass of U3O2: 79 g 10) -U sample No. 4, enrichment by U-235: 21.6%; mass of U3O8: 180 g 11) -U sample No. 3, enrichment by U-235: 47.1%; mass of U3O8: 180 g 12) -U sample No. 2, enrichment by U-235: 88.9%; metal: 10.4 g 13) -U sample No. 1, enrichment by U-235: 90.1%; metal: 3.1 g 14) -Pu-239 sample No. 7 (96.7%); Pu metal: 0.3 g

44

15) -Pu-239 sample No. 8 (90.0%); Pu dioxide: 5.9 g 16) -Pu-239 sample No. 9, irradiated reactor-type Pu; Pu dioxide: 60 g

Fig. 6.5. Plutonium sources. The samples of protective containers are shown in Fig. 6.6. 6.2.1. Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials in various packaging containers The results on the definition of isotopic composition of radioactive substances and radioactive materials placed in various protective containers are summarized in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, correspondingly, and displayed in Fig. 6.66.8.

Fig. 6.6. The snap-shots of experiments on identification of sources.

45

Table 6.1. Definition of isotopic composition of radioactive substances placed in various protective containers
Samples Identification results (names of identified isotopes) Identification to be MKS- 6101 CanberraInSpector IdentiFINDER Exploranium PM1401K (Smartphone) conditions identified A03 1000 (Target) GR-135 PM1802 -133 -133 No -133 -133 Ba-133 -133 -133 (90 (100 sec) (60 sec) (100 sec) (300 sec) (90 sec) (100 sec) Devices with equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 1.22 Sv/h 3105 Bq, no protection Ra-226 -133 No -133 -133 Ba-133 -133 -133 (40 (23 sec) K-40 (60 sec) (300 sec) (60 sec) (180 sec) Devices with (300 sec) equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 0.85 Sv/h 3105 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb) Ra-226 -133 No -133 -133 Ba-133 -133 -133 (180 (45 sec) K-40 Eu-152 (300 sec) (90 sec) (240 sec) Devices with (300 sec) (100 sec) equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 0.25 Sv/h 3105 Bq in KT1-10 (10 mm Pb) Ra-226 No U-235 -133 -133 Ba-133 -133 -133 (240 (100 K-40 (300 sec) (300 sec) (100 sec) (240 sec) Devices with sec) (300 sec) equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 0.15 Sv/h 3105 Bq in KT1-15 (15 mm Pb) Ra-226 No U-235 -133 No Ba-133 -40 -40 (300 (300 sec) K-40 (300 sec) -40 Cs-137 (300 sec) Devices with (300 sec) (300 sec) (300 sec) equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 5 0.11 Sv/h 310 Bq in KT1-20 (20 mm Pb) Cs-137 Cs-137 Xe-133 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30 (23 sec) (60 sec) (30 sec) (300 sec) (30 sec) (50 sec) Devices with equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 4 Sv/h 3104 Bq, no protection Cs-137 Cs-137 WeaponCs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (50 (23 sec) (60 sec) (30 sec) grade Pu (60 sec) (60 sec) Devices with K-40 equivalent activity sec) dose rate: level of 4 2 Sv/h 310 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb)

46

Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30 (23 sec) with activity sec) level of 3104 Bq in KT1-10 (10 mm Pb) Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (35 (30 sec) with activity sec) level of 3104 Bq in KT1-15 (15 mm Pb) Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30 (32 sec) with activity sec) level of 3104 Bq in KT1-20 (20 mm Pb) Eu-152 Eu-152 Eu-152 (90 (60 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq, no protection Eu-152 Eu-152 Eu-152 (90 (90 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb) No No Eu-152 (300 (300 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-10 (10 mm Pb) Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 (40 (10 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq, no protection Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 (25 (10 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb)

Cs-137 (60 sec)

Cs-137 (60 sec)

No (300 sec)

Cs-137 (30 sec)

Cs-137 (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 1.45 Sv/h

No (300 sec)

Cs-137 (60 sec)

No (300 sec)

Cs-137 (35sec)

Cs-137 (20 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.95 Sv/h

No (300 sec)

Cs-137 (60 sec)

No (300 sec)

Cs-137 (30 sec)

Cs-137 (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.45 Sv/h

Eu-152 (300 sec)

Eu-152 (90 sec)

No (300 sec)

Eu-152 (40 sec)

Eu-152 (90 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.8 Sv/h

Eu-152 (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

Zn-65 (40 sec)

No (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.4 Sv/h

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.3 Sv/h

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (50 sec)

Co-60 (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 3 Sv/h

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (25 sec)

Co-60 (20 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 2.2 Sv/h

47

Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 (30 (10 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-10 (10 mm Pb) Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 (40 (15sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-15 (15 mm Pb) Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 (30 (30 sec) with activity sec) level of 3105 Bq in KT1-20 (20 mm Pb) Ra-226 Ra-226 Ra-226 (30 (40 sec) with activity sec) level of 2105 Bq, no protection Ra-226 Ra-226 Ra-226 with (240 (150 sec) activity sec) level of 2*105 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb) Th-232 Th-232 Th-232 (60 (56 sec) with activity sec) level of 3103 Bq, no protection Th-232 Th-232 Th-232 (120 (120 sec) with activity sec) level of 3103 Bq in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb) K-40 with K-40 K-40 activity (120 (120 sec) level of sec) 5102 Bq, no protection

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (30 sec)

Co-60 (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 1.3 Sv/h

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (30 sec)

Co-60 (50 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.98 Sv/h

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (60 sec)

Co-60 (30 sec)

Co-60 (40 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.7 Sv/h

Ba-133 Ga-67 Tl-204 (120 sec)

Ra-226 (60 sec)

Ra-226 Pu U (120 sec)

Ra-226 (25 sec)

Ra-226 (22 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.5 Sv/h

No (300 sec)

Ra-226 (120 sec)

Ra-226 Pu K-40 (60 sec)

Ra-226 (180 sec)

Ra-226 (120 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.24 Sv/h

U-235 U-238 (60 sec)

Th-232 (60 sec)

Th-232 (60 sec)

Th-228 (60 sec)

Th-232 Th-228 (120 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.32 Sv/h

U-235 U-238 (150 sec)

Th-232 (120 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

Ra-226 (120 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.17 Sv/h

No (300 sec)

K-40 (120 sec)

U-235 K-40 (120 sec)

K-40 Cs-137 (300 sec)

K-40 (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.19 Sv/h

48

6101 GR-135 Target Ident-1000 -03 1802

Ba-133

1401

Cs-137

1.5 1 0.5 0 Lead container thickness, cm

Eu-152

Isotope s
Ra-226 Co-60

Th-232

GR-135

1802

Ident-1000

Device type

Fig.6.7. Identification of radioactive materials in lead containers.

-03

1401

6101

Target

6101 GR-135 Target Ident-1000 -03 1802 1401

U-235-90% U-235-88%, U-235-48% U-235-21% U-235-0,71%, Cs-137 U-235-4.4%, industrial G -135 R 1802 Ident-1000 03 - 1401 6101 Target

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Fig.6.8. Identification of uranium in lead containers.

49

16 14 12 6101 GR-135 Target Ident-1000 -03 1802 1401 1802 1401 Pu-239-90% U-235-90% Target Pu-239, industrial+Cs137 6101 Ident-1000 -03 10 8 6 4 2 0

Fig.6.9. Identification of plutonium in lead containers.

GR-135

50

Table 6.2. Definition of isotopic composition of nuclear materials in various protective containers
PM1401K

Samples to be identified Exploranium GR-135 U-235, Pu, (120 sec)

U-235 90% Sample No. 1, 3 g No protection

Identification results (names of identified isotopes) MKS-A03 AT6101 CanberraInSpector 1000 U-235, special, U-235, weapon- U-235, (180 sec) grade, (300 sec) (23 sec)

Identification (Smartphone) conditions PM1802 U-235, weapon- U-235, weapongrade, grade, Devices equivalent (25 sec) (120 sec) dose rate: 0.33 Sv/h U-235, weapon- U-235, weapongrade, grade, Devices equivalent (30 sec) (60 sec) dose rate: 0.29 Sv/h U-235, weapon- No grade, (300 sec) (20 sec) U-235, weapon- No grade, (300 sec) (30 sec) Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.26 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.23 Sv/h U-235, weapon- U-235, weapongrade, grade, Devices equivalent (30 sec) (25 sec) dose rate: 0.4 Sv/h No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.15 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.14 Sv/h Th-232, industrial (60 sec) No (300 sec)

U-235, special, (40 sec)

U-235, weapon- U-235, grade, (300 sec) (25 sec)

U-235, special, (40 sec)

U-235, weapon- U-235, grade, (300 sec) (23 sec)

U-235, special, (40 sec)

U-235, weapon- U-235, grade, (300 sec) (27 sec)

U-235, special, (40 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) Bi-207 (100 sec)

U-235, weapon- U-235, grade, (300 sec) (15 sec)

U-235, Pu, K-40 (150 sec) U-235, Pu, K-40 (150 sec) U-235, Pu, K-40 (180 sec) U-235, (300 sec)

U-235 90% Sample No. 1, 3 g Protection: 1 mm, Cu U-235 90% Sample No. 1, 3 g Protection: 2 mm, Cu U-235 90% Sample No. 1, 3 g Protection: 1.5 mm, Fe U-235 88.9% Sample No. 2, 10 g Protection: 1.5 mm, Fe U-235 88.9% Sample No. 2, 10 g Protection: 5 mm, Pb U with Pb protection, K-40 (180 sec) U with Pb protection, K-40 (240 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) 51 U-235 U-238 Pu (60 sec)

U-235, special, Co-57 (300 sec)

Th-228, (160 sec)

IdentiFINDER (Target) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) No (300 sec)

U-235, special, K-40 (300 sec) U-235 (120 sec)

Th-228, (133 sec)

U-235 88.9% Sample No. 2, 10 g Protection: 5 mm, Pb, 1 mm, Cu U-235 47% Sample No. 3, 158 g; Protection: 3 mm, Fe

U-235, special (60 sec)

U-238, natural Th-228, industrial (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 1.2 Sv/h

U-235, special (60 sec)

U-238, natural Th-228, industrial (47 sec) U 235 (60 sec) U 235 (60 sec) U-235, U-238 (70 sec) Cs-137, U-238, (200 sec) U-238 (100 sec) Pu-240, (240 sec) U-238, (240 sec)

U 235 (60 sec)

U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec)

U-235 U-238 Pu (60 sec)

Th-232, industrial (60 sec)

Th-232, Th-228, industrial (60 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 1.1 Sv/h

U-238, U-235 (60 sec)

U-238, U-235 (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.63 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.62 Sv/h

U-238, U-235 (120 sec) No (300 sec) U-235 U-238 (60 sec)

U-238, U-235 (30 sec)

U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) Cs-137, U with no indication of isotope type, (60 sec) Cs-137, (300 sec) Cs-137, U-235 (120 sec) Cs-137, U-238, (150 sec)

U-235 U-238 Pu (60 sec) U-235 U-238 Pu (60 sec)

Cs-137, U-238, (50 sec)

Cs-137, U-238, (40 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.44 Sv/h

Cs-137, U-238, U-235 (120 sec) U-235 (120 sec) Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec)

U-235 47% Sample No. 3, 158 g; Protection: 3 mm, Fe, 1 mm, Cu U-235 21% Sample No. 4, 158 g Protection: 3 mm, Fe U-235 21% Sample No. 4, 158 g; Protection: 3 mm, Fe, 1 mm, Cu U-235 0.71% Sample No. 5, 173 g Reactor-type sample (with Cs-137); Protection: 3 mm, Fe U-235 4.4% reactor-type, Sample No. 6, 79 g Protection: 5 mm, Fe Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g; No protection Cs-137, U-235 (120 sec) Cs-137, (240 sec) Pu-239 weapon-grade (180 sec) Pu-239 weapon-grade (180 sec) Cs-137, (240 sec) U-235 (120 sec) Sn-113 (60 sec)

Cs-137, U-235 U-238, (30 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.9 Sv/h Pu-239 weapongrade Devices equivalent (280 sec) dose rate: 0.9 Sv/h

Pu-239 WG, special Am-241 (60 sec)

Am-241, Pu-239 (80 sec)

Pu-239 96.7% Pu-239 WG, special Sample No. 7, 0.3 g; Am-241 Protection: 1.5 mm, (60 sec) Cu

Pu-239 (45 sec)

U-235 Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U-235 Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.5 Sv/h

52

Pu-239 WG, special (60 sec)

Pu-239 (45 sec)

U-235 (120 sec)

Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) Sn-113 (150 sec)

Cs-137, (150 sec)

Sn-113 Co-57 (60 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.41 Sv/h

Pu-239 WG, special (120 sec) No (300 sec)

Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g; Protection: 1.5 mm, Cu, 1 mm, Fe Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g; Protection: 5 mm, Pb Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g; Protection: 10 mm, Pb No (300 sec) Am-241, (100 sec) U-235 Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) No (300 sec) U-235 (60 sec) Sn-113 (150 sec)

K-40, Pu-239 WG, special (300 sec)

Pu-239 K-40 (260 sec) No (300 sec)

U-235 Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) U-235 (60 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.14 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.11 Sv/h

Pu-239 90% Pu-239 WG, special Sample No. 8, 5.9 g; Am-241 No protection (60 sec) No (300 sec) Am-241, (120 sec) No (300 sec)

Am-241, Pu-239 nuclear, (40 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 1.2 Sv/h No (300 sec) No (300 sec)

Pu-239 WG, special (60 sec)

No (300 sec)

Am-241, Pu with no indication of isotope type (60 sec) No (300 sec) Pu-239 Cs-137, (300 sec) Cs-137, (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.16 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.145 Sv/h Cs-137, (300 sec) No (300 sec)

Pu-239 90% Sample No. 8, 5.9 g; in KT1-5 (5 mm Pb) Pu-239 90% Sample No. 8, 5.9 g; in KT1-10 (10 mm Pb) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) No (300 sec) Pu with no indication of isotope type U-235 (60 sec) No (300 sec) Am-241 U-235 (120 sec)

Pu-239 WG, special (120 sec)

No (300 sec)

Pu-239 WG, special K-40 (240 sec)

No (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.14 Sv/h Cs-137, (300 sec) Cs-137, (300 sec) Devices equivalent dose rate: 5 Sv/h

Pu-239 90% Sample No. 8, 5.9 g; in KT1-15 (15 mm Pb) Pu-239 irradiated, reactor-type, 5 mm Sample No. 9, 60 g

Pu-239 WG, special Pu-239 reactor-type, Am-241 (300 sec)

Cs-137, Cr-51 (120 sec)

53

6.2.2. Identification of nuclear and radioactive materials in their various combinations

The results on the definition of isotopic composition of radioactive substances and radioactive materials in their various combinations are summarized in Table 6.3.
Identification conditions

Table 6.3.
PM1401K U-238, U-235 (120 sec)

Samples to be identified IdentiFINDER (Target) U, with no indication of isotope (60 sec) Ba-133, Pu with no indication of isotope (60 sec) Ba-133 (60 sec) Pu-239 Np-237 (120 sec) Pu-239 (120 sec) Ba-133 (120 sec) Ba-133 (120 sec) Exploranium GR-135 U-235 (120 sec) (Smartphone) PM1802 Sn-113, U-235 (120 sec)

Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g

U-235 90%, Sample No. 1, 3 g No protection Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g I-131 Am-241 (120 sec)

Identification results (names of identified isotopes) MKS-A03 AT6101 CanberraInSpector 1000 Pu-239 weapon- Pu-239 weapon- U-235 grade, grade, (60 sec) U-235 U-235 (60 sec) (30 sec)

Ba-133 with activity of 3*105 Bq No protection Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g I-131 (120 sec)

Pu-239 weapon- Ba-133 grade, (30 sec) Am-241, Ba-133 (60 sec)

Ba-133 with activity of 3*105 Bq Protection: 1 mm, Fe Pu-239 96.7% Sample No. 7, 0.3 g I-131 (120 sec) Ba-133 (60 sec)

Ba-133, Ba-133 Pu-239 weapon- (30 sec) grade, Am-241, (180 sec) Pu-239 Ba-133 (120 sec)

No (300 sec)

No (300 sec)

Ba-133, Ba-133 Pu-239 weapon- (60 sec) grade, Am-241, (120 sec) Cs-137, U-238, (120 sec) Cs-137, (300 sec)

Ba-133 (120 sec)

Ba-133 (120 sec)

Ba-133 with activity of 3*105 Bq Protection: 2 mm, Fe U-235 4.4%, regenerated with Cs137 Sample No. 6, 79 g Protection: 5 mm, Fe

Cs-137, U-238, U-235 (120 sec)

Cs-137, U-238, U-235 (30 sec)

Cs-137, U (180 sec)

Cs-137, (300 sec)

Cs-137, (300 sec)

Devices equivalent dose rate of Pu-239: 0.6 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of U-235: 0.6 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Pu-239: 1.5 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Ba-133: 1.5 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Pu-239: 0.9 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Ba-133: 0.8 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Pu-239: 0.5 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate of Ba-133: 0.5 Sv/h Devices equivalent dose rate: 0.9 Sv/h

54

6.2.3. Detection of nuclear materials by neutron emission Neutron channels undergo additional tests in the following devices: - Radiometer-spectrometer MKS-A03 (Russia); - Radiometer-spectrometer (identifier) IdentiFINDER (Target) with NaI; - Survey radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K; - Survey identifier (Smartphone) PM1802. - Am-Li sample (neutron source obtained from the irradiated Pu) with neutron radiation of 5104 n/sec during the tests; - Cm-244 sample (neutron source) with neutron radiation of 1.6104 n/sec during the tests; - Cf-252 sample (neutron source) with neutron radiation of 9104 n/sec during the tests.

The neutron channel sensitivity to the following nuclear materials is determined:

The configuration of experiment on neutron channel testing is displayed in Fig. 6.10.

Fig. 6.10. Configuration of neutron measurements.

55

Table 6.4. Testing of neutron channels of the devices.

Samples to be identified Measurement results (identification, cm) MKS-A03 IdentiFINDER PM1401K (Target) 15 120 (Smartphone) PM1802 40 45 Sv/h from the surface of the source container Measurement conditions

Am-Li (neutron source 160 obtained from the irradiated Pu) with intensity of 5104 n/sec Cm-244 with intensity 140 of 1.6104 n/sec Cf-252 with intensity of 9104 n/sec 190

10 20

105 130

35 55

12 Sv/h from the surface of the source container 150 Sv/h from the surface of the source container

Note: 17) The devices IdentiFINDER (Target), PM1401K and (Smartphone) PM1802 were placed at the operators belt with their face to the source of radiation. 18) Since MKS-A03 is not designed to be attached to the belt it was placed in the operators hand and held at a distance of 20 to 30 cm from his body. 19) The devices PM1401K, (Smartphone) PM1802, and MKS-A03 were moved along the sources of neutron radiation at a speed of 0.5 m/sec. 20) In order to get the response of the gamma channel from IdentiFINDER (Target) at the said distances, the device was moved at a reduced speed of 0.3 to 0.4 m/sec.

200 180 160

-03 1401 Target 1802

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Am-Li , intensity 5*E4 1/sec Cm-244 intensity 1.6*E4 1/sec Cf-252intensity 9*E4 1/sec 1401 -03 1802 T arget

Fig.6.11. Results of identification of neutron source at various distances.

56

6.3. Additional processing of spectra using software

In understanding that the measurements taken at the customs control posts with the help of radiometer-spectrometers yield evaluative and preliminary results needed to take a decision as to whether the identified SIR should be sent for further expert evaluation, the following was assumed to be sufficient: The spectrum identification result should be shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; Complex-isotope spectra should contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; The library of nuclides used for additional processing of spectra should have approximately the same volume, which, however, should exceed that of the libraries embedded in the radiometer-spectrometers for express identification. The library of nuclides should be editable; The measurement result protocol should be printable; The spectrum should be printable. The software should identify the spectrum automatically (if the parameter is chosen in the parameter window) when the spectrum is loaded (a desirable option for facilitating the customs FRM control). No additional adjustments should be required. The measurement result should be shown on the screen. There should also be an option of manual identification of the nuclide through a menu item (e.g. identification). The following isotopes were included into the Libraries of Spectra of the tested radiometer-spectrometers as of the time of processing (32 items): Am-241, Ba-133, Co-57, Co-60, Cs-137, Cs-134, Cd-109, Eu-152, Ir-192, Mn-54, Na-22, Np-237, Se-75, Th-228, Th-232,Cr-51, Ga-67, I-123, I-125, I-131, In-111, Tc-99m, Tl-201, Xe-133, K-40, Ra-226, U-238, U-233, U-235, Pu-239, U-RG Pu-239, U-WG Pu-239.

The results obtained in the course of processing the spectra with additional software are summarized in the following tables: Table 6.5. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected radioactive material samples in protective containers (SPCs); Table 6.6. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected nuclear material samples in protective containers (SPCs); Table 6.7. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected radioactive material samples in various combinations. The left column of the Tables contains summarized details of the measured isotope and measurement parameters. The next column presents the express analysis results obtained in the laboratory of the RRC Kurchatov Institute in 2005. Column three specifies the identification results obtained with the help of additional software (this column is in bold type). Positive results obtained with the help of additional processing are highlighted. The summary Table 6.8 and charts contain summarized results of the measurements.

57

Table 6.5. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected radioactive material samples in protective containers
Preliminary and additional Identification results (identified isotopes) -03 Preliminary Additional (file, result) result) result) -133 # 11 Ba-133 Eu-152 Pd-103 Hg-203 Bi-210 In-111 Tl-201 Pu-240 Pu-242 Th-231 -133 Ba-133 0005 (60 s) U-235 Tl-201 # 003 -133 Ba-133 0006 (180 s) -133 Eu-152 (100 s) -133 (240 s) Ba-133 K-40 In-111 U-235 Tl-201 # 004 Not identified In-111 (300 s) 58 U-235 -133 (100 s) # 14 Cs-137 -133 (240 s) # 14 Pd-103 -133 (90 s) -133 (40 s) In-111 -133 (60 s) # 12 Pd-103 Zr-95 Ce-143 # 13 Pd-103 Zr-95 -133 (240 s) # 13 Pd-103 Ba-133 -133 (180 s) # 12 Pd-103 Ba-133 (90 s) -133 (100 s) -133 Not identified #002 (100 s) -133 Ba-133 004 (90 s) Preliminary Additional (file, Preliminary Additional (file, Preliminary IdentiFINDER (Target) 1401 (Smartfone) 1802 Additional (file, result) # 11 Ba-133 Pd-103 Hg-203 In-111 Tl-201

Samples for

identification

6101

Preliminary

Additional

(file, result)

-133 activity

-133

-133

3*10 Bq without

(90 s)

K-40

shielding

# 38

-133 activity

-133

-133

3*10 Bq in 1-5 (40 s)

K-40

(5mm Pb)

# 39

-133 activity

-133

-133

3*10 Bq in

(180 s)

K-40

1-10

(10 mm Pb)

# 40

-133 activity

-133

-133

3*10 Bq in

(240 s)

K-40

1-15 0007 Ba-133 # 005 Pd-103 Ce-143 Ba-133 -40 Ba-133 # 15 Pd-103 Ba-133 I-132 I-131 Cs-137 Sb-127 Cs-137 Cs-137 Not identified # 007 (30s) (30s) 0009 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30s) # 16 s-137 Ac-228 Ra-226 Br-82 Co-60 I-132 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30s) 0010 Cs-137 (50s) Not identified # 008 Cs-137 (60s) # 17 Cs-137 Y-90 Eu-152 U-235 Te-129 Pu-241 59 Cs-137 (60s) # 17 s-137 U-235 Tl-201 Cs-137 (50s) # 16 s-137 U-235 Y-90 K-40 U-235 Tl-201 0008 # 006 (300 s) (300 s) Cs-137 Not identified In-111 -133 (300 s) not identified # 15 (300 s) Pd-103 Ba-133 I-131 Ag-110 Tl-201 I-132

(15 mm Pb)

# 41

-133 activity

-40

-133

3*10 Bq in

(300 s)

K-40

1-20

(20 mm Pb)

# 42

Cs-137 activity

Cs-137

Cs-137

3*10 Bq, without

(30s)

shielding

# 43

Cs-137 activity

Cs-137

Cs-137

3*10 Bq in

(50s)

1-5

# 44

(5 mm Pb)

I-132 Ga-67 Cs-137 Cs-137 Not identified # 18 Cs-137 Y-90 Pu-241 U-235 Te-129 Sb-125 Cs-137 Cs-137 Not identified # 010 (35s) (60s) 0012 0013 Cs-137 Cs-137 (60s) # 011 0014 Not identified (30s) Cs-137 Cs-137 (30s) # 20 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30s) Cs-137 Cs-137 (35s) # 19 Cs-137 Cs-137 (20s) # 19 s-137 U-235 Y-90 # 20 s-137 I-132 Pr-144 Eu-152 (90s) Eu-152 0017 (90s) Eu-152 In-111 Pu-239 Co-57 Am-241 # 013 Eu-152 (40s) # 22 Cs-136 Ra-226 Ac-228 Ba-133 Pb-103 Eu-152 Eu-152 (90s) # 21 Eu-152 Cs-134 Ba-133 Pd-103 U-234 Co-57 Pu-239 60 (30s) # 009 (30s) (60s) 0011 Cs-137 Cs-137 Cs-137 (30s) # 18 Cs-137

Cs-137 activity

Cs-137

Cs-137

3*10 Bq in

(30s)

1-10

# 45

(10 mm Pb)

Cs-137 activity

Cs-137

Cs-137

3*10 Bq in

(35s)

-40

1-15

(15 mm Pb)

# 46

Cs-137 activity

Cs-137

Cs-137

3*10 Bq in

(30s)

1-20

# 47

(20 mm Pb)

Eu-152 activity

Eu-152

Eu-152

3*10 Bq without

(90s)

# 48

shielding

Ce-144 In-111 Xe-133 Th-232 Ra-226 I-132 Ac-228 Pa-234 Bi-207 Nb-95 Ag-110 U-238 Eu-152 Eu-152 (300 s) # 016 0018 (40 s) Not identified Not identified Zn-65 (90s) # 23 Ag-110 Cs-137 I-132 Ac-228 Sb-127 Not identified # 22 (300 s) Cs-136 Ba-133 Pd-103 I-131 Ac-228 Pa-234 Ra-226 Not identified Eu-152 (300 s) 0019 Not identified Not identified (300 s) # 017 Not identified # 24 (300 s) Ra-226 Ba-133 Pd-103 I-131 Ga-67 61 Not identified # 23 (300 s) Br-82 Nb-95 Cs-136 K-40 Cs-134

Eu-152 activity

Eu-152

Eu-152

3*10 in 1-5

(90s)

# 49

(5 mm Pb)

Eu-152 activity

Not identified Eu-152

3*10 in 1-10

(300 s)

# 50

(10 mm Pb)

U-235 Eu-152 Co-60 Co-60 # 018 Cs-137 Th-232 Bi-207 Co-60 Co-60 (60s) # 019 Cs-137 Th-232 Bi-207 Co-60 Co-60 # 020 Cs-137 Th-232 Bi-207 Co-60 Co-60 (60s) 0025 # 021 Cs-137 Th-232 Bi-207 (40s) Co-60 Co-60 (30s) # 29 -60 Xe-133 Sr-85 Pb-212 Th-232 In-111 Sb-127 Co-60 (30s) Co-60 Co-60 (60s) 62 # 022 Cs-137 Co-60 (30s) # 30 Co-60 Co-60 (40s) # 30 Co-60 Co-60 (50s) # 29 Co-60 (30s) (60s) 0024 Co-60 Co-60 (30s) # 28 Co-60 Co-60 (30s) # 28 Co-60 (25s) Co-60 0023 Co-60 Co-60 # 27 (25s) Co-60 (20s) # 27 Co-60 (50s) Co-60 (30s) (60s) 0022 Co-60 Co-60 # 26 (40s) Co-60 # 26 Co-60 I-132 Na-24

Eu-152

Co-60 activity

Co-60

Co-60

3*10 Bq without

(40s)

# 53

shielding

Co-60 activity

Co-60

Co-60

3*10 Bq in 1-5 (25s)

# 54

(5 mm Pb)

Co-60 activity

Co-60

Co-60

3*10 Bq in

(30s)

# 55

1-10

(10 mm Pb)

Co-60 activity

Co-60

Co-60

3*10 Bq in

(40s)

# 56

K1-15

(15 mm Pb)

Co-60 activity

Co-60

Co-60

3*10 Bq in

(30s)

# 57

K1-20 0026 Bi-207 Ra-226 Ra-226 #014 # 31 not identified (22 s) Co-57 Ce-139 Am-241 Bi-207 (25 s) Ba-133 0020 (60 s) Ra-226 Ra-226 Ra-226 (30 s) # 24 Ra-226 I-131 Pd-103 Ba-133 Pm-148 Eu-152 Ra-226 Ra-226 # 015 # 32 Tl-208 V-50 La-140 Co-57 Ce-139 Am-241 Bi-207 (180 s) (120 s) 0021 Ra-226 Ra-226 (240 s) Ra-226 (120 s) # 25 Pm-148 Cs-134 Y-88 Ag-110 Br-82 Ra-226 Th-232 Th-232 # 023 Co-57 Ce-139 Co-60 Be-7 (60 s) 0027 Th-232 (60 s) Th-228 (60 s) # 33 U-235 Th-232 Tl-208 La-140 Mn-54 I-132 Cs-137 Bi-207 Sb-122 63 Th-232 Th-228 (120 s) # 31 Ac-228 La-140 Th-232 Tl-208 Xe-133 Pb-212 Te-132 Ba-133 Pd-103 Th-232

(20 mm Pb)

Ra-226 activity

Ra-226

Ra-226

2*10 Bq without

(30 s)

# 51

shielding

Ra-226 activity

Ra-226

Ra-226

2*10 Bq in

(240 s)

# 52

1-5

(5 mm Pb)

Th-232 activity

Th-232

Th-232

3*10 Bq without

(60 s)

# 58

shielding

Ag-110 Eu-152 Th-232 Th-232 # 024 Co-57 Tl-208 Th-232 U-235 Mn-54 Sb-122 Ru-103 Rh-106 Kr-85 La-140 Br-82 K-40 K-40 # 051 not identified. (120 s) 0058 K-40 (120 s) K-40 Cs-137 (300 s) # 82 Th-234 Am-241 K-40 Pu-240 Pu-242 U-234 U-238 K-40 (300 s) # 59 K-40 Co-60 Ce-139 Am-241 Bi-207 (300 s) (120 s) (120 s) 0028 Th-232 Not identified # 34 Ra-226 (120 s) # 32 Tl-208 V-50 Th-232 Cs-134 La-140 Ra-226 Br-82

Ra-226

Th-232 activity

Th-232

Th-232

3*10 Bq in

(120 s)

# 59

1-5

(5 mm Pb)

K-40 activity 5*10 K-40

K-40

Bq without

(120 s)

# 88

shielding

64

Table 6.6. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected nuclear material samples in protective containers
Preliminary and additional Identification results (identified isotopes) -03 Preliminary Additional Additional Additional (file, result) U-235, # 58 U-235 weapongrade, (25 s) U-235, weapongrade, (120 s) (file, result) U without # 025 Cd-109 isotope designation 0030 (60 s) (file, result) U-235, U-235 (90%) U-238 (180 s) Preliminary Preliminary Preliminary IdentiFINDER (Target) 1401 (Smartfon) 1802 Additional (file, result) # 33 Tl-201 Th-231 Th-234 Cd-109 U-235 Pu-242 Th-232 Tl-208 Eu-152 K-40 Pu-240 Bi-207 Co-60 Ag-110 Am-241 Ra-226 Xe-133

Samples for

identification

6101

Preliminary

Additional

(file, result)

U-235 90%

U-235,

Th-228

Sample # 1, 3 g weapon-

U-235 (90%) special,

Without

grade,

# 60

shielding

(23 s)

65

U-235 90% # 026 # 59 U-235 Am-241 Th-234 Pu-240 Pu-242 U-234 (60 s) grade, weaponTh-231 Th-234 Tl-201 U-235 Pu-242 Th-232 Cd-109 Tl-208 Eu-152 K-40 Pu-240 Am-241 Ra-226 Bi-207 U-235, U-235 (60.4%) U without # 027 Cd-109 isotope designation (60 s) 0032 Th-238 U-238 (40 s) U-235, weapongrade, (20 s) # 60 U-235 Not identified # 35 (300 s) Th-231 Am-241 Th-234 U-235 Pu-242 Pu-240 Cd-109 Tl-201 # 34 Cd-109 grade, (30 s) weaponU-235, U-235, (40 s) (60 s) 0031 U-235 (60.9%) U without U-238 isotope Th-232 designation

U-235,

Th-228

U-235,

Sample # 1, 3 g weapon-

U-235 (90%) special,

Shielding 1mm grade,

# 61

Cu

(25 s)

U-235 90%

U-235,

Th-228

Sample # 1, 3 g weapon-

U-235 (90%) special,

Shielding 2 mm grade,

# 62

Cu

(23 s)

66

U-235 90% U-235 (97%) U-238 # 028 Cd-109 grade, (30 s) weaponU-235 (300 s) Th-231 Th-234 Pu-242 Am-241 Th-234 U-235 Pu-240 Cd-109 Tl-201 Cs-134 Ra-226 U-235, # 029 Cd-109 grade, (30 s) U-235, weaponU-235 (95.9%) U without Th-232 isotope designation 0034 (60 s) (40 s) # 62 U-235 U-235, weapongrade, (25 s) # 37 Tl-208 Th-231 La-140 Th-234 Pu-242 Am-241 Th-234 U-235 Pu-240 Cd-109 Tl-201 Cs-134 Ra-226 67 isotope designation 0033 (60 s) U without U-235, # 61 Not identified # 36 (40 s)

U-235,

Th-228

U-235,

Sample # 1, 3 g weapon-

U-235 (90%) special,

Shielding

grade,

# 63

1.5 mm Fe

(27 s)

U-235 88.9% U-235,

Th-228

Sample # 2,

weapon-

U-235 (90%) special,

10 g

grade,

# 64

Shielding

(15 s)

1.5 mm Fe

Xe-133

U-235 88.9% Th-228, U-235, special, Co-60 Cs-134 Th-232 Tl-208 Sb-127 I-132 Cs-137 Ag-110 Ra-226 Br-82 K-40 0036 Co-57 (300 s) U-235 Th-232 (300 s) (300 s) Not identified # 63

Th-228

Not identified # 030

Not identified # 38 (300 s) Th-232 Tl-208 Bi-207 Kr-85 Sr-85 Ru-103 Ba-140 Sb-122 La-140 Cs-134 Ra-226

Sample # 2,

(160 s)

10 g

# 65

Shielding 5 mm

Pb

U-235 88.9% Th-228, U-235, special, K-40 (300 s) 0037 U-235 Th-232 (100 s)

Th-228

Bi-207

# 031 Co-60 K-40 I-131

Not identified # 64 (300 s) Th-234 Pu-240 Pu-242 Cs-134 Th-232 Tl-208 Sb-127 I-132

Not identified # 39 (300 s) Cs-134 Pa-234 U-238 Tl-201 Pu-242 Pu-240 Th-232 Tl-208

Sample # 2,

(133 s)

10 g. Shielding

# 66

5 mm Pb, 1 mm

Cu

68

Cs-137 Bi-207 Kr-85 Sr-85 Ru-103 Ba-140 Sb-122 La-140 Cs-134 Ra-226 Ac-228 U-235, K-40 # 032 Cd-109 (60 s) industrial U-235 (7.1%) Ra-226 (60 s) 0038 designation isotope U without Th-232, (60 s) # 65 Pa-234 Cs-137 Y-90 U-235 Pu-241 Ga-67 Not identified # 40 (300 s) Co-60 Pu-240 Pu-242 Tl-201 Na-24 Th-234 Th-234 Ra-226 Am-241 Eu-152 U-235, (60 s) 0039 U-235 (65.7%) U without isotope designation (60 s) # 033 Cd-109 Th-232, industrial (60 s) # 66 Th-232 Tl-208 Ac-228 Bi-207 69 Th-232, Th-228, industrial (60 s) # 41 Tl-201 Pu-242 Pu-240 Th-234 Ag-110 Ra-226 U-238

U-235 47%

U-238, nat.

Th-228

Sample # 3,

Th-228,

U-235 (37%) special

158 g

industrial

# 67

Shielding 3 mm (30 s)

Fe

U-235 47%

U-238, nat.

Th-228

Sample # 3,

Th-228,

U-235 (37%) special

158 g

industrial

# 68

Shielding 3 mm (47 s)

Fe, 1 mm Cu

Th-231 Pa-234 U-238 Th-232 Tl-208 Ra-226 Cd-109 Eu-152 Ac-228 Rh-106 Co-60 U-238, U-235 # 034 Cd-109 (240 s) isotope 0040 (60 s) designation Pu-240, (60 s) U without # 67 Th-232 Tl-208 Bi-207 Sb-122 Ag-110 Pa-234 U-238 U-238, (240 s) # 42 Pu-242 U-238 Pa-234 Pu-240 Tl-201 Th-234 Th-231 Cd-109 Am-241 U-238, U-238 U-235 (55%) 0041 (120 s) U without isotope designation (60 s) # 035 Cd-109 U-235, U-238 (70 s) # 68 U-235 Ac-228 U-238 (100 s) # 43 Pu-242 Pu-240 U-238 Pa-234 70

U-235 21%

U-238,

Th-228

Sample # 4,

U-235

U-235 (18%) U-235

158 g

(30 s)

# 69

Shielding 3 mm

Fe

U-235 21%

U-238,

Th-228

Sample # 4,

U-235

U-235 (17%) U-235

158 g

(30 s)

# 70

Shielding 3 mm

Fe, 1 mm Cu

La-140 Tl-201 Th-234 Na-24 Th-231 Am-241 Eu-152 Co-60 Cs-137, U-235 # 036 Cr-51 Be-7 Th-232 (200 s) U-238, U-235 Pa-234 U-238 U without 0042 designation, (60 s) isotope Cs-137, Cs-137, # 70 U-238, (50 s) Cs-137, U-238, (150 s) # 44 Pa-234 Ga-67 Pu-241 Th-231 Tl-201 Pu-242 Pu-240 U-235 Am-241 Pu-239 U-233 U-238 Co-57 I-132 Eu-152

U-235 0.71% Cs-137,

s-137

Sample #5,

U-238,

U-235

173 g Reactor-

(40 s)

(less then

type ( Cs-137)

1%)

Shielding 3 mm

# 71

Fe

# 89

71

U-235 4.4% U-235 # 69 # 61 Cs-137 Pa-234 Pu-240 Pu-242 Pu-241 Am-241 U-234 U-233 U-235 Co-57 U-238 Th-234 Th-231 Pu-239 Cd-109 Tl-201 Eu-152 Ac-228 Pu-239 Pu-239 isotope 0043 designation (60 s) WG,special Am-241 (60 s) Pu without # 037 Pu-239 U-235 Pu-239 (180 s) # 71 weapon-grade I-131 I-132 Pd-103 Ba-133 Cs-137 Y-90 72 Pu-239 (280 s) # 45 weapon-grade Th-234 Pu-242 Cd-109 Pd-103 Ba-133 U-233 U-235 Zr-95 0060 Nb-95 Pa-234 U-238 Mo-99 I-132 Br-82 (240 s) U-238 Cr-51 (300 s) (240 s) # 053 Cs-137, Cs-137, U-238, U-235 (120 s)

Am-241,

Pu-239

Cs-137,

Cs-137,

reactor-type ,

Pu-239

U-RG

Sample # 6,

(80 s)

#74

79 g Shielding

5 mm Fe

Pu-239 96.7% Pu-239

Pu-239

Sample # 7,

(45 s)

U-RG

0.3 g

#72

Without

shielding

Pu-241 Ir-192 Th-231 Am-241 I-131 Pu-240 Pu-239 Pu-239 # 038 # 72 Nb-95 I-132 Pd-103 U-233 Ir-152 Ba-133 Y-90 Pu-241 Am-241 Mo-99 Eu-152 Pu-239 U-235 Cr-51 Cd-109 (180 s) weapon-grade Zr-95 isotope 0044 (60 s) designation Pu-239 WG,special Am-241 (60 s) Pu without Sn-113 (60 s) # 46 Pu-242 Th-234 Cd-109 Na-24 Eu-152 Ba-133 Pd-103 I-131 Th-231 Co-60 U-233 Ir-152 Am-241 Pu-240 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-241 0045 WG,special (60 s) Pu without isotope designation (60 s) # 039 Zn-65 Cs-137, (150 s) # 73 I-131 I-132 Pu-240 Pu-242 Ba-133 73 Sn-113 -57 (60 s) # 47 Pu-240 Pu-242 Am-241 Th-234 U-234 U-235 Mo-99 Te-129

Pu-239 96.7% Pu-239

Pu-239

Sample #7,

(45 s)

U-RG

0.3 g

#73

Shielding

1.5 mm Cu

Pu-239 96.7% Pu-239

Pu-239

Sample #7,

-40

U-RG

0.3 g Shielding (260 s)

#75

1.5 mm Cu,

1 mm Fe

Cs-137 Th-231 U-233 Ag-110 Pd-103 Ir-192 Sb-127 Pu-239 Pu-239 (300 s) Pu-239 Th-232 Tl-208 Ce-144 Mo-99 Tc-99 Pu-239 I-132 Cs-137 U-235 Ag-110 Pd-103 Eu-152 Sb-127 Pu-239 Pu-239 0047 (120 s) Not identified # 041 (300 s) not identified Not identified # 57 (300 s) Sb-127 Te-129 I-132 Y-90 Pu-241 74 Sn-113 (150 s) # 49 Eu-152 Br-82 Pa-234 Cs-134 Sb-125 U-235 Ir-192 I-131 (300 s) 0046 Not identified # 040 Not identified # 74 WG,special (120 s) Sn-113 (150 s) # 48 Eu-152 Ra-226 Cs-134 Sb-125 Pm-148 In-111 Tl-201 U-235 Th-232 Tl-208 Br-82 Ga-67

Pu-239 96.7% Not identified -40

Sample #7,

(300 s)

Pu-239

0.3 g

U-RG

Shielding 5 mm

#76

Pb

Pu-239 96.7% Not identified # 77

Sample #7,

(300 s)

not identified WG,special

0.3 g

Shielding 5 mm

Pb

Am-241 In-111 Tl-201 U-234 Th-232 Tl-208 Pu-239 La-140 K-40, Pu-239 Pu-238 not identified I-132 Pr-144 Te-129 Am-241, # 045 U-235 Pu-239 I-125 Pu without isotope 0051 (60 s) designation Not identified # 75 (300 s) Am-241 Th-231 Th-234 U-234 Co-57 Pu-240 Pu-242 Pu-239 I-132 Cs-137 I-131 Sb-127 75 Sn-113 (150 s) # 53 Th-234 Pu-242 Pu-240 Cd-109 Na-24 Pu-241 Y-90 I-131 Ba-133 Th-231 Am-241 Eu-152 Pu-240 Pu-241 0049 Pu-239 Pu-239 Am-241 WG,special Am-241 (60 s) (300 s) (300 s) Sb-127 Not identified # 042 Not identified # 50 Pu-239 WG,special (300 s) Not identified # 50 (300 s)

Pm-148

Pu-239 96.7% Am-241,

Pu-239

Sample #7,

Pu-239

U-RG

not identified

0.3 g Shielding nuclear,

# 81

10 mm Pb

(40 s)

Pu-239 90%

Not identified Pu-239

Sample # 8,

(300 s)

U-RG

5.9 g

# 82

Without

shielding

Ag-110

Co-60

Pu-239 90% Pu-239 # 76 I-131 I-132 Cs-137 (300 s) (300 s) U-235 Pu-239 Cr-51 (300 s) Cs-137, 0052 Pu-239 WG,special (60 s)

Not identified Not identified Pu-239

Not identified # 046

Not identified # 54 In-111 Tl-201 U-235 Ga-67 I-131

Sample # 8,

(300 s)

# 83

5.9 g

in 1-5

(5 mm Pb) Pu-239 (300 s) U-235 Pu-239 Zn-65 0053 (300 s) Not identified # 047 Cs-137, # 77 I-131 Ba-133 I-132 Cs-137 Pd-103 Ag-110

Pu-239 90% WG,special (120 s)

Cs-137,

Not identified Pu-239

Not identified # 56 (300 s) Th-231 Am-241 Ce-143 Cs-137 I-132 Ag-110 Pd-103 Sb-127 Ba-133 Th-234 Pu-240 Pu-242 U-233 U-234 Co-57 Pu-239

Sample #8,

Cr-51

# 84

5.9 g

(120 s)

in 1-10

(10 mm Pb)

76

I-131 Sb-125

Pu-239 90% Not identified # 048 Cs-137, # 78 K-40 Sb-127 I-132 Cs-137 Pu-239 Not identified # 055 Cs-137, (300 s) (300 s) U-233 Th-232 Pu-239 reactor-type , Am-241 (300 s) # 54 Th-234 Pu-240 Pu-242 Pd-103 Am-241 (300 s) (300 s) U-235 Ce-139 Tc-99m WG,special K-40 (240 s)

Pu-239

U-WG

Pu-239

Not identified # 51 (300 s) not identified.

Sample # 8,

WG,special

Pu-239

5.9 g in 1-15 Pu-239

# 93

(15 mm Pb)

reactor-type ,

Am-241

(300 s) Cs-137, (300 s) # 63 Cs-137 Ir-192 Be-7 Y-90 U-235 In-111 Pu-241 Sb-125 Ru-103

Pu-239

U-235,

Th-228

irradiated ,

weapon-

U-235 (90%) WG,special

reactor-type

grade,

# 60

Sample # 9,

(23 s)

60 g

Shielding 5 mm

Fe

77

Table 6.7. Additional identification of the spectra of the inspected nuclear material samples in various combinations.
Preliminary and additional Identification results (identified isotopes) -03 Preliminary Additional Additional Additional (file, result) U-238, # 53 U-235 I-131 Pd-103 Ba-133 U-235 (120 s) Sn-113, U-235 (120 s) (file, result) U, without # 044 Pu-239 Cd-109 Ga-67 isotope designation 0050 (60 s) (file, result) Pu-239 WG, Pu-239 U-235 U-235 Preliminary Preliminary Preliminary IdentiFINDER (Target) 1401 (Smartfon) 1802 Additional (file, result) # 52 Th-231 Th-234 Pu-242 Tl-201 Pu-240 Cd-109 U-235 Th-232 Tl-208 Cs-134 Ra-226 Bi-207 Am-241 Br-82 Pu-239 WG, Pu-239 Ba-133 0054 Am-241, Ba-133 (60 s) Ba-133, Pu- without isotope designation (60 s) 78 # 048 U-235 Ce-139 Tc-99m Ba-133 (120 s) # 80 Pd-103 Sb-127 I-132 Ce-143 Ba-133 (120 s) # 57 Th-231 Th-234 Cd-109 Pd-103

Samples for

identification

6101

Preliminary

Additional

(file, result)

Pu-239 96.7%

Pu-239 WG,

U-RG Pu-

Sample # 7, 0.3 g U-235

239

U-235-90%,

(30 s)

U-235 (90%) (60 s)

Sample # 1,

Th-228

3 g Without

# 78

shielding

Pu-239 96.7%

Ba-133

U-Pu-239

Sample # 7, 0.3 g (30 s)

-133

-133 activity

# 85

3*10 Bq

Without Cs-137 Pu-240 I-131 U-233 Am-241 Ba-133 Ba-133, Pu-239 # 049 # 81 Pd-103 d-109 Pu-242 0055 Th-231 Sb-127 I-132 Ce-143 Cs-137 Ba-133, Pu-240 Pu-239 Ba-133 0057 Ce-139 (60 s) U-235 Ba-133 # 050 Pu-239 WG, Am-241, (120 s) Ba-133 (120 s) # 83 U-238 Pa-234 U-235 Zr-95 I-132 Pu-241 Cs-137, U-238 Cs-137 U-235 (7%) U-238, U-235 (120 s) 79 Cs-137, (300 s) # 053 Cr-51 Cs-137, (300 s) # 84 Cs-137 Eu-152 U-238 Cs-137, (300 s) # 62 s-137 Ir-192 Be-7 Ba-133 (120 s) # 61 U-235 Ce-139 (300 s) Pu-240 Ba-133 (60 s) Pu-239 WG, Am-241, (180 s) Ba-133 Not identified Not identified (300 s) # 58 Pd-103 I-131 Ba-133 Pu-242

shielding

Pu-239 96.7%

Ba-133

-133

Sample # 7, 0.3 g (30 s)

# 86

-133 activity

3*10 Bq

Shielding 1 mm

Fe

Pu-239 96.7%

Ba-133

-133

Sample #7, 0.3 g (60 s)

# 87

not identified

-133 activity

3*10 Bq

Shielding 2 mm

Fe

U-235 4.4%,

Cs-137,

U-235 (6%)

regenerated with U-238,

Cs-137

Cs-137

U-235

# 90

Sample #6, 79 g (30 s)

Shielding 5 mm 0060 Tl-201 Ru-103 Te-129 Sb-125 I-132 Ra-226 Pa-234

Fe

Table 6.8. Summary of the results on express and additional identification. Results of express identification / results on additional identification (using software)
IdentiFINDER PM1401K 9/ 19/10 19/9 19/0 additional identification was not carried out 9/ additional identification was not carried out 1/ 0/0 0/2 1/0 additional identification was not carried out (Smartfon) 1802 (Target) Id 1000 GR-135 8/ additional identification was not carried out 10/ additional identification was not carried out 2/ additional identification was not carried out 2/3 14/18 21/23 6101

Sources

MKS-A03

Radioactive materials (23 samples)

21/23

Nuclear materials (23 samples)

10/9 5/2

24/21

14(without isotopic composition) /6 (only Pu-239)

Combinations of radioactive and nuclear materials (23 samples)

5/5

80

6.3. Summary on capabilities of the devices for identification of nuclear and radioactive materials
6.3.1. Spectrometer InSpector 1000 The InSpector 1000 sample provided for testing was subject to periodical additional calibration. Considering the customs control procedures in field conditions, long adjustment procedures considerably affect the use of the device. User interface is quite complicated. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: 4 out of 6 radioactive sources offered for testing; 5 out of 6 uranium product samples offered; None of the plutonium product samples offered.

The device is not equipped with a neutron channel. The software is sufficiently comprehensive with a high level of detail as to the SPC modeling elements. The program weakness includes difficulties in working with it, which may impede its use during the customs FRM control. 6.3.2. Spectrometer MKS AT 6101 The MKS AT6101 sample provided for testing is capable of energy calibration using the K-40 source, which is not covered by the Radiation Safety Regulations due to its activity level. This is a considerable advantage of the device in terms of operation convenience and simplicity when identifying radioactive cargo in field conditions. The user interface is simple and easy to use. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: All the radioactive sources offered for testing (it also showed one of the best results when these isotopes were screened by protective materials); 5 out of 6 uranium product samples offered; 2 out of 3 plutonium product samples offered.

The device is not equipped with a neutron channel. - The spectrum identification result is shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; - Complex-isotope spectra contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; - The library of nuclides is editable; - The measurement result protocol is printable; The spectrum is printable. The convergence rate for the results obtained in the course of the express analysis and the analysis using additional software is very high and is one of the best ones. Considering the fact that this radiometer-spectrometer showed one of the best express analysis results, especially for the complex-isotope spectra, and the best result in additional processing of complex-isotope spectra with the help of software indicating the U-235 and Pu-239 enrichment, this radiometerspectrometer meets the requirements of the customs FRM control technology in the full amount. Its additional benefits include maximum simplicity in printing out the measurement results and user-friendly interface. 6.3.3. Spectrometer MKS-A03 The MKS-A03 sample provided for testing is equipped with the Th-232 calibration gammasource located on a special platform, therefore the device automatically performs additional
81

calibration of its spectrometric channel when in a stand-by mode. The device was not subject to additional calibration during the tests. This is a considerable advantage of the device in terms of operation convenience and simplicity when identifying radioactive cargo in field conditions. The user interface is simple and easy to use. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: All the radioactive sources offered for testing (it also showed one of the best results when these isotopes were screened by protective materials); 6 out of 6 uranium product samples offered (in the express analysis mode the device quite correctly distinguished between the low enriched and highly enriched uranium samples, which is unique for this class of equipment); 3 out of 3 plutonium product samples offered, which is unique for this class of equipment. Being equipped with a neutron channel MKS-A03 showed the best result in identifying nuclear materials based on their neutron radiation.

- The spectrum identification result is shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; - Complex-isotope spectra contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; - The library of nuclides is editable; - The measurement result protocol is printable; The spectrum is printable. The convergence rate for the results obtained in the course of the express analysis and the analysis using additional software is very high and is one of the best ones. Considering the fact that this radiometer-spectrometer showed the best express analysis result especially for the complex-isotope spectra and mixtures, this radiometer-spectrometer meets the requirements of the customs FRM control technology in the full amount. There is a minor weakness related to some difficulties in printing out the measurement results. 6.3.4. Spectrometer IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target) The IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target) sample provided for testing is capable of energy calibration using a LED-generated photo peak, therefore the device was not subject to additional calibration during the tests. This is a considerable advantage of the device in terms of operation convenience and simplicity when identifying radioactive cargo in field conditions. The user interface is simple and easy to use. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: The basic number of radioactive sources offered for testing (6 out of 6 were identified; only non-protected Eu-152 sample could be pre-identified); 5 out of 6 uranium product samples offered; 2 out of 3 plutonium product samples offered; IdentiFINDER Ultra (Target) showed the worst result in identifying nuclear materials based on their neutron radiation.

82

- The spectrum identification result is shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; - Complex-isotope spectra do not contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; - The library of nuclides is editable; - The measurement result protocol is not printable; The spectrum is not printable. In spite of high express analysis results shown by the identifier, especially for radioactive materials the use of additional software did not provide for additional information about the spectra measured. 6.3.5. Spectrometer Exploranium GR-135 The GR-135 sample provided for testing is equipped with the Cs-137 calibration gamma-source located on a special platform. The device was subject to additional calibration during the tests. User interface is rather complicated. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: Only 2 out of 6 radioactive sources offered for testing; 6 out of 6 uranium product samples offered; 2 out of 3 plutonium product samples offered; The device is not equipped with a neutron channel.

It was not possible to open the saved files with a .txt extension containing information about the spectra measured. 6.3.6. Spectrometer MKS-PM1401K The PM1401K sample provided for testing is equipped with the Cs-137 calibration gammasource located on a special platform, therefore the device was not subject to additional calibration during the tests. This is a considerable advantage of the device in terms of operation convenience and simplicity when identifying radioactive cargo in field conditions. The user interface is simple and easy to use. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: The basic number of radioactive sources offered for testing (6 out of 6 were identified; only non-protected Eu-152 sample could be pre-identified); 6 out of 6 uranium product samples offered (in the express analysis mode the device quite correctly distinguished between the low enriched and highly enriched uranium samples, which is unique for this class of equipment); Only 1 out of 3 plutonium product samples offered.

As it is equipped with a neutron channel PM1401K showed one the best results in identifying nuclear materials by their neutron radiation. - The spectrum identification result is shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; - Complex-isotope spectra contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; - The library of nuclides is editable; - The measurement result protocol is printable; The spectrum is printable. The convergence rate for the results obtained in the course of the express analysis and the analysis using additional software is low. The results obtained in the course of additional processing of complex-isotope spectra with the help of software contain information as to the U-235 and Pu-239 enrichment; however, it is not always correct. A list of identified isotopes is
83

shown in the measurement protocol. The list often contained 10-20 items, which cannot be described as a correct identification. Most of the isotopes are within triplets and multiplets irresolvable by the software used. This radiometer-spectrometer does not meet the requirements of the customs FRM control technology in the full amount. Its additional benefits include maximum simplicity in printing out the measurement results and a user-friendly interface. 6.3.7. Spectrometer Smartphone PM1802 The Smartphone PM1802 sample provided for testing was not equipped with the Cs-137 calibration gamma-source. The device was not subject to additional calibration during the tests since the producers representative recommended not carrying out such work but using the calibration performed at the factory instead. In the express analysis mode the device was able to identify: The basic number of radioactive sources offered for testing (6 out of 6 were identified; only non-protected Eu-152 sample could be pre-identified); 3 out of 6 uranium product samples offered; None of the 3 plutonium product samples offered.

PM1802 showed one the worst results in identifying nuclear materials based on their neutron radiation. - The spectrum identification result is shown as a letter-and-digit abbreviation; - Complex-isotope spectra contain information as to the U-235 enrichment for U spectra and the Pu-239 enrichment for Pu spectra, respectively; - The library of nuclides is editable; - The measurement result protocol is printable; The spectrum is printable. The convergence rate for the results obtained in the course of the express analysis and the analysis using additional software is extremely low. The device showed poor results in the express analysis of the spectra obtained. The results obtained in the course of additional processing of complex-isotope spectra with the help of software contain information as to the U-235 and Pu-239 enrichment; however, it is not always correct. A list of identified isotopes is shown in the measurement protocol. The list often contained 10-20 items, which cannot be described as a correct identification. Most of the isotopes are within triplets and multiplets irresolvable by the software used. The software used in the device is similar to that used in the Survey radiometer-spectrometer PM1401K. This device does not meet the requirements of the customs FRM control technology in the full amount. Its additional benefits include maximum simplicity in printing out the measurement results and a user-friendly interface.

CONCLUSIONS
The information on the most frequently shipped radioactive sources and nuclear materials and design of standard shipping containers for the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances was systemized. The capabilities of spectrometers (identifiers) on transport index confirmation were verified. All tested devices are capable to solve a problem of transport index confirmation The spectrometric analysis of most frequently shipped isotopes was carried out. 3. The spectrometer capabilities were verified in terms of the definition of isotopic composition of gamma nuclides in their various combinations, and isotopic composition of radioactive substances and nuclear materials placed in various protective containers.
84

For the decision of the problem of radioisotope identification, it is expedient to develop devices with extremely simplified procedure of measurements and identification and friendly user interface. Information about each saved spectrum is stored in a special file. Each software developer currently uses its own format for presenting the information, which extremely impedes adaptation and unification of the measured spectra obtained with the help of different radiometer-spectrometers. Each spectrum file contains the necessary calibrations as to the energy and resolution of the spectrometer and each ADC channel stores a fixed number of pulses; yet the information is presented in quite different forms and the files have different extensions. In order to unify the customs FRM control procedure related to the spectra identification, the exchange of spectrometric information (including that with customs services in other countries) in a single format seems crucial. The software should become as understandable and user-friendly as possible to be used in the customs FRM control technologies, considering that measurements are taken almost in field conditions and within a minimum period of time. The software product should move from a survey instrument category into a practical one. In preparing a library of nuclides for resolving the tasks of the customs FRM control, the spectrum is to be modeled for each nuclide both without any protection and with its possible distortion by the protection. Each nuclide spectrum should be described with account taken of the lines adjusted to their weakening by the protection, the total absorption peaks, the backscatter peaks, the leakage peaks, the Compton edges, etc. The results obtained in the course of this work as well as positive results in the field of customs FRM control identified in such radiometer-spectrometers as -6101 and MKS-03 (using additional software to obtain additional supportive information as to the measured spectra) are recommended to be used by IAEA to standardize the spectrometric measurement procedures. It is advisable to start developing the relevant IAEA Recommendations and to continue the work related to further improvement of this category of spectrometric equipment and transfer of the existing software into a more practical field of use.

85

Verification of the Design Information of Shipment Containers Using Gamma-Spectrometry

S. Korneyev Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research, NAS, Belarus, Minsk A. Khilmanovich, B. Martsynkevich B.I. Stepanov Institute of Physics, NAS, Belarus, Minsk E. Bystrov ATOMTEX Enterprise, Belarus, Minsk Abstract The possibility of using the Compton parts in a spectrum to determine the thickness of possible shielding materials was analyzed. Measurements were made, using 137Cs and
60

Co sources, that showed that it is possible to do this using data from either NaI(Tl)

or HPGe detectors. The accuracy of the method was analyzed, and found to be promising. An algorithm based upon this work was developed, and inserted into commercially-available software. At present time the correctness of software has been tested for lead, steel and a tungsten shields with thicknesses from 3 to 50 mm for
152

Eu,

137

Cs,

60

Co,

133

Ba,

88

Y, and

22

Na. This developed software can be used in

practice by customs services and can be easily implemented for routine procedures.

INTRODUCTION As usual for storage and transportation of radioactive sources and nuclear materials are used containers made of materials with high Z for effective shielding of the gammaradiation. Declared value of activity and isotope content of radioactive source transported in the container can be controlled by means of measurements of an external gamma-ray field on a surface of the transport container, but for definition of real activity of transported radioactive material it is necessary to know precisely thickness of a wall of the container and a material of which the container is made. In this work we study of possibilities to extract information about container design by analyzing of gamma radiation of transported source inside. Because of transformation of the original spectra of a source of radiation by shielding material there is opportunity to measure container thickness using shape of pulse-height spectra measured outside a container. In the 1st year of the project, we used Monte Carlo simulation simultaneously with experiments to assess possible approaches for the solving of formulated task. For this 1st year, data from a HPGe detector and from a NaI(Tl) detector were compared to calculations and Monte Carlo Simulation. In the 2nd year of the project, we, in cooperation with staff from the company Atomtex, implemented these results using NaI hardware and commercially-available software. Year 1 activities 1. Experimental and calculation method 1.1. Experiment setup The geometry used for the initial calculations and experiments is shown in a Fig. 1

Fig. 1. Experiment layout. Measurements were carried out in geometry when the detector was on distance of 50 and 100 mm from a radioactive source which was placed behind lead shield with thickness which varied up to 50 mm. Such variations in thickness of shield have been chosen from a reason of that these thicknesses are characteristic for typical designs of containers intended for transportation low activity radioactive sources. In experiments standard gamma ray point type sources manufactured by VNIIM Russia were used. 1

Intensity of a source 137Cs was 6.63104 gammas per second and 60Cs 4.57104 gammas per second. Measurements were carried out with HPGe and NaI(Tl) detectors with the following characteristics: energy resolution of detector NaI(Tl) manufactured by Bicron with the size of the crystal 2"x2" is 7 % on 662 keV; energy resolution of semi-conductor detector GC2018 manufactured by Canberra is 1.8 keV on 1332 keV and efficiency of registration of 20 % relative to NaI(Tl) 3"x3" on 1332 keV on 25 cm distance. For the analysis of spectra portable analyzer InSpector fully controlled by PC was used. The measured spectra were analyzed by Genie-2000 software [12]. If necessary, additional processing of pulse-height spectra (smoothing, subtraction of a background) was made. Parameters of energy calibration and parameters of peak Gaussian broadening were used at processing and as input data at Monte Carlo simulation. Acquired data was stored in 4096 channels for HPGe detector and 512 channels for NaI(Tl) detector [34]. 1.2. Monte-Carlo simulation General-purpose Monte Carlo computer code MCNP [5] was used for simulation of pulse-height spectra. So-called pulse height tally is built in MCNP code for modeling of detector response and this possibility was used in simulation process. The pulse height tally is analogous to a physical detector and represents distribution of the absorbed energy in spectrometer channels due to physical processes of radiation interaction with detector material. Measurements of pulse-height spectra of radioactive sources 241Am, 57 Co, 133Ba, 137Cs, 60Co for different distances was performed for creation and test of adequate mathematical models of detectors. Then were calculations with the purpose of adjustment of parameters of mathematical models to bring to conformity of experimental and modeled parameters. Schematic drawings of used models are presented in a Figs 23. Well known, that the data of manufacturers of semi-conductor detectors on their sizes are not absolutely exact and the detailed model demands the account of its geometrical form, the data on depth of an internal aperture, thickness of a dead layer besides influence of heterogeneity of an electric field inside the detector is essential that results in non-uniformity in sensitivity volume of the detector. The account of these data is very important at carrying out of mathematical calibrations of the detector for absolute measurements [67]. The model were adjusted to provide difference between experimental efficiencies and calculated within the limits of 5%. Much more attention paid on as possible to satisfy to the requirement of similarity of the shape of the calculated and measured spectra.

Fig. 2. Sectional view of HPGe detector model used in Monte Carlo calculations.

Fig. 3. Sectional view of NaI(Tl) detector model used in Monte Carlo calculations. In Tables 1 and 2 are presented measured and Monte Carlo simulated efficiencies. It is necessary to pay attention, that the consent of calculation and experiment for the semi-conductor detector in the chosen range is better, this fact can be explained more developed mathematical model and more simple procedure of the analysis of the pulseheight spectra. Table 1. Experimental and calculated full-energy peak efficiency for HPGe detector, 20% efficiency relative to NaI(Tl) 10 cm E, keV 59 122 276 303 356 384 662 1174 1332 exp 3.81 103 8.22 103 5.24 103 4.68 103 4.01 103 3.71 103 2.23 10
3

20 cm calc 4.15 103 8.51 103 4.94 103 4.48 103 3.96 103 3.48 103 2.15 10
3

,%
2.1 9.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1

,%
<1

exp 1.06 103 2.31 103 1.56 103 1.40 103 1.21 103 1.15 103 6.40 10
4

,%
2.2 9.9 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2

calc 1.14 103 2.38 103 1.51 103 1.37 103 1.17 103 1.08 103 6.47 10
4

,%
<1

<1
<1 <1

<1
<1 <1

<1
<1 <1

<1
<1 <1

1.28 103 1.14 103

1.31 103 1.19 103

<1
<1

3.97 104 3.51 104

3.99 104 3.62 104

<1
<1

Table 2. Experimental and calculated full-energy peak efficiency for NaI(Tl) 2"x2" detector 10 cm E, keV 59 122 662 1174 1332 exp 1.14 102 3.41 103 1.53 103 1.46 103 20 cm calc 1.13 102 1.19 10
2

,%
2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2

,%
<1
<1 <1

exp 3.02 103 1.13 103 4.69 104 4.45 104

,%
2.7 2.2 2.3 2.3

calc 3.15 103 3.37 10

3

,%
<1
<1 <1

3.42 103 1.88 103 1.67 103

1.06 103 5.81 104 5.24 103

<1
<1

<1
<1

A number of calculations with shielded and unshielded sources of gamma rays with wide energy range have been performed to show adequacy of the description of the shape of calculated pulse height spectra to measured ones. Monte Carlo simulated pulse-height spectra in comparison with experiment are presented on Figs 411. Comparison of the simulated and measured spectra shows, that model calculation does not allow to describe the shape of tails of spectra from zero up to energy close to Compton edge in case of detector NaI(Tl) and in soft area of energies in case HPGe. The principal cause of distinctions will be that multiple scattered gamma rays appear in real experiment. The account of this can be carried out by detailed modeling of structure of a design of the detector and detailed reproduction of conditions of experiment. For the problems of the research there is no such necessity. Moreover, this result specifies undesirability of use of a low energy tail of a spectrum because its shape is very sensitive and can vary depending on measurement conditions.

Fig. 4. A comparison of the measured NaI(Tl) spectrum for gamma-rays from 137Cs with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 10 mm.

Fig. 5. A comparison of the measured NaI(Tl) spectrum for gamma-rays from 60Co with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 10 mm.

Fig. 6. A comparison of the measured NaI(Tl) spectrum for gamma-rays from 137Cs with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 20 mm.

Fig. 7. A comparison of the measured NaI(Tl) spectrum for gamma-rays from 60Co with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 20 mm.

Fig. 8. A comparison of the measured HPGe spectrum for gamma-rays from 137Cs with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 10 mm.

Fig. 9. A comparison of the measured HPGe spectrum for gamma-rays from 60Co with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 10 mm.

Fig. 10. A comparison of the measured HPGe spectrum for gamma-rays from 137Cs with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 20 mm.

Fig. 11. A comparison of the measured HPGe spectrum for gamma-rays from 60Co with Monte Carlo simulated spectrum. Lead Shield Thickness: 20 mm.

2. Extracting information about shield thickness 2.1. Studied approaches The possibility of use of the Compton part of a spectrum for extraction of the information on thickness of the container on measurements of a radiation from a source placed inside the container is investigated. In general the problem will consist in a choice of values on which change it is possible to judge change of thickness. The possibility of use of the ratio of areas taken from different windows of a spectrum and use of only part of Compton tail has been investigated. This work is based on study pulse-height spectra from 137Cs and 60o sources shielded by lead. The assumption of a possibility of use of a Compton part of a pulse-height spectrum is based on fact, that the shape of a registered spectrum is influenced by gamma rays undergoes Compton scattering in a material of shield. In a Fig. 12 are presented of Monte Carlo calculated scattered photon fluxes on surface of lead shield for different thicknesses of shield for 662 keV source.

Fig. 12. Monte Carlo calculated scattered photon fluxes on surface of lead shield after transition of different thicknesses from 662 keV source.

The analysis of these distributions shows that the energy averaged on a spectrum shape of scattered gamma rays increases with increase in thickness of shield. The ratio scattered and nonscattered gamma rays also increases. Table 3. Energies of gamma rays averaged on spectrum shape versus shield thickness H, mm 5 10 15 20 25 30 6 E, keV 489 504 512 517 520 523

Thus, with increase of shield thickness high-energy gamma rays scattered in shield make a contribution to measured pulse-height spectrum simultaneously with nonscattered gamma rays reached detector. It results the deformation of spectra within Compton continuum. It allows, in general, explaining presence of effects studied in the work. For an illustration of this statement in a Fig. 13 response function of detector NaI(Tl) are presented for various thickness of shield normalized on a maximum of fullabsorption peak of 137Cs source.

Fig. 13. Normalized on maximum in full-absorption peak pulse-height spectra of 137Cs for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) detector. 2.2. Using Peak to part of Compton tail ratio method From the theory of interaction of radiation with matter is known that Compton scattering gamma rays in a material of the detector results formation of Compton tail. This arises due to incomplete transfer of energy of gamma rays to detector material. This Compton tail on the right is limited to energy determined by equation

ECE = E

E 1+
2E mc
2

(1)

where E - energy of emitted gamma rays and ECE - Compton edge energy. Table 4. Calculated energies of Compton edges E , keV 662 1174 1332 ECE , keV 478 964 1118

General procedure of the analysis of spectra is consist in a choice of two windows to calculate ratio of the count sums of pulse-height spectra. In Table 5 the sizes of windows in keV for used types of detectors and used gamma-ray sources are presented. 7

Table 5. Width of windows in keV used for peak/Compton ratio analysis

137

Cs II 600720 660665 I 8501000 850964

60

Co II 11001440

I NaI(Tl) Ge 440530 440478

(11721177) + (13291334)

The choice of width of windows can be made arbitrary in some extent, but we were guided by the following criteria: 1. Do not use a low-energy part of a tail in view of the significant contribution scattered gamma-rays. 2. The right border is defined by Compton edge corresponding to energy of radioactive source. In a case 60Co for HPGe the detector as border energy corresponding to a line with smaller energy 1174 keV is chosen. In case of detector NaI(Tl) the account of Gaussian broadening of a spectrum results in a choice of the right border different from exact value. Generally procedure should be reduced to summation of the areas of all peaks (region II) and then this sum it is necessary to divide on Compton component (region I). Ratio peak/Compton should be beforehand known for the specific detector and a radioactive source stored in the container. Generally it is possible to calculate with program MCNP pulse-height spectra from sources with separate energies for various thicknesses and then make summation according to emission probabilities. In case of discreet set of spectra it is necessary develop interpolation procedure to obtain spectra corresponding exact value of energy. Described procedure is some kind of mathematical calibration. Using precalculated spectra seems the most preferable and flexible. It is enough to set a radioactive material to receive a required set of peak/Compton ratios for various thicknesses. In Figs 1617 comparisons experimental results with Monte Carlo simulations are shown. The received satisfactory agreement of experiment with calculation has allowed us to use of calculated calibration values of peak/Compton dependent of thickness of shield.

Fig. 14. Ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137 Cs as function of lead shield thickness for NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 15. Ratio of counts in the sum of full-energy peaks to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co as function of lead shield thickness for NaI(Tl) detector.

In a Figs 1617 peak/Compton ratios for NaI(Tl) detector are presented. The received dependences are approximated exponential function. The received dependences are calibration characteristics of the detector for measurement of shield thickness.

Fig. 16. Lead shield thickness versus ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs for NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 17. Lead shield thickness versus ratio of counts in the full-energy peaks to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co for NaI(Tl) detector.

Similar measurements and calculations have been executed for detector HPGe. Results of comparison of experiments and calculations are resulted in a Figs 1819.

Fig. 18. Ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137 Cs as function of lead shield thickness for HPGe detector.

Fig. 19. Ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 60 Co as function of lead shield thickness for HPGe detector.

In a Figs 2021 are presented calibration curves for HPGe detector.

Fig. 20. Lead shield thickness versus ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs for HPGe detector.

Fig. 21. Lead shield thickness versus ratio of counts in the full-energy peaks to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co for HPGe detector.

On Fig. 22 shown result of zero extrapolation of ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs for HPGe detector. Result obtained allows estimating of minimum of upper limit of thickness of lead shield which can be determined using described method. Generally speaking this is very rough estimation because real dependence is not linear. The general analysis allows asserting, that with increase in thickness of shield the accuracy decreases in view of that the steepness of curve dependence grows.

Fig. 22. Extrapolated lead shield thickness versus ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs for HPGe detector. Estimation of accuracy of the suggested method can be performed by setting initial conditions. Assume that precision in measurement of the peak/Compton ratio is 2%. Having analytical expressions of dependence of peak/Compton ratio from thickness it is possible to receive easily analytical dependence of accuracy of measurement versus of measured thickness. In a Figs 2324 dependences for detector NaI(Tl) are shown. The 10

behavior of these curves completely depends on the calculated peak/Compton ratio and can be considered as estimation.

Fig. 23. Estimated standard deviation in determining of shield thickness with 137Cs source inside container. NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 24. Estimated standard deviation in determining of shield thickness with 60Co source inside container. NaI(Tl) detector.

It is important to estimate time of measurement necessary for achievement of precision of 2%. Having the calculated response functions and setting value of source intensity 3.7105 cps it is possible to calculate required time. In a Fig. 25 dependences of necessary time of measurement versus of thickness of shield are shown. From obtained distributions is clear advantage of NaI(Tl) detector. In such measurements efficiency of registration is more important factor for maintenance of comprehensible accuracy in comparison with the energy resolution of the detector.

Fig. 25. Measurement time versus lead shield thickness for reaching 2% precision in determining of ratio of counts in the full-energy peak to part of Compton tail in pulseheight spectrum of 3.7105 Bq 137Cs and 60Co inside container.

11

2.3. Method based on analysis Compton part of pulse-height spectra only In this method for the analysis the part of a spectrum corresponding Compton tail is used by itself. This is preferable approach from our point of view. Powerful methods developed in the theory of recognition of images can be used in this approach. In our case the problem of classification can be formulated as comparison of the chosen quantitative characteristics of the measured distributions with measured or calculated beforehand for known thickness of shield. The analysis of this region allows asserting, that the shape of a spectrum depends on thickness of a wall of container. In general case it would interest to find of such transformation which convert the space of spectra into space of attributes. Thickness is such attribute in considered problem. In a Figs 2635 the simulated spectra for HPGe and NaI(Tl) are presented depending on thickness of lead shield. The analysis of these distributions allows asserting, that the form of a spectrum strongly depends on thickness of shield. The general approach will consist in search of a matrix of transformation R which satisfies to equation

T = RS ,

(2)

where T identity matrix with dimensions NxN equal to number of discrete values of thickness of shield, S a matrix made of vectors of the spectra corresponding to discrete thickness with dimension MxN, where M number of channels of a spectrum. Dimension of a matrix R is NxM. Having a set of spectra it is possible to calculate value of a matrix from matrix equation

R = T S 1 .

(3)

Thus the task is reduced to task of finding of Moore-Penrose inverse of a matrix with columns representing of spectra for various thickness of shields. It is important that dimensions of matrix satisfy condition M > N. At the solving of this problem it is necessary to be limited to reasonable number of channels in a spectrum, i.e. the analyzed spectrum should be convoluted till the reasonable sizes. We are considered 50 groups in interesting energy range. Also it is necessary to scale a spectrum in limits from 0 up to 1. The calculations have shown suitability of such approach. In work we used method based on calculation of area under normalized Compton tail. On Figs 2728, 30-31, 32, 34 presented spectra normalized on a maximum of Compton peak and full-absorption peak. Such normalization allows transforming a spectrum to such units when dependence on distance between detector and source disappears and there is only a dependence on thickness of shield. The area of normalized Compton part of a tail depends on thickness of shield thickness.

12

Fig. 26. Monte Carlo simulated pulse-height spectra of 60Co for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 27. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulse- Fig. 28. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 60Co normalized on maximum in height spectra of 60Co normalized on full-energy Compton tail for different thicknesses of lead peak for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) shield. NaI(Tl) detector. detector.

Fig. 29. Monte Carlo simulated pulse-height spectra of 137Co for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) detector. 13

Fig. 30. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 137Cs normalized on maximum in Compton tail for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 31. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 137Cs normalized on maximum in full-energy peak for different thicknesses of lead shield. NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 32. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 60Co normalized on maximum in 964 keV Compton peak for different thicknesses of lead shield. HPGe detector.

Fig. 33. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 60Co for different thicknesses of lead shield. HPGe detector.

14

Fig. 34. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 137Cs normalized on maximum in Compton peak (478 keV) for different thicknesses of lead shield. HPGe detector.

Fig. 35. Fragment of Monte Carlo simulated pulseheight spectra of 137Co for different thicknesses of lead shield. HPGe detector.

In Table 6 the sizes of windows in keV for various types of detectors and radioactive sources are presented. Table 6. Size of windows (keV) used for Compton part of spectra analysis
137

Cs

60

Co

NaI(Tl) Ge

440-530 450-650

850-1000 750-1150

On Figs 3639 normalized areas are plotted.

Fig. 36. Area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs normalized on height of fullenergy peak versus lead shield thickness for NaI(Tl) detector.

Fig. 37. Area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co normalized on height of fullenergy peak (1174 keV) versus lead shield thickness for NaI(Tl) detector.

15

Fig. 38. Area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs normalized on height of fullenergy peak versus lead shield thickness for HPGe detector.

Fig. 39. Area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co normalized on height of fullenergy peak (1174 keV) versus lead shield thickness for HPGe detector.

The resulted calculations are in good agreement with experimental results. In a Figs 4041 are shown calibration characteristics for HPGe detector. Values of the calculated calibration values for HPGe detector are shown in table 7.

Fig. 40. Lead shield thickness versus area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 137Cs normalized on height of full-energy peak for HPGe detector.

Fig. 41. Lead shield thickness versus area under Compton part in pulse-height spectrum of 60Co normalized on height of full-energy peak (1174 keV) for HPGe detector.

16

Table 7. Calibration values for determining shield thickness with HPGe detector using area of Compton part of pulse-height spectrum normalized on height of full-energy peak
60

Co SD 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.80 0.88 0.96 1.05 1.14 1.25 1.36 1.49 1.62 1.77 1.93 2.11 2.27

137

Cs SD 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.62 0.73 0.86

Thickness, mm 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5 30.0 32.5 35.0 37.5 40.0 42.5 45.0 47.5 50.0

Area, norm. counts 16.99 17.98 19.00 20.09 21.09 22.12 23.24 24.21 25.26 26.44 27.08 27.79 28.27 29.08 29.71 30.37 31.04 31.70 32.31 32.96 33.54

Area, norm. counts 2.13 2.49 2.82 3.13 3.43 3.70 3.96 4.23 4.49 4.73 4.97 5.18 5.43 5.68 5.88 6.04 6.21 6.45

Year 1 Conclusion In work is analyzed the opportunity of use Compton parts in a spectrum measured by the solid-state detectors for determining of thickness of shield by measuring of pulseheight spectra of a sample placed in the container. It is approved, that this problem can be solved with use either NaI(Tl) or HPGe detectors. The simple technique of measurement of thickness with 137Cs and 60Co sources is offered. The accuracy of the method was analyzed. In such formulation proposed method will work in case of other radioactive sources. Proposed method can be effective used in practice of customs services and it can be easily implemented as the software for wide use. The given work is preliminary research and is intended to show an opportunity of extraction of the information on a design of the container on the registered pulse-height spectrum of radioactive source placed inside a container. The suggested approach has been tested on sets of measured and Monte Carlo simulated spectra from radioactive samples are placed behind lead shield of various thicknesses. We shall note, that developing methods of such kind will allow supervising non-authorized transportation of sources.

17

Year 2 Activities The goal of the continuation project was implementation of the developed approach for concrete realization as the software and hardware to estimate of transportation container wall thickness and source activity. This phase of the project were carried in cooperation with ATOMTEX enterprise, Minsk, Belarus (producer of radiometric and gamma-spectrometry equipment) [8]. An algorithm, allowing analyzing spectrums of wide range of shielded radio nuclides with the purpose of their quantitative analysis, is suggested 3. Experimental studies and Monte Carlo simulation for Year 2 Activities As the basic device for implementation of a method for determination of activity of a radioactive source located inside of the transport container had been took the identifier of radionuclides made by Atomtex enterprise AT-6101 with detector NaI (Tl). Energy resolution of detector NaI(Tl) with the size of the crystal 4x4 is <9 % on 662 keV. The measured and calculated spectra were analyzed by ATAS software. Additional processing of pulse-height spectra (smoothing, subtraction of a background) was made. Parameters of energy calibration and parameters of peak Gaussian broadening were used at processing and as input data at Monte Carlo simulation. Acquired data was stored in 512 channels.

Fig 42. Radionuclide identifier AT-6101. ATOMTEX enterprise offered detailed information on a design of the detecting module with NaI(Tl) detector. On Fig. 43 section view of the detector is shown.

18

Fig. 43. Sectional view of NaI(Tl) detector. General-purpose Monte Carlo computer code MCNP was used for simulation of pulse-height spectra. MCNP input file for calculation of necessary calibration data was created. Measurements of pulse-height spectra of wide range of radioactive sources for different distances was performed for creation and test of adequate mathematical model of detector. The model was adjusted to provide difference between experimental efficiencies and calculated within the limits of 5%. For example comparison of measured and simulated pulse height spectra from 152Eu source is shown on Fig. 44.

19

Fig. 44. Comparison of measured spectra and simulated pulse height tally from 152 Eu source. The good agreement of calculation with experiment has allowed performing of necessary calculations for the spectrometer calibration. Computer Monte Carlo simulations of the detector response functions was performed for Pb-shield thicknesses varied from 0 up to 50 mm with step of 5 mm. Energy diapason from 50 to 2000 keV was chosen. Used thicknesses are typical for transport containers designed for radioactive sources transportation. Measurements and calculations were carried out in geometry when the detector was on distance of 50 mm from a radioactive source which was placed behind lead shield. Standard gamma-ray point type sources manufactured by VNIIM Russia were used for testing purposes. Calculated response functions are input data for developed software for quantitative measurements of activity and determination of characteristics of shield. Note that calculated response functions make possible to obtain pulse height spectra for any shielded radioactive source. Simulation of response functions can be considered as mathematical calibration procedure. Simulated response functions where used for calculating all necessary calibration values. The using of precalculated spectra seems the preferable and flexible approach in many assessment tasks. On the basis of the simulated response functions for various energies and thickness of Pb-shield the table of full-energy-peak efficiency was obtained (Table 8). Calculated data is used in the software for measuring of source activity located in transportation container.

20

Table 8. Dependence of full-energy-peak efficiency as function of energy and Pb shield thickness

Energy, keV 50 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 0 1.68E-02 2.41E-02 2.05E-02 1.36E-02 8.87E-03 6.56E-03 5.18E-03 4.28E-03 3.63E-03 3.16E-03 2.79E-03 2.51E-03 2.27E-03 2.08E-03 1.92E-03 1.78E-03 1.66E-03 1.56E-03 1.46E-03 1.38E-03 1.30E-03 1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.34E-07 2.26E-04 9.15E-04 1.37E-03 1.57E-03 1.59E-03 1.53E-03 1.46E-03 1.38E-03 1.31E-03 1.23E-03 1.15E-03 1.09E-03 1.04E-03 9.70E-04 9.22E-04 8.75E-04 8.31E-04 7.91E-04 Pb shield thickness, cm 2 3 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.35E-06 4.59E-08 8.43E-05 7.73E-06 2.70E-04 5.22E-05 4.57E-04 1.31E-04 5.75E-04 2.06E-04 6.32E-04 2.60E-04 6.68E-04 3.04E-04 6.72E-04 3.25E-04 6.70E-04 3.44E-04 6.56E-04 3.52E-04 6.34E-04 3.52E-04 6.15E-04 3.50E-04 5.95E-04 3.45E-04 5.67E-04 3.31E-04 5.45E-04 3.23E-04 5.22E-04 3.13E-04 5.01E-04 3.02E-04 4.80E-04 2.91E-04 4 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.37E-07 9.80E-06 3.57E-05 7.32E-05 1.05E-04 1.35E-04 1.57E-04 1.76E-04 1.86E-04 1.93E-04 1.96E-04 1.97E-04 1.93E-04 1.91E-04 1.88E-04 1.83E-04 1.77E-04 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.75E-08 1.87E-06 1.03E-05 2.56E-05 4.28E-05 6.07E-05 7.53E-05 8.93E-05 9.92E-05 1.06E-04 1.11E-04 1.14E-04 1.12E-04 1.14E-04 1.13E-04 1.11E-04 1.08E-04

On Fig. 45 energy dependence of full-energy-peak efficiencies for different Pb-shield thickness are shown.

Fig. 45. Full-energy-peak efficiencies for different Pb-shield thickness. 4. Determination of shield thickness The Table 8. contains the information necessary for determination of thickness of a container wall in case of the radioactive sources emitting of more than one gamma ray 21

with energies enough far apart. On ratio of full-energy-peak areas corrected by branching ratio fraction to find container wall thickness according to equation

R=
where

S ( E 1 ) I 2 S ( E 2 ) I 1

( E ) ( E )
1 2

(4)

S ( E ) - full-energy-peak area; I - branching ratio fraction; ( E ) - full-energy-

peak efficiency. Exact values of efficiencies for the certain energies are gained by interpolation of table data. On Fig. 46 the ratio of the calculated efficiencies for 1000 and 500 keV depending on thickness of a wall of the container is shown. In a semi-log scale it is can be approximated by a straight line.

Fig. 46. Ratio of the full-energy-peak efficiencies for energies 1000 and 500 keV versus Pb-shield thickness. For analyzing radionuclides with single or very close gamma-ray lines in their emitting spectra approach developed on the first stage of project was utilized. 5. Accounting the distance from source to detector Calculations of efficiency have been made only for one fixed distance. Nevertheless, these data it is enough to use the calculated values for any distances between a radiation source and the detector. For this purpose we shall take advantage of the concept of effective centre of the detector according to which there is a point inside of the detector for which efficiency of registration of the detector varies in inverse proportion to a square of distance between a radioactive source and this point. As definition this is point located inside the detector with inverse square of distance to source dependence of photo-efficiency. 22

For transition to other distance the formula is used

(d '+ h) 2 ( E , d ) = ( E , d ' ) ( d + h) 2
where

(5)

( E , d ) - full-energy-peak efficiency for energy E and distance source from detector d ; h distance from detector face to effective detector centre; ( E , d ' )
calculated value; d ' =5 cm. MCNP simulation has shown relevancy of such approach in correction of full-energypeak efficiency for various distances. On Fig. 47 the experimental dependence of effective detector centre on energy of gamma-rays is presented.

Fig. 47. Energy dependence of effective detector centre. 6. Software algorithm Obtained data have allowed creating algorithm implemented as addition to ATAS software allowing to analyze spectrums of gamma rays of radioactive sources located inside of the transport container. General procedure of operation of algorithm consists in following steps. Before the beginning of measuring it is enough to input the information on distance from a radioactive source to the detector.

23

Fig. 48. Input and output results window. As a result of the analysis of a spectrum identification of radioactive source located inside of the container is made. Thickness of a wall of the container is determined from the analysis of a spectrum. There is an individual algorithm for particular radionuclide. Additional data necessary for analysis are contained in library of nuclides of ATAS software.

Fig. 49. Nuclide library window.

24

In case of the container is made of a material different from lead software find thickness of lead with the same attenuation ability as well as a wall of the real container. The equivalent thickness of lead gained thus allows choosing from the Table 1 proper value for full-energy-peak efficiency. On Fig. 50 shown result of measurement. On the MCA interface we can see identified radioactive source, estimated activity and equivalent to lead shielding thickness. .

Fig. 50. MCA window. 7. Year 2 Conclusions For implementation of the developed algorithm we inserted additional module to the ATAS software which is used by ATOMTEX enterprise for control of electronics and processing of gamma-ray spectra in identifiers of radionuclides. Measurements and Monte Carlo simulation of a basis set of pulse-height data for various gamma sources and various shielding compositions and thicknesses was performed. As input data the information on the declared source activity, placed inside the container, thickness of a container wall and distance from an entrance window of the detector to a measured radionuclide is required. The accounting of distance from source to detector is performed with using of the effective detector centre concept. Thickness of a wall of the container calculated from the analysis of the spectrum transformed by shield in terms of equivalent lead thickness. Thus for determining of activity we need only information about distance from source to detector. Using of thickness entered manually by operator for measurement of activity is provided. At present time the correctness of software was tested for lead, steel and a tungsten shields with thicknesses from 3 to 50 mm for 152Eu, 137Cs, 60Co, 133Ba, 88Y, and 22Na. Energy dependent attenuation approach was implemented for analysis of wide set of radioactive sources. The accuracy of the method was analyzed. Software has been tested on sets of measured and Monte Carlo simulated spectra from radioactive samples are placed behind shields of different compositions and thicknesses.

25

8. Project Summary The possibility of using the Compton parts in a spectrum to determine the thickness of possible shielding materials was analyzed. Measurements were made, using 137Cs and 60 Co sources, showed that it is possible to do this using data from either NaI(Tl) or HPGe detectors. The accuracy of the method was analyzed. An algorithm based upon this work was developed, and inserted into commercially-available software. At present time the correctness of software was tested for lead, steel and a tungsten shields with thicknesses from 3 to 50 mm for 152Eu, 137Cs, 60Co, 133Ba, 88Y, and 22Na. This developed software can be used in practice of customs services and can be easily implemented for routine procedures. REFERENCES [1] Model S504 Genie-2000 InSpector Basic Spectroscopy S504-CUS 7/97. [2] Model S501 Genie-2000 Gamma Analysis. S501-CUS 7/97. [3] K. Debertin, R. G. Helmer, Gamma- and X-ray Spectrometry with Semiconductor Detectors, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1988. [4] D. Reilly, N. Ensslin, H. Smith, Jr., and S. Kreiner, Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials, NUREG/CR-5550, LA-UR-90-732, 1991. [5] J.F. Briesmeister (Ed.), MCNP A General Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code Version 4B, LA-12625-M, 1997. [6] J. Rodenas, A. Martinavarro, V. Rius, Validation of the MCNP code for the simulation of Ge-detector calibration, Nucl. Instr. and Meth. A450 (2000) 8897. [7] M.A. Ludington, R.G. Helmer, High accuracy measurements and Monte Carlo calculations of the relative efficiency curve of an HPGe detector from 433 to 2754 keV, Nucl. Instr. and Meth. A446 (2000) 506521. [8] www.atomtex.com.

26

The Vehicle Monitor for the Detection of Radioactive Materials

Qingli Zhang, Jizeng Ma, Minchen Han, Yawen Huang China Institute for Radiation Protection, Taiyuan, China Abstract At this time, almost all RPMs used in China are produced by foreign companies. To achieve a higher implementation rate of these devises, it is important to develop a vehicle monitor that has a user-friendly interface to the Chinese language and is more economically than foreign products. The objectives of this project were to: 1. Make a prototype vehicle monitor with a Chinese man-machine interface & with the minimum performance requirements by IAEA-TECDOC-1312 2. Test this prototype monitor with the international standard procedures 3. Make some improvements to this monitor, to make the monitor to have the abilities to reduce the NORM alarm rate with multi-energy-window methods. 4. Make a movable RPM for accident & emergency situation Under this project, the objectives were achieved. Prototypes of a fixed RPM and a movable RPM were constructed. They achieved the desired specifications and functions, such as, gamma sensitivity and low false alarm rate, in the tested static modes. They operated with user-friendly Chinese man-machine interfaces. The monitors were tested both in the laboratory and at a scrap recycle mill.

It is anticipated that advanced filtering techniques such as an exponential smoothing filter, a stepwise monitor and the sequential probability ratio test should be adopted in the near future. Tests of multi-energy-window method should be made to get more information from this technique, using medical radionuclides and NORM sources. Dynamic tests still need to be made with moving sources.

1. The Objects and Specifications In 1950s, China began to establish its atomic energy industry. With the development of nuclear industry and nuclear technology in our country, radioactive materials, radioactive sources and radioactive devices are widely used in industry, agriculture, medical, science, education, military etc. They have made important contributions to economy development and social advancement. According to the statistical data from the specialized action check radiation sources to assure the public in 2004, there are 12412 units which use radioactive sources and 108504 radioactive sources in total. Among these radioactive sources, 137Cs are about 45 percent and 60Co are 27 percent. About 25 thousands radioactive sources are out of service, and there are certain amounts of special nuclear material. It is estimated that there are more than 2000 orphan sources in China. In recent years, average 30 radiation incidents annually in our country and 80 percent are accidents of lost or stolen sources. Some of them were severe accidents and source melting accidents in the past [1]. For example, in 1991, a lost radioactive source 60Co (370GBq), which was out of service for agriculture breeding purposes, killed two persons and severely injure several others in Shanxi province in north of China. As we know, a Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) is one of the most effective monitoring device to enforce the management of radioactive materials and prevent such radioactive accidents. In generally, they are installed at checkpoints, such as customs, airport, seaport, toll-gate of highway, steel mill and public venue. But RPMs have not been widely accepted and deployed in the above mentioned necessary site in China. They only have been installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs)& some of customs where the staffs of NPP & Custom have better radiation and foreign language professional training experience than the staffs of other end-users, such as in medium and small steel mill, toll-gate of highway, garbage treatment mill and so on. In recent two years, some big steel companies begin to install RPMs at the requirement of China National Environment Protection Agency. As an example, in one year after RPMs had been deployed, tens of orphan sources had been discovered in scrap in the steel mill of Wuhan Steel Co. Ltd. in the central south of China. Up to now, almost all of these RPM in China are from foreign companies such as BICRON, EBERLINE, SAIC, EXPLORIUM, MGP, EURISYS, ESM, RADOS etc. The high price and also foreign man-machine interface are the main obstacles to these end-users for more widely use of these monitors. So, for a more popular RPM installation rate in China, beside to fulfill the technical requirements of respective international standards, it is even more important to develop a vehicle monitor that has a more user-friendly interface to Chinese and is more economically than foreign products. The objectives of this project are: Make a prototype vehicle monitor with a Chinese man-machine interface & with the minimum performance requirements by IAEA-TECDOC-1312

Test this prototype monitor with the international standard procedures Make some improvements to this monitor, to make the monitor to have the abilities to reduce the NORM alarm rate with multi-energy-window methods. Make a movable RPM for accident & emergency situation

The minimum specifications for these type of the monitor are as following:[2, 3] Sensitivity to gamma radiation: At background 0.2Svh-1, with increment of 0.1Svh-1 for 1 second, the alarm probability of the monitor should be not less than 99.9%. False alarm rate: For background less than 0.2Svh-1, the false alarm rate should be not more than 1 false in 10000 measurements. Environmental conditions: Temperature: 15 to +45 Humidity: 1090%

2. Description of Research 2.1. The prototype fixed monitor The prototype fixed monitor only for gamma channel have been built up in our lab under this contract. The configuration of this monitor is showed in Figure 1. As usual, it is composed of subassemblies as follows: Two detection assemblies, which sense gamma radiation. They consist of the plastic scintillators, PMTs, electronic circuit boards and other accessories. One remote PC: it can be used as a process center of the whole system, a graphic man-machine interface, a huge data storage center. It also can be connected to other peripherals. Controller unit: to perform management of the following accessories, such as occupancy sensors, speed sensors, indicating units, etc. The photograph of prototype fixed monitor is showed in Figure 2. We have self-developed the signal conditioning unit with preamplifier, amplifier, high voltage adjust unit, discriminator.

Temp.Adj. PC
Detector Assembly

Signal Condi.

Acquisition

CPU

Detector Assembly

Signal Condi.

I/O Power Supply

Occup. sensors Speed sensors,etc.

I/O

Alarm Light

Figure 1. The configuration of prototype fixed monitor.

Figure 2. The fixed RPM (for gamma channel). 2.1.1. The composition of a fixed monitor Detector assembliesfor gamma channel) Figure 3 is a photo of the inside of detector panel. A plastic scintillator with the dimensions of 1000 mm500 mm51 mm is used in both of the detector assemblies. The model of plastic scintillator is BC408 (made by BICRON); the specifications of BC408 are showed in Table1 and its relative light output versus wavelength is showed in Figure 4. It can be seen that the light attenuation length of BC408 can reach as long as 210 cm. The longer the light attenuation length of the plastic scintillator, the better the plastic scintillator for application of large area usage. The BC408 plastic scintillators are wrapped in reflective foil and black vinyl for light collection and lightproof. 3

Figure 3. The photo of the inside of detector panel.

Figure 4. The relative light output of BC408.

Table 1. The specifications of BC408 plastic scintillators

Base Density Refractive Index Softening Point Light Output,% Anthracene Rise Time, ns Decay Time, ns Pulse Width, FWHM,ns Wavelength of Max. Emission,nm Light Attenuation Length, cm

Polyvinyltoluene

1.032g/cc

1.58

70

64

0.9

2.1

2.5

425

210

We have chosen the photomultiplier tube model CR105, made by Beijing- HAMAMATSU Ltd.; it is a head-on PMT with Sb-Cs photocathode and box-and-grid type. This type of bialkali photocathode PMT can operate with low photomultiplier noise at room temperature. The low photomultiplier noise is essential to good intrinsic detection efficiency in organic scintillators. Its specifications and spectrum response are showed in Table 2 and Figure 5 Table 2. The specifications of CR105 photomultiplier tube
Spectral Response Length Diameter Max. (mm) (mm) Range (nm) Peak Wavelength (nm) 420 Cathode Sensitivity Luminous (A/lm) Radiant at p (mA/W) Anode to Cathode Supply Voltage (Vdc) Anode Luminous Sensitivity (A/lm) Current Amplification Typ. Anode Anode Dark Pulse Current Rise (after Time 30 Min.) (ns) Typ. (nA) 50 7.0 Max. Supply Voltage (Vdc)

51

125

300-650

>60

>60

1000

2000

106

1500

Figure 5. The spectrum response of CR105. To reduce the measured level of natural background radiation, a lead box with thickness of 30 mm lead shield all faces of plastic scintillator except the one facing to vehicle. A aluminum plate with the thickness of 1 mm is used to cover this face of the detector. Signal conditioning unit is also in the detector assemblies.

Signal Conditioning Electronics Unit A signal conditioning unit has been developed by ourselves for this monitor. It consists of a high voltage divider, preamplifier, Its diagram is showed in Figure 6. The electronic circuits of monitor (preamplifier, amplifier) can be checked by test pulses which are produced by an internal pulses generator. A high quality AC/DC module is used to provide DC power supplies for electronic system. A DC/DC converter module is used to provide high voltage supplies for HV divider of photomultiplier. A digital potentiometers is used to adjust the high voltage between 200V and 1200V. Five analog thresholds (Thres.1 to Thres.5) that their values can be adjusted by five potentiometers are used to form four analog windows. We can distinguished the difference of radiation induced pulses amplitude with recognize the nature of radioactive materials which trig the alarm of monitor and to suppress the NORM alarm [4], 241Am, 137Cs, 60Co, 226Ra sources has been used for the test. Up to now, this unit is still tested in our laboratory.

Figure 6. Diagram of Signal Conditioning Unit. Speedometer A radar speedometer is used to measure the speed of vehicle for speed range from 1.5 to 50 km/h with accuracy 1km/h. The speed measurement data can be transmitted to central computer via RS-232. It also can provide an alarm signal when the vehicle speed is over allowable limit (such as 10kmh-1). A audio/visual alarms light give the indications whether or not the vehicle contains allowable amount of radioactive materials by comparing the measurement results with the alarm threshold. Figure7 is the radar speedometer and a audio/visual alarms light.

Figure 7. Radar speedometer and audio/visual alarm light.

Occupancy sensor Photoelectric sensor (Beam-Array Banner) and magnetic loop are used to be a vehicle recognize unit, A curtain of light with the height of 120 cm is provided by the Beam-Array Banner to recognize the air gap between vehicle & its trailer, a magnetic loop and its control unit (Sarasota 526B from Peek-Traffic Ltd., UK) are used to be occupancy sensor to trig the monitor from background measurement to vehicle monitoring. Sarasota 526B (Figure 8) is a dual channel boxed detector designed for use in traffic and access control application with magnetic loops. It has a single presence relay output per channel. The microcontroller is programmed with an enhanced detection algorithm to give optimum operational stability and compensates for environmental changes that occur around the detection circuit. It has the features of high crosstalk and noise immunity, loop fault indicator, four switch selectable sensitivity level.

Figure 8. Sarasota 526B for a occupancy sensor. Power supply unit & a thermostat

A module AC/DC power unit provides the DC (+5V, 12V) for signal processing unit and a DC/DC module which can produce a variable high voltage (range about from 200 V to 1100 V by a digital potentiometer) for voltage divider of PMT. A simple thermostat and a semi-conductor thermoelectronic cooling keeps air temperature around PMT not higher than the set point. AC/DC and DC/DC power modules provide an excellent stable power supplies for whole system. The variations of power almost have no effects on the performance of the monitor. Model 4NIC-X is a linear integrated AC/DC power supply with a low ripple and high reliability & high efficiency. The voltage accuracy is smaller than 1%, voltage regulation is smaller than 0.5%, current regulation is smaller than 1%, ripple is smaller than 1 mV. It is also provided for over-current protection, short-circuit protection, over-heat protection and over-voltage protection. Central/Control computer A industrial computer (Advantech model IPC 610 with PCL-836 card in Figure 9) is used to be a control center and also provide a friendly man-machine interface for user and record the historical alarm measurement data. It also can make some algorithms as signal processing unit. The PCL-836 is a counter/timer and digital I/O card for PC/AT compatible computers. It provides six 16-bit counter channels, it also includes 16 digital outputs and 16 digital inputs. The PCL-836 also includes a unique digital filter to eliminate noise on the input signal. The frequency can be adjusted to provide more stable output readings. It can recognize the vehicle & its trailer, catch the speed of the vehicle, and also provide diagnostic pulses for electrical self-test of monitor.

Figure 9. The central computer of fixed PRM.

2.1.2. Data Acquisition & Control Software in Chinese We have developed data acquisition, processing & control software by ourselves. MCGS (Monitor and Control Generated System) is used to build acquisition software and it is developed on object-oriented language.

A lot of program have been developed for counting subroutine, timing subroutine, testing subroutine, communication subroutine, self-diagnostic subroutine, reset subroutine, parameteraccess subroutine, filter subroutine and data processing subroutine. The main page of man-machine interface in Chinese is showed in Figure 10. It can monitor four vehicle lanes. We can enter the page of one of these four lanes by click the Detail button on main page or by selecting the four lane menus. It is the mode of background monitoring in the left part of Figure 11. and the mode of vehicle monitoring in the right part of this figure. The monitor works in the mode of background monitoring when there is no vehicle entering into the monitoring area. When there is a vehicle passing through the monitoring area, the occupancy sensor is trigged and the monitor turn into the mode of vehicle monitoring. In the mode of background monitoring, the monitor measures the counts of current background and renews the alarm threshold. In the mode of vehicle monitoring, the monitor measures the counts of vehicle monitoring and compares the monitoring results with the alarm threshold and makes the decision if there is a significant amount of radioactive material in the vehicle. If the decision is NO, the monitor will turn back to the mode of background monitoring when the vehicle passing through the monitoring area. If the decision is Yes, the monitor will trig the alarm unit to produce a sound/light signal. The vehicle must be stopped and checked thoroughly.

Figure 10. The main page of man-machine interface.

Figure 11. The page for one of four lanes in background & vehicle monitoring. We also can execute the other commands by pressing the respective button or by selecting the respective sub-menu of the main menu. The man-machine interface shows measurement data &curve, the buttons for alarm & fault information, the buttons for preset of parameters, HV adjust, the buttons for self-testing, a lots of help information in Chinese, and so on. The operating parameters concern the aspects related to operation and use of the monitor. The different operating parameters are summarized in the Table 3, these parameters can be set and adjusted by the man-machine interface. Table 3. The system operating parameters Parameters Date & Time W Description Use the clock of computer parameter contains the this current date and time of the system. Moving average coefficient, the number of background measurement which is recorded to refresh the alarm threshold. The counts of background are not in the normal range because of the malfunction of the system. The counts of background are not in the normal range because of the malfunction of the system and other reasons which have to be investigated clearly. We can select the 100 ms or 200 ms as sampling time to increase the response speed of system. Number of , standard deviation of background measurement. The count of vehicles what pass the monitoring area. The count of vehicles what trig the alarm of monitor be confirmed to be contaminated.

Low Background Threshold High Background Threshold

Sampling period of measurement K Number of Pass Vehicle Number of alarm

We can digitally adjust the value of high voltage for PMTs by the up & down arrow button on the page of high voltage adjusting. It is showed in the left part of Figure 12 and the right part in this figure is HV fault & the help information for user to deal with the possible HV faults.

10

Figure 12. The pages for HV adjusting & HV fault information. It also can keep the record of information of monitoring results (the mean value of measurement value and their standard deviation) and alarm. The pages of alarm information is showed in Figure 13. These information are those as the start & end time of events, the type of alarm, the alarm threshold, the measurement data of alarm event and so on. The historical measurement information are showed in Figure 14.

Figure 13. The pages of alarm information.

11

Figure 14. The pages of historical measurement information. 2.1.3. Description of the Data Processing Method In order to achieve the possible reliability in the triggering of the alarm signals and the indicating of faulty operation, background noise is steadily analysed and the estimated value undergoes a smoothing by the calculation of moving averages. Moving average algorithm is used to reduce the statistics fluctuations of background measurement. When the RPM is in operation, a constant counting is performed and acquisition is done at time intervals of 200 ms, that is to say that BT, BT+1, BT+2, raw counting rates (background noise) are obtained. In order to get a rapid response, a shorter monitoring time interval of 100 ms or 200 ms is used for the monitoring of background and vehicles. The raw counting data can be smoothed by the following formula to get the smoothed background noise.

Bm =

W 1 B( m1) + BT W +1 W +1

where: W: Operator parameter ( we selectively preset W=80 in our test experiment) Bm: Background noise with moving average upon acquisition B(m-1): Background noise with moving average on the previous acquisition at T-1 BT: Background noise on acquisition T The alarm threshold is: where:

Bm + K

Bm : is the above mentioned Background noise

: is the standard deviation of background monitoring K : is a factor that it is usually 3 or 4 for different level of false alarm rate

12

When the monitor is trigged to the mode of vehicle monitoring by the occupancy sensor, the system stops the process of background monitoring and keeps the same value of this smoothed background. Then, we can set the alarm threshold with this smoothed background noise and its standard deviation. Also we can detect the faulty operation of the monitor (low background counting rates or high background counting rates). As soon as the occupancy sensor (magnetic loops) is trigged, the monitor starts its measurements in order to monitor any possible radioactive contamination. Successive measurements for every 100 ms or 200 ms are performed by the software as long as no contamination has been detected. The processing algorithm for these measurement data is to make the sum of ten (for 100 ms cycle time) or five (for 200 ms cycle time) most recent data, then to compare the mean value of the ten or five measurement data with the above mentioned alarm threshold from background monitoring, finally to decide whether or not to trig the alarm unit. In case of contamination alarm, these measurements are interrupted and confirming measurements should be performed. In the application of RPM, the frequent innocent alarm caused by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) and medical radioisotopes administered to patients is a major problem. NORM radionuclides such as 40K, 226Ra, 232Th and 238U are often found at seaports, trains, and truck traffic at land borders when large quantities of materials are transported. On the other hand, medical radionuclides such as 111In,123I, 125I, 129I, 131I are often found at airports or at the checkpoint of public venue. The high innocent alarm rate will cause large expense of investigation and decrease the traffic flow cross the checkpoint. A number of methods have been developed to solve this problem, such as RPMs based on the NaI scintillation detector for vehicle and pedestrian monitors. But even these monitors have higher energy resolution for the recognition of radioisotopes, the lower sensitivities and higher price than that of RPM with plastic scintillator limit their wide application. The most popular detectors of RPMs are plastic scintillators. The plastic scintillators which can be used as a large volume detector have high detection sensitivities and worse energy resolution. The multi-energy-window method [7] is a good approach to make plastic scintillators to have the abilities to recognize radioactive materials to be NORM or medical radioisotopes. The principle of the method is to split the gamma spectra into three energy windows, a low energy window for low energy gamma from SNM and medical isotopes, a medium energy window for most industrial radioactive sources and a high energy window for the detection of high energy gamma from NORM. The principle of this method is showed in Figure 15 [7].
TOTAL channel LOW MEDIUM
MEDICAL and SNM INDUSTRIAL SOURCES

HIGH
NORM MATERIAL

TOTAL

LOW MEDIUM HI ANALYSIS SNM/MEDICAL INDUSTRIAL NORM

Figure 15. The principle of multi-energy-windows method.

13

2.2. The prototype of moveable RPM We have built the moveable RPM for vehicle/equipment/person radiation monitoring in radioactive accident & emergency situation. It consists of two detector units, one portable computer and one control unit in which there are UPS and linear actuator elevation control unit. Figure 16 shows the photograph of the moveable RPM. The main page of man-machine interfaces is showed in Figure 17 and Figure 18 is the pages for settings of ultrasonic sensor and alarm information. Detector assemblies: Each detector assembly has a 500 mm500 mm51mm plastic scintillator with PMT. In order to decrease the weight of the monitor, no shielding lead plates are applied to the plastic scintillators. Signal conditioning unit is also in the assemblies Ultrasonic sensor: Instead of magnetic loops for fixed RPM, an ultrasonic sensor is used to be occupancy sensor to trig the monitor from background measurement to vehicle monitoring. Power unit & a thermostat: Power unit provides the DC for Signal processing unit, high voltage for PMT. A simple thermostat adjusts air temperature around scintillator & PMT. A UPS is used for improvement of power qualities in emergency field. A portable computer provides a user friendly man-machine interface and record the historical measurement data. The elevation unit: The center of plastic scintillator can be lift up and down rapidly and smoothly from 1000 mm to 1800 mm by a light compact linear actuator. It is useful to monitor the different size of vehicles in the emergency circumstance.

Figure 16. Moveable PRM for accident & emergency situation.

14

Figure 17. The main page for the moveable PRM.

Figure 18. The pages for ultrasonic sensor, alarm information.

3. The measured performance and applications of RPM: We have made some tests on the performance of the monitor in our lab. We have tested the some effects of parameters setting. We test the false alarm rate, gamma sensitivities at test point, gamma sensitivities at different point in detection region with collimated and non-collimated 241 Am, 137Cs and 60Co sources. We take the moveable RPM to a steel mill to monitor the vehicles which are loaded with recycle scraps. We have tested the moveable RPM at a recycle mill for 30 days. We have monitored the vehicles and also checked them with a portable survey meters. We have got the information about the influence of rain, vehicle screen effects, and so on. 3.1. Setting of parameters In order to detect the gamma radiation with a more wide energy range, we adjust the amplifier to make the pulse height to be about 200mV for 241Am gamma ray (energy 60keV), about 2V for the 137Cs gamma ray (energy 660keV) and the pulse height to be about 5V for gamma ray (energy 1500keV). The curves of detection efficiency vs high voltage at different bias voltages have been measured with a 137Cs sources and some of these curves are showed in Figure19. We choose to set the high voltage to about 900V~950V for PMTs. In fact, because of the excellent stabilities of the 15

AC/DC and DC/DC modules, we almost can not observe the significant variations of the counts that they are caused by the fluctuations of main power. The result of this test is showed in Table 4.
Thres.50mV 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 High Voltage (V)
a. The detection efficiency vs high voltage at thres.50mV

c/0.1s

Thres.100mV 2000 c/0.1s 1500 1000 500 0 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200

High Voltage (V)

b. The detection efficiency vs high voltage at thres.100mV

Thres.150mV 2000 c/0.1s 1500 1000 500 0 400 600 800 High Voltage (V)
c. The detection efficiency vs high voltage at thres.150mV

1000

1200

Thres.200mV 2000 1500 c/0.1s 1000 500 0 400 600 800 High Voltage (V) 1000 1200

d. The detection efficiency vs high voltage at thres.200mV

Figure 19. The curves of detection efficiency versus high voltage on PMT. 16

Table 4. The variation of counts with the fluctuations of main power from 220V 187V
Detector A Detector B

198V
Detector A -5.7 Detector B -4.1 -0.3

210V
Detector A -4.7 -4.5 Detector B 1.4 -0.9

230V
Detector A -0.7 -5.8 Detector B -0.8 2.9

242V
Detector A -4.0 -4.4 Detector B 1.7 1.3

-1.4

0.4

-4.0

We have adopted the signal-to-noise method to determine the value of bias voltage for discriminator. We measure the counts of the monitor with and without radioactive source at different bias voltage, then determine the ratio of signal-to-noise by the following equation. We select the bias voltage that it is correspondent to a larger R value. In case of our monitor, the bias voltage of discriminator is set to be greater than 30mV.

R=
Where:

SB B

S : the counts with radioactive source B : the counts of background noise without radioactive source R : the ratio of signal-to-noise
The minimum detection activity (MDA) is determined by the following formula, the lower bias voltage of discriminator is a better selection for more higher detection efficiency. At the different settings of bias voltage, we have tested the MDA of the monitor with 241Am(399.4kBq 1.8%, k=3), 137Cs(114.8kBq2.8%, k=3), 60Co(35.4kBq1.9%, k=3). The distances between the surface of detector cover and the radioactive source are 20 cm for 241Am source and 50 cm for 137 Cs&60Co sources. Also there is 10 cm gap from the cover to the surface of plastic scintillator. The results of the test are showed in Tables 5-1 and 5-2. Figure 20 is the curve of MDA vs bias voltage for 241Am, 137Cs and 60Co. Among the range of test bias voltage, it can be seen from data that there is a strong dependence between the value of MDA and the bias voltage of discriminator for lower energy gamma rays than for higher energy gamma rays. Among them, MDA can be defined as follow:

MDA = 2
Where:

2 B T

B : the counts of background noise without radioactive source T : the measurement time

: the detection efficiency

MDA : the minimum detection activity at 2

17

The raw measurement results of monitoring sensitivities with 241Am, 137Cs and 60Co are listed in Tables 68.
241Am 150 MDA (kBq) 100 50 0 0 100 200 300 Bias Voltage (mV) MDA (kBq) 20 15 10 5 0 0 200 400 600 Bias Voltage (mV) 137Cs 60Co

Figure 20. The MDA vs bias voltage for 241Am, 137Cs and 60Co. Table 5-1. Source/Distance
241

The MDA of the monitor at the settings of bias voltage for 241Am 50mV 31.4kBq 110mV 38.3kBq 200mV 46.4kBq 230mV 69.9kBq 250mV 141.5kBq

Am(20 cm)

Table5-2.

The MDA (kBq) of the monitor at the settings of bias voltage for 137Cs, 60Co 50mV 7.66 4.23 110mV 7.73 4.39 200mV 7.92 4.19 250mV 7.36 3.94 300mV 7.63 3.39 350mV 8.11 3.33 400mV 9.74 3.45 500mV 16.9 3.45

Source/Distance
137 60

Cs(50 cm)

Co(50 cm)

Table 6. Bias voltage 50mV 110mV 200mV 230mV 250mV

1418 1414 1401 1390 1269 1253 1096 1079 891 884

The raw data of count rate vs bias voltage with 241Am at 20 cm Background
241

Am source
2026 2054 1883 1870 1648 1632 1334 1316 993 985 2017 2023 2010 1884 1877 1881 1655 1645 1615 1314 1315 1301 978 983 967

1428 1416 1405 1383 1259 1252 1095 1077 868 868

1411 1431 1375 1390 1256 1261 1079 1064 874 886

1417 1413 1390 1385 1262 1256 1076 1061 873 878

1420 1416 1397 1383 1390 1395 1267 1253 1258 1086 1078 1071 876 877 872

2010 2029 1862 1875 1666 1632 1330 1302 997 961

2004 2026 1889 1876 1668 1635 1313 1314 994 980

2020 2034 1895 1858 1673 1630 1308 1322 995 977

18

Table 7. Bias voltage 50mV 110mV 200mV 250mV 300mV 350mV 400mV 500mV
1419 1391 1396 1380 1203 1220 840 835 585 577 443 457 373 362 286 275 1405 1432 1385 1378 1220 1199 832 844 571 578 444 439 362 363 285 277

The raw data of count rate vs bias voltage with 137Cs at 50 cm Background
1406 1402 1398 1370 1208 1198 835 835 578 582 448 447 360 355 284 283 1423 1403 1363 1374 1199 1221 832 840 577 570 450 448 352 360 277 272 1397 1407 1391 1390 1382 1391 1205 1207 1201 833 835 824 585 578 575 454 448 445 353 360 358 277 280 284 417 424 425 432 438 631 423 642 427 659 411 670 425 636 418 424 845 637 848 632 790 646 815 644 810 627 642 1041 844 1053 823 1041 842 1037 810 1044 832 826 1433 1024 1421 1052 1407 1036 1402 1027 1390 993 1035 1796 1404 1826 1400 1844 1392 1855 1390 1812 1411 1405 2130 1856 2127 1874 2139 1835 1990 1873 2017 1866 1844 2197 2155 2004 2034 2088 1998 2015 2049 2257 2167 2081 2157 2076
137

Cs source
2196 2086 2121

2129

Table 8. Bias voltage 50mV 110mV 200mV 250mV 300mV 350mV 400mV 500mV
1419 1391 1396 1380 1203 1220 840 835 585 577 443 457 373 362 286 275

The raw data of detection efficiency vs bias voltage with 60Co at 50 cm Background
1405 1432 1385 1378 1220 1199 832 844 571 578 444 439 362 363 285 277 1406 1402 1398 1370 1208 1198 835 835 578 582 448 447 360 355 284 283 1423 1403 1363 1374 1199 1221 832 840 577 570 450 448 352 360 277 272 1397 1407 1391 1390 1382 1391 1205 1207 1201 833 835 824 585 578 575 454 448 445 353 360 358 277 280 284 508 467 499 502 498 609 491 611 496 627 516 611 504 597 493 497 733 612 724 584 741 612 721 592 713 605 606 893 748 888 732 893 732 911 737 863 737 732 1155 924 1150 918 1159 873 1148 872 1155 913 895 1569 1189 1553 1154 1609 1151 1582 1176 1600 1199 1164 1764 1552 1760 1587 1774 1603 1710 1610 1743 1524 1579 1901 1756 1666 1682 1876 1802 1794 1852 1762 1768 1761 1851 1799
60

Co source
1788 1808 1805

1803

19

3.2. The gamma detection efficiency in the detection region of monitor The detection region of monitor is limited between the two detection assemblies. The distance between the two detection assemblies is 380 cm, the height of central line of the plastic scintillator is 185 cm, the length of plastic scintillators is 100 cm. The gamma sensitivities of the plastic scintillators is measured with collimated and non-collimated 137Cs and 60Co radioactive sources at different positions in the detection region. The detection sensitivities for one detection assembly with the source-detector distance are showed in Figure 21. It can be seen that the less effective detection position is along the central line between the two detection assemblies. The results of gamma detection efficiency with 137Cs radioactive source are showed in Figure 22. The test points on the plastic scintillator with 100 cm50 cm are showed in Figure 22-a. The PMT is mounted at the center of left side of the plastic scintillator. The gamma sensitivities of the monitor with collimated and non-collimated 137Cs radioactive sources are showed in Figure 22-b and Figure 22-c It can be seen that the most effective detection position is along the central line of the plastic scintillator for non-collimated radioactive sources.

137C s

320000 280000 240000

count

200000 160000 120000 80000 40000 0 0 0. 5 1 1. 5 2 2. 5 3 3. 5 4

The sour ce- det ect or di st ance ( m )

Figure 21. The sensitivities with the source-detector distance.

20

25 20 15 10 5 0 5 -5 -4 -4 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 --5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 - 10 - 15 - 20 - 25

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

a. The test point on the plastic scintillator (unit: cm)

137

C sour ce w t h col l i m or s i at

1. 4 1. 3 1. 2 1. 1 1 0. 9 0. 8 0. 7 0. 6 0. 5 0. 4 0. 3 0. 2 0. 1 0 0

B D C A H E G F

Response)

cent r al l i ne 20cm above 20cm Bel ow

b. The gamma sensitivities with collimated 137Cs

137C sour ce w t hout col l i m or s i at

1. 4 1. 3 1. 2 1. 1 1 0. 9 0. 8 0. 7 0. 6 0. 5 0. 4 0. 3 0. 2 0. 1 0 0

D C B H A

E F

Response

cent r al l i ne 20cm above 20cm bel ow

c. The gamma sensitivities with non-collimated 137Cs

Figure 22. The sensitivities at different position with collimated and non-collimated 137Cs. 3.3. Gamma sensitivities Gamma sensitivities are tested by putting radioactive source at the position which is 0.5 or 1 meter from the monitor. The radioactive sources are: 241 Am: ( 399.4kBq1.8%, k=3 ) 137 Cs: ( 114.8kBq2.8%, k=3 ) 60 Co: ( 35.4kBq1.9%, k=3 ) We have tested the MDA of the prototype monitors at the bias voltage of 100mV with these sources. MDAs at 0.5 and 1 meter for different sources are listed in Table 9. 21

Table 9. MDA
(kBq)

MDAs at 0.5 and 1 meter for fixed monitor with different sources
241

Am 1.0m 110.9 0.5m 8.27

137

Cs 1.0m 22.8 0.5m 4.83

60

Co 1.0m 14.7

0.5m 57.7

3.4. False alarm rate The false alarm rate was tested at the background radiation environment for the prototype monitors. The dose rate of background radiation is about 0.11 to 0.15Gy/h. The false alarm rate was tested in the absence of vehicle. The time period of measurement is 200 ms. After 1 second measurement (5 cycle time periods), the monitor turns from vehicle measurement to the background refresh measurement. The monitor is trigged automatically to 1 scond vehicle measurement once in a minute. The average value of the sum of 5 successive measurements is compared to the alarm threshold which is based on moving average method. The test results are that 9 alarms events happened in total 6736 trigs at alarm threshold (2) in about 4 days test, the false alarm rate are 1.3. No alarms events happened in total 6856 trigs at alarm threshold (3) in about 4 days test. 3.5. Multi-Energy-Window method As mentioned above, the multi-energy-window method is used to decrease the alarm rate induced by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) and medical radioisotopes. We have made some primary tests on the method with 241Am, 137Cs, 60Co, 226Ra. The principle of judgment is showed in right part of Figure 15. The pulse height which is set for low, medium and high energy windows are as following: Low-window: 50mV1V about equivalent to range of energy 20 keV300keV Medium-window: 1V3V about equivalent to range of energy 300 keV1MeV High-window: 3V upper limit about equivalent to range of energy 1MeV Total-window: 50mVupper limit about equivalent to range of energy 20 keV 3.6. Environment test We have tested the moveable RPM in the walk-in environmental test chamber. The moveable RPM passed the test at the following environmental condition: At low temperature of -20, storage 2 hours, then start the computer & monitor, then works half hours. At high temperature of +45, relative humidity 90%, works 24 hours 3.7. The variation of background radiation [4, 5, 6] Alarm thresholds are set by the background radiation and the variation of its intensity with time. The rapid variations in background radiation intensity, which can be caused by natural background radiation processes, will cause the monitoring sensitivity to decrease. The screen effect of vehicles and the precipitation are the examples of these rapid variations in background radiation intensity. These effects are evaluated by the field tests. Figure 23 is the field test at a recycle mill and the photo in the right-down corner of this figure is to check the vehicle with survey meter. 22

Figure 23. Field test for the moveable PRM at a recycle mill. 3.7.1. The screen effect of vehicles When a vehicle enters the monitoring region of RPM, the counts of background measurement will decrease because of screen effect of vehicle. This effect will decrease the detection sensitivities when the alarm threshold is set by the background radiation level. So, it is important to know the variation of effect induced by different vehicles. At the recycle mill, we test this screen effect for various vehicles which they are different in type, size, loaded, dense or loose, etc. The small, less and loose loaded vehicles have less screen effect on background radiation level. The screen effects of monitoring results are given in Figure 24 for 20 vehicles. Some of the measurement data are listed in Table 10. It can be seen that the screen effects are very different from vehicles to vehicles. They vary to about 15% for different loaded vehicles in our test. Table 10. Some monitoring results of vehicles at a recycle mill Detector A No. of Vehicle Count rate
1 2 3 4 3165.2 2856.0 2872.9 2992.4

Detector B Count rate

3000.7 2315.0 2285.3 2659.2

Alarm threshold
3669.5 3534.0 3541.0 3615.3

Alarm threshold
3461.0 3056.8 3025.8 2971.0

23

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

2784.8 2930.1 2807.6 2929.0 3334.3 3451.2 3168.3 3418.9 3184.8 3071.0 2979.4 2940.4 3011.3 2953.1 2980.0 2954.2 3034.0 2853.8 2945.8 2971.0 3089.9 2862.6 3074.5 3316.9 3026.3 2984.8 3214.0 3242.5

3448.5 3497.0 3497.0 3547.8 3753.6 3854.8 3888.0 3922.5 3518.2 3518.2 3518.2 3530.0 3530.0 3530.0 3530.0 3483.2 3505.2 3445.0 3445.0 3425.8 3425.8 3470.2 3470.2 3727.0 3608.0 3608.0 4046.2 3707.0

2486.6 2566.0 2576.9 2859.1 3106.3 3148.0 3078.8 3278.3 2917.7 2889.0 2617.4 2573.8 2864.3 2808.0 2661.3 2757.5 2794.6 2519.0 2429.3 2510.9 2791.1 2549.5 2819.7 2647.2 2416.4 2530.3 2905.8 2680.1

2959.8 3333.0 3333.0 3436.4 3592.6 3729.5 3710 3770.5 3343.8 3343.8 3343.8 3310.0 3310.0 3310.0 3310.0 3244.0 3185.2 3098.8 3098.8 2998.5 2998.5 3140.6 3140.6 3189.8 3165.0 3165.0 3456.5 3275.8

24

33

rear end foreside

Rear end of trailer foreside of trailer

3240.1 3277.0 3020.4 3118.5 3121.2 3050.5 3061.8 3034.3 3010.9 3001.7 2922.7 2783.7 2802.0 2795.9 3372.6 3325.5 3090.9 3123.6 3063.5 3176.6 2957.8 3023.0 2854.8

3701.8 3701.8 3514.3 3514.3 3514.3 3514.3 3660.0 3660.0 3660.0 3660.0 3555.8 3555.8 3555.8 3555.8 3723.0 3746.6 3717.6 3800.8 3823.6 3829.3 3829.3 3829.3 3569.6

2667.2 2692.7 2598.1 2597.5 2647.6 2597.1 2472.0 2497.3 2447.1 2519.0 2555.6 2530.3 2506.0 2533.6 2770.8 2740.1 2491.7 2270.4 2325.1 2567.1 2497.1 2509.2 2525.8

3141.8 3141.8 3064.2 3064.2 3064.2 3064.2 3050.4 3050.4 3050.4 3050.4 2954.8 2954.8 2954.8 2954.8 3149.8 3102.0 3055.0 2821.2 2824.0 3113.3 3113.3 3113.3 3078.0

34 rear end foreside

rear end of trailer

35

foreside of trailer

rear end foreside

rear end of trailer

36

foreside of trailer

rear end foreside 37 38 39 40 41 42 rear end middle foreside 43

25

Shield effect of different vehicle A detector B detector

20
Percent for depress of background

15 10 5 0
A detector B detector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7.95 7.22 14 17.5 12.1 17.9 8.92 4 13.9 10.9 11.8 18.2 15.5 17.9 11.9 10.7 5.91 8.17 10 4.84 9.39 11 12.6 11.4 12 7.46 7.14 13 3.99 6.36 14 7.42 7.28 15 10.2 16 16 10.9 16.1 17 8.27 6.61 18 10.5 8.44 19 9.67 13.2 20 9.08 9.47

No.of vehicles
Figure 24. Screen effect of different loaded vehicles at a recycle mill. 3.7.2. Rainfall on background radiation level It is the decay of 226Ra in soil, which produce the gaseous daughter, 222Rn, which can escape the soil to decay in atmosphere. These daughter products may attach to dust particles that form condensation center for raindrops. When these raindrops fall to the ground, the level of background radiation will temporarily increase and then slowly return to its normal value after about 2 hours. A brief intense precipitation will make this increase sharply. A medium-small precipitation is recorded during the field test. About 20% increase of background level was observed. The monitoring results are showed in Figure 25.

var i at i on of backgr ound count r at e dur i ng r ai n

counts(1/s)

4000 3500 3000 2500

09: 24 09: 26 09: 28 09: 30 09: 33 09: 36 09: 40 09: 45 3760 3845. 3813. 3791. 3277 3309. 3274. 3250

Backgr ound A 3379. 3477. 3577. 3667. Backgr ound B 2919. 3035. 3145. 3219

Ti m ( m nut e) e i
Figure 25. The variation of background radiation during rain.

26

4. The Results of the project: We have finished preliminary physical and functional and mechanical design and installation of the prototype monitor for gamma channel. The specifications of these monitors are showed below. We have developed the preliminary signal processing unit and central/control unit with user-friendly interface for Chinese. We also have developed a prototype of movable RPM for emergency situation. We have tested some characteristics of these monitors and developed a multi-window signal-processing unit to suppress the NORM alarm. 4.1. The measured performance of the fixed RPM The dimensions of plastic scintillator: 1000 mm500 mm51 mm2 The thickness of shield lead: 30 mm False alarm: about 1 Gamma sensitivities: MDA(1m,1second,2): 241 Am(111kBq, 3Ci) 137 Cs (22.8kBq, 0.62Ci) 60 Co (14.7kBq,0.40Ci). Power: when the main voltage varies from 187V to 242V, there are not significant variations of response that can be observed. 4.2. The measured performance of the movable RPM The dimensions of plastic scintillator: 500 mm500 mm51 mm2 The weight of one monitor: 75kg Height of the center of plastic scintillator: 1000 mm1800 mm False alarm: about 4 Gamma sensitivities: MDA(1m,1second,2): 241 Am(2.11MBq,57Ci) 137 Cs (39.5kBq, 1.1Ci) 60 Co (21.4kBq,0.58Ci). Environmental conditions: Temperature: -20 to +40 Humidity: 10-90% 5. Conclusions The project has made a prototype of a fixed RPM and a movable RPM with reasonable specifications and functions, such as, gamma sensitivity and false alarm rate. friendly Chinese man-machine interfaces are developed for the monitors. The monitors have been tested in laboratory and a recycle mill. More advanced filtering techniques such as an exponential smoothing filter, a stepwise monitor and the sequential probability ratio test should be adopted in the near future. The tests of multi-energy-window method should be further made to get more information from this technique with more medical radionuclides and NORM. The dynamic tests should be made with moving sources. We are very grateful to IAEA for technique and financial support to this project.

27

REFERENCES [1] Ziqiang Pan, Radiation protection at the beginning of 21st century, Proceedings of experience exchange for radiation protection at nuclear facilities. Beijing, Oct, 2002. [2] IAEA-TECDOC-1312, Detection of Radioactive Materials at Borders. [3] Beck, P., ITRAP Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Program. [4] P.E. Feklau, G.S. Brunson,Coping with Plastic Scintillators in Nuclear SafeguardsIEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NS-30,158(1983). [5] P.E. Feklau, C. Garcia, et al. Vehicle Monitors for Domestic Perimeter Safeguard, Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-9633-MS(1983). [6] P.E. Feklau, Perimeter Radiation Monitors. [7] K.E. Duftschmid, The application of gamma spectrometric techniques with plastic scintillators for the suppression of innocent alarms in border monitoring for nuclear and other radioactive materials.

28

Development and Demonstration of the New Methods for the Detection of Hidden Highly Enriched Uranium
L. Meskhi State Military Scientific and Technical Center DELTA, Tbilisi, Georgia Abstract At the airports of many countries, in parallel with modern x-ray monitoring systems, there are passive devices to detect nuclear materials. Unfortunately, it is problematic to detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) in this way, due to the low energy of emitted gamma-radiation and HEUs practical absence of spontaneous fission. Using active interrogation techniques, it is possible to detect even small amounts of shielded HEU. It this research, it was proposed to develop a mechanical switchable source of neutrons that is different from normal D-T generator style of pulsed neutrons. The type of switched-off neutron source was chosen to be Am-LiF. Extensive calculations were performed, and a switchable source was designed. It was designed to meet the following technical requirements: 1. Overall dimensions of equipment do not exceed the size of modern x-ray visual devices. 2. During the working regime radiation conditions outside of device correspond to the radiation safety requirements. 3. The lowest detectable mass of detected substance do not exceed 10 gram that corresponds to the one pellet of assemblage of heat-generating cell. 4. Time of detection of the lowest mass (with probability 99%) in the luggage compartment (having dimensions 60 x 60 x 50) does not exceed one second. Three Russian nuclear centers (Khlopins Radium Institute in St-Petersburg, IPPE in Obninsck and the Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Reactors of the Russian Federation in Dimitrovgrad city) have express preliminary consent (with juridical and financial reservations) to develop the experimental models of modern sources. At this time a physical model has not been fabricated.

Prevention of illegal movement of nuclear and radiating materials undoubtedly is a task of extreme importance. Last years IAEA has carried out works on ITRAP (Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Program) [6, 7], has developed corresponding TECDOC Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment and conducts Coordinated Research Project: Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials. Our project is a part of these efforts. At the airports of many countries in parallel with modern systems x-ray monitoring systems of luggage are already widely applied passive detectors of nuclear materials. These detectors allow finding out and identifying the majority of radioisotopes and nuclear materials on neutrons of spontaneous fission and characteristic gamma-radiation [4, 5]. However, till now, problematic there is a detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The reason of it is rather low intensity both small energy of gamma-radiation and practical absence of spontaneous fission. The technique of active detection of hidden in luggage high-enriched uranium developed by us can be used together with known x-ray visual systems and/or as a new part in structure of the conveyor monitoring system of luggage [2, 3, 16]. Modern systems of the x-ray control of luggage (for example, HI SCAN EDS 10050) operate on the basis of a multi level principle of research of subjects of luggage that guarantees high reliability of detection at high throughput. At speed of a tape of the conveyor 50 cm/s it is possible to appear through at one o'clock of 1500 units of luggage in length up to 100 cm. The first level completely automatically distinguishes the basic part of luggage as safe which are transported further on delivery to the owners. That part of luggage which does not give clear results at the control, transmit on the second level. This level of the control also automatically carries out the additional computer analysis which provides very high degree of the resolution for a various chemical compound materials. Only stayed after that small a share of all luggage it is carefully examined by the safety personnel. Such organization of the monitoring system quite corresponds also to a task of detection of the hidden nuclear materials. With the purpose of reduction radiological problems and improvements of operational characteristics of the device, it was provided to develop a "switched off" radioisotope source of the neutron radiation - Switchable Neutron Source (SNS) [10] on the basis of Americium-241 and Lithium-7 as target. The basic preconditions of our researches in these directions are development the USA portable equipment AWCC-Active Well Coincidence Counter for measurement of parameters HEU-235 [1] and patent USA #4.829.191. Development of a new "switched off" source of the neutron radiation is conducted together with the IPPE (Obninsk, Russia), Khlopins Radium Institute (St. Petersburg, Russia) [2] and with the Scientific-Investigation Institute of Nuclear Reactors of the Russian Federation (city of Dimitrovgrad-10, Ulyanovsk region).

Specific objectives and research directions

1. Development of a technique of active detection of the latent highly enriched uranium for combined use in the structure of existing conveyor systems of the x-ray control or as the independent control system [8, 9];

2. With the purpose of reduction of radiological problems and improvement of operational characteristics, it is planned to develop a switchable radioisotope source of neutron radiation, so called SNS Switchable Radiation Neutron Source; 3. A choice of source type and development of the SNS design; 4. Development and optimization of the block of the neutron source; 5. Development and optimization of the block of detection of the fission neutrons; 6. Formation of radiating fields in a zone of the control; 7. Minimization of control time - no more than 5 seconds; 8. Achievement of the maximal sensitivity of detection (the minimal found out weight) no more than 1020 gram of 235U. 9. Maintenance of radiating safety outside of the control system 10. Development of data acquisition system and algorithm of decision-making 11. The solution of technical and technological problems of realization of new units of the device.

The general description of the control system

In the general view the circuit of control system (installation) can be presented in the following (Fig. 1):
SU

D1

D2

SD

Tr

Fig. 1.

As a whole the control system consist of the following basic units: top (SU) and bottom (SD) blocks of the neutron source, working area with the conveyor (Tr), two blocks of neutron detectors (D1, D2), researched object (B). Biological protection in figure is not shown. Besides one of basic elements of installation is preamp electronics and data acquisition system.

Accordingly, each of the listed units is a subject of optimization of nuclear-physical parameters and demands careful design study. Optimization is directed on achievement of the set characteristics of control system (installation). The unit of the neutron source should provide of the homogeneous field of slow neutrons in the control area. Density of a flux and a spectrum of neutrons in working area of installation should be such to provide certain detection of the nuclear materials. Units of detecting D1 and D2 are identical. Own experience and the literary data testify, that proportional tubes with working gas 3He under 4 atmospheres pressure are the most suitable for the fission neutrons detection. The tube sizes (diameter and length) and their arrangement, the geometrical parameters of moderators and the reflectors are a subject of optimization. The principle of construction of the biological protection for such devices is known. In our case, in conditions of the concrete design of installation it is necessary to minimize the sizes, weight and accordingly the cost of protection. All calculations were carried out by the Monte Carlo method with use of software package GEANT3 [11] with a set of subroutines for simulation of the slow neutrons interaction with substance. At passage of the neutrons through substance all basic processes of the neutrons interaction with nucleus, including elastic and inelastic scattering, neutron fission of nucleus, radioactive capture, radioactive fission etc, are taken into account [15]. The destiny of neutrons is traced up to the threshold energy Ttr = 10-3 eV. Neutrons with smaller energy are considered lost.

Choice of a Type of Neutron Source

The general requirements to a radioisotope source of neutrons is a low energy of neutrons, absence of fission neutrons and accompanying high energy -quantum. Neutrons of isotope sources are usually produced in reactions (-n) on nucleus of light elements. At presence in quality of emitter mostly are used americium-241 (a half-life period 432 years, specific activity 1.27 Bq/g) or plutonium-238 (a half-life period of 87 years, specific activity 1.27 Bq/g) more often. Traditional isotope sources of neutrons usually represent tablets from a mix of a -emitter with a light element in the ratio approximately 1:10, placed in a hermetic capsule. The neutron yield depends on energy of alpha particles, on a kind of a target and can change a little depending on manufacturing techniques [12, 13]. As energy of an outcome of alpha particles of plutonium-238 (5.49 5.45 MeV) and americium-241 (5.43 5.48 MeV) differs a little, table 1 gives good representation about neutron yield from a source made on the basis of 241Am or 238Pu and a corresponding target [14].

Table 1 Nucleus-target Beryllium-9 Boron-11 Boron-10 Magnesium-25 Fluorine-19 Lithium-7 Peak energy of neutrons, MeV 13 7,3 8,1 10,1 2,5 1,2 Average energy of neutrons, MeV 4,7 3,2 3,4 3,6 1,4 0,4 Neutron yield for 106 alpha-particles 80 26 13 6,1 12 2,6

As an alpha emitter 241Am is more acceptable, as in case of 238Pu outcome of spontaneous fission neutrons is rather high about 2000 neutrons in a second on 1 gram. 241Am at the expense of spontaneous fission lets out all less than one neutron in a second on gram. The simple analysis of preliminary theoretical, experimental researches and the table data gives the unequivocal answer that only Am-Li or Am-LiF sources, having least average energy of neutrons, shall be used. Besides, this energy is much less than energy of fission neutrons (secondary, informative). This factor promotes reliable allocation of informative signals from background.

Optimization of the Source Block Constructed on the Base of Point Like Source
The purpose of optimization of a design of the source block is achievement of the maximal flux density of slow neutrons in a working zone of installation. Besides for achievement of uniform sensitivity of detection on all volume of a working zone, it is desirable to have maximum homogeneous flux of the neutrons. At all stages of performance of the project two variants of a design of a source a standard small size source (industrial manufacturing), conditionally named further point-like source and switchable source were considered. Development of a design and manufacturing of the experimental model of the switchable source is one of tasks of the given Project. However, construction and technological study of 241 Am-Li switchable source has revealed serious technological problems connected with use of lithium as a target. Therefore, as alternative, alongside with Am-Li in pair, a pair Am-LiF was considered. Though, average energy of neutrons from fluorine is three times higher -<Tn> = 1.2 MeV , but the output of neutrons almost is five times higher at rather low value of the maximal energy of neutrons -3.5 MeV. Furthermore, physical and chemical characteristics of LiF make its rather attractive to application. Use of LiF significantly reduces technological problems and essentially simplifies a design of switchable source. As the spectrum of neutrons from these sources is various, the basic calculations were carried out in parallel for Am-Li and for Am-LiF sources.

As known, reflectors and moderators forming the block of the source not only return a part of neutrons in working area, but also soften a spectrum of neutrons. These both factors are extremely important for a task of detection of nuclear materials by active methods. Optimization of a design of the block of the source means selection of such form and thickness of emitter and moderator which will provide maximum high density of a flux of lowenergy neutrons in working area of installation. Instead of determining two values - spatial distribution of density of a flux on volume of a working area and spatial dependence of a energy spectrum of neutrons, we have used that, that the method of Monte Carlo allows to fix in a course of performance of calculation events satisfying certain criterion - accordingly to the effect. For this purpose, in the center (on height) of a working zone it is placed thin (0,4 cm) uranium plate (90% 235 U + 10% 238U) the area of the equal area of a working zone and we fix the fact of 235U fission and , -coordinates of this event. Thus, but also spatial distribution (heterogeneity) of these events is defined not only number of partitions (probability). To an essence it is equivalent to calculation of convolution of section of division on spectral density of a stream of neutrons in points (xi yi). On picture 2 the elementary scheme of the block of a source a point-like source (it is designated by an asterisk) and polyethylene reflector RF are shown. The distance between a source and a reflector makes dS = 0.5 cm. The uranium plate (target) having thickness dTG = 0.4 cm is on distance L = 50.0 cm from a source. The sizes of a reflector and a target make 6060 cm2. As a rule, the number of modeled events - neutrons emitted by a source makes number Ntot = 105.

dRF dS L

RF *

dTG

TG

Fig. 2.

During simulating the number of neutrons hit in target N_TG and number of nucleus fissions 235 U N_Fiss. was counted up. Number of modified calculations in this simple configuration the are carried out. In absence of a reflector for discrete values of neutrons energies a range of values of energy makes from 1 keV up to 10 M. The relation of the number of neutrons hit in a target to total number of emitted neutrons N_TG/Ntot determines a solid angle of a target (for homogenous source) equal to 0.085 steradian. On picture 3 results dependence of number of fissions in a target from energy of neutrons are resulted.

Fig. 3.

This dependence is proportional to section of partition of nucleus through 235U neutrons. The following calculation is carried out for thick (semi-infinite) reflector dRF = 20cm. Energy of neutrons again discretely varied in the same range. Dependence of number of partition in a uranium plate from energy of neutrons is shown on Fig. 4. From figures it is visible, that the number of fission has grown almost ten times. This growth is caused by appreciably smaller energy of the reflected neutrons.

1 .10

7500 Num_Fiss

5000

2500

0 3 1 .10

0.01

0.1

10

Neutron kinetic energy, MeV

Fig. 4.

Calculations with Am-Li and Am-LiF sources for different thickness of a reflector in order to optimize the thickness of a reflector in a same simple geometry are carried out. Dependence of number of neutrons hits in a target upon thickness of a reflector is shown on Fig. 5, and number of fissions in a target on Fig. 6.

Fig. 5. (boxes-Am-Li, circles- Am-LiF).

Fig. 6. (boxes-Am-Li, circles- Am-LiF).

In both figures it is well visible effect of application of a reflector and distinction for Am-Li and Am-LiF sources. At thickness of a reflector 46 cm. the number of neutrons hit in a target is doubled (Fig. 5), and number of fission, because of mitigation of a spectrum of the reflected neutrons, increases in 10 times! From figures it is visible also, that optimum value of thickness of a reflector makes 56 cm. Efficiency of a reflector can be increased having applied an additional cylindrical form reflector (Fig. 7). Internal radius of polyethylene cylinder R, external radius (R + dC) and height of the cylinder hC. Here two parameters radius of cylinder R and its height hC are subject to optimization. Thickness of a reflector dRF and the cylinder dC are fixed and are accordingly equal 4 cm and 3 cm.

dRF dS L

RF * dC 2R TG Fig. 7. hC

dTG

On Fig. 8 shows results of calculations are resulted: dependence of number of fission in a target from height of the cylinder for four different values of internal radius of the cylinder.

Fig. 8. (boxes-Am-Li, circles- Am-LiF).

From these figures it is visible, that dependence upon the internal radius of a cylindrical reflector is weak and optimum makes 34 cm. At small values of height of the cylindrical reflector hC dependence seems to be strong, the exit on a plateau poorly depends on radius of the cylinder and occurs at hC ~36 cm. In all cases, for a point like source application of an additional reflector having cylindrical form increases number of fissions in a target still twice! From these figures it is visible, character of dependence does not vary for Am-Li and Am-LiF sources, and value of efficiency differ on (1525)%.

Source of neutrons having the form of a disk

Development of a design and manufacturing of a pre-production model switchable source of neutrons is one of the tasks of the Project. The switchable source of neutrons essentially has the big area - a little hundred square centimeters. Structurally, the switchable source can have the form as of a flat disk and the form of a square or a rectangular as well. More simple design of a switchable source turns out for a source as a disk. The geometry of the block of a source with a thin flat source is shown on Fig. 9. Radius of disk R = 20 cm, thickness of a reflector dRF and thickness of moderator dMod. Gaps between a disk, a reflector and moderator make 0.1 cm. At this stage of calculations (the design of a switchable source is not concretized yet) thickness of a disk is zero. A point of neutrons emission is performing uniformly on a surface of a disk.

60x80 dRF 0.1 0.1 2R L

dMod

dTG

Fig. 9. For optimization of thickness of a reflector modeling in absence of moderator dMod = 0 is carried out. Dependence of N_FISS from dRF is shown on Fig. 10. From figure it is visible, that as well as in a case with a point-like source, N_FISS appears on a plateau at thickness of a reflector 46 cm. Having fixed thickness of a reflector on size dRF = 4.0 cm dependence on thickness of moderator dMod is performed. On Fig. 11 this dependence is shown, an optimum thickness of moderator makes dMod = 2.0 cm. 9

Fig. 10.

It is necessary to note, that despite of so big size of a disk 2R = 40 cm the absolute number of fission in a uranium plate is approximately equal to number of fission in a case with a point-like source. As to homogeneity of a field of neutrons created by an switchable source, studying of this question should be postponed before specification of details of a design of asource. Other important characteristic of the block of a source is homogeneity of density of a flux of

Fig. 11. neutrons in working volume of installation. For studying homogeneity of a neutron field modeling with one, with two and with four point-like sources and with a source in the form of a disk has been carried out. The best homogeneity (1015)%, obviously, is reached in case of four allocated pointlike sources and with a source in the form of a disk.

10

Neutron detection
The basic purpose of the detection block to provide the maximum of the neutrons detection efficiency of the fission 235U and the minimal efficiency for the primary neutrons from Am-Li source. As detectors of neutrons, the tubes filled by the 3 gas at the pressure of 4 atmospheres, operated in proportional mode are chosen. This type of neutron detectors possesses high efficiency of registration of slow neutrons. The industry lets releases the wide nomenclature, both tubes, and electronics to them. In real conditions of installation, neutrons get in the working volume of the tubes both from Am-Li a source and the fission neutrons of 235U. The design of the detector block should be optimized so that to provide high efficiency of the fission neutrons and low efficiency for neutrons from Am-Li or Am-LiF sources. As a rule the detector block, besides detectors of the neutrons proportional 3He tubes, contains moderator and a reflector. In some cases use as well filters of a boron or cadmium. For definition of moderator optimum thickness and of the reflector in the detector block, calculations for different values of thickness of a moderator and a reflector are carried out. The point-like source in the isotropic regime lets out neutrons according to a fission spectrum. Thickness of 3He detector 2.5 cm, pressure of working gas 4 atmosphere. In the program the number of operations of the detector, i.e. number of events in which energy deposition in the detector exceeds threshold value Eth = 50 keV is counted up. By results of calculations (Fig. 12) optimum values of moderator thickness - dMod = 34 cm. and a reflector - dRF = 56 cm are chosen.

dRF dMod

Fig. 12.

11

During the work the analysis of expediency of use of the boric filter in the block of detectors is lead. The spectrum of neutrons from a source is essentially softened in comparison with a spectrum of the fission neutrons. The effect of application of the boric filter on model of the detector block was investigated. Dependence of number of registered neutrons from Am-Li and Am-LiF sources and the fission neutrons was investigated depending on thickness of the filter. A material of the filter boron carbide B4C. According to the general configuration of the control system, Am-Li/F source were located hardly above blocks of detectors along the center of a working zone, and a source of partition neutrons - in the central area of a working zone. Results have shown, that for the fission neutrons practically there is no dependence on thickness of the filter dFL and for neutrons from Am-Li and Am-LiF sources sharp dependence is observed. So, even at thickness of the filter dFL = 0.30.4 cm the stream of neutrons causing operation of tubes decreases twice. One more issue which is not obvious without simulation, is orientation of proportional tubes along a vertical or a horizontal. Results of modeling did not give distinctions within the limits of statistical errors.

Optimization of Biological Protection

With the purpose of optimization of biological protection corresponding calculations are carried out in conditions of concrete configuration of the monitoring system. Two-layer protection from all sides surrounds installation. Internal (first) layer is made from polythene, an external (second) layer of lead or iron. Hereinafter, the following designations are accepted: first layer - IX, Y, Z, the second IIX, Y, Z, indexes designate a protection layer along the corresponding axes. First of all influence of protection along a z-direction (along conveyor) has been investigated. On Fig. 13 dependence of an withdrawal of neutrons and scale of gamma-quantums out of limits of protection is submitted depending on thickness of a polyethylene layer from end faces (in z-direction). In other directions IX,Y = 0 and IIX, Y, Z = 0. Full number of neutrons emitted from sources Ntot = 104.

6000

8000

Number of Neutrons

4500

Number of Photons
0 5 10

6000

3000

4000

1500

2000

10

Thickness of Iz layer

Thickness of Iz layer

Fig.13.

12

From the figure it is visible, that the neutron number almost twice decreases at thickness of a polyethylene layer 56 cm. accordingly, the number of gamma quantums moved out of limits of installation, equally grows. On Fig. 14 results of calculations of dependence of a neutron yield and gamma quantums from the thickness of the first protective layer in a direction x and y are shown at different IZ values (thickness of protection in a z-direction) IZ = 4.0 (red squares), IZ = 6.0 (dark blue dots) and IZ = 10.0 cm. (black diamonds).

1 .10

1 .10

Number of Neutrons

Number of Photons
0 5 10

1 .10

8750

7500

100

6250

10

5000

10

Thickness of Ix,y layer

Thickness of Ix,y layer

Fig. 14.

From figure it is visible, that, number of neutrons, predictably, does not appear on a plateau, therefore thickness of the first protective layer is chosen on the base of absolute value of a neutron yield. At thickness IZ = 6.0 and IX,Y = 6.0 cm. the neutron yield from the whole surface of installation makes about 400 neutrons on 104 neutrons from the sources. This size of a neutron yield is quite acceptable and as it will be visible from the further, provides allowable levels of radiation outside of installation. The gamma quantums yield achieves maximum at 5 cm. The further decrease in number of gamma quantums is connected to absorption of gamma quantums in polythene. The absorption of the gamma quantums moved out of the first protection layer of shield (IX,Y,Z = 6.0 cm.) should be ensured by the second protective layer made from the heavy material iron or lead. In Figure 15 results of calculations of withdrawal of a neutron yield and gamma quantums out of limits of the second protective layer depending on thickness of the second iron (red squares) or lead (dark blue dots) layer are shown

13

600

1 .10

Number of Neutrons

450

Number of Photons

7500

300

5000

150

2500

Thickness of IIx,y,z layer

Thickness of IIx,y,z layer

Fig. 15. Simulations show, that, in concrete geometry of installation 2 cm of lead provide quadruple decrease in gamma quantums yield, hardly less 4 cm of iron. It is obvious, that increasing thickness of the second layer it is possible to lower gamma quantums yield. Thickness of the first and second protective layer should be such to provide an optimum ratio between a neutron and gamma quantums yield namely, Noutcome/Noutcomen ~ where the -factor means radiation weighting factor. The total surface of installation, external surface of shield, makes 44.103 cm2. This is minimal value and after real design study, in view of constructive elements, the sizes of installation will increase. The limits of shield leave, basically, the slow neutrons preliminary exposed to several acts of dispersion and gamma quantums having energy 2.2 MeV initiated by 1H (n, )2H reaction. Table 2 Am-Li Fe 4.0 m. Nn N 1267 41300 Pb 2.0 m. 3206 22231 Am-LiF Fe 4.0 m. 2809 40355 Pb 2.0 m. 5119 21704

According to the table 2 the output of neutrons and gamma-quantums out of limits of shield makes accordingly about (15)103 and (23)104 on 105 neutrons from sources. These figures give area density of a flux for slow neutrons about 0.1 neutrons/cm2 sec and for gamma about 0.5 gamma/cm2 sec. These levels completely meet sanitary norms of safety. 14

Calculation of Control System Efficiency

General configuration of installation without biological shield it is shown in Figure 16. The sizes and composition both the block of a source, and the detection blocks have been specified by results of simulation. The 3He tubes are located in the plane xy. The tubes diameter are 2.5 cm, active length 50 cm, thickness of aluminum wall of 0.5 mm. Total number of tubes 48. The tubes are located in chessboard. It is supposed, that the tubes are filled with working gas 3He at pressure 4 atm. The tubes external plane is closed by the polyethylene reflectors RF, from the inside preliminary moderator PMd, boron carbide (B4C) filter-FL and the polyethylene basic moderator-Md. The target (90% 235U + 10% 238U) is located in the center of working area and is model of the hidden sharing material in luggage. The sizes of a target are 220.1 cm3. Weight of a sample about 8 g.

RF RF PMd FL

TG

Md

RF * dRF

Fig. 16.

15

Calculations were carried out both with Am-Li, and with Am-LiF point-like sources. The total number of released neutrons made 5105. A signal of detection of a sharing material is simultaneous registration of two (double coincidence) or three (triple coincidence) neutrons by proportional tubes. The threshold of operation of a tube is chosen at a level 50 keV energy deposition in 3He. This value of a threshold is much less than in 3He (n, p)3H cases (kinetic energy of a proton 0.57 MeV) and is more than level of noise of tubes and electronics. In case of 105 neutrons in a second the rate of the count of an each tube will not exceed 100200 hertz. Dependence of number of single response of tubes has been investigated depending on a threshold for Am-Li sources in absence of a uranium target (there are no fission neutrons). For three values of a threshold 50, 100 and 200 keV, dependences on a threshold in these limits is not observed For reception of more authentic values simulation with the big statistics - 5 105 neutrons from sources has been carried out. An average of double and triple coincidence (number of events of effect) have made, accordingly for Am-Li and Am-LiF sources 14.3 1.2 and 10.8 1.1. Without a target the same values are equal 0.20 0.14 and 0.3 0.17 correspondingly. Such high values of effect mean that the flux of neutrons from source can be reduced by 2030% having kept high reliability of detection (above 99%).

Development of the design of a switchable source

One of the primary goals of the project was development of the switchable source which prototype is U.S. Patent 4,829,191. For the purpose of use of the switchable source in the luggage monitoring system researches on the following directions have been lead:

A theoretical assessment of the parameters of SNS on the basis of Am-Li, Development of technical requirements to a source of neutrons, An experimental assessment of nuclear physical characteristics of a source,
development of the technological proposal on manufacture of a source and an assessment of its approximate cost. The principal scheme of the neutron switchable source is shown in Fig. 17 [8, 9]. The sources consist of several parallel mobile and three motionless disks. Both surfaces (half of every surfaces) of mobile disks are covered with 241Am and corresponding surfaces of motionless disks Li or LiF. Permanent magnets provide reliable fixing rotating disks in the switched off condition. Initial turning on and final turning off is carried out mechanically. Each disk is divided into segments that match those of the adjacent plates; alternate plates are in a fixed position. Those disks between the fixed plates can be rotated into the opposition so that the Am surfaces are directly opposite the Li surfaces and can strike the Li, or alternately, into the "off' position in which from Am surfaces cannot strike Li. The neutron switchable source has a non-magnetic stainless steel capsule. The capsule can be evacuated, or alternatively, can contain a non-chemically contaminating atmosphere.

16

Fig. 17.

17

Fig. 18.

18

Fig. 19. The sketch of the variants SNS design are shown in Fig. 18 and 19 [8, 9]. The choice of a variant of a design will be possible after of much testing of experimental model of the sources. The major technology requirement to switchable isotope source is: to result in working position in contact substances of -emitter and targets so that at switching them off it will be possible to divide them again, not having polluted one another. As have shown experimental researches optimum thickness of an -emitter layer makes about 0,1 microns, i.e. approximately 10% from the maximal run of -particles in plutonium or in americium. This thickness allows use effectively about half of emitted -particles. As for exception of auto absorption of -particles in a material of a source it is necessary to make a layer of a -emitter thin, at their limited specific activity, a neutron yield from sources will be proportional to the area of covering of substance of a target and an alpha emitter. So, for a source on the basis of plutonium-238 and beryllium with an output 105 n/s the area of an active surface of a metal plutonium layer should be equal to 3,2 cm2, for is those a source on the basis of americium-241 about 15 cm2, and for source Am241-Li7 the covering area will turn out already about 500 cm2. Activity of Americium-241 is about 2 curie, about 0,7 gram.

19

Especially it is necessary to note presence at plutonium-238 of neutrons of spontaneous fission with intensity about 2 103 n/s per gram. Hence, as for such source with an output 105 n/s it is required about 20 mg of plutonium-238, which in the switchable regime will let out 40 neutrons in a second. Americium-241 at the expense of spontaneous fission lets out all less than one neutron in a second on gram. The assessment of size of the covering area of -sources and targets was given earlier. It is evident, that dimensions of "switchable" neutron sources will be far from the traditional "point" sizes and their design will depend on tasks of application and special rigid technical and operational requirements to sources of radiation. As much as possible taking into account necessary requirements, we have developed some variants of a design of a switchable neutron source of updating. It is similarly possible to design a source of the rectangular form, and make inclusion trough shift of alternating plates for width of strips of alpha-emitter and target. SNS case provides necessary tightness and radiating protection against accompanying soft gamma-radiation caused by Americium-241. The last phase of the CRP the experimental study of the switchable neutron source has not been executed. As stated above, all three organizations not only have shown interest to creation of a source, but also have carried out the certain work on development of manufacturing techniques m and m-Li components of SNS. However, these organizations belong to a military-industrial complex, therefore to receive from them real products without intermediary IAEA is not possible. Therefore the relations of this kind do not give IAEA and Delta the right to use the practical results, e.g., we have no right to include in this report some important results of preliminary investigations and discussions. In this regard the memorandum IAEA confirming interests of the Agency in the given subject, i.e. interest of the Agency in the future development of the themes and receipt of the working model of SNS for testing, will be helpful. At the same time authority of the Agency will be the key factor during adjustment of the legal relations.

Conclusions
The main technical requirements to the Project are solvable and available from practical point of view. Suggested technical decisions is sufficient for realization of developing method of detection of High Enriched Uranium in luggage: 1. Overall dimensions of equipment do not exceed the size of modern x-ray visual devices. 2. During the working regime radiation conditions outside of device correspond to the radiation safety requirements. 3. The range of neutron output (35) x 105 is sufficient for switched-off neutron sources. 4. The neutron source of given activity ensures dynamic control of luggage within the system of existing X-Ray visual control devices. 5. The lowest detectable mass of detected substance do not exceed 10 gram that corresponds to the one pellet of assemblage of heat-generating cell. 6. Time of detection of the lowest mass (with probability 99%) in the luggage compartment (having dimensions 60 x 60 x 50) does not exceed one second. 7. Technical parameters of serial electronic system of analysis in time domain of coincidence of secondary partition neutrons are quite sufficient. 20

8. Extension of activity of neutron source as well as area of detection could accordingly increase the speed of detection. 9. The basic parameters of emanation and detection units were optimized in order to form the neutron fields of primary and converted secondary partition neutrons. 10. The type of switched-off neutron source is chosen: Am-LiF. 11. The model of frame for switched-off neutron source is developed. 12. The technical issues of safe plotting of components (alpha-emitter and target) of switched-off neutron sources on layers are studied. 13. Three Russian nuclear centers (Khlopins Radium Institute in St-Petersburg, IPPE in Obninsck and the Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Reactors of the Russian Federation in Dimitrovgrad city) express preliminary consent (with juridical and financial reservations) to develop the experimental models of modern sources. Support of IAEA is strongly needed to support organizational efforts due to construction, testing and delivery of switched-off sources to the customers. Recommended Future Action by Agency It is recommended to maintain activities for the further development of methods the active detection of hidden highly quality nuclear materials. Specifically, it is recommended to initiate a CRP in a direction of The comparative analysis of application of radioisotope sources and neutron generators for the active detection of hidden highly quality nuclear materials. REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] Description and Operation Manual for the Active Well Coincidence Counter. Los Alamos, LA-7823-M. V. Smirnov, Analysis of Performance of a System for Explosives Detection in Airline Baggag, Pros. of NATO Advanced Research Workshop Detection of Explosives and Land Mines: Methods and Field Experience, 2001, St. Petersburg, Russia. L. Meskhi, Methodology and Field Equipment for Detection Explosives, Drugs and Other Substances of Organic Origin, Pros. of NATO Advanced Research Workshop Detection of Explosives and Land Mines: Methods and Field Experience, 2001, St. Petersburg, Russia. Beck P., Schmitzer C., Duftschmid K.E., Arlt R., ITRAP- International Laboratory and Field Test Site Exercise for Radiation Detection Instruments and Monitoring Systems at Border Crossings, Proceedings International Conference on Security of Material, Stockholm, May 2001, IAEA-CN-86 (2001). Gunnink R., and Arlt R., Illicit Trafficking Isotope Identification: Software Problems and Solutions, Unpublished report presented at the Technical Co-ordination meeting on HandHeld Device Isotope Identifiers, January 811, 2002, IAEA, Vienna. Copies available on request. P. Beck, Austrian Research Center Seibersdorf, ITRAP Project Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Programme; www.arcs.ac.at. F. Gabriel, A. Wolf, D. Proehl, R. Jainsch, K.W. Leege, R. Arlt, P. Schwalbach, B. Richter, Mini MCA Evaluation, Field Test and Commercialization. Proceedings of the 19th ESARDA Annual Symposium, Montpellier, France, May 1997, EUR 17665 EN, ESARDA 28, pp. 419; www.gbs-elektronik.de.

[5]

[6] [7]

21

[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

L. Meskhi, L. Kurdadze, G. Cirekidze, Development of the equipment to reveal clandestine highly-enriched uranium. International conference on Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting. May 1620, 2005, Obninsk. L. Meskhi, L. Kurdadze, Working Material RCM on the CRP Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials. IAEA, SGTS/NSNS. 2428 April 2006, Vienna, Austria. E.A. Rhodes, D.L. Bowers, R.E. Boyar, C.E. Dickerman, Advanced concept proof-ofprinciple demonstration: Switchable radioactive neutron source, ANL/ACTV-95/2, Technical Report. OSTI ID: 197135; DE96004828. GEANT, Detector Description and Simulation Tools. CERN, Geneva, Switzerland. Safeguards Techniques and Equipment. International Nuclear Verification Series #1, IAEA, 2003 Edition. T. Gozani, Active Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials: Principles and Applications, 1981. Donald R. Rogers, Handbook of Nuclear Safeguards Measurement Methods, 1983. W.M. Bowen and Carl A. Bonnett, Statistical Methods for Nuclear Management, 1988. Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials/Edited by D. Reilly, N. Ensslin, H. Smith and S. Kreiner, 1991.

22

Comparative Study of New Scintillation Materials in Application to the Border Monitoring Equipment
M. Moszyski The Andrzej Soltan Institute for Nuclear Studies, Poland Abstract At present there is a continuous need for highly efficient and of good energy resolution (selectivity) detectors to use them in border monitoring hand-held instrumentation to fight illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. There are at least two major technical obstacles of the instrumentation: sensitivity and selectivity. The sensitivity is of great importance parameter, which allows finding nuclear material, while the selectivity is required to avoid a misinterpretation of the benign radioactivity as being a threat. An extensive set of measurements was performed; some of the results are listed below: 1. A high energy resolution was measured for the LaCl3:Ce scintillator above 100 keV gamma rays. For lower energies, NaI(Tl) crystal is still superior because of the excess of the light yield at theses energies. 2. The superior performance of the LaBr3 crystal in the whole range of gamma-rays energy was reflected in its high selectivity and good detection efficiency, better than that of NaI(Tl) crystal. A high linearity of the new crystal response was observed, which should simplify isotope identification. 3. A good energy resolution and high detection efficiency was measured for gamma rays of small CWO and CaWO crystals. However, a larger crystal exhibited a degradation of the light output and energy resolution. In the case of both crystals further efforts are necessary to get large volume detectors of comparable performances. 4. A high detection sensitivity for thermal neutron detection of 6LiI(Eu) crystal was observed, as well as its a high selectivity against gamma ray background. As such, 6LiI(Eu) could be used in compact handheld neutron monitors to replace He-3 detectors. 5. The comparative study of LaBr3 and CZT detectors of comparable size showed a better energy resolution of LaBr3. A poor charge collection in a large CZT limits still obtainable energy resolution. More efforts are necessary for a further development of larger volume CZT detectors with an energy resolution similar to that measured with small detectors. 6. It was recognized that further work is necessary to select and to optimize photomultipliers for LaBr3, assuring particularly a good linearity of the PMT response. To utilize full capabilities of LaBr3 detector, photomultipliers with a reduced number of linear-focused dynodes (to 7 or 8 stages) and characterized by high quantum efficiency of about 35% is required.

1. General description of the research At present there is a continuous need for highly efficient and of good energy resolution (selectivity) detectors to use them in border monitoring hand-held instrumentation to fight illicit trafficking of nuclear materials [1]. There are at least two major technical obstacles of the instrumentation: sensitivity and selectivity. The sensitivity is of great importance parameter, which allows finding nuclear material, while the selectivity is required to avoid a misinterpretation of the benign radioactivity as being a threat. As of now, the small hand-held instrumentations utilize scintillation detector NaI(Tl) and semiconductor detector CZT. The former one is characterized by a very high detection efficiency but poor energy resolution, while the latter one is of better selectivity but lower efficiency due to its small size. New scintillation detectors are needed to significantly improve current border monitoring instrumentation. Particularly, new scintillators as LaCl3, LaBr3, CdWO4 (CWO), CaWO4 and LiI(Eu) seem to be good candidates and their advantages and drawbacks should be evaluated. A high energy resolution (selectivity) of LaCl3 and LaBr3, a high detection efficiency of CWO and CaWO4 for high-energy gamma rays due to their density and high Z number can improve the border monitoring. In the case of LiI(Eu), its high sensitivity to thermal neutrons, as well as, its excellent selectivity against -ray background have to be pointed out. The scientific program of the contract was addressed to evaluation of the performance of new scintillation detectors for the border equipment characterized by both a high selectivity in one case and a high sensitivity in the other. Besides of new scintillators, the new photomultipliers necessary for the efficient work with LaBr3 crystal was studied. The study covered tests of: Scintillators of a high selectivity as LaCl3 [2] and LaBr3 [3] in comparison to commonly used NaI(Tl) and CZT detectors, Scintillators with a high sensitivity as CdWO4 (CWO) [4] and CaWO4 (CaWO) [5] in comparison to BGO, The program was extended by the tests of LiI(Eu) crystal as a very efficient neutron detector Tests of new photomultipliers for efficient work with LaBr3 crystal, First tests of new photodetectors, as Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and Silicon Drift Detectors (SDD).

The studies were summarised in the following papers, attached at the end of the report: [I] M. Moszyski, M. Balcerzyk, W. Czarnacki, M. Kapusta, W. Klamra, A. Syntfeld, M. Szawlowski, Intrinsic Energy Resolution and Light Yield Non-proportionality of BGO, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 51 (2004) 1074. M. Balcerzyk, M. Moszyski, M. Kapusta, Comparison of LaCl3:Ce and NaI(Tl) scintillators in -ray spectrometry, Nucl. Instrum. Meth., A537 (2005) 50.

[II]

[III]

M. Moszyski, M. Balcerzyk, M. Kapusta, A. Syntfeld, D. Wolski, G. Pausch, J. Stein, P. Schotanus, CdWO4 Crystal in Gamma-ray Spectrometry, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 52 (2005) 3124. A. Syntfeld, M. Moszyski, M. Balcerzyk, M. Kapusta, D. Wolski, M. Majorov and P. Schotanus, 6LiI(Eu) in Neutron and ray Spectrometry A High Sensitive Thermal Neutron Detection, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 52 (2005) 3151. M. Swoboda, R. Arlt, V. Gostilo, A. Loupilov, M. Majorov, M. Moszynski, A. Syntfeld, Spectral Gamma Detectors for Hand-held Radioisotope Identification Devices (RIDs) for Nuclear Security Applications, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 52 (2005) 3111. M. Moszyski, M. Balcerzyk, W. Czarnacki, A. Nassalski, T. Szczesniak, H. Krus, V.B. Mikhalik, I.M. Solskii, Characterization of CaWO4 scintillator at room and liquid nitrogen temperature, Nucl. Intstr. Meth., A553 (2005) 578.

[IV]

[V]

[VI]

[VII] A. Syntfeld, R. Arlt, V. Gostilo, A. Loupilov, M. Moszynski, A. Nassalski, M. Swoboda, D. Wolski Comparison of a Large Volume CdZnTe Detector with a LaBr-3 Scintillation Detector, presented at 2005 IEEE NSS/MIC Conference, submitted to IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 2. Results 2.1. High energy resolution scintillators - comparison to NaI(Tl) scintillator and CZT detector Recently new chloride and bromide compounds, as LaCl3:Ce [2] and LaBr3:Ce [3], showed both a very high light output and good energy resolution [26]. The value of 2.9% measured for 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source with LaBr3 scintillator is unequalled [3]. A good density of both crystals equal to 3.86 g/cm3 for LaCl3 and to 5.3 g/cm3 for LaBr3 assure a comparable or better sensitivity than that of NaI(Tl). Fast light pulses with the decay time constant of about 18 ns allow for a high counting rate measurements. 2.1.1. LaCl3:Ce crystal The LaCl3:Ce crystal was proposed first by van Loef et al [2]. In the study [II], the commercial sample of LaCl3:(91)%Ce with the size of 25 25 mm was compared to NaI(Tl). A good light output of 9400100 photoelectrons per MeV and energy resolution of 4.2 0.2% for 662 keV -rays were measured with the LaCl3 crystal coupled to the XP3212 photomultiplier with bialkali photocathode. Below 122 keV, energy resolution of LaCl3 was unexpectedly worse than that of NaI(Tl). Estimated photofraction of 17.9% at 662 keV is comparable to 21.4% for NaI(Tl) of 25 31 mm size. The radioactive background of the natural 138La radioactive isotope was observed in LaCl3, estimated to be about 28 c/s in the crystal. Moreover, the contamination of the crystal by emitting isotopes of uranium series was discovered. The LaCl3 showed a good proportionality of the light yield versus energy within 3% down to 20 keV. The total and intrinsic energy resolutions are discussed.

The new LaCl3:Ce crystal delivered by Saint-Gobain showed a reduced alpha contamination at least by one order of magnitude in comparison to the first tested crystal. Fig. 1 presents the comparison of energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source, as measured with LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) crystals at 3 s shaping time constant. Note a very good energy resolution of LaCl3 of 4.2% in comparison to 6.5% observed with NaI(Tl).
5000

NaI(Tl)
4000 3000

Counts

FWHM 6.7%
2000 1000 0 30000

1000

2000

3000

4000

LaCl3:Ce
20000

FWHM 4.2%

Counts

10000

1000

2000

3000

4000

Channel

Fig. 1. The comparison of energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source, as measured with LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) crystals under the same gain of spectroscopy amplifier.

The non-proportionality curves for LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) are shown in Fig. 2. The nonproportionality is defined here as the phe number yield measured at specific -ray energy relative to the phe number yield at 662 keV -peak. LaCl3 is clearly superior to NaI(Tl) in terms of non-proportionality.
120%

Nonproportionality

LaCl3 110%

NaI(Tl)

100%

90% 10 100 Energy, keV 1000 10000

Fig. 2. Non-proportionality of the light yield of LaCl3 and NaI(Tl). The curve error is 3%.

30% Energy resolution NaI(Tl) Sample 3 20% LaCl3

10%

0% 10 100 1000 10000 Energy, keV

Fig. 3. Energy resolution of LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) versus energy.

The advantages and properties for LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of properties of LaCl3 and NaI(Tl) Property Light yield Afterglow Radioactivity Energy resolution at 662 keV Proportionality / Density Zeff Photofraction at 662 keV NaI(Tl) 12750 phe/MeV Large None 6.760.15% LaCl3:Ce 9400 phe/MeV Substantial La, 2.34 decays/cm3 4.20.13%
138

+15% at 20 keV 0.64 3.67 g/cm 50 21.4%

3

3% above 20 keV 0.330.01 3.86 g/cm3 59.5 17.9%

No doubt that the main advantage of LaCl3 over NaI(Tl) is superior energy resolution at energies above 120 keV. This fact and a comparable detection efficiency and photofraction will make it, in the near future, a crystal of choice for a precise -ray spectrometry. A much faster light pulse allows for a high counting rate measurements, several times larger than that with NaI(Tl). A high speed of the fast component of light pulse and high light output assure also fast timing capabilities of the new crystal. For more details, please look to the enclosed copy of the paper.

2.1.2. LaBr3:Ce crystal The performance of hand-held radioisotope identification devices (RIDs) is still hampered by the performance of the NaI(Tl) detectors, which are commonly used in such instruments. In the paper [VII] we continue the search for better detector options. One of the largest ever made single elements, coplanar CdZnTe detector (30 15 12.1 mm3, volume 5.45 cm3, designed by University of Michigan) is compared with a commercially available LaBr3 detector (1 1; volume 12.9 cm3). Parameters, relevant to the performance of isotope identification devices, such like resolution and efficiency as function of the -ray energy, temperature shift, linearity and others are measured and compared. According to first measurement results it seems to be very likely that for this application LaBr3 detectors are an alternative to CdZnTe detectors. This, even more, if one bears in mind that LaBr3 came only recently commercially available and detectors with larger volumes are likely to appear in the nearest future. The overall energy resolution for LaBr3 crystal connected to PM tube was measured as 3.2% at 662 keV (see Fig. 4) at the shaping time being 3 s. In the same figure the spectrum of 137Cs measured with CP CZT is included and compared to LaBr3. An energy resolution of 5.1% was measured for the CP CZT detector. The energy resolution of LaBr3 is much better than that obtained for the CP CZT detector. On the other hand, all large volume (2.25 cm3) CZT detectors presented in [8] had energy resolutions less than 2% on the energy 662 keV. For the measured 137Cs spectra the peak-to-Compton and peak-to-valley ratios for LaBr3 and CP CZT were calculated and presented below in Table 2.
1600 1400 1200 1000
Counts

1 ch = 1keV 661.6 keV

800 5.1% 600 400 200 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Channel number CP CZT LaBr 3 3.2%

Fig. 4. The -ray spectra from a 137Cs source measured with LaBr3 and CP CZT.

Figure 5 shows an overall energy resolution as a function of -ray energy measured for LaBr3, CP CZT and NaI(Tl) detectors. CP CZT exhibits poor energy resolution in the whole energy region (18.7% and 5.1% at 81 and 662 keV, respectively.) The energy resolution measured for LaBr3 is extremely good for -ray energies above 100 keV. The deterioration of energy resolution below 100 keV follows probably the light yield decrease observed for the LaBr3 crystals (see Fig. 6). The increasing tendency of NaI(Tl) light output while the -ray energy is going down makes NaI(Tl) still competitive amongst scintillators in the low energy region.

NaI(Tl) LaBr 3 CP CZT

Energy resolution (FWHM, %)

10

1 10

100 Energy (keV)

1000

Fig. 5. The overall energy resolution measured for LaBr3 and CP CZT (compared to 25 x 31 mm NaI(Tl)).

The light yield as a function of and X-ray energy relative to the yield at 662 keV is presented in Fig. 6. The non-proportional response of LaBr3 is compared to that of NaI(Tl). For the energies above 200 keV both scintillator responses are quite well proportional while in the low energy region the LaBr3 detector is more proportional than NaI(Tl). In contrary to NaI(Tl), the LaBr3 non-proportionality curve is bending down when energy decreases and the light production is much lower compared to NaI(Tl) (see Fig. 6) The non-proportionality curve presented in Fig.6 for the LaBr3 detector is in agreement with the non-proportionality reported by Dorenbos et al. [10]. However, one should be careful in determination of light yield in the high energy region (above ~1 MeV) owing to a possible non-linearity of PM tube.
1.20 1.15 1.10
Non-propotionality (normalized to 662 keV)

NaI(Tl) LaBr 3

1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 10

100 Energy (keV)

1000

Fig. 6. A comparison of the non-proportionality curves measured for the LaBr3 and NaI(Tl) (25 31 mm) crystals, respectively.

Figure 7 shows spectra for the enriched 235U. The lower spectrum presents the 235U source behind fertilizer, 14 cm in thickness, taken with the LaBr3 detector. Since 235U emits -radiation mainly in the low energy region, a good energy resolution is crucial to -ray separation and identification in this energy region. The 186 keV peak is still observed even if the 235U sample is masked by the natural radioactive shield.

10k 1k 100 10
Counts

235

1 ch = 1 keV

235

40

K (background)

1
235

10k 1k 100 10 1 0 500 1000

U behind 14 cm fertilizer
40

1500 Channel number

2000

2500

3000

Fig. 7. The

235

U spectra taken for the LaBr3 detector.

Table 2 summarizes a comparison of performance of the LaBr3 scintillation detector, a large volume coplanar grid CdZnTe (CP CZT) detector and those of NaI(Tl) crystal.
Table 2. Properties of LaBr3, CP CZT and NaI(Tl) detectors

Unfortunately, poor performance of the tested large volume (5.45 cm3) CP CZT indicates bad quality of this crystal that is a consequence of the still immature fabrication of such big single slab crystals. Previously measured smaller volume (up to 2.25 cm3) CdZnTe detectors were characterized by a small temperature drift, the highest energy resolution and the best linearity of the energy scale. More efforts are necessary for a further development of larger volume CdZnTe detectors with an energy resolution similar to that of smaller ones. Quite new LaBr3 scintillation crystals occurred to be a compromise between NaI(Tl) and CdZnTe. Recent samples of a volume of about 13 cm3 can register radiation with an energy resolution as high as 3.2% at 662 keV compared to about 2% for CP CZT (volume 2.25 cm3) and 6.5% for the selected NaI(Tl) samples. In the low energy region (<100 keV) LaBr3 has

poorer energy resolution and comparable to NaI(Tl). On the other hand, LaBr3 is more linear in the whole energy region. High detection efficiency of LaBr3 scintillators is due to their high density and recently available larger size of the crystals. 2.2. Scintillators with a high sensitivity comparison to BGO and NaI(Tl) scintillators New high-Z scintillator detectors are needed to significantly improve current border monitoring instrumentation utilizing plastic detectors, as well as, for the development of highly efficient handheld instrumentation. BGO, widely used high-Z scintillator suffers because of a low light yield and in consequence a poor energy resolution. CdWO4 (CWO) [4] and CaWO4 (CaWO) [5] are candidate to be used for this purpose. An application of CWO and CaWO in the gamma spectrometry is limited because of a long main decay time constant of the light pulses, which does not allow measurements at high counting rates. Both crystals belong to the group of very slow scintillators with a long decay time constant of the light pulse of 14 s for CWO [4] and 9 s for CaWO [5]. However, in the border monitoring equipment, one is looking for traces of gamma rays emitted by well-shielded radioactive sources. Thus, high rate capabilities of the detectors are less important. 2.2.1. CdWO4 (CWO) In the paper [III], the properties of CdWO4 (CWO) crystals in gamma spectrometry were studied. Several small samples of 10x10x3 mm size, typically used in CT X-ray detectors, were tested and then compared to performance of a larger crystal of 20 mm in diameter and 20 mm high. A light output, energy resolution and non-proportionality of the CWO response versus gamma-ray energy were measured and compared to those of small BGO to discuss further the origin of the intrinsic resolution of pure scintillating crystals. A high light output of 6500 200 phe/MeV and a good energy resolution of 6.6 0.2% were measured for 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source coupling the small samples to XP3212 photomultiplier. Common non-proportionality curves and consequently common intrinsic resolutions of small CWO and BGO suggest that they represent fundamental characteristics of the scintillating material themselves, for heavy oxide crystals. Fig. 8 shows the energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source measured with a small CWO crystal and with a 25 mm in diameter and 30 mm high NaI(Tl). Note the high energy resolution of 6.6 0.2% for the 662 keV peak obtained with the CWO, which is comparable to that of NaI(Tl). Note also the comparable photofractions of 26% and 23% in both spectra for the CWO and the NaI(Tl) crystals, respectively, while the volume of the NaI(Tl) crystal is 50 times larger. A shift down of 32 keV KX-ray peak in CWO spectrum in relation to that of NaI(Tl) is seen. It reflects an excess of light at low energies in NaI(Tl) observed in the non-proportionality curve [58] and a reduced light yield in the case of CWO, see Fig. 10, below. Fig. 9 presents the spectra of gamma rays from a 207Bi source and that of the background of the laboratory measured with a larger CWO crystal of 20 mm in diameter and 20 mm in height. High photofractions are observed for the high energy gamma peaks of 1063 keV and 1770 keV. In the background spectrum, well defined peaks of 1460 keV for 40K, 1764 keV due to Radium series and 2614 keV due to Thorium series, are present. All of them are typically observed in background spectra.

8.0x10

6.0x10

NaI(Tl) 2530 mm

137

Cs 3 s shaping

Number of counts

4.0x10

FWHM 6.5% 2.0x10

3

0.0 1.5x10
5

500

1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000

CWO 1L 10103 mm
Number of counts
1.0x10
5

137

Cs 12 s shaping

FWHM 6.6%

5.0x10

0.0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

Channel #

Fig. 8. Energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source, as recorded with the 10 x 10 x 3 mm3 CWO (bottom panel) and with the 25 mm x 30 mm NaI(Tl) (upper panel). An escape peak of K X-rays of Tungstate is seen at the 662 keV peak in the CWO spectrum.

Fig. 9. Energy spectra of -rays from a 207Bi source (top trace) and that of the laboratory background (bottom trace), as recorded with a large CWO crystal at 12 s shaping time constant in a spectroscopy amplifier.

Fig. 10 presents the non-proportionality characteristics of the small CWO in comparison to that of a BGO crystal, according to Ref. [I]. The non-proportionality is defined here as the ratio of the photoelectron yield measured for photopeaks at a specific -ray energy relative to the yield at 662 keV -peak [5, 7]. Note a comparable shape of the measured curve for CWO to that reported in [I].
110

100

Light yield [% of662 keV]

90 CWO BGO

80

70

60 10

100

1000

Energy [keV]

Fig. 10. A comparison of the non-proportionality curves measured for the small CWO and BGO crystals. The curve for BGO follows that of [I].

In the whole range of energies, the curves are well matched. Since BGO showed the same non-proportionality at room and at LN2 temperatures, it was postulated in [I] that its nonproportionality is a fundamental characteristic of BGO material. This may imply a further conclusion that the curve presented in Fig. 10 also represents fundamental characteristics of the scintillating materials themselves, i.e. characteristic of heavy oxide crystals. Note that one can expect a high purity of CWO crystals, developed for CT scanners. Both BGO and CWO crystals belong to the scintillators with the lowest afterglow. Fig. 11 presents the energy resolution versus the energy of gamma rays obtained with the CWO 1L crystal in comparison to that measured in [I] with BGO crystals of 4 mm thickness.

100

Energy resolution [FWHM, %]

CWO BGO

10

10

100

1000

Energy [keV]

Fig. 11. Energy resolution of CWO and BGO crystals versus gamma rays energy. Error bars are within the size of the points. Data for BGO are taken from [I].

Note a much better energy resolution of the CWO crystal compared to BGO in entire range of energy. There is no doubt that this is due to about 3.5 times higher photoelectron number of the CWO.

The study of the small CWO crystals showed a high light output of 27300 2700 ph/MeV and an energy resolution of 6.6 0.2% for the 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source, both placing the CWO crystal within bright scintillators with a good energy resolution. The high photofraction estimated for the CWO crystals studied here and particularly that of 47% for the 662 keV peak, estimated for a 20 mm in diameter and 20 mm in height CWO crystal, confirmed the high efficiency for gamma rays detection and the high potential of CWO crystals for application in the border monitoring equipment. A further improvement of the quality of larger crystals is required to improve their energy resolution. 2.2.2. CaWO4 The properties of CaWO4 (CaWO) crystals in gamma spectrometry were studied at room and liquid nitrogen temperatures. Small samples of 10 10 4 mm3 and 10 10 8 mm3 size were tested, coupled to a Photonis XP3212 photomultiplier at room temperature and a large area avalanche photodiode at liquid nitrogen temperature. Light pulse shape and light output at room and liquid nitrogen temperatures were measured. Energy resolution and nonproportionality of the CaWO response versus gamma-ray energy were studied and compared with those of small BGO and CdWO4 crystals to discuss further the origin of the intrinsic resolution of pure undoped scintillating crystals. A high light output of 4800 200 phe/MeV and a good energy resolution of 6.6 0.2% for 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source were measured for the small samples coupled to the XP3212 photomultiplier. Fig. 12 shows the energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source as measured with the CaWO1 crystal at room and LN2 temperatures. Both spectra exhibit a comparable energy resolution of the full energy peak.

Fig. 12. Energy spectra of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source recorded with a CaWO crystal at room and LN2 temperatures.

Worthwhile noting is the clearly observed escape peak of tungsten K X-rays on the low energy side of the peaks and a high photofraction of 29% in the small volume crystal (0.4 cm3). This parameter is a factor of two greater in comparison to the 10 mm in diameter and 10 mm high NaI(Tl) sample having about twice the volume (0.8 cm3). The measured energy resolution is superior, as compared to those reported in [5], but it was achieved with a small-size crystal. Fig. 13 presents the energy resolution versus energy of gamma rays obtained with the small CaWO1 crystal at room and LN2 temperatures measured with the PMT and LAAPD readout, respectively. A straight line in the double logarithmic plot shows that the energy resolution of CaWO in the whole range of measured energies is independent of temperature.

Fig. 13. Energy resolution measured with CaWO at room and LN2 temperature versus energy of gamma rays.

Fig. 14 presents the non-proportionality characteristics of CaWO crystals determined at both room and LN2 temperatures. The non-proportionality is defined here as the ratio of the light yield measured at specific -ray energies relative to the light yield at the 662 keV -peak [5, 6]. The curves exhibit a good match and there is no temperature dependence. This finding is consistent with earlier measurements for BGO crystals [I]. This implies that in contrast to halide crystals [57], the non-proportionality of BGO and CaWO seems to be a fundamental characteristic of the scintillating materials. A characteristic dip of the non-proportionality curve around the K-absorption edge of tungsten can be noticed and that was also observed for other scintillators [5]. It may suggest also that the nonlinearity of CaWO is independent of temperature in a typical range required for border monitoring instrumentation.

Fig. 14. Non-proportionality characteristics of a CaWO crystals determined at both room and LN2 temperatures.

The study of small CaWO crystals in gamma spectrometry showed a high light output of 15800 1600 ph/MeV and an energy resolution of 6.6 0.2% for the 662 keV -rays from a 137 Cs source, as measured at both room and LN2 temperatures. It places CaWO crystals within the range of bright scintillators with good energy resolution. The light pulse shape studied by means of a single photon method at room temperature showed that it is represented well by a single main decay time constant of 8.2 0.1 s. The high photofraction determined for the CaWO crystals studied here confirmed the high efficiency for gamma ray detection and the high potential of CaWO crystals for application in border control equipment. The study of energy resolution and non-proportionality of the light-yield of CaWO as function of gamma ray energy showed common characteristics at both room and LN2 temperatures and confirmed the good correlation of the intrinsic resolution of the crystal with the non-proportionality curves. It is shown that the non-proportionality of the light yield and the intrinsic resolution of CaWO are superior to those of other heavy scintillators, namely BGO and CWO. 2.3. LiI(Eu) crystal as a very efficient neutron detector In the paper [II], Europium activated 6LiI crystal (enriched to 96% 6Li) has been extensively studied in neutron and -ray spectrometry with a special attention laid to its sensitivity to thermal neutrons and selectivity against the -ray background. A sample of

50 mm 5 mm size was tested using a light guide between the crystal protective window and the calibrated Photonis XP5200 photomultiplier window. The response to neutrons emitted from the Pu-Be source, shielded with paraffin blocks, has been investigated and the thermal neutron peak has been found to be located at Gamma Equivalent Energy (GEE) of about 3.5 MeV with the very good peak-to-background. The high sensitivity of the 6LiI(Eu) crystal is demonstrated by observing the neutron peak at very low neutron rate of the order 10-2 counts per second. Moreover, a high selectivity against the -ray background is measured as the apparent peak of neutrons originating in the atmosphere is located beyond the highestenergy gamma peak of the background radiation. Apart from neutron spectra a light output, energy resolution and non-proportionality of the 6LiI(Eu) response versus -ray energy have been measured. The light yield obtained was 1.5104 ph/MeV (about 40% of NaI(Tl)) and the energy resolution at 662 keV (Cs-137) of 7.5 0.2%. The non-proportionality curve has been measured to have more proportional character as compared to NaI(Tl) crystal although an upward bending is still observed for energies below 200 keV. An example of a spectrum measured for the shielded Pu-Be source is shown in Fig. 15. Note a well defined Gaussian neutron peak characterized by a high energy resolution of 3.9%. A continuous spectrum on the left from the neutron peak corresponds to the laboratory -ray background with a characteristic peak of 1460 keV from 40K.

Fig. 15. The spectrum of a shielded Pu-Be source (0.6 Ci). Thermal neutron peak appears at about 3.5 MeV with a very good peak-to-background ratio.

To determine a sensitivity of 6LiI(Eu) crystal to thermal neutrons, a neutron monitor Nuclear Enterprises NM2B1 was used to control a dose equivalent (DE) expressed in both Sv/h units and counts of neutrons per second registered in the monitor. Since the 6Li nuclei have a large cross-section for thermal neutron capture, the strong Pu-Be source (0.6 Ci) was surrounded with paraffin blocks to slow down the fast neutrons. Moreover, several 5 cm thick lead bricks were used in front of the source to absorb 4.4 MeV -rays following (,n) reaction in the Pu-Be source. The source was placed several meters far from the 6LiI(Eu) detector and the neutron monitor. Thus, in fact, instead of the neutron flux, detectors responded to a homogeneous field of diffused thermal neutrons. Provided the neutron field was homogenous, the high sensitivity of the detector is illustrated in Fig. 16 where almost linear dependence of the number of detected neutrons by

1 NMB2 monitor based on boron trifluoride proportional counter surrounded by a combined modulator/attenuator assembly to produce the correct dose corresponding to the human.

LiI(Eu) on the dose equivalent goes down to very low DE values. 6LiI(Eu) is able to detect neutrons at the dose equivalent as low as 0.05 Sv/h registered in the NMB2 neutron monitor.

Fig. 16. Measured linear dependence between the number of neutron detected in 6LiI(Eu) (left Y-axis) vs. dose equivalent (bottom X-axis) and counts of neutrons (top X-axis), both registered by the neutron monitor NM2B.

To test the 6LiI(Eu) response to gamma rays, the energy spectra were measured using different radioactive source covering the energy range from 16 keV to 1.33 MeV. Fig. 17 shows the energy spectrum of 662 keV -rays from a 137Cs source as measured with 6LiI(Eu) (L). The energy resolution of 7.5 0.1% was measured to be much better than a value of 8.8 0.1% obtained for the small one. These both values are inferior to that obtained for NaI(Tl).

Fig. 17. The -ray spectrum from a 137Cs source measured with 6LiI(Eu) (L) with a light guide placed between the crystal and the PMT window.

Fig. 18 presents the non-proportionality characteristic of 6LiI(Eu) in comparison to that of a small NaI(Tl) [8]. The non-proportionality is defined here as the ratio of photoelectron yield measured for photopeaks at specific -ray energy relative to the yield at 662 keV -peak [5, 8]. The non-proportionality of 6LiI(Eu) shows a characteristic shape for other halide crystals with an excess of light at low energies [57]. It points out that this shape is independent of a doping agent and correlates with the structure of the halide crystal. Light yield non-proportionality obtained in our measurements, presented in Fig. 18, has much better proportional character of the curve as compared to the NaI(Tl) crystal. On the other hand,

more proportional scintillators have the downward bending of proportionality curve at few tens of keV [5, 8].

Fig. 18. A comparison of the non-proportionality curves measured for the 6LiI(Eu) (L) and NaI(Tl) (10 10 mm) crystals, respectively.

Fig. 19 shows radiation of the low and high burnup samples of Pu shielded with a 30 mm thick Pb brick, registered in the 6LiI(Eu) crystal. The brick was placed between the sample and the detector and significantly attenuated intense low energy photons. No neutron moderator was used in both measurements. The sample of low burnup 239Pu was measured within 25 minutes while the other for 7 minutes. In both cases, the peak of neutrons which were thermalized by surrounding materials is distinct from the -rays registered by the detector at the same time. Finally, neutron count rates were measured as 45 n/s/kg and 240 n/s/kg for the low and high burnup 239Pu samples, respectively.

Fig. 19. The -ray and neutron spectra of the low burnup Pu (bottom) and high burnup Pu (top) samples measured with 6LiI(Eu). The 30 mm Pb shield was placed between the samples and the detector.

A very high sensitivity to thermal and slow neutrons was demonstrated for 6LiI(Eu) crystal, as well as, a high selectivity against -ray background was observed as the neutron peak was distinct from the highest energy background peaks. Due to the high neutron detection efficiency of 6LiI(Eu), the crystal detects slowed down neutrons emitted from plutonium samples. The high sensitivity and efficiency in detection of thermal and slow neutrons are major merits of the 6LiI(Eu) scintillator and can play an important role in the selection of the best crystal for the border monitoring equipment. 2.4. Tests of new photomultipliers for the efficient work with LaBr3 crystal, A further improvement of energy resolution of scintillation detectors can be achieved selecting new photodetectors. Particularly important is a development of new photomultipliers for the LaBr3 crystals. Independently, for small volume crystals, silicon drift detectors [12] and avalanche photodiodes [13] are of a great interest. A large number of primary e-h pairs has been measured with all these devices due to a high quantum efficiency of silicone. The most of the classical PMTs do not fit to LaBr3 crystals because of a lack of a large dynamic range of anode signal. A fast light pulse of LaBr3 with 18 ns decay time constant and its high intensity, above 60000 ph/MeV, requires more than one order of magnitude larger linear range of the output current of the PMT, than that for NaI(Tl). Independently, a large progress of the quantum efficiency of the most modern photomultipliers up to 35% for the current production and above 40% for the experimental tubes is achieved at Photonis. It is of importance for the development of scintillation detectors with a good energy resolution particularly for low energy gamma rays. Within the carried out study numerous different photomultipliers were tested, listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Tested photomultipliers PMT type XP5200 XP5212 XP3422 R3998 XP2930 XP3142 XP2920 XP2950 XP2960 Blue sensitivity [A/lm blue] 10.7 12.2 16.3, QE = 35% 9.2 11.2 9.2 11.2 11.3 12.5 Diameter 51 mm 51 mm Hexagonal, 60 mm 28 mm 29 mm 25 mm 29 mm 29 mm 29 mm Number of dynodes/types 8/LF 9/LF 8/LF 9/ Box and LF 11/ LF 8/LF 11/LF 11/LF 8/LF

Photomultipliers XP5200 and XP5212 were tested mainly with LaBr3 crystal. Results for the XP5212 are summarized in sect. 2.1.2 presenting properties of the LaBr3 crystal. A very good linearity up to 2.5 MeV gamma rays was obtained in the test with 226Ra source. A precise measurement of the non-proportionality characteristic of LaBr3 presented in Fig. 6 confirmed a good performance of the XP5212 PMT. A high energy resolution of 3.2% was measured for 662 keV gamma rays from 137Cs source.

Fig. 20 presents the progress in the development of new photocathodes achieved recently by Photonis. The best XP3422 are equipped with the photocathode characterized by QE of about 40%.

Fig. 20. A progress in the development of photocathodes at Photonis. Courtesy of Photonis.

An excellent performance of the XP3422 PMT, associated with its high quantum efficiency is reflected in Fig. 21. It shows a comparison of energy resolution measured with NaI(Tl) crystal coupled to XP3422 and to the XP5200 PMT with a standard bialkali photocathode.
30
QE = 25%

25 Energy resolution [%]

QE = 35%

20

15

10

0 10 100 Energy [keV] 1000 10000

Fig. 21. Energy resolution measured with a 25 mm 30 mm NaI(Tl) crystal coupled to the XP5200 of a standard QE and to the XP3422 with QE of 35%.

Note a significant improvement of energy resolution in the low energy region due to a high QE of the XP3422 PMT. It is reflected in the resolution of 9.3% for 59.6 keV gamma rays from 241Am source. Fig. 22 presents the energy spectrum of 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source measured with LaBr3 crystal coupled to the XP3422 PMT with quantum efficiency of 42%. Note an excellent energy resolution of 2.8% measured with the crystal from the first batch of Saint Gobain production.

3500 3000 PMT XP3422, QE - 42% 137 Cs LaBr3

Number of counts

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

2.8%

Channel number
Fig. 22. The energy spectrum of 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source measured with LaBr3 crystal coupled to the XP3422 PMT with quantum efficiency of 42%.

Tests of the small PMTs were addressed mainly to the linearity problem in gamma spectrometry with LaBr3 crystal. The most of the tests were done observing a detector response to 511 keV and 1274.5 keV gamma lines from a 22Na source. In each case a deviation of the measured 1274.5 keV peak position was presented. All photomultipliers were tested with the tapered voltage dividers to increase the linearity range of the PMTs and their gain was adjusted by HV to get the same 511 keV peak position. Table 4 summarizes collected data.
Table 4. Number of photoelectrons and non-linearity of tested small PMTs as measured with 25 mm x 25 mm LaBr3 PMT type R3998 XP2930 XP3142 XP2920 XP2960 Number and type of dynodes 9/ Box and LF 11/ LF 8/LF 11/LF 8/LF HV [V] 600 670 950 490 890 Phe number [phe/MeV] 12450 14000 10400 13100 10430 Non-linearity [%] 1.74 0.6 0.03 0.35 0.27

Table 4 shows a better performance of the photomultipliers with the linear-focused dynode structure. The R3998 PMT, with first three dynodes built as the box and grid, showed the poorest non-linearity, close to 2%. The XP3142, with 8 stages, exhibits an excellent linearity of the response. It is related to the highest voltage used for this PMT, close to 1000 V, which assures sufficiently high inter-dynode voltage for a good collection of electrons. The importance of the tapered voltage divider has to be pointed out, not shown in the Table 4. With the linear voltage divider, the non-linearity of the most of PMTs is much poorer because of the space charge effect in the last stages. Moreover the importance of the reduced number of dynodes is easily observed. Based on the above study, one can formulate the requirements addressed to PMTs for LaBr3 scintillators. To get a good linearity in the large dynamic range of energy, the linear focused PMTs with a reduced number of dynodes down to 8 or even 7 stages is required, working with the tapered voltage divider. It will increase the inter-stage voltage reducing the space charge effect in the PMTs. A further improvement of energy resolution can be achieved using PMTs with high quantum efficiency of order of 35%. It is generally important to use PMT with a larger diameter of the photocathode than the external diameter of the crystal. 2.5. Tests of avalanche photodiodes in scintillation detection The results of the first tests of Large Area Avalanche Photodiodes are presented in Figs. 23 and 24. Measurements were done with 9 mm x 9 mm CsI(Tl) and 10 mm x 10 mm NaI(Tl) crystals coupled to the 16 mm in diameter LAAPD from Advanced Photonix, Inc. A high number of electron-hole pairs produced by scintillation light in APD allowed getting a high energy resolution not only for 662 keV gamma rays but also for low energy gammas. Fig. 22 presents the energy spectrum of 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source measured with CsI(Tl) crystal. Note a high energy resolution of 4.8%.

Fig. 23. Energy spectrum of 662 keV gamma rays from a 137Cs source measured with CsI(Tl) crystal coupled to the LAAPD.

Fig. 24 presents the spectra of low energy gamma rays measured with NaI(Tl) crystal coupled to the LAAPD.

Fig. 24. Energy spectra from 241Am and 57Co sources measured with NaI(Tl) crystal coupled to a 16 mm LAAPD.

The best energy resolutions of 11.3% and 8.4%, respectively, were obtained at the LAAPD gain of 100 and 0.5 s shaping time constant in the spectroscopy amplifier. The energy threshold of the collected spectra is below 10 keV. These results are comparable to those measured with the best scintillators coupled to a photomultiplier. 3. Conclusions The performed studies were addressed to characterize new scintillators for the border monitoring equipment. It has covered: A study of new LaCl3:Ce and LaBr3:Ce scintillators showing a superior energy resolution in gamma spectrometry. A study of new heavy CWO and CaWO scintillators with the efficiency of gamma ray detection comparable to that of BGO scintillator. A study of 6LiI(Eu) crystal in thermal neutrons and gamma rays detection using a modern detection systems. The complementary study of photomultipliers for future LaBr3 detectors with the highest performance.

The study showed: A high energy resolution of LaCl3:Ce scintillator above 100 keV gamma rays. For lower energies NaI(Tl) crystal is still superior because of the excess of the light yield at theses energies. A high linearity of the new crystal response should be pointed out.

The superior performance of LaBr3 crystal in the whole range of gamma-rays energy reflected in its high selectivity and good detection efficiency, better than that of NaI(Tl) crystal. A high linearity of the new crystal response should be pointed out too, which makes simpler isotope identification. A good energy resolution and high detection efficiency for gamma rays of small CWO and CaWO crystals. However, a larger crystal of 20 mm x 20 mm exhibited a degradation of the light output and energy resolution. In the case of both crystals further efforts are necessary to get large volume detectors of comparable performances. A high detection sensitivity for thermal neutron detection of 6LiI(Eu) crystal and its a high selectivity against gamma ray background. No doubt that it can be used in the compact handheld neutron monitors replacing He-3 detectors. The comparative study of different detectors confirmed the superior energy resolution of LaCl3:Ce and LaBr3:Ce scintillators and the superior detection efficiency of CWO and CaWO crystals. However, in all the cases further efforts are needed to increase their volume and to reduce price. Particularly, the comparative study of LaBr3 and CZT detectors of comparable size showed a better energy resolution of LaBr3. A poor charge collection in a large CZT limits still obtainable energy resolution. More efforts are necessary for a further development of larger volume CZT detectors with an energy resolution similar to that measured with small detectors. However, a further work is necessary to select and to optimize photomultipliers for LaBr3, assuring particularly a good linearity of the PMT response. To utilize full capabilities of LaBr3 detector, the photomultipliers with a reduced number of linear-focused dynodes to 7 or 8 stages and characterize by high quantum efficiency of about 35% is required. REFERENCES

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M. Moszyski, Inorganic scintillation detectors in -ray spectrometry, Nucl. Instr. Meth., A505, 2003, 101110. M. Moszyski, "Energy resolution of scintillation detectors," in Proceedings of SPIE Hard X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Detector Physics VII (SPIE, San Diego, California, 2005) Vol. 5922, edited by R.B. James, L.A. Franks, and A. Burger, 592205-1. M. Moszyski, J. Zalipska, M. Balcerzyk, M. Kapusta, W. Mengeshe, J.D. Valentine, Intrinsic energy resolution of NaI(Tl), Nucl. Instr. Meth., A484, 2002, 259269. W. Mengesha, T.D. Taulbee, B.D. Rooney and J.D. Valentine, Light Yield Nonproportionality of CsI(Tl), CsI(Na), and YAP, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 45, 1998, 456460. B.W. Sturm, Z. He, E. Rhodes, T.H. Zurbuchen, and O.L. Koehn, "Coplanar grid CdZnTe detectors for space science applications," in Proceedings of SPIE Hard X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Detector Physics VI (SPIE, Bellingham, WA, 2004) Vol. 5540, edited by A. Burger, R.B. James, and L.A. Franks, 0277-786X/04$15. P. Dorenbos, J.T.M. de Haas, and C.W.E. van Eijk, "Gamma Ray Spectroscopy with a 19 19 mm3 LaBr3:0.5%Ce3+ Scintillator," IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 12891296, June 2004. C. Fiorini, A. Longoni, F. Peroni, C. Labanti, P. Lechner, L. Struder, Gamma Ray Spectroscopy with CsI(Tl) scintillator coupled to Silicon Drift Chamber, IEEE Trns. Nucl. Sci., 44, 1997, 25532560. M. Moszynski, M. Szawlowski, M. Kapusta, M. Balcerzyk, Large Area Avalanche Photodiodes in scintillation and X-ray detection, Nucl. Instr. Meth., A485 (2002) 504.

Analysis of Procedures of Testing the Technical Means for Detection, Localization and Identification of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Substances
G. Yakovlev Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, Moscow

Abstract The existing procedures of testing and performance monitoring of fixed radiation portal monitors were considered. From analysis of the failure statistics in the conditions of the real custom control, the least fault-tolerant (crucial) elements/units were revealed for all (pedestrian, vehicular, and railway) types of the devices. The averaged mean lifetime of elements/units of the fixed radiation portal monitors and the causes of failure were determined. The possibility of increasing the total lifetime of the devices by preventive replacement or duplication of items was studied. Based on the above examinations, the recommendations on how to increase the total lifetime and reliability of the fixed radiation portal monitors were worked out. The procedures of testing the hand-held devices and technical characteristics of the device s (including ANSI, IEC, ISO, Russian specifications/test procedures, IAEA Specifications and Test Procedures, IRAP, US Customs RADTAP, etc.) were analysed. On the basis of the Russian and foreign standards, a Unified Test Procedure was developed for testing hand-held devices that are used for qualitative evaluation of parameters of radioactive materials during the customs control of the fissile materials and radioactive substances. The specific features of the customs control procedure for nuclear and radioactive materials crossing the border, effective in the system of customs agencies of the RF were taken into account, as well as the current practice of using portable instruments in the customs control technology.

SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................4 1. MODERN STRATEGIES IN CUSTOMS CONTROL OF RISK GOODS..............................6 2. PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMS CONTROL, AIMED AT PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ACROSS THE BORDER, EFFECTIVE WITHIN THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM| OF RUSSIA ................................................................................................................................7 3. ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE STATISTICS OF FIXED RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS. RECOMMENDATIONS ON INCREASING THE TOTAL LIFETIME AND RELIABILITY OF THE FIXED RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS.........................9 3.1. General requirements to installation of stationary radiation portal monitors at various border checkpoints for customs control purposes ..............................................9 3.2. Overview of Stationary Portal Monitors ...........................................................................11 3.2.1. YANTAR STATIONARY CUSTOMS FISSILE AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DETECTION SYSTEM (Aspect Research and Production Center, Russia, Dubna) ............................................................................................11 3.2.2. URK-RM5000 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Polimaster Joint Venture, Minsk, Belarus).............................................................12 3.2.3. DM 002 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (SAPHIMO, France)................................................................................................13 3.2.4. PUMA-TM STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (USA, NucSafe) .......................................................................................................13 3.2.5. STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING BICRON APM GN (BICRON, USA, BICRON).....................................................................................14 3.2.6. KSAR 1U.041 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Nuclear and Technical Research Center Scientific and Technical Center, Saint-Petersburg, Russia).........................................................................................14 3.2.7. RIG-08 N STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (SNIIP-KOMVEL Research and Engineering Center, Moscow, Russia) ...............15 3.2.8. SPEKTR RADIATION MONITORING & METAL DETECTION STATIONARY COMBINED SYSTEM (GUP Dedal, Moskovskaya oblast, Russia) .....................................................................................................................17 3.2.9. VM 250 STATATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (TSA Systems Ltd, USA.) .......................................................................................17 3.2.10. JPM-32A STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Canberra Industries, Inc., USA) .............................................................................18 3.3. Basic technical characteristics and general design............................................................18 3.4. Basic Principles of the FRM Operation ............................................................................21 3.5. Main Modes of Operation of a Typical FRM System.......................................................23 3.6. Research of FRM detection equipment reliability ............................................................23 3.6.1. Systemic approach to the research of reliability indicators to analyze functionality and performance features of stationary FRM detection equipment.................................................................................................23 3.6.2. Stationary detection systems failure statistics in the Russian Federation................24 3.7. Testing of stationary portal monitors aimed at the identification of the most critical elements (units) .....................................................................................................27 3.7.1. Development of reliability test plan and methodology............................................27 3.7.2. Reliability proof tests of standard FRM detection systems. Duration of reliability test ...........................................................................................................30 3.7.3. Outcomes of reliability proof testing of FRM detection systems ............................31 3.7.4. Failures of individual units of the FRM over the regions during the period of 20042005 ...........................................................................................................31 3.7.5. Probable FRM faults and remedies..........................................................................33 2

3.8. Recommendations on improvement of radiation monitor reliability through implementation of group-shared kit of spare parts and accessories..................................34 3.8.1. General strategies in development of Spare Parts and Accessories Kit (SPAK).....34 3.8.2. Assessment of required number of units to be uncluded to the group shared SPAK............................................................................................................35 3.9. CONCLUSIONS...............................................................................................................36 4. DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFIED TEST-PROCEDURE FOR TESTING THE HAND-HELD DEVICES ................................................................................................37 4.1. Current practice of using portable equipment in the customs control procedure..............37 4.2. Analysis of standards and specifications for testing the hand-held devices .....................38 4.3. Unified procedure for testing the hand-held devices ........................................................50 4.3.1. Evaluation Category 1: functional evaluation of an instrument ..............................50 4.3.2. Evaluation Category 2: False identification (to be performed first of all prior to detection tests) .........................................................................................................53 4.3.3. Evaluation Category 3: Possible detection of objects, irradiating gamma-quanta ..54 4.3.4. Evaluation Category 4: Possible detection of objects, irradiating neutrons ............54 4.3.5. Evaluation Category 5: Possible detection of surface radioactive alpha- and betacontamination...........................................................................................................55 4.3.6. Evaluation Category 6: Requirements on isotope library........................................55 4.3.7. Evaluation Category 7: Possible identification of one isotope (shielded) ...............55 4.3.8. Evaluation Category 8: Possible identification of more than one isotope simultaneously .........................................................................................................56 4.3.9. Evaluation Category 9: Possible identification of an isotope under the conditions of increased radiation gamma-background..............................................................56 4.3.10. Evaluation Category 10: Ergonomical properties of the instrument face panel. .....57 4.3.11. Topic 1: Evaluation of control elements..................................................................57 4.3.12. Topic 2: Evaluation of display.................................................................................57 4.3.13. Topic 3: Evaluation of work ....................................................................................57 4.4. Adoptation of the Unified Procedure for testing the hand-held devices ...........................58 4.5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................61 APPENDIX 1. Format, rules and procedure for filling out the register to track the time of operation, failures and damages to equipment items during testing.........................................62 APPENDIX 2. The RADTAP Program (USA)............................................................................65 APPENDIX 3. Protocol for the evaluation of portable isotope identification instruments at Los Alamos National Laboratory on May 1719, 2004 .......................................................67

SUMMARY
The project Analysis of procedures of testing the technical means for detection, localization and identification of nuclear materials and radioactive substances was implemented in the framework of IAEA Research Contract # 12598\Nuclear Security Multi-donors Fund by Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute from December 01, 2004 till May 31, 2006. The project manager is Guenrikh Yakovlev. In the framework of the project the existing procedures of testing and performance monitoring of fixed radiation portal monitors were considered. From analysis of the failure statistics in the conditions of the real custom control, the least fault-tolerant (crucial) elements/units were revealed for all (pedestrian, vehicular, and railway) types of the devices. The averaged mean lifetime of elements/units of the fixed radiation portal monitors and the causes of failure were determined. The possibility of increasing the total lifetime of the devices by preventive replacement or duplication of items was studied. Based on the above examinations, the recommendations on how to increase the total lifetime and reliability of the fixed radiation portal monitors were worked out. The procedures of testing the hand-held devices and technical characteristics of the device s (including ANSI, IEC, ISO, Russian specifications/test procedures, IAEA Specifications and Test Procedures, IRAP, US Customs RADTAP, etc.) were analysed. On the basis of the Russian and foreign standards, the Unified Test Procedure was developed for testing hand-held devices that are used for qualitative evaluation of parameters of radioactive materials during the customs control of the fissile materials and radioactive substances. The specific features of the customs control procedure for nuclear and radioactive materials crossing the border, effective in the system of customs agencies of the RF were taken into account, as well as the current practice of using portable instruments in the customs control technology.

A number of proposals on improvement of the test procedures for portable instruments, captured in the Unified Test Procedure, were implemented in the Project IAEA-TECDOC-XXXX Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment. The first version of the Unified Test Procedure was approved during the experiments in the Russian research center Kurchatov Institute in 2003. After the corrections, the release version of the Unified Test Procedure was approved during the experiments in Los Alamos National Laboratory. The results were reported on the Research Co-ordination Meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agencys Coordinated Research Project on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and radioactive Materials held in Vienna in 2003 and 2006, and in Dagomys (Russia) in 2004.

1. MODERN STRATEGIES IN CUSTOMS CONTROL OF RISK GOODS

Customs services of many countries are going through a new stage of their upgrade, where primary focus is shifted towards such policy goals and objectives as development of customeroriented services, promotion of foreign trade and improvement of customs control procedures. Globalization of the international economy, integration of national economies into the global economic environment determine an increasing role and significance of customs regulation as a management tool in foreign trade. At the same time, one of the most important responsibilities of the customs remains to be the reduction of potential threats related to trafficking of the prohibited and restricted goods over the border. Customs control of the goods with inherent qualities allowing their further use for production of mass destruction weapons or for nuclear and radiological terrorist attacks, shall remain the most efficient instrument in prevention of illicit trafficking of such materials, and provides the most immediate impact on the support of national security and compliance of a country with its international obligations. Escalation of international terrorism necessitates improvement of customs control effectiveness through creation of organizational, technical and legal mechanisms aimed at minimization of the above threats. The Council of the World Customs Organization (WCO) approved the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade on June 23, 2005 at is annual session in Brussels. The above document allows moving to the new principles of the safe world trade and signifies the beginning of a radically new approach in organization of activities and interaction between customs administrations and business circles. The WCOs Framework of Standards starts with the following introduction: International trade is an essential driver for economic prosperity. The global trading system is vulnerable to terrorist exploitation that would severely damage the entire global economy. As government organizations that control and administer the international movement of goods, Customs administrations are in a unique position to provide increased security to the global supply chain and to contribute to socio-economic development through revenue collection and trade facilitation. Customs administrations have important powers that exist nowhere else in the government the authority to inspect cargo and goods shipped into, through and out of a country. Customs also have the authority to refuse entry or exit In compliance with Standard 3 of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, equipment for non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection shall be available and used wherever available to conduct inspections in accordance with risk assessments. Such equipment is necessary for operational search of containers and higher risk goods without interruption of the legitimate trade processes. Physical inspection (search) of every shipment, involving opening of cargo compartments and unloading of goods would create unacceptable and unnecessary impediments. Thorough inspection of each shipment would halt the world trade and inflict additional hardships for the foreign trade participants, as it would result in increase of time for customs clearance and downtime of transportation means, additional expenses for cargo handling operations and consignment of goods. The current customs control technologies are based on the following key principles: 1. Facilitation of the world trade and creation of conditions for unimpeded transfer of goods and transportation means over the border by the law compliant participants of the foreign economic activities; and 6

2. Customs control based on the risk management system and random inspection of goods (switch from dispersed shooting to pointed strikes). Accordingly, criteria or conditions for selection of goods for inspection should be in place to serve as grounds for customs officials to identify the goods (vehicles, or persons) to be subject to physical inspection in the form of customs examination and/or search. The above criteria shall be spelled out in appropriate documents describing the customs control technologies. The radioactive and nuclear materials are known to be qualified as risk goods, because their illicit trafficking over the border impacts the national security and implies considerable political, economic and environmental consequences for a state. Consequently, physical customs inspection involving opening of a certain object (container), search and identification of a location of radiation source in it (i.e. customs visual examination and search of an object) is a necessary technique in preventing the illicit trafficking of risk goods over the border. Justification for such customs physical inspection is an alarm generated by the radiation monitor, i.e. identification of objects with ionizing radiation higher than the natural background in the entire flow of goods, vehicles and persons crossing the border. This is the way the general technology of customs control is implemented when aimed at the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials via the border: - initial detection of NRM (identification of a suspicious object) with the help of radiation monitor; - follow-up radiation monitoring and in-depth radiation investigation to search, locate and identify the NRM in the object. As it is seen from the above, such technology fully complies with the principles of selective customs control and supports the risk management system, where radiation monitors are trusted with the role of main instruments to ensure the selectiveness of physical inspection.

2. PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMS CONTROL, AIMED AT PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ACROSS THE BORDER, EFFECTIVE WITHIN THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM OF RUSSIA
In the process of the customs control, aimed at prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive substances across the customs border of the country, the authorized customs personnel successively executes the following steps: - The customs observation with the help of technical means (primary radiation monitoring); - The customs external inspection with the help of technical means (additional radiation monitoring of an object without opening it); - The customs inspection with the help of technical means (additional radiation monitoring and close radiation investigation). The purpose of the customs observation with the help of technical means (primary radiation monitoring) is to detect objects with an increased level of ionizing radiation, as compared with the natural radioactive background, in the overall traffic of goods and vehicles subject to the customs control. 7

The continuous customs observation with the help of technical means is performed at the border crossing points, at the goods delivery areas, as well as during the actual control of goods shipped as international post items. The customs observation (primary radiation monitoring) is performed by authorized customs personnel with the help of stationary radiation monitoring equipment, or, in case of its absence or failure, with the help of portable radiation monitoring detectors A stable non-false operation of a detector, confirmed by a repeated measurement, serves as a criterion for classification of an object subject to control (a transportation vehicle, a storage room, a package containing goods, luggage, etc.) as an object with an increased level of ionizing radiation The following serves as a justification for performing additional radiation monitoring of an object without opening it: - The customs observation results (primary radiation monitoring); - Obtaining of indirect indications as to the presence of nuclear and radioactive materials (radiation danger signs on goods packages, specific protective containers, massive lead structures, etc.); - Obtaining of rapid information, results of checking of transportation and/or commercial documentation. In the process of additional radiation monitoring of an object without opening it, an authorized customs officer: - Determines points (areas) with the maximum intensity of ionizing radiation on an object surface; - Measures radiation characteristics of an object, including the levels of surface contamination with alpha- and beta-radiating radionuclides; - Determines the degree of radiation danger of an object. During the customs inspection with the opening of goods package or vehicle cargo areas or bays, containers or any other areas where the cargo items are or may be located, an authorized customs officer executes: a) additional radiation monitoring in order to search for and localize an ionization radiation source (IRS) within the cargo item, measurement of its radiation characteristics and evaluation of the degree of radiation danger; b) close radiation investigation in order to achieve maximum possible localization, initial identification of the IRS, and preliminary classification of the IRS within one of the following groups: Nuclear materials or products made of them; Radioactive substances or products made of them; Radioactive waste materials; Goods with an increased content of radionuclides (scrap metal, mineral raw materials, civil engineering materials, etc.). The additional radiation monitoring and close radiation investigation are performed by authorized customs personnel, certified to handle ionization radiation sources. If, in the process of the customs observation, an event of stationary equipment operation in the neutron channel is recorded, the additional radiation monitoring should be performed with the help of portable equipment, provided with neutron radiation detectors.

The goods and transportation vehicles, with an increased level of ionization radiation detected in the process of the customs control, should be located at a certain section of the customs control zone, specified by the customs, taking all the measures necessary to ensure radiation safety. The opening of goods packages or cargo bays of vehicles or vessels, containers or any other areas where cargo items could be located, as well as any other activities on the search for and localization of a source of ionization radiation should be performed with the use of individual protection means. Before the beginning of the above-mentioned work, levels of surface contamination by alpha- and beta-radiating radionuclides should be measured on the surface of each object under investigation. The opening of detected sources of ionization radiation, resembling containers for transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials by their external characteristics (in the form of cylinders, hermetically sealed vessels, tubes, flasks, cans, etc.) is not allowed in the customs control zone. The above activities can be implemented only in the process of expert investigation at specialized enterprises. In order to make a decision about classifying the detected source of ionization radiation as nuclear or radioactive materials, an expert investigation is assigned.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE STATISTICS OF FIXED RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS. RECOMMENDATIONS ON INCREASING THE TOTAL LIFETIME AND RELIABILITY OF THE FIXED RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS 3.1. General requirements to installation of stationary radiation portal monitors at various border checkpoints for customs control purposes
Type of radiation monitor Purpose of use Place of installation VEHICLE CHECK POINT (VEHICLE BORDER ENTRY) Pedestrian type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of drivers, Customs passengers control and neutron detectors. passengers, and their luggage. zones (customs clearance for persons). Vehicle type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of vehicles Vehicle entrance to restricted and neutron detectors. and goods they transport. access area of checkpoints (usually behind a drop bar). The number depends on lane width and availability of individual lanes for trucks, cars, and buses. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CHECK POINT Customs passengers control Pedestrian type with gamma 1. Initial radiation monitoring of zones (customs clearance for and neutron radiation airplane crews, passengers, and their persons), VIP halls, customs detectors luggage. clearing of aircraft crews, 2. Initial radiation monitoring of international mail exchange international mail. Entrances to/exits from airport Vehicle type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of goods cargo terminals. and neutron detectors. liable to customs control and transported to and from airport cargo terminals by vehicles.

SEA CHECK POINT (SEA PORT OPEN FOR INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER AND CARGO TRAFFIC) Pedestrian type with gamma Initial monitoring of ship crews, Seaport zones for customs and neutron radiation passengers, and luggage. control over passages and detectors luggage. Vehicle type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of goods Vehicle entrance/exits to cargo and neutron radiation liable to customs control and and container terminals of detectors. transported to and from airport cargo seaports and container terminals by vehicles. Railway type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of goods Train entrance/exits to cargo and container terminal of seaports and neutron detectors liable to customs control and transported to and from airport cargo and container terminals by vehicles. RAILWAY CHECK POINT ( BORDER RAILWAY STATION) Pedestrian type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of train In areas for customs inspection and neutron radiation crew, and passengers and their of passengers (customs detectors. luggage. clearance). Railway type with gamma Initial radiation monitoring of trains as At a railway entrance to and neutron radiation well as transported cargo. restricted access areas of check detectors. points.

In addition to monitors the system will include data acquisition and processing equipment (including control unit, video surveillance system, and data and control server, operators workstation) to implement the following tasks: 1. Integration of stationary radiation monitors into a single response system. 2. Recording, storage and display of information on alarms generated by radiation monitors. 3. Recording, storage, and display of video data on events that triggered radiation monitors. The typical control point and the possible location of the fixed portal monitors are displayed in Fig. 1.

Fig.1. Typical control point and the possible location of the fixed portal monitors. 10

3.2. Overview of Stationary Portal Monitors

3.2.1. YANTAR STATIONARY CUSTOMS FISSILE AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DETECTION SYSTEM (Aspect Research and Production Center, Russia, Dubna) Yantrar system is designed to detect movement of fissile and radioactive materials (FRM) over the border. The system works 7 days a week 24 hours a day in automatic mode and generates light and sound alarms if FRMs are detected in the system coverage. Yantar family products include several versions of systems such as a pedestrian system (Yantar -1P and Yantar -2P), a vehicular system (Yantar -1A and Yantar -2A), and a railway system (Yantar -1G and Yantar 2G). Yantar systems vary by the number of elements included in each version (e.g. number of pillars), the types of detected radiation, size of detection zones, minimal quantities of detected materials, and by other features and specifications (Table 1). Differences in Yantar Systems
Model ID Yantar 1P Yantar 2P Yantar 1A Yantar 2A Yantar 1G Yantar 2G Application Pedestrian Pedestrian Vehicle (trucks) Vehicle (trucks) Railway Railway Detection Channels Gammas and neutrons Gammas and neutrons Gammas and neutrons Gammas and neutrons Gammas and neutrons Gammas and neutrons The maximum width of monitored lane (in meters) 1.5 1.5 8 4 10 5

Minimal mass values of various nuclear materials (in grams) detectible by Yantar system
System type Yantar 1P Yantar 2P Yantar 1G Yantar 1A Plutonium-239 1 1 20 10 Uranium-235 10 10 2500 1000 Uranium-238 100 160 7000 6000 Plutonium -239 shielded (4 cm lead) 40 30 400 100

Minimal activity values of various nuclear materials detectible by Yantar systems, in kBq (Cu)
System type Yantar 1 Yantar 1P Yantar 2P Yantar 1G Yantar 1A Cs137 420(12) 40 (1.1) 11(0.3) 900(24) 300(8.1) Co60 118(3,2) 56(1.5) 7.4(0.2) 300(8) 91(2.5) Ra226 177(4,7) 43(1.2) 7.4(0.2) 400(11) 136(3.6) Th232 180(5,1) 43(1.2) 7.4(0.2) 450(12) 143(3.9) K40 2,360(64) 1,133(31) 444(12) 5,400(146) 1,800(4.9)

Composition: - gamma-channel: plastic scintillating detectors, each with a sensitive volume of 4,000 cm3; and - neutron channel: 3 helium-based neutron detectors, each with a sensitive volume of 800 cm3 False alarms do not exceed 1/1000; Operating mode 24 hours a day 7 days a week; Data display unit can be positioned at 2,000 m maximum from the detectors; 11

Operating temperature range: -50 - +50 0; Power supply: 220V, 50 Hz; Power consumption does not exceed 60 W; Time of continued operation with use of a built-in chargeable battery is 10 hours at least; Weight: Yantar 1A: 700 kg Yantar 1P: 200 kg; Yantar 2 P: 500 kg; Yantar 1G: 1,200 kg; Dimensions: Yantar 1A: 370 600mm 2,987 mm; Yantar 1P 250 mm 520 mm 1,670 mm; Yantar 2P 610 mm 1,190 mm 2,340 mm; Yantar 1G 500 mm 2,220 mm 2,400 mm; Warranty: 24 months; Service life: 12 years. 3.2.2. URK-RM5000 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Polimaster Joint Venture, Minsk, Belarus) URK-RM5000 Radiation Monitoring System is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials over the borders of secure areas. The system consists of independent units to assemble eight types (models) of radiation monitors. Gamma detection unit an organic plastic scintillating detector with a sensitive volume of 4,500 cm3 (optionally per clients request 8,500 cm3). Neutron detection unit: -3 proportional meters with a sensitive volume of 3,200 cm3. Sensitivity of detection unit: - Gamma radiation: 150 (pulse/sec)/(R/h) for 241Am; 125 (pulse/sec)/(R/h) for 137Cs. - Neutron radiation: Up to 500 pulse cm2/neutron for Pu--Be, 2,000 pulse cm2/neutron for Cf. False alarms level: no more than 1 alarm per 1,000 movements of an object crossing the area in the system coverage. Operating temperature: -30 - +50 . Operation mode: continued, 24 hours. Power supply: Commercial power 95250 V/AC, 50/60 Hz or built-in chargeable battery, 12 V during eight hours (in case of a blackout).

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Power consumption: shall not exceed 50 VA. RS-232 port to connect to a personal computer.
Models UPK-RM5000 TIGR.412151.001 RM 5000 TIGR.412151.001-02 RM 5000-02 TIGR.412151.001-03 RM 5000-03 TIGR.412151.001-11 RM 5000-11 TIGR.412151.001-14 RM 5000-14 Max. speed, Max. Minimal detectible quantities of radioactive and nuclear lane materials width, 241Am, 137Cs, 60Co, 238U, 235U, 239Pu, 239Pu, m km/h Cu Cu Cu g g g g 10 6 150 10 4 2700 300 4,3 50.3 20 6 10 6 200 12 5,5 2000 250 4,2 50.3 20 6 5 1,5* 80 3 2,5 1000 35 1,2 5 3* 50.3 10 3* 10 6 50.3 20 6 10 3* 5 3* 50.3

3.2.3. DM 002 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (SAPHIMO, France) DM 002 is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials at various checkpoints. Composition: - Gamma/neutron plastic scintillation detector (used as a neutron moderator - Three He-3 neutron detectors (1000 mm) - Data processing unit. System Specifications: - Thresholds of gamma radiation detection at 1 meter from detectors (exposure of 1 sec with the background 70 nGr/hour, 5 sigma of standard error ) 30 kBq Cs-137; - Neutron sensitivity 450 (units/sec/cm2); - Operating temperature: 15 - + 50 0; - Dimensions of gamma detector: 1,000 mm 250 mm 50 mm; - Overall dimensions: 2,000 mm 350 mm 440 mm; - Weight: 170 kg. 3.2.4. PUMA-TM STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (USA, NucSafe) PUMA-TM is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials at various checkpoints. Composition: Gamma scintillating detector (NaI(Tl)); Neutron detector based on scintillating glass; Data processing unit. System specifications: 13

- Operating temperature range: 15 + 50 0; - Dimensions of gamma detector: 50 mm 100 mm 400 mm; - Dimensions of neutron detector: 5,000 cm2; - Overall dimensions: 2,600 mm 1,430 mm 310 mm; - Weight: 300 kg. 3.2.5. STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING BICRON APM GN (BICRON, USA, BICRON) BICRON APM is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials at various check points. Composition: - Gamma scintillation detector (NaI(Tl)); - -3 neutron detector; - Data processing unit. Specifications: - Operating temperature range: -35 - + 40 ; - Gamma detector dimentions: 75 mm x 75 mm; - Neutron detector dimensions 100 cm; - Overall dimensions: 610 mm 630 mm 280 mm; - Weight: 115 kg. Minimal gamma dose rate detected: For 241Am 0.1 Sv/h; For 241Co 0.1 Sv/h; For 137Cs 0.1 Sv/h with natural background gamma radiation of 0.2 Sv/h, with radiation source movement speed of 15 kmph and false alarm rate of 1/10,000; Minimal mass of weapons-grade 239Pu detected at 2 meters from detector is 300 g where exposure time is 5 sec and false alarm rate is 1/10,000. 3.2.6. KSAR 1U.041 STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Nuclear and Technical Research Center Scientific and Technical Center, Saint-Petersburg, Russia) RUBEZH KSAR 1U.041 Vehicle stationary radiation monitoring system KSAR 1U.041 Vehicle System is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials at various checkpoints. COMPOSITION: - Two detecting pillars: 3,100 mm 710 mm 210 mm; - Signal processing unit: 1,000 mm 470 mm 404 mm. - Each detecting pillar includes: - Eight polystyrene gamma detectors, 26,400 cm3 each - Eight He-3 neutron detectors. 14

Specifications: System detection threshold: - For gamma radiation: 400 g of 235U and 5 g of 239Pu; - For neutron radiation: 100 g of 239Pu with 5 meters between pillars, with vehicle speed of 8 kmph and false alarm rate of 1/4,000; Due to a detector heat setting unit, operating temperature ranges from -50 up to 50 C. The system is certified by Gosstandart Agency of the Russian Federation, and has ASTM USA conformance certificate. Dozor KSAR 1U.031 pedestrian stationary radiation system KSAR 1U.031 Pedestrian System is designed to monitor movement of radioactive and nuclear materials at various checkpoints. COMPOSITION: Two detecting pillars: 2,210 mm 740 mm 196 mm; Detection zone: 2,000 mm 800 mm. Each detecting pillar includes: Three polystyrene gamma detectors, 2,640 cm3 each Two He-3 neutron detectors. Specifications: System detection threshold: - For gamma radiation: 10 g of 235U and 0,3 g of 239Pu; - For neutron radiation: 50 g of 239Pu with 0.8 meters between pillars, 0.8 sec of measurement time at mean speed of 5 kmph and 1/1,000 false alarm rate; Operating temperatures ranges from -50 up to 50 C due to a detector heat setting unit. The system is certified by Gosstandart of the Russian Federation and has certificate of conformance to requirements of ASTM USA. 3.2.7. RIG-08 N STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (SNIIP-KOMVEL Research and Engineering Center, Moscow, Russia) RIG-08N Radiation Monitoring Systems (hereinafter referred to as systems) are designed for continuous monitoring of gamma and neutron radiation levels and for generation of alarms if the relative value of a radiation background exceeds a certain threshold. Photon ionizing radiation level is monitored by value of measured effective dose rate. Systems can be used to monitor (detect) illicit trafficking of radioactive and fissile materials by persons and vehicles crossing a detection area. The system is produced in two versions: RIG-08N-1 system equipped with one pillar, and RIG-08N-2 with two pillars. Options to use: RIG-08N-1 active at a distance of 1.5 m when speed of persons carrying target materials is 4,0 0,4 kmph. RIG-08N-2 with 0.8 m between pillars when speed of persons with target materials is 4.0 0.4 kmph. 15

RIG-08N-2T with 4 meters between pillars when speed of vehicles transporting target materials is 10 1 kmph. Scintillating plastic is a detector unit. The measurement range of photon effective dose rate shall be from 0.05 Sv/h up to 3Sv/h. The allowable basic error shall be 30 % where the confidence level is 0.95. RIG-08 sensitivity
Fissile material, radionuclide Weapons-grade Plutonium-239 Weapons-grade Uranium-235 137Cs 60Co Unit of threshold detection g g kBq kBq Maximal thresholds detection where the confidence level is 0.95, for various options Option a Option b Option c 0.2 0.03 2 30 480 450 5 55 50 300 -

False alarm rate shall not exceed one false alarm per 8 hours of continuous monitoring when radiation background does not exceed 25 R/h. Time of measurement is 0.125 sec. The least period of continuous operation is 24 hours, reading instability does not exceed 10 %. Power consumption: does not exceed 10VA/AC Dimensions: Pillar: 150 mm 1,005 mm 75 mm; Control unit: 225 mm 170 mm 85 mm. Weight: Pillar 7 kg; Control unit 1 kg: Service conditions: - Ambient temperature: from -30 to +50 ; - Relative humidity: 95 % at +35 and at lower temperature, without moisture condensation The set of equipment included in the system is as follows:
Description Detecting pillar Detection control unit Quantity 2 1

The RIG-08H has an interface for a printer port, personal computer or inspection data reader (time of equipment switch on/off, time of alarm events, and the current background radiation when the system was triggered, monitoring of detecting unit failure or shutdown).

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3.2.8. SPEKTR RADIATION MONITORING & METAL DETECTION STATIONARY COMBINED SYSTEM (GUP Dedal, Moskovskaya oblast, Russia) SPEKTR is designed to detect gamma radiation of fissile and radioactive materials including those shielded in various containers made from ferromagnetic and non-ferromagnetic materials. The SPEKTR is used at sites handling radioactive materials. Composition: Two stand-alone pillars containing: -Two plastic scintillating detectors Distance between pillars: 0.76 m Pillars height: 2.25 m Pillars width: 0.61 m Specifications: Permissible speed of detected target movement between pillars ranges from 0.3 to 5 m/sec Detection probability: Metal items with weight exceeding 100 g is 0.95 at least Minimal weight of detectible gamma sources: Pu-239: 0.3 g U-235: 10 g Ambient temperature: +5 - +50 . 3.2.9. VM 250 STATATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (TSA Systems Ltd, USA.) VM 250 TSA monitors nuclear and radioactive materials transported by railway and vehicle. The system is used at site handling radioactive materials. Composition: Two plastic scintillating detectors with the following dimensions: 150 mm 760 mm 38 mm; of 17.6 liters volume; and data processing unit Specifications: Distance between pillars: from 3 up to 10 meters Operating temperature range: from -35 up to +50 oC; Dimensions of each pillar: 250 mm 250 mm 3,050 mm; Weight of each pillar: 135 kg - Stand-alone power supply provides 12 hours of operation if the system is disconnected from commercial power; - The system has the following sensitivity parameters when detecting materials in a vehicle moving with the speed of 8 kmph at 3 m from detectors. The false alarm rate in this case will be 1/1,000 if the background radiation of 0.20 Sv/h: - 10 g for low enriched Pu-239 - 1000 g for U-238 oxide; - 18 Cu for Cs-137; - 9 Cu for Co-60 . 17

3.2.10 JPM-32A STATIONARY RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (Canberra Industries, Inc., USA) JPM-32A Canberra monitors traffic of nuclear and radioactive materials transported by vehicles. The system is used at site handling radioactive materials. Composition: Two stand-alone pillars containing: -Four plastic scintillating detectors, their volume being 4,572 cm3 -Eight He-3 neutron proportional counters of 1,830mm length and 55mm diameter; -Data processing unit Specifications: - Distance between pillars: from 3 to 6 meters - Operating temperature: from -40 to +40 C - Stand-alone power supply provides 12 hours of operation if the system is disconnected from commercial power - The system has the following sensitivity parameters when detecting materials in a vehicle moving with the speed of 8 kmph at 3 m from detectors. The false alarm rate in this case will be 1/4,000 if the background radiation of 0.20 Sv/h: -157 g for weapons-grade Pu-239 - 30 g for reactor-grade Pu-239.

3.3. Basic technical characteristics and general design

The Fixed Radiation Monitors (FRM) are manufactured by different companies in different modifications. They differ in their purposes (pedestrians, vehicle, and railway), types of registration channels (gamma-, neutron or gamma-neutron), number of measurement racks (one or two), design, control zone dimensions, minimum quantities of detected materials and some other technical data and characteristics. The FRM operates continuously, 24-hour per day in an automatic mode and ensures visual and tone alarms, in case the radiation level exceeds the background, the recording of the time and duration of the radiation level excess, storage and display of information about exceeding the operation threshold. A typical SCSD NMF consists of the main and additional equipment. The main equipment consists of the following: A rack with detectors and electronic units of the UVK type (Fig. 2); A console of the PVTs-01 type (Fig. 3).

The UVK-type typical rack consists of the following: A scintillation detection unit of the BDS-G type A neutron counter of the SN type A module of counters power supply MPS A neutron channel amplifier UNK A module of the system monitoring of the MSK type A module of charging and power supply of the MZP type 18

A module of power supply and processing of the MPO type A power supply and processing unit of the BPO type Tone indicator of the SPEK-5 type A presence sensor of the PARADOR type An infrared radiator of the RS type An infrared receiver of the RS type A console for information processing and analysis PVTs-01

2 3

Fig. 2. A typical layout of the units in the FRM: 1) the storage battery; 2) the neutron detector; 3) the gamma-radiation detector; 4) the power supply units and information processing unit. Depending on the tasks to be resolved with the help of the FRM, it can be complete with additional equipment, which may include the following: A computer, a printer, a device for mating the channels between the USK-01 racks; A matching unit of the BX-01 type; Annunciators of additional visual and tone signal indication of the BOP type; An alarm button; Check sources of gamma- (Cs-137) and neutron (Cf-252 or Cu-244) radiation; A system of visual display and recording of information. From the viewpoint of its design, the FRM is manufactured in one rack (of the USK type) or in two racks (of the USK type). To ensure maximum sensitivity, the racks should be installed at the minimum distance from the controlled objects. Currently, automated complexes of the FRM are installed at the customs control areas. In addition to the monitor racks of the UVK type with the TV observation system, a server computer (a control module) and automated working stations (ARM) (Fig. 4) are included into 19

the software/hardware part of this complex. One server of the complex can support up to a few dozens of the FRM systems and transmit information to a few automated working stations (ARMs). The server/ARMs interface is implemented via a local computer network. The ARM computer ensures the work of the standard Internet Explorer program; there is no need to install any specialized software. The computer is equipped with a tone adapter and columns to ensure the alarm tone indication; the printer is connected to it to print out the protocol.

Fig. 3. The control and information processing unit of the FRM (an option without the use of the computer). General Features for All the FRM: Visual and tone alarm signal indication; Automatic adaptation to the natural background variation; Archiving of information about the event: date, time, count rate of detectors, channel type (gamma- or neutron); if complete with the video-recording system, can additionally record a video-clip of the alarm object; A gamma-detector is an organic plastic scintillator (or NaI-based scintillator); A neutron detector is He-3-proportional counter; Lightning protection of power lines and data transmission lines; Possibility for combining of systems of different types into a unified information network without additional software/hardware expenditures; A developed system of self-diagnostics.

20

Fig. 4. The server computer (the control module) and automated work station (ARM) of the FRM.

3.4. Basic Principles of the FRM Operation

The basic principle for all the FRM operation is always the same, despite the existing differences in the level of completeness, in particular, in the number of registration channels, availability or absence of a video-camera and a computer, etc. The registration and analysis of the ionization radiation in the FRM are performed by the method of comparison of the controlled object radiation with the background radiation level at the place of installation of the monitor without direct measurement of the numerical value at a certain rated accuracy. The detection of the nuclear materials and radioactive substances by the system is generated in the form of signals, containing no values of physical units, but confirming that the radiation of the controlled objects exceeds the levels of a certain threshold with respect to the external radiation background, processed in accordance with slightly different but still close mathematical models. The equipment for storage and processing of information of the FRM ensures the monitoring, procession of information from all the detector units, its delivery via the main consecutive channel to the information procession unit PVTs and external devices (the computer and printer, when connected), as well as the initiation of the tone and visual alarm signals in case the established threshold is exceeded. The maximum length of the communication line to the console is not more than 2000m (when connecting the matching-type unit BX, up to 4000 m). It is possible to connect a video system to the FRM to record the transportation vehicle that initiated the system triggering on a video tape. The video system is controlled by forming a dry-contact-type signal with the parameters: M commutated voltage is 50 V; M commutated current is 250 mA. The system is powered from the AC mains with the voltage from 187 to 242 V 501 Hz or a storage battery with the voltage from 14 to 10 V. The time of the system operation from the storage battery during the mains shutdown is, as a rule, not more than 10 hours. The following can be connected to the PVTs-type control console: A computer to perform automated collection and processing of information about the system operation; 21

A printer to print out the data about the system triggering; A visual-type annunciator of the BOP type, i.e. a lamp, operating in the flash mode, when the FRM system is triggered. A block diagram of the UVK-type rack is given in Fig. 5. The rack consists of 2 separate detection channels (gamma- and neutron), units for processing signals from the gamma- and neutron detectors, a controller for procession of data on the detectors status, sensors detecting the presence of an object in the controlled zone (between the racks), elements of information and signal indication. From the viewpoint of their design, the UVK racks are made in the form of metal cabinets, housing the electronic units and protecting them from the external effects. Protective shields, used to decrease the effect of the external background on the detectors and to increase their sensitivity, are installed inside the rack around the detecting units, except for their front part. As a rule, the shield for the gamma-detectors is made of lead sheets with the thickness of about 10 mm. For neutron detectors, provision is made for shields made of borated polyethylene with the thickness up to 5070 mm.

Fig. 5. Block diagram of the UVK-type rack. The exchange of information between the console and racks is performed via the main consecutive channel, satisfying the requirements and recommendations of the RS-485 interface. The information is supplied by a consecutive digital code via the information transmission line (ITL) in the form of messages, using the command-response principle. Each message contains an address byte and the data bytes. The ITL are made in the form of a cable with a shielded twisted pair of conductors in a protective envelope. The system has a flexible structure, with possibilities of extending the number of information channels and connection of additional peripheral devices. When operating a few racks, to automate the information processing and visualization processes, provision is made for connection of a computer and a printer. In the absence of the PVTs, it is possible to use the device for mating of the channels RS-485 RS-232 (USK) to control the system, using the computer keyboard, and to send the visual information to be displayed on the monitor screen.

22

3.5. Main Modes of Operation of a Typical FRM System

The operation of the FRM system is based on evaluation of statistical parameters of the natural radiation background in the absence of an object in the monitored zone and their subsequent comparison with the radiation parameters, obtained in the presence of the monitored object. The count rates of the number of pulses from the gamma- and neutron detectors are the evaluated radiation parameters. Each measurement of the count rate consists of a few intervals; the time of one measurement is defined as: = m*t, Where m is the number of intervals; t is the exposure time (duration of one measurement interval), ms. A number of measurements of the count rate is performed in the mode of measurement of the natural background to get the sampling, on the basis of which the count rate average value is evaluated. The sampling size is defined as:
M = Tb , where T

Tb is the background measurement time. For the sampling the following is calculated: Evaluation of the count rate average value:
M

Nav = Evaluation of dispersion:

N
i =1

, where Ni is the sampling element. M 1 The sampling refreshment and calculation of evaluations take place upon completion of the next measurement; and the result of this measurement is added into the sampling with a simultaneous removal of the oldest in time measurement from it. As a result, provision is made for adaptation of the FRM system to the natural background variations.

S2 =

(N
i =1

N cp ) 2

3.6.

Research of FRM detection equipment reliability

3.6.1. Systemic approach to the research of reliability indicators to analyze functionality and performance features of stationary FRM detection equipment The analysis is based on the main assumption of random failure process of the multi-unit stationary FRM detection system. Random processes are best described by the probability density function: one-dimensional, two-dimensional, etc. However, it is very difficult to operate with such multi-dimensional functions for most cases, therefore, in this situation the problem was approximated, and the random failure process of the FRM detection equipment can be described with characteristics and parameters of principles describing the random process in part, rather than in full. The most important among them are mathematical expectation and dispersion. Measurement of parameters and characteristics of random processes is simplified significantly if they are stationary (the number of hardware units in FRM detection equipment stays the same, etc.) and ergodic (parameters and specifications of hardware units in FRM detection equipment do not change, etc.).

23

Stationary processes include random processes, developing homogeneously over time, with specific functions varying around some average function with a steady magnitude. The properties of stationary processes are characterized by the following conditions: ) mathematical expectation of a stationary random process is a constant, i.e. mx(t)=mx=const. This requirement, although, is not essential for the multi-unit systems, as one can always switch from a random X(t0 function to the centered one. The latter will have a zero level of mathematical expectation (centered random process). Therefore, if a random process of FRM detection units is not stationary only due to the mathematical expectation of a unit failure fluctuating in time, then its centering would convert it into a stationary process anyway. b) for stationary random process dispersion by sections is a constant value, i.e. Dx(t) =Dx=const. Practically all real electric switching and detecting random processes in FRM detection equipment refer to stationary ones. The overwhelming majority of stationary random processes possess ergodicity as their property, allowing averaging-out by the ensemble of functions with averaging-out by time of one function within an infinitely long interval x. Measurement of probability of stationary ergodic processes is of interest in most cases. The main numeric characteristics of these processes would include: mathematical expectation (mean value) of a random process is calculated by averagingout the values in a given function. dispersion of a random process determines the magnitude of fluctuations D=2x; Parameter x = Dx is a standard error Real characteristics of such random processes as failures of FRM detection equipment, specified as infinite limit integrals, can be found on the basis of infinitely large number of their possible functions, or, in case of ergodicity on the basis of a function of infinite duration. In reality, there are only limited samples of failures of FRM detection equipment, i.e. an ultimate ensemble of functions or a function of a finite duration. Therefore, estimation of reliability is a task involving evaluation of characteristics of a random process of FRM detection equipment failures on the basis of finite samples. The examples of actual samples for analysis of FRM detection equipment failures as used in this report, are samples of failures of FRM detection equipment in some regions of the Russian Federation (impact of climate conditions) and samples of failures of individual units of the FRM detection equipment systems, taken for a period of time (analysis during 4 years of observation of FRM detection equipment in operation) 3.6.2. Stationary detection systems failure statistics in the Russian Federation Sample of FRM detection equipment failures broken down by the regions of the Russian Federation was conducted over the period of two years of observation of these systems. Reliability of the FRM detection systems was evaluated based on the four key assumptions: FRM detection systems are installed in customs by manufacturer's representatives, and the systems maintenance is performed by authorized trained professionals. These measures allow avoiding a human factor impact on failure statistics of FRM detection equipment. Some processing operations are disabled and protected by passwords as the misuse of these operations may cause the failure of FRM detection equipment during the maintenance activities. The above processes are performed by the specialists additionally trained and properly certified. To improve reliability of FRM detection systems and to reduce the impact of human factor on failures, all customs officers authorized to work with FRM detection systems as per their duties shall be trained at the special training courses in branches of Russian 24

Customs Academy. The courses shall include both practice and theory issues on FRM detection system functioning. The procedures of maintenance and operation of FRM detection systems were the same in various regions of the Russian Federation. The results of the analysis of failure statistics of FRM Detection Systems Failure in the Russian Federation Regions over Two-Year Period from 2002 through 2005 are given in table 1. Fig. 6 displays the total FRM equipment by regions. Total statistics of failed FRM detection systems repaired with/without replacements are given in Diagrams (Figs 78).

Fig. 6. FRM equipment by regions. Table 1.

Ratio of repaired systems to the Repair total number of Repair with without replacement FRM detection replacemen systems of units t of units* (with/without replacements)

Region of activities

Type and number of FRM detection systems

NorthWestern region Western region Southern region Urals region

Vehicle FRM detection systems (101) Railway FRM detection systems (41) Pedestrian FRM detection systems (143) Vehicle FRM detection systems (65) Railway FRM detection systems (6) Pedestrian FRM detection systems (42) Vehicle FRM detection systems (53) Railway FRM detection systems (32) Pedestrian FRM detection systems (49) Vehicle FRM detection systems (32) Railway FRM detection systems (-)

69 29 80 76 6 21 60 36 80 60 -

12 12 13 24 9 11 21 20 34 14 -

0.684/0.11 0.71/0.29 0.56/0.09 1.17/0.37 1/1.5 0.5/0.26 0.69/0.24 1.1/0.6 0.87/0.37 2.2/0.51 -/-

25

Pedestrian FRM detection systems (32) Siberian Vehicle FRM detection systems (27) region Railway FRM detection systems (5) Pedestrian FRM detection systems (19) Far-Eastern Vehicle FRM detection systems (29) region Railway FRM detection systems (16) Pedestrian FRM detection systems (38) Central region Vehicle FRM detection systems (8) (Moscow, Railway FRM detection systems (-) Moskovskaya Pedestrian FRM detection systems (119) oblast)

28 99 15 12 49 27 22 8 41

12 48 4 4 27 18 13 6 9

1/0.42 1.11/0.54 2.14/0.57 0.6/0.2 1.1/0.6 1.8/1.2 0.4/0.24 0.6/0.46 -/0.31/0.07

Notes * - Replacement of rechargeable batteries, control lamps, fuses, cables, and software are not considered as replacements of units.

Fig.7. Statistics of failed FRM with replacements.

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Fig.8. Statistics of failed FRM without replacements.

3.7. Testing of stationary portal monitors aimed at the identification of the most critical elements (units)
A special test plan was used to identify the most critical elements (units) in typical stationary portal monitors. One sample of each type of FRM detection systems (pedestrian, vehicular, and railway) was subject to proof testing. 3.7.1. Development of reliability test plan and methodology Test plan and methodology were developed to perform reliability proof testing of stationary portal monitors.Three various versions of monitors are tested. All main components of monitor shall be subject to burn-in process in conformity with the equipment specifications. The aim of proof testing is to evaluate conformity of equipment with requirements as specified in design documentation and to make conclusion on whether this equipment meets these requirements. Nature of failures occurred during testing shall be reviewed to develop recommendations on prevention of future failures. The test shall result in the development of recommendations in the following areas: Improvement of equipment reliability; Improvement of equipment repair, maintenance and supply with spare parts; and Improvement of design documentation and user's manual quality. Period of Test Performance: - In accordance with a diagram on Figure 1 but within t=22,400 hours; - If no failures occur, the test will last tmin=7,420 hours (310 days). Successfully tested equipment will be shipped after replacement of the components that expired more than 75% of their service life, while appropriate records confirming replacement and actual hours in operation are made in the equipment certificate.

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The proof test shall result in evaluation of reliability level. The mean time before failure rate shall not be less than the level specified in operating manuals (e.g. 14,000hours); The monitor is considered failed when it does not meet the following requirements: When test radiation source moves through the detection zone, the system shall provide detection with 0.5 probability where the confidence level is 0.95; The system shall provide recording, storage and transmitting of data from all system sensors and detecting units; When triggered, the system shall generate visual and audible alarms. Methodology of reliability proof testing Given the limits in duration and number of items to be tested, the test program was selected to truncate the test duration and number of tested items, while retaining the risks of manufacturer and customer. The input data for planning of reliability testing are assumed as follows: - Number of tested items . N = 3 pcs; - Acceptable mean time to failure (MTTF) . = 16,000 hours; - Rejected MTFF .. = 8000 ; - Risk of vendor (manufacturer) = 0,2; - Risk of customer (user).. = 0,2. The exponential law was selected to distribute MTTF. Notes: During the test, one system can be replaced with its analog if required. When such replacement occurs, the sum of MTTFs is used. Units must be recovered after a failure. For this plan, the profile of sequential testing method was developed as shown on Fig. 9.

Figure 9. Profile of sequential reliability testing. a) 1 inconsistency lines; b) 2 consistency lines; 28

c) t the maximum possible non-failure operating time to consider the item consistent with reliability requirements; d) t min minimal time of testing if failures do not occur (t min = 1.39 t/T); e) rtr truncation parameter as per number of failures (rtr =7); f) t - Total time (hours) of operation before failure since the beginning of a test, as calculated by equation: t = t, =1 Where t - total non-failure operating time of i-item during the test; The system is considered consistent with reliability requirements if the graph of sequential reliability testing intersects one of the consistency lines (Line 2). The system is considered inconsistent if the graph intersects the inconsistency line (Line 1). When reliability indicators are evaluated, all of the failures identified in testing are broken into accountable and unaccountable. The following failures are not taken into account: Dependent; Caused by external factors not envisaged by equipment specifications; Caused by violation of operating requirements by operating/maintenance staff; planned for elimination during design improvement process, if their efficiency is obvious or demonstrated by further reliability test or another additional test; Damages: when failed equipment remains functional; Malfunctions: transient failures or once-occurring failures repaired by minor involvement of an operator; and Fault-tolerant status: when system can operate if some of its elements fail. Reliability proof tests are performed in real operating conditions during all four seasons. Safety requirements shall be met during testing procedures. Routine maintenance shall be conducted in accordance with requirements of operating manuals. Personnel conducting tests during working hours shall consist of two persons experienced and qualified as specified in operating manuals. Before and after tests, and every 720 hours, each item shall be subject to functionality tests in accordance with failure criterion, as specified in this test plan. Operating time before failure and and the time taken for equipment recovery after failures shall be recorded by authorized testing personnel in computerized Reliability Proof Testing Log where the following information is entered: Day and time when the equipment was switched on/off; Day and time of when failures were detected; and Time taken to recover after each failure; Environment factors such as temperature and humidity: the accuracy of measured temperature will be 3 , humidity will be measured until the temperature exceeds +5 with accuracy of 3%, with no restriction to the location of measurement instruments installation. The log form is attached in Appendix 1. 29

All alarms shall be recorded in computer log in format as described in Appendix 1. In the course of testing activities, the total operating hours before each failure will be calculated. All information will be shown on the sequential testing profile, as specified on Fig. 1. If the test results achieve Line #2, the tested items are considered to meet the reliability requirements; and testing will be stopped. If the test results achieve Line #1, the tested items are considered inconsistent with reliability requirements; and testing will be stopped. During the test, responsible persons involved in testing maintain records in Reliability Test Logs on a computer. Test results will be reported and approved in accordance with the established procedure, and the test protocol (report) will include the following: Name of equipment (system); Name of manufacturer; References to test plan and methodology; List of failures and their grouping; Causes of identified failures; Processed test results; Conclusions on whether the tested items meet requirements as specified; Recommendations on equipment design modifications in order to improve or achieve the specified reliability, and to review design documentation; and Test profile (graph) shall be attached to the report/certificate. The following recommendations shall be developed during the test procedure: Improvement of equipment reliability Improvement of equipment repair, maintenance and supply with spare parts; and Improvement of design documentation and user's manual quality 3.7.2. Reliability proof tests of standard FRM detection systems. Duration of reliability test
Types of systems Pedestrian Vehicle Railway. Non-failure operating hours during testing 14,040 14,040 14,040 Total non-failure operating hours of all tested systems 42,120 Minimal test duration hours (r=0) 7,420 Actual test duration

14,040

Functionality of each item (system) was checked before and after testing procedure, and every 720 hours, to check the failure criterion consistency. Test logs evaluation results:
Type of system 1 2 3 Total Number of false alarms 23 18 21 62 Number of failures and damages 20 18 19 57 Number of detected targets 39,923 39,916 39,903 119,742

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3.7.3. Outcomes of reliability proof testing of FRM detection systems The equipment was tested for non-failure operation during 42,120 hours. The total number of 57 failures and damages were recorded. Results of evaluation of failure causes are specified in Log for Tracking Failures and Damages during Testing Procedures. All of them can be ignored. The failures were mostly caused by equipment mishandling and significant changes in natural radiation background in the area of test performance. 3.7.4. Failures of individual units of the FRM over the regions during the period of 20042005 Table 2.
Region of activity in the Russian Type of FRM units Federation North-West region BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Western region BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Southern region BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Number of repairs of units 15 7 4 4 5 6 9 0 1 3 2 0 1 11 11 20 5 14 4 6 13 0 0 4 3 3 21 4 6 1 1 12 1 0 0 1 4 0 2

31

Urals region

BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Siberian region BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Far East region BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) MPO (the power supply and processing module) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis) Central region of BDS-G (the gamma-radiation detection unit) activity (Moscow, SN (the neutron radiation detection unit) the Moscow MPO (the power supply and processing module) region) MSK (the system monitoring module) UNK (the neutron channel amplifier) MZP (the charging and power supply module) BPO (the power supply and processing unit) The storage batteries The tone annunciator The presence sensor The matching unit BX The Alarm lamp PVTs (the console for information processing and analysis)

4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 8 4 3 3 6 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 5 3 2 1 2 3 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 7 3 4 3 1 5 1 1 0 2 1 1 1

32

3.7.5. Probable FRM faults and remedies The most likely faults and their recommended effective remedies are given in Table 3. Table 3. Probable FRM Faults and Remedies
Probable cause ) no power supply of 220 V to the UVK rack; With the mains power on, the MAINS b) the fuse of the MZP-type indicator fails to glow on the face panel of module is burnt; the MZP-type module. c) the MZP-type module failed. Fault manifestation Remedy method ) provide for the power supply; b) replace the fuse;

c) replace the MZP-type module. ) wipe the optical parts ) the presence sensor is dirty of the presence sensor; and covered with ice; No signal from the presence sensor as an ) replace the presence object drives into the monitored area. b) the PARADOR-type sensor. presence sensor is faulty. ) the storage batteries voltage ) charge storage With the mains power off, there is no is lower than permissible; batteries; change over to the power supply from the b) the MPZ-type module failed. b) replace the MZP-type storage batteries. module. ) the parameters of the system ) establish the required values of parameters; operation do not comply with The LOW BACKGROUND message is the required values; induced. b) the BDS-G-type unit failed. b) replace the BDS-Gtype unit. ) the parameters of the system ) establish the required values of parameters; operation do not comply with The HIGH BACKGROUND message is induced. the required values; b) the BDS-G or SN unit failed. b) replace the faulty unit. ) the parameters of the system ) establish the required values of parameters; operation do not comply with b) repeat the check at a the required values; constant value of the b) there is a change in the natural background; The frequency of false triggerings is higher natural background value; c) the FRM system grounding is c) restore the grounding; than the permissible one. violated; d) the presence sensor is faulty; d) reveal and remedy the e) the BDS-G-type or SN-type fault; e) replace the faulty unit. unit failed. ) restore the connection ) the communication cable is of the PVTs console; broken; The NO COMMUNICATION message is b) replace the MPO-type indicated b) the MPO-type power supply faulty module. and processing module is faulty.

33

3.8. Recommendations on improvement of radiation monitor reliability through implementation of group-shared kit of spare parts and accessories
3.8.1. General strategies in development of Spare Parts and Accessories Kit (SPAK) The required level of reliability in the process of operation of stationary portal monitors within the expected lifetime determines the need for development and delivery of SPAKs to the operational divisions. The main properties of SPAKs are as follows: SPAK types List of items within a SPAK Methods for replenishment of spare parts in SPAKs Indicators of sufficiency of items in a SPAK Optimal number of spare parts in SPAKs Cost, weight and volume of SPAKs. A group shared SPAK is meant for support of routine preventive and corrective maintenance of a suite of stationary portal monitors of the same and varying types, to be stored at the centralized facility in the region of monitor operation (the location for SPAK storage can be either a warehouse of the regional customs office, or a warehouse of the organization in charge of the routine preventive and corrective maintenance of monitors as per the agreement with a regional customs agency). A group shared SPAK should be used and spent in accordance with its declared objectives following the criteria in the operational manuals. A standard group shared SPAK shall include: Spare parts, Tools, Accessories and supplies, Documentation, and Packaging materials. Spare parts are understood primarily as the following units of the stationary portal monitors:
Units Gamma radiation detector unit (GRDU) Purpose Recording of gamma rays in the controlled space and generation of a pulse with peak value proportional to the gamma radiation energy Processing of the received data and its transmission to the power supply and processing unit Recording of neutron flux in the controlled space Processing of the received data and its transmission to the power supply and processing unit Data accumulation and processing Information exchange with a recording and control console Storage of the following information in the nonvolatile memory: Number and type of devices in the system System parameters Archive of events recorded during the system operation. DC power supply for the system components Switch of the system to the power supply from the chargeable batteries if the power network is lost, or of the power parameters go beyond acceptable parameters Charging of batteries

Neutron radiation detector unit (NRDU)

Power supply and processing unit (PSPU)

Power and charge modules

34

Presence sensors Recording and control console

Annunciation of the movement of a controlled object to the controlled area and its departure from the controlled area Specification of the operation modes and display of the system status

3.8.2. Assessment of required number of units to be uncluded to the group shared SPAK The baseline data to be used for estimation of the required number shall include the following: - total number of portal monitors in operation by the regional customs structure - number of systems with a unit of a given type in operation by the regional customs structure F; - number of units of a given type per a specific monitor version pedestrian, vehicular or railway version - Kin. - failure rate of each unit type in relation to the total number of these units in operation for 2 years Kfailure. In addition, the following factors shall be taken into account: - expected increase of the number of monitors in this region Kgrouth - peculiar features (specifically, the climatic conditions) of the region Kregion. - elevating factor to take into account the previous experience in operation of these units Kexp - Knorm, to determine the needs over the future 3 years (it is 1.5). Knew the factor to distinguish the old and new versions of the monitors. It is new=0 for the old versions, and Knew=1 for the new ones. The estimated value of the SPAK number Ncalc, required to support the operation of all previously installed monitors, as well as monitors to be installed in the next year over a 3 year period shall be determined by the formula Ncalc = N x Kin x Kfailure/100 x Kregion Kexp Knorm x (1+(Kgrouth-Knew) Knew) Number of units Ntot, to be included in the group-shared SPAK is arrived at through rounding of Ncalc to the whole number. Review of statistics on portal monitor units failure over the two years of operation produced the following results:
Unit Gamma radiation detector unit (GRDU) Neutron radiation detector unit (NRDU) Power supply and processing unit (PSPU) % of unit repairs of the total number of these units operated as part of the portal monitors 2.3 1 1.2

Power and charge modules (PCM)

Presence sensors (PS) Recording and control console (RCC)

5.2
3.8 8

The procedure for estimation of the SPAK contents for a specific region (one regional customs structure) over a three-year period:

35

Baseline Data
Unit GRDU NRDU PSPU PCM PS RCC Kfailure 2.3 1 1.2 5.2 3.8 8 Kin 4 4 1 2 2 1 Kexp 1 1 1.2 1.2 1 1 Knew 1 1 1 1 1 1 Knorm

1.5

For the described region of operation: Kgrouth =1, Kregion = 1 Unit GRDU NRDU PSPU PCM PS RCC F 7 7 7 7 7 7 Ncalc 0.97 0.42 0.15 1.31 0.79 0.84 Ntot 1 1 1 1 1 1

3.9. CONCLUSIONS
It is evident from the analysis of the failure statistics on the equipment subject to the corrective maintenance where units were not replaced as a whole (minor failures are mainly meant here, where interface failures, or safety fuses, or oxidation processes are mostly involved), that the major share of such failures happen in the regions with unstable climatic conditions (Far East, Western, and Siberian regions). The analysis of the failure statistics on the equipment subject to the corrective maintenance where whole units have to be replaced demonstrates that the major share of the failures happen to the equipment for detection of fissile radioactive materials installed at the locations with changing climatic conditions. (Statistics on pedestrian detection systems installed in more or less comfortable locations with positive temperature gradient and low relative air humidity is lower than in vehicular and railway systems by the order of magnitude). Statistics of the systems subject to repairs involving replacement of the whole units reveals that the failures are caused by the stationary random processes (failures) of some equipment units. Sustainability of the detection systems can be supported through the creation of SPAKs of standard units and assemblies. It is recommended to perform preliminary diagnostics of the SRM system in order to reveal initial indications of failures of individual units (assemblies) of the SRM system in the process of periodical maintenance of the SRM system, performed by certified diagnostics centers. Taking into account the performed analysis of failures of the SRM system individual typical unit, it is recommended that the designers of these devices should develop a set of measures to increase reliability of those units that fail most often. It is proposed to ensure redundancy of the most important individual low-current units as one of the most efficient measures. It is recommended to implement systematic analysis of failures of the SRM systems operated in the IAEA participant countries in order to reveal repeated systematic failures induced by insufficient reliability of the component units and devices. 36

4. DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFIED TEST-PROCEDURE FOR TESTING THE HAND-HELD DEVICES 4.1. Current practice of using portable equipment in the customs control procedure
Currently, taking into account the existing technologies of the customs control for nuclear fissile materials (NFM) in the RF, and the equipment for detection, recording and identification of NFM, developed and available for the customs, the following classification of the use of the customs control equipment can be presented:
Customs observation Search instrument for radiation monitoring with gamma- and neutronradiation detectors Universal radiometer-spectrometer Individual dosimeter Individual dosimeter of X-Ray and gamma-radiation Universal dosimeter of X-Ray and gamma-radiation Description of Customs Operation (Forms of Customs Main Goals and Tasks Resolved Control) Primary radiation monitoring Detection of objects with increased (Customs observation) level of ionization radiation, as compared with natural radiation background, in the overall traffic of goods and transportation vehicles Additional radiation monitoring 1. Search for and localization of an ionization radiation source (IRS) of an object without its opening within an object. (within the framework of customs inspection) 2. Measurement of IRS radiation characteristics. Additional radiation monitoring 3. Evaluation of degree of IRS of an object with its opening radiation danger. (within the framework of customs inspection) Close radiation investigation of 1. IRS initial identification. detected source of ionization 2. Preliminarily classification of IRS radiation (within the framework within one of the following groups: of customs inspection) - nuclear materials or products made of them; - radioactive substances or products made of them; - radioactive waste products; - Goods with increased content of radionuclides (scrap metal, mineral raw products, civil engineering materials, etc.). Customs external inspection/inspection on results of Customs observation Additional radiation Close radiation monitoring investigation +

+ + + +

Portable Instrument Used Search instrument of radiation monitoring with gamma- and neutronradiation detectors - Search instrument of radiation monitoring with gamma- and neutronradiation detectors - Dosimeters - Radiometer-spectrometer

Radiometer-spectrometer

37

The current practice of using this equipment on the whole makes it possible to draw the following conclusions: The use of the radiation monitoring equipment, different in its purposes, specific applications, not always complying with the specific features of the customs control of NFM, often resulted in insufficient use of such equipment, decreasing the overall efficiency of the customs control of the NFM. In order to evaluate the technical characteristics and capabilities of using the above equipment in the procedures of the customs control, this equipment was subjected to different tests. At that, in view of the diverse technical capabilities of the equipment, the testing procedures also displayed considerable differences Problems also arose in connection with the recognition of the test results by the ministries and industries of the Russian Federation, because some of them (the MinAtom Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF, the GosSanEpidNadzor State Sanitary Epidemic Supervision Inspection of the RF, etc.) had their own procedures for testing of this class of equipment at their disposal The customs personnel directly engaged in performing the customs control of goods and transportation vehicles, crossing the customs border of the Russian Federation, resolve a broad number of tasks on inspection and control of goods, the task of the customs control of the NFM being one of them. Therefore, it is not feasible to use a few types of equipment for control of the NFM in performing the NFM customs control. By combining possible tasks to be resolved by a customs specialist in connection with the NFM, the following main tasks can be specified: Search and localization of the IRS within an object. Measurement of radiation characteristics of the IRS. Evaluation of the IRS radiation danger degree. Implementation of preliminary identification of the IRS.

4.2. Analysis of standards and specifications for testing the hand-held devices
In view of the above-mentioned tasks, currently, unified equipment for the customs control of the NFM is being designed, which will be subjected to verification and testing. In order to develop a unified procedure for testing of this class of equipment, the data captured in the following documents were analyzed in the process of implementation of the present Contract: Russian Specifications and Test Procedures- Monitors of NM Radiation. GOST R 516352000 Standard sources of NM for radiation monitors. GOST R 52118-2003 IAEA Specifications. IAEA TECDOC-XXXX. Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP) ASTM Standards C 1112-93, C 1237-93 ANSI Standards ANSI N42.32-2003, N42.33-2003, N42.34-2003. Radiation Detection Technology Assessment Program (RADTAP) IEC 61526. Direct reading personal dose equivalent meters. ISO 22188 Standards. Technical Requirement Specifications of hand-held devices

38

Procedures for testing the technical means for detection, localization, and identification of NM and RS. Testing in RRC Kurchtov Institute (1995) The summary materials of this analysis are given in Table 3. The RADTAP program differed considerably from the major part of the test procedures in its evaluation criteria; therefore, the information about this program is given separately in Appendix 3.

39

Table 3.

Identification

Radioisotope sources Power supply Notes

industrial

medical

Climatic conditions

Report of the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, 1995

Tests with the goal of collecting experimental data to perform evaluation calculation on sensitivity. Accumulation of the background data, measurement of sources of different masses, in a stationary position and in moving with respect to the instruments. Plus the composition of 137Cs + 60Co. The scientific and engineering substantiation of typical programs and procedures for acceptance tests of the TKDRM search equipment is available. 1. NaI(Tl) 5050 , exposure of 0.5-5 s in a powerful Pb shield (5 cm), the temperature stabilization of the duct is absent, the -radiation spectrum is measured in 128 channels. 2. NaI(Tl) 6363 can be used on a stand-alone basis, 128 channels.

1 Density of 137Cs activity in the range of 0,5-400 Cu/m2

U, 238 U, Pu, 252 Cf (shielded by 4-cm of Pb),

235

137

Cs, 60 Co,

1.Spectrometer -radiometer of gammaradiation based on RKG-09N (KORAD) instrument 2.Portable gammaspectrometer PGS

2. On in the range of energies of 50 keV 3.0 MeV

60

241 Am, Th

137

Co+ Cs

Identification in

Pu

Spectrometer: GR-135 2014 NaI detector, GR-135 2580 NaI detector, GR-135 2580 CZT detector, GR-135 2014 NaI detector, MK-02A 96/01, fieldSPECCZT-1382, fieldSPECNaI - 1122, fieldSPECNaI-1507

1)recorded value (threshold) of 0.34 with background of 0.13 Sv/h 2) 1.5 at 0.13 3) 3.7 at 0.13 4) 0.4 at 0.15 5) 0.5 at 0.15

Ba-133 + Pu-239

of natural origin

Type of recorded radiation and sensitivity (detection and its probability)

Nuclear materials

Test Results of Hand-Held Identifier in IAEA, 2002

1) warhead Pu (mass: 6.6g,93 % Pu-239; 6.3 % Pu-240) Pb container with the wall thickness: 10mm. GR-135 (NaI), MKS-02 and fieldSPEC-NaI and CZT is/was capable of identifying Pu-239 under these conditions (states). Recommend to measure time: 300 s. 2) reactor Pu (mass: 6.6 g, 62.5% Pu-239; 25.4 % Pu-240) Pb container with wall thickness: 10 mm GR-135 (NaI), MKS-02 and fieldSPEC-NaI and CZT is/was capable of identifying Pu-239 under these conditions (states). Recommend to measure time: 100 s. 3) reactor Pu free in the air. 4) reactor Pu free in the air with 1.2 mm filter of Cd. 5) a mixture of Ba-133 and Pu-239 (93 %), enclosed (covered) by 1.2 mm filter of Cd 6) identification time depending on radioactive material and instrument: 30,60,120,240,300 and 600 s.

40

Probability characteristics (false operation)

Type of instrument

GR-135 2014 NaI detector, GR-135 2580, MK-02A 96/01, fieldSPECNaI-1122, fieldSPECNaI-1507

137

Cs

1) The source activity is 370 MBk and it is in a container with unidentified characteristics. 2) Measurements were taken at distances of 40 and 25 cm from the source centre. 3). All the specified standards (rates) of the dose from three different types of instruments are in perfect agreement. Check with BABYLINE by showing the instrument with the maximum difference by 5 %. 4) At the high dose estimates the dead time of GR-135, and the MKS instrument is so high that there are problems with identification. Proposal: 1. Implementation in testing of the standard (rate) of the dose is positioned to ensure possibility of identification. 2. The proposed upper limit is at least 100 Sv/h.

K.E. Duftschmid 2003-11-15 IAEA Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment Minimum Requirements for Test Laboratories Draft 15 November 2003
- 20 C to + 50 C and a relative humidity of 90 %

Indicators

Spectrometers

in : from 10 nSv/h to 10 Sv/h < 5 %,

in n: 10 nSv/h to 1 mSv/h < 30 %

For indicators 241 Am 20 MBq 252 Cf 0.2 MBq (22.104 n/s) uranium oxide in powder (>90% 235 U) 100g oxide (6% 240Pu) 10g For spectrometers: 241 Am; 10, 104 235 U; 1; 238 U; 1 239 Pu; 1; 233 U 232 Th 10; HEU oxide powder (> 90 % 235U) 100g; DU 100g;

For indicators 57 Co 0.5 1; 137 Cs 0.2 1, 100; 60 Co 0,25,100, 105 MBq; 131 I 10; 226 Ra 103 for spectrometers: 137 Cs; 1, 100, 1000; 60 Co; 0.25, 10, 100, 105; 111In; 1; 99mTc; 10; 201Tl; 10; 67Ga; 1; 133Xe; 10; 125I; 100; 123I; 1; 131I; 1; 18 F; 1; 57 Co; 1; 237 Np; 100; 1; 133 Ba; 1; 40 K; 1;

Minimum requirement for a test lab: 1. A room no less than 100m2. 2. High means of illumination of the standard (rate) of the gamma dose, the standard (rate) of the dose ~ 1 Sv/h 60Co > 0.5 m. A climatic board for PRD and RIID tests, covering (enclosing) - 20C to + 50C with > relative humidity by 90 %. A radar or IR speedometer for exact measurement of a transportation vehicle or a pedestrian speed (< 10 %). An automated system of a trolley for transfer of a source from is accelerated to 15 km\h on a distance of 20 m. A system of positioning a source for determining (the intent) of the area (region) of the search, the vertical range up to 4 m., with the lead of thickness collimators by 5 mm. A microphone-based tone alarm, sensitive to the device for automated recording of different signals fed by PRDs and RIIDs. ICRU PMMA phantom 30 x 30 x 15 cm. A rotary disk prints a unit of testing of the busy sensor.

41

226

192

NU 100g; LEY (< 20 % 235U) 100g; WGU (30-90 % 235U) 100g; WG Pu oxide ball (< 90 % 239Pu) 10g; RGPu (~65 % 239Pu) 10g

Ra; 1; Ir; 1; Sr/Y; 10; 252Cf; 0.2 (2.104 n/s);

90

ANSI 42.32-2003 approved as of 23.12.2003

Rechargeable Temperature batteries. range from 20 to +50. Under alarm conditions the instrument should operate continuously during 30 minutes. Probability of significant operation is 95%. For instruments with a digital indication of the dose rate, the measurement error + 30%, if calibrated in Cs-137. The alarm signal types: tone, visual, vibration. Access to change the instrument functions (calibration parameters, signal threshold level) should be classified (required to enter a password). The instrument should retain working characteristics after mechanical impacts (drops) and the effect of vibration within the range from 10Hz to 500Hz. If the instrument measures the level of radiation in different units of measurement (r/h, Sv/h, Gr/h), then the dose rate value should be displayed on the screen with the indication of the units of measurement. The battery indicator should indicate that the time of operation for the instrument is limited to 4 hours in the absence of alarms.

Pocket-size instruments

Personal dosimeter

Energy range from 200keV to 1.5 MeV. Exposure time is 2 sec. The alarm should be initiated by an excess of the signal threshold by 50 r/h for more than 0.5 sec.

Radionuclides are not identified.

42

ANSI 42.32-2003 approved as of 23.12.2003

Temperature range from20 to +50. Relative humidity up to 93%. The instrument should remain fully operational after being subjected to water splashes (sea water included).

Radionuclides are not identified.

Pocket-size instruments

Instruments for evaluation of radiation danger

The instrument should immediately respond to the excess of the threshold level. Indications should be displayed in the screen with illumination (possible operation under low illumination conditions). The instrument size should not exceed 20m10m5m (if it is not a part of another instrument). The instrument weight should not exceed 400 gram. The instrument should be provided with a ring or a grip allowing it to be reliably fixed. The instrument should be marked allowing the front and the back panel to be distinguished, as well as the detector location indicated. The instrument casing should be made of water-resistant easy-to-decontaminate materials. Requirements on mechanical impact: the instrument should retain its working characteristics after a drop from a height of 1.5 m on a concrete floor with any side. The tone alarm frequency is 1000-4000 Hz. In case of an unstable alarm, the signal interval should not exceed 2 sec. The tone signal level should be not less than 85 dB but not more than 100 dB at a distance of 30 m from the instrument. For quiet indication, use is made of visual, vibrations and other types of alarms. Provision should be made for a special signal indicating about the instrument status, under which its normal operation is impossible (the battery low level, the sensor failure, etc.). The effect of radio frequencies (from 20 mHz to 1000 mHz) should be eliminated.

ANSI 42.33-2003 approved as of 23.12.2003

Temperature range from 20 to +50, at the relative humidity from 40 to 93%.

Portable (hand-held) instruments

Instrument of type 1

Detection and alarm Radionuclides are not identified. initiation at the level of the dose rate from 0nSy/h to 10 Sy/h. Energy range from 60keV to 1.33 eV. New batteries: uninterrupted work during 24 hours. Under the conditions of continuous alarm signal, operation during 15 minutes. For charged storage batteries: 12 hours of non-stop work and 15 minutes under the condition of triggering of all the alarm types.

The instrument weight should be less than 4.55 kg. The instrument should be provided with making showing the location of detectors inside the casing. The alarm should be a combination of tone, visual and vibration signals. The signal threshold is established with the account taken of the natural background. The alarm is initiated in the instrument by the presence of a radioactive material (on the basis of the dose rate increase). The instrument should withstand the wind velocity up to 5 inches per hour, should be stable under the effect of dust particles at the speed of 1750 ft per min. and atmospheric pressure from 520 to 720 mm Hg. It is forbidden to subject the instrument to the effect of waves with the frequency from 20 MHz to 1000 MHz. The display screen of the instrument should be illuminated in such a way that it would possible to use under different illumination conditions. The Menu structure should be simple and convenient. The instrument should withstand a drop on a concrete floor from a height not less than 1m (with any surface) and vibration with a frequency of 10-30 Hz during 15 minutes.

43

ANSI 42.33-2003 approved as of 23.12.2003

Temperature range from 20 to +50, at the relative humidity from 40 to 93%. New batteries: uninterrupted work during 24 hours. Under the conditions of continuous alarm signal, operation during 15 minutes. For charged batteries: 12 hours of non-stop work and 15 minutes under the condition of actuation of all the alarm types. Uninterrupted work powered from a new battery is not less than 2 hours. The battery state indicator should be available on the display screen. It should not be difficult to replace batteries under field conditions. The instrument definitely identifies radionuclides in 8 out of 10 subsequent tests.

Portable (hand-held) instruments

Instrument of type 2

Detection and alarm initiation at the level of the dose rate from 1Sy/h to 1 Sy/h. The energy range from 60keV to 1.33 MeV.

Radionuclides are not identified.

The instrument weight should be not more than 2.7 kg. The instrument should be provided with making showing the location of detectors inside the casing. The alarm should be a combination of tone, visual and vibration signals. The signal threshold is established independent of the natural background. The instrument is used to evaluate radioactively dangerous and potentially dangerous cargo items under the conditions of an increased level of ionization radiation. The tone alarm frequency from 1000 to 4000 Hz, in the event of an unstable alarm signal, the interval should not exceed 2 sec. The level of the tone signal in the ear phones is about 75 dB, while at a distance of 30 cm from the instrument, no less than 85 dB. The instrument should be provided with the battery state indicator. The instrument should withstand the wind velocity up to 5 inches per hour, be stable under the effect of dust particles at the speed of 1750 ft per min. and atmospheric pressure from 520 to 720 mm Hg. It is forbidden to subject the instrument to the effect of waves with the frequency from 20 MHz to 1000 MHz. The instrument should withstand a drop on a concrete floor from a height not less than 1m (with any surface) and vibration with a frequency of 10-30 Hz during 15 minutes.

ANSI 42.34-2003 approved as of 23.12.2003

67

Pocket-size instrument for detection and identification The temperature range from -20C to +50C, with the relative humidity up to 93 %.

The energy range of 233U, the gamma spectrum 235U, 237 from Np, 25 keV to Pu 3 MeV. The actuation in the neutron channel with the Cf-252 source with a weight of 0.01 g located at a distance of 25 cm (in this case the neutron radiation dose rate amounts to 3 Sy/h), the exposure time is 2 Ga, 51 Cr, 75 Se, 99m Tc, 103 Pd, 111 In, 123 I, 125 I, 131 I, 201 Tl, 133 Xe
40

Cs 57 Co, 60 Co, 133 Ba, 192 Ir, 204 Tl, 226 Ra, 241 Am

137

K, 226 Ra, 232 Th 238 U

The instrument display screen should be illuminated in such a way that it would possible to use under different illumination conditions. The Menu structure should be simple and convenient. Access to the radionuclides library should be limited. The instrument should have two modes of operation: automatic (convenient) and classified (for experts). Provision should be made for a means of data transfer from the instrument to an external device. Possibility to connect the pocket computer to an external power supply source (from 12 Volts). The instrument should be capable to store up to 50 unprocessed spectra, containing information about the date and time, identified radionuclide, time of spectrum accumulation, level of gamma and neutron radiation. If the radionuclide is not identified, there should be a glowing inscription informing about it. It should be possible to handle the instrument wearing gloves and putting it into a polyethylene bag to protect it from contamination. The instrument should be capable of identifying the following radionuclides: - Without enclosure: 40, 137Cs, 57, 60Co, 99mTc, 201Tl, 67Ga, 125I, 131I, 192Ir, 133, 226Ra, 232Th, 233U, 235U, 238U, Pu (>6% 240Pu), 241m. - Behind a steel enclosure by 5 mm: 40, 137Cs, 57, 60Co, 99mTc, 201Tl, 67Ga, 125I, 131I, 192Ir, 133, 226Ra, 232Th, 233U, 235U, 238U, Pu (>6% 240Pu), 241m. The instrument should be capable to distinguish at least two radionuclides simultaneously. The instrument should be capable to identify radionuclides under the conditions of increased gamma-radiation by natural Th or increased beta-radiation. The instrument should not identify an unavailable radionuclide. The instrument should be able to withstand vibration during 15 min. within the frequency range of 10-33 Hz.

44

ISO 22188
The instrument operating conditions: the instrument temperature range from -150 to +450, at the relative humidity of 95%. The instrument operation probability is 99%, i.e. on the average, 2 failures per days. Stand-alone operation of the instrument powered from the storage batteries is not less than 12 hours. The battery charge level should be displayed in the information panel. The instrument size should allow it to be carried in a side pocket or on a belt. The instrument system should provide for adjustment of the alarm threshold level. The instrument should not fail at a considerable increase of the ionization radiation dose rate. Provision should be made in the instrument for three types of alarm signals: visual, tone, and vibration. The tone alarm should be no less than 30 dB at a distance of 30 cm from the instrument. Provision should be made for quietly informing the operator about the presence With the of radioactive materials. neutron In order to warn the operator about the danger, as well as to localize the source, the detector tone alarm signal should change proportionally to the increase of the ionization subjected to radiation dose rate. gammaFalse alarms should not exceed one operation per day (in view of the presence of an radiation of insignificant amount of natural Th and U in the goods). not more than The instrument should be subjected to check tests by a specialized agency once a 1% of the total year. radiation, the confidence of alarm triggering should amount to 50%, i.e. 6 failures per 1 hour.

Pocket-size instruments

Triggering of the Radionuclides are not identified gamma-channel could be initiated by excess of the dose rate value of 1 Sy/h at the time of exposure from 2 sec. Triggering of the neutron channel can be initiated by location of the instrument at a distance of 0.25 m from the Cf-252 source with a weight of 0.01 microgram (in this case, the neutron radiation dose rate amounts to 3 Sy/h) with the time of exposure of 10 sec. (i.e. about 20000 neutrons per second).

ISO 22188
The instrument operating conditions: the instrument temperature range from -150 to +450, with the relative humidity of 95%. Stand-alone operation of the instrument powered from the storage batteries is not less than 12 hours. The battery charge level should be The operation probability standard is more than 90%, i.e. 6 failures per hour. With the neutron detector subjected to gammaThe instrument should be provided with a tone indicating the excess of the dose standard. The tone signal should be no less than 85 dB at a distance of 30 cm from the instrument. It is desirable to have a different alarm tone levels in case of operation of the gamma- and neutron detectors. To be used in the search mode, the instrument should not weigh more than 2 kg and be provided with a convenient handle for carrying. The instrument should allow measurements to be taken during a short period of time (less than 1 s), in order to quickly inspect surfaces, bags, pedestrians and transportation vehicles. In case of detection of the radiation source location, the alarm signal should either be repeated automatically or change the signal tone frequency, which should

Portable (hand-held) instruments

Triggering of the Radionuclides are not identified. gamma-channel could be initiated by an average value of the dos rate of 0.4 Sy/h at the time of exposure of more than 3 sec. Triggering of the neutron channel can be initiated by locating a source

45

of Cf-252 with a weight of 0.01 microgram (in this case the neutron radiation dose rate amounts to 3 Sy/h) with the time of exposure of 10 sec. (i.e. about 20000 neutrons per second). displayed in the information panel. radiation of not more than 1% of the total radiation, the confidence of alarm triggering should amount to 50%, i.e. 6 failures per 1 hour.

increase with the dose rate increase. Provision should be made in the instrument for adjustment of the alarm threshold level. The instrument should be easy to handle. The instrument should be subjected to check tests by a specialized agency once a year. The instrument should operate adequately enough at a sufficiently high level of ionization radiation dose rate. The higher the dose rate, the quicker the instrument should trigger.

Instruments for identification of radionuclides No requirements on power supply. The instrument operating conditions: the instrument temperature range from 150 to +450, with the relative humidity of 95%.

Detection of gamma-radiation spectra in the energy range from 60keV to 1.5 MeV. After calibration, the radionuclides (-57, -60, -40, Cs-137, Am-241), giving the dose rate of gamma-radiation in the detector by 0.5 Sy/h higher than the background level, should be identified. If provision is made for detection of gammaradiation, the alarm should be initiated at the value of 0.4 Sy/h of the dose rate with the exposure time of 3 s. If provision is made for detection Probability of confident operation at an increased level of gammaradiation is 90%, i.e. 6 failures

233

U| 235 U 239 Pu 241 Pu

60

Co 137 Cs 192 Ir 226 Ra 241 Am 238 Pu

18

F 57 Co 67 Ga 99 mTc 201 Tl 123 I 125 I 131 I 111 In 192 Ir

40

ISO 22188
Possible identification of radionuclides with the help of the instrument by nonspecialists. The instrument should be calibrated on a stand-alone basis, preferably, on the basis of an internal source. The library of radionuclides should be profoundly studied by the designer, as well as edited, optimized and tested.

K 226 Ra 232 U 238 U

46

of neutron radiation, the alarm should be initiated in location of the Cf-252 source with a mass of 0.01 microgram at a distance of 0.25 m from the instrument (the neutron radiation dose rate in this case amounts to 3 Sy/h) with the exposure time of 10 sec. (i.e. about 20000 neutrons per second). per 1 hour. With the neutron detector subjected to gammaradiation of not more than 1% of the total radiation, the confidence of alarm triggering should amount to 50%, i.e. 6 failures per 1 hour.

47

GOST 51635-2000 Radiation Monitors for Nuclear Materials (General Specs for Use by the Customs)
Temperature range from 30 to +50 at the humidity of 95% During analysis of preliminary tests, it is allowed to use alternative sources of gamma-radiation Ba-133 (750 kBk), neutron sources Cf-252 or Cm-244 (flux of 1.5*104) to control the detection threshold of instruments for the gamma-channel. The uranium standard: the content of the mass fraction of uranium should be no less than 99.75%, other impurities of not more than 0.25%, at that, the content of uranium-235 should be not less than 89%. The plutonium standard: the content of the mass fraction of plutonium should be no less than 98%, other impurities of not more 2%, at that, the content of plutonium-239 should be not less than 93.5%, plutonium-240 not more than 6.5%. In addition, the Functional test at the maximum permissible background of 0.25 Sy/h following is verified: The time of uninterrupted operation with a standalone power supply by storage batteries is not less than 6 hours. The false triggering frequency is not more than 1 false triggering per 10 min. of continuous operation of the instrument. At that, at least 15 triggering of the instrument out of 20 cases of the source carrying (detection probability is 0.5 at a confidence |of no less than 95%)

Portable (hand-held) search instruments for radiation monitoring

1. Triggering of Radionuclides are not identified. the gammachannel can be initiated by transfer of a CO sample of uranium with a mass of 10 gram or plutonium with a mass of 0.3 gram to a distance of 20 cm with the transfer rate of 0.5 m/sec. 2. Triggering of the gammachannel can be initiated by transfer of a CO sample of uranium with a mass of 250 gram or plutonium with a mass of 3 gram to a distance of 100 cm with the transfer rate of 0.5 m/sec .

1. Triggering of the neutron channel can be initiated by transfer of a sample of plutonium with a mass of 10 gram, shielded by led with a thickness of 0.03-0.05 m to a

48

distance of 20 cm with the transfer rate of 0.5 m/sec. 2. Triggering of the neutron channel can be initiated by transfer of a sample of plutonium with a mass of 350 gram, shielded by led with a thickness of 0.03-0.05 m to a distance of 100 cm with the transfer rate of 0.5 m/sec.

49

4.3. Unified procedure for testing the hand-held devices

The logic of adopting a particular testing procedure is specified by the following: Specific features of the customs control procedure for nuclear and radioactive materials crossing the border, effective in the customs system of the Russian Federation (refer to Section 1). The current practice of the use of portable instruments within the customs control technology (refer to Section 4.1).

It follows from the analysis of the above-mentioned procedures for testing of technical means for detection, localization and identification of nuclear materials and radioactive substances that the procedures, on the whole, make it possible to perform evaluation of equipment belonging to the class of indicators (with the dosimeter functionality) and radiometers-identifiers. Using the existing experience gained in testing, the testing procedures can be subdivided into 10 sections: 1. Functional evaluation of an instrument. 2. False identification evaluation. 3. Possibility to detect objects irradiating gamma-quanta. 4. Possibility to detect objects irradiating neutrons. 5. Possibility to detect surface radioactive alpha- and beta-contamination. 6. Requirements on the isotope library. 7. Possible identification of one isotope (shielded). 8. Possible identification of more than one isotope. 9. Possible identification of an isotope under the conditions of an increased gammaradiation background. 10. Ergonomic properties of the instrument front panel. 4.3.1. Evaluation Category 1: functional evaluation of an instrument The instrument is analyzed for the presence of the following properties, being desirable but not mandatory. Characteristic features of instrument: To be operated by one person (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004) It allows gamma- and neutron radiation, as well as the alpha- and beta-contamination, to be simultaneously detected with the help of an additional detector (the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF, the Rules for Transportation, IAEA, ST-1). The timer/counter mode for neutron and gamma-channels in order to improve the detection efficiency (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los-Alamos Test Program, 2004) Mechanically strong, intended for outdoor use within a broad range of temperatures and humidity (the instrument and its component parts working capacity should be retained at the temperature from -20 to +40 ). (TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF)

50

An illuminated display screen to be used during the dark time, its readings can also be taken under a bright sun light (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, US Standard, RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004) The battery service life is sufficient for at least 8 hours of operation (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004) An automatic (for a wide range of users) and a manual (for experts) modes of operation, provided with a protected toggle switch. The set critical parameters can be reset to the manufacturers settings by default; they are protected by classified access; the parameters selected by the user are preserved in case of the system is switched off in the mode for experts. Detectors are installed for simultaneous measurement of gamma- and neutron radiation, the detectors are integrated within one casing of the instrument (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004) An external detector for measurement of alpha- and beta-radiation (the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). A neutron detector functional under the conditions of gamma-radiation background (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). An adequate size of the display; the display is reliable under the field conditions and at extreme temperatures; the time during which the display is in the on position can be adjusted with the help of the always on option; automatic adjustment of the degree of contrast, depending on temperature; limited manual adjustment, if required (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). The number of pulses (count rate) per second (counts/s) for gamma-quanta and neutrons. Automatic scaling for graphical representation of the count rate (for example, histogram, belt-type diagram for search). After activation the date and time are indicated, as well as the hardware and software versions. Indicates the excess of the range for the dose rate > 1 Sy/h (It is proposed to initiate a tone (picked) signal in excess of the unit dose rate by more than 1 Sy/h (transportation category 1 in compliance with the Rules for Safe Transportation of Radioactive Materials (ST-1), IAEA, Vienna (1996). Indicates the residual capacity of the battery (storage battery) when using recommended batteries (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). The spectrum display with the cursor functions (only in the mode for specialists). Indication of the dead time and maximum range of the count rate. Indication of the detector optimal count rate on the graphical display (information: move the instrument closer or away. The instrument is installed at the optimal distance) (the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). 51

Properties of the detector equipment:

Properties of the display screen and visual indication:

Display indication in isotope identification:

The remaining time until the spectra procession is complete (back count), if used in the fixed time mode. Neutron count per second; total count during a selected time (only in the mode for specialists). (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). Indication that the instrument is busy processing the spectrum. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). Indication of results: an isotope and category, or an unknown isotope, or a weak signal, in case identification failed. It is recommended to have indication of the identification degree of confidence. In all the cases it is possible to continue measurements without restarting the instrument. Different tone search signals for gamma-quanta and neutron count. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). An increase of the frequency rate (not the tone level) of the tone signal is proportional to the count rate of gamma-quanta (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF) Single tone signals to indicate the neutron count. An acoustic alarm signal in excess of preset level of the dose rate. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF.) Visual and acoustic warning about the battery low voltage. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF) Possibility of a toneless and audible warning signal (vibration or earphones); information of the display screen if the signal is toneless. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). At least 1000 of the analog-to-digit transformer (ADT). (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). Stabilization of energy dependence and a repeated calibration mode with the help of the K-40 isotope). (The Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). Maximum nonlinearity of the energy scale (after the linearization): < 0.25% below 200 keV, < 0.5% above 200 keV. Linearization depending on the energy range for scintillation detectors. Calibration correction in energies with the help of a radioactive source; preferably, a natural isotope, which is not subject to the Rules due to its activity. (The Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF).

Acoustic signals:

Characteristics of the amplifier/multichannel analizer (MCA) of the spectrometer:

52

A memory to store at least 30 spectra, 1000 channels per each. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). A response to a strong temperature variation: the amplifier should withstand temperature variations from the room temperature to +50/-20 degrees C (one repeated stabilization is permitted, if the instrument is used for more than 8 hours). (TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF).

Nonobligatory automatic saving of spectra in the automatic (for a wide range of users) mode. A format of spectral data in the ASCII. A PC interface with the help of a standard connection with communication means (for example, RS232, USB, IR or WIFI, the port is protected against splashes of water). (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). Standardized information saved in a file, including all the settings and diagnostics, as well as the measurement results. User-friendly software for the PC support in the mode for experts. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). A standard-size storage battery (rechargeable) or non-rechargeable (to be used if the internal battery is discharged completely or the charging device is faulty). (ISO, TECDOC IAEA ,the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). The preset parameters, data and time settings should not be lost, if the main battery is discharged completely or replaced. An automatic voltage reading, an adapter/charging device of AC, used throughout the world (not mandatory), automobile battery adapter. Change-over to the mains charging device, if the system is powered from the mains. The indication of the states: charging and discharged completely. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). It is possible to charge during operation. The time of charge (up to reaching 90%) is less than the time of the battery discharge in the switched off instrument.

In-built memory and a PC Interface:

Power supply source:

4.3.2. Evaluation Category 2: False identification (to be performed first of all prior to detection tests) Requirement: The instrument should not identify an unavailable radionuclide during operation in a stable mode with a low-radiation background of the environment. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, the US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). 53

The Method of testing: Perform identification of a radionuclide, using the instrument under the conditions of a stable background with the intensity of not more than 0.1Sy/h in the absence of any radiation source (a shielded box or shielding cover can be required to perform the test). Under these conditions not a single unavailable radionuclide should be identified. The test consists of 10 subsequent attempts, and the characteristics of the instrument are appropriate if the instrument has not identified any unavailable radionuclide in 9 cases out of 10 subsequent attempts. If a natural radionuclide, for example, -40 has been identified, measures should be taken in order to decrease or eliminate this source before the performance of the test. If the presence of a radionuclide is anticipated, and it cannot be eliminated, the test result will be acceptable, if the anticipated radionuclide is identified. 4.3.3. Evaluation Category 3: Possible detection of objects, irradiating gamma-quanta Requirements: Provision should be made for correlation between the instrument sensitivity and the portal monitors sensitivity, since these portable instruments are used to localize the radioactive sources of gamma-radiation, detected by the portal monitors. The instrument should comply with the standards of ASTM C1237 of the US and GOST 51635 of the RF on the minimum detectable quantities of nuclear materials and alternative radioactive sources. (The US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF). Highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the form of a sphere with a mass of 10 g; Cs-137 source with the intensity of 1 Curie; Co-60 source with the intensity of 2 Curie; -133 source with the intensity of 21 Curie.

The method of testing: The test should be performed with the following:

Each source should move along the front surface of the detector at a speed of more than 0.5 m/s; and, at the closest approach, the distance from the front surface of the detector to the source centre should be not less than 0.25 m. It is required to perform at least 20 tests for each source and the number of successful measurements should be recorded. The goal is to achieve the detection probability of at least 50% at the level of confidence of 95% (i.e., at least, 15 attempts out of 20 should be successful). 4.3.4. Evaluation Category 4: Possible detection of objects, irradiating neutrons Requirements: Provision should made for correlation between the instrument sensitivity and the portal monitors sensitivity, since these portable instruments are used to localize radioactive sources of neutron irradiation, detected by the portal monitors. The instrument should generate an acoustic alarm signal, when located in the field of neutrons with the intensity higher than the threshold value. It should be taken into account that the criterion for detection of neutron radiation is an important factor, indicating that a fissile material or a neutron source has been detected. In this case, the criterion of minimum detectable value of the neutron flux is a very important value. (the RF Standard, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF, ISO, TECDOC IAEA).

The method of testing: 1. The instrument is carried in the neutron radiation field of the Cf-252 source, equivalent to the flux of (15000 n/s 30%), generated by the Cf-252 source without a moderator

54

(i.e. a sample with a weight of about 0.1 g), at a distance of about 100 cm from the instrument at a speed of about 0.5 m/s. 2. Perform 20 tests and record how many times an acoustic signal was generated. The goal is to achieve the detection probability of at least 50% at the level of confidence of 95% (i.e., at least, 15 attempts out of 20 should be successful). (The US Standard, the RF Standard, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004, the Use of Technical Means of Radiation Monitoring in the RF, ISO, TECDOC IAEA). Notes: 1. A source of 252Cf with a mass of 0.01 g, located at a distance of about 25 cm from the instrument, generates about 3 Sy/h (0.3 m/hour). 2. The neutron detection sensitivity of a manual instrument strongly depends on the neutron moderator. Therefore, the test should be performed under the conditions of the absence of reflection, for example, on a thin steel plate. Use is made only of the neutron moderator being a component part of the instrument. 4.3.5. Evaluation Category 5: Possible detection of surface radioactive alpha- and betacontamination A criterion of permissible level of surface radioactive contamination: Alpha-particles of not more than 1.0 particle/m2min; Beta-particles of not more than 100 particle/m2min. (ST-1, IAEA)

4.3.6. Evaluation Category 6: Requirements on isotope library Requirements: The instrument should have the following isotopes in its library: K-40, Co-57, Co-60, Ga-67, Tc-99m, I-125, I-131, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Tl-201, Ra-226, Th-232, U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu [reactor-grade plutonium (> 6% Pu-240)], Am-241. At that, it is required to be taken into account that, in view of the danger of nuclear material illegal trafficking, the spectra of U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu (> 6% Pu-240), Am-241 should have a priority value from the viewpoint of appearance of possible multiplets with the rest of the nuclide library; in order to prevent that, the lines of other radionuclides located closely to the lines of nuclear materials should not be processed. 4.3.7. Evaluation Category 7: Possible identification of one isotope (shielded) Requirements: The instrument should be capable to identify the following radionuclides, shielded by a steel shield, within 5 minutes: Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ra-226, Th-232, U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu [reactor-grade plutonium (> 6% Pu-240), Am-241. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). The method of testing: 1. The instrument measures each of the above-mentioned radionuclides (one by one). The radionuclide should have a nominal activity of 2 Curie. The instrument is spaced 10 cm apart from the source (in the cases when a source with the 2 Curie activity is not available, the detector location should be selected proceeding from the assumption that the dependence on distance of 1/r2 is implemented). A steel shield of a sufficient thickness is then located between the source and the detector until the measured intensity decreases by a factor of 2. 2. 10 tests should be performed; in the middle of test sequence it is required to recalibrate the instrument. The test is treated as successful, when the instrument correctly identifies

55

an isotope, irrespective of its other readings. The goal is achieved when the instrument correctly identifies a radionuclide in 9 out 10 successive attempts. As a rule, actual deliveries of radioactive materials are performed in protective containers made of lead. Therefore, it is extremely important to check the identification of a number of radioactive sources in the lead containers. To perform identification, the 137Cs, 226Ra, 60Co sources are to be put into lead containers with such a thickness that the measured intensity will not decrease by more than a factor of 10 (possible correct identification in case of appearance of single and double leaks) (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). 4.3.8. Evaluation Category 8: Possible identification of more than one isotope simultaneously Requirements: The instrument should be capable of identifying, at least, two radionuclides simultaneously. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). The method of testing: 1. The instrument simultaneously measures isotopes Ba-133 and Pu (of a reactor grade), each with the activity of about ~ 1 Curie. The isotopes are spaced 10 cm apart from the instrument. The testing consists of 10 subsequent tests, the duration of each being not more than 5 minutes. The goal is for the instrument to correctly and simultaneously identify both the tested radionuclides in 9 out of 10 subsequent tests. Similarly as in the previous category, the instrument should be recalibrated in the middle of the testing sequence. 2. The instrument simultaneously measures isotopes Co-57 with the activity of about ~ 1 Curie and a sphere made of HEU with a mass of 10 g. The isotopes are spaced 10 cm apart from the instrument. The testing should consist of 10 subsequent tests, the duration of each being not more than 5 minutes. The goal is for the instrument to correctly and simultaneously identify both the tested radionuclides in 9 out of 10 subsequent tests. Similarly as in the previous category, the instrument should be recalibrated in the middle of the testing sequence. 3. The instrument simultaneously measures isotopes Th-232 and Ra-226 with the activity of about ~ 1 Curie. The isotopes are spaced 10 cm apart from the instrument. The test should consist of 10 subsequent tests, the duration of each being not more than 5 minutes. The goal is for the instrument to correctly and simultaneously identify both the tested radionuclides in 9 out of 10 subsequent tests. Similarly as in the previous category, the instrument should be recalibrated in the middle of the test sequence. 4.3.9 Evaluation Category 9: Possible identification of an isotope under the conditions of increased radiation gamma-background Requirement: The instrument should be capable of identifying radionuclides of interest under the conditions of an increased background of gamma-radiation generated by natural thorium. (ISO, TECDOC IAEA, Los Alamos Test Program, 2004). The method of testing: 1. The instrument is irradiated by natural thorium, the dose rate of which, measured by the detector, amounts to 50 Roentgen/h. 2. Put the 241Am source in such a place where the intensity measured by the detector can be increased by 0.5 Sy/h (50 Roentgen/hour). The goal is that the detector can correctly identify 241Am in 8 out of 10 subsequent attempts; at that, none should last for more than 1 minute. 3. Put the 60Co source in such a place where the intensity measured by the detector can be increased by 0.5 Sy/h (50 Roentgen/hour). The goal is that the detector can correctly 56

identify 60Co in 8 out of 10 subsequent attempts; at that, none should last for more than 1 minute. 4.3.10. Evaluation Category 10: Ergonomical properties of the instrument face panel. At the end of the testing program, each expert in evaluation should answer the questions in the evaluation review that have to do with the three easy-to-handle topics : 4.3.11. Topic 1: Evaluation of control elements 1. Is it easy to find the On/Off switch? 2. Are all the control elements marked? 3. Are all the marked control elements easy to read/interpret? 4. Is it easy to handle all the control elements without wearing gloves? 5. Is it possible to handle all the control elements wearing gloves? 6. Evaluate the control elements using a ten-point scale (10 the best, 0 unacceptable). 7. Is it possible to adjust the brightness/contrast, manually or automatically, so as to compensate for the brightness levels? 4.3.12. Topic 2: Evaluation of display 8. Is it possible to read everything with poor illumination? 9. Is it possible to read everything at high levels of illumination? 10. Is it possible to read the display readings, when it is located in a polyethylene bag? 11. Did the display contain abbreviations or icons (if not, omit the next question). 12. Is it easy to interpret or understand the abbreviations or icons? 13. Were the date and the time displayed on the screen? 14. Evaluate the control elements using a ten-point scale (10 the best, 0 unacceptable). 4.3.13. Topic 3: Evaluation of work 15. Did the instrument inform you about its technical status during initiation (for example, about the battery service life, if the detector is available, if it is activated, the scope of memory available, the mode of operation)? 16. Did you have to turn to the instructions more than once during the execution of the testing? 17. Was the Menu structure simple and intuitively clear? 18. Did the instrument invite you to act at any time during the testing? 19. Did the instrument generate any caution and warning messages? (If not, go over to Question 21). 20. Did the instrument submit you information about the character of the caution and warning messages and the respective order of actions to be taken? 21. Evaluate the instrument from the viewpoint of work convenience, using the ten-point scale (10 the best, 0 unacceptable).

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4.4. Adoptation of the Unified Procedure for testing the hand-held devices
The first version of the Unified Procedure was preliminarily approved during the testing at the Kurchatov Institute in 2003 (see Figs 10). The following portable instruments were used: 1. Spectrometer Gamma-1/NB1
The spectrometer energy resolution in the gammaradiation line with the energy of 662 keV (Cs-137) is 8%. The range of energies for recorded -quanta is 50 to 3000 keV. The time for establishing the working mode is not more than 30 minutes. The range of working temperatures is from -20 to 50 . The spectrometer mass is not more than 20 kg.

2. Universal Radiometer-Spectrometer RSU-01 Signal-M

The relative energy resolution of the spectrometer in the gamma-radiation line with the energy of 662 keV (Cs-137) is not more than 35%. The range of recorded energies of the gamma-spectrum is 200 to 3000 keV. The time for establishing a working mode is not more than 15 minutes. The range of working temperatures is from -20 to +40 . The overall dimensions (of the electronic panel) are 180*140*75 mm. The mass (of the electronic panel) is 1.5 kg.

3. Universal Radiometer-Spectrometer MKS-02

The relative energy resolution of the spectrometer in the gamma-radiation line with the energy of 662 keV (Cs-137) is not more than 8%. The range of recorded energies of the gammaspectrum is 50 to 3000 keV. The time for establishing a working mode is the following: - not more than 30 minutes in the identification mode; - not more than 2 minutes in the other modes. The range of working temperatures is from -20 to +50 . The overall dimensions are 290*160*135 mm. The mass is 3.6 kg.

58

4. Search Radiometer-Spectrometer RM-1401 The relative energy resolution of the spectrometer in the gamma-radiation line with the energy of 662 keV (Cs-137) is not more than 7%. The range of recorded energies of the gammaspectrum is 15 to 3000 keV. The time for establishing a working mode is the following: - not more than 30 minutes in the identification mode; - not more than 2 minutes in the other modes. The range of working temperatures is from -20 to +50 . The overall dimensions are 290*160*135 mm. The mass is 0.65 kg.

Fig. 10. The testing at the Kurchatov Institute in 2003 in Category 7: Possible Identification of One Isotope (Shielded). After preliminary coordination and correction by the RF/US testing participants, the working version of the Unified Procedure was approved in the course of testing in the Los Alamos national laboratory executed from May 16 to May 19, 2004 (see Figs 11 and 12). The following portable instruments were used: 1. Search Radiometer-Spectrometer RM-1401. 2. Universal Radiometer-Spectrometer MKS-02. 3. Universal Radiometer-Spectrometer MKS-03. 4. Radiometer-Spectrometer FieldSpec (the Target Company, Germany). The Protocol compiled on the basis of the instrumentation testing results is given in Appendix 3. 59

Fig. 11. Testing in Evaluation Category 3: Possible Detection of Objects Irradiating Gamma-Quanta.

Fig. 12. Testing in Evaluation Category 7: Possible Identification of One Isotope (Shielded).

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4.5. CONCLUSION
The developed Unified Test Procedure is used for portable instruments, performing qualitative evaluation of parameters of radioactive materials during the customs control of the fissile materials and radioactive substances. The Unified Test Procedure is developed on the basis of the Russian and foreign standards for the test procedures and technical characteristics of portable instruments. In developing the Unified Test Procedure, specific features of the customs control procedure for nuclear and radioactive materials crossing the border, effective in the system of customs agencies of the RF were taken into account, as well as the current practice of using portable instruments in the customs control technology. A number of proposals on improvement of the test procedures for portable instruments, captured in the Unified Test Procedure, were implemented in the Project IAEA-TECDOC-XXXX Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment, July, 2004. The experimental work on defining qualitative characteristics of the isotopes of nuclear materials and radioactive substances confirmed the applicability of the developed Unified Test Procedure and necessity to use it in the process of the customs control.

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APPENDIX 1. Format, rules and procedure for filling out the register to track the time of operation, failures and damages to equipment items during testing.
(Tables .1 and .2) .1. Format, Rules and Procedure for Filling Out the Table to Track the Time of Operation .1.1. The table for tracking the time of operation during the test is filled out by a person responsible for the test, its sample and recommended form are provided in Table .1. .1.2. The Date and Time column shall have time when the item was switched on and off (hour, minutes, day, month, year) at the beginning of the test and after the scheduled or forced switching off. .1.3. The Impact Factor Set shall have a daily record of temperature and humidity in the room and outside, with relative humidity outside measured at the temperature above +5 . .1.4. The time of item operation after switching it on shall include the time of item operation in hours from the moment when it was last switched on till it is switched off due to any reason. By the time the item is switched off the total time is recorded in hours. .1.5. The total Non-failure Operating Time column shall contain the total operating time (in hours) from the moment the test started till the latest switch-off. .1.6. The Reason for Switching the Item off column shall specify the reason for switching the item off. .2. Format, Rules and Procedure for Filling Out the Table to Track Failures and Damages .2.1. The table for tracking the failures and damages during the test is filled out by a person responsible for the test, its sample and recommended form are provided in Table .2. .2.2. The Date and Time of Failure (Damage) Detection column shall have the date and time for failure manifestation (day, month, year, hour, minutes), .2.3. The Time for Item Operation from the Moment of Switching it on before Failure (Damage) Column shall specify the time of item operation (in hours) from the moment of its scheduled switching off. .2.4. The Manifestation of the Failure and Terms under which the Failure (Damage) was Detected during Operation or Examination Column shall include the character of a failure (what was seen at the moment of a failure, what happened), and the conditions under which it was detected during a performance test or during scheduled functional testing. .2.5. The Recovery Time column shall cover the time (in hours and minutes) from the moment the failure was detected to the time the item was switched back on. .2.6. The Commissions Opinion on the Reasons of Failure (Damage) column shall have the opinion of a commission which analyzed the reasons of a failure. Based on the commissions findings the person responsible for the test shall prepare a report of findings in any form .2.7. The Measures Taken column shall specify what measures were taken to eliminate and prevent similar failures in the future. The data shall be entered based on the report of findings. .3. Sample of a filled out register:

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Register to Track the Time of Operation, Failures and Damages to Equipment Items during Testing (Format) Table .1 Tracking the time of equipment operation during testing
Date and Time Operation of Impacting Factors as a Set Items since (temperature, Switching on humidity) Inside Outside 24 , 15 65 % 80 % Total Nonfailure Operation Time Reason of Switching off the Item Name of a person responsible for the test

On 08.08.2005 17 Hrs 00 Min

Off

24.12.2005 12 h 00 m

3313 h 30 m

3313 h 30 m Further the time is given as total

Scheduled activities

A.S. Ivnov

Table .2 The table for tracking the failures and damages during the test
Date and Time of Failure (Damage) Detection Time for Item Operation from the Moment of Switching it on before Failure (Damage) 1,024h 30m. Manifestation of the Failure and Terms under which the Failure (Damage) was Detected during Operation or Examination Malfunction of internal timer during information exchange Recovery Time after Failure or Damage Commissions Measures Taken to eliminate and Opinion on the prevent similar Reasons of failures in the Failure future (Damage)

20.09.2005 13 h 00 m

3h

Software imperfection

Replacement of software. Creation of a pool of chips with software at the consumers quarters

Format, Rules and procedure for filling out the register for tracking the alarms B.1 The register to track down the alarms generated by the items shall be maintained by the person responsible for the test, with recommended form and sample of a filled out register attached in Table B.1. B.1.1 The Date and Time of Alarm column shall include the date and time of the alarm (day, month, year, hour, minutes).

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B.1.2 The Reason of the Alarm column shall specify the reason of the item alarm whether it was an authorized or unauthorized detection or a false alarm (reason unidentified) B.1.3 The Code of the Responding Item shall be used to record the ID number of the piece of equipment which responded to the event. B.1.4 Comment Column shall be filled as required if an operator decides that something should be further explained or clarified. Table B.1 Register for Tracking the Alarms
Date and Time of the Alarm 15.09.2005 . 13 h 55 m Reason of the Alarm ID Number of the Responding Item, its Serial Number Serial 141-01 Comment Name of the Operator on Duty I. Petrov

Attempt to transport through the guarded area

Trespasser detained

Reason unidentified 23.11.2005 . 03 h 10 m

Serial 008-00 False alarm I.P. Vetrov

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APPENDIX 2. The RADTAP Program (USA)

The main purpose is to evaluate the functional capabilities, sensitivity, and reliability of the existing industrial and pilot samples of the radiation control equipment. Evaluation of possible use of this equipment for the customs purposes Evaluated Equipment - Personal portable instruments (pagers, etc.) - The so-called manual (hand-held) instruments - Small portal systems - Spectrometers Methodology Initially, within the framework of the check tests, the minimum sensitivity was checked, as well as the sensitivity to the detection of a certain quantity of radioactive sources with the energy range 60 keV to 2.6 MeV. After the successful implementation of the check tests, each instrument was evaluated in view of the possible detection of gamma-radiation sources within the framework of the developed scenarios. The scenarios were developed taking into consideration the real-life conditions of the customs control implementation at different check points (vehicle check points, airport, cargo terminal, a conveyer belt with post packages). The user (operational) characteristics of the equipment were evaluated in parallel. 1. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 1.1. Check Tests 1.1.1. Checking the Minimum Sensitivity All the instruments (except the spectrometers) were checked for compliance with the requirements on the detection of the Cs-137 source (20 r/hour) at a standard distance. 1.1.2. Determination of Sensitivity to Sources with Different Energy (targeted reaction) Personal portable instruments and manual (hand-held) instruments were checked. The maximum distance for detection of various isotopes was defined. Source Am241 Co-57 Ba-133 Cs-137 Y-88 Th-232 I-131 LEU HEU Pu-239 (U-235, (U-235, 4.3%) 93%) 2.2 mC 590 C 63 C

Activity Distance

50 C 212 C 195 C 68.2 C

170 C 59,7 C

104,7 C

1.2. Evaluation of technical means of detection in the process of verification under real conditions of the customs control Scenarios Adapted to Real-Life Conditions of the Customs Control: 1. Vehicle Check Point - Passing-by inspection of automobile vehicles. With the use of personal portable and manual (hand-held) instruments, the detection and localization of sources hidden in a vehicle is performed. 65

Sources: Co-60, LEU (4.3%), I-131, Ga-67, Tb-160, Pu-239, Cs-137, HEU (93%) - Driving-by inspection of automobile vehicles (2-5 miles per hour). With the use of portal, manual and personal portable instruments the detection of sources is performed. The portal systems are installed on the motion line. The manual and personal portable instruments are located in the inspector place of location (a booth), which the automobile vehicles drive by. Sources: Co-60, LEU (4.3%), I-131, Ga-67, Tb-160, Pu-239, Cs-137, HEU (93%) 2. The Airport 2.1. The Airport (Passengers and Hand-Carried Baggage) With the use of portal, manual and personal portable instruments, the detection of sources carried in the passengers baggage is performed. Sources: I-131, Tl-201, Co-60, Tb-160, Am-241, Ga-67, Th-232, LEU (4.3%), Pu-239 2.2. The Airport (Unattended Baggage and Cargo Items) - With the use of portal, manual and personal portable instruments, the detection of sources, passing by the detectors along the conveyer belt, as a part of the passengers baggage or smallsized cargo items is performed. Sources: I-131, Tl-201, Co-60, Tb-160, Am-241, Ga-67, Th-232, LEU (4.3%), Pu-239 - Detection of sources contained in the cargo items (packages, containers, etc.), located at the customs cargo terminal, during passing-by along the territory. Use is made of manual and personal portable instruments. Sources: Co-57, LEU (4.3%) Evaluation Criterion: Detection/Failed Detection 1.3. Evaluation of spectrometers in the process of verification under real conditions of customs control Sources: LEU (4.3%), I-131, Co-60, Pu-239, Ga-67, Tb-160, Cs-137, HEU (93%), Th-232 The sources were located in different objects (baggage, a container, transportation vehicle). A situation was developed in the procedure when the spectrometer was used at the second stage of control (after the detection and localization of a source within the object). Evaluation Criterion: Identified/Failed Identification 2. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION Using a 5-grade scale, the following parameters were evaluated: Display - Readability of information - Readability under solar illumination - Information clarity Operating Characteristics - Easy to use - Mass and overall characteristics - Easy to replace power supply sources - Display of information about triggering 66

APPENDIX 3. Protocol for the evaluation of portable isotope identification instruments at Los Alamos National Laboratory on May 17-19, 2004
Representatives of the Russian delegation arrived at Los Alamos National Laboratory, LANL, on May 17, 2004. We met and discussed the testing procedure for the evaluation of the hand-held isotope identification instruments. An side-by-side evaluation of the ASPECT model MKC-A02-1M RIID, the ASPECT model MKC-A03-1 RIID, and the Polymaster model PM-1401KEKE RIID was performed at Technical Area 35 of Los Alamos National Laboratory on May 17-19, 2004. The evaluation procedure was designed to evaluate the search and identification capabilities of these detectors. For comparison purposes, the Bicron FieldSpec-N RIID was evaluated in the same manor. In this report, we will summarize:(i) the central characteristics of each detector, (ii) the results of the search tests, (iii) the results of the gamma isotope identification tests (with and without shielding), and (iv) the results of the multiple source tests. Also included in this report are general observations of "Human Interface" issues: ease of use, controls and display evaluations, etc. 1. Central Characteristics. The main components of each evaluated detector are summarized below. a. The ASPECT model MKC-A02-1M RIID is the older of the two ASPECT RIIDs that were evaluated. It contains a 3.4 cm dia X 4.7 cm long Nal gamma detector, and two 1.8 cm 14 y cm 8-atm Helium 3 detectors for neutron identification. b. The ASPECT model MKC-A03-1 RIID is the newer of the two ASPECT RIIDs that were evaluated. It contains a 4 cm dia X 4 cm long Nal gamma detector, three 1.5 cm X 14 cm 8-atm Helium 3 detectors for neutron identification, and a G-M tube for dose-rate measurements. c. The Polymaster PM-1401KEKE RIID contains two gamma detectors: a 2.5 cm dia. X 2.5 cm long CsI crystal (seeded with Csl37 for calibration purposes)with a photodiode, and a Silicon photodiode as a semiconductor detector. For neutron detection, one 1.5 cm dia. X 12.5 cm long 3He tube detector is used. d. The Bicron FieldSpec contains a 1" dia. X 2" long Nal detetctor (also seeded with Csl37), and a x" x y" N aim He-3 detector. 2. Search Mode However, it was determined prior to testing that many of the RIIDs would not be able to'successfully indicate the presence of a continuous moving source at this distance. Each detector was evaluated at an initial distance; if 5 or more unsuccessful trials were performed, the distance was reduced by 5cm and the trials repeated. This process was iterated until the detector could alarm on at least 16 of 20 consecutive trials. Initially, the plan was to only run this conveyer belt continuously, which would lead to the source passing in front of the detector every 3 seconds. A modification to the plan was agreed upon by all parties that, in addition to this procedure, additional tests were performed where the drive motor for the conveyor belt was manually switched on & off so that the source passed in front of the detector with a frequency of no more than once every 10 seconds. In the fast-moving or continuous mode it was very difficult to distinguish independent alarm signals. The ASPECT A03 exceeded the minimum performance requirements in both the fast and slow test modes. The Bicron Fieldspec met the performance criteria for 60Co in both fast and slow testing but failed for HEU and 137Cs. The ASPECT A02 passed in both modes of testing for 60Co and HEU but failed for 137Cs. The Polymaster

67

140 IKE met the minimum requirements for all source and testing procedures except the fast test for 137Cs where its performance was only slightly below the requirement. 3. Unshielded Isotope ID: All of the instruments failed to identify the unshielded reactor grade plutonium. The ASPECT A02 and A03 instruments identified all of the isotopes except Pu. The Polymaster 140 IKE could not identify Pu, 131Ba and 57Co; the CsIl detector-silicon diodes combination seems to have limitations at low energies. The Bicron Fieldspec identified all the isotopes except Pu but had several instances of identifying isotopes which were not present with a lower confidence level. 4. Shielded Isotope ID: The ASPECT A03 and the Bicron Fieldspec instrument were able to identify the shielded reactor grade Pu source as 239Pu when placed at approximately a 10 cm spacing. The other instruments could not. The ASPECT A03 met all of the other identification requirements for shielded sources. The ASPECT A02 met all the other requirements except for 232Th. The Bicron Fieldspec met all of other requirements. The PolyMaster 1401KEKE met all of the other requirements except for 57Co and 133Ba. It also had several instances of identifying isotopes which were not present. 5. Neutron detection: We extended the neutron detection testing to evaluate the detection of the 252Cf source(21K neutrons per second) at 25 cm, 40cm and 50 cm. The PolyMaster 140 IKE met the detection-criteria at 25 cm and 40 cm but not at 50 cm. The ASPECTA02 met the detection criteria at 25 cm, 40 cm, and 50 cm. The ASPECTA03 met the detection criteria at at 25 cm and 40 cm but not at 50 cm. The difference between the A02 and A03 is attributed to the A02 being set at a false alarm rate of 3 per hour and A03 being set at a false alarm rate of 1 per hour. The Bicron Fieldspec did not meet the criteria at 25 cm. 6. Multi-Source Isotope ID: The ASPECT A02 identified the 57Co and HEU combination correctly but could not identify 226Ra and 232Th in combination. The ASPECT A03 identified the 57Co and HEU combination correctly and the 226Ra and 232Th in combination correctly. The Bicron Fieldspec identified the 57Co and HEU combination correctly and the 226 Ra and 232Th in combination correctly. The PolyMaster 140 IKE identified the 226Ra and 232 Th combination correctly but could not identify 57Co and HEU combination 7. Human Interface: The controls and human interface components of the ASPECT A02 were rated v.-ry highly. The operators found it easy to use and the control and information displays were easy to understand. The ASPECT A03 was found to be further improved in this area. It had additional control and display features that made it even easier to use. The ergonomic improvements make this device considerably easier to handle. The Bicron Fieldspec was rate only fair in its control features but it is by far the easiest to handle. The display were simple but adequate. The operation was somewhat difficult because of discrepancies between the instrument and the manual. One feature which made it difficult was that the acquire time was not self adjusting. The PolyMaster 140 IKE requires experience in the operation of a PDA. For the reason its interface features were considered to be less obvious than the other instruments. The data displays are also less intuitive. Further more the PDA screen could not be viewed by more than one person at a time. This instrument would require more training to be use effectively. Conclusion: The overall performance of the ASPECT A03 instrument was equal to or better than any of the isotope identification instruments that have evaluated in the past. It met all of the testing requirements except the identification of unshielded reactor grade plutonium but we have 68

not tested any instruments that have reliably met this requirement We would recommend that this instrument be used for identification of the sources of radiation alarms in the Second Line of Defense Program. We would also recommend that a field performance acceptance procedure be developed.

69

Investigation of the Alternative Gamma-Spectropic Detectors for Quantitative Determination of Activity Isotopes "TYK" (Standard Shipping Containers)
S. Ulin, V. Dmitrenko, K. Vlasik, Z. Uteshev, N. Ivanova, A. Ischenko, R. Ibragimova Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (the State University) (MEPhI) N. Kravchenko, I. Bannyh, I. Chirkina, Y. Popkov, A. Korotkov State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation A. Dorin Green Star Company Abstract Description of the xenon gamma-ray detector and results of its main parameters investigations are presented. It is shown that the detector provides good energy resolution (2% for gamma-line 662 keV) and has average gamma-ray efficiency about 5% in the energy range 0,055000 keV. Higher sensitivity xenon gamma-ray detectors technique for nuclear and radioactive materials detection is considered. It is shown that using of variable scanning energy intervals for data processing gamma-ray spectrum increases xenon detectors sensitivity almost tenfold. Experimental tests of xenon gamma-ray detector sensitivity were carried out. It was shown that gamma-source with activity 75 kBq placed at a distance of about one meter was detected by a xenon detector for less than one second. This exposition is 78 times shorter in comparison with standard radioactive sources detecting methods. Test results of xenon gamma-ray detector installed in a portal monitor, which was developed at AllRussian Scientific Research Institute of Electro mechanics in 2005 for the purpose of comprehensive check-up of passengers and their luggage while passing through a checkpoint, are presented. It was determined that the gamma-ray source 226 Ra with activity about 50 kBq was detected at a distance of one meter in less then one second and exposure time for identification of this radioactive nuclide was only several seconds.

Using the xenon gamma-ray detector at customs terminal at the Domodedovo Airport is considered. It is confirmed that the gamma-detector can be efficiently applied in order to detect and identify radioactive materials and to control and investigate radio-nuclides in shipping containers as well. Prospects of xenon gamma-ray spectrometer development due to using thin-walled cylindrical ionization chambers with a composite cover are considered. In this case total mass of xenon detector can almost be halved, an energy range of measurement gamma-rays will be enlarged to the end of low energies and gamma-quanta scattering in the walls of working chamber will be essentially smaller. Results of gamma-ray spectrum processing by the software, where iterative methods of measurement spectrum reconstruction were used, are presented. It is shown that, in comparison with ordinary methods, iterative methods provide more detection efficiency of gamma-lines in measured spectra and raises nuclide identification reliability.

LIST OF EXECUTORS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. First name, last name Sergey Ulin Valery Dmitrenko Konstantin Vlasik Ziyaetdin Uteshev Nikolay Kravchenko Appointment held Professor Place of employment MEPhI

Head of scientific investigation MEPhI sector Senior Scientific Researcher Senior Scientific Researcher MEPhI MEPhI

Deputy Chief of department of State Custom Committee of RF Special Equipment and Automatization for Custom Technologies Head customs inspector Head customs inspector Head of customs department Deputy Head of customs department President Post graduate student Engineer Engineer State Custom Committee of RF State Customs Committee of RF Domodedovo Customs Domodedovo Customs Company Green Star MEPhI MEPhI MEPhI

6. 7. 8. 9.

Igor Bannyh Iraida Chirkina Yuri Popkov Andrey Korotkov

10. Andrey Dorin 11. Nadezhda Ivanova 12. Artyom Ischenko 13. Rumiya Ibragimova

CONTENTS Introduction.. 1. Preparation of test equipment..... 1.1. Brief description of xenon gamma-ray detector....... 1.2. Determination of main spectroscopic characteristics of xenon gamma-ray detector... 2. Operation of xenon gamma-ray detector in portal monitors... 2.1. Development of higher sensitivity xenon gamma-ray detectors technique for nuclear and radioactive materials detection and identification... 2.2. Experimental test of the technique developed..... 2.3. Description of the portal monitor -.. 2.4. Test results of xenon gamma-ray detector comprised in a portal monitor -..... 3. Test of xenon gamma-ray detector at customs terminal of the Domodedovo airport. 3.1. Measurement conditions.. 3.2. Detection and identification of nuclear and radioactive materials withdrawn from passengers. 3.3. Investigation of medical radioactive materials in shipping containers.. 4. Prospect of more perfected xenon gamma-ray spectrometers and software construction....... 4.1. Development of thin-walled xenon gamma-ray detectors . 4.2. Development of reconstruction technique for measured gamma-ray spectra. Conclusion... 5 6 6 7 10 10 12 13 15 16 16 17 19 21 21 22 25

Introduction At present the tasks of development and construction of spectroscopic portal monitors used for control of nuclear and radioactive materials transportation are becoming extremely relevant. These problems can be solved by means of gamma-ray spectrometers providing high efficiency and energy resolution. Application of this kind of equipment will permit detection and identification of radioactive materials as early as at the first stage of customs control which will appreciably simplify the task of competent decision-making on further transportation of passengers, their luggage, as well as various loads in shipping containers at their traversing customs terminals. Gamma-ray spectrometers based on xenon gamma-ray detectors (XeGD) are highly promising for being used as part of portal monitors equipment as well as for carrying out the usual customs control measurements. Main purpose of the third stage of Contract 12599 was to study the possibility of using the XeGDs developed at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (the State University) (MEPhI) for customs control of nuclear and radioactive materials transportation. General tasks of the third stage of Contract 12599 are as follows: equipment preparation for XeGD testing under real conditions of nuclear and radioactive materials customs control; development and experimental testing of effective nuclear and radioactive materials detecting technique by means of xenon gamma-ray spectrometer; testing of xenon gamma-ray spectrometer as part of portal monitor ; testing of xenon gamma-ray spectrometer at customs terminal at Domodedovo airport; development of recommendations for construction of new xenon gamma-ray spectrometer models, taking into consideration the experience and test results at Domodedovo customs; development of recommendations for new software development for the purpose of further improvement of spectroscopic data processing efficiency. Works implied by the Contract 12599 were carried out at Radiation Laboratory (MEPhI), Green Star company, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics (), and customs terminal at Domodedovo airport.

1. Preparation of test equipment 1.1. Brief description of xenon gamma-ray detector According to the work program of Contract 12599 XeGD was made ready at MEPhI. The gamma-detector (XeGD) is based on a cylindrical ionization chamber filled with compressed xenon and supplied with a shielding grid. The chamber operates in pulse mode. Its general arrangement and view of XeGD are given in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.

Fig. 1. General arrangement of XeGD. 1 charge sensitive amplifier; 2 valve; 3 high voltage power supply; 4 metal-ceramic feedthrough; 5 cylindrical ionization chamber; 6 anode; 7 shielding grid; 8 thermal insulation; 9 metal case.

Fig. 2. View of XeGD.

XeGD is connected to a personal computer (), where a board with shaping time amplifier and multi-channel analyzer is installed. Spectrometric information is collected and stored in PC and processed by means of special software, developed by Green Star company. XeGD shown in Fig. 2 has sensitive volume of two liters. General technical parameters of the detector are presented in Table 1. Table 1. Technical parameters of XeGD
Energy range of registered -quanta Xenon density Sensitive volume End and flank surface (area) Mass Dimensions Supply voltage Power consumption Warranty period 6 0,055 MeV 0,3 g/cm3 2000 cm3 100 cm2 200 cm2 5 kg diameter 120 mm, length 320 mm +24 V at most 15 W at least 10 years

1.2. Determination of main spectroscopic characteristics of xenon gamma-ray detector. Major task of preparing the equipment for the test was to check spectrometric characteristics of XeGD after its continuous service in the course of fulfillment the second stage of the Contract in 20032004. Besides, it was necessary to make calibration measurements with the use of standard set of radioactive sources. Diagram of spectrometric characte.ristics measurements and XeGD calibration is shown in Fig. 3.

Gammasource

XeGD

1 2 4

Lead housing

PS

220 V

Fig. 3. General arrangement of measurements and XeGD connection to power supply and PC. XeGD xenon gamma-detector, PC personal computer, PS power supply, 1 electric signal cable from XeGD, 2 24 V cable for the charge sensitive amplifier, 3 blocking signal cable, 4 24 V cable for high voltage signal.

The detectors working substance (Xe gas) purity check was carried out by means of the system for purification and preparation xenon-hydrogen mixture, which is installed at Radiation Laboratory of MEPhI. Gas control was fulfilled by testing small amounts of working substance from the detector. As a result of analysis of the portion of Xenon gas it was determined that its purity had not changed despite the fact that more than three years had elapsed since the moment of filling the detector with working substance. Life time of electrons in the gas taken from the detector at density of 0.3 g/cm3 was more than 5 s which corresponds to the value measured at initial filling of the newly made gamma-detector.

Linear characteristic of XeGD. Full absorption peak position versus registered gamma-quanta energy was obtained with the help of nine gamma-sources: 137Cs, 60Co, 57 , 22Na, 141Am, 54Mn, 139, 65Zn, and 113Sn. Typical spectra for 137 Cs and 133Ba gamma-sources measured with the XeGD are given in Figs 4 and 5.

14000 12000 10000 8000

50000

Cs-137 FWHM=15.15keV

Ba-133
40000

Counts

6000 4000

Counts

30000

20000

10000

2000 0
0

200

400

600

800

100

200

300

400

500

Energy, keV

Energy, keV

Fig. 4. Gamma-spectrum of 137Cs source (Eg = 662keV) measured by XeGD.

Fig. 5. Gamma-spectrum of 133 source (Eg = 80.9; 160.6; 223.1; 276.4; 302.9, 356.0; 393 keV) measured by XeGD.

Measurement results of xenon detectors linear characteristic are presented in Fig. 6. Deviation scope of gamma-peak positions from linear dependence was 2 evaluated by criterion , which was 0.18248 at twelve degrees of freedom. In other words, deviation scope from linear dependence of gamma-peak positions on gammaquanta energy was not more than 0.5%.
1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

E n e rg y , k e V

Fig. 6. Gamma-peak position versus gamma-ray energy.

Energy resolution measurement. To measure energy resolution (/) a set of standard gamma-sources was used. The results of measurements concerned are given in Fig. 7. As the gamma-quanta energy grows the detectors energy resolution gets better for gamma-lines 662 keV / 2%, and 1332 keV / 1.5% respectively.

Energy Resolution (%)

10

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

E, keV

Fig. 7. Curve of energy resolution versus gamma-quanta energy.

Registration efficiency. Efficiency of gamma-quanta registration by means of xenon detector was defined by gamma-peak area measurement for the gamma-sources from set. The distance between the detector and a gamma-source was 50 cm. Fig. 8 represents the results of the measurements.

10

Efficiency, %
1 0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Fig. 8. Gamma-quanta registration efficiency versus its energy.

Registration efficiency of the detector in the energy range from 50 keV up to 1.5 MeV does not exceed 12%, which corresponds to general requirements of the gamma-spectrometric equipment normally used for radionuclides control and identification. Xenon detectors efficiency is defined by operating substance (xenon) density. Basically, if there is a necessity to increase the detectors sensitivity it is sufficient to merely enlarge the mass of the operating substance in the detector. In this case main spectrometric properties of the detector will not practically change. There is a possibility for the detector to extend energy range of registered gamma-quanta into the region of low energies (up to 30 keV). This can be done by making the wall of the sensitive volume thinner, as thin as 1mm (normal thickness is 3 mm), as well as strengthening of the thin-walled case at the expense of composite synthetic fiber coating. Sensitivity of the xenon detector, especially for gamma-quanta of low energies, will also increase in this case. General result of the measurement is that spectroscopic characteristics of the XeGD have not practically changed since the time of manufacture in 2003.
9

2. Operation of xenon gamma-ray detector in portal monitors. 2.1. Development of higher sensitivity xenon gamma-ray detectors technique for nuclear and radioactive materials detection and identification. Conventional portal monitors usually use gamma-detectors based on plastic scintillates by means of which excess of registered gamma-quanta over natural background is defined. In fact, those detectors are used as simple counters of the registered particles. It is easy to show that lack of spectrometric capabilities of those detectors reduces their sensitivity of radioactive materials. Especially visibly this becomes apparent at registration of those radioactive materials whose gamma-radiation is close to background level. As a rule, weak gamma-sources, whose radiation does not exceed background statistical fluctuations (within the limits of 12 sigma), altogether cannot be detected by portal monitors in short (12 sec) measurement time. Application of high energy resolution gamma-spectrometers in portal monitors opens fundamentally new vistas for detection as well as identification of various gamma-sources while controlling radioactive materials transportation. Significant feature of spectrometric detectors is the fact that they permit analysis of specific peaks of gamma-quanta full absorption by measured spectra as well as comparing the number of corresponding gamma-quanta to background radiation within the energy range of measurements. As a criterion of sensitivity (x) of the spectrometric detector the ratio can be chosen between total number of registered gamma-quanta of a particular peak in the measured spectrum and background roof-mean-square deviation in the same energy range. If full absorption peak is described as Gaussian distribution, and background as exponent, then sensitivity (x) of the detector can be put down as:
E0 + x / 2 ( E E0 ) 2 2 E 2

K '( x) =

E0 x / 2

N0 2E 2
E0 + x / 2

dE

E e dE E0 x / 2

1 2

The integrals of the formula can not be calculated analytically, they can only be integrated by numerical methods. (x) values were obtained for various magnitudes of parameters energy range of integration and E full width of half maximum (FWHM) absorption peak. It was presumed that total magnitude of gamma-quanta in full absorption peak would not exceed the background value by 0.5 sigma in all of the energy range between 1001000 keV. Calculated results are shown in Figs 9 and 10.
10

0,8

Gauss Background Background+Gauss

14

0,6

12

10
0,4

K(x)

FWHM 14 keV 16 keV 20 keV 24 keV 28 keV 36 keV 46 keV

0,2

4
0,0 630

640

650

660

670

680

690

700

2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

E keV

x keV

Fig. 9. Gamma-quanta distributions in background Fig. 10. Gamma ray detector sensitivity versus and full adsorption peak. scanning intervals for several values of energy resolution.

Registered gamma-quanta distributions in full absorption peak (662 keV) and natural background that were used in calculations are shown in Fig. 9. In Fig. 10 one can see sensitivity (x) of the gamma-spectrometer versus the scanning interval at various values of FWHM of the peak concerned, i.e. energy resolution of the gamma-detector. It follows from Fig. 10: 1. The given functions have characteristic maximum at scanning interval values equal to energy resolution of the detector. 2. The higher energy resolution of the gamma-ray detector the higher its sensitivity to gamma-radiation. The calculations involved show that sensitivity of XeGD with energy resolution about 2% can be increased nearly tenfold as compared to simple count of registered events. This high sensitivity of XeGD is provided due to the method of scanning the measured spectrum by energy intervals that correspond to detectors energy resolution for particular value of registered gamma-quanta. The calculations in question are of demonstration character. They were carried out with the view of revealing advantages of spectrometric gamma-ray detectors over simple gamma-counters normally used for radioactive gamma-sources detection.

11

2.2. Experimental test of the technique developed In order to check the results of the calculations concerning evaluation of XeGD sensitivity to gamma-ray sources series of special measurements was conducted. As a gamma-ray source 137Cs (with activity of 75 kBq) was used. That was placed at various distances from a two-liter XeGD. Exposure time varied from 0.5 to some tens seconds. During the measurements minimal exposure time was defined when sensitivity of the XeGD (x) exceeded the background by three sigma. Measurement results are shown in Fig. 11.
10

1000 keV 100 keV 20 keV

Time, sec

25

50

75

100

125

150

X, cm

Fig. 11. Minimal exposure time of gamma-ray source detection versus distance between the gamma-ray detector and a gamma-ray source for various scanning intervals.

It can be seen from the figure that sensitivity of XeGD to the gamma-ray source increases with the decrease of scanning intervals width. The best sensitivity of XeGD is achieved at scanning intervals close by value to energy resolution of the XeGD. At short distances between the gamma-ray source and XeGD the measured curves come nearer to one another since in this case intensity of gamma-radiation flux entering the working volume of the detector increases drastically. At moving the source away from the XeGD the curves in Fig. 11 noticeably diverge. At a distance about 75 cm, at processing the data by scanning intervals procedure (the scanning interval is equal to 15 keV), time of gamma-ray source detection was 7 times shorter than at spectrum processing by simple counting of registered gamma-quanta (counting mode of a conventional counter). The measurement conducted confirms the earlier computations and shows the possibility of XeGD sensitivity extension owing to application of scanning intervals procedure while analyzing the measured gamma-spectra.

12

2.3. Description of the portal monitor - A pedestrian portal monitor - was developed at All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics () in 2005 for the purpose of many-sided check-up of passengers and their luggage at passing through a checkpoint. A passenger will have to walk inside the portal to have measurement taken. Gross time of the procedure will not exceed ten seconds. Duration of time exposure in the portal will be determined above all by the procedure of vocal diagnostics of the passengers as well as the technique of drugs and explosives detection. By means of portal monitor it is planned to identify passengers and to detect various metal, explosive, narcotic, and radioactive substances. The portal includes following equipment: Digital camera; Vocal analyzer; Metal finder; Infrared imager; Device for detection of narcotic and explosive materials (with forced aircirculation system); Xenon gamma-ray spectrometer. Photos of the portal monitor - XeGD are shown in Fig. 12.

Fig 12. Portal monitor - XeGD aimed for radioactive materials detection and identification.

13

Measuring equipment is located on the top of portal monitor except for infrared imager and digital camera which are installed at a height of about 1.5 meters for getting better images of a passenger under examination. As a multichanal analyzer of the XeGD plate SBS-75 developed by Green Star company was used. Software for this plate was also developed by that company. To operate the XeGD special software was developed by MEPhI employees which was included in the software bundle of the portal monitor. Portal monitor in the course of assembling and tuning is shown in Fig. 13.

FIg. 13. XeGD adjustment and demonstration test of portal monitor -.

14

2.4. Test results of xenon gamma-ray detector comprised in a portal monitor - During the test an operator carrying a plastic bag with a gamma-ray source (226Ra with activity about 50 kBq) (Fig. 10) walked into the portal. The gamma-ray source was being detected for one second, practically at the moment of approaching the portal monitor at a distance of about two meters. This can be accounted for the fact that lead screening of the gamma-ray spectrometer for lessening the viewing angle had not yet been provided for. The measurement taken showed that the XeGD had effectively detected the 226Ra source with activity of 50 kBq at a two-meter distance during the exposure time of one second. The result obtained fully meets the requirements set for modern portal monitors using conventional plastic scintillators for these purposes. Besides radioactive source detecting its identification was simultaneously accomplished. It took several seconds to obtain a spectrum having necessary statistics. Spectrum of gamma-ray source 226Ra (50 kBq) measured by XeGD during five seconds is shown in Fig. 14.
1 0 0
2 2 6
2 9 5
(1 9 ,3 % )

R a

(1 6 0 0

y e a rs )

3 5 1

(3 7 ,6 % )

1 0

6 0 9

(4 6 ,1 % )

Counts, 1/sec

7 6 8

(4 ,9 % )

1 1 2 0

( 1 5 ,1 % )

1 2 3 8

(5 ,8 % )

1 3 7 7

(4 % )

1 7 6 4

(1 5 ,4 % )

0 ,1

2 0 0

4 0 0

6 0 0

8 0 0

1 0 0 0

1 2 0 0

1 4 0 0

1 6 0 0

1 8 0 0

2 0 0 0

E n e rg y , k e V

. 14. Gamma-ray 226Ra source (50 kBq) spectrum measured by XeGD.

Identification of gamma-ray source 226Ra was carried out by means of software that was developed by Green star company to solve the tasks of customs control. Thus, the test results have shown that XeGD can be used in portal monitor for detection and identification of gamma-sources. It should be noted that in these measurements XeGD had comparably small volume (2 liters), nevertheless its sensitivity was quite sufficient for effective work of the portal monitor. Of necessity sensitivity of XeGD can be essentially increased by means of making working volume bigger.

15

3. Test of xenon gamma-ray detector at customs terminal of the Domodedovo Airport 3.1. Measurement conditions Tests of XeGD were carried out at customs radiation control zone of Domodedovo airport (Fig. 15) in a special room (Fig. 16) equipped with everything necessary for making measurements of this kind (laboratory tables, light, electricity etc). The XeGD and a personal computer were delivered from MEPhI to Domodedovo airport. All measuring equipment was installed on a laboratory table (Fig. 16). Radioactive materials destined for investigation in shipping containers or without them were also placed on the table if their activity was not too strong. Powerful gamma-ray sources were placed in a special cart for the time of measurement with the aide of which they could be moved from the XeGD at a distance of 25 meters to provide acceptable load of the detector.

Fig. 15. Domodedovo airport.

Fig. 16. Customs radiation control zone. 16

3.2. Detection and identification of nuclear and radioactive materials withdrawn from passengers To investigate the possibility of using XeGD at the customs terminal of Domodedovo airport gamma-active samples were examined. They had been detected and then withdrawn from passengers who had passed through portal monitors of Aspect company that have already been working at the airport for several years. Major task of the measurements was to clarify the question whether the XeGD involved had sufficient sensitivity for detection and identification of the gamma-ray sources made mention of. Several objects withdrawn from passengers and their corresponding gamma-ray spectra measured by XeGD at a distance of one meter are shown in Figs 1720.

10

295 (19,3%) 351 (37,6%) 609 (46,1%)

226

Ra (1600 years)

Counts, 1/sec

768 (4,9%) 1120 (15,1%) 1238 (5,8%) 1377 (4%)

0,1

1764 (15,4%)

0,01 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Energy, keV

Fig. 17. A clock.

100
226
295 (19,3%) 351 (37,6%)

Ra (1600 years)

10

609 (46,1%)

Counts, 1/sec

768 (4,9%)

1120 (15,1%) 1238 (5,8%) 1377 (4%) 1764 (15,4%)

0,1

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Energy, keV

Fig. 18. An altimeter.

17

238 (43,3% )

232

10

Th (1,4*10

10

years)

583 (84,5% )

Counts, 1/sec

510 (22,6% ) 727 (10,3% ) 911 968 2614 - 1022 (100% )

0,1

0,01 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

E n erg y, k eV

Fig. 19. Grids for gas-rings.

238 (43,3%)

232

Th (1,4*10

10

years)

10
583 (84,5%) 510 (22,6%)

Counts, 1/sec

727 (10,3%)

911 968 2614 - 1022 (100%)

0,1

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

Energy, keV

Fig. 20. Camera lens.

Objects introduced in Figs 1720 contain various radio nuclides, mainly 226Ra and 232Th. To define minimal duration of detecting these gamma-ray sources additional measurements were taken. As a result of measurements it was revealed that it had taken less than one second for the XeGD to detect them at a distance of one meter, though the activity of each gamma-ray source did not exceed 50 kBq. It is worth mentioning that the duration of these objects detection is not longer than the time exposure estimated for portal monitors made by Aspect company currently functioning at Domodedovo airport. At the instance of customs control officers gamma-ray spectra of the samples mentioned above were measured within 25 minutes. The spectra are shown in Figs 1720. Based on these spectra 226Ra and 232Th radioactive nuclides were identified in the objects under study. It is significant that spectra obtained by means of XeGD in several seconds are sufficient for radioactive nuclides identification. Thus, the results of the research surely show the possibility of XeGD effective application in customs control portal monitors.

18

3.3. Investigation of medical radioactive materials in shipping containers At the radiation customs terminal of Domodedovo airport investigation of possibility of XeGD application for detection and identification of various radioactive sources placed in shipping containers were also carried out. For this purpose radioactive sources assigned for medical application were used. More than twenty containers were examined, and only a small fraction of the measurements is submitted in this report. Apart from radioactive materials detection and identification the investigation in question was also to reveal probable presence of any other additional radioactive sources not included in declaration accompanying forms. Spectrum shown in Fig. 21 was measured within three minutes from a load destined for a town in Russian Federation.
12
131

I (8 days)

10

Counts, 1/sec

364 (100%)

6
284 (7,6%)

4
636 (9,1%) 722 (2,3%)

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Fig. 21. Medical radioactive isotope

Energy, keV 131

I spectrum measured with XeGD.

At analyzing the results of measurements it was established that the load was 131I radioactive nuclide (with activity 203 5 Bq). Metal protecting container underneath packing was absent. Accompanying forms confirmed that the load concerned was in fact a medication 131I with activity of 200 Bq placed in cardboard boxes without additional lead protection. Presence of any other supplementary radioactive isotopes was not revealed. Measurement was taken at a distance of 2.5 m because of high activity of the load.

19

Similar measurement was taken from another load placed in a special container. A photo of it as well as measured gamma-spectrum are shown I Fig. 22.

140 (100%)

99

100
740 (13,7%)

Mo (69 hours)

Counts, 1/sec

10

778 (4,9%)

0,1

0,01 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Energy, keV

Fig. 22. Shipping container and measured gamma-ray spectrum of its gamma-radiation.

Measurement presented in Fig. 22 was taken for three minutes with a distance of three meters between the XeGD and container. At this distance measuring equipment dead time did nit exceed 10%. In the course of analysis of the spectrum measured it was established that the load 99 was Mo with activity of (405 10) kBq, which actually was parent radioisotope for 99* Tc. Thus technetium generator widely in use in medical applications was found in the container. It was also revealed that the container had lead protection 2 cm thick. Presence of other supplementary radioactive nuclides was not revealed. The results of measurement of that load were in good agreement with accompanying forms. The results in question of various radioactive loads investigations have shown that XeGD can be effectively used for detection and identification of loads alike. At the same time it should be pointed out that during the use of XeGD under real conditions of customs terminal no problems concerning its functioning occurred. As for XeGD reliability and time stability check, it was made and confirmed at the Second Stage of the Contract.

20

4. Prospect of more perfected xenon gamma-ray spectrometers and software construction 4.1. Development of thin-walled xenon gamma-ray detectors XeGD development prospects are determined first of all by perfection of their manufacturing technology and application of new methods for making thin-walled and ultrastrong vessels assigned for working substance of these detectors. At present this kind of work is under way. A pre-production model of XeGD having a thin-walled vessel with composite covering which provides its high strength and reliability has been made. As a result safety of these devices should get better, efficiency should increase and energy range should widen towards especially low gamma-ray energy. However the main result is that the total mass of XeGD becomes three times as less. A photo of the pre-production model of the XeGD having a thin-walled vessel with composite covering is shown in Fig. 20. As a result of testing of the two-liter XeGD with composite covering, it was shown that it can withstand inner pressure of more than 400 atm without residual deformation of the vessel. It should be noted that working pressure inside the detector is not more then 45 atm. As it was mentioned above safety and reliability of high level are required for wide use of XeGD. Application of new technologies, namely covering of vessels by composite materials based on ultrastrong synthetic fibers provides high operational characteristics of these detectors.
Fig .23. XeGD thin-walled vessel with composite coverage.

Currently, there are other methods of production ultrastrong thin-walled vessels. For example, using ultrastrong sorts of steel for making the vessel for XeGD can in principle decrease its wall thickness from 3 mm to 0.5 mm. However, using of this kind of steel will essentially increase the cost of XeGD. Regardless of the XeGD design it is necessary to provide for a safety valve on the vessel for the case if any outside extraordinary impacts occur. For the final choice of the thin-walled vessel production technique, it is important to carry out additional investigations which will clarify the optimal solution to this question.

21

4.2. Development of reconstruction technique for measured gamma-ray spectra Along with the improvement of XeGD design, development of new data processing methods is also very important for effective application of this kind of equipment. Currently, work on development of new software permitting reconstruction of gamma-spectra measured by XeGD has been started at Radiation laboratory MEPhI. General algorithms to solve tasks of this kind are well known. However to realize these algorithms availability of good software as well as fast personal computers is essential. The latter has only recently become possible when high clock frequency personal computers came into being. The gamma-ray spectra measured can be described by the Fredholm integral equation.

K ( x, y) Z ( y)dy = f ( x) , 0
where: Z(y) incident gamma-radiation spectrum; (x,y) core of the integral equation, i.e. instrument functions aggregate; f(x) gamma-ray spectrum measured by XeGD. and y gamma-ray energy in our case. The task of solving this integral equation is to find a function Z(y). As is well known, problems of this kind are ill-conditioned ones. Special iteration methods are used to solve them. Various stabilizing functionals are usually applied to search for stable solutions. In this particular case the integral equation can be presented as a matrix equation:

n a1n x n =1 ... n a in x n =1

= C

aik 0

i 0

= C

i =1

aik = 1

i =1

i = 1

Coefficients of this matrix are determined by calibration measurements and their further approximation for all the energy range of registered gamma-rays. The matrix dimension can be more then 20002000. Matrix equations like these are usually solved by iteration methods. In Fig. 23 first results of the matrix equation solution with the use of full set of instrument functions of the XeGD are presented. For convenience the gamma-ray spectra measured by XeGD are shown on the lefthand pictures and the reconstruction gamma-ray spectra (results of calculations) on the right-hand ones.
22

8000

137
7000 6000 5000

Cs

6000000

5000000

4000 3000

Counts

4000000

3000000

2000000
2000 1000 0

1 iteration 5 iteration 10 iteration 15 iteration 20 iteration 25 iteration 40 iteration 45 iteration 50 iteration

Counts

1000000

0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300

Energy, keV

Energy, keV

12000 11000 10000 9000 8000

3000000

133

Ba
Counts

2500000

Counts

2000000

1 iteration 10 iteration 30 iteration 50 iteration

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450

1500000

1000000

500000

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Energy, keV

Energy, keV

15000000

20000

22

Na

12000000

15000

1 iteration 10 iteration 40 iteration

10000

Counts

9000000

6000000

5000

3000000

0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Energy, keV

Energy, keV

Fig. 24. Measured and reconstructed gamma-ray spectra of 137Cs, 133Ba 22Na gamma sources.

23

From these pictures it is clear that the radioactive source main gamma-lines in the reconstructed spectra are shown more distinctly. It may be noted, that after several iterations only real gamma-lines are left in the reconstructed gamma-spectra and Compton substrate practically disappears. This circumstance essentially simplifies the procedure of radionuclide identification in many cases. A very important peculiarity of the software package being developed is the fact that in the course of spectra reconstruction one manages as if to improve energy resolution of the gamma-ray detector. As a result it is possible to detect gamma-lines if a distance between them is smaller than energy resolution of the gamma-detector. The results of calculations made look very promising. In this connection it is seems very important to continue the development of the software involved. This concerns, first of all, increasing of a spectrum reconstruction speed as well as more precise description of the XeGD instrument functions, and connection of this software to the standard data processing software. It is also necessary to carry out the developed software comparative research together with the other ones which do not use spectrum reconstruction algorithms dosent used.

24

Conclusion In the process of fulfilment of the Contract # 12599 the possibility of XeGD application for nuclear and radioactive materials traffic control was studied and following results were obtained: 1. General spectroscopic characteristics of XeGD were measured and it was shown that they had not practically changed since the time of manufacture (2003). In particular, the energy resolution for gamma-lines 662 keV remained the same (about 2%). 2. The method of increasing the XEGD sensitivity to gamma-ray sources was developed. It was shown that its sensitivity can be extended almost tenfold if the energy scanning interval is chosen correctly for analysis of gamma-ray spectrum both experimentally and theoretically. 3. Tests of the two-liter XeGD installed in the portal monitor - were carried out. Results of these tests showed that the gamma-ray source 226Ra with activity about 50 kBq was detected at a distance of one meter in less then 1 second and exposure time for identification of this radioactive nuclide was only several seconds. 4. Tests of the two-liter XeGD were carried out in real conditions of customs radioactive control terminal at Domodedovo airport. As result of testing it was determined that the xenon gamma-ray spectrometer can be effectively used both for detection and identification of radioactive materials placed in shipping containers and outside them. 5. General directions of XeGDs development for their further applications as well as for heightening the safety of their use. A first pre-production model of XeGD thinwalled vessel of higher strength was made. The vessel withstands inner pressure of more than 400 atm., though working pressure is at least ten times smaller. The total mass of the XeGD with a thin-walled vessel will decrease to one third. 6. First test results of software developed at MEPhI for reconstruction of gammaray spectra were obtained. It was shown that by means of this software it is possible to essentially simplify the process of radioactive materials identification. Summing up the results of Contract # 12599 fulfillment, it is necessary to note that further development of xenon gamma-ray spectrometers will promote creating the spectroscopic portal monitors which are very important for the progress of qualified radioactive materials traffic control. Including xenon gamma-ray spectrometers in the portal monitors will undoubtedly be of aide for solving the tasks of radioactive nuclides detection and identification as early as at the first stage of control. As follows from the report first steps in this direction have already been made. New models of XeGDs can become regular equipment for various radioactive materials traffic control checkpoints and above all at customs terminals.

25

Taking into account the results obtained in the course of fulfillment Contract 12599 general directions of further work connected with the development of XeGD for radioactive materials traffic control (detection and identification) passing customs terminals can be formulated. 1. Development of an improved XeGD design due to the use of a new technology producing thin-walled and ultrastrong vessels for working substance. 2. Development of new XeGD samples to be used in pedestrian and other types of portal monitors. 3. Development of new techniques for spectroscopic information processing to increase the efficiency of radionuclide detection and identification. 4. Caring out tests of new types of xenon gamma-ray spectrometers and developed special software application packages in real conditions of the traffic radionuclide control. In conclusion participants of Contract 12599 would like to express deep gratitude to the employees of IAEA for their cooperation in the Contract realization.

26

Using Associated Particle Technique (APT) for the Detection of Shielded Nuclear Materials
A.V. Kuznetsov, D. Vakhtin V.G.Khlopin Radium Institute, St.Petersburg, Russia Abstract One of the weak points of all existing instruments used to detect and characterize radioactive materials, including fixed automated portals, is their inability to detect fissioning materials that are shielded by substances that absorb their spontaneous gamma and neutron radiation. While spontaneous radiation emitted by some of the most dangerous fissioning materials cannot be used for their detection and identification, these materials can still be detected by the so-called active methods. These methods use external radiation to induce fission reactions within the irradiated volume and then measure such products of these reactions as neutrons and high-energy -rays, which have a very high penetrating ability and can penetrate thick layers of shielding material. The main goal of the Project was to apply active methods to the detection of shielded fissioning materials. The following summarizes the work performed: 1. Three neutron detectors were made on the basis of fast plastic scintillator and a photo multiplier. These detectors used measurement channels of the data acquisition system, which was been built specially for experiments with the neutron generator. 2. Experiments with an APT neutron generator, one neutron detector, and depleted U sample were carried out. 3. First experiments with shielded and unshielded uranium samples were carried out. 4. Full mathematical model of the experimental setup was created on the basis of MCNP5 Monte-Carlo code. It was concluded that the characteristics of the created detectors and electronics are adequate for the task of using them in a system for detection of shielded nuclear materials. Additional experimental work using three neutrons detectors for detection of triple (n-n-) and quadruple (n-n-n-) coincidences between neutrons from induced fission of shielded fissioning materials is currently under way.

1. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH CARRIED OUT

The first year of the Project was devoted to refining the Associated Particle Technique (APT) and assessing its applicability to detection of shielded nuclear materials. The main idea of the proposed active detection method is to irradiate the inspected volume with 14 MeV neutrons from a miniature DT neutron generator with built-in detector of associated particles, and to detect fission neutrons and rays in coincidence with particles, that accompany emission of primary neutrons in the d+t n+ reaction. Detection of associated particles allows one to determine emission time and flight direction of each primary 14 MeV neutron. Measurement of secondary particles (neutrons and rays originating from induced fission of nuclear materials) in coincidences with these tagged neutrons in very narrow (tens of nanoseconds) time windows allows one to suppress the background, which is associated with primary 14 MeV neutrons and their (n,2n) and (n,) reactions on surrounding materials [1]. The following activities planned for the first year of the Project have been carried out. 1. 2. Applying neutron generators for detection of shielded fissioning materials: investigation of the required intensity of the primary flux of 14MeV neutron; estimation of the size of the beam spot on the target, which influences the spatial resolution of the device; ensuring close to 100% intrinsic efficiency of the detector and low noise levels; tuning fast electronics to get sub-nanosecond time resolution and fast determination of the number of the detector that was hit by an particle; determination of the dose of radiation and measures to fulfill the radiation safety rules. Mathematical modeling of the detection process: tuning the MCNP4C2 code to describe the geometry of the measurements using available types of detectors; estimating count rates of neutron and ray detectors; formulating recommendations for the measurement channel of the device.

The second year of the Project was devoted to creation of the neutron detection channel and conducting first test experiments with real samples of fissioning materials. At the first stage three neutron detectors have been made on the basis of fast plastic scintillator and a photo multiplier. These detectors use measurement channels of the data acquisition system, which has been built specially for experiments with neutron generator. This data acquisition system can handle extremely high counting rates in both neutron channel and tagging particle channel. First experiments with the whole system have been conducted. The third year of the Project was devoted to experimental detection of real fissioning materials in different shielding conditions.

2. RESULTS OBTAINED
2.1. 2.1.1. Applying neutron generators for detection of shielded fissioning materials Investigation of the required intensity of the primary flux of 14MeV neutron

The optimal intensity of the primary flux of 14 MeV neutrons is chosen as a result of a compromise between the following requirements: 1. The higher is the neutron flux, the shorter is the lifetime of the vacuum neutron tube of the neutron generator. Lifetime of portable APT neutron generators depends for the most part on the stability of the target. Existing prototype APT NG, working at intensities up to 108 n/s into 4, have typical lifetime of about 1000 hours. With typical time needed for one inspection about 1 minute, this lifetime is equivalent to more that 50,000 inspection cycles before the change of the vacuum tube of the neutron generator is needed. 2. The associated alpha-particle detector, that is built into the neutron generator, should be capable of detecting all the incident alpha-particles. The nine-segment semiconductor detector of associated alpha-particles and associated fast electronics produced by APSTEC Ltd., Russia, (see Figure 2-1) have been shown to work at count rates up to 107 n/s and more. The fast pre-amplifier coupled to the detector produces 20 ns-wide pulses with amplitude about 80 mV, which are transformed into logical levels and are fed into the programmable logic microchip, which produces time reference signal for use in coincidence measurements, as well as the coded number of the hit segment of the detector.

Figure 2-1. Left: nine-segment detector of associated alpha-particles. Right: fast electronics. 3. The counting rate of neutron detectors coming from the primary neutrons should not be too high not to produce too many false coincidences. The typical signal length from fast scintillator-based detectors is of the order of 100 ns or less. Thus, in order to have the accidental coincidence count rate under 1%, the count rate of each of the two neutron detectors should be kept below 105 counts per second. 4. The time needed for detection of shielded fissioning materials is inverse proportional to the intensity of the neutron generator. On the basis of the above considerations, the optimal intensity of the APT neutron generator was estimated to be between 107 n/s and 108 n/s.

2.1.2.

Estimation of the size of the beam spot on the target, which influences the spatial resolution of the device

The size of the deuteron beam spot on the target of the APT neutron generator influences the position resolution of the device. Existing nine-segment alpha-detector is a 33 matrix of 1 cm1 cm semiconductor detectors located at 6 cm from the target of the NG. If the deuteron beam spot on the target were point-like, the in-plane position resolution of the device at 60 cm from the target would be 10 cm10 cm the size of the area corresponding to each segment of the alpha-detector. However, a point-like beam spot would lead to a fast burn-out of the target, and would reduce the lifetime of the neutron tube.

Coincidence count rate [arb. units]

60 50 40 30 20 10 center of area

experiment Monte-Carlo simulation: point-like target spot diameter = 2 mm spot diameter = 4 mm

~10% of neutrons fall into adjacent areas

half area size: 5 cm

X coordinate [cm]

Figure 2-2. Experimental determination of the deuteron beam spot size on the target. The beam spot size was experimentally measured using coincidences between alpha-particles measured by the central segment of the 33 associated particle detector and corresponding neutrons. Neutrons were detected by a 1 cm1 cm p-i-n diode covered with a polyethylene converter foil and located at 60 cm from the NG target. The diode was moved with 1 cm step, and coincidence count rate between it and the associated-particle detector was measured for each position (Figure 2-2). Experimental curve was compared to Monte-Carlo calculations, that took into account real geometry, beam profile and reaction kinematics. Comparison shows that the diameter of the beam spot on the target is about 4 mm, which translates into about 10% of neutrons that coincide with alpha-particles detected in the central segment of the alpha-detector missing the corresponding area at 60 cm distance from the target. Such neutron beam defocusing ratio is totally acceptable, and the beam spot diameter 4 mm is also big enough not to burn the target too quickly. The beam spot diameter of 4 mm will be the target for all future APT NG prototypes.

2.1.3.

Ensuring close to 100% intrinsic efficiency of the alpha-detector and low noise levels

The detector of associated alpha-particles that is built into an APT neutron generator should have close to 100% intrinsic efficiency of detection of ~3.5 MeV alpha-particles. The detector should also remain operational for the whole lifetime of the vacuum neutron tube, during which it should detect about 1012 alpha-particles per cm2. The nine-segment alpha-detector was tested using a large NG-400 neutron generator at Radium Institute. The total number of incident alpha-particles was 1013, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the detector was still acceptable after such irradiation. Dependence of the count rate of the central segment of the 33 alpha-detector on the detection threshold is shown at Figure 2-3.

25000

Count rate [s ]

-1

20000

15000

10000

5000

NG intensity: 1.12 x 10 n/s

-90

-80

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

Threshold [mV]
Figure 2-3. Dependence of the alpha-particle count rate on the threshold. Presence of the horizontal region between -20 mV and -70 mV indicate, that all the signals from incident alphaparticles are correctly processed by the fast electronics, and the detector has close to 100% efficiency to alphaparticles from d+t n+ reaction.

2.1.4.

Tuning fast electronics to get sub-nanosecond time resolution and fast determination of the number of the detector that was hit by an alpha-particle

The first set of fast electronics for servicing the nine-segment detector of associated alpha-particles, produced by APSTEC Ltd., Russia, has been tested (see right part of Figure 2-1). It contains fast pre-amplifiers and low-level discriminators for each of the nine channels, a programmable logic microchip for formation of the timing signal and on-line determination of the number of hit segment, and an RS-485 interface with a controlling PC. Thresholds can be adjusted for each channel independently using an on-board multi-channel DAC. The dead time of the electronics depends only on the signal width, and is typically about 20 ns. The internal delay of the electronics is 3.5 ns. The fast electronics was installed on a prototype APT neutron generator with built-in nine-segment detector of associated alpha-particles. Example of signals after pre-amplifier from all nine segments of the 33 alpha-detector is shown at Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-4. Left: signals after pre-amplifier (top) and logical signals (bottom) from nine 1 cm1 cm segments of semiconductor alpha-detector. Right: noise after pre-amplifier. The rise time of the analogue signal from any segment of the alpha-detector is about 5 ns, which ensures subnanosecond time resolution of the detector.

2.1.5.

Determination of the dose of radiation and measures to fulfill the radiation safety rules

The dose, which the operator working with the neutron generator would receive within a year, was calculated with the assumption of 36 hour-long working week and 50 working weeks per year. Examples of MCNP5 dose calculations for a neutron generator with intensity 5107 n/s are presented on Figure 2-5. When no additional shielding is used, the operator should be at distances about 10 meters from the working neutron generator. By using appropriate shielding one can reduce the safe distance down to the dimensions of the device. It must be noted, however, that the relevance of these calculations to real work with the device strongly depends on the measurement scenario. The inspection cycle of the planned portable device for detection of shielded nuclear materials (more precisely, the time during which the NG will be switched on) is expected to be about 1 minute, during which the dose received by the operator will be much less than the allowed values. However, if the device is used as a stationary constantly-working installation, then the above estimations are correct, and measure should be taken to ensure the compliance with the existing safety standards. Experimental dose measurements, as well as studies of the role of residual activation of the device components will be carried out during the third year of the Project, when the detection device is fully assembled.

10

Dose per year [mSv]

no shielding 20 cm of concrete 20 cm of concrete + 0.5 cm of cadmium 40 cm of water

10

safe for operator

10
1

10

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Distance from working neutron generator [meters]

Figure 2-5. Dependence of the dose on distance from the working neutron generator (36 hour-long working week, 50 working weeks per year).

2.2. 2.2.1.

Mathematical modelling of the detection process Tuning the MCNP4C2 code to describe the geometry of the measurements using available types of detectors

In order to select the measurement methodology, mathematical modeling of experiments with neutron generator were carried out for different types of neutron and gamma-ray detectors, using MCNP4C2 code [2]. Investigated materials highly enriched uranium (HEU), weapon-grade uranium (WU), reactor plutonium (RPu), weapongrade plutonium (WPu) and natural lead (Pb) were assumed to have spherical shapes (diameters 4.62 cm, masses about 1 kg, 0.58 kg for lead).

The isotopic composition of the samples (see Table 1) was taken from (http://nuclear-weapons.nm.ru/theory). Isotope content (%)
235

Isotope content (%)

238

U WPu RPu

239

240

WU HEU

94 20

6 80

93 80

6 17

Table 1. Isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium samples used in calculations. Calculations were carried out for two cases: when the sample was surrounded by 5 cm-thick lead shielding, and without any shielding (Figure 2-62.6). In both cases samples were located at 30 cm from the isotropic source of 14 MeV neutrons with intensity 108 n/s into 4. Two (or three) neutron detectors had dimensions 66 cm and were located at distances of 15 cm on both sides of the sample.

Neutron source

Neutron source

Pb cube 15 cm

30 c m

10 cm 15 cm

15 cm

Sample

S ple am S tilben detec tor 6 x 6 cm

Stilben detec tor 6 x 6 cm

Figure 2-6. Model geometry without lead shielding (left) and with lead shielding (right). As a result of calculations for two geometries shown at Figure 2-6, the following characteristics were obtained: 1. 2. number of neutrons and gamma-rays forming as a result of spontaneous and induced fission in each sample and then reaching the surface of the sample (see Table 2); number of neutrons per second: a. b. c. d. e. primary 14 MeV neutrons incident on the sample; going through the sample without interaction; leaving the sample without causing secondary neutrons; causing (n,2n) reactions; causing fission;

30 cm

3. 4.

number of fission neutrons leaving the sample per one incident neutron; average multiplicity of secondary neutrons in events, when an incident neutron has caused fission. WU Neutrons from induced fission Neutrons from spontaneous fission 2.110
5

HEU 1.410
5

WPu 3.310
5

RPu 3.2105 3.3105

1.2105

Table 2. Number of neutrons from spontaneous and induced fission leaving the sample for the case without lead shielding. In the same calculations the background due to accidental coincidences and detector cross-talk were calculated for different neutron detection thresholds and neutron and gamma-ray detection efficiencies.

2.2.2.

Estimating count rates of neutron and gamma-ray detectors

The method based on detection of coincidences between fission neutrons [3] was selected for detection of shielded fissioning materials. The main idea of the traditional method, as well as its proposed APT modification, is listed below. Traditional method: no APT. The inspected volume is irradiated with fast neutrons. The first neutron (or gamma-quantum) detected in one of the detectors opens the window for detection in another detector. The width of this window is determined by the measurement geometry; in geometries shown at Figure 2-6 this window is 3040 ns wide. Detection of coincidences in narrow time windows allows one to reduce the background associated with the primary neutron beam from the neutron generator. Calculated number of coincidences within 40 ns time window caused by neutrons from induced fission in 1 kg sample of weapon-grade uranium is 9 s-1, which is few compared to accidental coincidences between primary neutrons and neutrons, scattered on the lead shielding: 200 s-1. Apart from that, calculation show that 20 kg of lead would produce the same effect due to (n,2n) reactions on lead. Thus, existing active method based on double neutron-neutron coincidences can not detect uranium shielded with large amounts of lead (or other heavy metal). Plutonium in lead shield can be detected by a passive method by neutrons from spontaneous fission of 240Pu. Using triple coincidences between neutron detectors and subsequent determination of neutron multiplicity by Rossi method [4] allows one to significantly reduce the neutron (and gamma-ray) background originating from (n,2n) reaction on lead, inelastic scattering of neutrons, etc. However, the count rate of triple coincidences effect is small (12 s-1), even when all three detectors are as close as 15 cm from the 1 kg sample. Modified method: with associated particle technique (APT). Introduction of additional coincidence with alpha-particles, which accompany neutron emission from the neutron generator (t(d,n) reaction), allows one to substantially (by two orders of magnitude) improve the signal-tobackground ratio compared to the traditional method. Due to strict correlation between directions of neutron and the associated alpha-particle, APT selects only those neutrons, that fly on the direction determined by the geometry of the associated particle detector. Time of arrival of secondary neutrons into neutron detectors (see Figure 2-6) relative to the emission time of the primary neutron (which is determined from detection time of the associated alpha-particle) should fall into a short (1040 ns-wide) time interval (Figure 2). Triple coincidences between two neutrons and an alpha-particle allows one to suppress contributions to the background from (n,2n) reactions on the surrounding shielding materials located outside the spatial area, which corresponds to a given segment of the alpha-particle detector. Figure 2-7 shows results of calculations of the dependence of coincidence count rate on time difference between two neutron detectors (T1-T2) for different samples: WU, RPu, WPu and natPb. The integral effect (sum of events within 40 ns coincidence window) varies for different samples from 9 s-1 (WU) to 30 s-1 (WPu), while the background due accidental coincidences is just 34 s-1 (Figure 2-8).

16

30 ns

Counts [arb. units]

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Time [ns]

Figure 2-7. Time dependence of coincidence count rate of two neutron detectors caused by induced fission of weapon-grade uranium (WU) for the geometry with lead shielding (Figure 2-6, right). Time is counted from the moment of emission of the primary 14 MeV neutron from the neutron generator.

2.0

Events / nsec sec

1.5

- WU - WPu - RPu - Pb

1.0

0.5

-40

-30

-20

-10

10

20

30

40

T1-T2 (ns)
Figure 2-7. Dependence of coincidence count rate on time difference between two neutron detectors (T1-T2) for different samples: WU, RPu, WPu and natPb in the geometry with lead shielding. Neutron detection threshold was assumed to be 0.5 MeV.

4.8 4.6

Events / nsec sec

4.4 4.2 4.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 -40

background from accidental coincidence: without APT with APT effect from WU sample

-30

-20

-10

T1-T2 (ns)

10

20

30

40

Figure 2-8. Dependence of coincidence count rate on time difference between two neutron detectors (T1-T2) in the geometry with lead shielding for WU sample and for accidental coincidence with and without APT. Neutron detection threshold was assumed to be 0.5 MeV. Integral count rate of the background due to accidental coincidences is 211 s-1 without APT (straight line with squares on top of Figure 2-8), and 3 s-1 with APT (straight line with circles on the bottom of Figure 2-8), i.e. 70 times less. More detailed results for different samples are summarized in Table 3. WU NG ON1 background (-1) effect ( ) background (-1) effect ( ) spontaneous fission in APT window (-1) total effect (-1)
-1 -1

WPu NG ON 211 39.7 3.37 28.7 0.18 28.88 NG OFF 11 11 NG ON 211 54.3 3.37 24.1 0.48 24.6

RPu NG OFF 30.2 30.2

Pb sample NG ON 211 0.48 3.37 0.48 NG OFF

NG OFF2

without associated particles detection (no APT) 211 9.3 3.37 9.3

with associated particles detection (APT)

Table 3. Number of coincidences in neutron detectors within 40 ns time window for the geometry with lead shielding with and without APT.

1 2

NG ON: induced fission, plus spontaneous fission. NG OFF: only spontaneous fission.

Calculations for the geometry with lead shielding (Figure 2-6) showed, that contribution of -n and - coincidences to both effect and background does not exceed 0.30.4%.

2.2.3.

Formulating recommendations for the measurement channel of the device

The detailed studies of the measurement channels of the device neutron and gamma-ray detectors will be conducted during the second year of the Project. Preliminary estimations, arising from the expected detection time and detector counting rates, suggest that neutron detection should be based on two or three large-area plastic scintillators with photo multipliers, while gamma-rays will be detected with BGO or NaI(Tl)-based detectors. The major issues, that would be addressed during the second year of the project will be: 1. Neutron detection sub-system. a. b. c. 2. number and dimensions of the detectors; detector type (with or without n- separation properties; shielding type for neutron detectors.

Gamma-detection sub-system. a. b. number and type of the detectors type of shielding for gamma-ray detectors

3.

Data acquisition system.

2.3.

Neutron detectors

Based on results of mathematical modeling, a new concept of neutron detection for the proposed device for detection of shielded nuclear materials has been explored. The main difficulty associated with extraction of coincidences from fission neutrons is connected with very high background in neutron detectors due to detection of primary 14 MeV neutrons from the neutron generator. If neutron detectors are placed outside the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons (i.e. those neutrons, for which the moment of their production in the neutron generator and flight directions are known from the detected associated particle), time of arrival of these background primary neutrons is uncorrelated with the detection time of particles. On the contrary, if neutron detectors are placed within the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons (see Figure 2-9), then each detected primary 14 MeV neutron must have its tagging particle detected by the associated particle detector located inside the neutron generator. Moreover, the time of arrival of such background primary neutrons to the neutron detector is fixed by the distance from that detector to the target of the neutron generator. Thus, the background becomes correlated in time with the detection of the associated particles, and can be suppressed by performing time-of-flight analysis of the detected neutrons relative to tagging particles.

1 6

2 3

5 4
Figure 2-9. Possible layout of the detection device with three neutron detectors. 1 position of the target in the neutron generator; 2 extension with an associated particle detector and electronics; 3 neutron detectors; 4 pseudo beam of tagged neutrons; 5, 6 electronics and computer. Three neutron detectors based on plastic scintillator with dimensions 7721 cm3 were produced (see photo on Figure 2-10). Detectors can be stacked together to form a square with external dimensions about 2525 cm2 and 8 cm thick, which fits into the pseudo beam of tagged 14 MeV neutron at distance about 55 cm from the target of the neutron generator. Thus, any primary neutron detected by this assembly should in principle have a counterpart particle detected at one of the nine segments of the associated particle detector. Thus, for each such background neutron its time-of-flight is known: they all should arrive to neutron detectors about 11 ns after being emitted from the NG target (they all have ~5 cm/ns velocity; 5cm/ns 11ns=55cm flight path). It was estimated, that about 90% of primary neutrons pass through the assembly of neutron detectors unaffected, so such detector placement does not significantly reduce the intensity of neutrons incident on the inspected object, which can be located very close to (e.g. right behind) neutron detectors.

Figure 2-10. Neutron detector based on plastic scintillator and a photo multiplier.

2.4. 2.4.1.

Experiments with uranium samples Geometry

First experiments were carried out using four aluminum-coated cylinders (27 cm3) of metallic depleted uranium. These samples were placed at different locations relative to one neutron detector, as shown on Figure 2-11 and Figure 2-12.

S VIEW IDE
NG target

FRONTVIEW

58 cm neutron detec tor 3 (7x7x21 c m )

Figure 2-11. Measurement geometry. Rectangular neutron detector was placed at 58 cm from the target of the neutron generator (NG) so, that if fit within the voxels corresponding to three segments of the associated particle detector (pseudo beam of tagged neutrons).

238

U sam ple

238

U sam ple

28 c m 58 c m
58 cm

20 cm

238

U sam ple

58 c m

Figure 2-12. Three geometries, in which measurements with the U sample were carried out: A sample between the NG target and the neutron detector; B sample behind neutron detector; C sample above neutron detector. The neutron detector was inside the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons (see Figure 2-11).

2.4.2.

Results

One of the most important problems in detection of a weak flux of the secondary neutrons emitted in the induced fission of hidden fissile materials is reduction of the neutron and gamma backgrounds. Considerable part of this background comes from primary 14 MeV neutrons that are directly detected by the neutron detector. In order to investigate this problem the background measurements for two locations of the neutron detector with respect to the pseudo beam of neutrons tagged by particles detected in different segments of the associated particle detector have been performed. In the first series of experiments a neutron detector was placed outside the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons, so that particles, which accompanied 14 MeV neutrons hitting this detector, were not detected in the associated particle detector. In this case all the accidental coincidences between events in the neutron detector and particles were uncorrelated in time. In the second series of experiments the neutron detector was placed inside the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons (see examples of these geometries at Figure 2-12). In this case most of the primary 14 MeV neutrons hitting the neutron detector had their accompanying particle detected in one of the segments of the associated particle detector, so they produced a sharp peak in time-of-flight distribution. If the time resolution of the whole system

allows one to separate between the peak of primary 14 MeV neutrons from the rays and neutrons from induced fission, this geometry is preferable. In this case the neutron detectors are located at the closest possible point to the inspected object, and this may overweight the reduction of the 14 MeV neutron beam on the inspected object by about 10% due to reactions in the neutron detector.

10000

14 MeV neutrons

1000
Yield
-rays from NG target

100

8ns

10

detector inside tagged neutron "pseudo beam" detector outside tagged neutron "pseudo beam"

1 -60 -40 -20

Time [ns]

20

40

Figure 2-13. Background time distribution measured by means of neutron detector situated inside (dashed line) and outside (solid line) the pseudo beam of tagged neutron.

Figure 2-13 demonstrates the difference in the time spectrum for different locations of the neutron detector. The background level estimated over the part of the spectrum corresponding to pure accidental coincidences (to the left from the 0 time moment of emission of the 14 MeV neutron from the NG) and normalized to the total number of detected associated particles is approximately 10% higher in the case of the detector located outside the pseudo beam of tagged neutrons. This is due to the fact, that primary 14 MeV neutrons, that would have otherwise contributed to this uniformly-distributed background, have their accompanying -particle detected in the associated particle detector inside the neutron generator, and are collected within a narrow peak corresponding to their time-of-flight from the NG target to the neutron detector. On the other hand, the background level at the right side of the spectrum (to the right from the 14 MeV neutron peak) is higher in the case of neutron detector inside the pseudo beam due to a tail of scattered neutrons. Thus, the optimal choice of the detector geometry depends on the relative positions of the NG target, neutron detector and the inspected object. This question will be addressed in further studies. The goal of the next set of experiments was to determine time resolution of the detector neutron-detector pair, and to measure time-of-flight spectra of different spectral components. Measurement results are summarized on Figure 2-14. The top time-of-flight spectrum corresponds to measurement without sample. Only events with particle detected in the central segment of the nine-segment detector were selected. No neutron/gamma discrimination was used. The main contribution to the spectrum comes from primary 14 MeV neutrons hitting the neutron detector (its central part corresponds to the central segment of the detector, see Figure 2-11). The width of this peak is FWHM = 1.55 ns, which includes time resolution of the -n detector pair, as well as contribution from final dimensions of the detector segment neutron detector (width 7 cm). Thus, intrinsic time resolution of the -n detector pair (plus electronics) is about 1 ns, which is enough for time-of-flight analysis. Another feature of the top spectrum is a small peak coming from rays produced in the material of the target of neutron generator. These rays reach the neutron detector in about 2 ns, compared to ~11 ns needed for that for a 14 MeV primary neutron. So, the peak corresponding to these rays is located about 10 ns left from the main 14 MeV neutron peak. Another small peak ~8 ns after the 14 MeV peak comes from rays produced by fast neutrons in the construction materials of the experimental setup.

10000 1000 100 10 10000 1000 100 10 10000 1000 100 10 10000 1000 100 10 -5

-rays from

NG target 10ns shielding effect () by U

14MeV neutrons B ### from NG target

no sample

Counts [relative units]

no sample geometry A U in front of detector effect (n) no sample geometry B U behind detector no sample geometry C U above detector
20 25 30 35 40

effect (n)

10

15

Time [ns]
Figure 2-14. Time-of-flight spectra of events recorded in the neutron detector relative to associated particles detected in the built-in detector. Spectra obtained without sample for each case are shown with thin lines. U sample in front of neutron detector (geometry A). When four U cylinders were placed between the NG target and the neutron detector (second spectrum from top on Figure 2-14), the following effects can be seen: 1. 2. A small peak of rays produced in NG target is reduced compared to the case without U sample due to shielding of the central part of the neutron detector by U cylinders. A peak of prompt fission rays appears ~5 ns after the rays from the NG target and ~5 ns before the main 14 MeV neutron peak. These 5 ns represent extra time needed for 14 MeV neutrons to reach the U sample (flight path 28 cm). Fission neutron are not visible, since they fall right in the huge main peak of 14 MeV neutrons.

3.

U sample behind neutron detector (geometry B). In geometry B effect from fission neutron can be seen as a wide distribution around TOF = 25 ns. Out of this time, ~16 ns are needed by 14 MeV neutrons to reach the U sample (a total flight path of ~80 cm), and the remaining 9 ns are needed by slower fission neutrons (which have average velocity about 2 cm/ns) to fly back to the neutron detector (flight path ~20 cm). rays from fission in this case are not visible, since they fall right into the huge peak of 14 MeV primary neutrons. Though the time distribution of fission neutrons is rather broad, the integral number of events in it is consistent with the geometry of the experiment. U sample above neutron detector (geometry C). This experiment was carried out in order to demonstrate the use of position sensitivity of the associated-particle detector built into the neutron generator. The uranium sample was located in the area above the neutron detector corresponding to segment #6 of the associated-particle detector. So, any effect from this sample was expected in coincidence with segment #6, not with the central segment #9, as in the previous experiments. Time-of-flight spectrum from neutron detector relative to particles detected in segment #6 of the associated particle detector is shown on the bottom panel of Figure 2-14. The spectrum was not corrected for the time shift, which is due to the

geometry of the associated particle detector, and the effect of scattering of particles on the NG target, so the zero time on the time axis in this case does not coincide with the 0 label of the axis. The main peak of primary 14 MeV neutrons in this experiment is a factor of ten lower than in the previous cases. This reflects the fact, that only a small part of the neutron detector falls into the tail of the area corresponding to segment #6 of the tagging detector. The peak of rays from the NG target is well pronounced, since neutrons coinciding with particles detected in segment #6 have to pass through thicker layer of the target holder than those coinciding with particles from segment #9. A rather broad and well-pronounced peak about 5 ns after the main peak from 14 MeV neutrons corresponds to fission neutrons from the U sample. These extra 5 ns are needed by neutrons to travel ~10 cm gap separating the U sample and the neutron detector. Fission rays coincide in time with the maximum of the main peak from primary 14 MeV neutrons. Role of amplitude distribution. Another task was to investigate the role of amplitude distribution measured by the neutron detector for better discrimination of fission neutrons. Over 80% of fission neutrons have energies below 5 MeV, while most of the detected 14 MeV neutrons leave more than 5 MeV in the detector. In Figure 2-15 an example of a two-dimensional plot measured in the geometry shown in Figure 2-12C is presented. It can be seen that at amplitudes above the region, where fission neutrons are expected, there are some background events (most probably scattered incident neutrons), which can be removed by introducing of an upper amplitude threshold.

U
300

50.00 34.97 24.45 17.10 11.96 8.363 5.848 4.090 2.860 2.000

Energy [channel]

200

region of interest

100 20 25 30 35 40

Time [ns]

Figure 2-15. Two-dimensional amplitude-time distribution measured with U sample in the geometry shown in Figure 2-12C. In Figure 2-16 a time-axis projection of the distribution shown at Figure 2-15 is given with and without pulseheight discrimination in the amplitude channel (events with energies over 145 ch were rejected). The spectra were normalized to the maximum of the peak at 15 ns corresponding to simultaneous arrival of prompt -rays created by 14 MeV neutrons in the NG target. One can note, that the fission neutron distribution in the vicinity of 4ns is more pronounced in the discriminated case, and the peak corresponding to the incident 14 MeV neutrons is somewhat suppressed.

all amplitudes only lower amplitudes

Yield [arb. units]

0.1

0.01

-20

-10

10

20

30

40

Time [ns]

Figure 2-16. Time distribution corresponding to two-dimensional distribution shown in Figure 2-15. Black line spectrum with the pulse height discriminated below channel 145 (see Figure 2-15).

2.5.

Experiments with shielded uranium

First measurements with samples of natural uranium in lead container have been carried out (see Figure 2-17). Neutrons and gamma-rays were measured in coincidence with the associated alpha-particle detector. Double (n-), triple (n-n-) and quadruple (n-n-n-) coincidences have been collected. Experiments were carried out, using equipment developed for the NATO Science for Peace project. Data analysis is currently under way.

Figure 2-17. Measurements with natural uranium surrounded by lead.

3. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN
Application of the associated particles technique (APT) to detection of shielded fissioning materials offers a unique possibility to build an all-in-one portable system for detection of both neutron- and ray emitters and materials with no significant spontaneous radiation.

10

Results of the advanced Monte-Carlo calculations and first experiments show, that introduction of the APT technique into the traditional method of detection triple neutron-neutron-alpha coincidences allows one to: 1. 2. 3. 4. detect ~1 kg of fissioning materials (FM) shielded with 5 cm of lead in less than one second; identify the detected FM by spontaneous-to-induced fission ratio and other fission characteristics; significantly improve the effect-to-background ratio and the detection time, relative to the traditional method without APT; localize the detected object with precision determined by the geometry of the device and type of the associated particle detector.

When the 5 cm-thick lead shielding is complimented with a massive shielding against neutrons (e.g., polyethylene or water), the neutron coincidence count rate will drop. However, presence of such additional shielding can be determined by using an additional detector of rays to detect secondary radiation from inelastic scattering of primary (14 MeV) neutrons. Presence of most light chemical elements (carbon, oxygen, etc.) can be detected by characteristic peaks in the spectrum of this radiation, measured using APT technique. First experiments with one neutron detector and real uranium samples have shown, that observable effect from fission neutrons can be obtained even without use of neutron-neutron coincidences. The possible role of energy discrimination on time-of-flight spectra has been investigated. Introduction of additional neutron detectors and measurement of triple n-n- and quadruple n-n-n- coincidences within the time windows determined in the first experiments would allow one to account for different sources of the background in neutron detectors. Experimental work using three neutrons detectors for detection of triple (n-n-) and quadruple (n-n-n-) coincidences between neutrons from induced fission of shielded fissioning materials is currently under way.

4. REFERENCES
[1] Kuznetsov, A.V., Using of the associated particle technique for the detection of shielded nuclear material. Proc. of Research Coordination and Technical Meeting (M2-RC-927), December 15, 2003 IAEA Headquarters, Vienna

[2] Vakhtin, D.N., Using Associated Particle Technique for Detection of Shielded Nuclear Materials, Report at
the Second RCM of the IAEA CPR Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, 48 October 2004, Sochi, Russia [3] Kuznetsov, A.V., et al., Portable multi-sensor for detection and identification of explosive substances. //Proc. of the International Conference EUDEM2-SCOT: Requirements and Technologies for Demining and the Removal/Neutralization of Unexploded Ordnance, 1518 September, 2003, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Bruxelles, Belgium. H.Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J.Cornelis (Eds.), pp. 633637

11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. 2. Contract Number: #12600/Nuclear Security Multi-Donors Fund Title of Project: Using associated particle technique for detection of shielded nuclear materials 3. Institute where research is being carried out: V.G.Khlopin Radium Institute 2-j Murinski pr., 28 194021 St.Petersburg RUSSIA Tel. (812)-2475737 FAX: (812)-2478095 E-mail: apl@atom.nw.ru 4. 5. 6. Chief Scientific Investigator: A.V. Kuznetsov, Director of Physics Department, Ph.D. Time period covered: 15th September, 200331th May, 2006 Scientific Background and Scope of Project One of the weak points of all existing instruments used to detect and characterize radioactive materials, including fixed automated portals, is their inability to detect fissioning materials that are shielded by substances that absorb their spontaneous gamma and neutron radiation. While spontaneous radiation emitted by some of the most dangerous fissioning materials cannot be used for their detection and identification, these materials can still be detected by the so-called active methods. These methods use external radiation to induce fission reactions within the irradiated volume and then measure such products of these reactions as neutrons and high-energy rays, which have a very high penetrating ability and can penetrate thick layers of shielding material. The main goal of the Project is to apply active methods to the detection of shielded fissioning materials. 7. Experimental Method The proposed device will be based on the Nanosecond Neutron Analysis (NNA) method, which rely on measurement of correlations between 14 MeV neutrons produced by a portable neutron generator, and secondary radiation (neutrons and energetic rays), that is produced by these neutrons in the material of the investigated object. The secondary radiation will be detected in very narrow (few nanoseconds) time intervals counted from the time of emission of each neutron from the neutron generator. This time, in turn, will be determined by detecting particles, that accompany neutron emission in the reaction d+t n+a, by a position-sensitive or segmented semiconductor detector built into the sealed vacuum of the neutron generator. By detecting secondary radiation in coincidence with particles, one would be able to select the region of space, in which this secondary radiation has been produces by the primary neutron, thus achieving substantial suppression of the background arising from reactions of the primary neutrons on surrounding materials. 8. Results obtained Experimental work. Three neutron detectors have been made on the basis of fast plastic scintillator and a photo multiplier. These detectors use measurement channels of the data acquisition system, which has been built specially for experiments with the neutron generator. This data acquisition system can handle extremely high counting rates in both neutron channel and tagging particle channel. Experiments with an APT neutron generator, one neutron detector, and depleted U sample were carried out. Time-of-flight spectra of neutrons measured in coincidence with associated particles were analyzed. Measurements with different neutron detector locations have been carried out. The possible role of energy discrimination on time-of-flight spectra has been investigated. First experiments with shielded and unshielded uranium samples have been carried out. Data analysis is currently under way.

12

Mathematical modeling. 9. Full mathematical model of the experimental setup has been created on the basis of MCNP5 Monte-Carlo code. Conclusions drawn The characteristics of the created detectors and electronics are adequate for the task of using them in a system for detection of shielded nuclear materials by NNA technique. Experimental work using three neutrons detectors for detection of triple (n-n-) and quadruple (n-n-n-) coincidences between neutrons from induced fission of shielded fissioning materials is currently under way. 10. Papers Published on Work Done under the Contract [1] Kuznetsov, A.V., Using of the associated particle technique for the detection of shielded nuclear material. Proc. of Research Coordination and Technical Meeting (M2-RC-927), December 15, 2003 IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. [2] Vakhtin, D.N., Using Associated Particle Technique for Detection of Shielded Nuclear Materials, Report at the Second RCM of the IAEA CPR Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, 48 October 2004, Sochi, Russia. [3] Kuznetsov, A.V., et al., Portable multi-sensor for detection and identification of explosive substances. //Proc. of the International Conference EUDEM2-SCOT: Requirements and Technologies for Demining and the Removal/Neutralization of Unexploded Ordnance, 1518 September, 2003, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Bruxelles, Belgium. H.Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J.Cornelis (Eds.), pp. 633637.

13

Development of Methodical Recommendations on Detection of FRM in Objects of the Customs Control Using Stationary Customs System of Detection of FRM Yantar, Search Instruments 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN and Universal Radiometers-Spectrometers MKS-A03 and IdentiFINDER-NGH
A.V. Borisenko, V.N. Kustov, L.G. Eliseenko, V.V. Temchenko, O.G. Alehina, B.A. Semerkov, N.E. Kravchenko, I.N. Bannyh, D.J. Danko The Russian Customs Academy, the Vladivostok Branch, Vladivostok, Federal Customs Service of Russia, Moscow Abstract This research is related to the development of organizational-technical procedures of application of means of the radiation control and is aimed at increase of efficiency of measures on preclusion of illegal FRM movement across the border. The research results are based on the authors' great experience in organizing FRM customs control in the Russian Federation The procedures of application (methodical recommendations) include: 1. Procedures for preparing and checking the working capacity of instruments; 2. The procedural order of using these instruments 3. The order and sequence of actions when carrying out of the radiation control of passengers, luggage, goods and vehicles at customs pedestrian and automobile check points. Specific methodical recommendations are developed for the following instruments: 1. 2. 3. 4. The stationary customs systems of detecting FRM (Yantar Radiation Portal Monitors) Radioisotope search instruments 1401, 1703 (and their modifications) Radiometers-spectrometers MKS -02, MKS-A03 (and their modifications) Radiometer-spectrometer IdentiFINDER and its modifications.

 , 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH

.. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 2, .. 2, .. 2 ( , , . , , ) , - 12601\ () . - . ( ) : ; ; , , . : () ; 1401, 1703 ; - -02, -03 ; - IdentiFINDER . , , . - .

1 2

, . . , . .

 , 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH

.. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 1, .. 2, .. 2, .. 2 ( , , . , )

12601 () , () ( ) 22.09.2003 . .., - ( ) . - . , ( ). . () , 1703GN . 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , . : [4] - [5], [6] [7] . [1] - [2, 3]. [8, 9].

1 2

, . . , . .


1. 2. () 2.1. , , 2.2. , 2.2.1. -1, -11, -2 2.2.2.
2.2.1.1. 2.2.1.2.

-1, -2
2.2.2.1. 2.2.2.2. 2.2.2.3.

2.2.3.

-1, -2
2.2.3.1. 2.2.3.2.

3.

1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH 3.1. 3.2. 1703, 1401GN, 1401GN - -03 3.3. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , . 3.3.1. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN
3.3.1.1. 3.3.1.2. 3.3.1.3. , - , - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH

3.3.2.

3.3.1.4.

- -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH
3.3.2.1. 3.3.2.2.


, , , , - . , . , , . () , : . , , -. , , , , , . , - , . : ; , ; , . , , , . , , ( , , , ) ( , , , , ..). , . , , : , , . , 12601, , .

 , , : () ; 1401, PM1703 ; - -02, -03 ; - IdentiFINDER . . , (PM1401, PM1703) ITRAP . , , . . , , : 1 (-1, -2, -1, -1, -2, -1, -2) ( [4]); ( [6]; 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN, -03, IdentiFINDER-NGH , ( [5]); -1 [4]; : 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN, -03, IdentiFINDER-NGH: [5] [6, 7]. . , , , . 1401 . [47].

, , .

1. , [11, 13], : (fixed, radiation portal monitors), (Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) ( ), (Multi-purpose Handheld Radioisotope Identifier Devices (RID). , , , . , . , . , , . : - ; - ; - ; - . , . [11]: - , , ; - , , . , , ; - , , , , ; - . , , , , , . , , ,

 , . ( ) : - ( ); - ( ); - ( ). ( ) . , ( () ). -, . . , , . , . , , -. - . () . , : , , ; . , . -, -. . . , , , , . , : - , 1 / 0,1 ; - ; - ; - ( ) , . : < 1 / 0,1 ,

, , . , .

2. () [4] [6] , , , . , , -1, -11. 2.1. , ,

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: - . ; - . - ; - (), , , , ( , ); - 3 . - . ; - ( ; ; ), ; - , .. , , , . . . : , , , .

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: , . , , .

2.2. , , [6] . , - , -1 -1, -2, . [6].

2.2.1. -1, -11, -2 2.2.1.1. ( -1, -11) ( -2). 1,0 . , , 1,5 , . , , . , , . , . ( ). : 5 /; ; 3 . ( 20 ) , . -1, -2 , . , -1 , . , . 2.2.1.2.

20 : ( ); -1, -2; -1, -2; . : , ; () , ; , , ; , , ;

 , () , , ; , , , , , ; , -01 , ; : ; , , , , , -; ( ) , , . 1, -2 : , , , ; -2, , , ; -1, -2 , ; , . , , , , : , ; , ; ( , ..). ( ) .

: - 3 /. 1 , . , , . ( -1, -2), , .

 -1, -2 , . 2.2.2. -1, -2 2.2.2.1. -1, -2 . , , : - ; - ; - ; - , , . , . -1, -2 . , , , . : , (5 /); , 5 . . , . 2.2.2.2. -1, -2 , , , ( ) . -1, -2 ( ), . . , . , , . , , .

 -1, -2. 2.2.2.3.

-1, -2 , , . -1, -2 , , . -1, -2 . . , , , . , , . , , . , , , , , , , , . 2.2.3. -1, -2 2.2.3.1. -1, -2 . . , . , 100 %- . ( ). : 25 /; ; 10 . ( 10 ) , , .

 -1, -2 , . , 1-, 2 . 2.2.3.2. -1, -2 : 10 , , , , ( ) , ; 1401GN -1, -2 1,5 , ; , , - 1 /, , . , , , , , , , , , , ( - , - -03), . ( -1, 2) , ( 1401GN). 3. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDERNGH 3.1. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , . : - 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH; - 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN , ;

- - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , . : - ; , , , - , .. , - , ; - ; ; , ; 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , . . , , 1703, 1401GN 1401GN, - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH. 12601 - [5] [7]. 3.2. 1703, 1401GN, 1401GN - -03 . , . , () , . : n ; N n; , , n -; , , n ; . - -03 :

 - ; - -03 - -. - Co-60, Cs-137, Ba-133, Am-241 . (, .) ; +20 -15 , () , . , , . = 0,080,09 /, 35 %. . I. n . 12 ( 0,2 /), n 6. PM1703M PM1401GN (. 2), n = 4 (~ 1 ) , , . 2 () n n 1 2 3 4 5 () 23 812 120150 30006000 6 2030 57 0,40,5 0,010,02

II. () n. n . () . , . , , , , - (), (), , , 0,5 , .. 1,5. , , () ,

n = 34 (= 1,5), , n = 67 ( = 3 ). III. , , n -. (.1) : n , -; n , . n 0,1, , , , n.

1 2

. 1. , , n, -: 1 Ba-133 (=132,5 ); 2 -60 (A=95,8 ) IV. , , n . , (1401GN) , n Cf-252 3103 /. 1401GN - , , -, . (.2), - , . n , , -.

. 2. , , n, f-252 (=3103 /): 1 -; 2 -. V/. , . , , n: - 4; 3. . - -03 , : -03 - ; -, - -03 ; -, - - -03. 3.3. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH , : ; ; , , .

3.3.1. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN 3.3.1.1. , 1703, 1703GN 1401GN, : , - (1703 -); Cs-137 . : ( ); ( ); ( ). 3.3.1.2. : ; ; , ( ) . . (N) (). , , , . 3.3.1.3. ,

: ; ; . , , : 5 /; ; ; , 1 / 0,1 , .
. IAEA-TECDOC-1312 (, 2003) () 20 / 510 . 5 ( 0,25 ). .

 , . , , . , , , . 3.3.1.4. , - . 1703GN 1401GN .

: .

( 20 ) 1401GN -. , , -. , . , . , ( ). 3.3.2. - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH - -03-1 IdentiFINDER-NGH , , : ; ; . - , -03, . . IdentiFINDER-NGH . , . 3.3.2.1.

- -03 : /. ; .; /; ; . - IdentiFINDER-NGH : (EASY USER MODE) (EXPERT USER MODES). , - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH: - : (, , ) ; : -03 ; IdentiFINDER-NGH FINDER MODE, -, DOSE RATE MODE, - ; ; , , ; , , , , . 3.3.2.2. -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH

() : , ( ); , . /. -03 DOSE RATE MODE IdentiFINDER-NGH. -03 - . , ( ). : ; ; ; .

 - -03 IdentiFINDER-NGH : 1.) , - ; 2.) ; 3.) , , ; 4.) ; 5.) , , : , , . : , , .

12601 , , , . . , . , . , , . , , .


[1] : /. ,. .. , .. . . .: , 2003. 411 . ISBN 5-93-189-004-1. [2] : -. . . 1. , 1401, 1401 , 140101, 1203, 1621/.. , .. , .. .; . . .. ; . .: ; ; , 2005. 140 . [3] : -. . . II. - -01 -, -02, -03, -1401 / .. , .. , .. .; . . .. ; . .: ; ; , 2005. 152 . [4] 1: /.-.: .. , .. , .. .; . .. . .: ; : , 2004. 160 . ISBN 5-9590-0006-7. . [5] : 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN; - -03, IdentiFINDER-NGH: : -. /.-.: .. , .. , .. ; . .. . : , 2006. 148 . . [6] () . 1. : , 12601\ . , 2004. 84 . [7] () . 2. 1703, 1703GN, PM1401GN - 03 IdentiFINDER-NGH: , 12601\ . , 2006. 80 . [8] .., .., .. // , : . . : , 2004. . 41-44. ISBN 5-9590-0002-4.

[9] .., .., .. // , : . . : , 2004. . 56-61. ISBN 5-9590-0002-4. [10] : IAEA-TECDOC-1311. : , 2003. [11] : IAEATECDOC-1312. : , 2003. [12] , : IAEA-TECDOC-1313. : , 2003. [13] Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment: Reference Manual. Vienna: IAEA, 2006. Technical guidance. Nuclear security series No.1.

Research and Development of Hand-Held Neutron Monitor, and Feasibility Studies of a 6LiI(Eu) Crystal Based RID and SPRD
M. Majorov Federal State Unitary Enterprise, Scientific Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research Abstract According to the common approach to detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials at border crossings and checkpoints, the primary automated radiation detectors portal radiation monitors and secondary means hand held instruments (RIDs or PRDs) are widely used at any points where there is potential threat of illicit trafficking. In order to be an efficient mean to provide verification of alarms, the performance of the second set instruments should fit the sensitivity of fixinstalled systems, i.e. to provide detection of minimum mass or activity detectable with fix-installed monitors. The main goal of the project was to bridge a gap between neutron sensitivity of the secondary set of instruments and typical fix-installed systems. In this respect our activity included: 1) research and development of new tool a highly sensitive hand-held neutron monitor (He3-based) and 2) improvement of neutron detection capabilities for standard hand-held monitors which could enhance sensitivity of these instruments and made the secondary inspection of vehicles and pedestrians more reliable and efficient. The first year of Project focused on the development of a new category of neutron search instrument the Neutron Search Detector (NSD), which would have matching sensitivity to that of a portal monitors. Upon completion of this task (including instrument development and tests by the IAEA), project extensions for the second and third years focused on the development of a new approach to the design of hand-held portable instruments: i.e. to use one radiation detector involving simultaneous and separate neutron and gamma ray detection. This approach would allow a gain in the net size and volume of the detector element of the handheld instruments, and thus (hopefully) allow an improvement of overall neutron sensitivity. For this new approach, two new instruments were developed, and and delivered to the IAEA for evaluation.

Contents
1. 2. Introduction Scope of the Project Research and development of neutron search detector Fundamentals of neutron detection Basic instruments for neutron detection Gas-filled proportional counters for thermal neutron detection Proportional counters for fast neutron detection Fission Chambers Scintillation detectors Feasibility study of neutron detector for NSD Results for 3He counters based neutron detector Results for 6LiI(Eu) crystal based neutron detector Development of Neutron Search Detector KSAR1U.06 Detailed description of NSD KSAR1U.06 Algorithm of operation Results of trial operation and laboratory tests Informal type tests, test of a new Neutron Search Device KSAR1U.06 at Seibersdorf performed in 2003-12-18 by Dr. M. Swoboda, SGTS/TNS Laboratory Acceptance Test of the Neutron Search Device Hand Held Neutron Monitor KSAR1U. 06 performed by Dr. Yu. Kulikov 25.02.2004 Comparative test of the NSD (Neutron Search Device) No 1 and No 2 performed by Dr. Yu. Kulikov on 23 March 2004 The Neutron Search Device (NSD) Functional/Technical Specifications and Hand Held Neutron Monitor KSAR1U.06 Acceptance Criteria and Check List Improvement of NSD according to IAEA experts recommendations and suggestions Feasibility study of LiI(Eu) based detector RID and SPRD Scientific background of the research work Technical approach and methodology Experimental study of LiI(Eu)detector Development of LiI(Eu) detector based RID Result of the acceptance tests Development of LiI(Eu) detector based SPRD Preliminary results of the acceptance tests Sammary of the Project References 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 10 11 15 13 13 17 25 25 29 34 35 39 41 41 42 43 47 50 53 55 56 57

2.1. 2.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.2.4. 3.1. 3.2. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.3.1. 4.3.2. 4.3.3. 4.3.4. 4.3.5.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

5.1. 5.2. 7.1. 8.1.

Introduction According to the common approach to detection of nuclear and other

radioactive materials at border crossings and checkpoints the primary automated radiation detectors portal radiation monitors and secondary means hand held instruments potential (RIDs or of PRDs) illicit are widely used The at any points where to there the is threat trafficking. first response gamma

ray/neutron alarm, generated by PRM, is verification of the event with the second set of radiation detection equipment. For instance, if a portal alarm is activated, the first responder should utilize radiation pagers (PRD), hand-held survey meters or some other radiation detection equipment (RID) to verify the presence of radiation. If the initial alarm cannot be verified by the second instrument malfunction confirmed source). In order to be an efficient mean to provide verification of alarms, the performance of the second set instruments should fit the sensitivity of fixinstalled systems, id est to provide detection of minimum mass or activity detectable with fix-installed monitors. Meanwhile, while gamma ray sensitivity of hand-held instruments available in the market is sufficiently enough not only for verification, but also for localization the source detected by portal radiation monitors, neutron sensitivity did not match sensitivity of portals and therefore hardly provide verification procedure not speaking about localization of the source. The main goal of the project was to bridge a gap between neutron sensitivity of the secondary set of instruments and fix-installed systems. In this respect our activity included: 1) research and development of new tool highly sensitive hand-held neutron monitor and 2) improvement of neutron detector for standard hand-held monitors radioisotope identifying device (RID) and personal radiation detector (PRD), which could enhance sensitivity to mass form factor of these instruments and made the secondary inspection of vehicles and pedestrians with RIDs and PRDs more reliable and efficient. within of the the the reasonable time, it may If be assumed presence that of of the first is indication was a false alarm, or that the information received was false (due to fix-installed verification system). the radiation is by process, further investigation performed

(localization,

radiological

hazard,

isotope

identification

radioactive

1. Scope of the project There are two major items defining the technical performance of neutron search instruments. They are algorithm of raw data analysis and performance neutron detector. While algorithm implemented for search instruments is quite developed item, there is an essential variation in type of neutron detectors which could be used for hand-held instruments. The first year of Project focused on the development of NEW CATEGORY of neutron search instrument Neutron Search Detector (NSD), matching sensitivity of portal monitors. The purpose was to carry out feasibility analysis of various types of neutron detectors for NSD, to work out the functional and technical specification for NSD and to develop production prototype of such an instrument. Project extensions for the second and third years focused on the development of NEW APPROACH to design of hand-held portable instruments. That was the idea to use one radiation detector involving simultaneous and separate neutron and gamma ray detection. This approach could allowed to gain a net size and volume of the hand held instruments and thus to use this gain for improvement of overall neutron sensitivity. 2. Research and development of neutron search detector. Today there are many types of neutron detectors, commercially available in the market. However, only a few types of neutron detectors are applicable for being used in hand-held instruments indented for detection of neutron sources, because of the following reasons: Detector should be as much as sensitive to neutrons with energies corresponding to fission spectrum under field conditions; - It should be as much as insensitive to gamma rays with energies below 3 MeV; - Detector should be rugged enough to be used at hand-held instrument: intrinsic strength to shock and vibration should be considered important. Below we discuss contemporary methods of neutron detection and make primary selection of the neutron detector type being applicable for NSD. 2.1. Fundamentals of neutron detection Neutron is elementary particle interacting in all known processes [1]: Weak: np+e-+e - -decay of neutrons Nuclear: n+6Li4He+3H+4.78 MeV Gravitational: mnc2=939.5 MeV mn=1.6710-27 kg Electromagnetic: qn<10-21qe no charge n=-1.91 B, B=eh/4mpc magnetic momentum

However, in practice only nuclear interaction makes possible neutron detection due to the following reasons: The neutron-nuclei collision is usually following by energetic particle emission (high energy access) there is no significant delay between the time of neutron interaction and the appearance of reaction products (charged particles or gamma ray). major channels of neutron-nuclei interaction providing a mechanism of neutron detection are:

Table of Neutron interaction processes [2] 2.2. Basic instruments for neutron detection. Two major groups of neutron detectors [3] are in use today. They are gasfilled counters and scintillation ones. 2.2.1. Gas-filled proportional counters for thermal neutron detection. Gas-filled proportional counters are the regular proportional counters filled either with boron fluoride or neutrons are captured by reactions: n+10B7Li*++2.31 MeV (93.7%)
7 3

He at high pressure about 5 atm. The thermal (10B or

3

absorber

He)

and

thereby

induce

nuclear

Li*7Li++0.48 MeV

n+10B7Li++2.79 MeV (6.3%) or n+3Hep+3H+0.765 MeV The reactions yield charged particles, detected in proportional counter. Cross section for the reactions above for thermal neutrons are 3840 barns and 5330 barns respectively and decreases essentially with increasing of neutron energy providing only 1 barn at 1 MeV. Proportional counters are widely used in different applications. They also may be used for fast neutron detection. In that case proportional counter is surrounded with moderator (usually polyethylene). The main advantages of the 3He and
10

B proportional counters are:

commercial availability in different forms, sizes, pressure (length from 10 cm to 1.5 m, pressure up to 10 atm, diameter 1050 mm)

high stability high efficiency for thermal neutrons ( 25mm, 4 atm. ~70%) weak sensitivity to gamma rays allows operation into intensive gamma ray fields, producing dose rate up to 10 Sv/h
3

He provides

The disadvantages of the proportional counters are: high pressure may involve a problem of transportation microphonic effect (low resistance to shock and vibration)

2.2.2. Proportional counters for fast neutron detection. In elastic scattering projectile neutron share its initial kinetic energy with the target nuclei. Being charged, the recoil nuclei lose its energy ionizing the working gas in proportional counter. This mechanism is used in hydrogen, helium and methane CH4 filled detectors, providing the detection of neutrons with energies above hundred keV. The main disadvantage of such detectors is the low efficiency of detection. 2.2.3. Fission Chambers. Another type of gas-filled neutron detector is an absorber-deposed chamber such as fission chambers. The mechanism of neutron detection by such detectors is the detection of fission fragment from thermal neutron induced fission of
235

U or

239

Pu isotopes

having large fission cross section. Energy release of the fission is about 160 MeV. This makes possible to use gas-filled chambers in their ionization mode, without secondary gas amplification. To avoid full stopping of the fission fragments in the layer of fissioning materials, the typical layer thickness is 12 mg/cm2. Therefore the efficiency of the fission chamber is relatively low, about 0.51.0%. However due to high kinetic energy of fission fragments, the fission chambers are
4

practically

insensitive to gamma ray and may operate up to the dose rate of 10 Sv/h. 2.2.4. Scintillation detectors Today there are many different types of scintillators, suitable for both slow and fast neutron detection. There are three main types of scintillators: inorganic, organic and mixed type. Inorganic materials:
6 6 6

LiI(Eu) crystals Li-glass Ce3+ doped solid state fibers Li+ZnS(Ag) detectors

Organic materials: Stilbene crystals Plastic scintillators NE102, NE104, BC454 (5% boron loaded) Liquid BC501, NE311(5% boron loaded), NE323(1% gadolinium loaded) Mixed type: Hornjak detector composition of organic glass with ZnS(Ag)

Table 1. Neutron detectors: efficiency, sensitivity to gamma ray and applicability for hand-held instrument Energy of incident neutron 1 MeV neutrons) 1 MeV 78 0,001 Complicated (require application of neutron/gamma ray discrimination technique, relatively high detection threshold 0.5 MeV) 1 MeV 1 0.01 Low (efficiency) 78 0,0001 ray, Sv/h Low (no pulse shape discrimination feature gamma ray are indistinguishable from % to gamma Efficiency, Sensitivity Applicability within NSD

Detector type

Size

Absorber/

Converter

Plastic

5 cm

scintillator

thick

NE102

Liquid

5 cm

scintillator

thick

BC501

CH4

5 cm

proportional

counter at

7 atm 1 MeV 1 0.01 Low (efficiency)

at 18 atm

5 cm

Thermal neutron detectors moderator is required 0.025 eV 75 0.05 High (simultaneous and separate detection of gamma ray and neutrons) 0.025 eV 50 0.01 Medium (relatively high sensitivity to gamma rays, possible to use in form of solid state fibers) 0.025 eV 77 10 High (the only way to built high sensitive neutron detectors)

6LiI(Eu)

1 mm

Li

thick

6Li-glass

1mm

Li

thick

, 4 atm

2.5 cm

and 5% 2

The upper limit of gamma dose rate when detector is still able to operate

BF3 at 0.66 0.025 eV 46 10 Low (efficiency)

5 cm 0.025 eV 29 10 Low (efficiency)

10

tm

BF3 at1.18 0.025 eV 0,5 106107 Inapplicable

10

tm

Fission

2.0 mg/cm2

235

chamber

Recent improvement of crystal growing technology has resulted in development of LiI(Eu) crystal with excellent properties for simultaneous detection both gamma ray and neutron. The absorption of a neutron in the nuclear reaction n + 6Li is accompanied by the kinetic
4

He + 3H + 4.78 MeV release

6

energy

of

reaction

products.

Being

charged, they generates into the crystal

LiI(Eu) the same quantity of light as

that accompanying the complete absorption of electron with energy 3.2 MeV. This makes it possible to determine directly the number of measured gamma quanta with energies less than 3.2 MeV and the number of neutrons as the number of events in different ranges of one energy scale, i.e., to perform the n/ separation using the amplitude selection method [4].

10000 1000 100 10 1 0 500 1000

1460 keV

2614 keV

Counts

1500

2000

2500

3000

Neutrons 3500

Energy, keV

Fig. 1. Amplitude distribution of background gamma ray and thermal neutron peak, corresponding to complete absorption of the neutrons detected. Owing to the fact that the energy distribution of background gamma quanta is confined mainly at energies lower than 2.6 MeV (208Tl), the contribution of background gamma-ray into the energy window of neutrons is negligibly small. The use of such gamma ray and neutron detector is mainly important for safeguards purposes, because its low weight and high efficiency for gamma ray and neutrons. Energy resolution of the crystal is also suitable for primary selection of the type of radioactive source found. Typically at 0.662 MeV the energy resolution is 7.58.0% [5]. Solid-state
6

Li-glass

Ce

3+

doped

fibers

is

variation
6

of

regular

scintillation detector. Thermalized neutrons are captured by

Li and thereby

induce a nuclear reaction, yielding an alpha particle and a triton. The charged

particles excite Ce3+, which is contained as a dopant in the glass fibers. Each fiber is coated with a low refractive index silicon polymer, which maximize the amount of light captured in the glass fiber. Generated light is guided to photomultiplier tube at the end of the fibers, thus providing the neutron detection. Gamma ray induced events in the optical fibers can be distinguished from neutron height. Compared with other conventional neutron detectors, the main advantage of such a detector is very high neutron detection efficiency resulting from the large effective area up to 500 cm2. In addition the solid-state fibers are flexible and more robust than gas-filled proportional counters. One of the interesting applications of recently developed semiconductive polymers is the use in thermal neutron detectors. A solid state
235

signals

by

adjusting

an

appropriate

threshold

level

for

the

pulse

U,

239

Pu or

Li

thin converter are interposed between two layers of semiconductive polymer. Charged particles or fission fragment resulted from neutron capture in the converter are detected by polymers similar to conventional diode detector. The thickness of the individual detector is about 0.10.3 mm, but the assembly of 3 detectors absorbs 85% of incident thermal neutrons. 3. Selection of neutron detector for NSD Analysis of the detector characteristics listed in Table 1 displays only three possible candidates or for being used in hand-held
6

neutron

instrument: or
3

stilbene

(BC-501A

equivalent)

based

detectors,

LiI(Eu)

crystals

He

proportional counters both in moderator. Development of pulse shape discrimination technique resulted in number of organic scintillators, such as stilbene or liquid scintillators NE 213 or BC501A, having become one of the most powerful instrument for studying fast neutrons. Many of high precision neutron spectrometers [7, 8] utilize the organic scintillator as an excellent detector for fast neutron registration even in the background of the accompanying gamma rays. Its well known [7], [8] and [9], that there is possibility of separate neutron detection in low in field of gamma ray exceeding 1 MeV The neutron of flux over 103. and of However, the pulse shape discrimination technique does not provide the reliable separation relatively amplitude ray region (below neutron energy) high gamma flux (<103 1/scm2)). energy distribution

fission neutrons, emitted by nuclear materials may be well (accuracy about 510%) represented by Watt distribution or by the more simple Maxwell shape with corresponding parameters of nuclear temperature T (Table 2).
E T

n( E ) =

T 3

E e

[6]

10

Table 2. Parameter of nuclear temperature [11] Nuclei 233U 235U 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 252Cf Fission process Thermal neutron induced fission Thermal neutron induced fission Thermal neutron induced fission Spontaneous fission Spontaneous fission Spontaneous fission T, MeV 1.35 1.35 1.40 1.24 1.39 1.42

Simple estimation shows, however, that contribution of neutrons below the detection threshold 1 MeV (where gamma/n separation becomes reliable) exceeds 34% for
240

Pu and 30% for

252

Cf. In field, fast neutrons emitted by bare source

are moderated by source vicinity, construction materials, ground etc, and thus the contribution of neutrons below the threshold becomes more, dramatically degrading efficiency of detection. 3.1. Results for 3He counters and LiI(Eu) based neutron detector

As 3He and LiI detectors are low sensitive to fast neutrons, they should be surrounded by appropriate amount of moderator. The shape of the moderator involving the highest detection efficiency was always the subject of intensive study [10]. In the present report the criteria for optimization was the minimum mass of the detection unit at assigned sensitivity. In first phase, numerical modeling of the moderator shape was done with Monte-Carlo MCNP code. Initial data for calculation was a rough estimation of the overall mass of the assembly, number and type of neutron counters, diameter and thickness of LiI(Eu) crystal. Optimum shape of the moderator and 3He counters is shown in Fig. 2 with geometrical characteristics given in table 3.

Fig. 2. 3He neutron detection unit.

11

Table 3. Optimum geometry of 3He-based NSD Detector Three 3He proportional counters @3atm. pressure, 32180 mm Length, mm Width, mm Thickness, mm Forward layer, mm Backward layer, mm Gap between counters, mm 200 150 90 14 4 36

Experimental study of the detector built according to the calculated data gave the following results: it was found that background count rate of three
3

He

tubes was 0.150.20 CPS, sensitivity to fast neutrons 21.4 cm2, increasing its value with moderating of neutrons in vicinity of the radioactive sample and intrinsic efficiency to neutrons 7.1 %. The net weight of the detector was found to de 2.24 kg. LiI(Eu) based detector was simulated as a polyethylene thick-wall cylinder Fig. 3. LiI(Eu) crystal with cylinder.
6

Li enriched up to 90% was mounted inside the

Fig. 3. 6LiI(Eu) scintillation crystal 7020 mm in polyethylene thick-walled cylinder. Optimum shape is presented in Table 4. Table 4. Detector Cylinder length, mm Outer diameter, mm Inner diameter, mm Forward layer, mm
6

LiI(Eu) 90% enrichment on 6-Li isotope 130 220 80 30

Intrinsic background was found to be 0.34 cps, gross weight of the LiI(Eu) + moderator detector was found 6.4 kg, sensitivity 20.1 cm2.

12

4. Development of Neutron Search Detector KSAR1U.06 Results of calculation presented above have shown the pronounced advantage of using
3

He-counter

based

neutron

search

detector

because

the

requested

sensitivity of the detector may be obtained with the less mass of the detection unit. However, the use of LiI(Eu) based detector is defensible in the systems, if 1) high neutron sensitivity is desirable, but not a critical parameter 2) gamma ray spectrometry is
3

considered

important.

For

the

development

of

Neutron search detector (NSD) He-counter based neutron detector was selected. Following to IAEA recommendations the following functional and technical recommendations to NSD were considered important: High efficient moderated neutron detector with reasonable insensitivity to gamma radiation and resistively to vibration and shock Visual and acoustic (tone height being proportional to alarm threshold exceeding value) indicators of alarm Enhanced statistical algorithm moving-average criteria Friendly interface with both digital and graphical indication simplifying the neutron source localization process Single-handed operation Selectable radiological safety alarm threshold shown on the display Rugged design for outdoor use in a wide range of temperature and humidity Illuminated large area display Rechargeable operation 2 operational buttons and 1 power/ illumination on button 4096 alarm records available in power-independent memory USB interface batteries providing at least 8 hours of continues

4.1. Detailed description of NSD KSAR1U.06 Detailed description of NSD hardware is given in this chapter. Fig. 4 shows the top view of NSD. Both neutron detector and electronics are integrated in one instrumental case. Rechargeable batteries and analog electronic socket are mounted on the either ends of the moderator block. LCD, LED "Alarm", operating buttons F1 and F2, connector for connection of the charger and PC via USB port (charger/USB), piezoelectric siren, and protected button "Switch On" with the built-in LED are mounted on the top cover of NSD case. Vibromotor generating an additional alarm signal is mounted inside the case. NSD has two lightweight carrying handles. Three 3
3

He

proportional to form the counters

counters neutron are

SNM-88, detector. into

diameter
3

32

mm, in

200 the

mm

long, to

are is

assembled

He

pressure

counters

atm. The

placed

polyethylene

moderator

improve

13

sensitivity to fission neutrons. Fission spectrum neutrons ambient dose rate is evaluated from the detected neutrons flux value. GM counter SB-20 is intended for detecting and evaluating of the gamma ray ambient dose rate over the energy range 0,06-3.0 MeV.

Fig.

4. General view onto neutron search detector. Upper panel top view, bottom panel detector with cover open.

Fig. 5 presents NSD functional diagram . Ni-MH rechargeable battery (RB) 3,8 Ah/7,2 V provides power for NSD. RB serviceability is analyzed by poweron control circuit which prevents turning NSD on at low voltage. Poweron control circuit applies supply voltage URB to HV power supply, electronic keys, LED "Switch On", divider, LF amplifier (LFA), and DC/DC low voltage former (DC/DC LVS), after the signal from the button "Switch On" is received in case the output voltage on RB is satisfactory. Supply voltage URB is converted by DC/DC LVS to voltage +5V and -5V for CSA, discriminator, pulse former, and controller supply so that NSD is in "On" mode. Voltage URB is applied to analogto-digital converter (A/DC) input via divider. A/DC is built in controller. The divider transforms URB so as to get in the measurable by A/DC voltage range. In case URB steps down below the specified level controller produces a signal to

14

turn NSD off. Voltage +400 V is generated by HV power supply for GM counter that measures gamma ray ambient dose rate. Voltage +1600 V is generated for neutron detector (ND) detecting neutron radiation. LED indicates the NSD "On" mode. Signals generated by ND follow to the discriminator via CSA. The discriminator produces logical signals, duration 40 s, if ND signal amplitude exceeds T/4. T is an average pulse amplitude distribution value corresponding to the peak of thermal neutron full absorption in
3

He proportional counters.

Logical signals come to the controllers counter where their number per unity of time is digitized. GM counter signals also come to the controller that conducts statistically data processing, via pulse former. The pulse shaper forms logical signals 40 s length. NSD operation modes are changed with buttons F1, F2, and "Switch On". The "Switch On" button becomes functional when NSD is turned on. Information from the controller comes to LCD so that NSD modes of operation and the results of data processing are indicated on the screen. Controller-PC data exchange interface is provided by USB-controller. LED "Alarm", vibrator, and piezodynamic are triggered by controller through electronic keys K2 and K3, and through LF amplifier. LED illumination is controlled via electronic key K1. In order to save in RAM circular buffer data obtained as the result of measurements and to supply the internal timer NSD is provided with the subsidiary Ni-MH battery with capacity 0,07 Ah and voltage 3,6V (SB RAM).

15

Fig.

5. Functional diagram of NSD KSAR1U.06.

16

4.2 Algorithm of operation NSD modes of operation are TEST, WARM UP, BACKGROUND, SEARCH, INTEGRAL, and SETUP. When it turns on NSD goes on to the TEST mode and checks the proper functioning of intrinsic systems. Acoustic indicator, display illumination, LED and vibrosignal are all switched on for approx. 1 second. Software version, time, and date are displayed on the screen (Fig. 6). Duration of TEST mode is 5 s.

Fig.

6. TEST mode screen view.

WARM UP mode is active on completing the TEST mode. Fig. 7 shows the WARM UP screen view. Duration of this process is 60 s.

Fig. 7. WARM UP mode screen view. Indication of current operational status and elapsed time in WARM UP mode is displayed in the center of the screen. The current time indication from the internal RTC microcontroller timer is displayed in the right lower corner. Since the timer is operated from the subsidiary Ni-MH battery, the current time is not lost when NSD is turned off. Rectangle in the lower right corner of the screen indicates the RB status. Filled rectangle indicates the maximum RB charge, blank frame warns of forthcoming discharge of the NSD and that RB is to be charged. If the latter is the case acoustic signal (0,5 s, 0,5 kHz) is generated at 10 s intervals. If it is unnecessary to warm NSD up (e.g., a short-term break), WARM UP mode can be canceled by pressing the button F1. On completion up warming, NSD turns into BACKGROUND mode. Fig. 8 shows

BACKGROUND mode screen view.

Fig. 8. BACKGROUND mode screen view. Neutron background flux value is needed for searching neutron source measures while operating in SEARCH/INTEGRAL mode. BACKGROUND mode cannot be cancelled in contrast to WARM UP mode. When pressing the button F1, NSD turns into SETUP mode. If during the background measurement no neutron counts were detected, the system warns about fatal malfunction (Fig. 9). Attempt to press F1 button leads to repeated Background measurement.

Fig.

9. No neutron counts screen view.

BACKGROUND mode also analyses count rate in gamma-ray detection channel (GM counter). Contrary to above mentioned neutron malfunction, gamma-ray malfunctioning is not a fatal error and after displaying the corresponding message (Fig. 10) the NSD allows operator to continue operation by pressing a button (F1 or F2).

Fig.

10. No gamma counts screen view.

On completion operation in BACKGROUND mode, NSD turns into the SEARCH mode that is used for searching and localization neutron sources as well as verification of alarms. Fig. 11 shows the SEARCH mode screen view.

18

Fig.

11. SEARCH mode screen view

The right upper corner of the screen indicates specified sampling time (dT), prompt count rate (N), average background count rate (B) and alarm threshold in standard statistical deviation units (Th). Neutron (Dn) and gamma ray (Dg) ambient dose rate values and specified radiological safety alarm threshold (SA) in Svh-1 are indicated lower. Dose rate updating interval is 10 s and is not user-selectable in contrast to the sampling time and detection threshold. To estimate a tendency of their change, obtained count rate values over the last 70 s are shown by diagram. Scaling is controlled automatically. For quick Y-axes rescaling, shift NSD into the SETUP or INTEGRAL mode followed by going to the SEARCH mode. Active alarm indicators (acoustic, LED and vibro) are displayed under the diagram with corresponding symbol. All three indicators are switchable and can be activated / deactivated independently in the SETUP mode. Beneath there is a formalism of generating alarm signal. The system triggers an alarm if

N B + Th B + 2 , where

N - is number of neutron counts within sampling time ;

B - is background count rate within sampling time;

Th - sigma multiplier.

On with 0,5

exceeding Hz

of

the

prompt acoustic

count alarm

rate

value on,

over

specified height

alarm being

threshold, the corresponding indication is displayed (Fig. 12), LED flashes frequency, turns tone proportional to alarm threshold exceeding value.

Fig.

12. SEARCH mode screen view on exceeding alarm threshold.

19

A circular buffer for alarm related information recording is provided for the device. Alarm time, date, sampling time, can be read out by the PC. NSD can be shifted in SETUP or INTEGRAL mode by pressing F1 or F2-button correspondingly. INTEGRAL mode is intended to detect and verify weak neutron sources that cannot be detected in the SEARCH mode because of the insufficient measurement time. Fig. 13 shows the INTEGRAL mode screen view.

N , sigma multiplier and

B are

recorded in one event. The buffer capacity is 4096 events. Data from memory

Fig.

13. INTEGRAL mode screen view.

NSD displays the following items in this mode: TIME Elapsed time (since START button (F1) was pressed) N Number of neutron counts accumulated since START button (F1) was pressed B Number of background neutrons simply estimated as product of time left and average background count rate earlier in BACKGROUND mode CPS Average count rate over the elapsed time, CPS = N

TIME

ERR statistical uncertainty of average count rate with confidence level 0.9 The data are updated on the screen once a second. On pressing STOP (F1) button NSD compares N and B and generates the message (Fig. 14)

N > B if the expression N B + 3 B

is correct. Otherwise the

N-B underline is not displayed.

Fig.

14. INTEGRAL mode screen view on exceeding background.

Measurement cycle repeats on pressing F1-button. NSD returns to the SEARCH mode if F2-button is pressed.

20

SETUP mode is intended to optimize NSD performance to the user requirements and operation conditions. To shift in the SETUP mode, the password is required (Fig. 15).

Fig.

15. Entering password.

A digit above the marker shifts from 0 to 9 on pressing F1. To shift to the next option press the F2-button. When the last digit of the password is entered, in case the password is legal, the main menu of the SETUP mode is displayed on the screen, otherwise message ILLEGAL PASSWORD displays on the screen. (Fig. 16). Pressing any button returns the device to the previous mode before shifting in the SETUP mode. The password is given in the NSD certificate.

Fig.

16. Illegal password entered.

Main menu of the SETUP mode is shown in Fig. 17.

Fig. Menu option is realized

17. Main menu of the SETUP mode. by pressing the F1-button, and by F2-button to

confirm the choice. When the F2-buttton is pressed in Return option, the device returns to the mode in which it operated before shifting in the SETUP

21

mode. The device shifts in BACKGROUND mode in case Review BACKGROUND option is chosen. All NSD options are set up in the manufacturer specified condition when All Default option is chosen (Table 5). In this case, the confirmation menu is displayed on the screen (Fig. 18).

Fig. mode.

18. Confirmation menu of the All Default option.

Any other option means turns into the corresponding submenu of the SETUP Setting options in the BACKGROUND and SETUP mode is realized in the submenu MEASURE OPTIONS (Fig. 19).

Fig. press the F2-button.

19. Submenu MEASURE OPTIONS.

To choose an option, press the F1-button, and to confirm the choice Sampling time in SEARCH mode is specified by the option DWELL TIME and varies from 1 to 10 s (step 1 s). Duration of the background count rate measurement in the BACKGROUND mode is specified by the option BKGD TIME and takes on values 100, 200, 300, 500, and 1000 s. Note, that at normal background conditions ( 0.015 n

s cm 2

the background count rate is to be 0.10.2 CPS. Therefore, to get a sufficient statistical accuracy of the data the minimum duration 300 sec should be applied. BKGD CORRECT option is YES/NO. It means whether correction of average background value in the BACKGROUND mode takes place in the SEARCH mode depending on the current count rate fixed. In order to avoid variation of average background count rate on approaching the neutron source, this option is not corrected in case the current count rate exceeds the alarm threshold. ALARM TRSH (sigma multiplier) parameter directly reflects to probability of detection and false alarm rate, because it sets alarm threshold. This

22

value has the dimensions of the standard deviation unit and varies from 1 to 6. ALARM LED, ALARM BEEP, and ALARM VIBR. options activate/deactivate the corresponding alarm indicators. The options are YES/NO. Radiological safety alarm threshold of total neutron and gamma ray dose rate value is set in SAFETY ALARM submenu.

Fig.

20. Alarm threshold total dose rate specifying menu.

Radiation dose rate are analyzed once in 10 s. Alarm indication is turned on in case alarm threshold is exceeded: LED flash frequency is 0,25 Hz, permanent acoustic alarm appears and corresponding message is shown on the screen. Dose rate is monitored in all operational modes, and alarm threshold indication is of priority. For example, in case the search threshold and the radiological NSD safety in dose two rate threshold Russian are or exceeded English. simultaneously, The language is indication corresponds to the dose rate threshold. operates languages selected by means of submenu LANGUAGES.

Fig.

21. Submenu LANGUAGES.

Switch on/off illumination of the screen is controlled by LIGHTING submenu.

Fig.

22. Illumination control panel.

Display illumination remains switched off in case ALWAYS OFF option is chosen except only illumination switch on for 40 s at every press on the Switch On button provided for changing illumination conditions in the dark. Display is permanently illuminated in ALWAYS ON mode.

23

40 SEC mode illuminates the display for 40 s at every press on any button, at changing operation modes (including automatic modes), at exceeding of the detection threshold in SEARCH mode, and at exceeding the radiological safety alarm threshold. Note, that display illumination is one of the most power consuming NSD part. Avoiding frequently use of ALWAYS ON option provides longer operational life time of NSD without recharging batteries. Use TIME/DATE menu to change current time and date. Time is indicated on the bottom right corner of the screen, and date indication is in square brackets. Press F1 button to select the option and F2 button to vary it.

Fig.

23. TIME/DATE mode screen view.

To turn NSD off, press Switch on button and hold it for 5 s. Corresponding screen message is shown in Fig. 24.

Fig.

24. Shutdown menu.

Shutdown is possible in any operation mode. YES option turns NSD off, NO option returns NSD into the current operation mode all data being retained. Use F1 and/or F2 buttons to select and confirm your choice. NSD is linked with PC via USB-port, software-assisted being delivered. Executive instructions are provided to inquire about the current status of NSD and current neutron and gamma ray dose characteristics, to read the data on specified detection alarm threshold exceeding events from the buffer, to clear the event buffer, to inquire about the current measurement date in SEARCH or INTEGRAL mode, and to control NSD with the instructions that emulate pressing F1 and F2 buttons. To link the device with PC: connect NSD to output connector of PC USB-port with the cable form the delivery set; run setup.exe from CD disk supplied; follow the instructions from the Inquiry menu of the NSD interface program.

24

Table 5. Specified options 1 Option DWELL TIME Sampling mode, s 2 BACKGROUND Duration of background count 100, 200, 300, rate measurement, s 3 BKGD CORRECT Automatic adjustment of the average background value depending on the current count rate 4 ALARM TRSH Sigma multiplier, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 ALARM LED Activation / Deactivation of LED indicator under alarm condition 6 ALARM BEEP Activation / Deactivation of acoustic signal indicator under alarm condition 7 ALARM VIBR. Activation / Deactivation of vibro-indicator under alarm condition 8 SAFETY ALARM Radiological safety alarm threshold dose rate, Svh 9 LANGUAGE Working language
-1

Purpose time in SEARCH

Value range 110, step 1

Default 4

100

500, 1000 YES/NO YES

YES/NO

YES

YES/NO

YES

YES/NO

YES

20, 50, 100, 200, 500 Russian, English

200

English

10

LIGHTING

Display illumination

YES, NO, 40 s

40 s

4.3. Results of trial operation and laboratory tests. The acceptance test and trial operation were performed at Federal state Unitary Enterprises Scientific Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research, Saint Petersburg, Russia, at Headquarters IAEA, Vienna, Austria and at Austrian Research Centre, Seibersdorf. After the first test phase the number of recommendations and suggestions were made to improve functional and technical performance of NSD. Then the necessary changes were applied to its design. The final, production prototype was tested at Scientific of experts from IAEA Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research. Dr. Rolf Arlt, Dr. Yury Kulikov and Dr. Martha Beneath, there are reports on the results of NSD test, performed by group Svoboda.

25

4.3.1. Informal type tests, test of a new Neutron Search Device KSAR1U.06 at Seibersdorf performed in 2003-12-18 by Dr. M. Swoboda, SGTS/TNS The neutron sensitivity of RIDs is sufficient to trigger an alarm caused by a neutron source corresponding Pu) to the ITRAP specifications sensitivity for is fixed much installed systems (20000n/s But the neutron now

higher than requested in the ITRAP specifications. A neutron source hidden in a car detected by the fixed installed system cannot be detected by RIDs. We already tested the MKC-A02 in summer 2003 (Report: Testing the Hand-held MKC-A02 in Comparison with the Exploranium Border Monitor). The results in summer 2003 have shown that a new hand-held neutron detector is needed to match the sensitivity of RIDs. For the tests now we used a new neutron search device (KSAR1U.06, Prototype developed by the Scientific Engineering Centre, Nuclear Physics Research), one MKC-A02 and one NRM-477. Different neutron sources were hidden into a car and a search process was performed. The new neutron search device has a sufficient sensitivity for searching and locating a neutron source detected with a border monitor system having a sensitivity of 9350n/s for 8km/h. a. b. Car detection test Search test

Used instruments Equipment: Exploranium border monitoring system (AT-920) MKC-A02 NRM-477 NSD (New Search Device) NSD Setup: Dwell time BG measurement time BG correction Alarm Threshold Safety Alarm 2 1500cps 2s 100s Yes

Fig. 25. NSD, MKC-A02, NRM-477.

26

A. Car test The first used source corresponds to the Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment Draft Rev 18.5, 19 December 2003, especially to the dynamic test with moving sources. All four used Pu sources together correspond to 150g WGPu or a neutron rate of 9350n/s. A car containing four Pu sources in a lead container passed the detection pillars of the fixed installed system AT-920 (Exploranium). In the first run the car speed was too high therefore only a g-alarm was triggered. The car speed was reduced for the second run and the result caused by the same sources on the same place was a neutron alarm Source: All four PuO2 CBNM Standards in the transport box (10mm lead)

B. Neutron vehicle search Different selections of a set of Pu sources were hidden (each after another) on different places into the car and a search process was performed. The first step was always to locate the source from outside of the car. For this purpose all three instruments were used. General procedure: Step1: Using the instrument with the most sensitive side towards the car (Fig. 28) go once around the car with a search speed of <50cm/s at a height of about 60cm about ground The test was counted successful if the user was able to get a neutron signal determining from outside the quadrant of the car where the source was located. Step2: Access source. If there was no signal during searching in step 1, the source was searched using the step 2 procedures, what is much more time consuming. If the source was found within 10 minutes, the test was still counted successful. the quadrant (open trunk, door, motor cover, etc.) and find the

Fig. 26. Search process with the most sensitive side towards the car.

27

Table 6. Plutonium sources used for evaluation Source Pu93 O2 Pu84 O2 Pu70 O2 Pu61 O2 Equivalent mass of weapon grade Pu [g] 10.25 21 46 64 Neutrons/second 680 1390 3060 4220

The total neutron production rate is therefore at least 9350n/s. The total mass is approximately equivalent to about 150g of weapon grade metal plutonium. B.1 Used sources container Searching Results MKC-A02 NRM-477 NSD the car B.2 Used sources Pu93 O2, Pu84 O2, Pu70 O2 and Pu61 O2 in the lead transport container on a different location as in B.1. was detected, but very slow, scanning movement was required was not able to detect the source from outside of the car has clearly indicated the location of the source from outside of Pu93 O2, Pu84 O2, Pu70 O2 and Pu61 O2 in the lead transport

Fig. 27 Lead transport container in the trunk of the car. Searching Results MKC-A02 NRM-477 the car NSD the car. B.3 Used sources Pu 61 O2 source (reactor grade Plutonium) in the lead transport container. Before the car test was performed a simple detection check was done. Result: MKC-A02 Neutron alarm triggered in a distance of 10 cm from the surface of the transport box The location of the sources was clearly indicated from outside of the detection process was marginal it was not possible to detect the sources from outside of

28

NRM-477 instrument

There was no possibility to detect the source with this

The Pu 61 O2 source in the lead container was hidden in the trunk of the car Searching Result MKC-A02 the car NRM-477 NSD --- not used It was possible to locate at first from outside the part of the There was no possibility to find the source from outside of

car, which was containing the source. A search process inside the car also exactly located the source. B.4 Used sources Pu 84 O2 source (nearly weapon grade Plutonium) in the lead transport container. The Pu 84 O2 source in the lead container was hidden in the cabin of the car MKC-A02 NRM-477 if not hidden) NSD source from outside. It was marginal and time consuming. Summary on the results of the test The NRM-477 does not fulfill the requirements of neutron search device at all. It was also the only of those three instruments, which was not able to directly detect the Pu 61 O2 source (reactor grade plutonium). The NSD is at least 5.5 times more sensitive than the NRM 477. All three tests were also performed with the MKC-A02 (old model), which is about two times more sensitive than the NRM-477. This MKC is quite on the detection limit and the search process was slow. The new neutron search device, NSD passed all searching tests. This device has the highest neutron sensitivity of all tested devices. It has also a bar graph indication for the search process as usually used in the gamma search process simultaneously with an audio signal. This instrument is still a prototype and some usability features need improvement. 4.3.2. Laboratory Acceptance Test of the Neutron Search Device Hand Held Neutron Monitor KSAR1U. 06 performed by Dr. Yu. Kulikov 25.02.2004 Technical Performance Specifications A. The Acceptance Test has been performed according to the Chapter 6.4 of the Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment Draft 18.5 (December 2004), which contains the following items: A.1 Absolute detection efficiency: shall be not less than 20 cps per n/s cm for fission spectrum neutrons; It was only with a slow speed scanning method possible to find the There was no possibility to locate the source from outside. There was no possibility to detect the source at all (even

29

A.2 SNM detection limit: shall be not more than 100 g of WGPu at 1 m distance and 10 s measurement time (80% detection probability at 95% confidence level) in standard neutron background; A.3 False Alarm Rate (FAR): shall be less than 1/10 min at a 2 s dwell time at 95% confidence level in standard neutron background; A.4 Safety Alarm: shall be triggered, when the dose rate on the detector surface exceeds 100 Sv/h. The safety alarm level shall be user settable. A.5 Gamma insensitivity: shall be no neutron alarm at a gamma dose rate (Co-60) not less than 100 Sv/h at the detector surface; A.6 Search mode: MCS The acoustic with on the and visual indication audio have signal on the of the the neutron source and to a

localization (optional) distance.

process graph alarm

changing display should

repetition source to

rate

depending

detector

algorithm

option

adapt

continuously or slowly changing background; A.7 Environmental: Temperature range 20 + 50 degrees Centigrade; non-

condensing humidity 90% at 35 degrees Centigrade; A.8 Electromagnetic compatibility: not considered in this report.

Requirements are listed in paragraphs 5.4.18 5.4.22 of the Draft 18.5; A.9 Battery life: 8 hours without alarm and 3 hours at alarm conditions; A.10 Physical dimensions: 300x200x150 mm and 4 kg; A.11 Ruggedness: waterproof under rain conditions; resistant to drop test in its shipping case (1 m height).

B. Test of the main Functional Requirements 1.1 through 1.6. Test source. The strongest 252Cf source available at the headquarters # K867 was used for sensitivity assessment in both static (1.1 and 1.2) and dynamic search modes. (1.6) The source supplier data: 11.1E+5 Bq (3E-5 Ci) on of 1989-01-15, nuclear which

corresponds to No = 12.9 E+4 n/s intensity [ 1Bq = (2.646/85.5)*3.757 = 0.116, reference: Passive non-destructive assay materials, LA-UR-90-732 ]. Presumably, this value is subject to 10% uncertainty. Taking into account 2.646 y half-decay time, the K867 source activity at 2004-02-10 shall be: N = No * exp [ - 0.693 * 15.07 / 2.646 ] = 2500 +/-250 n/s The actual neutron intensity was also estimated by a standard IAEA HLNC counter of 0.175+/-0.010 absolute detection efficiency for fission neutrons

30

on 2003-07-02, and resulted in 437+/-7 cps, which corresponds (on 2004-02-10) to N = (437 / 0.175) * exp [ - 0.693 * 0.58/2.646 ] = 2150 +/- 130 n/s. Finally the K867 source intensity used for the test results assessment was arbitrarily set as 2300 n/s B.1 Absolute detection efficiency Absolute detection efficiency was measured in INTEGRAL mode at different (from 20 up to 120 cm) distances with less than 5% statistical uncertainty each. Background counts (0.15 cps) were always subtracted. Results are presented in the following Table 8: Table 7. L, cm N, cps F, n/scm N/F 150 0.41 0.008 51 120 0.55 0.013 42 100 0.72 0.018 40 80 0.89 0.029 31 60 1.52 0.050 30 40 2.42 0.114 21 20 6.31 0.458 14 10 14.3 1.83 8

Neutron follow

flux, just

F, 4/3

was

calculated Detector

for has

point about

geometry 100x250

and mm

no

scattering area.

effects, and both assumptions are not valid. Instead of 1/R law the N counts power. sensitive Nevertheless, the absolute detection efficiency requirement can be considered as met: 40 cps per 1 unit of flux at 1m distance, and 30 cps per 1 unit of flux at 80 cm distance. Declared value is 24 cps at 1 m. Specs minimum requirement is 20 cps. B.2. SNM detection limit Specs 18.5 test method requires at least 45 alarms at 50 tests when Cf252 source of 6500 n/s intensity is measured at 1 m distance with 10 s dwell time. It is equivalent to 2300 n/s at 60 cm distance. Actual measurement results are as follows: Table 8. L, cm Alarms 60 50/50 70 46/50 80 37/50 90 32/50 100 21/50

SNM detection limit requirement is met. B.3 False Alarm Rate (FAR)

Calculations show that the required FAR 1/300 at 95% confidence level can be achieved measured at at the these average FAR probability conditions), equal it to 0.0012 to (binomial the alarm distribution). Assuming Poisson statistics at 0.11 cps background (FAR was background corresponds

31

threshold of 1.50 cps at 2 s dwell time, or about 2.3 cps at 1 s dwell time. According to the manufacturer, the alarm threshold algorithm is: A = B + SIG sqrt (B) + 2. To satisfy the above FAR requirement actual alarm threshold A shall be higher than 1.50 at 2 s dwell time, and higher than 2.3 at 1 s dwell time (at 0.11 cps background) The above relation allows to estimate that at dwell time 2 s and SIG=2, the alarm A = 1.58 cps. At dwell time 1 s and SIG=2, the alarm A = 2.77 cps. Hence, 2 SIG should be enough. Results of actual measurements were as follows: At 1s dwell time and 2 sigma: 11 alarms at 14 hours. At 2 s dwell time and 2 sigma: 1 alarm at 2 hours; at 2s dwell time and 3 sigma: 0 alarms at 4 hours. All results satisfy the FAR acceptance criteria at 2 sigma and 0.11 cps background. However, calculations show that the FAR requirements at background higher than 0.2 cps can be reliably (better than 95% confidence level) met at 3 sigma only. Final recommendation: At < 0.2 cps background 2 sigma meet the FAR

requirement; at > 0.2 cps background 3 sigma shall be used. B.4 Safety Alarm.

The test was performed at SIL with 4 Cf252 sources (## PP770, 771, 772, 773) of total activity 1.27 MBq = 150 000 n/s. Assuming 1/R law such source creates 100 Sv/h at approximately 12 cm distance. Direct measurement with calibrated MKS-A02 detector registered 100 Sv/h at 17 cm, which can be accepted keeping in mind scattering effects. The tested NSD has a selectable safety alarm threshold from 50 cps till 2000 cps. Direct measurements with above Cf 252 sources resulted in the following Safety Alarm Threshold Neutron dose rate numbers: Table 9. Alarm, cps Sv/h Dist., cm 50 6.2 120 100 12.5 73 200 25 47 500 62 24 1000 125 13 1500 190 8 2000 250 4

For example, the Safety Alarm Threshold of 1000 cps corresponds to 125 Sv/h. In real practice this value seems to be too high. It can be recommended to set the Safety Alarm Threshold at 200 cps, or about 25 Sv/h.

32

The acceptance criterion is met. B.5 B.6 Gamma insensitivity. To be done Search mode.

18.5 Specs require movement of 20000 n/s Cf252 source from about 2 m till about 10 cm distance at about 0.1 speed and 2 s dwell time. The audio alarm signal should trigger at about 1.2 m and increase its frequency until the maximum value when the minimal distance is reached. The MCS graph should adequately reflect the process of signal intensity change. Source of 20000 n/s intensity at 1.2 m distance creates about 0.11 n/s cm flux. The used K867 source of 2300 n/s creates such flux at about 40 cm distance, or slightly more because of scattering effects, and the net neutron counts rate of about 2.4 cps (see paragraph B.2). The search mode simulation was realized with the rotating machine, as illustrated in the following figure.

Fig. 28 Search mode scheme. The source is rotated on the end of the pole of R = 40 cm length. The maximum source-detector distance is 2R+L=90 cm, and minimum is L=10 cm. The rotator speed is variable from 0.75 till 20 circles per minute. The test was performed at the source linear speed of about 3 cm/s, 9 cm/s, and 18 cm/s. This is equivalent to the time intervals of about 23 s, 8 s and 3 s, when the source-detector distance is within 40 cm. Background value was 0.19 cps. Alarm level at 2 s dwell time and 3 sigma criterion was 0.38 + 3*0.62 + 2 = 4.2/2 = 2.1 cps. All tests have given positive results, and the MCS graphs clearly indicated rise and fall of the signal level. The maximum counts rate at the shortest distance was about 10 15 cps which agrees with the static mode tests (2.2). The test has been repeated with artificial background value of 0.8 cps, which is equivalent to the largest source-detector distance of 90cm. At these

33

conditions the detector alarm level increases up to 3.7 cps at 2 s dwell time and up to 5.5 cps at 1 s dwell time. Again all tests were positive, but the duration of the alarm signal was shorter. At the rotator high speed there was delaying of the alarm sound of about 1 - 2 s. The search mode test results are positive. Criterion is met. B.7 Environmental

The test was only partly performed. At 20 degrees the device was still functional, but the battery life was considerably shorter: 45 hours instead of 8 hours at normal conditions. B.8 Electromagnetic Not considered here. B.9 Battery life. It was checked as 8 hours at least without alarm conditions. Operational during recharging time, which is about 23 hours. B.10 Physical dimensions 300x160x120 and 4.6 kg slightly more than recommended (4 kg), but acceptable. B.11 Ruggedness Not tested we have one prototype only!

4.3.3. Comparative test of the NSD (Neutron Search Device) No 1 and No 2 performed by Dr. Yu. Kulikov on 23 March 2004 No 1 No 2 KSAR1U.06 Berthold LB 6414

A. Test at the Prater Atom institute A.1 Insensitivity to Gamma radiation. Cs137 source producing 1.2 mGy/h 1t 1 m distance was used. At the same room there was a strong PuBe neutron source producing 5E+6 n/s. When it was moved to the longest possible distance from the measurement station the neutron background was still about 2 cps (KSAR1U) and 0.8 cps (LB 6414). Both NSD were exposed to the Cs137 source gamma radiation of about 0.075 mGy/h or approximately 100 Sv/h. The neutron counts rate results were: No 1: cps. No 2: cps. Standard gamma background: 0.8+/-7% cps; 100 mkSv/h: 0.8 +/-7% Standard gamma background: 2.1+/-5% cps; 100 mkSv/h: 2.15+/-5%

34

Conclusion: Both NSD are not sensitive to gamma radiation of 100 mkSv/h A.2 Neutron detection efficiency Measurements, performed with Cf252 source of 2300 n/s intensity resulted in: No 1: 40 cm^2 at 100 cm, 31 cm^2 at 80 cm, 30 cm^2 at 60 cm, 21cm^2 at 40 cm No 2: 20 cm^2 at 100 cm, 16 cm^2 at 80 cm, 13 cm^2 at 60 cm, 10 cm^2 at 40 cm PRST: 40 -50 cm^2 at 40 cm.

Results 1. No1 NSD has at least 2 times higher neutron efficiency comparative to No2. 2. PRST has shown 22.5 higher efficiency than No 1. Keeping in mind, that the sensitive area of the PRST is 500 cm^2 (about 250 cm^2 for No 1), the intrinsic efficiency ratio PRST/No 1 will be 1.0 till 1.25, i.e. about the same. 4.4.5 The Neutron Search Device (NSD) Functional/Technical Specifications and Hand Held Neutron Monitor KSAR1U.06 Acceptance Criteria and Check List Acceptance criteria of NSD were established for Border in Chapter 6 of the

Technical/Functional

Specifications

Radiation

Monitoring

Equipment, Version 18.5 (December 2004). The following is a detailed point-by-point comparison of the NSD functional requirements formulated in 18.5 (pages 4852) versus parameters of the prototype device KSAR1U.06, resulting from the tests and trial operation described in 4.4.1-4.4.3. Acceptance Test Items and Check List are presented in Table 10. Acceptance Test Item 6.3.1 Generic Requirements Y Y Restricted access ?? Yes/No Comments

a) Single-handed operation b) Selectable Safety alarm threshold shown on display c) Rugged design for outdoor use d) Illuminated display e) Battery life for use at least 8 hours f) Critical parameters re-settable to factory defaults g) Minimum buttons to operate h) Easy decontamination

Y Y Y Y

To be checked

Restricted access ??

Y (3) Y Not checked

35

i) Suitable documentation j) Power on diagnostics, date and time 6.3.2 Detector a) High efficiency e4quivalent to a moderated He3 b) Reasonable insensitivity to gamma radiation c) Integrated in one instrument case d) Optional simple gamma detector for safety alarm 6.3.3 Display and visual indication a) Adequate display size, illuminated user settable, contrast adjustment, manual adjustment, if needed b) Capability for multi lingual support c) Indications in timer counter mode: time,cps,error d) Set up for search mode: dwell time, number of sigma e) Indication in search mode: cps, dwell time, sigma f) Permanent indications: battery status, safety alarm th., sigma, dwell time, alarm sound status g) POST message, SW and HV, date/time, memory h) Mode indication (INT, SEARCH, SET) i) Graphic signal intensity indication (MCS optional) j) Alert/alarm indication and sigma multiplier k) neutron dose rate indication l) indication of remaining battery life m) date and time

N Y - N

Not available Date and Time only

3 tubes in polyethylene

To be tested

Y N To be incorporated

Size is OK, no adjustments

Y (?) Y

English only Integer mode

Y - N

Cps only

Y - N

Battery status and alarm threshold

Y - N

Date and time only

Y Y MCS

Sigma in set up only

N Y Y

Cps only

36

6.3.4 Acoustic signals a) Alarm sounds, tone height, LED, vibration Y b) Increasing rate c) Visual and acoustic dose rate/cps alarm for safety d) Visual and acoustic low battery alarm e) Silent and audible alarm capability: screen massage 6.3.5 Internal memory and PC link a, d) Storage for >1000 alarms; standard file info, all setup and diagnostic data and measurement results b) PC with standard interface c) ASCI data format 6.3.6 Power supply a) Rechargeable and non-rechargeable battery N option b) Setup is dead c) Auto voltage setting, world wide AC adapter, car d) Switch to trickle charge, if left on mains power e,f,g) Charging and full charge indication. Time is less than discharge time. Charge is possible during operation 6.4 Technical and functional performance 6.4.1 Neutron sensitivity 6.4.1.1/2 Absolute efficiency: not less 20 cps/n/s cm 6.4.1.3/4 SNM detection: not more than 100 g Y WGPu 6.4.1.5/6 FAR less than 1/300 at standard Y See test report See test report Y See test report Y ? Y - N and data not lost, if main battery Y (?) To be tested Rechargeable only Y Y USB Y-N Circular buffer, 2048 Date/time, cps, dwell time Y-N ?? N Y Visual and acoustic,at preset cps Visual indication only Tone height and LED

37

background 6.4.1.7/8 Safety Alarm: at 100 Sv/h; user settable 6.4.2/3 Gamma insensitivity: not less than 100 Sv/h 6.4.4 Alarm setting: visual / acoustic; displayed on the screen; adjustable within full range (restricted access) 6.4.5/6 Search mode: source localization process indication; MCS (optional); Y rescaling; bkg update 6.4.7 Environmental: operational at 20 - + 50 degrees 6.4.8 Electromagnetic compatibility 6.4.9 Battery life: 8 h without alarm, 3 h with alarm; operational during recharge; recharge time < 8 hours 6.4.10 Physical dimensions: max 300x200x100; Y 4 kg 6.4.11 Ruggedness: waterproof under rain; drop test ?? Not tested ? Y ? Not considered here 8 h without alarm; alarm not tested; recharge is 2 hours 300x160x120; 4.6 kg ? Tested at 2O only Y See test report Y Restricted access ?? Y 100 Sv/h Cs-137 Y See test report

Preliminary assessment. A. Most of the technical and functional requirements, including high neutron sensitivity, are met. B. A few parameters still require testing: - environmental test at + 50 degrees (6.4.7) Presumably OK

- alarm condition battery life (6.4.9) Presumably OK - data, set up parameters and time stamp shall not be lost, when battery is dead (6.3.6 b); Yes - electromagnetic compatibility (6.4.8) - ruggedness (6.4.11) - easy decontamination (6.3.1.h) Presumably OK C. Some of the required by Specs 18.5 parameters are not realized at present prototype device version: a) Suitable documentation. Absolutely necessary.

38

b) Simple gamma detector for safety alarm. Optional, but very useful feature. c) Safety alarm at INTEGRAL mode. It is necessary d) Some relevant alarm event parameters are not stored in the memory file (Alarm threshold, number of sigma). It is necessary e) Display contrast adjustment. f) Bilingual support (English only). Presumably can be provided with any requested language (?) g) Neutron dose rate indication (cps only). Very desirable for fission

neutron spectra h) No non-rechargeable battery option. Is it possible to realize? i) Set up option is not password protected for restricted access to

parameters adjustment. Desirable j) acoustic low battery alarm . Desirable. Additional requests: 1. The device can be used in unattended mode, but in such a case a red light flush shall be provided (optional: remote signalization on the custom officer desk?) 2. It is desirable to provide measures against accidental turn on/off of the instrument (during transportation, or accidentally by the user). 4.4.6. Improvement of NSD according to IAEA experts recommendations and suggestions. As it stated in Table 11 the number of improvement need to be made to enhance NSD usability. On the second phase of the Project all suggestions and recommendations were compiled, analyzed and the items to be improved were listed. Perfomance of the second generation of NSD was improved according to suggestions of acceptance tests and trial operation. The list of improvement is given in Table 11 Status in NSD KSAR1U.06 ver. 1. 1 Suitable documentation was not provided Status in NSD KSAR1U.06 ver. 2. Operating manual including circuit diagrams and connection diagrams 2 No gamma detector GM detector 0.06-3.0 MeV to indicate ambient gamma ray dose rate 3 4 No safety alarm in INTEGRAL mode Relevant alarm event were not stored in the NSD memory Done Done

39

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Display contrast adjustment Multilingual support No neutron dose rate indication No non-rechargeable batteries Free access to setup parameter adjustment No low battery alarm signal No LED indicator for using instrument in unattended mode No measures against accidental turn on/off of the instrument (during transportation, or accidentally by the user).

No Russian, English Done No Password protected Yes LED super bright LED on the face panel Additional protective washer to prevent from accidental switching New IP 55 Connector Corrected

13 14

USB/Charge connector is not splash water protected Some suggestions to user interface

In addition, the weight of the NSD was decreased to 4.2 kg, additional handle and vibro signal were added. The resulting NSD technical specification is given in Table 12. # 1 2 Parameter Absolute detection sensitivity of NSD to fission neutrons at 1 m, 1/n cm
2

Value 23 1.2104

Alarm threshold, corresponding to the probability of detection 0.8, velocity of scanning 0.5 m/s, and distance of closest approach to the source 1 m, n/s

3 4 5 6 7

False alarm rate Intrinsic background of NSD at standard background, CPS The range of Ambient gamma ray dose rate, Svh
-1

1:600 s 0.2 0.141400 8 100

Duration of continues operation under no alarm condition (LED lightning always off), h No alarm generated when exposed to Co-60 gamma ray source, producing at the sensitive surface on NSD ambient dose rate, Svh-1

8 9 10 11

Dimensions, length width height, mm Range of operating temperatures, 0C Sealed to Net weight, kg

300160130 -20+50 IP 55 4.2

40

5. Feasibility study of LiI(Eu) detector based RID and SPRD. The goal of the second part of the Project was a development of innovative approach for radiation detection and implementation such a technique for radioisotope identification device and spectral personal radiation detector. The identification of the isotope causing a radiation alarm at a border monitor or within the country is essential for a quick resolution of the case. Commonly, hand-held radioisotope identification devices (RIDs) are used to solve this task. Although a number of such devices are commercially available, there is a gap between the requirements of the final users and what is technically feasible. Several components are essential for the performance of such devices:
6

The quality of the raw data the gamma spectra; Isotope identification software matching the specifics of a certain gamma detector; Intrinsic sensitivity to gamma rays and neutrons.

The goal of the second phase of the project was the feasibility study of LiI(Eu) detector based RID as one of the promising approach to the problem of radioisotope detection, localization and identification in field. 5.1. The Scientific background of the research work performance of hand-held radioisotope identification devices still

lags the needs and expectations of their users. Gamma peak locations drift by more than the desired 1-2 % if the devices are exposed to high dose rates or significant isotope temperature changes. The non-linearity shielded of the light and output samples requires corrections, which are often less than perfect. This causes spurious indications, problems detecting sources, containing multiple or weak sources. The serious problem of the available RID is insufficient sensitivity to neutrons. RIDs, on the other hand, play a decisive role when used by front line officers in the response-to-detection chain [12]. Large scale radiation monitoring at borders and inside a country can only be successful if the front line officers can quickly decide on the spot whether a radiation alarm was caused by naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), by a medical isotope or whether there is a case of illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material. Although there is a new class of automated spectral radiation portal monitors emerging [13], [14] and [15] a RID remains as the regular instrument for the handling of this task. RIDs are also expected to be needed in the future to support a spectral border monitor to verify the reason for an alarm in the event that was not caused by NORM or a medical isotope. As used RID in is a a multipurpose have the instrument, following which measures gamma ray energy the distribution and dose rate as well as detects neutrons. Spectral detectors, RID, functions, which determine requirements:

41

Gamma spectrometry sufficient to identify the isotope; Sufficient monitor; gamma ray and neutron sensitivity to allow the user to quickly find a weak source which caused a radiation alarm of a portal

Relatively short response time (either decay time of the light flash or the charge collection time in case of a solid state detector) to withstand a high count rate;

Ruggedness to effective application in field; Reasonable price and availability in large numbers.

Recently new gamma ray and neutron detectors were implemented into the technology of radiation detection. These are LaCl3,
6

LiI(Eu),

CdWO4

scintillating detectors and CZT hemispheric and planar detectors with LaCl3 and 6LiI(Eu) - the most promising detectors among them [16]. Under this part of the Project experimental study of to be done and R&D of hand-held performed. 5.2. Technical approach and methodology
6 6

LiI(Eu) detector was

LiI(Eu) based RID and SPRD were to be

The most of commercially available RIDs use NaI(Tl) based detectors IdentiFINDER-NGH (Target) [18], MKC-A03 (ASPECT)[19], GR-135 (Exploranium)[20] and Inspector 1000 (Canberra)[21]. Advantages of NaI(Tl) detectors include good availability, low price and high light output. There are some disadvantages however, which are usually taken into account by RID vendors. They are: non-linearity of the energy scale in low energy (<150 keV) area and strong dependence of light output on temperature. Some instruments implements CsI(Tl)+pin-diode assemply - PM1801, PM1802 (Polymaster)[22]. This combination allows designing very compact, low power detection assemblies. Advantages of this approach are: 1) No high voltage is needed; 2) Low power consumption, small and compact design, 3) Low price, 4) Better resolution for energies above 300 keV. Meanwhile the detectors are sensitive to temperature and thus are hardly applicable for detection of gamma and X-rays with energies below 100 keV at temperatures above 40 C0. Semiconductor identification. Corporation). detectors Room provide the ultimate solution to isotope as CdTe, and temperature with semiconductor better energy detectors such

CdZnTe, HgI2 are used in some RIDs (fieldSPEC-CZT, GR-135 and ICS 4000 (XRF Simultaneously resolution, linearity lower temperature drift, there are some problems, which limit application of these detectors price and small size. General problem of all RID available in the market now low neutron sensitivity, what recently resulted in the appearance of new class of handheld instrument neutron search devices. Even the most sensitive RID MKC-A03 is generally used only for verification of neutron alarm but neither for search nor for localization of the week neutron sources.

42

The big interest to highly enriched

LiI(Eu) crystal (>90% of

Li) as
6

neutron detector due to a high detection efficiency to thermal neutrons. kinetic energy release of 3.78 MeV:

Li

nuclei have a large cross section of 940 barns for (n,) reaction with

n+ 6Li + 3H
This principal feature of the crystal as an efficient neutron detector makes the scintillator very competitive in application to border monitoring [23]. Moreover, scintillators with good performance for gamma ray and neutron detection are of great importance for RID, because in all contemporary instruments without exception the combination of two detectors (gamma and neutron) is used. 6. Experimental study of 6LiI(Eu) As it was noted earlier gamma ray spectrometry of the detector within RID must be sufficient to identify the isotope. Energy resolution, light yield and its non-proportionality to the incident energy, scintillation pulse shape and temperature drift are the most critical parameters for gamma ray spectrometry in RID. Same sample spectra obtained with LiI(Eu) detector is shown in Fig. 1.

10000

Cs-137

Co-60

8000

6000

4000

2000

0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000

Amplitude, keV

Fig. 29. Amplitude spectra of gamma from Cs-137,Co-60 and neutrons from Cf-252.

Cf-252 (neutrons)

43

Energy resolution of the crystal was measured with 6LiI(Eu) detector 4520 mm coupled to 2 bialkali PMT Hamamatsu R6231-01. Anode signal was processed with Spectrometric 2048-channel Analyzer. Some results of the measurements are presented in Figs 30-31.
6x10
3

LiI(Eu) 45x20 mm
25

5x10

Am-241

30

20

C ounts

7.5 %
3x10
3

Co-60 Eu-152

10

1x10

5 100 1000

0 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Energy, keV

Energy, keV

Fig. 30. Energy distribution of gamma rays emitted in Cs-137 decay.

Fig. 31. Energy resolution vs gamma rayenergy.

The data obtained (7.5% for 0.662 MeV) are in a good agreement with that measured in [17] with 6LiI(Eu) 505 + PMT XP5200. The photoelectron number per 1 MeV gamma ray, defined as a ratio between position of the gamma ray peak and the position of single photoelectron peak was measured in [17] and found to be 150001500 phe/MeV (40% of NaI(Tl)). Fig. 32 presents the non-proportionality characteristic of
6

LiI(Eu) in

comparison to that of NaI(Tl) and CsI(Tl) crystals [17]. Non-proportionality is defined here as the ratio of photoelectron yield measured for photopeak at specific gamma-ray energy relative to the yield at 662 keV gamma peak [16].
1,35

Light yield [% of 662 keV]

1,30 1,25 1,20 1,15 1,10 1,05 1,00 0,95 0,90 10 100

LiI NaI(Tl) CsI(Tl)

1000

Energy [keV]
Fig. 32. Non-proportionality of the LiI(Eu) detector.

Th-232

2x10

Cs-137

15

Eu-152

4x10

Energy resolution, %

Ce-139

44

The non-proportionality of

LiI(Eu) follows the general behavior of the

halide crystals with an excess of light at low energies. However, the value of non-proportionality relative to that of NaI(Tl) crystal is much less, what makes the use of crystal more attractive for detection of low energy gamma ray. Sufficient gamma ray and neutron sensitivity of RID allows the user to quickly find a weak source which caused a radiation alarm of a portal monitor. Therefore, intrinsic detection efficiency is also very important characteristics of the detector. The main properties of LiI(Eu) crystal are compiled in Table 13 [14]. Table 13. Characteristics of scintillators. Parameters Density [g/cm3] Decay time constant [s]a Light output [ph/MeV] Temperature drift [%/C] Effective atomic number Peak emission [nm] Non Prop. of light yield[%]b Energy resolution Cs-137 [%] Energy resolution Am-241 [%] Sensitivity for therm. neutrons CdZnTe 6 0.1-0.2 -0.01 48.5 --2.5 -No CdWO4 7.9 14 27000 0.01 65 475 -20 6.6 21 no LaCl3(Ce) 3.86 0.025 36000 0.1 59.5 335 3 4.2 13.6 no
6

LiI(Eu) NaI(Tl) 4.08 3.67 1.2 0.23 15000 -0.3 53 475 +13 7.5 21 very high 40000 0.1 50 420 +20 6.7 10.4 no

CsI(Tl) 4.51 1 53000 0.13 54 550 +15 6.1 13.7 no

a. For the CdZnTe detector, the charge collection time; b. Non proportionality of the light yield at 20 keV. Density and effective atomic number of
6 6

LiI(Eu) crystals is slightly higher

then that of NaI(Tl), what makes the gamma ray detection efficiency of the LiI(Eu) greater as well. As it follows from the table 13, the decay time of LiI detectors is longer than that of NaI one. We tested a withstanding of LiI based detector to high countrate. Ra-226 0.5 mCi source was used for this test. Results are presented in Fig. 33.

45

Ra-226
10000

Peak shift 1.7%

2 kCPS 5 kCPS 12 kCPS 30 kCPS 50 kCPS

1000

100

10 0 250 500 750 1000

ADC channel
Fig. 33. Test of withstanding to high count rate. The peak shift observed was found to be 1.7% with shaping time 1 sec. Detection of fast neutrons with the neutrons are moderated up to
6

LiI(Eu) detector is more efficient when thermal energies. Therefore,

6

LiI(Eu)

detector for RID should be surrounded by a H-enriched material, such as polyethylene. Optimization of the moderator size/shape was performed during RID design on the second stage of the Project. The obtained results have shown an attractiveness of the for the RID because of the following reasons: 1. The crystal performance is good enough to provide the reliable gamma ray spectrometry. 2. 3.
6 6

LiI(Eu) detector

LiI(Eu) has about the same energy resolution as

NaI(Tl) does, non-proportionality of light output is less. Gamma ray detection efficiency of 6LiI(Eu) detector is slightly greater than that of NaI(Tl).
6

LiI(Eu) allows simultaneous detection of gamma ray and neutrons with

about the same efficiency as He-3 proportional counters in moderator of the same mass. An advantage of scintillation detector is its ruggedness to vibration and shock (no microphonic effect).

46

7. Development of 6LiI(Eu) based RID Within the framework of the Project 12602 and built. The design process covered three main directions: point Hardware development (6LiI(Eu) detector, Multichannel Analyzer, instrument case and associated accessories); User interface development; Software development algorithm of identification. of view,
6 6

LiI(Eu) based RID SIGMA-n

(Spectrometer Identifier GamMA ray and Neutron) KSAR1U.05-03 was designed

Data on gamma ray spectrometry has shown that, regardless to conventional LiI(Eu) detector performance is sufficient for isotope identification. Another important parameter of RID detector is the neutron sensitivity, allowing the user to fulfill not only verification, but also search and or localization pedestrians. of neutron sources 23104 n/s can in only cargo, be cars, vehicles The required performance achieved

provided neutron sensitivity is greater then that of today the most sensitive RID MKC-A03, with mass upper limit of 3 kg. A series of numerical (Monte-Carlo) calculations aimed the optimization of the shape and size of the moderator was performed within the Project. Initial parameters of calculation were: Mass of the detector should not exceed 1.4 kg; Thickness of
6

LiI(Eu) crystal should not be less then 20 mm (due

to required sensitivity to Co-60); A criterion for optimization was maximum specific sensitivity of the assembly

to fission neutrons:

=
where

m x + mm + mc
- masses of the moderator and

- sensitivity to neutrons, mm , mc

crystal, m x - constant, denoting the expected mass of the RID electronics, case, batteries etc, m x =1.1 kg). Results of optimization are shown in Table 14 and Fig. 34.

47

Table 14. Results of Monte-Carlo calculation Parameter Value, mm

Crystal Diameter Thickness Moderator Bigger diameter of cone Smaller diameter of cone Height Forward wall thickness 138 89 87 22 45 20

Fig. 34. RID detector. 1-6LiI(Eu) crystal, 2 - polyethylene moderator, 3 - PMT, 4 - detector case.

Multichannel Analyzer includes spectroscopic amplifier, baseline restorer, overlap rejecter and 2048 channel flash ADC. The Analyzer is controlled by MSP430-8 MHz microprocessor with 10 kB of RAM. An additional feature involves statistical leveling, providing differential nonlinearity less then 1%. The main microcontroller is built on the platform of STM 269-40 MHz processor with 512 kB ROM and 256 kB RAM. To provide the dose rate measurement up to 10 mSv RID contains Geiger counter SBM-20. RID has an USB ver.2 internal interface for transferring recorded spectra onto PC. Software indication is of running the under Windows 98/ME or 2000/XP silent operating indicator systems. Alarm RID includes three items: (vibro-), LEDs and piezosiren. Each indicator can be activated/deactivated from the SETUP of RID. RID case was developed with KOMPAS-3D V7 Plus computer-aided design kit by rapid prototyping method. Original layout of the detector in RID across the symmetry axis is caused by agronomic requirement to decrease the load onto the users wrist. User interface of Sigma-n was developed in accordance with Usability Guide for Manufacturer of Radiation Monitoring Devices, ver.1.0 by Michael Alexander. New approach to the design process was implemented first, the software emulator of RID was developed and sent to IAEA for preliminary examination. Second, all suggestions and recommendations were accumulated and implemented into RID software.

48

RID

user

interface

involves

button

operation

(Fig.

35)

with

the

following modes (Fig. 36-39):

SI GM A -n

8 Fig. 35. User panel of RID.

1 Neutron alarm LED indicator

7 2 Enter key
3 Cursor up/left 4 Cursor down/right

6 5 Power/Lightning on/off
6 Instrument On
ALARM

7 - Gamma alarm LED indicator

8 LCD 8262 mm 320240 pix mono

Fig. 36. RID in Search mode.

Fig. 37. RID in Identification mode.

Fig. 38. RID in Integral mode.

Fig. 39. RID in Setup mode.

Instrument has the battery independent memory to store up to 64 gamma ray spectra. User interface has Multilanguage support. Isotope identification software of RID is a combination of two traditional approaches to the radioisotope identification issue templates matching and peak analysis method. Both methods have their intrinsic advantages and

49

disadvantages. Preliminary results of RID trial operation have shown the higher reliability of the coincidence scheme. 7.1. Test and trial operation. SIGMA-n was tested in accordance to IAEA Specification at Scientific Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research. Results of the test are compiled in Table 15.

50

Table 15. Compilation of SIGMA-n test results. Specification IAEA LiI(Eu) RID SIGMA-n 0,03-3,0 0,03-3,0 ANSI N42.34
6

Results

Parameter

Energy range of

the detected gamma

ray, MeV + 0,05 Sv/h in 1 s (s-137) + + Am-241 - 0.008 Sv/h in 1 s Ba-133 - 0.017 Sv/h in 1 s Cs-137 - 0.061 Sv/h in 1 s Co-60 - 0.142 Sv/h in 1 s 2.3104 n/s @ 0.25 m in 2 s 1.5104 n/s @ 0.2 in 5 s

Neutron detection

Sensitivity to

0,05 Sv/h in 1 s

gamma ray

(Am-241, Cs-137, Co-60)

Sensitivity to

2.0104 n/s @ 0.2 m in 5 s

neutrons 1:60 (gamma), 1:3600 (neutron)

5 (neutron) 0,01100 1024

FAR

1:60 (gamma), 1:3600

Dose rate, Sv/h

0,01100 -

0,01100 2048

Number of ADC

channels U-233,235,238, Np-237, Pu, Ga-67, Cr-51, Se-75, Tc-99m, Pb-103, In-111, I-123,125,131, Tl-201, Xe-133, K-40, Ra-226, Th-232 + doughters, Co-57, CoU-233,235,238, Np-237, Pu, Ga67, Tc-99m, I-123, K-40, Ra-226, Th-232+ daughters, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Eu-152, Am-241, Cf-252, Pu-Be,

Isotopes to be

U-233,235,238, Np-237, Pu,

identified

Ga-67, Cr51, Se-75, Tc-99m,

Pb-103, In-111,

I-123,125,131, Tl-201,

Xe-133, K-40, Ra-226,

Th-232+ daughters, Co-57,

51

Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir204, Am-241 to four isotopes Single handled, no external cables cables 304185150 Single handled, no external Simultaneous identification up

60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Tl-

Ce-139, Sn-113, Y-88

192, Tl-204, Am-241, Eu-152

8 cables 300200150

Layout

Single handled, no external

Overall

dimensions, mm 3 8 2 2,6 6

10

Weight, kg

11

Duration of the

continues

operation without

charging, h -20+50, 90 90 -20+50, -20+50, 90

12

Operating

temperatures and

humidity, , % at

+35 0

52

8. Development of LiI(Eu) detector based SPRD Improvement electronics has of the radiation resulted detection in the technologies of and new associated category of

recently

development

radiation detection instruments Spectral Personal Radiation Detectors. Being the most advanced instruments for radiation monitoring equipment, these devices utilized the advantages of RID (internal MCA, reliable identification of radioactive isotope caused an alarm and low weight and size of pocket type instruments. It for an is obvious, that the the idea third to use of LiI the detector Project simultaneously was dedicated as to spectroscopic gamma and neutron detector is even more attractive for a SPRD then RID. Therefore, part development and test of LiI(Eu) based SPRD. General view of the spectral personal radiation detector SIGMA-n personal is shown in Fig. 40.

53

SPRD

has

the

same

functional

units

as

RID

does.

They

are:

LiI(Eu)

based

radiation detector with incorporated into the crystal LED pulser and Hamamatsu R1924 photomultiplier tube (1), main PC Board (2) with multichannel analyzer, microconroleer and high voltage power supply, buttons (3), graphical LCD (4), and Li-ion rechargable batteries. Fig. 8 shows the cross section of SPRD.

Fig. 41. Inner view of Sigma-n personal SPRD

1 2 3 4

Detecting unit Main board Operating button PCB LCD

5 6 7

On/Off button - Li-ion batteries Clip

Neutron and gamma rays are detected with 1818 mm 90% enreached with Li-6 LiI(Eu) crystal. Multichannel Analyzer includes spectroscopic amplifier, baseline restorer, overlap rejecter and 2048 channel flash ADC. The Analyzer is controlled by MSP430-8 MHz microprocessor with 10 kB of RAM. An additional feature involves statistical leveling, providing differential nonlinearity less then 1%. The main microcontroller is built on the platform of STM 269-40 MHz processor with 512 kB ROM and 256 kB RAM. SPRD has an USB ver.2 internal interface for transferring recorded spectra onto PC. Software is running under Windows 98/ME or 2000/XP operating systems. Similar to RIDs user interface the SPRD has four modes of operation: setup, search, integral and identification. Physical dimensions and weigth of LiI(Eu) based SPRD are 1719654 mm, 0.46 kg.

54

8.1. Preliminary results of laboratory test. Laboratory tests were performed at Scientific Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research. The tests are still underway but some preliminary results are compiled in Table 16. Table 16. Parameter IAEA Results
6

LiI(Eu) SPRD

SIGMA-n personal 1 Energy range of the detected gamma ray, MeV 2 3 Neutron detection Sensitivity to gamma ray + 0,5 Sv/h when passed by with 0.5 m/s + Am-241 - 0.06 Sv/h Cs-137 - 0.20 Sv/h Co-60 - 0.60 Sv/h 4 Sensitivity to neutrons 5 6 6 FAR Dose rate, Sv/h Number of ADC channels 7 Isotopes to be identified U-233,235,238, Np-237, Pu, Ga67, Tc-99m, I-123, K-40, Ra-226, Th-232+ daughters, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Eu-152, Am-241, Cf-252, Pu-Be, Ce-139, Sn-113, Y-88; Simultaneous identification up to four isotopes 8 Overall dimensions, mm 9 Weight, g 400 0.460 kg 20010050 1719654 2.0104 n/s when passed by with 0.5 m/s @ 0.1 m 1 in 3600 sec 0,01100 1 in 3600 sec 0,01100 2048 1.5104 n/s 0,06-1,330 0,03-3,0

55

10

Duration of the continues operation without charging, h

400

11

Operating temperatures and humidity, 0, % at +35 0

-20+50, 90

-20+50, 90

Preliminary results of the test have shown that LiI(Eu) based SPRD meets IAEA requirement demanded for PRD. Moreover, the use of LiI(Eu) detectors enhance neutron sensitivity of the instrument and provide simultaneous detection of gamma ray and neutrons with one detector.

Summary of the Project

Under the IAEA Project#12602 feasibility study of neutron detector for handheld search instrument was performed. It was shown, that 3-He proportional counters in polyethylene block as fast neutron moderator are the most useable detector for hand-held neutron search instrument, matching sensitivity of portal radiation monitors. Within the Project production prototype was developed and tested by IAEA experts. Technical and functional performance achieved enable the use of NSD prototype - KSAR1U.06 as a necessary supplement for vehicle and pedestrian monitors to do an independent verification of neutron alarm of a large border monitor, allowing first-line officers to verify the alarm and localize the source. Feasibility study of was performed during
6

LiI(Eu) detector for radioisotope identification device second year of the Project. It was shown, that

the

application of the detector in portable devices is attractive for the following reasons: base of device. The RID SIGMA-n and SPRD SIGMA-n personal are expected to be sent for independent testing to the IAEA.
6

relatively good spectrometry; very good sensitivity to neutrons.

RID KSAR1U.05-03 SIGMA-n and SPRD KSAR1U.08 SIGMA-n personal both on the LiI(Eu) detector were built and tested. Results have confirmed the
6

conclusion made about good applicability of

LiI(Eu) in isotope identification

56

References [1] [2] [3] [4] N.A. Vlasov., Neutrons. Moscow, Science, 1971. Yu. N., Pepyolyshev, Neutron Registration. Present State and Prospects of Development, Preprint JINR P13-86-719,1986. Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials, Edited by: D. Reilly, N. Ensslin and H. Smith, Jr, NUREG/CR-5550 LA-UA-90-732, 1991. Majorov, M., Lebedev, Safety: A., Materials of 4-th International 24-28 Conference 2001, Radiation [5] ecology-nuclear power September

St.Petersburg, Russia, p.284. A. Syntfeld, M. Moszyski, R., Arlt, M. Balcerzyk, M. Kapusta, M. Majorov, R. Marcinkowski, P. Schotanus, M. Swoboda, and D. Wolsky,
6

LiI(Eu)

in

Neutron and ray Spectrometry a High Sensitive Thermal Neutron Detector, Materials of the 2-nd Research Coordination Meeting of IAEA on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, 4-8 October, Sochi, Russia 2004. [6] [7] [8] [9] Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment, Draft 18.5, IAEA, December 2004. Batenkov O., et. al., Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Phys. Research A329:235, 1997. Ju.I. Kolevatov, V.P. Semenov, L.A. Trykov, Spectrometry of neutrons and gamma ray in radiation physics. Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1990. Majorov, M., Lebedev, Safety: A., Materials of 4-th International 24-28 Conference 2001, Radiation ecology-nuclear power September

St.Petersburg, Russia, p.281. [10] Ronald, I., Ewing and Keith W. Marlow, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Phys. Research A299 (1990), 559-561. [11] V. Frolov, Nuclear-physics methods of fissionable materials control, Moscow, Atomizdat, 1976. [12] IAEA TECDOC-1312, Detection of radioactive materials at borders, September 2002. [13] M. Schrenk, R. Arlt, P. Beck, H. Boeck, F. Koenig, T. Leitha, A Real Time, Isotope Identifying Gamma Spectrometer for Monitoring of Pedestrians, presented at the IEEE 2004. [14] Draft IAEA-TECDOC, Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment, October 2004. [15] N42.38 D, American National Standard Performance Criteria for Spectroscopy Based Portal Monitors used for Homeland Security. [16] Balcerzyk, M. Moszynski, M. Kapusta, Comparison of LaCl3: Ce and NaI(Tl) scintillators in -ray spectrometry, 2001 Elsevier Science.

57

[17] Syntfeld, M. Moszynski, M. Balcerzyk, m. Kapusta, M. Majorov, P. Schotanus, R. Marcinkowski, M. Swoboda and D. Wolski, 6LiI(Eu) in Neutron and -ray Spectrometry-a High Sensitive Thermal Neutron Detector, (presented at the IEEE 2004). [18] IdentiFINDER-NGH, Target, http://www.target-systems-gmbh.de/. [19] MKC-A02, MKC-A03, Aspect, http://aspect.dubna.ru/. [20] GR-135, Exploranium, http://exploranium.com. [21] Inspector 1000, Canberra, http://www.canberra.com. [22] PM1801, PM1802, Polimaster, http://polismart.net. [23] M. Majorov, A. Lebedev,LiI(Eu) crystals application in radiation control hardware, Proc. Of the 4-th Int. Conf.: Radiation Safety: Ecology-Nuclear Power, 2001, St. Petersburg, Russia. [24] WinMCA, Forschungszentrum Rossendorf, http://fz-rossendorf.de. [25] M. Swoboda, R. Arlt, V. Gostilo, A. Lupilov, M. Majorov, M. Moszynski, A. Syntfeld Spectral Gamma Detectors for Hand-Held Radioisotope Identification Devices (RIDs) for Nuclear Security Applications (presented at the IEEE 2004). [26] ICS 400, XRF Corporation, http://www.xrfcorp.com.

58

Radiation Monitoring with Norm Detection of Vehicles at Borders at Stand-Still

V.D. Petrenko, Yu.N. Karimov, N.N. Shipilov, A.I. Podkovirin, M.I. Fazilov, B.S. Yuldashev Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Uzbekistan
Abstract In this report the results of works performed under the Research Contract 12607/R0 are presented. All accomplished works can be divided into three parts: In the first part, the method is described used for radiation control of vehicles crossing customs and border check-points. At detection of the radioactivity in a vehicle, it is detained and the NORM materials and other radioactive materials are identified. The radiation monitor model was developed with realisation of the described vehicle control concept in it. This model was tested on-site on real vehicles crossing the customs check-point of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In the second part, based on the activities conducted in the first part, it was demonstrated that this method can be realised in practice for the purpose of its application at customs and border check-points for detection of nuclear and fissile materials with identification of radioactive isotopes in NORM-materials and other radioactive materials, as well as for decision making upon further possible transportation of such cargo. These results, showed in this report, were analysed and demonstrated that the 100x50 mm NaI(Tl)-crystal based scintillation detector is applicable, so that the identification capabilities become better when such detector is placed at 50 cm distance and closer to the vehicle. Other single crystal can be also used; however, one should take into account its geometry depending on the sizes of the crystal. In the third part, new sophisticated methods for radioactive materials detection were described, and the possibility for creation of radiation monitoring instrumentation based on the described above concept was demonstrated.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION, SYMBOLS, UNITS AND TERMS

ADC SCC MCA IAEA INP NORM R&D DEPARTMENT TIR PM RID

Analog to Digital Converter State Customs Committee Multi Channel Analyzer International Atomic Energy Agency Institute of Nuclear Physics Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material Research and development department Transportation International Regulations Photo-multiplier Radioisotope Identifier Device

INTRODUCTION Prevention of nuclear weapon and its components spread is important task in the modern world. For this aim, the control over the transportation means should be carried out at the customs border check-points to discover radioactive and fissile materials transported in them. In case when the transportation mean cannot be opened (for example, TIR system vehicle) within the control procedure it is important upon the alarm signal to determine the source location and to estimate its radioactive threat. It is also important to identify the radioactive source in term of its possible use as nuclear weapon component despite the clean or dirty bomb this could be. The given report presents the results of efforts for the 12607/RO Research Contract performed in years 2005/2006 at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan in cooperation with the IAEA. This project anticipated the assembly and testing of the 10050 mm NaI(Tl) crystal based detector and the appropriate software for the automatic identification of nuclides in the transportation means at stand-still by real-time identification of spectrum from the NaI(Tl) detector. Such approach is especially important for the case of the NORM materials (naturally occurring radioactive material) transportation, which can be determined as industrial materials, like tile, fertilizers, organic fertilizers, porcelain toiletry and others, containing 40K, 232Th, 226Ra, natural uranium, and causing so-called innocent alarms. Identification of 40K is especially important as it is contained in many everyday life materials.

1. CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE OF THE RADIATION MONITOR FOR TRANSPORTATION AT STAND-STILL In our opinion, the concept of the stationary radiation monitor at vehicle stand-still when excessive radiation is detected and the alarm is set off can be presented as follows: In case of alarm, at detected radioactivity in the object, it is important to obtain the radioactive materials distribution along the length. The object with the radioactive material must stop in the control area for spectrum measurement and identification of the radioactive material. After this the decision upon the further destiny of the vehicle is made.

Picture 1 shows the reciprocal location of the major parts of the installation scintillation plastic detector, NaI(Tl) crystal based scintillation detector, traffic lights and object sensor realizing the proposed concept.

Figure 1: A representation of the measurement process for a cargo vehicle. The graph represents the measurement of a gamma signal as a function of time (i.e. as a function of position of the truck as it passes by the detector). In this example, the truck generates a gamma alarm.

Our researches demonstrated that combination of the plastic and NaI(Tl) scintillators in one casing makes the determination of the isotopes characteristics more complex when the isotope is distributed unevenly along the length or there are several isotopes at different points of the object. Therefore, we selected the following structure of our installation: The first monitor contains plastic detector and is in charge for the following: - detection of radioactive material in an object; - measurement of radioactive materials distribution along the whole object in percents; - alarm signal forming and switching on the STOP signal (red signal on the traffic-lights) when radioactive material is detected.
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The second monitor has NaI(Tl) detector and performs the following operations: - it measures spectrum for 510 minutes when the alarm received from the first detector monitor and the object appears in the second monitors control area; - it forms the signal on isotope identification when the measurements are finished; - based on the information on radioactive material distribution and the type of the radiation source, the logical unit makes decision whether to give permission to leave or to detain for detailed radiation control. If the decision made for the vehicle to leave the traffic-lights sets off green light, permitting further transportation. On the contrary, the decision upon detailed radiation control is drawn and the object is redirected to the examination area. The layout of the installation is shown on Fig. 2.

Figure 2: A diagram of the electrical interface between components and the recording computer.

Fig. 3 demonstrates the logical circuit of the detector.

Presence of object

NO

Background excess

YES

Yes

Plastic detector

NORM material NORM material NORM NORM

identification

Isotope Isotope identification

YES

Presence of object

Prohibited material

NaI(Tl) detector NaI(Tl)

Permission to leave

Detailed check

Passage not allowed

Green light ON .

Traffic lights

Red light ON .

Figure 3: The alarm logic of the detection system.

Based on the given algorithm the software was developed. When there is no the object the first detector measures background, which is indicated on Fig. 4.

Figure 4: An example where no vehicle has entered into the detection region.

One can see from the Fig. 4 that the background level is lower than the alarm level indicated with bold line. In the second case, when the object appears and does not contain radioactivity, the background stays close to the earlier detected level shown on Fig. 5.

Figure 5: An object enters the detection region, but does not contain any radioactive material.

Figure 6: A vehicle enters the detector, carrying radioactive material. An alarm is generated. Let us now consider the case when the object moves by the monitor. Fig. 6 shows that there is a material with excessive radioactivity (fertilizers occupying 21% of the objects volume) in the central part of the object.

Figure 7: A modelled example of a vehicle containing multiple sources.

We have modelled the situation when the radioactivity sources were placed at different points of the vehicle, and as a result we have obtained two clear peaks indicating two sources caused this alarm. This is shown on Fig. 7. To conduct all these measurements we have prepared this radiation monitor based on 60020095 mm3 plastic detector. Fig. 8 shows this detector (1) with the PM FEU-118 (2) matched with the signal analyzer (3). Further the information is sent onto the industrial computer (4). This installation is placed in metal casing (5), and can be mounted at the determined points for radioactivity detection and for analysis of obtained spectrum.

5 1

2 3

2 4

Figure 8: A radiation monitor that used plastic scintillator.

Figure 9: A radiation monitor that used NaI(Tl).

Fig. 9 shows the radiation monitor composed of the 4040 mm2 NaI(Tl) crystal based scintillation detector (1). All the data is analyzed by the industrial computer (2). The equipment is placed into the casing (3), and can be carried along the vehicle. Unfortunately, we did not have the large size scintillation detector, and therefore, the main aim of the research was a detailed study of identification of the isotopes referred as the NORM-materials.

2. ASSEMBLY AND TESTING OF THE 100x50 mm NaI(Tl) CRYSTAL BASED DETECTOR

Later on in our further researches for radioactive NORM-materials identification, we used equipment (Fig. 10) kindly provided by the IAEAs Department of Safeguards Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory (NSEL). This equipment included: a NaI(Tl) crystal based detector (1), a mini-166 multichannel analyzer (2), a portable computer TOSHIBA with the Specmon software (3). The Specmon software is designed to identify passing sources in a spectroscopic based portal monitor system. To increase the count statistics, the new recorded spectrum gets added to the prerecorded spectra of the same alarm. After background elimination the spectrum will get identified into the memory of the computer (online). In case of a radioactive medical isotope the activity alarm is flagged out by a green light. A red light is given in the case of another isotope or if the identification was not possible. A logbook shows the results at the display. This program combines the recording software winSPECa and the identification software Identify with the subprogram Quick Identify. All four programs were designed by the company GBS.

Figure 10: Loaned equipment from the IAEAs Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory (NSEL).

Figures 11 and 12 show this equipment in the casing of the radiation monitor.

Figure 11

Figure 12

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3. TESTING OF THE SYSTEM AT THE CUSTOMS POINTS Since the transportation of the radioactive NORM-materials through the customs check-points in Uzbekistan does not happen everyday the SCC is concurred and agreed on the possible immediate response of the INP experts by visiting the Yallama, Navoi, Gisht-Kuprik, Bekabad and Alat customs check-points for examinations and identification of NORM materials. All the abovementioned customs check-points are equipped with the Yantar-type portal radiation monitors produced by R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region). 3.1. Customs check-point Yallama. Fig. 13 shows the Yantar-type portal radiation monitors produced by the R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region) installed at the Yallama Customs checkpoint. The vehicle radioactive monitors are installed at both sides of the road. The passage for pedestrians is equipped with dual portal monitor for control of the radioactivity of passing through pedestrians and passengers. Every monitor is equipped with the surveillance camera.

Figure 13: The Customs Check Point Yallama. When this portal radiation monitor detects some radioactive cargo the server computer displays the vehicle or the face of the passenger who caused the alarm signal (Fig. 14), as well as the distribution at gamma or neutron channel, at which this alarm was set off (Fig. 15). One can see from the Fig. 15 that the radioactivity source is located at the rear part of the vehicle as the marker line is drawn at the activity peak, and the corresponding video-image shows the rear part of the trailer.

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Figure 14

Figure 15

The personnel of the customs point detains this vehicle and calls for the INP experts. Upon arrival on-site the INP experts analyze the radioactive cargo distribution along the vehicle by taking into account the diagram from the Fig. 15 with the following measurement of the spectral composition of the detected ionizing radiation source.

Figure 16

Figure 17

It is occurred that in the sack located in the rear side the last on the left-hand side contained molybdenum oxide contaminated with radioactive isotopes. Figures 16 and 17 show this vehicle with discovered radiation source inside (sacks with molybdenum oxide).

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After this, the concurred with customs personnel standard procedure of radioactivity source identification and decision making takes place.

Figure 18: A NaI(Tl) measurement at the front of the trailer of the vehicle shown in Figs 1417. The distance to the trailer was 1 meter horizontally, and the detector was 2 meters above the road surface. Fig. 18 presents the spectrum the result of identification with the 10050 NaI(Tl) crystal based detector on 2 meter height from the road level and at the distance of 1 meter from the side of the vehicle at the beginning of the trailer. At the upper side of the Figure the measured spectrum is shown. In the right side of the spectrum one can see the 1440 keV energy peak of the -40 radionuclide. In the lower part of the Figure the identification results are presented showing the date and the time of measurements together with the type of the identified radionuclide and the preliminary evaluation of the radionuclides activity. In the given case one can see from the Figure that the identified radionuclide occurred to be -40 isotope. On the Figure 15 one can also see that these sacks are placed along the axis of symmetry of the vehicle and, therefore, the distance between the detector and the sacks is more than two meters. Further, the identification results were obtained at different measurement conditions. For example, Fig. 19 shows the spectrum measured at 2 meter height from the road level and at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral side of the vehicle at its beginning. As one can see from this Figure, the number of detected gammaradiation increased, which is especially clear from the scattered radiation peak, showing again the - 40 radionuclide.

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Figure 19: A NaI(Tl) measurement at the front of the trailer of the vehicle shown in Figs 1417. The distance to the trailer was 0.5 m horizontally, and the detector was 2 m above the road surface. Fig. 20 presents the spectrum taken at 2 meter height from the road level and 1 meter distance from the lateral side of the vehicle at its middle part. As one can see from the Figure, the increase in number of the detected gamma-radiation is still observed. Unclear peaks of U-235, U-238, Pu-240 have appeared, and the -40 radionuclide cannot be identified against their background.

Figure 20: Measurement at 1m horizontally from the middle of the trailer.

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Fig. 21 shows the spectrum measured at the distance of 0.5 m from the lateral side of the vehicle at the height of 2 meters from the road level at its middle part. From the Figure, it is clear that the number of unclear peaks decreased to single Eu-152, and -40 radionuclide is once again identified.

Figure 21: Measurement at 0.5m horizontally from the middle of the trailer. Fig. 22 presents the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral side of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the rear part of the trailer. From the Figure, one can see that approaching detector does identify the -40 radionuclide at the rear part of the vehicle, but it does identify the peaks corresponding to uranium and its chain.

Fig. 22: Measurement at 1m horizontally from the Rear of the trailer. Thus, Fig. 23 presents the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral side of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the rear part of the
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trailer. One can see that the U-238 radionuclide was identified. Based on the measurement results one can conclude that single point measurement identification does not give full information on all radionuclides in the examined object, especially if the measurements are conducted not on the activity peak.

Figure 23: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontally from the rear of the trailer. As the spectrometer MCA-166 with 100x50 mm NaI(Tl) crystal was borrowed we could not use it in our further studies. It was important to compare the obtained results with those obtained by the available hand-held spectrometers. Thus, Fig. 24 shows the energy spectra of the cargo detained at the Customs Point Yallama on March 7, 2006, and measured by a RID (model Target identiFINDER, Version: E3/9V S/N: 04f3/2465).

Figure 24: Spectrum from RID: Field 4F2465_2006-03-07_11-07-55-012.SPC; Date: 07.03.2006 11:07:12.
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The spectrum shown on Fig. 24 was measured directly on the surface of the package after opening of the vehicle at additional customs examination. By using the identiFINDER the whole set of cargo was examined and only one package (the last sack in the trailer) occurred to be with the radioactive contamination (U-235). The decision was made to send the samples of the cargo for further analysis. The analysis was conducted in the INP AS RU. The measurements were performed by means of a 80 cm3 High Purity Germanium detector based Canberra DSA 1000 semiconductor spectrometer. The measurement revealed the presence of uranium-235 and a number of its fission products. Fig. 25 shows the spectrum measured by this detector and the identification results.

Figure 25: Results of measurement by the HP Ge system, located at the Institute of Nuclear Physics AS RU.

Fig. 26 shows the just the -spectrum of the sample, where traces of U-235 and Pa-234m can be clearly observed. When natural radioactivity measured the U-238
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contents can be determined either by U-235 (185.7 keV line) with the following recalculation on U-238 or by 766.6 and 1001 keV lines which are emitted by Pa-234m the third daughter radionuclide in the U-238 radioactive chain:
238

4.47 10 years
9

> 234Th

24.1days

> 234 mPa

1.17 days

> 234U

2.5 105 years

>

Pa-234m is almost in radioactive equilibrium with U-238 or it is accumulated relatively fast (in 2-3 months) up to the radioactive equilibrium, upon gaining which the activities of Pa-234m and U-238 become equal.

Figure 26: The measured gamma spectrum for the sample. In addition to the gamma measurements, samples of the material were analysed by means of neutron-activation analysis. The samples were irradiated in the heat channel of the INP AS RU WWR-SM nuclear reactor for 16 hours, and, as a result, gave the average value of 0.90.06 wt. % of uranium. Obviously, such cargo could not be used for its direct purpose. It was found to be contraband and the investigation was started.

3.2. Customs check-point Navoi. Fig. 27 shows the Yantar-type portal radiation monitors produced by the R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region) and installed at the Navoi customs point. Navoi differs from the Yallama post with its single portal pedestrian radiation monitor.

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Figure 27: Customs Check Point Navoi. In case of alarm from the portal radiation monitors the vehicle is identified and is detained by the customs officers based on the video-image displayed on the server computer (Fig. 28).

Figure 28

Figure 29

The personnel of the customs point called up the experts from the INP. Upon arrival the INP experts analysed the radioactivity distribution in the sample along the vehicle. According to the diagram on the Fig. 29, the activity is distributed evenly from the middle-part to the rear part of the trailer. The spectral composition of the detected source was conducted by the 100x50 mm NaI(Tl) crystal based detector as shown on Fig. 30.

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Figure 30. Fig. 31 shows the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the beginning of the trailer. One can see from the figure that the radionuclides are not identified, whereas, however, it is possible to say that it is the -40 isotope by its peak.

Figure 31: Measurement at 1m horizontally from the front of the trailer shown in Figures 2830.

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Fig. 32 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral side of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the beginning of the trailer. As one can see from the Figure the number of detected gamma increased, and the radionuclide -40 was identified.

Figure 32: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontally from the front of the trailer. Fig. 33 presents the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the middle of the trailer. As one can see from the Figure the -40 radionuclide was identified.

Figure 33: Measurement at 1m horizontally from the middle of the trailer.

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Fig. 34 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the middle of the trailer. As one can see from the Figure, here the -40 radionuclide was also identified.

Figure 34: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontally from the front of the trailer. Fig. 35 presents the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the rear part of the vehicle. Figure shows that the -40 radionuclide can still be clearly identified.

Figure 35: Measurement at 1m horizontally from the rear of the trailer.

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Fig. 36 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and 2 meter distance from the road level at the end of the trailer. As one can see from the Figure the -40 radionuclide can be still clearly identified.

Figure 36: Measurement at 0.5m horizontally from the front of the trailer. At the additional customs examination the cargo was studied with the hand-held RID MKS-A02. The results it displayed were: Nuclides were not found Dose power on the lateral part surface was - 0,12-0,15 Sv/h, at the background - 0,10-0,12 Sv/h The sensitivity of the MKS-A02 was lower than that of the Target produced identiFINDER and the identification was conducted without opening the vehicle, which clearly influenced by the identification result absence of the radionuclides. The declared cargo type was cutlery of colourless and dyed glass and crystal (country of origin: Russia). This is consistent with the measurements made.

3.3. Customs check-point Gisht-Kuprik Fig. 37 shows the Yantar-type monitors produced by the R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region) installed at the Gisht-Kuprik customs check-point located on the border with Kazakhstan Republic.

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Figure 37: Customs Check Point Gisht-Kuprik. When the portal radiation monitors discover the radioactive cargo the vehicle caused the alarm is displayed on the server computer (Fig. 38) together with the distribution on the gamma channel on which the alarm was set off (Fig. 39).

Figure 38

Figure 39

The personnel of the custom point detained this vehicle. Based on the concurred procedure the personnel of the customs called up the INP experts for additional measurements. When the information from the Yantar radiation monitors was analysed the radioactive cargo distribution character was determined along the vehicle. It is obvious from the Fig. 39 that the radioactivity is localised in the middle part of the trailer and in the end of the trailer. Further, the spectral composition of the detected ionising radiation source was measured. Since it was not possible to keep the vehicle detained for a long time, all measurements were conducted at minimum of required equipment, which is shown
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on Fig. 40. The vehicle was measured according to the standard procedure described above.

Figure 40 Thus, Fig. 41 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the end of the trailer. One can see that the -40 radionuclide was identified.

Figure 41: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontal distance from the front of the trailer shown in Figures 3840. Fig. 42 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the middle of the trailer. One can see from the figure that once again the -40 radionuclide was identified.
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Figure 42: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontal distance from the middle of the trailer.

Figure 43: Manifest of vehicle, consistent with measurements. Fig. 43 presents the invoice containing the information about the transported cargo. The declared contents of this cargo were: tiles (weight: 12200 kg), country of origin: China. Results of the analysis conducted by the hand-held MKS-A02
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spectrometer: Dose on the surface of lateral part - 0,13-0,15 Sv/h, at the background - 0,9-0,11 Sv/h. 3.4. Customs check-point Bekabad Rail-road Fig. 44 presents the Yantar-type portal radiation monitors produced by the R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region) installed at the Bekabad Railroad customs check-point. The monitors are installed beyond the station area at the point where rails come together to one line and are fenced with metal construction against acts of vandalism.

Figure 44: Customs check-point Bekabad. The images displayed on the server computer when the portal radiation monitors detect radioactive cargo are presented on Figures 45 and 46.

Figure 45
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Figure 46.

These figures are similar to those imaged at other posts, but the object caused this alarm in this case is train, very long, and the peaks on the gamma channel activity distribution diagram correspond to one particular carriage. As one can see from the Fig. 46, the indicator is located at one of the peaks, and the video-image on the Fig. 45 shows some part of the carriage, which therefore means that the next carriage also carries radioactivity presented by the next peak on gamma channel activity distribution. In this case these are the freight carriage with fertilisers, which is proved by the conducted measurements. Due to its special purpose the carriage is designed so that the loose material empty the carriage itself via the hatch at the bottom, therefore the carriage has cone form, and only one measurement at the centre of the carriage was possible limited with the requirements on approaching to carriages. Fig. 47 shows the spectrum measured at 2.1 meter distance from the lateral side of the carriage and at 2 meter height from the rails level. As one can see from the figure the -40 radionuclide was identified.

Figure 47: Measurement at 2.1 m horizontal distance from the carriage of the train shown in Fig. 45 and discussed in the text.

The radiation portal monitors were installed at the Bekabad rail-road recently, and there was no hand-held equipment at this customs point. Thus, no additional RID measurements were made.

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3.5 Customs check-point Alat Figures 48 and 49 present the Yantar-type radiation portal monitor produced by the R&D Centre Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region) installed at the Alat customs checkpoint.

Figure 48

Figure 49

Similarly to the Gisht-Kuprik the Alat has separately installed truck and automobile vehicles monitors. The pedestrian monitor is installed inside the checking building shown on Fig. 49. When the portal radiation monitors detect the radioactive cargo the server computer displays the vehicle caused this alarm (Fig. 50) and the distribution on the channel on which the alarm as set off (Fig. 51).

Figure 50

Figure 51

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The personnel of the customs point provided the standard vehicle detaining procedure and called up the INP experts. Upon arrival, the INP experts analysed the distribution of the radioactive cargo along the vehicle in accordance with the activity distribution diagram on the gamma channel (Fig. 51), with the following measurement of the spectral composition of the ionising radiation source by means of 10050 NaI(Tl) crystal based detector. Figures 52 and 53 show the truck caused this alarm and its cargo occurred to be the zinc powder filled sacks.

Figure 52

Figure 53

Fig. 54 shows the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the beginning of the trailer. As one can see from this Figure, the -40 radionuclide was identified, however, peaks corresponding to other radionuclides were also observed.

Figure 54: Measurement at 1 m horizontal distance from the front of the trailer shown in Figures 5053.
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Fig. 55 presents the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the beginning of the trailer. One can see from this Figure that the -40 radionuclide is still identified. But only Cs-137 left of all elements under suspicion, and the number of detected gamma increased.

Figure 55: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontal distance from the front of the trailer. Fig. 56 shows the spectrum measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the middle of the vehicle. As one can see from the Figure two radionuclides -40 and Cs-137 were identified.

Figure 56: Measurement at 1 m horizontal distance from the middle of the trailer.

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Fig. 57 shows the spectra measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the middle part of the trailer. As one can see from the Figure two radionuclides -40 and Cs-137 were identified.

Figure 57: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontal distance from the front of the trailer. Fig. 58 shows the spectra measured at 1 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter distance from the road level at the end of the trailer. One can see from the Figure that the identified radionuclide occurred to be the -40 radionuclide. This is supported by the intensity distribution on the gamma channel obtained from the Yantar monitor (Fig. 42), which demonstrates that the intensity becomes lower by the end of the trailer.

Figure 58: Measurement at 1 m horizontal distance from the rear of the trailer.

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Fig. 59 shows the spectrum measured at 0.5 meter distance from the lateral part of the vehicle and at 2 meter height from the road level at the end of the trailer. As one can see from the figure the Cs-137 radionuclide was identified. This supports the fact that there is a contamination of the cargo transported at the end of the vehicle.

Figure 59: Measurement at 0.5 m horizontal distance from the rear of the trailer. Quite high radiation intensity and the discovered Cs-137 radionuclide caused a detailed examination of the container. The cargo was additionally studied by the Target identiFINDER hand-held dosimeter, which is demonstrated on Fig. 60.

Figure 60 Fig. 61 shows the energy spectrum of the samples from the cargo detained at the customs point Alat on 17.02.06. It was measured by a RID (model Target identiFINDER, Version: E3/9V S/N: 04f3/2465).
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Figure 61: Target identiFINDER spectrum for the contents in the vehicle referenced in Figures 50-60.

Later on, the radioactivity of every sack was measured, and the degree of Cs-137 contamination of their contents was evaluated. The cargo was detained, and an investigation is ongoing.

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Summary 1. In the given report the results of activities on the research contract 12607/RO are presented. 2. All performed works can be divided into three parts: a) creation of the concept and apparatus for detection and determination capabilities of NORM-materials and radioactive isotopes transported in vehicle at its stand-still, and laboratory tests; b) tests of the developed apparatus and isotope identification software on real object at the customs check-points of Uzbekistan; c) determination of possibilities for development of new methods and apparatus for detection of nuclear fissile and radioactive materials, as well as the results of nuclear smuggling countering in Uzbekistan described in attached articles. In the first part, the radiation monitoring of vehicles at the border at stand-still for detection of NORM-materials was developed, the prototype of the radiation monitor was designed with the concept realized, and the preliminary tests were performed on the real customs check-points of Uzbekistan. Advantages of the proposed control method comparing to the traditional approaches are: Automatic determination of innocent alarms; Automatic identification of nuclides in vehicle; Display of the ionizing radiation source distribution diagram along the vehicle. Disadvantages of the proposed method: Necessary organizational measures for vehicle control with the given method, namely in case of emergency the vehicle is forced to stop by the radiation monitor for 5 minutes to have measurement of the spectral composition of the ionizing radiation. On our opinion, it is almost impossible to analyse the cargo without forced stopping of vehicle; Use of additional indicating equipment (traffic-lights). In the second part, based on the conducted activities the practical possibility for identification of NORM-materials and decision making on the further destiny of the vehicles transporting this cargo are presented. The analysis of the obtained results presented in this report demonstrated that it is possible to use the 10050 mm NaI(Tl) crystal based scintillation detector, with better identification at the distance between the detector and the vehicle is of 50 cm and less. The third part shows the possible ways and importance of the development of new advanced methods and apparatus for detection of nuclear fissile and other NORMmaterials and their identification by using the methods described in these articles.
35

The authors wish to express their deepest gratitude and thanks to the staff of the IAEA, namely, Teresa Benson, Anita Nilssen, Rolf Arlt, Ken Baird, Pavel Dvornyak, Inna Cherkasskaya and others who paid continuous attention and supported this project determining its successful completion. The authors believe that this research on development of new methods for detection and identification of nuclear fissile and radioactive materials will continue. Publications produced during this CRP [1] V.D. Petrenko, Yu.N. Karimov, A.I. Podkovirin, N.N. Shipilov, B.S. Yuldashev, M.I. Fazylov Efforts of Uzbekistan to prevent terrorism and smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials //Applied Radiation and Isotopes, Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 737740. [2] Yu.N. Karimov, N.N. Shipilov, M.I. Fazylov, V.D. Petrenko, B.S. Yuldashev. On the possibility of detecting fissile nuclear materials using coincident gamma rays //Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 655658. [3] N.N. Shipilov, M.I. Fazylov, A.I. Podkovirin, Yu.N. Karimov, V.D. Petrenko, B.S. Yuldashev Identification of radioactive materials in moving objects // Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 783787. [4] V.D. Petrenko, The experience of the State Customs Committee in use of the apparatus for the radiation monitoring of the vehicles and passengers in Uzbekistan // International Workshop on Radiological Sciences and Applications, Albuquerque, USA, 1618 June 2003. [5] Yu.N. Karimov, B.S. Yuldashev, V.D. Petrenko, N.N. Shipilov, M.I. Fazylov, Vehicle control methods witch automatic nuclides identification and innocent alarms determination // The third Eurasian conference Nuclear science and its application, 58 October 2004, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, p.144. [6] N.N. Shipilov, B.S. Yuldashev, V.D. Petrenko, Yu.N. Karimov, M.I. Fazylov, A.I. Podkovirin Video surveillance as an indispensable part of radiation control // The third Eurasian conference Nuclear science and its application, 58 October 2004, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, p.144. [7] V.D. Petrenko, B.S. Yuldashev, Yu.N. Karimov, N.N. Shipilov, M.I. Fazylov Radiation monitoring at customs border posts of Uzbekistan //The third Eurasian conference Nuclear science and its application, 58 October 2004, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, p.145. [8] IAEA DRAFT TECDOC Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment, Rev. 20B (2004).

36

Ruggedized Detection Probe for Field Use with Large Volume Coplanar CdZnTe Detector
L. Grigorjeva, V. Gostilo, A. Loupilov, I. Lisjutin, R. Rjabchikov University of Latvia, Institute of Solid State Physics, Riga, Latvia Abstract The aim of the present Project was the development of ruggedized detection probe with large volume coplanar CdZnTe detector on the basis of CdZnTe detector with maximum possible high efficiency for field use.

Coplanar grid contacts applied for the detectors based on 15x15x10 mm3 crystals provided the total absorption efficiency of registration about 8%, energy resolution less than 2% on the energy of 662 keV and the peak/compton ratio better than 11. The best energy resolution of 10.5 keV (1.59%) was achieved at HV=2 kV and the optimal voltage of 60 V between the grids. The energy resolution of the detectors on energies 59.6 and 1332 keV was 7.9 and 14.5 keV, respectively.

A gamma-radiation Detection Probe (DP) based on a CdZnTe spectrometric coplanar detector was developed for joint operation with standard MCA-166. DP has dimensions 165x60x50 mm and it comprises: a CdZnTe coplanar detector, installed on Peltier cooler; a 2-channel differential charge sensitive preamplifier with resistive feed back; thermostabilisation device of detector; HV filter; HV power supply with voltage divider.

The test of the DP, supplied by power source of -166, shows that all characteristics in the requirements specifications of the technical assign are realised except the temperature stability. To rise insufficient stability of DU caused by insufficient power of the supply source +12V/50 m in -166 analyser the additional power supply +14.5 V/100 mA with Li-Ion Rechargeable Battery was applied what has provided the required stability.

Introduction The aim of the present Project is the development of ruggedized detection probe for field use with large volume coplanar CdZnTe detector on the basis of CdZnTe detector with maximum possible high efficiency. In the first year of the development the basic effort was paid to the development of production technology of CdZnTe detectors with coplanar electrode structure. The development of the detectors of such electrodes structure reuquires significant improvement of photolithography technologic processes. That task was solved successfully what is allowed to fabricate detectors with large volume. Investigations of crystal performance of different producers have also demanded for considerable efforts. Those performances were inspected carefully in manufacture process to adapt manufacture technology to the crystals properties. Two coplanar grid detectors were fabricated with application of the technology developed for the fabrication of pixel and strip detectors. Interpixel resistivity on different grids was within 16 GOhm. Energy resolutions achieved are 8.2 keV on 59.9 keV (13.8%); 8.04 keV on 122 keV (6.6%); 11.4 keV on 662 keV (1.72%); 16.0 keV on 1332 keV (1.2%) correspondingly. Evaluated registration efficiency of developed detector CZT2-4-2 was 18.75 mm2 or 8.3% for irradiation from the grids and 16.9 mm2 or 11.2% from the end face. All results of that researches and performances of the developed detectors are presented in details in the chapter I Development of CdZnTe Coplanar Grid Strip Detectors. Chapter II Design Development of Detection Probe shows the results of the development of the outer view and design of the device itself. First prototype was fabricated and delivered to IAEA for testing. In this probe we proposed the solution with thermo stabilization of detector which should provide high temperature stability of Detection Probe and expand the temperature working range. This solution was not proposed by somebody till now. Chapter III Correction of Detection Probe Design shows those changes which were done in Detection Probe in accordance with results of testing of the first prototype: correction of electronics circuitry; integration of additional circuitry for generator and peak stabilizer and preamplifier gain tuning; optimization of Peltier cooler performance on results of testing; correction of technical documentation. After finishing of fabrication of the second prototype in October 2006 it will be delivered to IAEA for the testing in November 2006.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF CdZnTe COPLANAR GRID STRIP DETECTORS

The aim of this part of contract was the develop of CZT coplanar detectors with the largest possible efficiency. 1. Input Inspection of CZT crystals 1.1. Inspection of sizes We received three crystals grown by Yinnel Tech Inc. Their sizes are as follows (Tab. 1): Table 1 THE DESCRIPTION OF YINNEL TECH.INC. CRYSTALS 1 2 3 Number of the crystal CZT2-4-1 CZT2-4-2 Shape rectangular parallelepiped* rectangular parallelepiped * Sizes, mm 17. 17. 11. 17. 17. 11. cross-section: 11.19.7

CZT2-4-3 irregular (side piece) * there was a small deviation from flatness of sides (about 0.3 mm).

1.2. Visual inspection The crystals have polished surface (the polishing was presumably made with the powder M7-M14). The edges of the crystals were small chips (not more than 0.3 mm) All crystals have no visible structure violations on the surface (borders of blocks, twins, inclusions). 1.3. The preparation of the samples for the measurements All crystals were subjected to the standard procession: grinding, polishing, chemical polishing in bromine ethil etchant. On two opposite edges the gold electrodes were deposited with the deposition of gold from 5% solution of hydrochloroarurate acid. On the sample No.CZT2-4-3 the electrodes were deposited only on the central part of edges. The area of each electrodes was about 1 cm3. 1.4. The measurements of electrodes mobility - e and the quantity ()e The values ()e and e were measured by modified time of flight method with application of alpha-particles method. The average values of the measured quantities ()e and e are shown in the Table 2.

Table 2 AVERAGE VALUES OF THE MEASURED QUANTITIES ()E and E 1 2 3 Number of crystal Thickness of detector, mm CZT2-4-1 11.6 CZT2-4-2 11 CZT2-4-3 (side piece) 11.1 e, cm2/Vs 740 750 710 ()ex10-3, cm2/V 6.8 6.9 5.5

There were no considerable changes in values of the measured quantities ()e and e at the change of the side of radiation. The registered alpha spectra had no false, double or rather distorted in shape peaks. That shows the homogeneity of the samples by area. To measure the value of the quantities () and for the holes was not possible due to their low value. 1.5. I-V characteristics measurement I-V characteristics were measured at the ambient temperature about +27 0 (Table 3). The time of exposition in the dark before the measurements was about 20 hours. The value of the current was fixed in 30 seconds after application of a new value of the voltage. After that application of the voltage the value mof the current is not a stable one. In the range of the applied voltages (up to 1000 V) the value of the current is decreased over the time. The stabilisation of the value of the current could appear in 1560 minutes after the voltage is applied. Table 3 I-V CHARACTERISTICS, MEASURED AT THE AMBIENT TEMPERATURE OF +270 Number of crystal U, V 100 200 300 400 500 600 800 1000 100 200 300 400 500 600 800 1000 100 200 300 400 500 600 800 1000 I, nA 5 9 14 18 23 28 39 49 7 15 23 33 41 50 68 86 3 7 11 14 17 20 27 33

CZT2-4-1

CZT2-4-2

CZT2-4-3 (side piece)

The change of the polarity of the detectors switch on does not result in the considerable change of I-V characteristics. All measured I-V characteristics in the applied range of the voltages have the nature close to the linear one. The specific resistance of the samples (36)*1010 Ohm*cm. 1.6. Measurement of spectra The energy resolution on line 59.6 keV of isotope -241 for the various operating voltages are shown in the Table 4: Table 4 THE ENERGY RESOLUTION ON LINE 59.6 KEV OF ISOTOPE -241 FOR THE VARIOUS OPERATING VOLTAGES Number of crystals CZT2-4-1 Operating voltage, V 400 600 800 1000 400 600 800 1000 Energy resolution, keV 8.6 5.5 4.5 4.2 8.8 7.2 6.9 6.7

CZT2-4-2

The spectrum of the isotope -241 registered by the sample CZT2-4-1 at the operating voltage 1000 V is presented in Fig. 1. Fig. 2 shows the spectrum of isotope Cs-137 registered by the same sample at the same voltage. 1.7. After input testing next conclusions were made: - The examined samples have rather high homogeneity. - The examined samples have rather high value of the parameter ()e = 6.8x10-3 cm2/V and low value of that parameter for the holes. - The samples have specific resistivity (3-6)*1010 Ohm*cm. Final conclusion is the samples are suitable for the fabrication of the detectors with coplanar lattice. 1. Layout and photo masks Layout of coplanar electrodes for the detectors was developed by Michigan University. We didnt fined any technological limitations for fabrication of detectors with such layout. Two mirror photo masks with the field 15mmx15mm were fabricated by us for coplanar electrodes on two opposite sides of the detector. 2. Fabrication of coplanar electrodes After input testing solid electrodes were deleted from the crystals. The surface of crystals was processed again and fabrication of coplanar electrodes were done by the technology developed for pixel and strip detectors. But special technological processes were used on photolithography for passivasion of surface and to provide as higher as possible interstrip resistivity.

Electrodes were done by deposition of gold (Fig. 4). To our regret the contacts of both crystals were made over several times due to the insufficient feed through I-V characteristics of the fabricated detectors. The search for the reasons has revealed that inner cavities of the crystal have appeared on the surface of that crystals in the result of all treatments (Fig. 5). A lot of crystal material has to be taken off to delete those cavities. And the second crystal has subjected to the treatments as well. As the result the final thickness of the crystal CZT2-4-1 was ~9 mm, and the crystal CZT2-4-2 ~ 9,5 mm. After detectors crystals fabrication the measurements of the interstrip resistance was made. After the thermal treatment of the crystals on air at the temperature = 120 within t = 120 minutes the measurements were repeated again. The results of the measurements of interstrip resistance of the detector crystals before and after annealing are shown in Table 5 and in Figs 6 and 7. Table 5 INTERSTRIP RESISTANCE (in GOhms) BEFORE AND AFTER ANNEALING Crystal CZT2-4-1 before thermal after thermal treatment treatment R1 R2 R1T R2T 1,159 0,198 1,653 0,571 1,543 0,208 2,283 0,722 1,871 0,229 2,752 0,823 2,162 0,256 3,12 0,909 2,415 0,282 3,39 0,978 2,609 0,308 3,576 1,03 2,726 0,329 3,676 1,065 Crystal CZT2-4-2 before thermal after thermal treatment treatment R1 R2 R1T R2T 0,119 0,943 0,755 3,521 0,142 1,124 0,881 4,598 0,166 1,316 0,953 5,19 0,192 1,493 1,011 5,674 0,215 1,667 1,048 6,002 0,236 1,807 1,07 6,166 0,254 1,902 1,048 6,228

U, 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

As the table shows after annealing the interstrip resistance on the different grids has increased from 1.5 to 5 times in comparison with initial value. The final interstrip resistance at the voltage 60 V on the various surfaces of the fabricated detectors was from 1 to 6 GOhm. The difference of the interstrip resistances on the different surfaces of the detector could be explained most obvious by the different stehiometry of CdZnTe on those surfaces. Those difference could be different due to the growth reasons as well as due to the distinctions appeared in procession of those surfaces at chemical polishing. It was noticed at the time of the fabrication process that not only interstrip resistances value on the various surfaces have been changed but the ratio between resistance on the surfaces to the opposite one. However the detailed study of that processes was not the aim of this project. 3. Design and Assembling After testing the crystals were assembled in the case. With the account of the research aspect of the present project we have developed the design (Fig. 8), that allows the multiple assembly and disassembly of the crystal and its duplicate application in the further projects. The crystals were placed on the dielectric substrate and wire bonded by gold wire to the contact areas at the substrate (Fig. 9). Dielectric substrate with the crystal was placed in commercial aluminum case with thickness of the walls of 1 mm . The sealing of the detectors case was made also . The wire bonding of the connector is shown at the Fig. 8. 4. The measurement of the detector CZT2-4-1 characteristics After the assembly the interstrip resistances were remeasured again. After that the I-V characteristics were measured. All measurements were made at the ambient temperature +230C.

For the testing of the spectrometry characteristics the simplest preamplifier was made in the accordance to the recommendation of [P. N. Luke, Unipolar Charge Sensing with Coplanar Electrodes - Application to Semiconductor Detectors, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 207213, Aug. 1995.] We have not executed any special actions to provide the least noise level of preamplifier. The noise level and energy resolution were defined mostly by the adjustment (balancing) of the preamplifier. The amplification and shaping of the signals of preamplifier were made with the standard spectrometry device MULTISPECTRUM manufactured by Baltic Scientific Instruments (BSI), www.bsi.lv . 5.1 The measurement of the detector CZT2-4-1 I-V parameters 5.1.1. The resistance between grids at the voltage 60 V is : - the side (blue) - 1.7 GOhm - the side B (red) - 1.03 GOhm. 5.1.2. I-V characteristics between grids on the sides and are shown in Table 6 and Fig. 11. Table 6 I-V CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN GRIDS ON THE SIDES AND U, V I,nA (grids A) I,nA (grids B) 10 8 10 20 16 21 30 23 32 40 27 41 50 31 48 60 36 58

5.1.3. I-V characteristics of the detector (table 7) are shown for the connection of the outputs listed below: - grids B and guard ring B are connected together (cathode) - guard ring A is connected to GND - grid A (anode) Table 7 I-V CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DETECTOR U, V I,nA -100 0.4 -200 0.7 -400 1.2 -600 1.7 -800 2.2 -1000 -1200 -1400 -1600 -1800 -2000 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.5 5.0

U the voltage supplied to the cathode. I-V characteristics is not changed at the connection of grids A-1 or grids A-2 or connecting them together. 5.1.4. I-V characteristics of the detector (Table 8) are shown for the connection of the outputs as follows: - grids B and guard ring B are connected together (cathode) - guard ring A is not connected to GND - grid A (anode) Table 8 I-V CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DETECTOR U, V I,nA -100 0.9 -200 1.6 -400 2.7 -600 3.7 -800 4.9 -1000 -1200 -1400 -1600 -1800 5.9 7.0 8.1 9.2 10.4 -2000 11.7

U the voltage supplied to the cathode. The change of the polarity of the detector switch on does not provide the essential change in I-V characteristics. All measured I-V characteristics have the view close to linear. The switch of the guard ring at the side of the signal grids results in the increase of the detector current in 2 times approximately. 5.2. The measurement of the spectrometry characteristics of the detector CZT2-4-1. 5.2.1. The measurement of the spectra were made to connect the outlets in accordance to p.5.1.3, additionally grids A are switched on differentially [P. N. Luke, Unipolar Charge Sensing with Coplanar Electrodes - Application to Semiconductor Detectors, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 207213, Aug. 1995]. The measurements were made at the voltages on the cathode within the range of 5001500 V and on the anode of 1060 V. The optimal parameters of the measurements were as follows: the optimal voltage -1000 V was supplied to cathode, +40 V to anode, shaping time constant was 3 s. 5.2.2. The measurement of spectrometry characteristics requires a sharp selection of amplification in the second measurement channel at the summation of the signals, the adjustment is made by energy resolution of gamma radiation source. The energy resolution depends mainly on the correct adjustment of the summary signal. 5.2.3. The proper energy resolution of the preamplifier is 3.0 keV at the nominal of the load resistors of 100 MOhm, and 2.1 keV at 500 MOhm. 5.2.4. When detector was exposed with light over a certain time and then connected to preamplifier, when HV negative polarity was supplied to cathode and positive polarity to anode, there appeared large excess current noise which could be explained by the residual charge after exposition of the detector. That effect disappears when all grids together with HV filters are shortcircuit on the case of the preamplifier. 5.2.5. The typical spectra of the various gamma-radiation sources for the detector CZT2-4-1 are shown in Figs 1317. 6. The measurement of the detector CZT2-4-2 parameters 6.1. The measurement of the detector CZT2-4-2 I-V parameters 6.1.1. The resistance between grids at the voltage 60 V is: - the side (blue) 5.0 GOhm - the side B (red) 1.28 GOhm 6.1.2. I-V characteristics between grids on sides and are shown in Table 9 and Fig. 18. Table 9 I-V CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN GRIDS ON SIDES AND U, V I,nA (grids A) I,nA (grids B) 10 2.1 7.0 20 4.5 16.8 30 6.8 24.9 40 8.4 32.4 50 10.1 39.1 60 12.0 46.8

6.1.3. I-V characteristics of the detector (Table 10) are shown for the outlets connection as follows: - grids B and guard ring B are connected together (cathode) - guard ring A is connected to GND - grid A (anode) Table 10 I-V CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DETECTOR U, V I,nA -100 0.4 -200 0.7 -400 1.2 -600 1.7 -800 2.2 -1000 -1200 -1400 -1600 -1800 -2000 2.7 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.5 5.0

U the voltage supplied to the cathode. At the connection of grids A-1 or grids A-2, or connecting them together, the I-V characteristics is not changed. 6.1.4. I-V characteristics of the detector (Table 11) are shown for the following outlets connection: - grids B and guard ring B are connected together (cathode) - guard ring A is not connected to GND - grid A (anode) Table 11 I-V CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DETECTOR U, V I,nA -100 1.0 -200 1.7 -400 2.9 -600 4.1 -800 5.3 -1000 -1200 -1400 -1600 -1800 -2000 6.6 7.8 9.0 10.2 11.4 12.7

U the voltage supplied to the cathode. The change of the polarity of the detector switch on does not provide the essential change in I-V characteristic. All measured I-V characteristics have the view close to linear. The switch of the guard ring at the side of the signal grids results in the increase of the detector current 22.5 times. 6.2. The measurement of the spectrometry characteristics of the detector CZT2-4-2. 6.2.1. The measurements of the spectra were made to connect the outlets in accordance to p.2.2.2 , additionally grids A are switched on differentially [P. N. Luke, Unipolar Charge Sensing with Coplanar Electrodes - Application to Semiconductor Detectors, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 207213, Aug. 1995.]. The measurements were made at the voltages on the cathode within the range of 5001500 V and on the anode of 1060 V. The optimal parameters of the measurements were as follows: Optimal parameters of the measurements were as follows: the optimal voltage -1000 V was supplied to cathode, +40 V to anode, shaping time constant was 3 s. 6.2.2. The typical spectra of the various gamma-radiation sources are shown in Figs 1824. 6.2.3. We have found that energy resolution of detector is better if to irradiate it from the end face of crystal but not from the grids face. For example Figs 22 and 24 show such spectra for Cs-37 correspondingly. Instead of energy resolution 12,0 keV detector demonstrates resolution 11,4 keV. Probably its due to more uniform conditions for charge collection in this case, but investigation of this effect was not the aim of this project. 6.2.4. We have evaluated also registration efficiency of the detector CZT2-4-2 for Cs-137. It was 18.75 mm2 or 8.3% for irradiation from the grids face and 16.9 mm2 or 11.2% from the end face.

7. Chapter I Conclusions. 1. Two coplanar grid detectors were fabricated with application of the technology developed by BSI for the fabrication of pixel and strip detectors. 2. Interpixel resistivity on different grids was within 1- 6 GOhm. 3. Energy resolutions achieved are 8.2 keV on 59.9 keV (13.8%); 8.04 keV on 122 keV (6.6%); 11,4 keV on 662 keV (1.72%); 16.0 keV on 1332 keV (1.2%) correspondingly. 4. Evaluated registration efficiency of developed detector CZT2-4-2 was 18.75 mm2 or 8.3% for irradiation from the grids and 16.9 mm2 or 11.2% from the end face.

3000

2500

2000

Am-241

counts

1500

1000

500

0 0 100 200 300 400 500

channels

Fig. 1. Spectrum of Am-241, shaping time = 1s, U = 1000V, Toper. = -27C.

8000 7000 6000 5000

Cs-137

counts

4000 3000 2000 1000 0 0 100 200 300 400 500

channels

Fig. 2. Spectrum of Cs-137, shaping time = 1 s, U = 1000V, Toper. = -27C.

Fig.3 Layout of coplanar grid structure.

Fig.4. Coplanar grid strip detector CZT2-4-2 (15x15x9.5 mm3) based on Yinnel Tech Inc. crystal.

10

a)

b)

11

c)

d) Fig. 5. a), b),c), d) defects of coplanar strip grid detector.

12

e) Fig. 5e. 1 mm scale for evaluation of defects sizes on CdZnTe crystal.

13

Fig. 6. The results of the measurement of interstrip resistance of detector CZT2-4-1.

14

Fig. 7. The measurement results of interstrip resistance of the detector CZT2-4-2.

15

Fig. 8. Construction of the detector assembly.

16

Fig. 9. Assembling of the detector crystal inside the case.

17

Fig. 10. Coplanar grid strip detector in case.

18

65

I, nA

60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 10 20 30

grids A grids B

40

50

60

U, V

Fig. 11. I-V characteristics between grids on the sides A and (CZT2-4-1).

I, nA

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 500

guard ring GND- off guard ring GND-on

1000

1500

2000

U, V

Fig. 12. I-V characteristics of the detector CZT2-4-1.

19

Fig. 13. (CZT2-4-1). The spectrum of Am-241( Res 59.6 keV = 8.4 keV).

Fig. 14. (CZT2-4-1) The spectrum of -57 (Res 122keV = 8.04keV).

20

Fig. 15. (CZT2-4-1). The spectrum of Cs-137 (Res 662keV = 13.2 keV).

Fig. 16. (CZT2-4-1) The spectrum of Cs-137 and Test (Res. 662keV = 13.8 keV, Res test = 8.2keV).

21

Fig. 17. (CZT2-4-1) The spectrum Co-60 (Res. 1332keV = 19.9 keV).

22

grids A grids B

I, nA

50

40

30

20

10

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

U,V

Fig. 18. I-V characteristics between grids on sides A and (CZT2-4-2).

guard ring GND-on guard ring GND-off

14

I,nA

13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000

U, V

Fig. 19. I-V characteristics of the detector (CZT2-4-2).

23

Fig. 20. (CZT2-4-2) The spectrum of Am-241 (Res. 59.6 keV = 8.2 keV).

Fig. 21. (CZT2-4-2) The spectrum of Co-57 (Res122keV 7.9 keV).

24

Fig. 22. (CZT2-4-2) Spectrum of Cs-137 (Res. 662 keV=12,0 keV( 1.8 %), p/c =11.5, p/valley = 103, sens. = 18.75 mm2 (8.3%) at exposition from detectors B side.

Fig.23. (CZT2-4-2) Spectrum of Co-60 (Res. 1332 keV = 16.0 keV).

25

Fig. 24. (CZT2-4-2) Spectrum of Cs-137 (Res 662keV = 11,4 keV (1.7%), p/c = 10.9, p/valley = 78, sens. = 16.9 mm2 (11.2%)).

26

II. Design Development of Detection Probe

Gamma-radiation Detection Probe (further DP) based on a CdZnTe spectrometry coplanar detector was developed for joint work with standard MCA-166 MultiChannel Analyser. A photo of the first prototype of the developed DP with closed and opened case is presented on the Figs 25 and 26. The DP is comprised of : - a detector based on CdZnTe coplanar detector, which is installed on a thermoelectric cooler (TEC) to provide thermostabilization, - a 2-channel differential charge sensitive preamplifier (PA) with resistive feed back; - a HV filter - HV power supply with voltage divider 1. Structure chart A structure chart of the Detection Probe is shown in Fig. 27. 2. Detector unit 2.1 The detector unit is a sealed chamber containing the TEC with heat exchanger, two 6-pins connectors, the detector and a temperature sensor PT-100 on a substrate, both glued to the upper TEC stage (possible with input PA stages) . Approximate sizes of TEC are 30308 mm and the detector is- 151510 mm. There are minimal distances ( 2.5 mm) between inner surface of the cover and the installed elements. 2.2 The approximate sizes of the cylindrical detector unit are diameter of 45 mm and height 35 mm. 2.3 The fastening of the PA flange is a rectangular under standard Al profile. 3. PA unit 3.1. The PA unit is comprised of: - two channel charge sensitive preamplifiers with summator and HV filter with HV divider. - detector temperature stabilisation device. Overall dimensions of printed board 75 55 20 mm. 3.2. Detector temperature stabilization device provides maintain of set up detector temperature by TEC with maximum current 50 mA and voltage 12 V. Temperature measurement is made with temperature sensor -100. 3.3. Ambient temperature could change within 0 + 400, and average value of detector temperature was +20 (0.5)0. 3.4. TEC operates in cooling and heating mode. 3.5. Possible temperature setting on the detector in the range of +10 to +200C. Developed DP is satisfied to specification presented in Table 12.

27

Table 12
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS of DETECTION PROBE N Parameters 1 2 1. Measuring gamma-radiation range, keV 2. Maximum loading on energy 662 keV (Cs-137), cps on shaping time constant 1s 3. Operating mode time setting, hour 4. Continuous operation time, hour 5. Energy resolution on energy 662 keV (Cs-137), keV (at optimal shaping time 3 s and temperature + 22 0C) 6. Geometric sizes of the detector, mm 7. Peak/Compton ratio on energy 662 keV (Cs-137) 8. Detector supply voltage of negative polarity , V 9. Output signal polarity 10. Registration sensitivity on energy 662 keV (Cs-137), mm2 11. Integral nonlinearity should be, % 12. Overall dimensions, mm 13. In operating temperatures range 0 +40 0| - conversion coefficient temperature instability , %/0 - energy resolution temperature instability, %/0 14. Preamplifier supply voltage, V/mA Value 3 50 - 1500 Measurement results 4 50 - 1500 Remarks 5

? ? ok ?

50000 0,5 12 16.5 (2.5%)

50000 0,5 12 16.5 (2.5%)

15x15x10 7 2000 negative 15 0,1 200x100x80

12.45x12.45x7.5 6.5 1800 negative 9.5 0.1 165x60x50

0,01 0. 5 +12/60 -12/60 +24/30 -24/30 1, 2 +5 V/100 -5 V/100

0.02 1.4 +12/50 -12/50 +24/33 -24/19 1,2

? ?

15. Shaping time constants MCA-166, s 16. MCA-166 should have additional supply buses 5V on supply connector Preampl. Power Supply

28

4. Chapter II Conclusions: The analysis of the results presented in Table 12 shows that all characteristics in the requirements specifications of the technical assign are realised except Technical Specification p.13 for temperature stability. Results mismatch in specification p.7 and p.10 is provided by the geometry dimensions of the detector, (Spec. p.6). If the detector with the dimensions specified in specification is installed then Numbers 7 and 10 are executed automatically. Poor temperature stability of DU (Spec. p.13) is caused by insufficient power of the supply source + 12V/50 m in analyser -166. To provide more high stability for DU the additional power supply + 14.5 V/100 mA is required. Additional power supply with Li-Ion Rechargeable Battery could be used for that. That is why the debugging of the detection probe in the development of the additional supply unit is required.

Fig. 25. Detection probe with closed case.

29

Fig. 26. Detection probe with opened case.

30

Fig. 27. Structure chart of Detection Probe.

31

III. Correction of Detection Probe Design

As it was shown in the conclusion of Chapter II, the development of the additional power supply is required to provide the necessary temperature stability of the detection probe. The development should comprise of : The development of the circuitry of the power supply The correction of the detection probe design The correction of the documents The manufacture of the sample The testing The development of Li-Ion Rechargeable Battery with commutation and control diagram and Universal smart Charger was made and Structure chart of Detection Probe is shown in Fig. 28. The housing design of Detection Probe was debugged and additional housing of the developed power supply was added to it. A new design is presented in Fig. 29. Conclusion of Chapter 3 As the result of the second year of the project the correction of the technical documents was made for the ruggedised probe for design part as well as for the electrical one. In accordance to the corrected documents the components were purchased and the manufacture of the second prototype of the detector was started. The manufacture will be over at the end of the October and after the testing in November 2006 the prototype will be supplied for the studies in IAEA.

32

Fig. 28. Structure chart of Detection Probe.

33

Fig. 29. Overall view of Detection Probe

Alexander Loupilov Chief Spectrometrist Riga September 4, 2006

Investigation of Different Scenarios that can be Used to Mask Nuclear Material with Other Gamma Emitters

M.I. Reinhard, D. Prokopovich, D. Alexiev, D. Hill Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) N. Dytlewski International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Abstract
Efforts to interdict trafficking in illicit nuclear and other radioactive materials take place at border control points. Here, following the alarming of radiation portal monitors, border control officers equipped with hand held isotopic analyzers examine suspect materials or packages. In order to not unnecessarily impede or disrupt the flow of traffic through the border control point the outcome of inspections is required promptly using a few minutes of measurement time. This task can present a significant challenge to hand held isotopic analyzers due to the limitations in the radiation detection technology employed, and the limited competency of officers in gamma-ray spectrometry.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation completed three programs of work to experimentally investigate different scenarios that could potentially be used to mask the presence of illicit nuclear materials. The first two programmes were concerned with the masking of HEU and plutonium. Two separate reports were filed previously with the IAEA CRP. The third programme, described here, investigated the comparative performance of the isotope analyser algorithms incorporated in a portable HPGe detector from ORTEC with those of the IDENTIFY software of GBS.

INTRODUCTION
Efforts to interdict trafficking in illicit nuclear and other radioactive materials take place at border control points. Here, following the alarming of radiation portal monitors, border control officers equipped with hand held isotopic analyzers examine suspect materials or packages. In order to not unnecessarily impede or disrupt the flow of traffic through the border control point the outcome of inspections is required promptly using a few minutes of measurement time. This task can present a significant challenge to hand held isotopic analyzers due to the limitations in the radiation detection technology employed, and the limited competency of officers in gamma-ray spectrometry. Of concern is the potential use of legal shipments of radioactive materials, such as radiopharmaceuticals, to mask the presence of illicit nuclear materials. The philosophy behind the masking of illicit nuclear materials is to prevent, or confuse the hand-held isotope analysers from obtaining the positive signatures that they require to unambiguously identify the radioisotopes of concern. The algorithms that isotope analysers use are proprietary, so one has to forward guess their detect-and-identify strategies. Knowledge of the underlying deficiencies of radiation detection instruments and inherent difficulties of gamma ray spectrometry can be exploited to circumvent the detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials. This same information might also be used to improve the performance of detector systems or to formulate better strategies to counteract attempts to mask the presence of illicit materials. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation completed three programs of work to experimentally investigate different scenarios that could potentially be used to mask the presence of illicit nuclear materials. The first two programmes were concerned with the masking of HEU and plutonium. Two separate reports were filed previously with the IAEA CRP [1, 2]. The third programme investigated the comparative performance of the isotope analyser algorithms incorporated in a portable HPGe detector from ORTEC with those of the IDENTIFY software of GBS is described here.

1.
1.1.

ORTEC The Detective versus GBS IDENTIFY

Introduction/Background

The experimental programme carried out and described in our previous reports definitively demonstrated the advantage owed to radiation detectors with good energy resolution at uncovering the presence of masked nuclear materials. In this respect HPGe is far superior to NaI or CZT. The need to operate HPGe detectors at cryogenic temperatures (<100K) has precluded the wide spread adoption of this type of detector in handheld isotope analysers for border security applications. This is due to difficulties associated with accessing a reliable supply of liquid nitrogen in the field as well as technical issues associated with the incorporation of cryogenic components into hand held instrumentation. Quite recently however, ORTEC, suppliers of radiation detection and measurement systems, introduced to the market a portable HPGe based isotope analyser. The instrument utilises a Stirling cycle mechanical system to cool the front end detector components thereby completely eliminating the need for liquid nitrogen. The instrument weighs approximately 8 kg making it portable albeit with more physical effort than that required for existing isotope analysers based on NaI or CZT. The overall performance of an isotope analyser is not just governed by the front end detector technology bit also on the algorithms used to identify peaks in the measured gamma-ray spectrum and correctly attribute them to the appropriate isotope. An experimental programme was

undertaken to compare the performance of the software algorithms incorporated into ORTECs The Detective with those incorporated into GBSs IDENTIFY software package at detecting nuclear material when shielded or combined with other gamma ray emitters.

1.2.

Experimental Methodology

A variety of test scenarios were formulated which involved the combination of nuclear material with other gamma ray emitters and a combination of different shielding material configurations. All scenarios consisted of a linear placement of nuclear material, shielding material, other isotope and The Detective. The HEU and plutonium materials described in previous reports were utilised. Shielding materials included lead plate (2mm to 1 cm thicknesses), steel plates (1 mm to 1 cm thicknesses), cadmium plate (2 mm thickness), combinations of the afore mentioned materials or no shielding material. The isotopes used included 99mTc, 60Co, 137Tc, 131I, 133Ba, 152Eu, 226Ra and combinations thereof. The quantities of isotopes and distance of separation between the source and The Detective were varied in order to test the detection performance of the algorithms over a broad range of degrees of difficulty from easy to highly challenging. In some scenarios the object of the exercise was to push the technology to the point of failure as evident by the production of a false negative result. A total of 135 different scenarios were tested; 74 involving HEU, 54 involving Pu and 7 without any nuclear materials present to test for false positives. All gamma ray spectra were measured using The Detective instrument. For each scenario two separate measurements were made using acquisition times of 1 minute and 10 minutes. The short measurement times were necessary to test algorithm performance with low statistical data likely to be encountered in actual border security applications. During acquisition The Detective provides a running analysis of the identified isotopes which are displayed as a list on the onboard LCD display. The isotopes identified by The Detective during acquisition were recorded manually by the testing officer. Following the spectral acquisition using the The Detective the acquired data was downloaded from the instrument and uploaded into the GBS IDENTIFY software programme. Spectral analysis was repeated using IDENTIFY and the identified isotopes recorded. The results from both algorithms were then compared in terms of the rates of false positives and false negatives.

1.3.
1.3.1.

Results
HEU

The numbers of false negatives and false positives from the 74 HEU scenarios is given in Table 5. Table 5: False positives and false negatives in masking scenarios involving HEU. Technology The Detective IDENTIFY False Negatives 31 11 False Positives 0 0

The number of false negatives produced by The Detective was found to be approximately three times higher than that produced by IDENTIFY.

No false positives were observed by either technology.

1.3.2.

Plutonium

The numbers of false negatives and false positives from the 54 plutonium scenarios is given in Table 6. Table 6: False positives and false negatives in masking scenarios involving plutonium. Technology The Detective IDENTIFY False Negatives 9 6 False Positives 0 0

The number of false negatives produced by The Detective was found to be approximately three times higher than that produced by IDENTIFY. No false positives were observed by either technology during the course of this study.

1.4.

Discussion

It is important to note as a prelude to further discussion that the observed high rates of false negatives were somewhat expected as the technology was intentionally pushed to failure using quite challenging masking scenarios. The experience of the team with isotope analysers containing NaI or CZT type detectors demonstrated that the challenging scenarios used to this section all exceeded the performance limitations of such moderate energy resolution technology. For this reason the observed results were not in any way indicative of questionable performance of a HPGe front end but rather a direct result of the experimental methodology employed. The higher rate of false negatives produced by The Detective in comparison to that of IDENTIFY in scenarios involving both HEU and plutonium was indicative of superior performance of the algorithms contained in IDENTIFY at detecting masked nuclear material. With all spectra acquired using The Detective a small advantage may have been afforded to the algorithms of this instrument over the algorithms of IDENTIFY. This is due opportunity afforded to the manufactures of The Detective to optimise the parameters of the peak detection algorithms to the known characteristics of the front end HPGe detector on board the instrument. In the case of IDENTIFY performance parameters of the HPGe detector on board The Detective, most notably the energy resolution as a function of gamma ray energy, had been experimentally measured and entered into IDENTIFY as part of the prior calibration. Poor setting of detector performance parameters into the peak detection algorithms was observed by the testing team to degrade the peak detection performance and therefore isotope identification. All efforts were made to ensure that the detector performance parameters of The Detective were accurately measured and recorded in the IDENTIFY software settings. Knowledge of the settings used within The Detective could not be obtained. As such a definitive advantage of The Detective over IDENTIFY cannot be claimed. The greater rate of false negatives produced by both algorithms in the case of the scenarios involving HEU as opposed to plutonium is suggestive of the greater difficulty required to unmask HEU using a HPGe front end. The lower energy of the HEU emissions combined with the low emission intensities makes detection of HEU particularly problematic. In the case of plutonium the indicative emissions are of higher energy thereby less likely to be attenuated through any shielding material placed laterally to the nuclear material. This result would not be expected for lower energy

resolution front end detectors due to the inability of all but HPGe to resolve the closely spaced gamma ray lines of 239Pu. The lack of any false positives from either algorithm was not unexpected. This was due to the simple fact that nuclear material was present in approximately 95 % of the scenarios thereby reducing the opportunity for a false positive to arise. It could be postulated that due to the extremely good energy resolution of HPGe and the lack of any gamma ray emissions from the masking isotopes with energies within a FWHM of those of either HEU or plutonium that false positives are not likely to be a significant problem for The Detective. In all other experimentation and experience with this instrument during the trial period no false positives were recorded. It is difficult to speculate further on the reasons behind the superior performance of IDENTIFY over that of The Detective with respect to false negatives. As part of the analysis process the IDENTIFY software displays on the measured spectrum each of the identified peaks and to which isotope they are attributed. The positions in the spectrum of missing peaks associated with isotopes detected on the basis of other peaks are shown. This avails the user with the opportunity to form expert judgement as to presence of low statistical peaks not identified by the peak detection algorithms. Such information is useful in assisting an understanding of how well the algorithms work. In the case of The Detective the results of the analysis are not presented to the user apart from the final isotope list. This is not meant to infer a criticism of The Detective but rather an indication of why a more sophisticated analysis of the comparative performance results cannot be undertaken. The limited results displayed by The Detective is probably instructive in making this instrument simpler for customs officers not trained in gamma ray spectroscopy easier to use.

1.5.

Conclusion

In summary The Detective, with front end detector technology based on HPGe, affords the user with a superior capability to unmask the presence of illicit nuclear material than that available in other isotope analysers which make use of NaI or CZT. At eight kilograms the extent to which the instrument is portable is the subjective opinion of the user. What is indisputable is that the instrument is mobile and not limited to localities serviced with a regular supply of liquid nitrogen. In terms of the rate of false negatives the algorithms on board The Detective were inferior to those of IDENTIFY at uncovering masked nuclear material. Improvements to the algorithms used in The Detective may be an important upgrade opportunity for ORTEC.

REFERENCES
[1] Dytlewski, N., Reinhard, M.I. and Alexiev, D., Report on IAEA Co-ordinated Research Project: Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, Task 6: Investigate different scenarios that can be used to mask nuclear material with other gamma emitters, PART I: HEU, ANSTO, February 2003 [Safeguards-in-Confidence]. Reinhard, M.I., Alexiev, D., Dytlewski, N. and Thomson, S., Report on IAEA Co-ordinated Research Project: Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, Task 6: Investigate different scenarios that can be used to mask nuclear material with other gamma emitters, PART II: Plutonium, ANSTO, March 2004 [Safeguards-in-Confidence]. Sampson, T.E., Plutonium Isotopic Composition by Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy: A Review, LA-10750-MS, UC-10, September 1986. Dytlewski, N. and Ensslin, N., An Isotopic Analysis of ANSTOs Plutonium Inventory by Gamma Ray Spectroscopy, AP/TN. 218, October 1988.

[2]

[3] [4]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The ANSTO authors would like to thank ORTEC and Nucletron for the generous loan of The Detective for use as part of this programme.

Reduction of the Frequency of Innocent Alarms in Border Monitoring

H. Bck, S. Hengster, M. Schwarz, M. Schrenk, M. Swoboda Vienna Institute of Technology Atominstitute Abstract Under the Research Agreement no 12585 four major tasks were carried out at the Vienna Institute of Technology-Atominstitute by four students. In particular the tasks were A. M. Swoboda: Dose rate and Isotope Identification Algorithm for CZT detectors for a possible use in SPRDs B. M. Schrenk: A Real Time, Isotope Identifying Gamma Spectrometer for Monitoring of Pedestrians by Michael Schrenk C. S. Hengster: Comparison of Simulation and Measurement of Radioactive Sources by the Usage of SuperSynth D. V. Schwarz: RID Hardware and ID-Software tests to compare different RIDs and ID methods by Vinzenz Schwarz The first three projects could be finished within the contract period while the last project is still ongoing. These individual reports are described below.

A: Dose rate and Identification Algorithm for CZT detectors for a possible use in SPRDs by Martha Swoboda A.1. Introduction

A new instrument group is going to be established called SPRDs (Spectral Radiation Detectors). These instruments are hybrids between PRDs (Personal Radiation Detectors) and RIDs (Hand-held Radioisotope Identification Devices). SPRDs will be developed in the first line to allow the user to distinguish quickly in case of a radiation alarm between medical isotopes and other isotopes, because most of the radiation alarms for pedestrians are triggered by medical isotopes and a RID is not quickly available. Nevertheless the algorithm is a full isotope identification algorithm for a certain number of unshielded isotopes. This is needed because a nuclear or an industrial isotope shall never be indicated as a medical isotope. Also a mixture of a medical isotope with another isotope should be correctly recognized. In order to avoid false positive results a full algorithm is needed. Whether detailed isotope identification results and/or an isotope categorization only are indicated by the instrument is a question of the end-user requirements. This type of instruments will be very small (like PRDs or even a wrist watch) and can therefore easy be used for uncovered or covered operations. The energy compensated dose rate indication is then also the basis for safety functions similar to the PRDs. This new instrument type will not replace the RIDs for various reasons (not for NORM in vehicles, not for heavily shielded isotopes, less sensitive because using CdZnTe detectors).

The work done under this research agreement was related to two functions of this new instrument type: 1. Energy compensated dose rate indication based on spectral information 2. Isotope identification, Isotope categorization. Used Detector and detector setting CZT500, #9928/069 MMCA-166, #9980/599 Settings 1s shaping time selected Number of channel: Usable number of channels Energy range: (Ritec, Latvia) (GBS Elektronik, Germany)

2048 2048-64=1984 3MeV

1.1. Used detector system.

A.2.

Dose rate algorithm

The dose rate algorithm is based on the spectroscopic information. The detector efficiency of CdZnTe detectors is strongly dependent on the energy of the incoming gamma radiation. For high energy gamma radiation the efficiency is very low in comparison to low energy gamma radiation at the detector. A number of isotopes, mainly emitting monoenergetic gamma lines, were selected in order to cover with all those gamma lines the whole energy range up to 3MeV.
ROI I-125 Am-241 Tl-201 Co-57 U-235 Cr-51 F-18 Cs-137 Mn-54 Co-60 [K-40]* Ra-Th 1 27keV 2 60keV 3 70keV 4 135keV 122keV 4 136keV 5 167keV 186keV 6 320keV 7 511keV 8 662keV 9 834keV 10 1173keV 10 1333keV 11 1460keV 12 ***

2.1. Selected isotopes for the dose rate algorithm ***There is only one calibration factor for energies >1500keV ROIs were selected in such a way that the whole energy range is covered by ROIs and the peaks of the isotopes mentioned above are located in one of the ROIs. Twelve ROIs were set around the peaks listed above (see 2.1). A set of spectra of the isotopes listed above was taken and the dose rate at the location of the detector measured with a calibrated reference dose meter. The calibration factor for each photopeak was determined. Furthermore the peak to Compton ratio for all ROIs below the photopeak was determined.

A software program based on Visual Basic 6.0 was created. The algorithm now starts looking from the highest energy for an occupied ROI and goes down to low energies. The calculation starts with the first ROI, which is occupied (occupied means that a certain threshold is exceeded). The peak to Compton ratios in the ROIs below according to the occupied ROI are then calculated and subtracted. The information in the first occupied ROI is then multiplied by the calibration factor. The algorithm is now looking for one more occupied ROI below. If there is still one, the procedure will be repeated. Results are given in table 2.3.

2.2. Schematic picture of the dose rate calculation method for an isotope mixture or a multipeak spectrum.

2.3. Results of the dose rate algorithm (Blue coloured row contains the isotopes used to figure out the calibration factor).

The dose rate accuracy for this type of instruments should be within 50 percent. Therefore the dose rate results based on this algorithm are within the required limit. Pu 61 02 is the source name of reactor grade Plutonium and U446 is the source name for a 4.46% enriched Uranium source.

A.3. Isotope Identification algorithm for a CZT 500 detector The goal was to use a fast algorithm, applicable also to spectra with bad statistics. Furthermore the power consumption must be low. Therefore using the normal procedure of a peak search algorithm combined with decision logic does not meet the requirements. A method based on ROIs was used for this algorithm. Only a certain number of isotopes were selected for this method as library. Isotope library Industrial: Na-22, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Eu-152, Ho-166m, Ir-192, Bi-207, Am-241 Medical: F-18, Ga-67, Tc-99m, I-131, Tl-201 Nuclear (U-233), U-235, (Np-237), U-238, Pu WG, Pu RG, NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) K-40, Ra-226, Th-232

Method A number of peaks were selected for each isotope of the library. ROIs were set around selected peaks. The result is a number of 39 partially overlapping ROIs. The algorithm now is using the information given in the ROIs, a set of rules (decision logic) and the library in order to identify the isotope or isotope mixture.

Identification criteria Identification criteria for single isotopes: Measurement time 10 min. 0.5Sv/h at the location of the detector above Background Identification criteria for Mixtures: Identification for at least the same dose rate

No shielded sources A spectra catalogue containing spectra of all the isotopes in the library was created. The spectra were taken with different dose rate at the detector and different measurement time. WinSPEC-T was used for data evaluation. A Visual Basic 6.0 code is currently being developed to test the identification algorithm. A.4. Reference: The algorithm development was done in close cooperation with the FZR (Forschungszentrum Rossendorf, Germany) in view of their development of the SpecWatch (see Research Agreement 12517). A.5. Summary: The Forschungszentrum Rossendorf is developing a miniaturized personal device for automatic detection and identification of gamma radiation sources packed in a wrist watch (called SpecWatch). The identification and dose rate algorithm will be tested by FZR in view of the possible use in this device.

B: A Real Time, Isotope Identifying Gamma Spectrometer for Monitoring of Pedestrians by Michael Schrenk B.1. Abstract: The demand for installation and use of radiation monitors at border crossing points [1, 2] and other locations in a country has significantly increased due to the fact that terrorist threats may involve the use of radiation dispersal devices (RDDs, dirty bombs). One of the problems that customs officers and security forces experience is a high frequency of innocent radiation alarms caused by airport passengers who have undergone a medical treatment. Since the halflife of the isotopes that are used for medical treatment ranges from hours to several days, the dose-rate for days and even weeks after the treatment is high enough to trigger a radiation alarm of a border monitor. In this report we describe the development and testing of a real time gamma spectrometer based on a commercially available large volume NaI detector and a computer coupled multi channel analyser (MCA) with fast data collection, stabilisation of the energy scale and isotope identification software. The system is capable of measuring a burst of gamma spectra in second intervals, to identify the isotopes and to produce a green alarm in real time when a medical isotope is present and a red alarm in other cases. The system has successfully been tested under laboratory conditions, as well as at an international airport and on patients in the radiation ward of hospitals. This work has been performed under an IAEA Research Agreements with the Atom Institute of the Austrian Universities and the International Atomic Energy Agency. B.2. Introduction: The Vienna International Airport (VIA) is a medium sized airport with more than 12 million passengers per year. Passengers that are arriving into the European Union (EU), and having nothing to declare, leave the arrival area with their luggage through the green channel. This Exit is radiation-monitored by a Yantar Pedestrian Monitor [3]. The ASPECT Yantar 1U is a single pillar detection unit containing a plastic szintillator for gamma radiation detection and two He3-tubes which are embedded in a polyethylene moderator for neutron detection. The dimensions of the pillar are 175 x 56 x 25 cm and the detection height is from the ground level up to 200 cm. An external controller (PVC-01) is evaluating the data, making the decision for an alarm and storing all values of gamma and neutron alarms in cps units. The system was installed under the ITRAP (Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program) [4] [5]. During a test phase, about 68 alarms per day occurred when the detector operated at the recommended sensitivity. In the case when an alarm occurs, the custom officers have to detain the persons and send the person back through the radiation monitor. If the pedestrian radiation monitor confirms the alarm, additional manual measurements with a radioisotope identification device (RID) are made to obtain information about the location, the dose rate and the isotope of the source. A large rate of medical isotopes in people was found. These alarms are called innocent alarms and are caused by passengers who recently had undergone therapy or diagnosis with radioactive medical isotopes. Therefore, it was necessary to find a technical solution to reduce the time-consuming process of manually detecting and identifying medical isotopes using a RID. A Real Time Gamma Spectrometer, based on a commercially available large volume NaI(Tl)-detector, a MCA, and a standard laptop with an online identification program, should be able to flag most of the innocent alarms, allowing for a reduction in the workload for the officers.

B.3.Experimental details: B 3.1. A Real Time Gamma Spectrometer (offline mode) This system was used for data collection at the airport and elsewhere to develop and optimise the method. The offline data evaluation should give information about the frequency of the occurrence of commonly used medical isotopes at the VIA. It also should give information about what percentage of the alarms at the VIA could be flagged in real-time as innocent alarms. Figure 1 gives the schematics of the system. A large volume NaI(Tl)-detector (5x1) is used for the spectral measurements with high efficiency. A MiniMCA [6] is used for data transmission to the computer in one-second real-time (RT) intervals. The computer program WinSPECa [6] distinguishes between spectra that are under a certain trigger level, and spectra, that have a higher count rate than the preset level. Only in the second case are the spectra recorded on the disk for later evaluation. The identification software versions used for this are IdentPro [7] and Identify [6]. Figure 2 gives an overview of the installation of the systems at the airport. The NaI detector is placed face to face with the Yantar Monitor. In between these detectors is the green channel.

Fig. 1. Schematic of the Offline Real Time Gamma Spectrometer.

Fig. 2. Ground plan of the green channel, the detector positions and the commonly used pathways (2 and 3). In case of an alarm the passengers between the monitor and the exit gate are send back to confirm the alarm again (pathway 1).

Measurements of medical isotopes which could cause innocent alarms at border monitors The first data from the airport show a huge difference between the shape of the spectra from sources that were shown in commonly used spectral catalogues and sources carried in passengers due to scattering of the gamma rays. Some measurements at the hospital had to be made on patients to obtain additional information on gamma spectra of radioactive medical isotopes in patients. Based on a list of the commonly used isotopes [8], we were able to measure 12 different medical isotopes in the department of nuclear medicine and the institute of radio oncology of the Vienna Danube Hospital (SMZ-Ost). All these medical isotopes are injected or implanted in the human body. Several days and even weeks after the treatment the dose-rate of these medical isotopes can still be high enough to trigger a radiation alarm. Three different

detectors for the measurements were used: a 3x3 NaI-, a CZT-1500- and sometimes a portable HPGe-detector. To get more information about the medical isotopes and their spectra (to optimise isotope identification), the following measurements were made: i) Measurements to create a catalogue of in vitro (in the bottle) and in vivo (in the person) spectra. ii) Short-time measurements with low dose rates to get initial information on the detection limits of the Real Time Gamma Spectrometric system. iii) Measurements of Pd-103 and I-125 seeds for prostate gland therapy with their low energetic peaks at 20 keV. These generated questions about the detectability of the isotopes. iv) Measurements on a Perspex phantom to answer a concern of whether we are able to distinguish between a source that is in a person and a source that is carried (smuggled) next to a persons body, e.g., in the luggage. The Online Real Time Gamma Spectrometer The evaluation of all the data from the airport and from the hospital measurements showed the direction in which the software developer had to optimise the Online Real Time Gamma Spectrometer. Several field tests of the online version, which is based on the offline set up with the additional new online identification software Specmon [6], were then used to show that the system can fulfil the expectation. Testing the System for use as a Spectral Portal Monitor The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will publish in the near future specifications and minimum requirements for spectral portal monitors [9]. These minimum requirements recommend the use of a NaI-detector with a size of at least 6x2 for spectral pedestrian monitoring. The detector of the system used in this paper is a little smaller but should show, in principle, similar performance. Among others, two special points of interests are investigated in this paper: i) The vertical and horizontal sensitivity distributions for the spectral portal monitor should be comparable to the detection range of a standard pedestrian portal monitor. A decrease of observed count rate of less than 50% at the edges of the range is required. ii) A high count rate can cause a distortion of the gamma ray spectrum. The system should still identify the isotope and be able to quickly recover normal operating conditions after the event. B.3.2. Results 3.2.1. Results of the airport measurements i) Run through sequences:

These sequences are produced by plotting Integral Counts of each spectrum of an alarm as a function of time. There are two different uses of the time axis. In the first method, each spectrum that is recorded over a period of 1 or 2 seconds in real-time is used to label the axis (Figure 3). In the second method, the real-time axis uses the recorded time stamp in seconds from the ASCII code of the spectral files (Figure 4). This time correction shows gaps that were produced by count rates below the trigger level (i.e., no recorded spectra). However,

there are also gaps that were caused by insufficient writing speed (12 ms, Win 95) to the hard disk.

Fig. 3. Run through sequence of the alarm 102 with Fig. 4. Run through sequence of the alarm 102 from file VIA055481 to file VIA055498 with the time axis uses the the recorded files as the time axis. recorded time stamp. This leads to an expansion of the region of figure 3 and shows more details. The gaps were produced by not recorded spectra with count rates below the trigger level and by the insufficient writing speed of the hard disk (clearly seen at second 7 and 34).

Several of the high count rates alarms delivered peaks in the run through sequences with increasing flanks over a time period of 15 seconds and single spectra with Integral counts of more than 20.000 cps. Low count rate alarms (about 1000 cps above background) show quit shorter increasing flanks with about five seconds. The first increase in the count rate shown in the figures corresponds to the peak that triggered the alarm for both, the spectrometer and the Yantar portal monitor. All of the following peaks were caused by the interaction of the customs officers with the passengers. Figure 2 shows the geometry of the two detectors and the possible pathways of the sources. The path commonly taken by passengers is the direct line starting from the corner of the Yantar that goes straight to the corner of the walls (pathway 2). If an alarm occurs, customs officers detain the persons in the area between the monitor and the exit gate. These passengers are sent back through the detection area into the customs control section (pathway 1 parallel to the wall). The officers make their first re-check with the help of the Yantar monitor. Now, the persons were sent separately through the detection area to confirm the alarm. Therefore the first peak is usually the smallest, which is caused by the greater distance of the source to the NaI-detector. Figure 5 shows one of the most interesting events recorded. The spectrometer triggered 8 minutes before the person with the source caused an alarm by passing the pedestrian monitor. The first interaction with the customs officers in front of the detector produced, over a period of one minute, spectra with more than 20.000 counts per seconds. In a room next to the NaI-detector, the person was measured with the RID and the data were noted in the logbook. This procedure produced additional 4 minutes of spectra where the spectrometer system was triggered. The person left the transit area through the red channel (Customs declaration exit).

Fig. 5. The run through sequence of the alarm 112.

ii)

Frequency of the alarm giving isotopes:

For this evaluation, a comparison with the logbook from the customs office was necessary. Table I gives a short overview of some differences in the detecting systems. System detector background trigger level detecting range Yantar Plastic 4.6 litre 345 cps (variable) 8 (var. with bkgrd.) small corridor Spectrometer 5x1 NaI(Tl) Crystal 240 cps (variable) 295 cps, constant small corridor + part of the luggage hall

Table 1 Comparison of the monitoring systems

In 241 days of data collection the spectrometer recorded 163 events. It missed four events that were noted in the logbook. Eleven events were recorded from the spectrometer showing no notification in the customs logbook, which means that the Yantar had not alarmed (only the spectrometer triggered an alarm). The rest of the Yantar alarms and the spectrometric events were at the same time. The 163 events were: 154 medical sources 3 NORM sources (stones and minerals) 5 not identifiable events 1 Yantar source test event The 154 medical sources (100%) were: 97 Tl-201 (62.99%) 27 I-131 (17.53%) 22 Tc-99m (14.28%) 4 Ga-67 (2.60%) 3 I-123 (1.95%) 1 In-111 (0.65%)

About 95% of all medical alarms were caused by only three isotopes (Tl-201, I-131, Tc-99m). The not identifiable isotopes delivered spectra with low statistics, having count rates in the range of the trigger level. Additionally, the alarm sequence was too short. Even summing of all spectra of this alarm event did not give a clear identification result. It was only possible to exclude Tl-201 and Tc-99m. A possible explanation for the eleven extra events could be that they were caused by the detection range of the NaI-detector reaching out into the luggage hall and the blue channel (Exit for EU internal flights), where a source could also exit this luggage area. The spectrometric data gave additional information about the Yantar false alarms, which were noted in the customs logbook. Of these, 24 out of 25 false alarms could be identified as medical. iii) Time of identification

The other important point of this evaluation was to determine the time when the first of a sequence of spectra is identified correctly, and that all following spectra gave the same result, until the maximum of the run through peak is reached. It requires one second to record and transmit a spectrum to the computer, and less than one second to identify it. Therefore, the spectrum taken at least 2 seconds before the maximum is reached had to be identified correctly in order to generate a timely alarm. This evaluation was done with the peak search mode of the program Identify [6]. The Identification software Identify is based on a peak search algorithm. The peaks found by the algorithm are compared with the peak energies from the isotope library. A decision logic is responsible for the identification results. The most significant peaks in the run through sequence are the first peak and the highest peak. The evaluation of the first peak gives information about how many of the alarms could be flagged in a timely manner as innocent for the case of the geometry of the green channel of the VIA (pathway 2 for the source. Passing the detector in a straight way, shown in figures 2 by the second part of the pathway 1, at a minimum distance of one meter is the typical example of the geometry of a portal monitoring system. Therefore, the data evaluation of the best peaks should provide information for the operation of these kinds of monitors. The evaluation was made with two different methods. The normal method is to evaluate each spectrum of the peak. The summing method is to sum a spectrum to the previous spectra of the same run to get better statistics. In the case of the best peak, only the spectra of the short run through sequence of this peak were taken for the evaluation (not all previous spectra from this alarm). medical isotope I-131 Tc-99m Tl-201 Evaluation of the first peak normal adding 30.8% 50.0% 59.1% 68.2% 31.3% 56.3% Evaluation of the best peak normal adding 38.5% 61.5% 63.6% 86.4% 37.5% 68.6%

Table II the evaluation of the alarm sequences

Table II shows the percentage of innocent alarms, which were flagged in a timely way. It can be seen that Tc-99m is the easiest isotope to be identified and that I-131 shows the worst identification properties of the three candidates. The other result shows that the summing method should be a part of the online software version since it gives a higher hit rate. With a specifically tuned software, which is able to evaluate correctly the X-ray peaks of the Tl-201 spectrum, the hit rate of this isotope could be increased enormously. Spectra that are distorted due to high count rates, however, must be excluded. Although not all alarms can be identified

(flagged) in time, this result shows a significant reduction of the manual follow-up which would be required in the case of the use of only a gross gamma detector. B 3.2.2. Measurements with radioactive medical isotopes which could cause innocent alarms at border monitors i) The ICRP 80 Catalogue (from the year 1998)[8] lists 73 different isotopes in use for nuclear medicine. The following isotopes were available at the hospital and gave a good cross-section of the standard isotopes used in Europe: F-18, Co-57, Ga-67, Y-90, Tc-99m, Pd-103, In-111, I-123, I-125, I-131, Sm-153, Tl-201. All these isotopes were measured in vitro and several were also measured in vivo. Based on this, a comparison of in vitro and in vivo spectra was made. Figure 6 shows clearly the differences. On the one hand, there is a huge region of scattered gamma rays, which is caused by the human body. On the other hand, there is a shielding effect of the body which leads to a decrease in the lower energetic peaks of some isotopes, e.g., I-123.

Fig. 6. Comparison of in vitro and in vivo spectra (recorded with a 3x3 NaI-detector).

ii) The short time measurements at low dose rates show that single peak in vitro spectra with a low energetic peak can be identified correctly even at 50 nSv/h above background and a measurement time of 1 s. iii) The measurements with Pd-103- and I-125 seeds produced the following results: The system is able to measure the 20 keV Pd-103 and the 27 keV I-125 X-ray peaks even in the case of short measurement times. The situation changes if the seeds are placed into the prostate gland or into a Perspex phantom. The X-ray line of the Pd-103 isotope is shielded so well by the body that in long time measurements only a bad Pd-103 spectrum was obtained. No useable spectra of this isotope in short time measurements were obtained. The 27 keV line of I-125 seeds delivers a usable spectrum in both cases. iv) Several tests with I-131 and a Perspex phantom lead to the following results: Due to the huge scatter area of Tc-99m, I-123 and I-131 a subroutine should be able to determine if the source is in the body or next to the body. Isotopes like I-131 and Ga-67 with peaks in the low energy and in the middle- or high-energy range can give information about shielded or unshielded isotopes. This can also be computed by a corresponding subroutine.

v) Isotopes for the library of the identification programs: In summary, all these measurements show that only a few of the medical isotopes need to be included in the identification library. Several of the medical isotopes cannot be taken into account because of: a) Too short a half life: F-18 b) Only Bremsstrahlung spectra: Y-90 c) Not measurable in a Real Time Gamma Spectrometric System: Pd-103 d) Seldom used: Co-57 f) Impurities allowed: Sm-153 (dominant Eu-152 spectrum after a few days). The medical isotopes for the library should include: Basic: Ga-67, Tc-99m, In-111, I-123, I-131, Tl-201 Additional: I-125, Xe-133 These basic isotopes were found at the airport measurements. B.4. The Online Real Time Gamma Spectrometer The requirements for online systems are: Notebook 600 MHz, 128 MB, Win 98 or higher background updating and a trigger level of 5 sigma summing spectra mode + background subtraction real-time spectral identification spectrum library should be optimised for the application with emphasis on medical isotopes colour indication to flag the kind of isotope: green for medical isotopes and red for other isotopes, mixture of medical with other isotopes and unknown isotopes never give an indication of a green alarm if other than medical isotopes are present capability to detect nuclear and industrial isotopes in the presence of medical isotopes spectra recording for later evaluation by an expert electronic logbook of the alarms and identified isotopes A prototype system was field tested in the hospital. Because of the high dose rates, a 3x3 NaI-detector was sufficient. People with the following sources were tested: F-18, Ga-67, Tc-99m, In-111, I-123, I-131 and Tl-201. All these isotopes gave a green light indication several seconds before the person was passing the detector. The program used in the Specmon device [6] is the link between the recording- and identification-software. A small window (Figure 7) on the PC-display appears if the program is operating. The window is split into three areas. On the top there is the alarm light indication. A yellow light for the indication that the system is working properly. A red light is the sign that the isotope is not medical (or not identified). The middle part of the display shows the nominal and current background and the trigger level in cps. In addition, the identification results in real time of each new generated spectrum can be seen. The logbook of the last three alarms can be seen in the lowest section of this window. In the future, the system should work with an occupancy sensor and an external light indication.

Fig. 7. The portal monitor window at the PC-display.

Fig. 8. The horizontal and vertical performance of the detector.

B.5.

Testing the System for Use as a Spectral Portal Monitor

i) Vertical and horizontal performance To simulate the geometry of a portal monitor the following tests were made. To test the horizontal performance of the detector, it was placed in a horizontal position one meter above the floor. A 73 Sv/h Cs-137 source was placed at a one-meter distance in front of the detector. In 10 cm steps it was moved from the floor (-100 cm) to a height of +100cm. The Integral Counts were compared with the 0 cm position. The decrease in each source position should be less than 50%. The same procedure was used with the detector in a vertical orientation. The horizontal distance from the centre of the detection sensible volume to the Cs-137 source was one meter. The vertical distances were variable in 10 cm steps from minus 100 to plus 100 cm. The Integral Counts were compared with the 0 cm position. A second graph was generated by a comparison of the Integral Counts at the position where the larges amount of counts appeared. ii) System performance at high count rates If a strong source is passing the detector, a distortion of the spectra could occur. The recovery time of the system should be minimal after the collapse and the system should guarantee that after this event the performance is not distorted. A peak shift to higher energies is also the result of higher count rates. If the system is working in a summing spectra mode, the peak shift decreases the resolution of the sum spectrum. Figures 9 shows the spectral distortion for four different isotopes. Each line gives the position of the main peak of that isotope in comparison to the count rate. Each peak has a shift to higher energies. The amount depends on the peak energy. A maximum occurs at 200 to 300 kcps. Then the shift changes direction toward lower energies until a rapid shift shows the start of the collapse.

Fig. 9. The peak centroids of the main peaks of four different isotopes as function of the count rate.

Fig. 10. The dynamic test with an I-131 source. The figure shows the peak shift of the 365 keV peak and the collapse when a source with high activity is passing the detector.

Figure 10 is based on a dynamic test with an I-131 capsule that is moved toward the detector and back away from the detector. It can be clearly seen that after the collapse (files 152158) the system returns to normal operating conditions. B.6. Summary The work described here had the goal of flagging innocent alarms caused by medical isotopes for cases when a conventional pedestrian monitor would give a gamma alarm. Based on a large volume NaI detector (minimum size of 6x2), the system shows a gamma sensitivity that compares well with that of a gross gamma counter. However, it has the advantage of providing the spectrometric information, allowing the identification of isotopes. Therefore, a new generation of spectral portal monitors for monitoring pedestrians has been developed and demonstrated. The decision to be made in the situation of a green alarm indication is still the responsibility of the user (manual follow up or not, depending on the threat level). However, this monitor cannot fully replace a RID, which is still needed for verification of red alarms. The most important function of such a device is the identification of medical isotopes. All other isotopes (or unclear cases) must be flagged red and be followed up with a RID. The system should never flag any other isotope green. Therefore, the system should have an acceptable sensitivity to detect nuclear material and industrial isotopes in presence of a masking medical isotope. This work will be continued to investigate in more detail performance limitations and improvements of the method, based on the results of ongoing field tests. B.7. Acknowledgement The author wish to thank the GBS Company for the provision of the online version of the data taking and evaluation program for some of the described tests. B.8. References [1] IAEA-TECDOC-1312, Detection of radioactive materials at borders, Sept. 2002. [2] IAEA-TECDOC-1313, Response to events involving the inadvertent movement or illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, Sept. 2002. [3] ASPECT, http://www.aspect.dubna.ru/english/.

[4] P. Beck, Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Program, Austrian Research Center Seibersdorf Report, OEFZGS0002, February (2000), http://www.arcs.ac.at/G/system/itrap. [5] P. Beck, F. Reichart, W. Klsch, G. Stehno, ITRAP-Airport, ARC Seibersdorf research Report, ARC Sr--G--0001, April (2004). [6] User manuals for Identify, WinSPECa, Specmon and MCA-166, GBS-Elektronik GmbH. Dresten, Germany. Available: http://www.gbs-elektronik.de/. [7] R. Gunnink, R. Arlt, Ident Pro: Isotope identification software for analyzing illicit trafficking spectra, presented at the ESARDA-Symposium 2003, Session 10: Combating Illicit Trafficking, Stockholm, 2003. [8] Radiation Dose to Patients from Radiopharmaceuticals: ICRP 80 (International Commission of Radioactive Protection, Publication 80) Volume 28, No. 3 1998. [9] Draft IAEA-TECDOC, Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Radiation Monitoring Equipment, October 2004.

C. Comparison of Simulation and Measurement of Radioactive Sources by the Usage of SuperSynth by Sabine Hengster C.1 Abstract

The main issue of this work was the investigation of the possibility to obtain simulated spectra similar to measured spectra with SuperSYNTH [1], a program to define a set of input parameters for MCNP [2]. C.2 Work performed

C.2.1 Comparison of simulation to measurement for several NaI detector configurations C.2.1.1 Simple source (Cs137) SuperSYNTH was tested with a Scionix Na(I) 25B25/1-E2-X 1*1 detector [3], which had a simple end cap geometry. In order to get the fitting data for the device, various source configurations and end cap materials were tested. As this did not produce a similar spectrum to the measured, a neutron radiography and a X-ray picture were taken to get an appropriate set of input parameters for the detector (see table C.1).

end cap window end cap spacing absorber 1 absorber 2

material Distance distance from detector face Al 0,4 Al2O3 0,3 vacuum (predefined) 0,1 silicone rubber 0,1 0,4 Al 0,1 0,5

Table C.1 Input set for a Scionix Na(I) 1*1 detector A spectrum of this set of variables for a Cs137 source can be seen in figure C.1.

Figure C.1. Simulated and measured spectrum of a Cs137 source for a Scionix [3] detector. The next type of detector to test were target fieldspec 1*1 and 1*2 Na(I) detectors [4]. The build up of this detector was known as presented by Target Systems, but in this type of detector the detecting crystal was surrounded at a distance of 1.7 cm by the electronics of the detecting device. The input of SuperSynth allowed only the definition of one end cap and entrance window material, therefore the a averaging and weighting of the different materials had to be performed. As the best set of input for the target fieldspec 1*2 Na(I) detectors the following data were obtained: For the detector input: RCC NaI with a diameter of 3.54 cm and a length of 5.1 cm, User defined endcap with a thickness of 1.071 cm, consisting of an interpolated mixture of 2 H, 2 C, 1 B, 1 Si, 1 S, 1 Cr, 1 Ni, 89 Al atoms and an interpolated density of 3g/cm3. End cap spacing 0.1 cm, User defined Teflon end cap window with an thickness of 0.2cm, consisting of 2 F and 1 C Atom and a density of 2.17 g/cm3. For the absorber input: The missing layers in front of the detector crystal were defined as absorbers in front of the detector face: From 0.3 to 0.35 cm an Al disk with a radius of 1.91 cm and a density of 2.707 g/cm3, From 0.351 to 0.668 cm an Epoxy disk with a radius of 1.27 cm and a density of 1.4 g/cm3, consisting of 10 H, 6 C and 1 O atom, Form 0.84 to 1.08 cm a second Al disk with a radius of 2.31 cm. For a resulting spectrum of a Cs137 source see figure C.2.

Figure C.2. Simulated and measured spectrum of a Cs137 source for a target fieldspec detector. This set of input parameters was used for further simulations concerning Uranium and Plutonium in fertilizers. C.2.1.2 Masked source (fertilizer) Strong sources of Uranium and Plutonium were tried to hide behind several PVC boxes of fertilizer with a dimension of 43.5*29*13 cm. As the composition of the fertilizer was unknown, it was determined by X-ray fluorescence analysis, for details see table 2. element concentation [g/g] deviation [g/g] concentration [%] Si P S Cl K Ca Zn Br Rb 1221.668 46.892 136.639 2342.708 1923.608 19.372 12.607 34.203 6.884 31.378 5.435 12.215 32.438 21.688 1.455 0.179 0.13 0.104 21.27 0.82 2.38 40.78 33.49 0.34 0.22 0.6 0.12

Table C.2 Composition of fertilizer

A minimum of 30 centimetres of fertilizer were necessary to shield a bundle of Uranium fuel plates (active length: 584-610mm, active width: 60 mm with a tolerance of 5mm) with an enrichment of 80% and 160g of U 235 at a Live Time of 600 s, see figure C.3.

Figure C.3. Fuel plates and measuring conditions. For the measurement and simulation of Uranium two CBNM [5] sources were used: CBNM-295-028 with an enrichment weight of 2.95% (5g U235, 165g U238) and CBNM-446-028 with an enrichment weight of 4.46% (7.6g U235, 162.4g U238). The nuclear material was measured behind one box of fertilizer, for the measuring conditions see figure C.4.

Figure C.4. CBNM source behind one fertilizer box. For the resulting spectra see figure C.5 and C.6.

Figure C.5. Spectrum of 2.95% enriched Uranium, measured and simulated at a Live Time of 600s (energy in keV).

Figure C.6. Spectrum of 4.46% enriched Uranium, measured and simulated by a reduced Live Time of 150s (energy in keV).

For the shielding of a Pu239 source (with a total mass of 6.65g) and an enrichment of 93% about 30 centimetres of fertilizer were necessary, and an 61% enriched source could be shielded by 40 centimetres at a Live Time of 600s. The number of particles of the CBNM [5] sources was too high to simulated, therefore the simulation for the sources had to be simplified by reducing the distance in order to run a simulation with a weaker source. Each source was in form of a sealed capsule containing plutonium oxide in pellet form and a deepening as entrance window, see figure C.7. The sources had a diameter of 1.7 cm, a height of 1.5 cm and an overall mass of 0.45 g.

Figure C.7. Shape of the 239Pu-samples. The structure of the simulated spectrum was similar to the measured one (see figure C.8).

Figure C.8. Pu239-94% behind 6cm of fertilizer at a Live Time of 180s.

C.2.1.3 Shielded source (concrete) The absorbing concrete was approximated with CaO to SiO2+Al2O3+Fe2O3 mixed with H2O, and a the spectrum of a Cs137 was measured and simulated with a 5*1 Na(I) detector. The Live Time for the simulation had to be reduced, but the structure of the simulated spectrum was similar to the measured (see figure C.9).

Figure C.9. Measured spectrum (black, Live Time 1399s) and simulated spectrum (red, Live Time 10s and multiplied with 7).

C.2.1.4 Further aspects Determination of the energy resolution and shift of the FWHM of the GR-135 Exploranium [6], for details see figure C.10.

Figure C.10. Resolution of the GR-135 Exploranium at 662 keV.

The measured spectra of Cs137 with a low Z-material as absorber and of a pure betaEmitter. A 500MBq Source was measured at a distance of 500cm while the GR-135 Exploranium detector was shielded 100cm of water, and a Sr90 source was measured in order to get two similar spectra shapes for the spectra see figure C.11.

Figure C.11. Spectra of Cs137 and Sr90. C.3. Summary

This work had the aim to see, how radioactive sources could be masked and shielded by common materials, and to investigate in which extent the spectra could be simulated by Monte Carlo simulation. The programming interface SuperSYNTH [1] proved to be easy to use and produced some spectra with a similar shape as the measured one. As the program could not handle a NPS (number of particle) value > 231-1, and the Live Time had to be reduced, the simulations had to be approximated. The simulation of simple detectors proved to be more accurate than detectors with an unknown or complicate surrounding of the detecting crystal, but for not to sophisticated detectors and geometries SuperSynth proved to be a powerful tool for simulations.

C.4. References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] W. Hensley, SuperSYNTH, Version 0.40 Beta_1, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, 2004. Monte Carlo N-Particle code, Version 5, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2003. Scionix, http://www.scionix.nl/. identiFINDER, Target Systems, http://www.target-systems-gmbh.de/frames-e.htm CBNM NRM 271, Central Bureau of Nuclear Measurements Certified Nuclear Reference Material. Exploranium, http://www.saic.com/products/security/gr-135/.

D. RID Hardware and ID-Software tests to compare different RIDs and ID methods by Vinzenz Schwarz D.1. Abstract This diploma-thesis deals with the detectability of various isotopes tested with so called hand held radionuclide identification devices (RIDs) under various, partly hardened conditions. Such devices are not only used to measure the count rate that the radiation of an isotope produces, such as a simple Geiger-Mller Counter would do. They are capable of recording spectra of the emitted gamma-radiation and can even identify the radiating isotope. The examined devices are the IdentiFINDER by Target systemelectronic GmbH and the MKCA03 from the Russian company Aspect.

Target IdentiFINDER

Aspect MKC-A03

The results of this work should give an in-depth overview of the time required to detect a specific isotope with a certain device or software. This is important because those devices are mostly used by non-professional staff (in terms of the technical background) for bordermonitoring, contamination monitoring, surveillance of crowds of people (such as Olympic Games), waste monitoring and much more. For this range of application it is important to know, how the devices respond to different conditions. The first part of the work consists of a presentation of the devices and the software in use and it gives a brief overview over the functionality and the range of application. One can get an idea of how and by whom those devices are commonly used and furthermore take a look at the workflows at borders around the world. The IAEA gives precise specifications on how the device should work, and how easy they should be to handle. This has been published in the document IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.1 Technical Guidance (NSS#1). The handling is particularly important for the staff that has to work with the devices like customs authorities, fire brigades police, and other non-professional users. Those specifications will find place in this part of the work as well as suggested changes to it.

The next section enters into the technical background of the devices. The setup and the physical background are explained and the miscellaneous types of detectors inside of RIDs are accurately described. It is important to highlight the differences between the devices in use and especially between the varying identification algorithms, such as Template Matching, Peak Search and the ROI-Method (Region Of Interest).

Display of Target IdentiFinder, viewing the recorded spectra in advanced mode Not only the hardware is examined, but also the software which is used to analyse spectra, recorded with the RIDs. Some of the programs are Identify by J. Brutscher and IdentPro by R. Gunnink. While R.Gunnink uses an enhanced ROI-Method, Identify works efficiently with a peak-search algorithm. The goal is to point out the advantages and disadvantages of each of the algorithms and to give an impression of how the could be combined to get even better results.

Identify by J. Brutscher is using peak-search algorithm In the next chapter the measurements are the central topic. Setup, conditions and measurements are described and results are being presented. It is dealt with identification limits of both, devices and software and how those limits can be predicted and tuned. It is very interesting to observe the (sometimes completely different) results the devices and the software are yielding from exactly the same setup. The identification quality and the time required to even get a result sometimes varies in a very wide range. In most cases the PCsoftware is much faster probably because of the higher computing power. This has to be analysed.

D.2. The main measuring method to determine the minimum time required to identify an isotope with IdentPro and Target identiFinder: Setup: a single-line-isotope behind a box of fertilizer (K40) First step is to take a long-term spectrum of an isotope behind a box of fertilizer. The fertilizer is used to create a higher count-rate. This has to be done because the IdentiFinder needs a certain amount of counts to identify nuclides properly. Naturally, the resulting spectrum can be easily identified by the identiFinder and IdentPro. Now the intention is to find out, at what real-time of a spectrum IdentPro recognises the isotope with 99% certainty. Therefore the Simulation Mode of IdentPro is used to simulate the given spectrum at a shorter runtime. IdentPro is able to not only downgrade the spectrum but to really simulate the spectrum as well as the statistics for a specific runtime. The chosen runtime has to be shorter than the real-time of the given spectrum. The simulation is started at zero runtime (t=0). Then the runtime (t) is increased bit by bit as soon as IdentPro recognises the desired isotope within the simulated spectrum. The next step is to repeat the simulation for 500 times for the determined runtime (t) and to find out whether the isotope can be detected in more then 99% of the 500 simulations. If this is not the case, the runtime is increased and the spectrum is simulated for 500 times again. This procedure is repeated as long as the 99% certainty is reached. The result is a value for the real-time of a spectrum where IdentPro recognises the specific isotope in 99 out of 100 spectra. This value has to be compared with the identiFinder. Therefore 20 (later more) measurements with the given setup and the evaluated real-time (t) are done. The identiFinder should as well identify the isotope at least in 99% of the measurements. The target-software wintmca is used to batch the measurements with the identiFinder.
original spectra isotope realtime [s] 300 Cs137+K40 600 Udep+K40 600 Udep+K40 600 Ba133+K40 600 Ba133+K40 600 Eu152+K40 600 Ra226+K40 simulations with IdentPro batched measurements IdentiFinder simulated time [s] detectability not detected [%] detectability 50 100,00 0 79% 100 13,16 >50% <10% 500 20,00 10% ~10% 120 22,25 >20% <10% 360 17,74 0% 16% 170 10,00 0% 56,50% 300 10,28 0% 28%

Results from measurements series with IdentPro and Target IdentiFinder. Detectability means the certainty of detection. For example: When examining depleted Uranium, identPro was able to identify the simulated spectra within a simulated time of 100 seconds, while the IdentiFinder needs a measuring time of 500 seconds to deliver suitable results.

Illicit Trafficking: Monte Carlo Modelling of Shielded Uranium Source Gamma Spectra from the NaI Detector
P. Ragan, S. Abousahl Institute for Transuranium Elements, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Karlsruhe, Germany Abstract The detection of uranium is of greatest interest because it is the type of nuclear material so far mostly encountered in illicit trafficking. However, its detection and identification is generally difficult and sometimes even impossible, especially if the uranium is highly enriched and concealed under shielding.

In this report we will present a complete study of the uranium gamma spectra seen by a typical hand-held monitor with a NaI detector through various shielding materials. Resulting gamma spectra were both obtained experimentally and by Monte Carlo simulation studies. From a review of the spectral data we propose a new approach for the identification of uranium which makes also use of the shape of the measured gamma continuum observed from shielded uranium. This complementary information can be helpful in cases of poor statistical data for the full photon energy peaks of uranium gamma rays. The applicability and limitations of this analysis approach will be discussed.

Contents
1.1. Avant Propos 1.2. Introduction 2. Methods 2.1. Simulation software 2.2. Detector 2.3. Geometry of the problem 2.4. Decay and daughter products in uranium 2.5. Photon energies 2.6. Bremsstrahlung 2.7. Primary and scattered radiation 3. Calculation of doses 4. Final shape of the spectra 5. Comparison to measured spectra 6. Investigation of an alternative approach 7. Conclusion

1.1. Avant Propos

Within the framework of the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, IAEA has set a list of R&D topics that are needed. The participating laboratories to the CRP were encouraged to lead one of these topics. The ITU-JRC as member of this CRP and also member of the consulting group on Functional Specifications of Border Monitoring Equipment showed interest in the investigation of algorithms for the detection of shielded radioactive sources and especially the case of Uranium materials. The detection of uranium is of greatest interest because it is the type of nuclear material so far mostly encountered in illicit trafficking. However, its detection and identification is generally difficult and sometimes even impossible, especially if the uranium is highly enriched and concealed under shielding. In this report we will present a complete study of the uranium gamma spectra seen by a typical hand-held monitor with a NaI detector through various shielding materials. Resulting gamma spectra were both obtained experimentally and by Monte Carlo simulation studies. From a review of the spectral data we propose a new approach for the identification of uranium which makes also use of the shape of the measured gamma continuum observed from shielded uranium. This complementary information can be helpful in cases of poor statistical data for the full photon energy peaks of uranium gamma rays. The applicability and limitations of this analysis approach will be discussed. This report is made for the IAEA under the research agreement 12592 between IAEA and ITU/JRC within the framework of the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials.

1.2. Introduction
On 17-11-2003 at 22h08 we received the following e-mail from a colleague in xxxx, I need your help. Border police stopped truck from xxxx, in the post you visited previously. I went with hand held device (detector NaI) to identify source. The Hand held device could not identify and wrote "Not in library". Trailer was very big. I measured around it. Dose rate in one place was 23.5 microSv/h, but in all the rest was background dose rate level. I send you the spectrum. I think it can be bremsstrahlung from beta source, is it? Please have a look. Best regards. The material was in fact shielded uranium, which could not be detected with the mentioned instrument. Nowadays fighting against illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is as important as never before. At the customs only hand-held devices can be used. NaI and CZT detectors are the most commonly applied hand-held spectrometers, as they are compact, easy-to-use and need minimal support requirements. On the other hand their resolution capability is limited. The detection of uranium is of greatest interest because it is the type of nuclear material so far mostly encountered in illicit trafficking. Gamma ray spectra from uranium samples depend on the enrichment. The 185.7 keV gamma ray is the most prominent single gamma ray from a uranium sample enriched above natural U-235 level. In the case of natural and low enriched uranium the 766.4 keV and 1001 keV gamma lines from Pa, a daughter of U-238, are also useful for identification. The identification and the determination of enrichment can be carried out easily when no other isotopes and shieldings are present. The identification of shielded radioactive or nuclear sources by gamma spectrometry is still an unsolved problem. Hand-held devices used by custom officers at borders suffer from this limitation. The shape of the spectra of a shielded source is specific to the nature of the radioactive isotopes of the source and the nature and thickness of the shielding materials. Highly enriched uranium is the most difficult nuclear material to be identified when it is shielded.
235

U is emitting gamma lines at low energies (up to approximately

238

200 keV). Daughter products from the

U are emitting gamma lines at high energies

(766.4 and 1001 keV). It is then more easy to detect depleted than enriched shielded uranium. However, an important contribution to the U spectra comes from beta particles

from the decay of 234mPa emitted with maximum energy 2.29 MeV. The beta particles are producing bremsstrahlung in the uranium source itself. The Bremsstrahlung continuum is representing a significant contribution to the shape of the measured spectra. In this paper we will present a complete study of the uranium gamma spectra seen by a typical hand-held monitor with a NaI detector through various shielding materials. Resulting gamma spectra were both obtained experimentally and by Monte Carlo simulation studies. From a review of the spectral data we propose a new approach for the identification of uranium that makes also use of the shape of the measured gamma continuum observed from shielded uranium. This complementary information can be helpful in cases of poor statistical data for the full photon energy peaks of uranium gamma rays. The applicability and limitations of this analysis approach will be discussed.

2. Methods
2.1. Simulation software A Monte Carlo code MCNP ver. 4 has been used for simulations. This code can simulate a transport of neutrons, photons and electrons in a 3D space in a geometry consisting of various cells with different materials. Following interactions are taken into account for the transport of photons: photoelectric absorption with possibility of emission of x-ray fluorescence photons, coherent (Thompson) modified by scattering functions, incoherent (Compton) scattering modified by form factors and pair production. The cross sections of these interactions are contained in libraries for elements from hydrogen (Z=1) to plutonium (Z=94). An electron library is available for the electron transport. Several output tallies current, flux across a surface, track length estimate of the flux in a cell are available. One of the features is a pulse height tally, so it can simulate a spectral energy distribution of particles detected by a detector.

2.2. Detector We assumed as detector a NaI(Tl) detector with a 1x1 cylindrical crystal (2.54 cm diameter and height as well). The material compositions and densities used to build up the configuration of the simulation problem are listed in Table 1. The detector is covered by a MgO reflector and enclosed by aluminium and on the one side there is a glass coupling to a photomultiplier. The layer of MgO is 1 mm thick, and the Al housing of the detector is 0.8 mm thick. Detector drawing is in Fig. 1.

Al Glass coupling to PMT NaI(Tl) MgO reflector

Fig. 1. NaI(Tl) detector. 2.3. Geometry of the problem The following three spherical geometries were chosen for the source material 2 cm diameter, density 10 g . cm-3, mass 41.88 g of UO2, (pellet) 5 cm diameter, density 5 g . cm-3, mass 327.25 g of UO2, (pellets) 9 cm diameter, density 2.5 g . cm-3, mass 1000 g of UO2, powder

The source is positioned in a centre and is surrounded by air. The assumed lead shielding is built as a layer at 5 cm from the centre and later on as a box with walls at 5 cm from the centre. The thickness considered was 1 and 5 mm. First simulations were done with one NaI(Tl) detector with the front side at 10 cm distance from the centre. The simulations were improved by introduction of six identical detectors positioned on main axes of the geometry (x, y, z). A schematic drawing of the configuration is shown in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. The x-y cut of the geometry with six detectors. Spherical UO2 source is in the middle. Two remaining detectors are on the z axis. The thickness and material of the shielding is determined by the thickness of the shielding box and is a subject of change. Table 1. Composition of materials used in simulations No Material 1. NaI(Tl) Elemental composition Na I Tl Mg O Al Si O C N O Ar U O Fraction by weight 0.153184 0.845582 0.001234 Fraction by elements Density [g . cm-3] 3.67

2. 3. 4. 5.

MgO Al Glass quartz Dry air

0.5 0.5 1 1 2 0.000124 0.755268 0.231781 0.012827 1 2

2.5 2.7 2.64 0.001205

6.

UO2

10, 5, 2.5

7. 8.

9.

Pb Pb Stainless steel ( used Cr as alternative to lead) Fe Ni Polyethylene C (as detector cap) H

1 0.18 0.72 0.1 1 2

11.35 7.9

0.92

2.4. Decay and daughter products in uranium Uranium is present in the Earths crust at an average concentration of 2 ppm. Acidic rocks with high silicate, such as granite, have higher than average concentrations of uranium, while sedimentary and basic rocks have lower than average concentrations. Uranite or pitchblende (U3O8) are the most common uranium-containing ores. The concentration of U3O8 in ores can vary from 0.5% in Australian ores to 20% in Canadian ores. Uranium ore after mining is milled and the uranium content is then leached from it. The final product of this separation procedure is called yellow cake (U3O8). For 235U enrichment the yellow cake has to be transformed into the gaseous phase of UF6. The enriched UF6 represents the starting material for the uranium fuel fabrication, where it is first converted into uranium dioxide. In the fuel cycle the uranium dioxide normally occurs in the form of powder (density ~2.5 gcm-3), pressed green pellets (density 6.5 gcm-3) or sintered pellets (density ~10 gcm-3). Immediately after conversion from UF6 to UO2 the uranium materials are free from daughter products. The in-growth of them is determined by the half-life of (25.52 h) in the case of
238 235 231

Th U.

U, and by the half-life of

234

Th (24.1 d) in the case of

238

Near-equilibrium is therefore reached after about 3 days for 235U, and after ~3 months for U. Table 2 lists the typical isotopic composition of different enrichment grades. Table 3 gives characteristic decay data of uranium and relevant daughter products.

Table 2. Isotopic composition of uranium (atom %) Uranium Depleted Natural Enriched High enriched U-235 0.2 0.72 25 3.5 > 20 90 U-234 0.0012 0.0055 0.019 0.048 0.03 > 0.019 0.88 U-238 99.7988 99.2745 Rest 96.47 Rest 9.12

Table 3. Properties of uranium isotopes and their daughters Parent nuclide U-238 Th-234 Pa-234m Pa-234 U-235 Th-231 Pa-231 U-234 Th-230 Half-life| 4.468E+9 y 24.1 d 1.17 min 6.7 h 7.038E+8 y 25.52 h 32760 y 245500 y 75380 Decay mode Alfa SF Beta Beta IT Beta Alfa SF Ne Beta Alfa Alfa Alpha SF Alpha Decay energy [MeV] 4.27 0.273 2.271 0.074 2.197 4.679 0.39 4.213 5.149 4.859 4.77 Emission Specific probability activity [%] [Bq . g-1] 100 12437 0.00005 100 98.84 0.16 100*0.16 100 7E-9 8E-10 100 1E-8 100 100 1.7E-9 99.5 79960 Daughter nuclide Th-234 Pa-234m U-234 Pa-234 U-234 Th-231 Pa-231 Ra-227 Ac-227 2.3E+8 Th-230 Ra-226

2.5. Photon energies Uranium as a material of interest is produced in various grades of enrichment in
235

U. Wide use of uranium as a fuel for NPP made it a common problem for illicit

trafficking. Natural and depleted uranium are also used as a relatively cheap and highly efficient shielding material for therapeutic and industrial radioactive sources. Photons produced by the radioactive decay of uranium are largely shielded by the uranium material itself, with a high degree of absorption mainly at low energies below 300 keV. The number of photons flying out of a real sample is then different from the

total number of photons produced in a source. The analysis of the importance of photons of different energies for detection therefore has to take into account the self-absorption in the source. It is obvious that the photons of higher energies are of higher relevance. The self-absorption was calculated using the f2 tally flux averaged over a surface for energies in an interval 302000 keV. The self-absorption in the spherical source with diameter 2 cm and the density 10 g . cm-3 versus the photon energy is shown in Fig. 3.

1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0 500

S elfabsorption

Fluence

Photons of Primary Energy

1000 Energy [keV]

1500

2000

Fig. 3. Self absorption of photons in the source of 2 cm diameter with a UO2 density of 10 gcm-3. The points were calculated using MCNP and represent the number of photons flying out of the sphere per one starting photon of corresponding energy. Triangles are representing the primary and scattered photons, and squares are the photons of primary energy only. The uranium isotopes and their daughter products emit a variety of gammas and x-rays. The importance of the different radiations depends on their emission probability and on the self-absorption in the source as well. The relevance of the different gamma lines for detecting is changing when we take into account the enrichment and self absorption. The number of escaping photons per gram then determines to: Y = Ag EP SA,

where Ag is specific activity [Bq g-1] of uranium nuclides (for daughter products equilibrium with parent U isotopes is assumed, EP is the emission probability and SA is the self absorption. Table 4 lists the number of escaping photons from a UO2 sphere ( 2 cm, density 10 gcm-3), ranked by intensity, for 4 different enrichment grades. Table 4. Number of primary photons (Y) flying out of a UO2 sphere with diameter of 2 cm and density 10 g cm-3 for four different enrichments in 235U.

HEU 90% No. E[keV] Nuclide 1 185.7 U-235 2 205.3 U-235 3 143.8 U-235 4 93.4 U-235 5 84.2 Th-231 6 163.3 U-235 7 105.0 U-235 8 90.0 U-235 9 109.2 U-235 10 202.1 U-235 Brems.

Y 2389 263 240 173 156 156 99 98 61 55 37

3.50% E [keV] 185.7 1001.0 766.4 92.8 92.4 205.3 143.8 93.4 84.2 163.3

Nuclide U-235 234m Pa 234m Pa Th-234 Th-234 U-235 U-235 U-235 Th-231 U-235

Y 93 61 19 14 14 10 9 7 6 6 390

Natural 0.0072% E [keV] Nuclide 1001.0 234mPa 766.4 234mPa 185.7 U-235 92.8 Th-234 92.4 Th-234 63.3 Th-234 742.8 234mPa 786.3 234mPa 205.3 U-235 112.8 Th-234

Y 63 19 19 14 14 6 5 3 2 2 401

Depleted 0.002% E [keV] Nuclide 1001.0 234mPa 766.4 234mPa 92.8 Th-234 92.38 Th-234 63.29 Th-234 185.7 U-235 742.8 234mPa 786.3 234mPa 112.8 Th-234 1737.7 234mPa

Y 66 20 14 14 7 6 5 4 2 2 403

Gammas in the low energy region are the most important ones for high enriched uranium (HEU). With increasing amount of from
234m 238

U in the materials, high energy gammas

Pa at 1001 and 766.4 keV are becoming more and more important. For the

assessment of the number of the detected photons, however, also the dependence of the detection efficiency of the gamma detector on the gamma energy has to be taken into account. Fig. 4 shows the calculated detection efficiency for 2 different NaI(Tl) detectors.

1.00E-02

2.500

Ratio

2.000 Efficiency

1.00E-03

Fieldspec - 1.2x1.5"

1.500

Volume ratio = 2.16

1x1"

1.00E-04 0.01

1.000 0.1 Energy [MeV] 1 10

Fig. 4. The NaI(Tl) detector efficiency for a point isotropic source at 10 cm distance from the detector front calculated by MCNP. The efficiencies were calculated for 1x1 and 1.2x1.5 detectors commonly used in hand-held instruments. The final shape of the spectrum as detected by the detector is depending also on the amount of scattered photons in the source itself, in materials surrounding the measuring geometry and in materials present between the active detector volume and the source. The most important are the materials covering the detector (aluminium and magnesium oxide) and materials of an eventual shielding of the source. 2.6. Bremsstrahlung Three isotopes are decaying by emission of beta- particle with a decay probability of ~100% (see Table 3). Two of them (234Th and
231

Th) are producing beta particles of

relatively low energy with a maximum at 0.2 and 0.3 MeV. The mean of the energy distribution is approximately at 1/3 of the maximum energy. The third one (234mPa) has a maximum of the energy distribution at 2.29 MeV. These beta particles are producing bremsstrahlung inside the material of a source. The mean of the energy distribution of the bremsstrahlung continuum is approximately at 1/3 of the mean of the beta particles energy distribution. Low energy electrons are producing bremsstrahlung mainly at low energies, with the mean of the distribution far below the 100 keV. In contrary the mean energy of the betas coming from
234m

Pa is 0.82 MeV. The bremsstrahlung photons are

then produced with the mean of ~250300 keV. These photons are partly absorbed by the material of the source, so the final mean energy is shifted to higher energies

(approximately 400 keV). The actual mean energy is slightly depending on the shape and the density of the source. The production of the bremsstrahlung in a UO2 source was obtained by the simulation of the electron transport in the source. The continuous beta distribution of beta decay (Fig. 5) needed as input was modeled as a histogram (20 steps in energy), and electrons were accounted to be emitted with isotropic distribution inside the volume of the source. The bremsstrahlung photons flying out of the UO2 sphere were then tallied in 10 keV energy bins. (Fig. 6)
60 R la e e is io p b b e tiv m s n ro a ility 50 40 30 20 Emax=2.29 MeV 10 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Energy [MeV]

Fig. 5. Spectrum of beta particles emitted by 234mPa.

7.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 0.E+00 0.0 0.5 1.0 Energy [MeV] 1.5 2.0

Fig. 6. Spectrum of photons from bremsstrahlung flying out of a 2 cm UO2 sphere with density 10 g cm-3. Spectrum was tallied (f4 tally) in a cell, which was a shielding box 10x10x10 cm with thickness 1 mm filled with air in 10 keV intervals. Two significant peaks are K and K x-rays of uranium.

Photon flux [cm ]

-2

The bremsstrahlung spectra were calculated for the three source geometries as defined above (spherical with diameter 2, 5 and 9 cm). These were then used as input spectra for tallying the detector response for bare and shielded sources. The same spectrum plotted in linear scale in Fig. 6 is also shown in logarithmical scale in Fig. 7. The total number of photons flying out of the source per one beta particle/decay is contained in table 130 of the MCNP output file (as cell 1 exiting). The numbers of the bremsstrahlung photons which are escaping from the 2, 5 and 9 cm UO2 sources as defined above are 0.0326, 0.0272 and 0.0290 per one beta particle starting in the source respectively. 2.7. Primary and scattered radiation The photon fluxes calculated by MCNP at 10 cm from the centre of the 2 cm UO2 sphere (with density of 10 g cm-3) normalized per one starting photon of energy 93, 185.7, 205.3, 766.4 and 1001 keV are indicated in Fig. 7. The absorption in the low energy region is important for primary and scattered photons as well. Results of photon flux calculations at a distance of 10 cm from the centre of the source are given in Table 5 for photons of primary energy, for scattered photons and for the total photon flux. For gammas at 185.7 keV the contribution of scattered photons to the total flux is 35% at maximum. This contribution in the case of a shielded source decreases as the thickness of the shielding is increasing, and it reaches a value of 23% for photons of the same energy after 5 mm of lead. The shielding is changing the spectral fluence of the scattered radiation. Below about 400 keV the scattered radiation is higly absorbed by the shielding. Above this energy the contribution of scattered radiation is increasing with increasing thickness of the shielding. (Fig. 6)

1.E-03 766.4 185.7 93 Fluence at 10 cm from centre [cm-2] 205.3 1001

1.E-04

1.E-05

1.E-06

1.E-07 Bremsstrahlung

1.E-08

1.E-09 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Energy [MeV] 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0

Fig. 7. The photon spectral fluxes at 10 cm distance from the centre of a 2 cm UO2 sphere (density 10 gcm-3) normalized for one photon generated in the source. The bremsstrahlung component is generated by beta decay of the 234mPa with betas with maximal energy 2.29 MeV. Table 5. Photon fluxes [cm-2] at 10 cm from the centre of a UO2 sphere with diameter 2 cm and density 10 gcm-3 normalized to one photon of the corresponding primary energy generated in the source. Three combinations without shielding, shielded by 1 and 5 mm of lead, total photon flux, primary flux of the photons of primary energy, scattered contribution to the total flux by the scattered photons No shielding 1mm Pb Total Primary Scattered Total Primary 3.40E-05 3.26E-05 1.39E-06 7.43E-07 7.69E-09 7.09E-05 4.58E-05 2.51E-05 1.32E-05 9.85E-06 8.31E-05 5.80E-05 2.52E-05 2.17E-05 1.73E-05 5.20E-04 4.26E-04 9.35E-05 4.77E-04 3.78E-04 5.94E-04 4.86E-04 1.08E-04 5.62E-04 4.43E-04 The same as above as relative contributions
1 1 1 1 1 0.96 0.65 0.70 0.82 0.82 0.04 0.35 0.30 0.18 0.18 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.79

Energy 93 185.7 205.3 766.4 1001 93 185.7 205.3 766.4 1001

Scattered 7.35E-07 3.35E-06 4.40E-06 9.90E-05 1.19E-04

0.99 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.21

Total 3.65E-08 2.16E-07 3.30E-04 4.33E-04

5mm Pb Primary Scattered 2.80E-08 1.68E-07 2.33E-04 3.05E-04 8.48E-09 4.80E-08 9.63E-05 1.28E-04

1 1 1 1

0.77 0.78 0.71 0.70

0.23 0.22 0.29 0.30

UO2 sphere, 2 cm diameter, density 10 g.cm-3

1.00E-06

9.00E-07

8.00E-07

7.00E-07

Photon fluence [cm ]

6.00E-07 1001 keV 0 mm Pb 1001 keV 1 mm Pb 1001 keV 5 mm Pb Bremsstrahlung

-2

5.00E-07

4.00E-07

3.00E-07

2.00E-07

1.00E-07

0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.00E-01 4.00E-01 6.00E-01 8.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.20E+00 1.40E+00 1.60E+00 1.80E+00 2.00E+00 Energy [MeV]

Fig. 8. Fluence spectra of the simulated 1001 keV gamma line from the shielded 2 cm UO2 sphere compared to the bremsstrahlung continuum (simulated by MCNP).

3. Calculation of doses
When defining a photon field at a point (as flux across the surface for example), the dose rate at this point can be simply calculated as follows:

Dtissue = 5.767 10 4 en

E ( E ) tissue

Gy h

photon cm 2

is the mass energy-absorption coefficient multiplied by a 5.767 10 4 en tissue constant, E is the energy in keV and (E ) the photon flux per cm2. Values for the
photon flux per cm2 are directly given by MCNP tally type 2. When the mass energyabsorption coefficient multiplied by energy (Fig. 9) is inserted in an input file on tally

modification card, then the result will be directly the dose rate. The dose rates were caculated for each component (93, 186, 205, 766, 1001, bremsstrahlung) separately and the results are given in Table 6.

10000 1000 100 10 1 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.001 Fig 9. Dose rate conversion coefficients. Table 6. Partial contributions to dose rate for natural U, enriched by 3.5% with HEU with 90% of
235 235

en
1 10
en

tissue
*E tissue

5.767 10 4 en *E tissue

U and

U in [nGy.h-1]. The uranium is in the form of sphere with 2 cm

diameter and mass of 42 g of UO2. (Note the numbers are rounded, so the sum is correct, although by manual summing the result will be slightly different.) Energy [MeV] 0.093 0.186 0.205 0.766 1001 Bremsstrahlung Sum Nat. U 0 mm Pb 1 mm Pb 5 mm Pb 3.5% 0 mm Pb 1 mm Pb 5 mm Pb 90% 0 mm Pb 1 mm Pb 5 mm Pb 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 11 2 0 275 54 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 44 12 0 9 8 6 9 8 6 1 1 1 38 35 27 36 34 26 4 4 3 85 65 43 83 64 42 9 7 4 136 110 75 142 109 73 334 77 8

4. Final shape of the spectra

The investigation on the influence of the beta particles flying out of the unshielded sources on the detector response shows that they are contributing directly as electrons depositing their energy in the sensitive volume of the detector, and they are producing bremsstrahlung in the materials covering the detector crystal as well. The contribution of these parts is not very important, as can be seen from Fig. 10. It is usually absorbed by the shielding. Final detector responses for the seven gamma lines, the bremsstrahlung in the source and the beta particles from the source are displayed in Fig. 10 and in linear scale in Fig. 11.

Enriched U 3.5%, 2 cm, NaI spectrum, no shielding

1.E-01

U-235 0.1857 1.E-02 Pa-234m 0.766 Pa-234m 1.001 Sum 1.E-03 Bremsstrahlung Composite .093 U-235 0.205 U-235 0.1438 1.E-04 U-235 0.1633 Electrons Electrons & brem

1.E-05

1.E-06 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5

Fig. 10. Partial and final detector responses from 2 cm UO2 source without shielding.

5. Comparison to measured spectra

The overall final shape of the calculated spectrum after taking into account the contribution from the bremsstrahlung closely resembles real spectra measured with the Fieldspec hand held instrument (Fig. 12).

Enriched U 3.5%, 2 cm, NaI spectrum, no shielding

0.040 U-235 0.1857 Pa-234m 0.766 0.030 Pa-234m 1.001 Sum 0.025 Bremsstrahlung Composite .093 0.020 U-235 0.205 U-235 0.1438 0.015 U-235 0.1633

0.035

0.010

0.005

0.000 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5

Fig. 11. The same as in Fig. 10 but in a linear vertical scale.

100 BGR 10 1 Photons 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 Channels U 4.3% + 4 mm Pb U 4.3% 1000

Fig. 12. Measured spectra with NaI(Tl) detector.

6. Investigation of an alternative approach

The bremsstrahlung produced by betas from
234m

Pa represents an important part of

uranium spectra. It is changing the overall shape of the spectrum, and the uranium gamma and X-ray lines used for the analysis and detection are superimposed on this continuum. The mean of this continuum is approximately at 400 keV, so it is not so much shielded as the 235U gammas at energies 186 and 205 keV (5 mm Pb will reduce photons at this energy ~4 times, at 205 keV more than 200 times, and at 186 keV more than 850 times). An example how the appearance of the Uranium spectra changes in the low energy with the lead shielding is shown in Figure 12. The most difficult case for detection is highly enriched uranium (90%
235

U) shielded by

lead (a lead thickness of 5 mm was assumed in the present studies), where the characteristic gamma rays from 235U can no longer be detected. The dose rate in this case is really low, and it is almost only due to bremsstrahlung and high energy gammas from
234m

Pa. Evaluation of the spectrum in terms of integral counts within suitable energy

intervals still will give a possibility to make a further analysis, if compared to the known responses of similar sources. Table 3 shows that it is not possible to detect a smaller amount of HEU (about 50 g) under shielding. However the ratio (signal + background/ background) is increasing with the uranium amount, and for approach.
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis for Highly Enriched Uranium for Fieldspec NaI(Tl) detector 1.2x1.5"
Shielded by1 mm of lead Energy interval (keV) 400-600 400-1100 300-600 300-1100 400-600 400-1100 300-600 300-1100 Counting rate per sec Background 42 g HEU 327 g HEU 1000 g HEU 5.58 0.84 5.78 18.92 10.90 1.59 11.08 36.16 12.74 1.55 10.52 34.61 18.06 2.30 15.83 51.85 5.58 0.56 3.86 13.13 10.90 1.12 7.85 26.78 12.74 0.93 6.35 21.46 18.06 1.49 10.34 35.12 Shielded by 5 mm of lead 235

U masses above about

300 g the detection of highly enriched uranium becomes possible using this new

(Signal + Background)/Background 42 g HEU 327 g HEU 1000 g HEU 1.15 2.04 4.39 1.15 2.02 4.32 1.12 1.83 3.72 1.13 1.88 3.87 1.10 1.69 3.35 1.10 1.72 3.46 1.07 1.50 2.68 1.08 1.57 2.94

7. Conclusion
The MCNP simulations were carried out (i) to model the emission characteristics of relevant specific gamma lines and of the bremsstrahlung emitted from different geometries of sources of and HEU, LEU, NU and DU materials under various gamma shielding, and (ii) to model the characteristic gamma responses of typical scintillation detectors (NaI) as used in hand-held monitors. The limits of the identification of uranium under shielding by gamma spectrometry are then defined. The results of this study will be used for testing the performance of any hand-held device in the identification of any uranium materials. From a review of the spectral data we are proposing a new approach for the identification of uranium which makes also use of the shape of the measured gamma continuum observed from shielded uranium. This complementary information can be helpful in cases of poor statistical data for the full photon energy peaks of uranium gamma rays. Further investigations of this approach are still necessary, especially for uranium mixed with other radioactive sources.

Gamma Spectra Measurements of Various Radiation Sources Using a LaBr3 Detector

P. Mortreau, A. Fernandes, R. Berndt JRC Ispra Abstract The participation of JCR Ispra in this Coordinated Research Project (CRP) involves the measurement, compilation and report of the gamma spectra emitted by various radioactive sources, using standard detectors under reference conditions.

Measurements have been performed in the Perla laboratory for a series of radiation sources, including plutonium and uranium samples, using a (dia.1x1) in. NaI detector. In the present work a LaBr3 scintillator detector with trade name BrillanCe-380 has been used to perform a similar set of measurements. Besides becoming an extension of the previous work and an additional contribution to a spectra database, this work may provide some support for the assessment of potential benefits or disadvantages of scintillators with a better energy resolution for illicit trafficking applications.

NOTE: A folder of spectra is provided. The text version of these files is shown in ANNEX I-3.

INDEX 1. 2. INTRODUCTION EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 2.1 DOSE RATE MEASUREMENTS 2.2 DETECTION CHAIN 2.3 BACKGROUND MEASUREMENTS 2.4 STABILISATION 2.5 RADIATION SOURCES 2.6 FILTERS 3. SPECTROMETER CALIBRATION 3.1 ENERGY CALIBRATION 3.2 ENERGY RESOLUTION 3.3 DETECTOR EFFICIENCY 4. 5. DETERMINATION OF SOURCE-DETECTOR DISTANCE MEASUREMENTS SERIES 5.1 SINGLE SOURCES 5.2 PLUTONIUM AND CS SOURCES 6. SUMMARY

REFERENCES ANNEXES Annex 1: The spectrum file format*.spe Annex 2: List of measurements series Annex 3: Energy calibration list of spectra

1. INTRODUCTION The participation of JCR Ispra in the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) Improvement of technical measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials (Research agreement 12595) involves the measurement, compilation and report of the gamma spectra emitted by various radioactive sources, using standard detectors under reference conditions [1]. Measurements have been performed in the Perla laboratory for a series of radiation sources, including plutonium and uranium samples, using a (dia.1x1) in. NaI detector [2]. In the present work a LaBr3 scintillator detector with trade name BrillanCe-380 [3] has been used to perform a similar set of measurements. Besides becoming an extension of the previous work and an additional contribution to a spectra database, this work may provide some support for the assessment of potential benefits or disadvantages of scintillators with a better energy resolution for illicit trafficking applications. 2. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 2.1. DOSE RATE MEASUREMENTS Source spectra measurements were performed at a dose rate of 0.5 Sv h-1. A dose rate meter (Scintillator Measuring Unit 6150 ADB) was used to locate the adequate measurement point in the radiation filed of a source corresponding to this dose rate. According to its technical specifications, the adequate photon energy range for the detector operation is 23 keV 7 MeV and the recommended dose range starts from 5 nSv h-1. Dose rate profiles were measured in order to determine the measurement position (see Section 4). No information is provided about the energy dependence of this detector. Although this may be a major origin of error in the dose rate estimation, it has been assumed that the calibration factor is constant for the various energies considered in the present work. The source distance (r) is measured from the surface of the dose rate meter to the surface of the source. The axis of the dose rate meter was aligned with the point sources or with the axis of small volume sources and perpendicular to the axis of the large cylindrical sources. In the case of the small volume source, the face turned to the

meter was that corresponding to the highest dose rate. The experiment was supported on a table. The height (h) of the detector axis was 8 cm. A similar setup was used for the spectra measurements, performed at a slightly larger height (9.5 cm). An effort was made to minimize the amount of support material inducing radiation scattering. For supporting the detector in a stable situation, lead bricks were used at the detector end furthest away from the source. Figure 1 presents a schematic view of the experimental set-up and Figure 2 describes some of the source supports used.

Figure 1. Set-up of detectors and radiation sources.

(a) Point sources (e.g., Cs FV713)

(b) Small volume sources (e.g., Pu CBNM61)

Figure 2. Examples of source supports. 2.2. DETECTION CHAIN Spectra measurements were performed with a LaBr3 detector type BrilLanCe-380 (nr. M-J900CSB) associated to a photomultiplier Model 276 and connected to a miniaturized system (MCA-166 GBS Elektronik GmbH, Rossendorf, Germany) that includes the electronics required to operate and control the detector, record and analyze the measured spectra.

The multi channel analyzer was used with 4096 channels at approximately 1 keV/channel (peak of 137Cs at channel nr. 662). A level threshold of 2% was used to reduce background counts. The detector was operated at a biasing voltage of +500 V and time shaping constant of 1 s. The coarse amplifier gain was 50. The pole-zero correction and fine amplifier gain were visually adjusted to approximately +1376 mV and 1.1, respectively. The fine adjustment on the amplifier gain was that required to establish the 1keV/channel reference condition. 2.3. BACKGROUND MEASUREMENTS Background measurements were performed prior and after each source measurement series. Figure 3 shows the background count rate measured during various days, the average background count rates were 200 cps in PERLA laboratory.
216 214 background count rate(cps) 212 210 208 206 204 202 200 198 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 time(h)

Figure 3. Background count rate. 2.4. STABILISATION Variations in LaBr3 detector responses as a function of time or temperature often occur causing a modification in the keV/channel factor. For this reason, a stabilization procedure was applied in order to maintain the the
137 137

Cs peak at channel nr. 662. The

stabilization consists of (i) accumulating counts in the region of interest (ROI) where Cs peak should occur; (ii) evaluating of the peak centroid in the ROI; (iii) automatically adjusting the fine gain, in order to shift the peak centroid to channel 4

nr. 662. Each cycle (i)(iii) is continuously repeated during the measurement and defines a stabilization interval. The percentage gain correction is after each interval is displayed. It is worth referring that once the stabilization is switched off, the former gain correction will no longer apply. Before each measurement series, the stabilization procedure consisted of: (i) with the stabilization switched off, measurement of a 137Cs source after adjusting the amplifier fine gain in order to locate the peak centroid in channel nr. 662(1); (ii) with the stabilization switched on, measurement of the nr. 5 is performed. It should be noted that the automatic gain corrections are performed every time the number of counts in the ROI achieves 50000, which may happen during the measurement of sources other than example, in the spectrum of
57 137 137

Cs source until stabilization interval

Cs. This situation has occurred during

measurements of low energy-emitting sources shielded by Pb (e.g., 57Co and U). For Co shielded by 6mm Pb (Figure 4), the most intense peaks at 122 and 136 keV (total intensity of 86%) have disappeared and those at 692 and 706 keV (total intensity of 0.154%) show up. As these peaks have an energy similar to that of 137Cs, they will trigger an inconvenient modification in the fine gain once the filtered source is measured during long time intervals.

Figure 4. Spectra of bare and shielded (6mm Pb) 57Co source. In such situations, spectra were measured with the stabilization switched off. Prior to such measurements, a
137

Cs source was evaluated and the gain was re-adjusted by

hand whenever necessary. In the present work, stabilization corrections were

generally smaller than 2% (and always smaller than 3%) and therefore these situations have never become problematic. 2.5. RADIATION SOURCES Table 1 describes the various sources evaluated in the present work. These may be grouped in (i) point wise standard sources; (ii) uranium sources (ii) plutonium sources and Th (iiii).
Isotope or element Source Description E (keV)

241

Am

57 60

Co Co Ba

AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. FV 711,B1544, B1545, B1524, DC866 MA 101 AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. DC 870 AEA Technology DD943,DD944, FV712, DC945,DC940, DC867 AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. FV 713 AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. HY 763

Point source

511

Point source Point source Point source

122.1 1173.2 1332.5 79.6 356 661.6 2614.5 208 (from Tl)

133

137

Cs Th

Point source Point source

228

CBNM 031 CBNM 071 U CBNM 446 Perla U50 Perla U128 PERLA1-PL30

200g U3O8 powder, 0.316 wt% 200g U3O8 powder, 0.711 wt% 200g U3O8 powder, 4.46 wt% 1751g UO2 powder, 19.88 wt%

235 235

185 185 185 185 185 185

U U

235

235 235

1751g UO2 powder, 92.42 wt% U Al-UO2-Al sandwitch plate 625*70.75*1.27mm3, 61.05g U, 19.88 wt% 235U, active zone(500600)*(60.465.1)*(0.3 Al-UO2-Al sandwitch plate 625*70.75*1.27mm3, 8.37g U, 93.11wt% 235U, active zone(500600)*(60.465.1)*(0.3

PERLA3-PL89

185

CBNM 61

Pu

CBNM 93

PuGa nr. 32

PM2

Pu wt% 6.625g PuO2 pellets. 6Jun02: 0.010, 93.533, 6.314, 0.104, 0.040 238-242 Pu wt% 6.625g PuO2 pellets. 6Jun02: 1.097, 64.968, 26.366, 3.212, 4.358 238-242 Pu wt% 9.4g Pu+1.5%Ga alloy. 6Jun02: 0.011, 93.922, 5.901, 0.134, 0.032 238-242 Pu 18.8g Pu+5%Ni+3%Cu alloy. wt% 6Jun02: 0.004, 95.470, 4.458, 0.053, 0.015 Pu02 powder, 7.939g Pu, 2steel walls 1.6mm+1mm thick, Pu wt% 6June 2006: 1.618%, 61.252%, 26.084%, 5.092%, 5.954%, Am-241 6.681%
238-242

238-242

208( Pu241)

208( Pu241)

208( Pu241)

208( Pu241)

PERLA06

208(Pu241)

PERLA01

Pu02 powder, 7.939g Pu, 2steel walls Pu wt% 61.6mm+1mm thick, June 2006: 0.181%, 72.19%, 24.983%, 1.654%, 0.993%, Am-241 2.708%
238-242

208(Pu241)

Th

PERLA 281T2

Natural powder thorium, 1500g

2614.5

Table 1. Evaluated radiation sources.

2.6. FILTERS Three filters were used to simulate container walls: 3mm steel, 5mm steel and 6mm lead. The filters were positioned closed to the detector. 3. SPECTROMETER CALIBRATION The detection system was calibrated for energy, resolution and efficiency, using the standard point sources using the following gamma radiation peaks. ________________________ Nuclide Energy(keV) ________________________ 133Ba 57Co 137Cs 60Co 228Th(208Tl) Eu152 79.6 122.1 661.62 1173 1332 2614.5 122 244 344 779 1086 1408 3.1. ENERGY CALIBRATION The energy calibration was made with the registered for 2000 s. At the beginning of the measurements series, the stabilization was switched on in the measurements, so that the 661.6 keV peak of a channel nr. 662. In scintillators, the relation between the peak channel and energy normally differs from the identity function (figure 5). Linear or quadratic functions are normally used to describe this relation with a very good agreement. In this case, the maximum
137 133

Ba, 57Co, 137Cs, 60Co and

137

228

Th sources:

Each point source was measured during 200 s, except the

Cs source which was

Cs source would be positioned in

deviation between measured and calculated peak channels has been reduced (Table 2) from 130 (identity function) to 12 (linear function) and 4 (quadratic function).

3000 2500 2000 Energy(keV) 1500 1000 500 0 0

measured points identity function quadratic fit (y=3E-05x2 + 0.9916x - 2.0063)

500

1000

1500 channel

2000

2500

3000

Figure 5. Energy calibration curve of the LaBr3 detector.

Channel deviation (calculated measured) Isotope E 8 (keV) channel Identity function (y=x)
60

Linear interpolation (y=1.0582x -23.353) -18.27 -18.17 20.92 14.97 15.99 1.50 -15.28

Quadratic interpolation (as in Figure 5) 1.36 1.54 -0.42 1.86 0.39 0.81 -4.18

Co Th Ba Cs

228 57

1173 1332 2614.5 122.1 79.6 356 661.7

1147.82 1297.98 2473 123.31 82.18 357.07 661.82

25.18 34.02 141.5 -1.21 -2.58 -1.07 -0.12

Co

133

137

Table 2. Peak position.

3.2. ENERGY RESOLUTION The energy resolution is normally characterized by the Full Width at Half Maximum, FWHM. Table 3 and Figure 6 show the results obtained for isolated peaks. The linear relation observed in a log-log scale (with a slope close to 0.5) is typical of scintillators, for which the statistical contribution to the energy resolution is dominant [4].

Isotope
60

E g (keV) 1173 1332 2614.5 122.1 79.6 356 661.7

FHWM(%) 2.3 2.2 1.5 8.0 10.9 4.0 3.1

Co Th Ba Cs

228 57

Co

133

137

Table 3: Detector resolution.

10.0 133Ba

Resolution(%)

133Ba 137Cs 60Co y=-0.5641x+4.8006 60Co 228Th 1.0 100 1000 Energy (keV) 10000

Figure 6. Resolution calibration curve of the La Br3 detector.

3.3. DETECTOR EFFICIENCY The detector efficiency was determined with a 152Eu source (reference HP 809), 25 cm distant from the detector and behind a 0.1 cm thickness Cd filter. The absolute full-energy peak efficiency was calculated as:

=
where

Ameas
ref Atot e ln( 2 ) t dec T1 / 2

(1)

A ref tot

: activity

at a reference date A ref , tot

A meas : measured peak activity;

T1/2 tdec p :

: source half-life; : time span between reference and measurement dates. branching ratio of the gamma line,

Figure 7 shows the measured absolute-full energy peak efficiencies.of the LaBr3 detector and for comparison that of typical detectors [5].

100 0.01

E(keV)

1000

10000

0.001

Abs-Full-Energy Peak Efficiency (counts per emitted photon)

0.0001

0.00001 NaI diam. 7.6cm*7.6cm NaI diam. 7.6cm*1.9cm Ge coaxial diam 5.2cm*5.4 cm Ge planar diam. 3.6 cm*2 cm Ge planar diam.1.6cm*1 cm CZT/1500 1.5*1.5*0.75 cm3 CZT/500(56) 1.5*1.5*0.5 cm3 CZT/500(13) 1.5*1.5*0.5 cm3 SDP310 0.5*0.5*0.25cm3 LaBR3

0.000001

0.0000001

0.00000001

Figure 7. Absolute-full energy peak efficiency for different detector types [5].

10

4. DETERMINATION OF SOURCE-DETECTOR DISTANCE The dose profile produced by a point source in vacuum is described by a 1/r2 dependence, where r is the distance to the source. In a practical situation, neither sources or detectors are point wise; furthermore scattering occurs in the materials surrounding the experiment (e.g., walls, supports, collimators, air) and in the detector itself. These distortions are mainly relevant (i) very close to the detector, where the source and detector dimensions and also the scattering in collimators and supports are significant, and (ii) at large distances from the detector, where scattering from walls and air may become important. Still, the 1/r2 dependence is expected to be valid in an intermediate range of displacement between the source and the detector. In these cases, the dose profile is described as D(r)=A/(r+r0)2
(2)

where A is an intensity constant that depends mainly on the source activity and r0 locates the effective measurement point in the detector (see Figure ). The location of the effective measurement point may depend on photon energy because the interactions within the detector also depend on energy.

Figure 8. Schematic representation of the effective measurement point r0. For the conditions of Eq. (2), there will be a linear relation between r and D-1//2: r=-r0+a1x with x=D-1/2 and a1=A1/2 To determine the effective measurement point for the sources, dose measurements were performed in several points, in which the source was placed at different distances from the detector window. Figure 9 shows an example of the dose rate profile as a function of the distance between the source and the detector. After fitting
(3)

11

of the dose distribution as a function of the distance to the detector, the parameter r is determined.
2 cbnm031 1.8 1.6 1.4 Dose rate (micro Sv/h) 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 5 10 Distance (cm) 15 20 25 cbnm071 cbnm446

Figure 9. Dose rate as function of the distance source-detector. The radioprotection instrument is equipped with a gas counter. For this reason, it was assumed that the effective detector position was in the center of the gas volume (ro=4 cm). This hypothesis was confirmed by some test measurements with Am and Cs sources. Table 4 summarizes the values. (r+ro) of the position corresponding to a dose rate of 0.5 Sv h-1.

12

Isotope or element Source No shield interposed 3 mm Fe

r 0.5 (cm) 5 mm Fe 6 mm Pb

241

Am

57 60

Co Co

AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. FV 711,B1544, B1545, B1524, DC866 MA 101 AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. AEA Technology DD943,DD944, FV712, DC945,DC940, DC867 AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. FV AEA Technology QSA GmbH, nr. HY 763 CBNM 031 CBNM 071 CBNM 446 Perla U50 Perla U128 PERLA1-PL30 PERLA3-PL89 CBNM 61 CBNM 93 PuGa nr. 32 PM2 PERLA06 PERLA01 PERLA 281T2

20 60 39

0.3(D=0.421mSv)* 0.5(D=0.118mSv)* 0.6(D=0.118mSv)* 45 34.8 45 34.8 10 30.8

133

Ba

49

35

33

12

137

Cs

26.5

24.8

23.8

19.3

228

Th

26.5

24.8

23.8

15.8

16.5 16.5 18 54 79 24 16 354 86 194 59 374 200 190

14.5 15 16.5 48 66 16.5 10 110.5 37 34 34 161 80 180

13.8 14 16.5 44 57 13 7 71 30 31 31 127 65 170

9 10 10.5 27.5 17 0.6 (D=0.252mSv)* 0.6 (D=0.078mSv)* 35 9.5 13 17 91 40 150

Pu

Th

Table 4. *) the dose rate of 0.5 Sv/h could not be achieved. The distance between the source and the detector corresponds to the thickness of the interposed shield.

13

5. MEASUREMENT SERIES 5.1. SINGLE SOURCES For each source, a series of measurements was performed as described in Table5 [2]. Source Cs Cs background sample sample sample sample
137 137

Stabilisation off on on on on on on on on* on*

Filter 3 mm Fe 5 mm Fe 6 mm Pb -

Measurement time (s) 100 100 300 3 10 180 60 300 1200 300

Nr. of spectra 1 1 1 10 10 1 1 1 1 1

sample sample background

Table 5. List of measurement series for each radiation source. The spectra for the measurement series have the following name structure: (i) Background spectra

Background spectra are identified as bgdssxx.spe where bgd ss xx (ii) stands for background; series name of the source (table 6) is the spectrum number. Monitor spectra

Monitor (137Cs) spectra are identifies as monxxoo.spe where mon xx stands for monitor; is the spectrum number;

14

oo indicates if the stabilization has been switched on or off, according to the following scheme:
oo=on oo=of stabilization switched on stabilization switched off

(iii)

Sample spectra

Sample spectra have been identified as ssffttx.spe where ss ff identifies the source as defined in Table 6 ; identifies the filter, according to the scheme
ff=f0 ff=f3 ff=f5 ff=p6 no filter filter 3 mm Fe filter 5 mm Fe filter 6 mm Pb

tt

indicates the measurement time

tt=t1 tt=t2 tt=t3 tt=t4 tt=t5 tt=t6 3s 10s 180s 60s 300s 1200s

is the spectrum number.

Isotope / Source

Identification (ii)

Isotope / Source

Identification (ii)

241 57 60

Am

am c5 c6 th ba cs u0 u1 u2

Perla U50 PERLA1-PL30 Perla U128 PERLA3-PL 89 cbnm61 Perla06 Perla01 cbnm93 PuGa n32 PM2

u3 u4 u5 u6 p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5

Co Co Th Ba

228 133

Cs U CBNM031 U CBNM071 U CBNM446

137

Table 6. Source identification in spectra files.

15

General information about each spectrum is given in Annex 2. The spectra are given in electronic form and can be made available to the users 5.2. PLUTONIUM AND CESIUM SOURCES To simulate an illegal transportation of plutonium transported in a legal transport of a 137Cs source, several measurements were performed using the sources and shielding available in the laboratory: 1. a 18 mm thick lead cylinder containing a Cesium source of 370MBq was placed a 25 mm thick Pb shielding ( figure 10 [2]) and the spectrum named Cs.spe was measured, 2. a Plutonium sample (1000g Pu powder, isotopes:239242:0.181%, 72.190%,24.983%, 1.654%, 0.993%, 241Am:2.708%, 2 stainless steel walls of 1.6 mm of 1.6mm and 1mm thickness) was placed behind the same shielding of 25 mm lead and the spectrum Pu.spe was measured 3. The Pu and Cs sources were measured together and the spectrum PuCs.spe was registered. The three spectra are shown on figure 11.( see file PuandCs.xls)

Figure 10.

16

3500

3000 Shielding 137Cs:18+25 mm Pb 2500 Shielding Pu: 25 mm Pb Shielding 137Cs: 18+25 mm Pb, shielding Pu:25 mm Pb

Nb of counts

2000

1500

1000

500

0 0 100 200 300 400 500 channel 600 700 800 900 1000

Figure 11. 6. SUMMARY Measurements have been performed in the Perla laboratory for a series of radiation sources, including plutonium and uranium samples, using a LaBr3 detector with trade name BrillanCe-380 [3] detector. The Source spectra measurements performed at a dose rate of 0.5 Sv h-1are a contribution to the spectra data base for the trafficking Coordinated Research Project (CRP) Improvement of technical measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. These spectra are made available to the users as ZIP. Files. For additional questions, please contact: Reinhard.Berndt@jrc.it

17

REFERENCES [1] Coordinated Research Project (CRP) Improvement of technical measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 25 April 2002. R. Berndt and G. Caravati, Gamma spectra of different radiation sources, measured with a NaI detector, Technical Note Nr. 1.03.31, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, Joint Research Center - Ispra, February 2003. A. Iltis, M.R. Mayhugh, P. Menge, C.M. Rozsa, O. Selles, V. Solovyev, NIM section A 563 (2006) 359-363 G. F. Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 2nd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1988. P. Mortreau, R. Berndt, Handbook of gamma spectrometry methods for nondestructive Assay of nuclear materials, report EUR 19822 EN

[2]

[3] [4] [5]

18

ANNEX 1 Spectrum file format *.spe

20

File contents

Comment

$MCA_166_ID: spectrometer type: MCA-166 SN# 283 serial no. of the instrument used for this spectrum HW# 9801 hardware version FW# 9804 firmware version AP# SPEC 1.23.12 (r) Gen.Date: 1998/06/16 software used: SPEC.EXE 1.23.12 (r) $SPEC_REM: user remarks: JRC NaI 8631 1"*1" remark 137Cs no. FV713 333kBq 06/06/02 ... filter 0mm, distance 430mm ... 120cps, dead time 0% ... A:\DATA\csnf0t33.spe measurement) $DATE_MEA: 06/18/2002 05:56:58 $MEAS_TIM: 180 180 $DATA: 0 4095 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 6 8 14 15 14 21 18 path and spectrum name (as given after the date and time of the measurement mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm:ss measurement time: live time dead time no. of first and last channel counts in channel 0 counts in channel 1

...
0 0 0

$ROI: 1 616 712 $ENER_FIT: -33.022671 0.000000 $ENER_DATA: 2 661.830017 661.700012 1300.869995 1332.500000 $ADC: 4096 0 3967 $PRESETS: Live Time (sec) 180 0 $PZC_VALUE:

parameters for pole zero cancellation

21

2499 15 15 $FAST_DISCR: 400 $SLOW_DISCR: 400 $THR: 0 $GAIN_VALUE: 20 1.1317 $DTC: 1 $INPUT: Amplifier neg $PUR: on $STAB: on 600 from 724 662 $POWER: +12= on -12= on +24= on -24= on $HV: +646V unused $MCS_CHANNELS: 4096 $MCS_INPUT: Input Rate $MCS_TIME: 10 $MCS_SWEEPS: 1 $MODE: MCA $TDF: 800 $POWER_STATE: I+12= 8mA I-12= 10mA I+24= 5mA I-24= 4mA IBAT= 159mA IHV = 18mA ICHR= 159mA UBAT=8049mV UHVs= 644mV $COUNTS: 17606 $PD_COUNTS: 18066

gain stabilisation gain stabilisation was ON gain stabilisation evaluates the peak in the range channel 600 to 724 and brings the centroid into channel 662

detector high voltage +646 V used in this measurement

22

$RT: 180 $DT: 188 $BT: 188 $STAB_OFFSET: 47 $STAB_OFFSET_MIN: 47 $STAB_OFFSET_MAX: 47 $STAB_COUNTER: 5 $REC_COUNTER: 1073245 $REC_ERROR_COUNTER: 297 $SPEC_INTEGRAL: 18025 $ROI_INFO: 1 616 712 664.31

total number of counts in the spectrum 13.14 1532 1229 127

23

ANNEX 2 Source spectra files

24

241Am series

Source: AEA Technology no. FV711, B1544, B1545, B1524, DC 866 Total activity: 1873 KBq (08-May-2006)

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 08-May-06 Spectrum name mon001of.spe mon002on.spe amf0t10.spe amf0t11.spe amf0t12.spe amf0t13.spe amf0t14.spe amf0t15.spe amf0t16.spe amf0t17.spe amf0t18.spe amf0t19.spe amf0t20.spe amf0t21.spe amf0t22.spe amf0t23.spe amf0t24.spe amf0t25.spe amf0t26.spe amf0t27.spe amf0t28.spe amf0t29.spe amf0t30.spe amf3t40.spe amf5t50.spe amp6t60.spe backam01.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 241Am 661.6 661.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0.3 0.5 0.6 100 100 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1848 1850 2212 2249 2197 2242 2204 2215 2238 2264 2240 2217 2287 2288 2239 2270 2310 2275 2272 2289 2269 2294 2300 4530 762 186 216 2 2 2.7 1.9 2.8 2.8 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2 2.6 2.4 4.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 Peak position channnel 672.93 663.48 61.93 62.01 61.88 62.00 61.92 61.55 61.62 61.62 61.65 61.56 61.57 61.52 61.63 61.59 61.56 61.57 61.56 61.57 61.88 61.53 61.55 60.88 61.05 -

25

133Ba series

Source:AEA Technology no.FV712, DD943,DD944, DC945,DC940, DC867 Activity: 761 KBq (08-May-06)

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 08-May-06 Spectrum name mon003of.spe mon004on.spe backba00.spe baf0t10.spe baf0t11.spe baf0t12.spe baf0t13.spe baf0t14.spe baf0t15.spe baf0t16.spe baf0t17.spe baf0t18.spe baf0t19.spe baf0t20.spe baf0t21.spe baf0t22.spe baf0t23.spe baf0t24.spe baf0t25.spe baf0t26.spe baf0t27.spe baf0t28.spe baf0t29.spe baf0t30.spe baf3t40.spe baf5t50.spe bap6t60.spe backba01.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 133Ba 661.6 661.6 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 35 33 12 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1823 1824 207 1122 1055 1124 1132 1095 1100 1106 1085 1129 1111 1109 1114 1122 1123 1129 1128 1144 1107 1116 1128 1111 1331 1298 450 210 2 2 0.3 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.6 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 0.5 0.3 Peak position channnel 671.47 661.98 359.707 360.16 360.44 360.24 359.19 360.57 359.91 361.02 360.87 360.10 360.00 359.59 360.46 359.30 359.72 360.26 360.56 361.02 360.10 359.77 360.04 360.33 360.36 -

26

57Co series

Source:MA101

Activity:109 KBq (12-May-06)

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 12-May-06 Spectrum name mon005of.spe mon006on.spe backc500.spe c5f0t10.spe c5f0t11.spe c5f0t12.spe c5f0t13.spe c5f0t14.spe c5f0t15.spe c5f0t16.spe c5f0t17.spe c5f0t18.spe c5f0t19.spe c5f0t20.spe c5f0t21.spe c5f0t22.spe c5f0t23.spe c5f0t24.spe c5f0t25.spe c5f0t26.spe c5f0t27.spe c5f0t28.spe c5f0t29.spe c5f0t30.spe c5f3t40.spe c5f5t50.spe c5p6t60.spe backc501.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 57Co 661.6 661.6 no 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 122.1 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 45 45 10 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1947 1958 299 3981 4098 4009 4056 4030 4030 3987 4070 3968 4006 4059 4051 4016 4047 3999 4071 4064 3997 4098 4055 3904 4632 3637 1233 204 2.2 2.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.5 0.3 Peak position channnel 672.79 662.14 123.72 123.94 123.98 124.05 123.95 123.65 124.00 123.61 123.60 124.32 123.99 123.66 123.70 123.94 124.01 123.70 124.03 123.75 123.97 123.98 123.97 125.87 123.58 -

27

137Cs series May-06)

Source:AEA Technology no.FV713

Activity:312 KBq (10-

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 10-May-06 Spectrum name mon007of.spe mon008on.spe backcs00.spe csf0t10.spe csf0t11.spe csf0t12.spe csf0t13.spe csf0t14.spe csf0t15.spe csf0t16.spe csf0t17.spe csf0t18.spe csf0t19.spe csf0t20.spe csf0t21.spe csf0t22.spe csf0t23.spe csf0t24.spe csf0t25.spe csf0t26.spe csf0t27.spe csf0t28.spe csf0t29.spe csf0t30.spe csf3t40.spe csf5t50.spe csp6t60.spe backcs01.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 661.6 661.6 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 137Cs 661.6 661.6 no 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 661.6 no Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb 10 10 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 24.8 23.8 19.3 300 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 220 1819 1815 216 499 494 525 522 524 513 516 524 520 518 524 510 514 524 507 518 527 510 511 514 518 528 549 477 0 2 2 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0 Peak position channnel 669.14 663.31 662.32 663.67 662.08 661.03 661.14 664.31 660.53 656 662.60 661.52 661.47 661.59 661.69 661.45 661.08 659.88 661.67 661.19 662.41 661.34 661.44 661.08 661.92 661.93

28

60Co series

Source:AEA Technology no.DC 870

Activity: 63 KBq (10-May-06)

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 10-May-06 Spectrum name mon009of.spe mon010on.spe backc600.spe c6f0t10.spe c6f0t11.spe c6f0t12.spe c6f0t13.spe c6f0t14.spe c6f0t15.spe c6f0t16.spe c6f0t17.spe c6f0t18.spe c6f0t19.spe c6f0t20.spe c6f0t21.spe c6f0t22.spe c6f0t23.spe c6f0t24.spe c6f0t25.spe c6f0t26.spe c6f0t27.spe c6f0t28.spe c6f0t29.spe c6f0t30.spe c6f3t40.spe c6f5t50.spe c6p6t60.spe backc601.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 60Co 661.6 661.6 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 1173.2 no Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb 10 10 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 34.8 34.8 30.8 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 240 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 550 400 380 210 2.3 2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 Peak position channnel 668.21 662.98 1154.84 1163.00 1141.26 1144.00 1152.0 1118.00 1319.0 1152.88 1145.22 1153.41 1157.47 1153.43 1161.00 1158.1 1163.32 1157.88 1169.83 1165.57 1160.03 1161.69 1160.29 1157.57 1155.77 1158.45

29

228Th series 06)

Source:AEA Technology no.HY763

Activity: 193 KBq (12-May-

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 10-May-06 Spectrum name mon011of.spe mon012on.spe backt800.spe t8f0t10.spe t8f0t11.spe t8f0t12.spe t8f0t13.spe t8f0t14.spe t8f0t15.spe t8f0t16.spe t8f0t17.spe t8f0t18.spe t8f0t19.spe t8f0t20.spe t8f0t21.spe t8f0t22.spe t8f0t23.spe t8f0t24.spe t8f0t25.spe t8f0t26.spe t8f0t27.spe t8f0t28.spe t8f0t29.spe t8f0t30.spe t8f3t40.spe t8f5t50.spe t8p6t60.spe backt801.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 228Th 661.6 661.6 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 24.8 23.8 15.8 1700 1700 300 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 10 250 180 250 60 230 300 230 1200 170 300 60 100 100 1.9 1.9 230 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 Peak position channnel 663.19 662.05 0.4 2428 2407 2508.33 2431.00 2451.00 2520.00 2476.00 2499.00 2406.00 2506.29 2512.00 2522.64 2503.20 2512.20 2505.75 2511.20 2505.00 2483.67 2479.00 2494.70 2503.73 2491.41 2495.65

30

U series u0

Source: CBNM031

U3O8 powder, 200g U3O8, 0.316wt% 235U, container wall: Al, 2 mm thick, plane Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 11-May-06 Spectrum name mon013of.spe mon014on.spe backu000.spe u0f0t10.spe u0f0t11.spe u0f0t12.spe u0f0t13.spe u0f0t14.spe u0f0t15.spe u0f0t16.spe u0f0t17.spe u0f0t18.spe u0f0t19.spe u0f0t20.spe u0f0t21.spe u0f0t22.spe u0f0t23.spe u0f0t24.spe u0f0t25.spe u0f0t26.spe u0f0t27.spe u0f0t28.spe u0f0t29.spe u0f0t30.spe u0f3t40.spe u0f5t50.spe u0p6t60.spe backu001.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 14.5 13.8 9 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1700 1700 200 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 720 650 440 200 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.4 0.2 0 672.07 663.50 203.01 192.75 199.87 188.81 188.55 193.17 180.58 187.61 190.28 188.74 189.34 188.90 190.32 185.83 188.27 184.89 191.81 184.11 189.20 189.89 188.64 -

31

U series u1

Source: CBNM071

U3O8 powder, 200g U3O8, 0.711wt% 235U, container wall: Al, 2 mm thick, plane Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 08-May-06 Spectrum name mon015of.spe mon016on.spe backu100.spe u1f0t10.spe u1f0t11.spe u1f0t12.spe u1f0t13.spe u1f0t14.spe u1f0t15.spe u1f0t16.spe u1f0t17.spe u1f0t18.spe u1f0t19.spe u1f0t20.spe u1f0t21.spe u1f0t22.spe u1f0t23.spe u1f0t24.spe u1f0t25.spe u1f0t26.spe u1f0t27.spe u1f0t28.spe u1f0t29.spe u1f0t30.spe u1f3t40.spe u1f5t50.spe u1p6t60.spe backu101.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 15 14 10 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1900 1900 80 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 400 380 250 70 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 Peak position channnel 671.99 663.83 179.71 191.44 192.16 190.12 186.83 188.27 191.75 186.72 190.91 185.90 188.64 190.07 191.03 190.34 189.29 189.34 187.19 186.92 189.80 185.56 188.86 188.50 189.18 -

32

U series u2

Source: CBNM446

U3O8 powder, 200g U3O8, 4.46wt% 235U, container wall: Al, 2 mm thick, plane Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 08-May-06 Spectrum name mon017of.spe mon018on.spe backu200.spe u2f0t10.spe u2f0t11.spe u2f0t12.spe u2f0t13.spe u2f0t14.spe u2f0t15.spe u2f0t16.spe u2f0t17.spe u2f0t18.spe u2f0t19.spe u2f0t20.spe u2f0t21.spe u2f0t22.spe u2f0t23.spe u2f0t24.spe u2f0t25.spe u2f0t26.spe u2f0t27.spe u2f0t28.spe u2f0t29.spe u2f0t30.spe u2f3t40.spe u2f5t50.spe u2p6t60.spe backu201.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16.5 15.5 10.5 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1900 1900 220 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 460 850 370 200 2 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.2 671.42 661.96 190.34 186.38 189.71 190.36 188.93 188.95 189.32 189.35 189.54 189.67 188.53 188.45 189.12 189.13 189.40 189.46 188.88 188.67 188.54 188.67 188.90 189.05 188.92 -

33

U series u3 Source: PERLA U50 UO2 powder, 1751 g U, 19.88wt% 235U, container wall: Al, 2 mm thick, plane Rossendorf) Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 31-May-06 Spectrum name mon019of.spe mon020on.spe backu300.spe u3f0t10.spe u3f0t11.spe u3f0t12.spe u3f0t13.spe u3f0t14.spe u3f0t15.spe u3f0t16.spe u3f0t17.spe u3f0t18.spe u3f0t19.spe u3f0t20.spe u3f0t21.spe u3f0t22.spe u3f0t23.spe u3f0t24.spe u3f0t25.spe u3f0t26.spe u3nf0t27.spe u3f0t28.spe u3f0t29.spe u3f0t30.spe u3f3t40.spe u3f5t50.spe u3p6t60.spe backu301.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb mm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 48 44 27.5 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 200 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1250 1250 600 200 2 2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0 0 651.08 660.58 188.45 187.76 188.96 188.15 188.31 187.87 188.35 188.53 187.93 187.77 188.52 188.93 188.20 188.76 188.89 188.56 188.44 188.09 188.05 188.37 188.40 188.41 187.59 -

34

U series u4 Source: PERLA1, pl30; Al-UO2-Al sandwich plate 625 * 70.75 * 1.27mm3, 61.05g U, 19.88wt% 235U, active zone (500...600) * (60.4......65.1) * (...0.3...) Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 10-May-06 Spectrum name mon021of.spe mon022on.spe backu400.spe u4nf0t10.spe u4nf0t11.spe u4nf0t12.spe u4nf0t13.spe u4nf0t14.spe u4nf0t15.spe u4nf0t16.spe u4nf0t17.spe u4nf0t18.spe u4nf0t19.spe u4nf0t20.spe u4nf0t21.spe u4nf0t22.spe u4nf0t23.spe u4nf0t24.spe u4nf0t25.spe u4nf0t26.spe u4nf0t27.spe u4nf0t28.spe u4nf0t29.spe u4nf0t31.spe u4nf3t41.spe u4nf5t51.spe u4np6t61.spe backu401.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 16.5 13 0.6 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 220 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2250 2300 4600 200 2 2 2.4 2.40 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 6.2 0.3 672.91 663.31 188.96 189.43 188.51 188.59 189.65 188.64 189.25 189.00 188.76 188.48 188.60 188.80 188.63 188.59 188.95 188.91 188.95 188.99 188.92 188.85 188.90 188.61 188.87 188.46

35

U series u5 Source: PERLA U128 UO2 powder, 1667 g U, 92.42% 235U, container wall: Al, 2 mm thick, plane Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 21-April-06 Spectrum name mon023of.spe mon024on.spe backu500.spe u5f0t10.spe u5f0t11.spe u5f0t12.spe u5f0t13.spe u5f0t14.spe u5f0t15.spe u5f0t16.spe u5f0t17.spe u5f0t18.spe u5f0t19.spe u5f0t20.spe u5f0t21.spe u5f0t22.spe u5f0t23.spe u5f0t24.spe u5f0t25.spe u5f0t26.spe u5f0t27.spe u5f0t28.spe u5f0t29.spe u5f0t30.spe u5f3t40.spe u5f5t50.spe u5p6t60.spe backu501.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 66 57 17 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1900 1900 200 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1100 1900 1200 30 2.2 2.2 0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2 2 2 0 656.50 661.57 200.8 201.0 201.2 201.5 201.0 201.7 200.6 201.0 200.7 201.3 201.1 200.8 201.6 200.8 200.1 200.7 201.0 200.0 200.7 200.9 200.1 200.5 203.8

36

U series u6 Source: PERLA 3, pl83; Al-UO2-Al sandwich plate 625 * 70.75 * 1.27mm3, 8.37g U, 93.11wt% 235U, active zone (500...600) * (60.4......65.1) * (...0.3...) Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 21-April-06 Spectrum name mon025of.spe mon026on.spe backu600.spe u6f0t10.spe u6f0t11.spe u6f0t12.spe u6f0t13.spe u6f0t14.spe u6f0t15.spe u6f0t16.spe u6f0t17.spe u6f0t18.spe u6f0t19.spe u6f0t20.spe u6f0t21.spe u6f0t22.spe u6f0t23.spe u6f0t24.spe u6f0t25.spe u6f0t26.spe u6f0t27.spe u6f0t28.spe u6f0t29.spe u6f0t30.spe u6f3t40.spe u6f5t50.spe u6p6t60.spe backu601.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 661.6 661.6 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 185.7 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 10 7 0.6 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1900 1900 210 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2600 2000 200 2 2 0.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.3 670.52 662.96 188.86 188.95 188.91 188.39 188.93 188.95 188.68 188.87 188.67 188.29 189.00 188.93 188.54 188.94 188.54 188.56 188.88 188.61 188.32 188.57 188.54 188.81 188.63 188.60

37

Pu series p0 Source: CBNM Pu61, PuO2 pellet, 6.626g Pu, thin metal window, 1mm PVC Pu 238-242 (6-Jun-02): 1.097%, 64.968%, 26.366%, 3.212%, 4.358%, Am/Pu:5.196% Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 26-May-06 Spectrum name NaI detector spectra: mon027of.spe mon028on.spe backp000.spe p0f0t10.spe p0f0t11.spe p0f0t12.spe p0f0t13.spe p0f0t14.spe p0f0t15.spe p0f0t16.spe p0f0t17.spe p0f0t18.spe p0f0t19.spe p0f0t20.spe p0f0t21.spe p0f0t22.spe p0f0t23.spe p0f0t24.spe p0f0t25.spe p0f0t26.spe p0f0t27.spe p0f0t28.spe p0f0t29.spe p0f0t30.spe p0f3t40.spe p0f5t51.spe p0p6t60.spe 137Cs 137Cs Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb 10 10 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 110.5 71 35 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 1800 1800 200 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7800 6000 2000 2.2 2.2 0.3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 681.11 659.57 210.1 209.5 212.79 209.74 208.6 203.79 205.66 214.00 210.02 206.41 211.36 210.35 210.43 210.77 Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel

38

Pu series p1 Source: PERLA06, PuO2 powder, 7.939g Pu, 2 steel walls 1.6mm + 1mm thick, Pu238-242 (6-Jun-02): 1.618%, 61.252%, 26.084%, 5.092%, 5.954%, Am:6.681% Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 24-May-06 Spectrum name mon028of.spe mon029on.spe backp100.spe p1f0t10.spe p1f0t11.spe p1f0t12.spe p1f0t13.spe p1f0t14.spe p1f0t15.spe p1f0t16.spe p1f0t17.spe p1f0t18.spe p1f0t19.spe p1f0t20.spe p1f0t21.spe p1f0t22.spe p1f0t23.spe p1f0t24.spe p1f0t25.spe p1f0t26.spe p1f0t27.spe p1f0t28.spe p1f0t29.spe p1f0t30.spe p1f3t40.spe p1f5t50.spe p1p6t60.spe backp101.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope keV 137Cs 137Cs Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Filter mm, Fe/Pb cm 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no E Distan Meas Count Dead Peak ce time rate time position s cps % channnel 10 10 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 161 127 91 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 300 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2200 1800 1600 200 2.3 2.3 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 6.3 1.2 0.3 655.42 661.42 211.88 206.00 212.69 208.15 212.94 205.89 207.56 208.31 211.50 208.55 209.50 210.90 211.73 216.22 208.16 211.13 215.75 211.36 207.16 219.15 210.97 209.48 209.64 209.84 -

39

Pu series p2 Source: PERLA01, PuO2 powder, Pu mass 8.009g, 2 steel walls 1.6mm + 1mm thick, Pu238-242 (6-Jun-02): 0.181%, 72.19%, 24.983%, 1.654%, 0.993%, Am/Pu: 2.708% Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 11-May-06 Spectrum name mon030of.spe mon031on.spe backp200.spe p2f0t10.spe p2f0t11.spe p2f0t12.spe p2f0t13.spe p2f0t14.spe p2f0t15.spe p2f0t16.spe p2f0t17.spe p2f0t18.spe p2f0t19.spe p2f0t20.spe p2f0t21.spe p2f0t22.spe p2f0t23.spe p2f0t24.spe p2f0t25.spe p2f0t26.spe p2f0t27.spe p2f0t28.spe p2f0t29.spe p2f0t30.spe p2f3t40.spe p2f5t50.spe p2p6t60.spe backp201.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead mm, ce time rate time Fe/Pb cm s cps % no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 80 65 40 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 200 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 900 600 600 200 2 2 0.3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 7.4 1.6 0 Peak position channel 668.56 662.97 210.33 213.65 213.44 210.79 210.39 212.61 206.78 203.72 209.71 208.83 212.69 215.29 212.54 213.34 211.59 211.08 209.86 207.42 211.84 210.32 211.45 212.17 211.46 217.01

40

Pu series p3 Source: CBNM Pu93, PuO2 pellet, 6.625g Pu, thin metal window, 1mm PVC Pu238-242 (6-Jun-02): 0.010%, 93.533%, 6.314%, 0.104%, 0.040%, Am/Pu: 0.223% Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 21-April-06 Spectrum name mon032of.spe mon033on.spe backp300.spe p3f0t10.spe p3f0t11.spe p3f0t12.spe p3f0t13.spe p3f0t14.spe p3f0t15.spe p3f0t16.spe p3f0t17.spe p3f0t18.spe p3f0t19.spe p3f0t20.spe p3f0t21.spe p3f0t22.spe p3f0t23.spe p3f0t24.spe p3f0t25.spe p3f0t26.spe p3f0t27.spe p3f0t28.spe p3f0t29.spe p3f0t30.spe p3f3t40.spe p3f5t50.spe p3p6t60.spe backp301.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 37 30 9.5 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 2200 2200 30 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 1000 950 470 200 2.4 2.4 0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1 0.9 0.5 0.3 659.08 660.92 210.92 208.24 217.18 204.25 222.91 211.70 209.43 206.75 209.97 -

41

Pu series p4 Source:PuGa no.32, Pu+1.5%Ga alloy, 9.4g Pu, 0.6mm thick disc, 1 wall 0.5 mmFe Pu238...242 (6-Jun-02): 0.011%, 93.922%, 5.901%, 0.134%, 0.032%, Am/Pu: 0.046% Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 24-May-06 Spectrum name mon034of.spe mon035on.spe backp400.spe p4f0t10.spe p4f0t11.spe p4f0t12.spe p4f0t13.spe p4f0t14.spe p4f0t15.spe p4f0t16.spe p4f0t17.spe p4f0t18.spe p4f0t19.spe p4f0t20.spe p4f0t21.spe p4f0t22.spe p4f0t23.spe p4f0t24.spe p4f0t25.spe p4f0t26.spe p4f0t27.spe p4f0t28.spe p4f0t29.spe p4f0t30.spe p4f3t40.spe p4f5t50.spe p4p6t60.spe backp401.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E mm, keV 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak ce time rate time position Fe/Pb mm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 34 31 13 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 200 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 12400 5900 4900 200 2 2 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 6 4 0.3 659.64 661.86 209.1 222.4 217.6 227.3 222.3 218.4 217.9 225.8 210.9 215.4 221.2 222.5 218.3 218.8 220.5 214.2 222.2 222.8 220.1 218.2 221.1 220.2 220.1 220.4

137Cs 137Cs Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu

42

Pu series p5, source PM2 18.8g Pu+5%Ni+3% Cu alloy. 238-242Pu wt% 6 Jun02: 0.004, 95.470, 4.458, 0.053, 0.015, walls 3mm Al+1 mm Fe Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 31-May-06 Spectrum name mon038of.spe mon039on.spe backp500.spe p5f0t10.spe p5f0t11.spe p5f0t12.spe p5f0t13.spe p5f0t14.spe p5f0t15.spe p5f0t16.spe p5f0t17.spe p5f0t18.spe p5f0t19.spe p5f0t20.spe p5f0t21.spe p5f0t22.spe p5f0t23.spe p5f0t24.spe p5f0t25.spe p5f0t26.spe p5f0t27.spe p5f0t28.spe p5f0t29.spe p5f0t30.spe p5f3t40.spe p5f5t50.spe p5p6t60.spe backp501.spe Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore U ore 661.6 661.6 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps (%) channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 10 10 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 34 31 17 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 30 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 1700 1400 1000 200 2.2 2.2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 657.40 661.04 212.10 204.00 195.65 216.25 210.85 213.71 207.87 216.68 214.94 209.14 219.85 226.09 210.93 208.63 210.39 -

43

Th powder

Source:Perla 381T2 - Natural Thorium powder, 1500g

Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 24-May-06 Spectrum name mon036of.spe mon037on.spe backth00.spe thf0t10.spe thf0t11.spe thf0t12.spe thf0t13.spe thf0t14.spe thf0t15.spe thf0t16.spe thf0t17.spe thf0t18.spe thf0t19.spe thf0t20.spe thf0t21.spe thf0t22.spe thf0t23.spe thf0t24.spe thf0t25.spe thf0t26.spe thf0t27.spe thf0t28.spe thf0t29.spe thf0t30.spe thf3t40.spe thf5t50.spe thp6t60.spe backth01 Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Isotope E keV 137Cs 137Cs Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th 661.6 661.6 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 2614.5 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no 3, Fe 5, Fe 6, Pb no 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 184 174 154 100 100 300 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 180 60 300 1200 300 1800 1800 200 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 430 470 770 200 2 2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 2 0.7 1.1 0 653.54 660.66 2495 2457 2408 2500 2448 2462 2490 2391 2395 2438 2527 2490 2506 2504 2502 2479 2509 2465 2469 2497 2532.0 2517.0

44

137Cs plus Pu Sources: 1. PERLA111, PO2 powder, Pu mass 999.8g, 2 steel walls 2.6mm + 1.5mm thick, Pu238-242 (6-Jun-02): 0.181%, 72.19%, 24.983%, 1.654%, 0.993%, Am/Pu: 2.708% 2. 137Cs, 370MBq Detector: LaBr3 BrilLanCe-380 Crismatec no. J900CSB MCA: MCA-166 (GBS Rossendorf) 31-May-06 Spectrum name Dose rate at the detector position about 0.5 microSievert Time hh:mm Pu.spe PuCs.spe Cs.spe 23:46 23:54 17:56 Pu 137Cs Pu 137Cs Isotope E keV ... 661.6 ... 661.6 Filter Distan Meas Count Dead Peak mm, ce time rate time position Fe/Pb cm s cps % channnel 25mm Pb 43mm Pb 25mm Pb 43mm Pb 300 300 300 800 1050 500 0.5 1 0.5 677.04 676.90

45

Annex III:
Co57.spe Co60.spe Ba133.spe Cs137.spe Th.spe

Energy calibration - list of spectra

46

Feasibility Study of a Wrist Watch Based Radiation Survey Meter (Phase I) and Isotope Identifying Gamma Spectrometer (Phase II)
A. Wolf FZD Research Center Dresden Rossendorf, Germany During the Period from March 2003 through April 2006, FZR Research Center Rossendorf had a Cooperative Research Agreement (CRA) with the IAEA. The Cooperative Research Agreement on Feasibility study of a wrist watch based radiation survey meter (Phase I) and isotope identifying gamma spectrometer (Phase II) was intended to give an substantial effort in the supporting and improving of the technical capabilities to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other materials and the detection of radiological threat by studying the possibilities of a new class of detection devices, Spectroscopic Personal Radiation Detectors. This work was funded by FZR. The long-range objective of the effort is to contribute to the improvement of the technical means by combining radiation detection with categorization of the nuclides. This allows to reduce the response to innocent alarms caused often in populated areas by radiopharmaceuticals in persons. This is achieved by continuous, automated measurement of gamma spectra and their evaluation with respect to the nuclide that had caused an alarm. During the first phase March 2003 to Dec 2003 we studied the possibility of the simulation and modeling of gamma spectra using a heuristic method. The results were reported by Jrg Brutscher on the Research Co-ordination & Technical Meeting IAEA Headquarter Vienna, 15 Dec 2003. As result an improved model for the Compton background was presented. This includes the efficiency-corrected Klein-Nishina distribution for scattering inside the detector as well as an approach to describe backscattering from surroundings. Based on modeling results and test measurements, a medium-size CZT detector was selected for use in this project. Beginning in March 2003 a feasibility study off an ultra miniaturized very low power radiation survey meter in shape of a wrist watch was started by component and detector selection, packaging studies, development of very low power high density electronic circuits and low power processor with enough power to allow measurement and control data processing (isotope identification). In addition an algorithm for a linearization of the dose rate indication based on the spectrometric information was developed and tested. A first prototype of a wrist watch based radiation survey meter with a room temperature planar solid state detector was completed in June 2004 and was presented at the Research Coordination Meeting in Sochi, Russian Federation, Oct 2004. During the Olympic Games in Athen 2004 and the Soccer World Championship Germany 2006 four field test samples of the radiation survey meter were made available to the respective support team of the IAEA. And a first prototype test was also done in cooperation with the Institute for Systems, Informatics and Safety of the Joint Research Centre; Ispra Italy in May 2005.

In the second phase starting in July 2005 the feasibility study of a wrist watch based Spectral Personal Radiation Detector with internal Isotope Identification has been performed. The selection of suitable spectroscopic solid state detectors was carried out and advanced pulse processing and data acquisition solutions were developed and implemented. In Cooperation with the Atom Institute of the Austrian Universities (ATI) in Vienna an isotope identification algorithm with low requirements to the numeric processing power and for use with spectral data with low statistics is under development. First results were presented at the third Co-ordination & Technical Meeting IAEA at Headquarter Vienna, 2327April 2006, Vienna by Andreas Wolf and Martha Swoboda. In cooperation with the AIT and the IAEA a catalog of gamma spectra of single nuclides which are used for medical and industrial purposes, natural occurring nuclides and nuclear material as well as mixtures of this nuclide categories was established. It is used, supplemented by a catalog of simulated gamma spectra with low counting statistics for testing of the isotope identification algorithm. A first prototype of a wrist watch based Spectroscopic Personal Radiation Detector (SPRD) is expected at the end of 2006, based on following hardware/firmware features: spectroscopic CZT detector 10x10x5 mm3 with resolution FWHM 25keV for Cs137 low power main and shaping amplifier with peak detection and low power multi-channel analyzer with 2 k channels suppression of microphonic noise spectrum memory for at least 10 spectra battery life time about 24 hours with full measuring function alarm types: radiation alarm and safety alarm with adjustable thresholds working in automated SPRD (Spectral Personal Radiation Detector) or manual RID (Radionuclide Identification Device) mode for expert users indication of dose rate and accumulated dose identification of single, unshielded nuclides with doserate 1Sv/h above background in 300 sec in energy range up to 800 keV, and in 600 sec in energy range to 1.6 MeV identification of very weak sources in the expert mode with a further extension of measurement time drop test of 1m high in shipping case

Picture 1: First prototype of WatchMon, showing finder screen for industrial nuclides.

Picture 2: First prototype of WatchMon, showing identify screen for mix of industrial nuclides.

Procedures for, and Testing of, Border Monitoring Equipment

R. Kouzes Pacific Northwest National Laboratory During the period from March 2003 through April 2006, Richard Kouzes of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory had a Cooperative Research Agreement (CRA) with the IAEA. The Cooperative Research Agreement on Procedures for and Testing of Border Monitoring Equipment states the purpose of this activity was as follows: The IAEA, the EC, and Member States purchase border monitoring equipment to support Member States in improving their capabilities to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. To make sure that the correct equipment is purchased and deployed, specifications and associated test procedures are required. Assistance in developing such equipment specifications is included under this CPR. Validated test laboratories are needed to be available for performing the tests for equipment according to the equipment type and outlined test procedures. Under this agreement, PNNL will be assisting in drafting detailed, engineering level test procedures to be validated and accepted by the IAEA. This effort is contingent upon PNNL obtaining appropriate support. The long-range objective of the effort is to contribute to the improvement of equipment to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The equipment is needed for use by law enforcement services to characterize such materials before and after seizure. The outcome of the work will help States in improving their capabilities to combat illicit trafficking through enhanced detection systems. At the Consultants Group Meeting, Vienna, 1721 March 2003, the draft "Technical/Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment" was discussed. PNNL will attempt to participate in follow-up meetings on the further review of this specification. The purpose of this Cooperative Research Agreement was to allow for the sharing of knowledge on the development and testing of border security equipment for the interdiction of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The Radiation Portal Monitor Project at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been deploying equipment for the interdiction of illicit radioactive materials at the U.S border since 2002. This work in the U.S. has been of direct interest and value to the IAEAs international programs in border security. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection, part of the Department of Homeland Security, approved of, and provided financial support for, this activity with the IAEA. During the time period of this CRA, PNNL wrote a number of open documents that were shared with the IAEA. A bibliography of relevant reports and a few key abstracts are provided below.

Bibliography of Related Reports Co-Authored by Richard Kouzes

DISCRIMINATION OF NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PLASTIC SCINTILLATOR MATERIAL James Ely, Richard Kouzes, Bruce Geelhood, John Schweppe, Ray Warner, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NS 51 (August 2004), p 16721676. Abstract Plastic scintillator material is used in many applications for the detection of gamma rays from radioactive material, primarily due to the sensitivity per unit cost compared to other detection materials. However, the resolution and lack of full-energy peaks in the plastic scintillator material prohibits detailed spectroscopy. Therefore, other materials such as doped sodium iodide are used for spectroscopic applications. The limited spectroscopic information can, however, be exploited in plastic scintillator materials to provide some discrimination. The discrimination between man-made and naturally occurring sources would be useful in reducing alarm screening for radiation detection applications that target man-made sources. The results of applying the limited energy information from plastic scintillator material for radiation portal monitors are discussed. HOMELAND SECURITY INSTRUMENTATION FOR RADIATION DETECTION AT BORDERS Richard Kouzes, James Ely, Randy Hansen, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, David Stromswold, Proceedings of the Fourth American Nuclear Society International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Controls and Human-Machine Interface Technologies (NPIC&HMIT 2004), Columbus, OH. ISBN 0-89448-688-8 (September 2004). Abstract Countries around the world are deploying radiation detection instrumentation to interdict the illegal shipment of radioactive material crossing international borders at land, rail, air, and sea ports of entry. These efforts include deployments in the US and a number of European and Asian countries by governments and international agencies. Items of concern include radiation dispersal devices (RDD), nuclear warheads, and special nuclear material (SNM). Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are used as the main screening tool for vehicles and cargo at borders, supplemented by handheld detectors, personal radiation detectors, and x-ray imaging systems. Some cargo contains naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) that triggers nuisance alarms in RPMs at these border crossings. Individuals treated with medical radiopharmaceuticals also produce nuisance alarms and can produce cross-talk between adjacent lanes of a multi-lane deployment. The operational impact of nuisance alarms can be significant at border crossings. Methods have been developed for reducing this impact without negatively affecting the requirements for interdiction of radioactive materials of interest. Plastic scintillator material is commonly used in RPMs for the detection of gamma rays from radioactive material, primarily due to the efficiency per unit cost compared to other detection materials. The resolution and lack of full-energy peaks in the plastic scintillator material prohibits detailed spectroscopy. However, the limited spectroscopic information from plastic scintillator can be exploited to provide some discrimination. Energy-based algorithms used in RPMs can effectively exploit the crude energy information available from a plastic scintillator to distinguish some NORM from items of concern. Whenever NORM cargo limits the level of the alarm threshold, energy-based algorithms can produce better detection probabilities for small SNM sources than gross-count algorithms. This paper discusses lessons learned from the use of plastic-based RPMs at borders. Results of observations of NORM and computations related to NORM characteristics are discussed as is the use of energy-based algorithms for NORM rejection. COMPARISON OF PLASTIC AND NAI(TL) SCINTILLATORS FOR VEHICLE PORTAL MONITOR APPLICATIONS E.R. Siciliano, J.H. Ely, R.T. Kouzes, B.D. Milbrath, J.E. Schweppe, D.C. Stromswold, NIM-A 550, pp. 647674 (September 21, 2005). Abstract The demand for radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems has increased, and their capabilities are being further scrutinized as they are being applied to the task of detecting nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and radiation dispersal device materials that could appear at borders. The requirements and constraints on RPM systems deployed at high-volume border

crossings are significantly different from those at weapons facilities or steel recycling plants, where RPMs have been historically employed. In this new homeland security application, RPM systems must rapidly detect localized sources of radiation with a very high detection probability and low false-alarm rate, while screening all of the traffic without impeding the flow of commerce. In light of this new Department of Homeland Security application, the capabilities of two popular gamma-ray-detector materials as applied to these needs are re-examined. Both experimental data and computer simulations, together with practical deployment experience, are used to assess currently available polyvinyl-toluene and NaI(Tl) gamma-ray detectors for border applications. DETECTING ILLICIT NUCLEAR MATERIALS R.T. Kouzes, PNNL-SA-43674, American Scientist 93, PP. 422427, SeptemberOctober 2005. THE USE OF ENERGY WINDOWING TO DISCRIMINATE SNM FROM NORM James Ely, Richard Kouzes, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, Denis Strachen, Dennis Weier, accepted to NIM-A, February 2006. Abstract Energy windowing is an algorithmic alarm method that can be applied to plastic scintillator-based radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems to improve operational sensitivity to certain threat sources while reducing the alarm rates from naturally occurring radioactive material. Various implementations of energy windowing have been tested and documented by industry and at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and are available in commercial RPMs built by several manufacturers. Moreover, energy windowing is being used in many deployed RPMs to reduce nuisance alarms and improve operational sensitivity during the screening of cargo. This paper describes energy windowing algorithms and demonstrates how these algorithms succeed when applied to controlled experimental measurements and real world vehicle traffic data. THE RESPONSE OF RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS TO MEDICAL RADIONUCLIDES IN BORDER APPLICATIONS Richard Kouzes, Edward Siciliano, April 25, 2005; accepted by Radiation Measurements. Abstract Radiopharmaceuticals are administered to a large number of individuals each year, and at any given time can be found at detectable levels in about one in 2600 Americans. Such individuals are among the population crossing international borders where equipment has been deployed for radiation detection, and the resulting nuisance alarms produced by these individuals must be resolved by further inspection like all other alarms. During 2001, a total of approximately 14.4 million medical procedures using radionuclides were performed in the U.S. This number rose to over 16.5 million in 2004. Of this total number of procedures, approximately 98% were diagnostic procedures and 2% were therapeutic procedures. Although there were over 45 different commercially-available products used in over 75 different types of medical procedures, only 17 different radioisotopes comprise the complete set of active radionuclides in the commercially-available radiopharmaceuticals in the U.S. There are other experimental radiopharmaceuticals in use, but their presence in the population is rare. Of these 17 radioisotopes, nine are customarily administered to outpatients and produce sufficiently energetic photons that can readily be detected. The radioisotope 99mTc is administered in about 90% of the procedures and is the one most likely to be detected by radiation screening equipment. This paper reports on various impacts of radiopharmaceuticals observed in people at border crossings. Calculations were performed to simulate the response of multi-lane portal radiation monitor deployments to these types of sources. Results are given for the time period during which radiopharmaceuticals might be detectable by radiation screening equipment at border crossings. NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CARGO AT U.S. BORDERS Richard Kouzes, James Ely, John Evans, Walt Hensley, Elwood Lepel, Joseph McDonald, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, Dan Strom, Mitch Woodring, Packaging, Transport, Storage & Security of Radioactive Material, Vol. 17, No. 1 pp. 1117 (January 2006). Abstract In the U.S. and other countries, large numbers of vehicles pass through border crossings each day. The illicit movement of radioactive sources is a concern that has resulted in

the installation of radiation detection and identification instruments at border crossing points. This activity is judged to be necessary because of the possibility of an act of terrorism involving a radioactive source that may include any number of dangerous radionuclides. The problem of detecting, identifying, and interdicting illicit radioactive sources is complicated by the fact that many materials present in cargo are somewhat radioactive. Some cargo contains naturally occurring radioactive material that may trigger radiation portal monitor alarms. Such nuisance alarms can be an operational limiting factor for screening of cargo at border crossings. Information about the nature of the radioactive materials in cargo that can interfere with the detection of radionuclides of concern is necessary to help anticipate and recognize likely sources of these nuisance alarms. BASELINE SUPPRESSION OF PORTAL MONITOR VEHICLE GAMMA COUNT PROFILES: A CHARACTERIZATION STUDY Charles A. Lo Presti, Dennis R. Weier, Richard T. Kouzes, John Schweppe, September 2005. Accepted by NIM-A. Abstract Radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems based upon polyvinyl toluene scintillator (PVT) gamma ray detectors have been deployed to detect illicit trafficking in radioactive materials at border crossings. This report sets forth a characterization of the baseline suppression effect in gross-count gamma ray profiles due to shadow shielding by vehicles entering RPMs. Shadow shielding is of interest because it reduces the alarm sensitivity of RPMs. This observational study investigated three types of PVT based commercial RPM systems currently deployed at selected ports of entry in terms of spatial effects relative to detector panel positioning. Radiation portal monitor sites were characterized by driver versus passenger side, top versus bottom panel, and narrow lanes versus wide lanes as observed for a large number of vehicles. Each portal site appears to have a distinctive baseline suppression signature, based on percent maximum suppression relative to measured background. Results suggest that alarm algorithms based on gross-counts may be further refined through attention to individual site characteristics. In addition, longer vehicle transit times were often correlated with stronger baseline suppression, suggesting that baseline suppression studies should take transit time into account. KEY ELEMENTS OF PREPARING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM John W. Poston, Sr., Steven M. Becker, Brooke Buddemeier, Jerrold T. Bushberg, John J. Cardarelli, W. Craig Conklin, Brian Dodd, John R. Frazier, Fun H. Fong, Jr., Ronald E. Goans, Ian S. Hamilton, Richard T. Kouzes, Jonathan M. Links, Phil L. Liotta, Fred A. Mettler, Jr., Terry C. Pellmar, Leticia S. Pibida, Michael J. Puzziferri, Carson A. Riland, Joseph P. Ring, Thomas M. Seed, James M. Smith, Robert C. Whitcomb, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Commentary SC2-1, December 31, 2005. COMPARISON OF PLASTIC AND NAI(TL) SCINTILLATORS FOR VEHICLE PORTAL MONITOR APPLICATIONS D.C. Stromswold, E.R. Siciliano, J.E. Schweppe, J.H. Ely, B.D. Milbrath, R.T. Kouzes, B.D. Geelhood, W.K. Hensley, Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE Volume 2, 1925 Oct. 2003 Page(s): 10651069 Vol. 2. DISCRIMINATION OF NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PLASTIC SCINTILLATOR MATERIAL (also listed with refereed journals) James Ely, Richard Kouzes, Bruce Geelhood, John Schweppe, Ray Warner, Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE Volume 2, 1925 Oct. 2003 Page(s): 14531457 Vol. 2. IEEE NSS Portland.

NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AND MEDICAL ISOTOPES AT BORDER CROSSINGS Richard Kouzes, James Ely, Bruce Geelhood, Randy Hansen, Elwood Lepel, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, Dan Strom, Ray Warner, Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE Volume 2, 1925 Oct. 2003 Page(s):14481452 Vol. 2. OVERVIEW OF PORTAL MONITORING AT BORDER CROSSINGS Bruce Geelhood, James Ely, Randy Hansen, Dick Kouzes, John Schweppe, Ray Warner, Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2003 IEEE Volume 1, 1925 Oct. 2003 Page(s): 513517 Vol. 1. HOMELAND SECURITY INSTUMENTATION FOR RADIATION DETECTION AT BORDERS Richard Kouzes, James Ely, Randy Hansen, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, David Stromswold, American Nuclear Society, Columbus, OH (September 19, 2004). DATA-BASED CONSIDERATIONS IN PORTAL RADIATION MONITORING OF CARGO VEHICLES Dennis Weier, James Ely, Robert OBrien, Richard Kouzes Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, FL (July 2004). FIELD TEST OF A NAI(TL)-BASED VEHICLE PORTAL MONITOR AT A BORDER CROSSING D.C. Stromswold, B.D. Milbrath, D.L. Stephens, L.C. Todd, R.R. Hansen, R.T. Kouzes, IEEE NSS Conference Record (2004). Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2004 IEEE Volume 1, 1622 Oct. 2004 Page(s): 196200 PIET-43741-TM-187, COMPARISON OF NAI(TL) SCINTILLATORS AND HIGH PURITY GERMANIUM FOR VEHICLE PORTAL MONITOR APPLICATIONS J.H. Ely, E.R. Siciliano, and R.T. Kouzes, IEEE NSS Conference Record (2004). Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, 2004 IEEE Volume 3, 1622 Oct. 2004 Page(s): 15841587. RADIATION DETECTION AT BORDERS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Richard Kouzes, PNNL-SA-40234, Physics and Society 33, p. 13, July 2004. TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETECTION OF CONTRABAND Daniel J. Strom, Richard Kouzes, Presented at the 38th Health Physics Society Midyear Meeting on Material Control and Security: Risk Assessment, Handling and Detection, New Orleans, 1316 February 2005. SPECTROSCOPIC AND NON-SPECTROSCOPIC RADIATION PORTAL APPLICATIONS TO BORDER SECURITY Richard Kouzes, James Ely, Brian Milbrath, John Schweppe, Edward Siciliano, David Stromswold, Presented at the 2005 IEEE DHS R&D Conference, Boston, MA, 2728 April 2005. RADIATION PORTAL MONITOR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND PROCESSING Mitchell Woodring, James Ely, Edward Ellis, Robert Burnett, Terri Mercier, Presented at the 2005 IEEE DHS R&D Conference, Boston, MA, 2728 April 2005. INVESTIGATIONS OF ENERGY WINDOWING FOR PLASTIC-BASED RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS James Ely, Richard Kouzes, Dennis Weier, Mitch Woodring, John Schweppe, Presented at the 2005 IEEE DHS R&D Conference, Boston, MA, 2728 April 2005.

FIELD TESTS OF A NAI(TL)-BASED VEHICLE PORTAL MONITOR AT BORDER CROSSINGS B.D. Milbrath, D.C. Stromswold, J.W. Darkoch, J.H. Ely, R.R. Hansen, R.T. Kouzes, R.C Runkle, W.A. Sliger, J.E. Smart, D.L. Stephens, L.C. Todd, M.L Woodring, Presented at the 2005 IEEE DHS R&D Conference, Boston, MA, 2728 April 2005. PERFORMANCE OF ENERGY WINDOW RATIO CRITERIA AT RADIATION PORTAL MONITORING SITES Dennis Weier, Richard Kouzes, James Ely, Mitch Woodring, Derrick Bates, Charles LoPresti, July 2005 INMM, Phoenix, AZ. CREATION OF REALISTIC MODELS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY PURPOSES S.M. Robinson, R. Kouzes, R.J. McConn Jr., R. Pagh, J.E. Schweppe, and E.R. Siciliano, April 28, 2005. Proceedings of DHS conference Research & Development Partnerships in Homeland Security, Boston, April 2728, 2005. COMPUTER MODELING OF RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS AT THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY R.T. Pagh, R.T. Kouzes, R.J. McConn, Jr., S.M. Robinson, J.E. Schweppe, and E.R. Siciliano, Proceedings of American Nuclear Society Conference, Washington, DC, November 1317, 2005. SPECTROSCOPIC AND NON-SPECTROSCOPIC RADIATION PORTAL APPLICATIONS TO BORDER SECURITY R.T. Kouzes, J.H. Ely, B.D. Milbrath, J.E. Schweppe, E.R. Siciliano, D.C. Stromswold IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NSS San Juan Conference Record N14-12 321-325 (2005). SPECTROSCOPIC PORTAL MONITOR PROTOTYPE Kathy McCormick, David Stromswold, James Ely, John Schweppe and Richard Kouzes, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NSS San Juan Conference Record N14-4 292-296 (2005). VALIDATION OF COMPUTER MODELS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY PURPOSES J.E. Schweppe, J.H. Ely, R.T. Kouzes, R.J. McConn, Jr., R.T. Pagh, S.M. Robinson, and E.R. Siciliano, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NSS San Juan Conference Record N14-5 297-301 (2005). COMPARISON OF LaBr3:Ce And NaI(Tl) SCINTILLATORS FOR RADIO-ISOTOPE IDENTIFICATION DEVICES Brian D. Milbrath, Bethany J. Choate, James E. Fast, Richard T. Kouzes, John E. Schweppe, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science NSS San Juan Conference Record N14-1 283-287 (2005). COMPUTER MODELING OF RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY APPLICATIONS R.T. Pagh, R.T. Kouzes, R.J. McConn, Jr., S.M. Robinson, J.E. Schweppe, and E.R. Siciliano, Proceedings of ANS Conference, July 2005. THE ROLE OF SPECTROSCOPY VERSUS DETECTION FOR BORDER SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS R. Kouzes, J. Ely, MARC VII Conference Record, Kona, HI, April 37, 2006. THE USE OF ENERGY INFORMATION IN PLASTIC SCINTILLATOR MATERIAL James Ely, Richard Kouzes, Denny Weier, MARC VII Conference Record, Kona, HI, April 37, 2006. IMPROVED PERFORMANCE OF ENERGY WINDOW RATIO CRITERIA OBTAINED USING MULTIPLE WINDOWS AT RADIATION PORTAL MONITORING SITES Dennis Weier, Charles LoPresti, James Ely, Derrick Bates, Richard Kouzes, July 2006 INMM, Nashville, TN.

Testing and Analyzing Instrumentation and Procedures for Radiation Detection and Identification
P. Beck, G. Sdouz Austrian Research Centers GmbH ARC Starting on November 2003 the Austrian Research Centers GmbH ARC (formerly ARC Seibersdorf research GmbH) had a Cooperative Research Agreement (CRA) with the IAEA. The topic of the Cooperative Research Agreement was Testing and analyzing instrumentation and procedures for radiation detection and identification. The scope of the participation on the CRP depended on the available resources of ARC. Amongst others following research subject were recommended: - Detection limits for SNM detection in presence of medical and other isotopes at a field test side: Analysis of the alarm frequency for medical isotopes - Model border crossing point at the Vienna Airport: Present and workout strategies together with the IAEA to implement the ITRAP-Airport project as a Model border crossing point study. - Contribute to development and test of IAEA specification document - Develop and test specifications for the new generation of spectral pedestrian monitors to be incorporated into the IAEA specification document. - Analysis of Nuclear Material and other radioactive materials from outside of standardized nuclear container, An overview on ARCs activities in the area of Illicit Trafficking was presented during IAEAs Research Coordination Meeting by G. Sdouz in April 2006. During the time period of this CRA, a number of papers and documents to this topic were published. A list of relevant documents are provided below. Bibliography of Related Reports Co-Authored by Peter Beck Arlt R., Swoboda M., Boeck H., Schrenk, Beck P., et al., Automated Flagging of Innocent Radiation Alarms at Airport Pedestrian Monitors, Paper presented in Budapest, 22.24.9.2003 Beck P., HiSEM High Sensitive Monitoring, Paper presented at University Vienna, FONAS Conference, Vienna, 17.9.2003 Beck P., International Nuclear Threat and Radiation Detection in the Field, Paper presented at Federal Ministry of Defence, ROTA Training, Korneuburg, 14.3.2003

Beck P., Border Monitoring Experience, Austria, Paper presented at IAEA Meeting Technical Specifications of Border Monitoring Equipment, VIC, Vienna, 17.3.2003 Beck P., ITRAP-Airport, Paper presented at SIAGIT Meeting, Ministry of Trade and Labour, Vienna, 16.1.2004 Beck P., Illicit Trafficking nuklearer Stoffe Internationale Bedeutung und Manahmen der Kontrolle, Paper presented at Ministry of Interior, Vienna, 17.2.2004 Beck P., Reichart F., Klsch W., Stehno G., ITRAP-Airport, Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Programme, ARCS Report ARC Sr G0001, April 2004 Beck P., International Nuclear Threat and Radiation Detection in the Field, Paper presented at Federal Ministry of Defence, ROTA Training, Korneuburg, 10.5.2004 Beck P., Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Material, Paper presented at IAEATraining Course, Vienna, 5.7.2004 Beck P., Aktueller Status und Zukunft von ITRAP in sterreich, Paper presented at SIAGIT Meeting, Federal Ministry of Trade and Labour, Vienna, 29.10.2004 Beck P., Prevention of Radiation and Nuclear Terrorism, Paper presented at NATO-Advanced Study Institute, Geilo, Norway, 14.17.April 2005 Schwaiger M., Nuclear and Radiological Detection Equipment Technology Review and Requirements, Paper presented at IMPACT WP300 Meeting, TNO, Rijswijk, Netherlands, 13.9.2005 Schwaiger M., Beck P., International Nuclear Threat and Radiation Detection in the Field, Paper presented at Federal Ministry of Defence, ROTA Training, Korneuburg, 28.11.2006

Capacity Building for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials
M. Melich HUMA-LAB APEKO Ltd.,Kosice, Slovakia Under the Research Agreement a National Intercepting System for radioactive contaminated Materials was developed. It consists of the following elements: The real time information system ILTRAM, detection equipment and detection response procedures. To guarantee smooth operation, the responsibilities of different state organizations needed to be defined and the information exchange was initiated. The emerging system was discussed in several national and international workshops and seminars. Participants came from the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic (SR), the Customs Directorate, Ministry of Economy, Slovenske Elektrarne, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the State Fund for Decommissioning of NPP, the Office of Civil Protection, the police and other. Development and implementation were complemented by training courses with participation of customs coordinators and officers from the Customs Criminal Unit. The training covered radiation protection, response plans, detection equipment and its technical parameters, practical exercises with hand-held instruments, practical operation of the information system ILTRAM, and training of the response to different scenarios. Special effort was paid also to the training of the coordination of the cooperation between different parties involved: Customs Directorate, Customs Criminal Unit, Presidium of the Police Force, Office of Civil Protection of the Ministry of Interior, Laboratory of Radiochemical Analyses (SLRA), Slovenske Elektrarne, APEKO. In the training the functioning of the whole system was demonstrated, including the response to illicit trafficking.

Detection of Nuclear Materials, Including Concealed Highly Enriched Uranium, using Enhanced Detection Methods
J.L. Jones, D.R. Norman Idaho National Laboratory Idaho National Laboratory (INL) had a representative at all three Research Coordination Meetings (RCMs) of the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials. During the RCMs the challenges associated with detecting masked or shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU) using passive detection systems were highlighted. Active interrogation methods were considered to address some of these detection challenges. One of the active methods considered was the Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) method being developed at INL in collaboration with Idaho State Universitys Idaho Accelerator Center (IAC) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [13]. The PPA method relies on unique signatures generated from photoninduced fission emissions from nuclear materials. An illustration of a basic PPA inspection system is shown in Figure 1. The major components of the system include a pulsed high energy (> 8 MeV) electron accelerator beam producing bremsstrahlung x-rays, delayed neutron and gamma-ray detectors, and a gray scale mapping system.

Figure 1. An illustration of a basic Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment System.

During this CRP a committee member, Dr. Rolf Arlt, visited the INL for a demonstration of the PPA method at the IAC. During this demonstration 5 kg of depleted uranium was detected inside 5 cm (2 in) of lead at a standoff distance of 8 meters (26 ft) within 120 seconds. The CRP committee invited INL to provide a presentation on this PPA method during a 2004 RCM meeting in Sochi Russia. As requested, a presentation PPAT for the Detection of Nuclear Materials, including Shielded Highly Enriched Uranium (presentation available in RCM minutes) was given at the October 2004 RCM meeting highlighting the basic technology and the current status of the PPA Cargo Inspection prototype system. During the question and answer section after the presentation, Dr. Maxim Karetnikov from the Russian Kurchatov Institute commented that they were working on photonuclear detection techniques also, and had very positive results. Also during the Sochi meeting, contacts with several other detector experts and others that use active methods were made. During the third and final CRP meeting held April 2006 at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna Austria, it was highlighted on multiple occasions including the meeting summary that many of the challenges of detecting nuclear materials could be addressed with active interrogation methods. Also during this meeting Dr. Karetnikov and Daren Norman identified areas of common research interests and initiated a follow on meeting that included a tour of the INL and IAC facilities in the United States. A prototype PPA Cargo Inspection System, shown in Figure 2, was assembled and characterized [46]. It measures delayed neutron and gamma-ray emissions for nuclear material detection, and utilizes transmission gray scale mapping to identify any significant shielding. This prototype detection system has demonstrated the ability to detect nuclear materials concealed in several INL Cargo Calibration Pallets. In Figure 2, a forklift has just set a metric-ton polyethylene calibration pallet with concealed nuclear material into the PPA inspection system. Other calibration pallets include borated polyethylene, lead, iron, wood, celotex, water and a 4.5 metric-ton nested lead in borated polyethylene pallet. Current areas of research and development for the PPA method include prompt emission and standoff detection to improve nuclear material detection capabilities. Some PPA performance improvements have been identified, such as using higher energies [7]. When considering the PPA methods for cargo inspection systems it is important to remember that the World Health Organization (WHO) would not exclude higher photon energies (> 10 MeV) inspections. The WHO document for photon inspection of foods states; [8] However, this conclusion is not intended to preclude other safe surveillance systems designed to operate at higher energy levels or dose. In such cases, assurance should be provided that, at the point of consumption, food would not contain a measurable detectable amount of induced radioactivity.

Figure 2. INL Prototype PPA Cargo Inspection System. The PPA method can provide efficient nuclear material detection and identification even in heavily shielded or masked configurations. As PPA methods continue to be developed they could address primary screening needs as well as secondary screening for alarm resolution. This CRP provided the opportunity to address the importance of shielded and masked nuclear material detection on an international basis. Collaborations with international colleagues are beginning to address common concerns and interests. New CRPs in nuclear material detection related areas could provide additional national and international benefits. REFERENCES [1] J.L. Jones, et al., Pulsed Photoneutron Interrogation: The GNT Demonstration System, INL Report WINCO-1225, 1994 [2] J.L. Jones, et al., Proof-of-Concept Assessment of a Photofission-Based Interrogation System for the Detection of Shielded Nuclear Material, INL Report INEEL/EXT2000-01523, 2000 [3] J.L. Jones, et al., Photofission-based, Nuclear Material Detection: Technology Demonstration, INL Report INEEL/EXT-02-01406 3

[4] J.L. Jones, et al., Detection of Shielded nuclear material in a cargo container, NIM A 562, pp 1085-1088, 2006 [5] J.L. Jones, et al., Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) Technique: CY-05 Project Summary Report, INL Report INL/EXT-05-01020, 2005 [6] J.L. Jones, et al., Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) Technique: CY04 Year-end Progress Report, INL Report INEEL/EXT-05-02583, 2005 [7] D.R. Norman, et al., Inspection applications with higher electron beam energies, NIM B 241, pp 787792, 2005 [8] Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 31, pp. 297301, 1990

Inspection of Shipping Containers for Undisclosed Radioactive Materials

V. Valkovic, S. Blagus, D. Sudac Department of Experimental Physics, Rudjer Boskovic Institute (RBI), Croatia

The objective of this project was to develop a conceptual design of a system for inspection of shipping containers, in order to determine if they contain radioactive materials, or other hazardous chemicals such as explosives (which are carbon-rich materials).

A neutron beam interrogation system was set up in a laboratory. The neutron was obtained by means of the d+t a + n reaction; the associated alpha particle was fixed in

such a way that the neutron beam was in the horizontal plane at 90o to the deuteron beam. The neutron tagged in this way was then expected to interact with the interrogated object, and produce radiation by A(n, n )A processes on nuclei of hidden substances. Test results indicated that a hidden carbon-rich source (e.g. TNT) could be localized and identified even when hidden behind steel. These results serve as a proof-of-principle that objects hidden inside a closed container can be located and identified by their chemical composition by using such a neutron sensor. It is expected that similar positive results could be demonstrated for shielded HEU.

Characterization of Various Survey Meters through Car-Borne Survey in Java Island as a Basis Data for Searching Orphan Sources
U. Pande Made, A. Yus Rusdian Center for Nuclear Material Security National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), Center fir Nuclear Material Security Technology, Indonesia An assessment of available technical means has been performed to select suitable instruments to be used in car borne surveys for the detection and localization of orphan sources. Criteria used for the selection included (i) that the instrument should be simple to operate, (ii) that it should provide reliable results, and (ii) that little time for processing or transferring raw data from the instrument to a desktop computer (for decision making using statistical methods) is required. Based upon these criteria, four hand-held instruments in the BATAN inventory were selected for further study.

Measurements data using these four instruments, taken during a 400 km car-borne survey of western Java, was analyzed. The data was taken both in rainy and clear weather conditions, thus recorded fluctuations from the instrument response (when the vehicle was driven along the same paths in both weather conditions) included variations due washout by the rain of Rn daughters. The data from all instruments was analyzed using various statistical tests to determine the most sensitive instruments (with lowest number of alarm fluctuations) and best statistical analysis technique for finding anomalous radiation levels. Using this data, as well as data from taken during controlled field measurements, it was determined that the best instrument could detect a 7.4 GBq source from as far as 145 m away, when traveling in a car at 50 kph.
137

Cs

Development and Utilization of Nuclear Analytical Techniques for Analysis of Nuclear Forensic Materials
H. Demirel, P. Arikan Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Center, Turkish Atomic Energy Authority When packages are seized at borders and have been identified as containing illicit nuclear or other radiological materials, it is very important to determine the origin of the materials, the last legal user of the materials, and the smuggling route. This is required to (i) close the hole that allowed that material to escape, and (ii) to prosecute the smuggler. Both classic and nuclear forensics techniques are used to answer these questions.

Under this project, laboratories were identified in Turkey to receive suspect radiological or nuclear samples. Considerable work was done to develop the methodology of activities for these laboratories. Work is ongoing to improve (i) the methods of analysis, (ii) legal traceability of the samples, (iii) interpretation of the results, and (iv) the confidential handling of suspect materials.

Development of Recommendations, Guidelines and Methods for Coast-Guard Officers on Measurement using Portable and Hand-Held Isotope Measurement Devices
M. Divizinvuk, Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, Sevastopol, Ukraine

The goal of this contract was to examine the most effective procedures for Coast Guard officers to use for the interception of illicitly smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. Specific equipment tailored for marine use was to be tested. Studies to examine the most efficient placement of radiation monitoring assets were to be made.

Theoretical analysis performed showed that when operative information (e.g. external intelligence) is absent, all ships in a territorial sea must be supervised/examined for possible trafficking issues. Radiation detection devises were placed upon a helicopter, which then flew at 80 km/hr at 100m over land vehicles carrying radioactive sources. Effective detection capability was demonstrated. Based upon this, a conceptual proposal was developed to place such devices on buoys in a water channel to form a floating portal monitoring system.

Research Co-ordination Meeting of the Agencys Co-ordinated Research Project on Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Sochi, Russia Federation, 48 October, 2004 Participants Overview Sheet # 1. COUNTRY AUSTRALIA Contr. # Participants Name 12516 Mr. Dimitri Alexiev Address
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO); Lucas Heights Research Labs., New Illawarra Road, Lucas Heights 2234/ Locked Mailbag No.1, Menai NSW 2234, Australia Tel: +61 2 9717 3182 Fax: +61 2 9717 9265 E-mail: dax@ansto.gov.au

2.

AUSTRIA

12585

Mr. Helmut Boeck

Atominstitut der Oesterreichische Universitaeten (ATI) Rektorabteilung Technische Universitaet Wien, Stadionallee 2, 1020 Vienna, Austria Tel: +43 1 58801 14168 Fax: +431 5880114199 E-mail: boeck@ati.ac.at

3.

AUSTRIA

12586

Mr. Peter Beck

ARC Seibersdorf research GmBH, Health Physics Division A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria Tel: +43 50550 2480 Fax: +43 50550 2502 E-mail: Peter.beck@arcs.ac.at

4.

BELARUS

12587

Mr. Sergey Korneyev

Joint Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research 99, academic A. C. Krasin st. , Minsk, 220109, Belarus Tel: +375 17 2994448 Fax: +375 17 299 4712 E-mail: sk@sosny.bas-net.by

5.

CHINA

12588

Mr. Qingli Zhang

China Institute for Radiation Protection (CIRP), P.O. Box 120, Taiyuan, Shanxi, 030006 Public Republic of China Tel: +86 351 2203461 Fax: +86 351 7020407 E-mail: zhangqing_li@hotmail.com zhangqingli@sina.com

6.

CROATIA

12589

Mr. Vladivoj Valkovic

Ruder Boskovic Institute, Dept of Experimental Physics Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Bijenicka c.54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel: +385 1 468 0101 Fax: +385 1 468 0239 E-mail: valkovic@rudjer.irb.hr

Page 2 7. FRANCE 12590 Mr. JeanLouis Szabo

Commissariat lnergie atomique (CEA); Centre dtudes nuclaires (CEN); Dpt. dinstrumentation et de mtrologie des rayonnements ionisants (DIMRI), B.P. Fontenay aux Roses, France Tel: +33 1 46 547558 Fax: +33 1 46 549942 E-mail: Riadh.cammoun@cea.fr

8.

GEORGIA

12591

Mr. Lerry Meskhi

State Military Scientific and Technical Center DELTA 73, Mnatoby st. 380002, Tbilisi, Georgia Tel: +995 32 955646 Fax: +995 32 956080 E-mail: Delta_ctbilisi@email.com Nuclear and Radioactive Safety Service 87 Paliashvilistr., Tbilisi Georgia Tel: +995 32 251632 E-mail: brus@access.sanet.ge

9.

GERMANY

12517

Mr. Frank Gabriel

Forschungszentrum Rossendorf FZR Postfach 510119, 01314 Dresden, Germany Tel: +49 351 260 3109 Fax: +49 351 260 3110 E-mail: f.gabriel@fz-rossendorf.de

10. GERMANY

12592

Mr. Said Abousahl

European Commission Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements Postfach 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe, Germany Tel: +49 7247 951 259 Fax: +49 7247 951 99545 E-mail: Abousahl@itu.FZK.de

11. GERMANY

12593

Mr. Dietrich E. Bundesamt fr Strahlenschutz (BfS) Becker Willy-Brandt-Strasse 5, 38226 Salzgitter, Germany
Tel: +49 1888 3330 Fax: +49 1888 333 1858 E-mail: Dbecker@bfs.de

12. INDONESIA

12594

Mr. Yus Rusdian Akhmad

National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) Kawasan Puspiptek Serpong Gedung 90, Serpong, Tangerang 15310 Indonesia Tel: +62 21 7560 183 Fax: +62 21 7560 895 E-mail: yusrusdi@batan.go.id

13. ITALY

12518

Mr. Richard Berndt

JRC-Joint Research Centre of the European Union, Institute for the Protection and the Security of Citizens Via Fermi 20, I-21020 Ispra (Va), Italy Tel: +39 (0332) 78 5317 Fax: +39 (0332) 785072 E-mail: reinhard.berndt@jrc.it

Page 3
14. ITALY 12595 Ms. Patricia Mortreau
JRC-Joint Research Centre of the European Union, Institute for the Protection and the Security of Citizens Via Fermi 20, I-21020 Ispra (Va), Italy Tel: +39 0332 78 9211 Fax: +39 0332 78 5072 E-mail: Patricia.Mortreau@jrc.it

15. KOREA

12597

Mr. Jong Uk Lee

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Technology Center for Nucelar Control, Dept. of Nuclear Security & Protection PO Box 105, Yuseong, Daejeon Republic of Korea 305-600 Tel: +82 42 868 8332 Fax: +82 42 861 8819 E-mail: julee@kaeri.re.kr

16. POLAND

12596

Mr. Marek Moszynski

Andrzej Soltan Institute for Nuclear Studies, Dept. of Detectors and Nuclear Electronics PL 05-400 Otwock Swierk Poland Tel: +48 22 718 0586 Fax: +48 22 779 3481 E-mail: marek@ipj.gov.pl

17. RUSSIA

12444

Mr. Nikolay E. Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, Kravchenko Kurchatov Sq. 1, Moscow 123182, Russia
Tel: +7 0951967265 Fax: +7 095 196 60 32 E-mail: Ustatt_kravchenko@mail.customs.ru

18. RUSSIA

12598

Mr. Maxim Karetnikov

Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, Scientific and Technological Division Electronics, Kurchatov Sq. 1, 123182Moscow, Russia Tel: +7 095 196 7265 Fax: +7 095 196 6032 E-mail: mdk@electronics.kiae.ru

19. RUSSIA

12599

Mr. Sergey Ullin

MEPhI Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute Kashirskoe shosse, 31, Moscow 115409, Russia Tel: +7 095 324 65 89 E-mail: ulin@kfl.mephi.ru

20. RUSSIA

12600

Mr. Andrey Kuznetsov

V.G Khlopin Radium Institute, Applied Physics Laboratory 2nd Murinsky pr 28., 194021 St. Petersburg, Russia Tel: +7 812 2470 173 Fax: +7 812 2478 095 E-mail: iste1050@atom.nw.ru

21. RUSSIA

12601

Mr. Aleksandr Borisenko

Russian Customs Academy Vladivostok Branch, 16-V Strelkovaya Street, 690014, Vladivostok, Russia Tel: +7 4232 236 711 Fax: +7 4232 236 711 E-mail: Borisenko2@mail.ru

Page 4
22. RUSSIA 12602 Mr. Michael Majorov
Scientific Engineering Center Nuclear Physics Research, 2nd Murinsky pr. 28, Saint Petersburg, 194021, Russia Tel: +7 812 24739 24 Fax: +7 812 247 82 44 E-mail: yafi@atom.nw.ru

23. SLOVAKIA

12603

Mr. Matous Melich

Huma-Lab Apeko Ltd Spectrometry Lab Letna 45 04001 Kosice, Slowakia Tel. and Fax: +42 1556829254 E-mail: mmelich@kbc.sk

24. TURKEY

12604

Mr. Pervin Arikan

Turkish Atomic Energy Authority Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Centre Besevler TR-06100, Ankara, Turkey Tel: +90 312 2126 230 Fax: +90 312 2234439 E-mail: pervin@taek.gov.tr Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey E-mail 2: pervin@gazi.edu

25. UKRAINE

12606

Mr. Mikhail Divizinyuk

Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, Nuclear Regulatory and Physical Protection Service Kurchatova Str., 99033 Sevastopol, Ukraine Tel: +38 0692 71 0169; +38 0692 71 0046 Fax: +38 0692 71 0138 E-mail: pomrfzas@sinp.com.ua

26. USA

12519

Mr. Richard Kouzes

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 920 Battelle Boulevard, P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA, USA Tel: +1 (509) 376 2320 Fax: +1 (509) 376 3868 E-mail: rkouzes@pnl.gov

27. USA 28. UZBEKISTAN

12812 12607

Mr. James Jones Mr. Vitaly Petrenko

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab. (INEEL), Idaho Falls Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences; Institute of Nuclear Physics Ulugbek Village, Tashkent 702132, Uzbekistan Tel: +10 998 712 6415 52 Fax: +10 998 712 64 25 90 E-mail: yuldashebv@iae.tashkent.su

29. LATVIA

13096

Ms. Larisa Grigorjeva

Institute of Solid State Physics, Riga, Latvia E-mail: igrig@latnet.lv

Usability Guide for Manufacturers of Radiation Monitoring Devices

Document Version: 1.0

Document Number: 42_Useabilty guide IAEA RPT27.doc - 1.0 Date: 11 May 2007 Author: Mike Alexander

Mike Alexander Usability Consultant Himmelstrasse 58 A-1190 Vienna Austria Europe + 43 1 320 8091 Tel: + 43 1 320 8090 Fax: + 43 664 320 8091 Mobile: Email: alexander_michael@csi.com
a

Contents
1. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.3.1. 1.3.2. 1.3.3. 1.4. 1.4.1. 1.4.2. 1.4.3. 2. 2.1 2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.1.3. 2.2. 2.2.1. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.5.1. 2.5.2. 2.5.3. 2.5.4. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6. 3.7. 3.8. 3.9. 4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 5. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 6. 7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................1 What is usability?...........................................................................................................................1 Why is usability important?............................................................................................................1 User Centred Design Principles ....................................................................................................2 Ongoing user-requirements monitoring .....................................................................................2 Focus group ...............................................................................................................................2 User representative in Development..........................................................................................2 What are the benefits?...................................................................................................................3 Understanding the Costs ...........................................................................................................3 Understanding the Benefits........................................................................................................3 Making the Decisions.................................................................................................................3 Managing the usability process .....................................................................................................4 Understanding the different usability activities ..............................................................................4 Usability Review.........................................................................................................................4 Usability Walkthrough ................................................................................................................5 Usability Test..............................................................................................................................6 Product Development ....................................................................................................................7 Development Process................................................................................................................7 Choosing the right process............................................................................................................8 Choosing the right usability activities.............................................................................................9 Getting the most benefit ..............................................................................................................11 Usability Report........................................................................................................................11 Using the Usability Report .......................................................................................................11 Action Document......................................................................................................................12 Using the Action Document .....................................................................................................13 Usability Principles.......................................................................................................................14 User Control.................................................................................................................................14 Consistency .................................................................................................................................16 Navigation Feedback ...................................................................................................................22 Status Feedback..........................................................................................................................24 Progress Feedback......................................................................................................................25 Error Message Feedback ............................................................................................................27 Forgiveness .................................................................................................................................28 Naming ........................................................................................................................................29 Ease of use..................................................................................................................................30 Hardware Usability Guidelines ....................................................................................................32 Handling.......................................................................................................................................32 Controls .......................................................................................................................................33 User control .................................................................................................................................33 Use of Icons.................................................................................................................................34 Multi-language Support: ..............................................................................................................34 Software Usability Guidelines......................................................................................................35 Dialogs.........................................................................................................................................35 Menus ..........................................................................................................................................35 Controls .......................................................................................................................................35 Feedback .....................................................................................................................................35 Error Recovery Support...............................................................................................................35 Multi-language support ................................................................................................................35 Error handling ..............................................................................................................................36 Forgiveness .................................................................................................................................36 Accessibility .................................................................................................................................36 Reading Tips................................................................................................................................37 Checklists ....................................................................................................................................38 Planning Phase Checklist............................................................................................................38 Prototyping Phase Checklist........................................................................................................39 Testing Phase Checklist ..............................................................................................................40 Building Phase Checklist .............................................................................................................41 Hardware Usability Checklist.......................................................................................................42 Software Usability Checklist ........................................................................................................43 ii

1. Introduction
1.1. What is usability?
Usability is like air. Although you need it, you tend not to notice it most of the time. You only begin to notice when it is suddenly missing. The best measure of usability is when a user describes a device, or piece of software as intuitive. They might say things like, I didnt know how to use it, but I just tried, and it worked out right. You know certain things about your users before you can build products that they find intuitive to use. You will need to know things like the following: What is a users motivation for using your product? What sort of formal education can you expect them to have had? What sort of job-specific training can you expect them to have? What previous experience can you reasonably expect your users to have had? What age-range are you addressing with your product? What assort of language abilities will they have?

These factors, amongst others, will determine what you have to do to build a product that your users find intuitive to use. You must know the answers to these questions before you can build a product that suits them.

1.2. Why is usability important?

It all boils down to a question of money. There are business reasons for investing in usability because bad usability costs money. Lets have a look at some of the costs. Education Costs: If a product is not intuitive to use, it will be necessary for potential users to receive some kind of training, and training cost money in these ways: Instructor salaries Lost productivity as students attend courses Maybe even travel and/or hotel expenses Turnover Costs: If your user population has a fast turnover, your educations costs will be ongoing over the life of the system. Error and Error-recovery Costs: If a product is not intuitive to use, users may make the wrong choices or get unexpected results as they work, and they will have to recover from the errors they have made. Error recovery can take different forms, but each form costs money. Here are some examples of where the money is lost: Calling a help desk Asking a colleague Trial and error Whichever method is used, the incorrect work has to be undone, and then be done properly. The productivity of users is therefore unnecessarily low which, in itself costs money. If usability can be improved, these ongoing and hidden costs can reduced or avoided altogether.

1.3. User Centred Design Principles

The best complement a product can receive is when its users describe it using comments like, intuitive, easy, friendly, simple-to-use, and helpful. To build a product having these qualities, it is essential to involve people who can view problems from the users perspective and who understand the users point of view.

1.3.1. Ongoing user-requirements monitoring

While a usability professional can do this to some extent, and it is recommended practise to involve usability professionals, the best people to represent the users interests are the users themselves. Design activities should therefore be centred around a group of representative users, and there should be permanent checking and re-checking with this group that the design continues to address their needs in a way that they find acceptable.

1.3.2. Focus group

A group of vocal potential end users, sometimes known as a focus group should be given the opportunity of contributing to user requirements, criticising ongoing design works, and trying out prototypes.

1.3.3. User representative in Development

Input from the focus group must be documented and a member of the development team should have the responsibility of ensuring that users input flows smoothly into the development process and is properly responded to. This person is also responsible to scheduling events such as walkthroughs1 and usability tests2 at the appropriate times.

1 2

Walkthroughs are explained in detail on page 5. Usability tests are explained in detail on page 6. 2

1.4. What are the benefits?

1.4.1. Understanding the Costs

To perform usability activities and to follow up on their outcomes, certain resources will be needed that fall into the following categories: Time resources Personnel resources Financial resources (constrained by project deadlines) (constrained by staffing levels) (constrained by available budget)

For any usability activity to be worthwhile there must be a return on this investment and it is important to understand where and when this return on investment will occur. The benefits will not be felt during project development. On the contrary, it is during development that usability investments are made. Summary: Usability activities cost money to perform.

1.4.2. Understanding the Benefits

The benefits will be felt throughout the expected life of the product perhaps a period of 5 or more years. Successful usability activities and appropriate follow-up during project development will produce a product that is easier to learn, more intuitive to use, and simpler to maintain. The savings during the products life will occur in the following ways: Shortened user-training times Reduced need for help desks and other support facilities Less time wasted as users recover from errors they have made Improved user confidence and, therefore, improved user productivity Less maintenance required for correcting initial system design errors. Summary: Properly performed usability activities have the potential to make great savings over the life of the product.

1.4.3. Making the Decisions

The budget for product development and the budget for daily operations are often not managed by the same function. It is therefore important that the decision to perform usability activities is made by a function that is sensitive to the overall budget requirements and appreciates that a comparatively small investment during development will be saved many times over during ongoing daily operations.

2. Managing the usability process

2.1. Understanding the different usability activities
There are three basic usability activities that can help in building more easy to use instruments: Usability Review Usability Walkthrough Usability Test It is important to understand the differences between the activities and when in the development process they can bring you the most advantage. The activities are described in detail below:

2.1.1. Usability Review

This is an economical usability activity where the usability professional, assisted by a product specialist, examines design proposals, a prototype, or a previous version of the product, and reports on concerns and opportunities for improvement.

When to use: At project initiation time During design the stage Before investment is made in construction While designs are still flexible Advantages: Quick and cheap to perform Gives immediate results Checklist helps track issues during development Disadvantages: End users are not directly involved Some end-user requirements may therefore be overlooked Resources: Product specialist Usability professional (2 days) (7 days) including report preparation

Deliverables: Hard- and softcopy report of all concerns found Rationale explaining the reason for each concern Suggested alternative implementations for discussion Checklist for the on-going management of the usability concerns.

2.1.2. Usability Walkthrough

This is a professional usability activity where a product specialist presents design proposals or a prototype to a group of potential users. The usability professional takes note of user concerns, and reports on opportunities for improvement.

When to use: When a paper or physical prototype of key functions is available During design the stage Before major investment is made in construction While designs are still flexible Advantages: User feedback goes directly to the development team Gives immediate results Checklist helps track issues during development Disadvantages: Presentation requires preparation and rehearsal Planning and coordination of attendees necessary Hosting of attendees necessary Resources: Product specialist Potential end users Usability professional (2 days) includes rehearsal (1 day each) (7 days) including report preparation

Deliverables: Hard- and softcopy report of all concerns found Rationale explaining the reason for each concern Suggested alternative implementations for discussion Checklist for the on-going management of the usability concerns.

2.1.3. Usability Test

This is a professional usability activity where potential users individually perform key tasks while being observed by a usability professional and a product specialist. The usability professional takes note of difficulties and user concerns, and reports on opportunities for improvement.
When to use: When design is relatively firm Before system is made generally available While there is still the possibility to make system changes Advantages: You can see how the system will perform under real conditions Checklist helps you track issues up to delivery and on to next release Disadvantages: Is relative expensive to perform Requires careful preparation Planning and coordination of attendees necessary Hosting of attendees necessary Resources: Product specialist (5 days) Potential end users ( day each) Usability professional (25 days) including planning, set-up and report preparation Two adjacent offices where TV equipment can be installed Deliverables: Hard- and softcopy report of all concerns found Rationale explaining the reason for each concern Suggested alternative implementations for discussion Checklist for the on-going management of the usability concerns.

2.2. Product Development

2.2.1. Development Process

While development processes may differ from organisation to organisation, they can generally be divided into phases, as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. Planning Prototyping Testing Building

The phases are described below: Planning Phase (1): In the planning phase, product plans are drawn up and information of the following kind will be gathered: What are we going to build? What will the main functions be? What kinds of users are we aiming at? How much is this project going to cost? How much profit are we likely to make? Prototyping Phase (2): In the prototyping phase, product ideas will be tried out using paper prototypes or inexpensive software prototyping tools. Testing Phase (3): In the testing phase, the designs will be checked until a stable design that can be put into production is achieved. Building Phase (4): The building phase is the most expensive phase. Project staffing levels increase as programmers and/or engineers join the project to create the finished product. Here is a diagram that shows how the phases generally differ in duration.

2.3. Choosing the right process

There have been different philosophies as to the best development process, and the process any particular organisation uses will be influenced, in part, by the type of product they build. In the waterfall process, which was widely used in the early days of the computing industry for building software, each phase had to be successfully completed before the next phase could begin, as shown below:

This process has the disadvantage that, once the design has been frozen, it is difficult to respond to requirements that may become apparent only in the later phases. The iterative design process was developed to combat this. In the iterative design process, progress is generally in a forward direction, but iterations into previous phases can be made as the need becomes apparent, as shown below:

From the usability point of view, this process has the great advantage that it allows the development team to respond to design flaws and also user-requirements that become apparent later in the process. The disadvantage is that it needs careful management to ensure that, despite the iterations, the planned schedules are still maintained.

2.4. Choosing the right usability activities

In the diagram below, two curves are plotted against the duration of a given project to show the following two parameters: Ability to accommodate change Cost of making changes

As can be seen above, as projects progress, the ability to accommodate change diminishes, and the cost of making changes to work that is already in-place, increases. So, to get the best benefit out of any usability work, it is important to schedule the right activity at the right time. In the Planning Phase (1), the ability to make change is high, and the costs of making changes are low. This is therefore a good time to do a usability review of a previous version or of the present designs. This activity will deliver requests for change, but at a time when they can be accommodated easily, so your final product benefit greatly. In the Prototyping Phase (2), there is still flexibility to make change and the cost of change, although rising, is not prohibitively high. This is therefore a good time to do a usability walkthrough with a paper or real prototype to get user feedback on your designs. This activity will generate requirements and user comments that will influence product design and will enable you to enter the next phase with a relatively stable design. In the Testing Phase (3), the ability to make changes is becoming limited and the impact of any change is also rising. If the previous usability work was performed properly, it should have revealed the major problems and fixes should now be in place. This is a good time to do a usability test to confirm that your design is correct before entering the final stage where your resources are concentrated on building the final product. In the Building Phase (4), the ability to make change is severely limited and the costs of making change are generally prohibitive. Usability activities this late will, therefore, not deliver data that can be used in the current development. Such data are only useful for a subsequent releases or later modifications to the product.

In summary, here are the suggested timings to get the best advantage from usability activities:

10

2.5. Getting the most benefit

Each usability activity will produce documentation showing the current usability status. To get the most benefit from any usability activity, it is important to understand what the documentation offers and how you can best use it to improve the product.

2.5.1. Usability Report

The usability report gives detailed information on the completion of a usability activity and contains the following major items: Activity description: Management Summary: Observations: A description of the usability activity that gave rise to the report A management-level summary of the main items resulting from the activity Details of each usability item found

A sample observation is shown below:

Identification number Severity indicator

Problem summary

5.1.3 (1) Possible Confusion Between Full-charge and Failure

See also 5.1.24 (3) Charge Not Shown When Instrument Turned Off

Problem details Rationale: If equipment can have different states and these states influence the way a user may use it, it is good practice to provide users with feedback of the current state. Certainly users would need to know the difference between a fully charged instrument and a defect one. Background information Suggested Alternative Implementation: Consider implementing the LED to show the all the possible states of the charging function, as follows: Suggested improvement LED permanently on Instrument is fully charged LED blinking Instrument is charging LED off Instrument is not charging

Observation: When the instrument is fully charged, the Charging LED switches off. If the charger circuit failed the LED would also be off, and a user may think an instrument is fully charged when, in fact, it is defect.

Cross-references where appropriate

2.5.2. Using the Usability Report

The report will be used by the following people for the following purposes: Management: Project management: Developers: To understand the current usability status and to allocate resources To allocate resources effectively To develop appropriate solutions to users problems

11

2.5.3. Action Document

On the completion of a usability activity, the action document lists the problems found, as shown in the excerpt below:

Identification number

Problem summary Cross reference to details in usability report Intended action to address the problem.
(explained below)

Severity indicator

Item 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.1.6 5.1.7 5.1.8

Description (1) Dose Rate Display Is Difficult To Interpret (1) Warning And Alarm Settings Not Shown (1) Possible Confusion Between Full-charge and Failure (1) Warning And Alarm Values Difficult To Set (1) Invalid Dates Can Be Set (1) Some Dates Are More Difficult To Set (1) Date Format Cannot Be Changed (1) Some Times Are More Difficult To Set

Page A 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

and so on

The columns (A, B, C, etc) are used to document the intended actions to rectify the reported problem. Since the possible actions are project-dependent, the columns are initially blank. A round-table meeting (usually involving at least, project management, development, and a usability professional) is held to agree on appropriate actions to address each of the usability items reported. The result of the meeting will be a completed action document that could look like this:

Column A B C D E

Action or comment Has already been addressed Will be addressed in next prototype planned for week 24 Alternative solutions will be prototyped and shown to user group for comment Needs investigating Chris will report back in next weeks progress meeting Not yet feasible postponed to a future release These project-specific Description actions are developed in a round-table Difficult (1) Dose Rate Display Ismeeting To Interpret (1) Warning And Alarm Settings Not Shown (1) Possible Confusion Between Full-charge and Failure (1) Warning And Alarm Values Difficult To Set Each usability item is allocated (1) Invalid Dates Can Be Set an appropriate action (1) Some Dates Are More Difficult To Set during the round-table meeting (1) Date Format Cannot Be Changed (1) Some Times Are More Difficult To Set

Item 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.1.6 5.1.7 5.1.8

Page A 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

12

2.5.4. Using the Action Document

The action document will be used by the following people for the following purposes: Management: Project management: Developers: To understand the current usability status and to allocate resources For on-going monitoring of the usability status To agree on strategies for developing solutions to users problems

As usability items are addressed, the action document has to be updated and re-circulated to its users. This is usually done by the project manager who uses the Action Document to communicate the current usability status to all concerned. Summary: The Action Document is a living document that shows the usability status of the product at all times. Efficient use of the Action document will enable management, project management, and development personnel to be informed of usability progress as the project advances towards final completion.

13

3. Usability Principles
There are various usability principles that, if adhered to, will help you produce a product whose users describe it as easy-to-use, intuitive, and helpful. As we have seen, a usable product is more economical to operate so, paying attention to these principles while designing your product will not only please your users, but will help them do their work more economically. Everything we do should have the underlying aim of using the available resources efficiently to provide users with the best tool possible. The principles detailed in this section will guide you in this aim. The usability principles can be categorised into the following groups: User control Consistency Feedback Forgiveness Visual Presentation Naming The principles are described in detail below. There are also some sample implementations, which have then been re-engineered to illustrate the usability principle.

3.1. User Control

It is important that users feel they are in control at all times. This means that the interface operates as a result of user requests. Users should never feel the interface is driving them and the system should never perform an operation without the expressed wish of the user. A sample dialogue:

Users are offered no choice They must wait for the installation process to complete They have apparently no control over the system for the moment An example of improved usability: Step 1:

Users have a choice If they select Yes the process continues

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Step2:

Even though the process has started, users can interrupt it if they need to. For example because a higher priority task has to be done, or it is just time for them to go home If the activity is expected to take a long time, foe example more than 4 seconds, a progress indicator should also be used. See details in 3.5 Progress Feedback on page 25. Advantages of improved user control: If users retain control at all times, the system is more likely to be doing what they want. This means that users are less likely to waste time in interrupting and recovering from the consequences of unwanted operations.

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3.2. Consistency
Be consistent! It sounds very simple but, as a product grows, it is very easy for functions to be given names by one development group, and similar functions, developed by a different group, to be given a different name. This would explain why, for example, we find applications that have functions like these: Erase Delete Purge Each of these functions causes some object or other to exist no more. They all do the same thing and in they do it in the same way but are called by different names. They could all be called Delete, because that is what they do. However, because of failing communication between the development teams, the differing terms have evolved and acquired meaning with each team. The usability principle is as follows: Things that are the same should be named the same, look the same, and behave the same. Things that are intrinsically different should be named differently, and also look different to reduce the possibility of confusion. Note: There is no need to make things that are intrinsically different behave differently. In fact it is good to keep interactions as similar as possible because, having learnt one interaction, users can easily go on to use other similar functions without any training. The advantage of consistency is that the education overhead is reduced. Once users have learned to use a particular function, they are able to use that knowledge wherever they encounter the function in the product. If the functions were named differently, users may assume there is a difference and will waste time in trying to understand the differences. As in most usability matters, it comes down to a question of saving time and money. A sample dialogue: Let us assume an instrument employs a system of menus to allow users to navigate around its functions and to select the various functions. To navigate the hierarchy and to choose a function, the following navigation choices will be necessary: Up Down Select Let us also assume the instrument has a display and is provided with three function buttons, as follows:

The function buttons A, B, and C are used to access all the functions that the instrument offers. Since there are considerably more than three functions, the current use of each button is shown in the respective dialogue. This gives total flexibility. 16

Sample menus: In this example, the Down and Select functions are allocated to the function buttons as shown:

Because Down and Select functions are located on different keys in the two menus, users must refer to each menu every time they use it to find out which function is allocated to which key. Also, if this instrument is to be used by an international audience, the letters A, B, C, of the Latin alphabet may not be familiar to them so, while they would learn it in time, they would have difficulty in communicating this information amongst their peers. To illustrate the problem more graphically, here is the same instrument with a keyboard that is probably foreign to you:

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Sample of improved usability:

The up function is on the + button in all menus The down function is on the - button in all menus The select function is on the * button on all menus The habits of use developed while using one menu are applicable to all menus The + and - symbols are more likely to be intuitively understood by an international audience The function + and - buttons can also be used to increment values up and down, and to move pointers etc in an intuitive way. Any choices that cannot be intuitively associated with a + or a - are offered as menu choices that are selected with the * button. Whatever the native language of users, they will have names for the plus, minus, and star symbols and so will be able to talk about them effectively in their own language. Screen space is not used to explain the function of the buttons so more space is available for other uses.

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Sample Dialogue: Let us assume an instrument that has a function to show the ambient radiation as follows: Scale gives visual indication of numerical value

(A)
Numerical value shown in easy-to- read numbers

Maximum value clearly shown here

Units of measure clearly shown here

As the dose rate increases, the number increases and the sliding scale moves further to the right.

If the instrument is moved, the display updates and might look as shown below:

Scale gives visual indication of the new reading

(B)
Numerical value again shown in easy-to-read numbers

Maximum value revised and clearly shown here

Units of measure again shown clearly here

Comparing examples (A) and (B): Although the radiation has increased from 83 n Sv/h to 132 n Sv/h, the slider actually moved to the left because the slider range was dynamically changed by the instrument from 100 to 1000.

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If the instrument is again moved, the display might look as shown below:

Scale gives visual indication of the new reading

(C)
Numerical value again shown in easy-to- read numbers

Maximum value clearly shown here

Units of measure revised and again shown clearly here

Comparing examples (A) and (C): Although the radiation has increased by a factor of 300.000, the slider actually moves back to the left because the value changed from 83 to 26. However, the units of measure were dynamically changed by the instrument from nSv/h to mSv/h. The subtle change of n to m could be overlooked by users.

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Sample of improved usability:

All increases in radiation produce increases in the same direction Small increases are shown by vertical movement Cumulative vertical increases are shown as horizontal movement Shorthand terminology has been introduced for communication between non-technical users For example, A reading of C1 or more indicates a life-threatening dosage. Units are written out in words nano, micro, milli to allow non-technical users to communicate with technical users. Advantages of improved consistency: Users are less likely to overlook potentially dangerous situations Users can develop habits of use that allow them to become expert in operating the equipment. As their expertise increases, they will need less time to perform a given task. They also gain confidence, which allows them to concentrate their attention on their job and less on the instrument they are using. Consistency therefore contributes to improved cost/benefit and reduces system running costs as more work can be done with a given manpower resource or, less manpower resource will be necessary to complete a given amount of work.

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3.3. Navigation Feedback

It is often necessary to arrange functions in a hierarchy of menus that users navigate. If users know where they are at any given time, they are more likely to be able to navigate more efficiently. Sample menus I: Here is an example of a menu hierarchy that gives users access to various functions:

The disadvantage of the above example is that on any given menu, users have no indication of where they are in the menu hierarchy. An example of improved usability: In the top right-hand corner, there is an indication of the menus position in the hierarchy.

There is a clear indication of where users are in the hierarchy, and how many steps are necessary to return to the main menu.

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Sample Menus II:

Software choice removed from this menu

Assume that privileged users are given the left-hand menu, and have access to the Software choice. Ordinary users are prevented from accessing the Software choice and it is removed from their menus as shown on the right. An example of improved usability:

Software choice retained, but greyed out

As above, privileged users are given the left-hand menu, and have access to the Software choice. Ordinary users are given the right-hand menu and do not have access to the Software choice, but the choice has not been removed, it has been greyed out. Note On LCD displays that do not support greying out, the choice can be retained but be marked as unavailable with, for example, an asterisk, an X, or the text unavailable. The advantage of leaving a choice in the menu is that any numbering users may have learned or are told by peers (on the phone for example) remains valid no matter whether they are privileged or non-privileged users. Users can also develop interaction habits that remain valid as they progress from ordinary to privileged users. Advantages of improved navigation feedback: Over time, users will remember the IDs of frequently used or otherwise useful functions, and will be able to navigate to them without needing to carefully read the menu prompts. This increased efficiency will, over time, reduce the running costs of the system.

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3.4. Status Feedback

Instruments are sometimes designed so that they can perform certain operations only in a given state or mode. Users find modal-operation limiting and sometimes confusing, so it is a good design philosophy to eliminate modes as far as practicable. However, modes are sometimes unavoidable, for example to protect certain classes of user from sensitive areas of operation. In such cases users must be made aware of the capabilities of the current mode, so that they appreciate what the instrument is currently able to do, and know what might have to be done to get to the other modes of operation if necessary. Consider an instrument that protects users by providing a visual and acoustical feedback when it detects dangerous levels of ambient radiation. The dialogs for changing the levels at which the alarm sounds should be protected from inadvertent changes that might prevent the instrument from warning of dangerous levels of radiation. The best way to protect this feature is to introduce a mode that is outside the normal hierarchy and is accessed perhaps with a password, or special key sequence known only to appropriate users. Although only certain users will be able to change the settings, there must be feedback of the instruments current settings to all users, so they are fully aware of the amount of protection a given instrument is currently giving them. Sample dialogs:

An advanced dialog gives only privileged users the ability to change alarm settings. The disadvantage is that ordinary users are not shown the settings that have been made, and so are unaware of the level of protection the instrument is giving them. An example of improved usability:

The same advanced dialog gives only privileged users the ability to change alarm settings However, ordinary users can see the settings that have been made, as reflected by the arrows in the middle and rightmost diagram. Users will immediately notice an instrument that has settings outside the normally expected ranges, as shown by the arrows on the rightmost diagram. This is particularly important when an instrument may be shared among a group of users.

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3.5. Progress Feedback

If an operation is likely to take some time to complete (more than 4 seconds for example), it is important to give users feedback such as: Expected duration Progress so far This will give users feedback to enable them to plan the use of their time and make changes to their plans if necessary. It is useful to provide a Cancel function so that users can stop an operation if it takes too long. Sample dialog I:

Users have to wait for the operation to complete They cannot cancel the operation They have no indication of the possible duration. An example of improved usability:

Users still have to wait of course, however: They can cancel if the process takes inconveniently long to complete The movement of the progress indicator gives an indication of the possible duration Note: It is important that the progress indicator gives a smooth operation so that users can more accurately predict the amount of time needed for completion. For example, if some spectra had to be downloaded and the indicator shows the progress, there would be a smooth operation if the number of bytes transferred was monitored. The operation would be less smooth if the number of spectra transferred was monitored because the spectra data could be of differing sizes. Complicated spectra would take longer than small ones to download but, irrespective of size, would be shown as a single increment on the progress indicator.

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Sample dialog II: In this example, the operation is assumed to consist of individual steps (downloading spectra 1, 2, and 3). The progress indicator is used to show the progress within each step. When one step completes, the indicator returns to zero again, as shown:

Spectrum 1: 89% complete

Spectrum 2: 40% complete

Spectrum 3: 66% complete

The progress indicator shows the progress within each step When a step completes the indicator shows 100% When the next step starts, the indicator starts again from zero There is no indication of the total number of steps to complete. An example of improved usability:

Overall process 21% complete

Overall process 42% complete

Overall process 93% complete

The progress indicator shows the progress over the whole process When one step completes, the indicator continues in a forward direction Users are shown the total number of steps to complete When it the progress indicator reaches 100% the whole process is complete

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3.6. Error Message Feedback

Error messages are used to communicate out-of-line situations to users. Error messages are sometimes written by developers to explain to users what they have done wrong. This may seem appropriate from the developers point of view, but what users really needs is not an explanation of what they have done wrong; they need to know what has to be done to get out of the current situation and continue with productive work. To get the best benefit from error messages it is important that they help users to know how to proceed. Here are some real error messages that initially tell users what has gone wrong, and have been improved to help users recover more quickly: Sample messages: Timeout has occurred you have been logged off Insufficient storage to complete this operation This operation cannot be performed here Required field cannot be blank Invalid date Invalid date File not found Examples of improved usability: Timeout has occurred please log on again Increase the size of the paging area and try again Switch to DEFINE mode to perform a DELETE operation Enter a name Start date cannot be later than finish date Month value is outside acceptable range <112> Check that diskette ABCD is properly inserted

When it becomes necessary to issue an error message, users may well be in difficulties. It is important to review error messages to make sure they are formulated to help users, not to scold them. Writing error messages is a professional job that is best undertaken by someone with appropriate communication skills a technical writer. Error message writing should not be considered as a sideline of the developer. Developers should work closely with their technical writer to come up with effective formulations.

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3.7. Forgiveness
An interface that is forgiving will anticipate errors, and protect users against them. A forgiving interface also gives users the confidence they need to explore its functions and allow them to learn quickly through trial-and-error. Let us assume a hand-held device that works from an internal battery that has to be recharged. Sample design:

Plug in low-voltage power lead to charge the instrument Device must be turned OFF to charge State-of-charge can only be seen when the instrument is turned ON User must remember to plug in the charging cable. An example of improved usability:

Bays are provided to store the instruments (unit is possibly wall-mounting) As soon as an instrument is dropped into a charging bay, it starts charging Instruments charge independently of whether they are switched ON or OFF The state-of-charge is shown by coloured indicators (LEDs) If an instrument that is not fully charged is removed from its charging bay, an acoustic beep and screen message warns users that the instrument may not be sufficiently charged for fault free operation.

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Further samples of improved usability: Require user confirmation before letting the interface perform any actions that destroy data If defaults are offered, make sure the choice is to save data rather than destroy it If data can be destroyed, provide an UNDO function to recover it when necessary Support successive UNDOs as opposed to one UNDO and then a REDO Remind users to save any data they may have changed but have not yet stored Warn users well in advance of any low-battery condition Deactivate currently invalid choices to prevent users from inadvertently selecting them.

3.8. Naming
The task of naming items is best given to a professional wordsmith; a technical writer who understands the language of the end users and also understands the functions of the instrument. The following things should be borne in mind: Things that are the same should be given the same name Things that are different should be named differently Names should be put into families, so that similar things are similarly named Wherever possible choices on menus should be action words (verbs) All menus should be titled The title of a menu should be the same as the choice that was used to access it.

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3.9. Ease of use

While the initial thrust of development must be to make an instrument that functions well, the later stages of development will refine the design for practicability. Sample design: Buttons for most frequently used functions Optional remote sensor

Carrying handle Keyboard

For keyboard operation users will need to use two-hands: One hand to hold the instrument by the carrying handle The other to press the keyboard buttons If the instrument will be used together with a hand-held remote sensor, keyboard operation becomes very difficult: One hand to hold the instrument The other to hold the remote sensor and press the keyboard buttons Leftmost and rightmost function buttons are so far from the handle that thumb operation is not possible Users have to learn the function of several keys (keyboard + function keys).

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An example of improved usability: All functions have been incorporated into the menus that can be operated by three buttons conveniently-located at the front end of the instruments carrying handle, as shown:

Navigation buttons:

+ *
All functions can be accessed using the three buttons Button positioning is suitable for left-handed or right-handed users All user controls are concentrated in a single place Once user understand the three buttons they can access all functions Single-hand operation leaves the users other hand free for other tasks: Opening and closing doors, car compartment lids etc. Holding a remote sensor Making written notes

Up Down Select

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4. Hardware Usability Guidelines

4.1. Handling
Consider carefully the conditions under which instruments will be used: Ambient lighting Air temperatures Relative humidity Noise levels Available space Amount of time the instrument will be carried Usage Scenarios

All of these items will affect the instrument design, as follows: Ambient lighting: If the ambient lighting can be expected to be low the following should be considered. Backlighting of screen If there are several buttons, they may need to be provided with internal lighting also Larger battery capacity may be necessary to accommodate the backlighting power requirements Backlighting should turn off after a time of inactivity to conserve battery power. Air temperatures: If the ambient temperature can be expected to be high, users hands may become sweaty so hand-held instruments should be provided with a secure grip to prevent it being dropped. If the ambient temperature can be expected to be low, buttons should be designed to allow users to operate them with gloves on. Relative humidity: If the relative humidity can be expected to be high, as with high temperatures, users hands may become sweaty so hand-held instruments should be provided with a secure grip. Noise Levels: If the noise levels can be expected to be high, any acoustic alarms should be accompanied by a visual indication. Available space: If the area to be searched is small or cramped (the corners of a car luggage compartment for example) the instrument and/or the instrument sensor must be sufficiently small to allow easy access. Amount of time the instrument will be carried: If users can be expected to keep the instrument with them for long periods, it will require various qualities including: Being as light as possible (so the users hands do not become tired) Being finely balanced (so the instrument is pleasant to hold) Capable of being carried on the belt (so users can perform other tasks) Indicator of state-of-charge (so batteries do not run out in the middle of a task)

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Usage scenarios: Consider exactly how the instrument will be used and what ancillary tasks users will perform. This will affect the instrument design as shown below: User needs one hand free to open and close compartments and doors etc. Single handed operation is a requirement Users wear protective clothing: Display must be clearly readable even if viewed through a visor User must be able to operate device even when wearing protective gloves Users work standing and need to make written notes or fill out forms etc. Instrument needs some kind of holster so user release it to use both hands to hold pen and clip-board Users generally perform tasks in a pre-defined sequence The required functions could be grouped together to provide easier and faster access Some authorities work differently from others, a customisation function may be necessary to let them group together the functions that they most frequently use

4.2. Controls

Reduce controls (buttons) to the absolute minimum Suggested minimum: Up Down Select

Locate controls so that one-hand (thumb) operation is possible

4.3. User control

As discussed previously, it is important that users feel they are in control at all times so they can explore the instruments features and functions and quickly become productive with it. The basic requirements for this are: Provide quick and simple access to frequently used functions Provide an undo function if data can be irrevocably destroyed Provide a Cancel option to allow unwanted functions to be terminated Give feedback on long running processes Give feedback on position in menu hierarchy

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4.4. Use of Icons

While icons can communicate complicated messages very economically, great care must be exercised in their use as some icons do not necessarily cross cultural borders, or speak to end users in a language they understand. Motifs: In some cultures, body parts including hands, fingers, head, ears, lips, nose, etc are considered profane, and should therefore be avoided in designs. Content: Search for simplicity in icons, as, on interfaces and in the documentation, icons may need to be reduced to just a few lines. If they are over complicated, they may become a source of confusion for users. Differentiation: It is important that icons can be differentiated easily. Avoid making icons look too much alike, for example, by putting a box around them. Since users tend differentiate icons by their shape or silhouette, the box would make differentiation difficult. Colour: This is probably not going to be an issue with the first generation of radiation monitors, but as screen technology improves, colour may be introduced to improve functionality. Be aware that 10% of the male population is colour-blind and that the most frequent colour-blindness is red/green. Use colour to help differentiate between items, but make sure that colour is not the only indicator as follows: Sample Icons:

The above icons use colour to differentiate them; so red/green colour-blind users will have difficulty in distinguishing one from the other. Example of improved usability

The above icons use colour and shape to differentiate them; so colour-blind users will be able to distinguish one from the other as easily as colour-sighted users.

4.5. Multi-language Support:

Language-dependent items should be replaced by icons or removed from the hardware interface and be taken into the software interface where multiple language versions can be offered..

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5. Software Usability Guidelines

5.1. Dialogs
Provide every dialog with a title Where appropriate provide the following standard buttons: Cancel Help Provide an Undo facility if appropriate

5.2. Menus

Provide every menu with a title Number menus to show their relative position in the overall hierarchy Number menu choices so users can remember the IDs of frequently used functions Provide a Back function so that, with repeated pushes, users are brought back to the main menu Display the main menu by default when the instrument is switched on and is ready for use All features, functions, and submenus must be accessible from the main menu Grey out, or leave empty, any choices that are currently unavailable

5.3. Controls

Keep the number of controls to a minimum Ensure the same name is used for controls throughout the interface

5.4. Feedback

Provide progress indicators for tasks expected to take more than 4 seconds Show relative position in menu hierarchy

5.5. Error Recovery Support

Ensure that, as far as possible, error messages dont tell users what the problem is, but tell them what to do to remedy the situation.

5.6. Multi-language support

Allow users to set the language of the device to their preference Language-dependent items should be brought into the software interface and be removed from the hardware interface Architect software so that there is a single engine that provides the instruments functionality, and then create the various language modules that can be attached to it. This allows for the simple addition of languages as needed, and also assures that the software functionality is independent of language.

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5.7. Error handling

Ensure the version and level information is easily accessible, so that users can determine which software they are using. Ensure, as far as possible, that error messages tell users what to do, rather than telling them what they have done wrong.

5.8. Forgiveness
Users make mistakes. The function of the interface is not just to offer functionality, but to inform and protect users so that any mistakes they may make do not have catastrophic consequences.

5.9. Accessibility
If you provide supporting software that runs on computers, many government agencies require that the software is enabled for handicapped (physically challenged) users. The following will help you do this: Ensure all choices that are accessed by mouse interaction can also be accessed using keyboard interaction and/or shortcuts: Press the Tab key to move to (and automatically select) the desired function Press Alt-key together with a keyboard key to select the desired function Press ENTER to launch the function selected by either of the preceding methods

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6. Reading Tips
There is a lot of literature to help you design better interfaces. Here are some reading suggestions to get you started: Reading Tips for Usability People: Title: Essentials of Psychology Author: Dennis Coon Reference Number: ISBN: 0-314-02768-8 This book will give you a very good grounding in understanding people; what makes them do what they do; and how are they likely to respond to various stimuli. Title: The Psychology of Everyday Things Author: Donald A. Norman Reference Number: ISBN 0-456-06709 In this classic treatise, Donald Norman helps the reader understand how things are designed and how they ought to be designed.

Reading Tip for Designers: Title: Designing the User Interface Author: Ben Shneiderman Reference Number: ISBN: 0-201-69497-2 This book by the prolific author Ben Shneiderman is a must on the bookshelves of all interface designers.

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7. Checklists
7.1. Planning Phase Checklist
Gather user requirements
Consider the following useful sources: Usability review of a similar system or currently available version Responses to questionnaires: Answered by users of the currently available version Answered by potential users of the new product Difficulties with similar equipment or currently available version: Problems frequently handled by help desks Problems encountered by teachers and instructors

Define potential users

You need the following information to be able to design a product that suits your users: Expected age range Minimum formal education Minimum previous experience Motivation for using the product

Define user scenarios

Consider the types of tasks users will want perform and the most unfavourable conditions that they are likely to encounter, including the following: Ambient lighting Air temperatures Relative humidity Available space Length of time the instrument will be carried

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7.2. Prototyping Phase Checklist

Design the product
Develop product designs, while constantly referring back to the following: Requirements definitions User definitions Scenario definitions

Use the checklist (Usability guidelines) to aid in developing the design Prototype the design
Design should be documented in the form of a prototype that can take any of the following forms: Flipchart presentation Slide show Power-point presentation Hardware and/or software demonstration

Check the design

Plan and execute appropriate usability activities to check the design: Usability Review Usability Walkthrough (with a single usability professional) (with a group end users)

Implement changes
Review the design and, as appropriate, make necessary changes to the following: Requirements definitions User definitions Scenario definitions Product design

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7.3. Testing Phase Checklist

Involve Users in design testing
Plan and execute appropriate usability activities to check the design: Usability Walkthrough Usability Test (with a group end users takes 1 day) (with a group of users takes 1 week)

Use the following checklists to aid in developing the design

Hardware Usability Guidelines Software Usability Guidelines

Implement changes
Revise, as appropriate, any or all of the following: Requirements definitions User definitions Scenario definitions Product designs

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7.4. Building Phase Checklist

Involve professionals during building
Plan and execute appropriate usability activities to check the design: Usability professional Technical writer (on-going monitoring of usability status) (terminology and documentation)

Use the following checklists to aid in building the product:

Hardware Usability Guidelines Software Usability Guidelines

Implement changes
Revise, as appropriate, any or all of the following: Requirements definitions User definitions Scenario definitions Product designs

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7.5. Hardware Usability Checklist

Handling
In formulating your design, consider the following: Ambient lighting Air temperature Relative humidity Noise levels Available space Time instrument will be carried

Controls
Reduce controls to an absoluter minimum

User control
Provide simple access to frequently used functions Provide Cancel function Provide progress indicators for tasks longer than 4 seconds Give feedback on position in menu hierarchy Provide Undo function where appropriate

Icons
Keep icons simple (use services of graphics artist) Icons Easily differentiated? No colour-only differences Review motifs for cultural acceptability (use real end users)

Multilanguage support
Multiple languages supported? Language-dependent code is outside of core code?

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7.6. Software Usability Checklist

All Dialogs
Have title Cancel button Help button Undo button if appropriate

Menus
Indication of relative position in hierarchy All choices numbered Repeated Back function brings user to Main Menu Main menu displays when instrument becomes ready All features, functions and sub-menus accessible from main menu Unavailable choices greyed out or otherwise disabled

Controls
Number of controls kept to minimum Names used consistently

Feedback
Indication of relative position in hierarchies

Forgiveness
Interface protects users against errors

Error recovery
Error messages help resolve the problem

Accessibility for PC components

All choices accessible without mouse

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Readers Comment Form

Manuals like this are used by different people for different purposes. We are interested in any feedback you have about how useful you found it, and what additions, deletions, or other changes that would make it more useful to you. You may use this page for your comments, or e-mail your comments, quoting document number 42_Useabilty guide IAEA RPT27.doc - 1.0, to the following address: alexander_michael@csi.com

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