India in 1975: Democracy in Eclipse Author(s): Norman D. Palmer Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No.

2, A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 95-110 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643138 . Accessed: 21/09/2012 08:30
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INDIA IN 1975: DEMOCRACY IN ECLIPSE NormanD. Palmer

IN 19/5 INDIA experiencedits greatestpolitical crisis since independence.During the first monthsthe political situation, six whichhad been deteriorating the past two years, for went frombad to worse,while theeconomicsituation, whichhad also been deteriorating formore than two years, began to improveappreciably. While the economic improvement was underway, political deterioration the was arrestedabruptly withthe proclamation a nationalemergency June of on 26. This is certainly watershed the date in India in 1975,and perhaps in the history independentIndia, for on that day the democratic of system that had functioned with considerablesuccessformore than a quarterof a century-thusconstituting major deviant case in the the developingworld-went into eclipse. India went throughtwo political crisesof unprecedented magnitude in 1975: a crisisof deterioration, and a crisisof democracy. The first crisiswas arrested, least temporarily, the actions that preciat by pitated the second. The second crisiswill doubtlesshave profoundefon fects the future the Indian lpolitical of system.

Political Deteriorationand Political Opposition In January1975,India commemorated 25thanniversary the the of Indian Republic,and Mrs. Indira Gandhi began her 10thyearas Prime Minister. The new yearwas usheredin witha wave of violencethathad becomean increasingly characteristic featureof the Indian scene. The most illustriousvictimwas the Railway Minister,L. N. Mishra, who died on January3 as a resultof injuriessustainedon the previousday in when a bomb exploded on a platform Samastipur, Bihar, where he was makinga speech (he was the first Indian cabinet memberto be assassinated).In the succeedingmonthsseriousacts of violenceoccurred almostdaily. They indicatednot only that therewas a breakdownof law and order,but also thatpoliticalopponentsof the existingregime wereresorting to methods.These were increasingly extra-constitutional 95

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the conditionsthat Mrs. Gandhi musthave had in mind when, in her followingthe proclabroadcastto the nation on June 26 immediately she mationof a national emergency, chargedthat "forcesof disintegration are in fullplay and communalpassionsare being aroused,threatening our unity." The first half of 1975 providedmany evidencesof Mrs. Gandhi's and fadingcharismaand the mountingopposition to her government in her party.This trendwas indicatedby Congressreverses severalbyin electionsin a numberof Indian statesand notablyin severereverses in the electionsto the LegislativeAssembly Gujarat in June-an election which Mrs. Gandhi had not planned to hold at this time, but whichshe agreedto only because of a "fastunto death" on the issue by Indian journalist, Morarji Desai in April. In earlyMarch a prominent Dilip Mukerjee,reportedthat "the climate of opinion today is vastly feelfromthat in 1971. There is an upsurgeof anti-Congress different ing in large partsof the country."1 In Even Mrs. Gandhi was not immune fromcriticism. 1975 the which involved charges against her of prolonged court proceedings, in numerous"corruptelectoralpractices" her campaignforelectionto in Parliament from the Rae Bareilly constituency Uttar Pradesh in 1971 filedby her defeatedopponent,Raj Narain of the SamyuktaSoreacheda climax. On March 18-19, in an unprecedented cialist Party, for Jag Mohan Lal move,Mrs. Gandhi testified two daysbeforeJustice Sinha of the Allahabad High Court, the presidingjudge in the case. to And on June 12, in a rulingthatstartledthe nation and threatened driveMrs. Gandhi fromoffice, Justice Sinha foundMrs. Gandhi guilty of two ratherminorcharges, whichnevertheless, accordingto the Representationof the People Act of 1951, were "corruptelectoral practices."
The J.P. Movement: opposition to Mrs. Gandhi Tlhe most effective which and the CongressPartycame fromthe so-calledJ.P. movement, rangprovidedan umbrellaforthemostdisparateoppositionelements, (R.S.S., Jana Sangh, Anand Marg) to ing from Hindu conservative extremeleft-wing groups (CPI-M, and various brands of Naxalites), and whichalso provideda leaderin thepersonof Jayaprakash Narayan. J.P., as he is generallyknown,is a veteranGandhian apostle of nonviolencewho enjoys perhaps the highestreputationof any prominent After several years of and selflessness. Indian for absolute integrity in into the politinon-involvement politics,he re-emerged self-imposed movecal arena in early1974as a championof student-initiated protest and has democracy" mentsin Bihar. Althoughhe advocatesa "partyless he no faithin the existingparliamentary system, put aside his more sweepingpolitical goals and challengedMrs. Gandhi to testthe popu1 Dilip Mukerjee, "Mr. Dharia's Dismissal: A Riposte to Mr. Narayan," The Times of India, March 8, 1975.

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larityof her partyand her "corrupt"government Bihar throughthe in electoral process. Bihar, J.P.'s home state,remainedthe base of his new movement, but it soon spreadto manyotherpartsof the country and was embraced by variousoppositiongroupsand partieswhose political fortunes were generallyat a low ebb, as well as by groups and individualsnot normallyactivein politics.Graduallyhis attacks the Congresspartyand on government, even on Mrs. Gandhi,became morepointed and more and frequent. insisted, He however, thatlie was not attacking any particular leaders or parties,but was calling for a "total revolution"in Indian political and social life.Within the framework such amorphousand of nebulous goals he focussed demands for the eliminationof corrupon tion, which he chargedhad become "the new god" in India, and for electoral2 and educational reforms. Mrs. Gandhi and otherCongressleaderstriedto denigratethe J.P. movement a strange as of and frustrated assemblage disorganized parties or and groupsof varioushues,with no real popular following support. They also criticized J.P. forlending his name to such dubious groups, but naive which they charged were tryingto use the well-meaning Gandhian leader for their own purposes.They insistedthat even in Bihar theyhad farmore supportthan J.P., and that outside of Bihar the J.P. movement had littlestrength. It did indeed seem hard to believe that an aged and unwell Gandhian, so long out of political life and so vague in his appeals and demands,could be thespearheadof any significant oppositionmovement. Yet in spiteof Congress did denigration, J.P.movement not die out. the Instead,by late 1974 and early 1975 it had developedinto a significant new political phenomenon. The J.P. movement faced Mrs. Gandhi with both a constitutional and an extra-constitutional challenge that she found hard to meet. SinceJ.P. had been a friend and associateof her father, and had known her since her childhood,and since both she and J.P. agreed on basic were reconcilgoals, it seemed to many Indians that theirdifferences able. But an ill-fated meetingin November 1974 apparently only acbetween them. centuated the differences and the personal bitterness ThereafterMrs. Gandhi and other Congressspokesmenbecame more vehementand more outspokenin their attemptsto discreditthe J.P. and J.P. became increasingly critical and J.P. personally, movement, the of thegovernment, rulingparty,and Mrs. Gandhi.
2 In order to give some substance to his demands for electoral reforms, P. apJ. pointed an Electoral ReformsCommittee,headed by V. M. Tarkunde, with E. P. W. da Costa as convenor.This Committeeheld several meetingsand hearings,and considered numerousproposals. Its report,submittedin February 1975, did not suggest an alternativesystemof elections,but it did make a large number of specificrecommendations,mainly relating to the composition and role of the Election Commission, election expenses, corrupt electoral practices,the use of radio and television, and election petitions. Even more specificrecommendationswere submitted to the Governmentin April by eight non-Communistopposition parties.

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As J.P. movedabout the country for with incredibleenergy a man of 72 in poor health,he was greetedby tremendous crowds,but ones that did not always indicate solid support.On March 6 he led some 100,000people throughthe heartof New Delhi to ParliamentHouse, This meeting, and presented "charter demands" to the Parliament. a of which had been scheduledweeks in advance and which attractednationwide attention,was described as the largest demonstration ever stagedagainstMrs. Gandhi's government.
Two Weeks in June: The developments the first of fivemonthsof 1975, and indeed of at least two yearspreviously, formthe backdrop for the dramaticevents of June, which ended one kind of political crisisand usheredin another.The immediatebackgroundof the proclamation of emergency June 26 was providedby the eventsof the of previoustwo weeks. June 12 and 13 were traumaticdays for Indira Gandhi and for India. On the 12thJusticeSinha handed down his rulingfinding Mrs. Gandhi guiltyof "corruptelectoralpractices"on two relatively minor counts, namelyusingherprivatesecretary her electioncampaign (he in resigned government his post beforehe became activein the campaign), and using state and local government officials supportof her own in campaigning. While he dismissedall other charges,includingbribery and intimidation, JusticeSinha ruled that Mrs. Gandhi's election was invalid.Under the Representation thePeople Act of 1951 thismeant of that,unlesstherulingwas reversed, Mrs. Gandhi would lose herseat in Parliamentand be forcedto resignas Prime Minister,and would be barred from political activityfor six years. JusticeSinha, however, granted stayof judgmentfor20 daysto give Mrs. Gandhi timeto cona sideran appeal to the SupremeCourtor othermoves to avoid removal frompublic life. On the followingday Mrs. Gandhi receivedanothershock when the resultsof the state assemblyelectionsin Gujarat, held on June 8 and 11, became known.Mrs. Gandhi had put her own prestige the on line in Gujarat, and had campaignedvigorously that state.But her in indefatigable campaigning was not enough to overcomethe anti-Congressfeelingin Gujarat, the ineptness the stateCongressleadersand of and the remarkablesuccessof the opposition parties in organization, unitingagainstthe Congress in party, whosestrength the stateassembly fell from140 to 75, whereasthe Janata Front won 87 seats,and soon afterward formed ministry a headed by Babubhai Patel as Chief Minister. The dual shocksof June 12 and 13 weakened Mrs. Gandhi's already decliningpersonal and political position. The question of the extent to which her moves in the followingweeks were designed to and strengthen own positionand power and the extentto preserve her which theywere designed to reversethe trendstowarddisintegration and disunity still a controversial is one. Quite naturallythe opposition

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seized upon her reverses demand that she resign.Some membersof to her own partyalso shared this view, although theycould not express such heretical opinions openly. Several Indian newspaperssuggested thatMrs. Gandhi should resignas PrimeMinister, least temporarily, at of until the results her appeal fromJustice Sinha's rulingwere known. ApparentlyMrs. Gandhi herselfconsidered this step, but rejected it of and others. after consulting members her cabinet,some legal experts, was so One difficulty seemed to be that the Congress government heavilydependenton her continuedleadership,and that no successor could be agreed upon, especiallyafterJagjivan Ram, the senior-most memberof the cabinet, came out in support of her continuance in for office. Legal justification this course was provided by a ruling of Justice R. KrishnaIyer,the "vacationjudge" of the SupremeCourt, V. on June 24. Althoughhe turned down Mrs. Gandhi's request for a "completeand absolute" stayof JusticeSinha's judgmentuntil the Supreme Court could considerher appeal, he did grant a "conditional" stay,enablingher to continueas Prime Ministerand to speak in either house of Parliament, not to take partin Parliamentary but proceedings, vote,or draw pay as a memberof the Lok Sabha. Once she had determined a course of action to attemptto imon prove her political position, Mrs. Gandhi moved swiftly;and once again the oppositionplayed into her hands. On June 25 speakersat a major rallyin New Delhi organizedby opposition groups led by J.P. were particularly vehementin denouncingMrs. Gandhi and her government. he had done severaltimesbefore,possiblyin a somewhat As the less directway,J.P. appealed to the military, police, and the civil to to above loyalty the "corrupt" to service put loyalty the Constitution This was interpreted Mrs. Gandhi as "inciting our government. by to armedforces mutinyand our police to rebel."

The Emergency After and

On thesame nightMrs. Gandhi set in motiona seriesof lightning movesthat had fateful consequencesforherselfand for India. In the early morninghours she asked PresidentFakhruddin Ali Ahmed to of and membersof the cabisign a proclamation national emergency, net to "consult"with her and approve the proposedproclamation(she has steadfastly maintainedthat all important decisions are made only afterconsultationwith cabinet colleagues and other key organs and under the persons). Invoking powers bestowed on the government Maintenanceof Internal SecurityAct of 1971 (the notorious MISA), theDefenceof India Rules, and otheremergency measures, ordered she the arrestof severalscore opposition leaders, including J.P., Morarji Desai, Asoka Mehta, Raj Narain, Piloo Mody, and Jyotirmoy Basu. of She also imposeda strict correscensorship the press and of foreign pondents. Earlyin the morningof the 26th Mrs. Gandhi announced and ex-

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plained her actionsin a radio broadcastto a startlednation:

panic about. I am sure you are conscious of the deep and widespread

The President proclaimed emergency. has an This is nothing to

conspiracy which beenbrewing has eversinceI beganto introduce certainprogressive measures benefit thecommon of to manand woman of India. In thenameof democracy has been sought negatethevery it to namestandby and allow thecountry's stability be imperilled? to
functioning democracy.. of
.

. How can any governmentworth the

Mrs. Gandhi gave assurances"that the new emergency will in no way the affect rightsof law-abidingcitizens,"and she expressedthe belief "thatinternalconditionswill speedilyimproveto enable us to dispense withthisproclamation soon as possible.' as With the proclamation a national emergency, of Indian democracy intoa stateof eclipse.4 entered The eventsthatfollowedconfirmed some of the worstfearsof thosewho feltthatIndia had permanently joined thevastmajority thosestatesof the developingworldwhere the eroof sion of democracyhad set in much earlier. They also gave hope to thosewho believed thatIndia needed the kind of shocktreatment that Mrs. Gandhi had administered. Apparentlythese included the majorityof the people of India, to the extentthat theyhad any feelingson such issues.These people were more interested such concretebenein fitsof the emergency greaterdiscipline,the restoration law and as of order,more consideratepublic servants, more emphasis on economic reforms, lower pricesforbasic commodities, and than theywere in the suspensionof basic freedoms, which had little meaning for them.
EconomicImprovement: Undoubtedlyeconomic conditionsimproved considerably 1975. This trendwas apparentbeforethe proclamation in of emergency, continuedduringtherestof the year.It was perhaps and due as much to externalfactors and a good monsoon as to more effectivegovernment. Inflation, which had skyrocketed the alarmingrate to of 31% in September 1974, was brought under control-a major achievement thatfewothercountries have equalled, althoughtheclaims of a negative rate of inflation mid-1975 by Pricesof may be exaggerated. some basic commodities were reducedimmediately afterthe proclamation of emergency, and more of these commoditieswere available in black marketeers, regular markets.Measures against smugglers, and were quite effective. moneylenders Mrs. Gandhi's 20-pointprogramof economicand social reforms, announced on July 1, was a popular and had been widelyappreciatedmove, even thoughmost of the reforms
4 For analyses of the emergencyand its implications, see W. H. Morris-Jones,
3

The text of this broadcast is given in India News, XIV (July4, 1975).

"Whose Emergency-India's or Indira's?," The World Today, XXXI (November 1975); Norman D. Palmer, "The Crisis of Democracy in India," Orbis, XIX (Summer 1975); Richard L. Park, "Political Crisis in India, 1975,"Asian Survey,XV (November 1975); and S. P. Seth, "Political Crisis in India," Pacific Community,VII (January 1976).

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promisedoftenin the past withoutmuch progress implementation. in Prospects thatIndia would at last get offthe no-growth rate of the past two or threeyearsseemed to be bright.In fact,the Reserve Bank of India, in its annual reportreleasedin September, statedthat a growth rate of between5%J0 6% in 1975-76 should be possible.5 and While thetemporary improvement the economicpictureseemed in to be real,ifnot so spectacular government as spokesmen claimed,most of the promisedeconomicand social reforms still remain to be implementedand the predictedincreasein rate of growthmay turn out to be over-optimistic. India is still handicapped by a desperatelypoor people, a relatively unproductive economy, vast inequality,limitednationalincomeand savings, and budgetdeficits the national level and at in mostof the states.It is also faced with large foreign exchange and tradedeficits, a huge externaldebt,somewhateased by foreign and aid, postponement debt servicing, of and foreign creditsof a unilateraland multilateralnature. All of these have been worsenedby the vast increases in the prices of essential raw materials and energy sources, mainlyoil. Three aspectsof the emergency have been particularly conspicuous and particularly controversial. They are (1) the widespreadarrests and detentionof many personswithoutlegal remedies; (2) the press and legal aspects,especiallythe censorship;and (3) the constitutional retroactive amendments and the use of the law and the Constitution to supportthe draconianmeasuresthathave been taken. sons who have been arrested since the proclamationof emergency vary greatly, rangingfromaround 10,000 (a figure sometimes mentionedby government spokesmen)to more than 50,000. It is also uncertainhow manyof those arrestedcould be accurately describedas political prisoners,and how many are "undesirableelements."Among the former group are many leaders of opposition parties and groups, including some 30 members Parliament(includinga fewmembersof the Conof gressparty).They have been detainedwithouttrial,which government have defendedon emergency spokesmen grounds. On June 30 MISA was amended througha Presidentialordinance to enable the Government detain anyonewithoutassigning to grounds fora maximumperiod of one year. The Government's was authority extendedby another amendmentto MISA, passed by Parliafurther sessionin late Julyand early Aumentduringthe special three-week
5 A World Bank study, entitled "Prospects for Developing Countries, 1976-80" and issued in the summer of 1975, envisaged a growth rate of 5% for developing countriesduring the second half of this decade, but it projected an average growth rate of not more than 3% for India. For a summaryof this study,as it applies to India, see "India's GDP Rate Won't Cross 3 p.c. Till 1980," The Times of India, August 11, 1975. For a gloomy long-range forecastof India's economic prospects,see Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome (New York: E. P. Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974).

Arrests and Detention Without Trial: Estimates thenumber perof of

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gust,which took away naturallaw or commonlaw rights personsdeof tainedunder theAct. But on September15 theDelhi High Court ruled that the detentionof Kuldip Nayar,the best-known Indian journalist to be arrestedunder MISA, had been illegal because specificcharges had not been broughtagainst him. And the Government's authority was further challengedin a seriesof legal actionsin lowercourtsin different partsof the country, broughtby about a dozen detained oppositionleaders.These cases-were being arguedbeforethe SupremeCourt at the end of the year.
Censorship:With the impositionof strictcensorshipimmediately followingthe proclamationof emergency, nation's presswas effecthe tivelysilenced,except for the versionsof events that the authorities wanted people at home and abroad to hear. Newspapers and other media sedulouslyavoided controversial of issues and criticism governmental policies. Occasional deviators were warned, and sometimes punished in variousways.Foreign correspondents were also subjected to thecensorship, and a fewwereorderedto leave the country. July On 22 the Governmentissued "Guidelines for the Press,"6which were in perhaps the most restrictive any democraticstate. Until theywere somewhatmodified by more liberal interpretation, these guidelines presented gravedilemmaforforeign a news media and theirrepresentativesin India, who were compelledto agree to adhere to the guidelines as the price of continuedreporting fromIndia. Althoughtheywere administered withvarying degreesof severity, the guidelineswere not relaxed throughout remainderof the year. the In fact,fromtime to time theywere further strengthened. Finally on December 10, by a Presidentialdecree aimed at "the preventionof publication of objectionable matter,"some of the censorshipregulations were given the forceof permanentlaw. The decree empowered theGovernment ban thepublicationof newsabout "any activity to preand of judicial to the . . . sovereignty integrity India and the security of the state."7

was proing questionsthat has oftenbeen raised since the emergency claimed is why Mrs. Gandhi resortedto such drasticaction when, acshe cordingto this line of thinking, alreadypossessedmore than sufficient legal and constitutional authorityto deal with any conceivable was derived fromthe Constitutionitcrisissituation.This authority and fromMISA, the Deself,especiallyfromits emergency provisions, fenceof India Rules, and otherextraordinary legislation.If she needed she could seek further amendmentsto the any additional authority,
6 The full text of these guidelines was published in The New York Times, July 22, 1975. 7 In an editorial in its issue of December 11, 1975, The Times of India, in a rare act, criticizedthe ordinance as "too sweeping." criticismof a governmental

and Constitutional Legal Aspects of the Emergency: One of theintrigu-

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amendments existinglegislation, new legislationto or Constitution, which she could easilyget since she controlled more than two-thirds of themembers Parliamentand the governments all but threeof the of of major states.Why,then,was it necessary proclaim a national emerto gencyand to suspendso manyof the basic democraticfreedoms? Mrs. Gandhi's own answeris that the proclamationof emergency was necessary arrestthe "forcesof disintegration" to and to safeguard the country's unityand stability.Some observers have suggestedthat she felt the nation needed this kind of shock treatment. Others have been less charitable,and have charged that she was more concerned about her own deteriorating power and position than about the welfare of the country. few have intimatedthat she was deliberately A suspendingnormal democraticfreedoms a first as step toward imposing her own brandof authoritarianism India. on Mrs.Gandhi has steadfastly maintainedthatall of her actionshave 'beenlegal and constitutional, thatshe has been usingconstitutional and means to meet an extra-constitutional challenge.Some criticshave denied this claim absolutely.Some have charged that Mrs. Gandhi has acted withintheletterof the law and the Constitution, amended by as her pliant majorities, but that she has in factviolated its spirit.Some have admitted thather actionsmayhave been legal, but have expressed doubts that theyhave been constitutional. Some have conceded her claims to constitutionality, have added, in the wordsof one Amerbut ican critic, that"the factthatall thishas occurredconstitutionally gives us cause to take seriously written the wordsof purportedly democratic constitutions.'" There is considerablefood forthought, and much latitude forvarying in conclusions, all of theseinterpretations. Perhaps a general conclusioncould be that while the constitutional formalities have been observed, the constitutional have to some extent safeguards Mrs. Gandhi has shown been abandoned,or at least put aside. Certainly a willingness use all the powers at her disposal, whateverthe conto sequences for the democraticsystem.One wonders what her father would have thought such behavior. of Since this is India's first experience under a national emergency proclaimedforreasonsof threatsto internalstabilityratherthan external threats (as in 1962 and 1971), the whole situation is unprecewas proclaimedunder the authority dented.The emergency provided and was approved by Parliament in Article352 of the Constitution, as withina periodof twomonths, stipulatedin Article352. But several have been cited as eviactions of Mrs. Gandhi and her government
8"The moves she [Mrs. Gandhi] has fosteredappear to be legal; but it is quesbetween what is 'legal' tionable that they have been constitutional.The difference and what is 'constitutional'can be a matterof opinion, but in the end the difference is what the Supreme Court says it is. This is a most frustrating fact that concerns and serious scholars . . . as well." Park, op. cit., membersof the existingGovernment, p. 1011 (italics in original). 9 Raymond D. Gastil, "Freedom in India," Freedomn at Issue, No. 33 (November-December1975), p. 13.

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dences of a determination stretch to theirconstitutional and legal authority the outerlimits, to and perhapsbeyond. One such action is the frequentresortto Presidentialordinances to make significant changesin existinglegislation,a practice that has been followedto a lesserdegreeforsome timeand that in the past has been theobject of widespreadcriticism. has been noted,Presidential As ordinanceswere the vehicle formakingmajor changesin the laws of detention and fortransforming censorship regulations, imposedbecause of the emergency, into permanentlaw. Anotherdevice, which is generallyfrowned upon and regardedas of dubious legalityin mostdemocratic states,is to give retroactive to effect amendments legislation to and even to Constitutional amendments. This devicewas resortedto by the Indian Parliament, the requestof the Government, its special at in sessionin late Julyand earlyAugust,when it amended both the basic electorallaw and the Constitution invalidateretroactively court to any judgmentdeclaring the election of a Prime Minister to be void-an action thatwas taken while Mrs. Gandhi's appeal fromJudgeSinha's rulingwas being consideredby the SupremeCourt. Anothermatterof concernis the effort the Government get to of the SupremeCourt to review-and hopefully, fromthe Government's point of view, to reverse-the historicdecision of the Court in the socalled Fundamental Rights Case in 197310 when the Court, by a majorityof one, held thatwhile the Parliamentcould amend any part of the Constitution,including the section on Fundamental Rights, it could not alter "the basic structure" the Constitution. full bench of A of the Supreme Court,which was set up to considerthis request,was abruptlydissolvedby the Chief Justice, but a numberof cases involving a challenge to the Fundamental Rights decision are pending beforethe Court,and the issue is therefore still a moot one. From time to timeMrs. Gandhi, the Law Minister, some other or officials referto the need forratherbasic reforms the legal system, in and sometimes a hard look at the Constitution for itself.Some observers interpret these commentsas evidences that Mrs. Gandhi is determined to scrap the legal and constitutional that India has had system since independence,and establisha new and more authoritarian politicalorder.Supportforthisinterpretation providedby a resolution was of the Congressparty,adopted at its annual session on December 29, to calling forchangesin the Constitution make it more responsive"to the current needs of the people and the demands of the present."Mrs. Gandhi, however,insiststhat she wants to reformand not scrap the she existing system. particular, has oftenstatedthatshe sees no need In fora new Constitution, that the presentConstitution adequate if it is is occasionally amended to meet changingconditionsand needs and to removeany obstaclesthat the Courts may place in the way of needed Since the Constitution been amended economicand social reforms. has
10Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 1461.

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been a changingdocument.It has it 39 timesin 25 years, has obviously was proclaimed,albeen amended several times since the emergency Again one wonto waysto givemoreauthority the centralgovernment. documentcan be and still reders how flexiblea basic Constitutional tain its basic character. Perhaps the most sigBecomesPermanent: Emergency A "Temporary" portentof thingsto come was providedby three and revealing nificant by passed unanimously delegatesto the 71stanresolutions momentous partyin Chandigarhat the end of theyear. nual sessionof theCongress which has already been mentioned,called for major One resolution, time The other two revealed for the first changesin the Constitution. decisionon two vital issues. One was to continue the the long-awaited until "the dangersof internaland exindefinitely state of emergency The otherwas to posthave been fullysurmounted." ternalsubversion pone the sixthgeneralelections,scheduledto be held by March 1976, for a year. All of these resolutions,shortlyapproved by the Indian and the prolongationof the presentParliamentbeyondits Parliament, maximumtermof fiveyears,are authorizedunder the Govotherwise powers, but they raise grave questions in the ernment'semergency in of mindsof all who are concernedwith the future democracy India. of As the South Asian correspondent The New York Times reported fromChandigarhon December 30, with particularreferenceto the resolutionsof the Congressparty: "Together, the . . . developments movedIndia into a new phase,givingan aspectof permanenceto what state of affairs."11 had been posited as a temporary Other Political Developments In makingthe many momentousdecisionsthat will inevitablyafand also the futureof India, Mrs. Gandhi apparfecther own future, ently consulted in any meaningfulway only a handful of advisers. mentionedis her own 29Among those whose names are frequently year-old son, Sanjay. There is a greatdeal of speculationon the extent of Sanjay's influenceon his mother,and on the nature of that influhe residence,and apparently ence. He and his wifelive in his mother's betweenhis motherand key people in oftenservesas an intermediary Indian public life, including some of the most powerful.Outside of New Delhi few people seem to have much influenceon the Prime Minister.Possible exceptionsare S. S. Ray, Chief Minister of West Bengal, and Rajni Patel, Presidentof the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee. Most of the Chief Ministersseem to be dependent on Mrs. Gandhi's support.In Decembershe broughttwo of theminto her cabinet:
11 William Borders,"India to Postpone Elections a Year," The New York Times, December 30, 1975.

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Bansi Lal, Chief Ministerof Haryana, first MinisterwithoutPortas folio and thenas Defence Minister, and P. C. Sethi,Chief Ministerof Madhya Pradesh, as Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers.These moves may have been promptedmore by a desire to findother roles for two chief ministerswho were experiencingdifficulties their in statesthan by a desire to strengthen centralcabinet. It is hard to the see how Bansi Lal could be a more effective Defence Ministerthan the veteranSwaran Singh,who was relievedof his post in December,after servingas a memberof the cabinet in various positions since 1952. Some chiefministers were eased out, obviouslywith the approval of Mrs. Gandhi. AmongthesewereV. P. Naik, who was suddenlyreplaced as Chief Ministerof Maharashtraby S. B. Chavan in February,and H. N. Bahaguna, who was forcedto resignas Chief Ministerof Uttar Pradeshin December. With obvious Indian orchestrationthe status of Sikkim was to changedin 1975 fromthat of a protectorate that of the 22nd state in the Indian Union. This was technically made possible by a vote in Sikkimin April to abolish the post of Chogyal (King) and to merge with India, and by a vote of the Indian Parliamentin May to admit Sikkimas an Indian state.The official Indian view was that thischange gave Sikkima position of greaterfreedom and importance, but many critics at home and abroad-especially Nepalis and Chinese-denounced the new arrangement. Diplomatic rather than strong-arm methods led to significant changesin two otherstates.On February25, afterlengthy and delicate negotiations,Sheikh Abdullah was installed as Chief Minister of Jammuand Kashmir,a post fromwhich he had been ousted 22 years previously. Sheikh Abdullah refusedto join the Congress party and instead,contraryto Mrs. Gandhi's advice, affiliated with the revived of National Conference;but he agreed to work withinthe framework the Indian Union, thus abandoning,or at least shelving, more exhis tremist demands. On November11 the Indian Government signed an with leaders of the undergroundmovementin Nagaland, agreement which had been under President'sRule since March 22, presumably ending the rebellion in that sensitiveborder state that had been simmeringformanyyears. Foreign Policy Even more than developments the Indian states,foreignpolicy in was overshadowed the twin crisesof political deterioration and naby tional emergency. The official interpretation was that the emergency had no impactwhatever the course of Indias foreign on policy; but, as any studentof political science is well aware, significant changes in theinternalpoliticsof a nation are bound to have important effects on externalbehavior.All other stateswere compelled to reassesstheirrelations with India in the light of the major political changes in that

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and some-also had to considerthe impactof thesechangeson country, trueof India's near theirown internalsituation.This was particularly neighbors. in countries criticism the eclipse of democracy India was muted,and of in some ruling circles,including those in Pakistan and Nepal, there to seemedto be a tendency welcomethe trendsin theirgiant neighbor. alternativemodel to their be India mighthenceforth a less attractive of and of own versions authoritarianism, Indian criticisms theirpolitiwould be less freelyexpressed.In the neighboringcouncal systems of therewere increasedapprehensions the consequences tries,however, of forthemof the emergence a more disciplinedand controlledpolitical orderin India. and the assassinationof The coup in Bangladesh in mid-August, in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, aroused grave apprehensions India. 0ffideplored the assassinaciallyMrs. Gandhi and otherIndian spokesmen relationswith tion of the man who had been a champion of friendly India and whose personal relationswith Mrs. Gandhi were excellent. and not mostlyto expressionsof regret, But theyconfinedthemselves of denunciation;and the Indian pressand othermedia were instructed to follow the same line. Doubtless the murderof the man who had been the unquestionedleader of the new state caused many Indians, includingMrs. Gandhi, to ponder on the political and personal suron of vivability even the most powerfulrulers,and to reflect the danin gersof political assassination India. Indian leadersviewedwith deep concernthe manychangesin Bangladesh afterthe August coup, espestate in cially since theseevidenceda basic instability the neighboring that could create problems for India and since the new leaders who commandin Bangladesh at the end of the were in at least temporary regardedas anti-Indian. year weregenerally in In most other Third World countriesthe developments India and with general approbation.As one were greetedwithoutsurprise, of has pointed out, "The Third World interpretation recent observer beyond the immediateisin developments India. . . has a significance sues involvedor theirbilateralrelationswith India. It is apparent ... thatthe almostuniversalresponsein thesecountrieshas been to interas pret the Emergency a movementaway from an essentiallydemoas proof that democratic to a modifiedcommand system, a further craticdevelopmentmodels are inappropriatefor the so-called emerging nations."" The Soviet Union and other Communistcountriesfollowingthe Soviet line strongly approved the Indian swing toward a more conIt to trolledand authoritarian system. would be interesting know to
and India's External Relations" (unpublished pa12 Leo E. Rose, "The Emergency Northridge, per prepared for a Symposiumon India at California State University, November 21, 1975), p. 2.

ForeignReactionsto the Emergency: In

all of India'snearneighbors

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what extentthisswingwas influenced, directly indirectly, Soviet or by advice and pressures, and to what extentMrs. Gandhi consultedSoviet advisersbefore and afterthe proclamationof emergency. may be It significant that the pro-Soviet CPR, which is allied with the Congress partyat the national level,is the strongest supporter Mrs. Gandhi's of movesof any politicalpartyother than the Congress (in fact,in some respects was a moreunifiedsupporter thesemovesthan Mrs. Ganit of dhi's own party).But it does not followthat Mrs. Gandhi is now more influenced theSovietsthan everbefore.13 by One could arguethatsince she is now in firml commandof her own country, aftera period of political uncertainty and decreasingsupport,she can follow her natural impulsesby takingan even more independentposition in foreignaffairs, whetherthe Sovietsapproveor not. There is some evidence that the Sovietsare aware that the changed situationin India may not redound whollyto theiradvantage,althoughtheystill give it theirvocal approval. In the other major Communist state, the People's Republic of China, eventsin India in 1975 were greetedwith criticism and often to with scorn,reflecting China's long-standing efforts denigrateIndia and to lessenIndian influence Asia and the Third World. The strong in Chinese denunciationof the mergerof Sikkiminto the Indian Union and the Chinese actions that precipitatedthe most serousborder clash since 1965 (in Arunachal Pradesh on October 90) may be primarily a reflection currentdifficulties of that the Chinese are having in Tibet and a suspicion that India may in some way tryto aggravatethesedifFor ficulties. some time,however, China has been following hard line a towardIndia, and in spite of repeated hintsfromIndia has shown no interest a "normalization"of relations.This line has become even in hardersince the emergency proclaimedin India. was The Indian Government was quite appreciativeof the decision of most Western states to refrainfrom any strong officialcriticismof in developments India; but it reactedwith considerableindignationto the strong criticisms the Westernpressand by manyprivatecitizens in and groups,particularly Britainand the United States. in
Indo-American Relations:On the whole, 1975 was not a good year for Indo-American relations.When Daniel PatrickMoynihan leftIndia in afterservicefor two years as U.S. Ambassador,he exearly January, pressedregretthat these relationswere so "thin" and "fragile."His William Saxbe, who arrivedseveralweeks later,has followed successor, a verylow-key fromWashington. posture, obviouslyon instructions The most serious set-backto Indo-Americanrelations in recent monthswas the decision of the AmericanGovernment, announced on February24, to liftthe 19-year-old embargoon arms sales to India and
13 See Girilal Jain, "A Balanced Foreign Policy: Coping with New Realities," TIhe Times of India, August 13, 1975.

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Pakistan,a decision that was welcomedin Pakistan and sharplycriticized in India. Indians were also indignantover non-official reactions in the U.S. to the emergency proclamationand subsequentevents,the cancellationof PresidentFord's plans to visit India, and a statement by the American Presidentthat was regarded as unduly critical of eventsin India. Toward the end of the year relationsseemed to take an upward turn.Y. B. Chavan made a successful visit to the United meetStatesin October,duringwhichhe co-chaired postponedfirst the ing of the Indo-U.S. Joint Commissionand had a lengthytalk with PresidentFord.
India in International Diplomacy:Throughout the year India was particularly activein international in diplomacy, spiteof its preoccupations visitsto the withinternalaffairs. January In Mrs. Gandhi made official Maldive Republic and Iraq, and in late April arid early May she participatedin the CommonwealthPrime Ministers' Conferencein Jamaica. PresidentFakhruddinAli made official visits to Hungary and Yugoslaviain late September and earlyOctober,and to Egyptand the Sudan in December. In addition to visits to the U.S. and to several countriesin Latin America and West and South Asia, Foreign MinisterChavan participated the meetingof the nonaligned coordinatin ing bureau in Havana, the nonalignedforeign conference in ministers' Lima, and the special and regular sessionsof the UN in New York. India gave special attentionto its relationswith the OPEC countries and with the nonalignedcountries It generally. continuedto press for of acceptanceof theresolutionof the UN General Assembly December 1971 declaringthe Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace and requesting the greatpowersto take action to removetheirmilitary presencefrom the area. It expressedparticularapprehensionover U.S. plans to expand the facilitieson the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia. But it continuedto oppose a UN General Assembly resolutionof 1974,sponof soredby Pakistan,forthe establishment a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia.

India? Whither The main questions relating to India in 1974 did not concern the directionof its externalrelations,but ratherthe course of its political and economicevolution,and particularly the questions of economic and political development."Everyproblem,"said Mrs. Gandhi the in inaugurating 56th sessionof the General Council of the Indian National Trade Union Conferencein New Delhi on November 15, "has to be seen in a largerperspective. What do we want to see forour What sort of a countrydo we want?" She pointed out that country? has "democracy been a changingconcept,"and thatin the modernage it had to accommodate"the conceptof greaterparticipation.""While we were struggling political freedom," observed,"we were confor she

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scious that political freedom was not the end. Our leaders were fully aware that freedomcould be real only if it broughta betterdeal to thosewho had been mostunderprivileged, mostoppressed.This needed a vast social and economic transformation our society." She had of concludedthat"the whole patternof development undertaken most by of the world is thewrongpatternof development India." She gave for no clear idea of the kind of Indian model of developmentthat she preferred, she did insistthat it mustbe one that could "reach out but to the poorestin the land."'4 Such a model has not yetemerged, either of duringthemore thana quarterof a century democratic government, or duringthe fewmonthsof emergency rule. This raisesquestionsand of suggests goals much morebasic than the preservation any particular kind of political system.
14 Extracts from Mrs. Gandhi's speech were printed in India News, XIV (December5, 1975).

of NORMAN D. PALMER is Professorof Political Science at the University Pennsylvania.