Institute of Engineering PULCHOWK CAMPUS

Tribhuwan University

A Report on GNSS

(Under Avionics Communication)

August

2012

Hari Prasad Bhattarai Nishant Shakya Prajwal Khatiwada Janardan Rimal

Group Members:

(065/BEX/414) (065/BEX/422) (065/BEX/425) (065/BEX/449)

Department of Electronics & Computer Engineering IOE,Pulchowk Campus

Submitted to: Mr. Sanjeeb Singh Kathayat Department of Electronics and Computer Engineering IOE, Pulchowk Campus

CONTENTS
HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................................................ 2 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Basic principles of GNSS ............................................................................................................................................... 5 GNSS ELEMENTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Sources of Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................................. 15 Evaluating GNSS vulnerabilities ............................................................................................................................ 17 Reducing the Likelihood of Unintentional Interference .......................................................................... 18 Mitigating the Effects of GNSS Outages............................................................................................................... 18 Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................. 21

HISTORY
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) were initially developed in the early seven- ties to improve global positioning and navigation from space. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was the first system to launch an operational prototype satellite in February of 1978. Shortly after, the number of GPS satellites in orbit increased to four but this was the absolute minimum to obtain a fix. More satellites would be needed if continuous global coverage was expected. GNSS constellations are constantly being expanded and upgraded but many of the initial designs and integrated systems on the original satellite are still found on newer satellites in the current GPS constellation. The first commercial GPS receivers were on the market in 1982. The receivers were large and bulky and could only track four satellites simultaneously. The satellites to track had to be selected manually on the receiver. Moreover, national geodetic agencies, research institutions and universities spent up to 250,000 for a single receiver. Today, modern receivers are much more sophisticated and can track GPS and GLONASS satellites simultaneously on more than 50 channels. Some of the latest receiver models can also track Galileo signals. Everything from satellite tracking to coordinate determination are computed automatically in real time. At the same time costs of new receivers continue to decrease. A high-end geodetic quality GNSS receiver costs around 20,000 . If a user is restricted to single-frequency, geodetic quality receivers, one would still have to spend 5,000 to 12,000 . In general this does not pose a problem in developed countries, but it may be a drawback in developing countries or for tasks where the surveyor needs a lot of receivers for specialized tasks such as monitoring.

INTRODUCTION

A satellite navigation or SAT NAV system is a system of satellites that provide autonomous geo-spatial positioning with global coverage. It allows small electronic receivers to determine their location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few meters using time signals transmitted along a line-of-sight by radio from satellites. Receivers calculate the precise time as well as position, which can be used as a reference for scientific experiments. A satellite navigation system with global coverage may be termed a Global NavigationSatelliteSystem or GNSS. The meaning of GNSS is the technical interoperability and compatibility between various satellite navigation systems such as modernized GPS(US), Galileo(European but under construction scheduled to complete by 2020), reconstructed GLONASS(Formerly USSR now Russia) to be used by civilian users without considering the nationalities of each system in order to promote the safety and convenience of life. Although both (GPS &GNSS)are national military systems, they are available for use by the international private and commercial communities. In Europe and other areas, concern was voiced about dependence on a foreign military system and plans for a civilian global navigation satellite system (GNSS) were put in place. Plans for the system are divided into two phases. The GNSS-1 is essentially an overlay for the existing systems and still relies on them. The second phase, GNSS-2, will be completely autonomous with a separate space segment.

Satellite navigation technology became of interest for agricultural applications in recent years. First experiments with automatic position detection for agriculturalvehicles, supported by DGPS, were conducted and names like precision farmingwere coined. DGPS applications with accuracy of some metres are used for precision farming. High-level accuracy of several centimetres is necessary for machine guidance applications. In the meantime, some manufacturers offer realtime kinematic receivers with an accuracy of 1 cm (horizontal) and 3 cm (vertical) with an update rate of 1 Hz, or 2 cm and 5 cm (rate, 5 Hz). A system for machine guidance will fulfill the accuracy requirements for precision farming but not vice versa. The measurement of the attitude of a vehicle with accuracy of up to 0.1 is possible with multiple antenna arrangements. Such accuracy is needed for autonomous guidance (Bell, 1999) to measure and compensate vehicle movements caused byto measure and compensate vehicle movements caused by rough terrain and slopes. Another task for satellite navigation in the future will be the measurement of true ground speed of agricultural vehicles. At the moment, the GPS is unable to measure low velocity; for this reason, radar and wheel sensors are used to measure speed. Taking into account the anticipated satellite navigation technology developments for the near future, it seems that the implementation of modern navigation equipment will increase in the future. Many publications exist on the topic of satellite navigation in agriculture (for

example,Auernhammer, 1994). The development of a new satellite-based navigation system has started and will have a great impact on the agricultural sector, because the users will become independent from foreign military systems. In the long term, it is not acceptable to base the navigation applications for industry, agriculture or the private sector on systems that can be degraded
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or switched off without warning. This is one of the main reasons for building a civilianoperated satellite navigation system.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF GNSS

The main principle behind a satellite navigation system is the creation of a trilateration from any point on the earths surface to the satellites in view. The distance to the satellites is measured by the time the radio signal needs to reach the receiver. Because a radio signal travels with the speed of light, highly precise clocks are used. The satellites contain atomic clocks, and the receivers advanced quartz clocks. The distance to the satellite can be calculated by multiplying the travel time by the speed of light (approximately 300 000 km:s). The exact location of the satellite in space is a prerequisite for this procedure. This is possible because the orbits are very stable and predictable. The satellites are observed and controlled by ground stations, which put the spatial information into the signal. These are the so-called ephemeris data (orbit of one satellite) and almanac data (relation between all of the satellites). Additionally, information on the satellite clocks is transmitted. In principle, three satellites must be available to determine a three-dimensional position. All points, which have the
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same distance to one satellite, form a spherical surface with the satellite in the centre. Three spherical surfaces intersect in two points. One point can be disregarded, because its position is located too far from the earth. A fourth signal is necessary to eliminate the time difference between the satellites atomic clocks and the receivers quartz clocks. This technique allows the use of inexpensive clocks in user equipment. After all, four satellites are necessary to determine a three-dimensional position. Another satellite is needed for integrity monitoring (quality control and identification of satellite malfunction).One more additional satellite is needed to identify the deficient satellite. The probability of receiving four or more GPS satellites with good geometry, quantified by a position dilution of precision (PDOP) of less than six and an elevation higher than 5 is about 99%. This is, however, a 24-h global average, and not a guarantee for the availability at a special place and time on Earth. The main influences on accuracy are: the geometric position of the satellites (PDOP); clock errors of the satellites; ephemeris errors; tropospheric and ionospheric conditions; multipath effects; inaccuracies of the receiver; GPS: artificial deterioration of clock and ephemeris data for civil users by the US Department of Defence (SA).

GNSS ELEMENTS
The GNSS consist of three main satellite technologies: GPS, Glonass and Galileo. Each of them consists mainly of three segments: (a) space segment, (b) control segment and (c) user segment. These segments are almost similar in the three satellite technologies, which are all together make up the GNSS. As of today, the complete satellite technology is the GPS technology and most of the existing worldwide applications related to the GPS technology. The GNSS technology will become clearer after the operation of Galileo and the reconstruction of GLONASS in the next few years.

Figure 1Differences GPS:GLONASS

Global Positioning System components: There are four GPS satellite signals that are used to compute positions in three dimensions and the time offset in the receiver clock. GPS comprises three main components: - Space segment: The Space Segment of the system consists of the GPS satellites; as inFigure1. These space vehicles (SVs) send radio signals from space as shown in Figure 2. - Control segment: The Control Segment consists of a system of tracking stations located around the world. The Master Control facility is located at Schriever Air Force Base (formerly Falcon AFB) in the State of Colorado, USA. - User segment: The GPS User Segment consists of the GPS receivers and the user community. GPS receivers convert space vehicle (SV) signals into position, velocity, and time estimates.

Figure 1Figure 1. GPS Constellation

Figure 2. GPS Satellite Signals

The satellites are dispersed in six orbital planes on almost circular orbits with an altitude of about 20,200 km above the surface of the Earth, inclined by 55 degree with respect to the
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equator and with orbital periods of approximately 11 hours 58 minutes (half a sidereal day). The categories are Block I, Block II, Block IIR (R for replenishment) and Block IIA (A foradvanced) and a further follow-on category Block IIF has also been planned (ICD-GPS, 2003). Figure 3 shows the main GPS segments. Figure3

Figure 3. GPS segments (Aerospace Corporation, 2003).

GLONASS
The GLONASS (GLObalNAvigation Satellite System or

GLObalnayaNAvigatsionnayaSputnikovayaSistema is nearly identical to GPS. Glonass satellite-based radio-navigation system provides the positioning and timing information to users. It is operated by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (GLONASS-ICD, 2002). Glonass space segment is consist of 24 satellites, equally distributed in 3 orbit separated by 120o in the equatorial plane. Satellite orbital altitude is about 19,130 km above the ground surface. GALILEO GALILEO is Europes initiative for a state-of-the-art global navigation satellite system, providing a highly accurate, guaranteed global positioning service under civilian control. Galileo will be not too different from the other GNSS parts (modernized GPs and Glonass (Salgado etal., 2001). It will provide autonomous navigation and positioning services, but at the same time will be interoperable with the two other global satellite navigation systems; the GPS and GLONASS. A user will be able to take a position with the same receiver from any of the satellites in any combination. By providing dual frequencies as standard, however, GALILEO will deliver real-time positioning accuracy down to the meter range. It will guarantee availability of the service under all, but the most extreme circumstances and will inform users within seconds of a failure of any satellite. This will make it appropriate for applications where safety is vital, such as running trains, guiding cars and landing aircraft. The combined use of GALILEO and other GNSS systems can offer much improved

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performance for all kinds of users worldwide. The first satellite of Galileo system (GIOVE A) was been lunched in 27th December 2005.

OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES OF GNSS Being global in scope, GNSS is fundamentally different from traditional navigational aids(NAVAIDs). It has the potential to support all phases of flight by providing seamless global navigation guidance. This could eliminate the need for a variety of ground and airborne systems that were designed to meet specific requirements for certain phases of flight. The first approvals to use GNSS came in 1993, supporting en-route (domestic and oceanic), terminal and non-precision approach (NPA) operations. The approvals, based on ABAS, came with operational restrictions but delivered significant benefits to aircraft operators. GNSS provides accurate guidance in remote and oceanic areas where it is impractical or too costly or impossible to provide reliable and accurate traditional NAVAID guidance. Many States employ GNSSto deliver improved service to aircraft operators while at the same time avoiding the cost of fielding traditionalNAVAIDs. Even in areas well served by traditional NAVAIDs, GNSS supports area navigation operations, allowing aircraft to follow more efficient flight paths. GNSS brings this capability within the economic reach of all aircraft operators. This allows States to design en-route and terminal airspace for maximum capacity and minimum delays.

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The availability of accurate GNSS-based guidance on departure supports efficient noise abatement procedures. It allows greater flexibility in routings, where terrain is a restricting factor, providing the possibility of lower climb gradients and higher payloads.

GNSS can improve airport usability, through lower minima, without the need to install a NAVAID at the airport. GNSS may support approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) on all runways, with proper consideration of aerodrome standards for physical characteristics, marking and lighting . When a landing threshold is displaced, the flexibility inherent in GNSS can allow continued operations with vertical guidance to the new threshold. GNSS may also be used to support surface operations.

In suitably equipped aircraft, the availability of accurate GNSS position, velocity and time may be used additionally to support such functions as automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) and controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC).

The availability of GNSS guidance will allow the phased decommissioning of some or all of the traditional NAVAIDs. This will decrease costs in the longer term, resulting in savings for airspace users. Even in the early stages of GNSS implementation, States may be able to avoid the cost of replacing existing NAVAIDs. Planning for the decommissioning of traditional NAVAIDs depends on the availability of GNSS service in a particular airspace and on the proportion of aircraft equipped for GNSS. There are a number of issues affecting availability, which are discussed in Chapter 4 of this manual.

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GNSS can be implemented in stages, providing increasing operational benefits at each stage. This allows aircraft operators to decide, based on weighing of operational benefits against cost, when to equip with GNSS avionics.

GNSS LIMITATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ISSUES While GNSS offers significant benefits, the technology has its limitations and brings with it a number of institutional issues. In approving GNSS operations, States should take account of these limitations and issues. A transition to GNSS represents a major change for all members of the aviation community. It affects aircraft operators, pilots, air traffic services (ATS) and regulatory personnel. States should therefore plan such a transition carefully and in close consultation with all involved parties. The global nature of GNSS also dictates close coordination with other States. These considerations, coupled with the pace of development of GNSS technology and applications, challenge air navigation service providers to dedicate resources, move quickly and retain flexibility in order to meet the demands of their customers for GNSS services. A challenge for GNSS is the achievement of a high availability of service. The first GNSS approvals relied on traditional NAVAIDs as a back-up when insufficient satellites were in view. SBAS and GBAS are designed to enhance, inter alia, GNSS performance in terms of availability. Interference with GNSS signals directly affects availability. While it is possible to interfere with signals from traditional NAVAIDs, these aids have limited service
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volumes when compared with GNSS, so interference with GNSS signals can affect more aircraft simultaneously. States should assess the likelihood of unintentional and intentional interference, including the effects of such occurrences on aircraft operations. If necessary, special measures have to be implemented to minimize these effects While GNSS has the potential to support better approaches to more runways at relatively low cost, approach minima also depend on the physical characteristics of the aerodrome and on infrastructure such as lighting. States should therefore consider the cost of meeting aerodrome standards when planning for new GNSSbased approaches or approaches with lower minima. The safety of GNSS navigation depends on the accuracy of navigation databases. States should therefore ensure data integrity when developing new procedures. Additionally, procedures andsystems should be in place to ensure the integrity of the data as they are processed for use in avionics.

GNSS VULNERABILITY 1, The most notable GNSS vulnerability lies in the potential for interference, which exists in all radio navigation bands. As with any navigation system, the users of GNSS navigation signals should be protected from harmful interference resulting in the degradation of navigation performance. 2. The GNSS SARPs require a specified level of performance in the presence of levels of interference as defined by the receiver interference mask. These interference levels are generally consistent with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regulations.
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Interference at levels above the mask may cause degradation or even loss of service, but such interference is not allowed to result in hazardously misleading information (HMI). 3. GPS and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) have filings with the ITU to operate, using spectrum allocated to the Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS) in the 1 559 1 610 MHz and 1 164 1 215 MHz bands. The RNSS allocation in these bands is shared with the Aeronautical Radionavigation Service (ARNS). SBAS also has a filing under the RNSS allocation in the former band. GBAS is operated in the 108 117.975 MHz band, shared with ILS and VOR (ARNS).

SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY
1. There are a number of sources of potential interference to GNSS from both in-band and out-of-band sources. Of particular concern is the use of the 1 559 1 610 MHz band by point-to-point microwave links that are allowed by a number of States. The use of these links, as stated in footnotes 5.362B and 5.362C in the Radio Regulations of the ITU, is due to be phased out starting in 2005 and completed by no later than 2015. In addition, no new links should be permitted. 2. Unintentional interference. The likelihood and operational effect of interference vary with the environment. Unintentional interference is not considered a significant threat provided that States exerciseproper control and protection over the electromagnetic spectrum for both existing and new frequency allocations. Furthermore, the introduction of GNSS signals on new frequencies will ensure that unintentional interference does not cause

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the complete loss of GNSS service (outage) although enhanced services depending upon the availability of both frequencies might be degraded by such interference. 3. Intentional interference. The risk of intentional interference depends upon specific issues that must be addressed by States. For States that determine that the risk is unacceptable in specific areas, operational safety and efficiency can be maintained by adopting an effective mitigation strategy through a combination of on-board mitigation techniques (e.g. use of inertial navigation system (INS)), procedural methods and terrestrial navigation aids. 4. Ionosphere. Scintillation can cause loss of GNSS satellite signals in the equatorial and auroralregions, but is unlikely to cause complete loss of GNSS service and will be mitigated with the addition of new GNSS signals and satellites. Ionospheric changes may limit the SBAS and GBAS services that can beprovided in the equatorial region using a single GNSS frequency. These changes must be considered whendesigning operations based on the augmentation systems. 5. Other vulnerabilities. System failure, operational errors and discontinuation of service could be significantly mitigated by independently managed constellations, funding and robust system design. Spoofing, the intentional corruption of signals to cause an aircraft to deviate and follow a false flight path, is mitigated through normal procedures and independent ground and collision avoidance systems.

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EVALUATING GNSS VULNERABILITIES

1. There are three principal aspects to be considered in the evaluation of GNSS vulnerabilities. a) Interference and atmospheric (ionosphere) effects are of primary concern. Operational experience is the best way to assess the likelihood of unintentional interference. Each State must consider the motivation to intentionally interfere with GNSS based on the potential safety and economic impacts on aviation and non-aviation applications. Atmospheric effects are unlikely to cause a total loss (outage) of GNSS but may impact some services (e.g. approaches with vertical guidance in equatorial regions). The likelihood of specific effects can be categorized as negligible, unlikely or probable. b) All operations and services dependent on GNSS should be identified and considered together, since GNSS interference can potentially disrupt all GNSS receivers at the same time over a certain area. GNSS is used for navigation services as well as other services such as precision timing with communications and radar systems, and may also be used for ADS services. In these cases, GNSS represents a potential common point of failure. c) The impact of a GNSS outage on an operation or service should be assessed by considering the types of operations, traffic density, availability of independent surveillance and communications and other factors. The impact can be categorized as none, moderate or severe.

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REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNINTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE

1. On-aircraft interference can be prevented by proper installation of GNSS equipment, itsintegration with other aircraft systems (e.g. shielding, antenna separation and out-ofband filtering) and restrictions on the use of portable electronic devices on board aircraft. 2. Spectrum management. Effective spectrum management is the primary means of mitigating unintentional interference from man-made transmitters. Operational experience has indicated that the threat of unintentional interference can be virtually eliminated by applying effective spectrum management. There are three aspects of effective spectrum management, namely: a) creation of regulations/laws that control the use of spectrum; b) enforcement of those regulations/laws; and c) vigilance in evaluating new radio frequency (RF) sources (new systems) to ensure that they do not interfere with GNSS.

MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF GNSS OUTAGES

1. There are three principal methods currently available for mitigating the effects of GNSS outageson aircraft operations when GNSS supports navigation services. They are: a) by taking advantage of existing on-board equipment such as inertial navigation systems and implementing advanced GNSS capabilities and GNSS receiver
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technologies (e.g. application of multiple constellations and frequencies, adaptive antennas, etc.); b) by employing procedural (pilot or air traffic control) methods, taking due consideration of the workload and technical implications of the application of such mitigations in the relevant airspace. Particular issues that need to be considered include: the impact that the loss of navigation will have on other functions such as surveillance in an ADS environment; and the potential for providing the necessary increase in aircraft route spacing and/or separation in the airspace under consideration; and c) by taking advantage of terrestrial radio navigation aids used as a back-up to GNSS or integrated with GNSS. In identifying an appropriate terrestrial infrastructure, due account should be taken of the following factors. Increased reliance is being placed upon the use of RNAV operations. DME provides the most appropriate terrestrial navigation infrastructure for such operations, as it provides an input to multi-sensor navigation systems which allow continued RNAV operation in both en-route and terminal airspace. This same capability can be used for RNAV approach operations if the DME coverage is sufficient. If it is determined that an alternate precision approach service is needed, instrument landing system (ILS) or microwave landing system (MLS) may be used.
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This would likely entail retaining a minimum number of such systems at an airport or within an areaunder consideration. 2. States wishing to approve GNSS-based operations should ensure that existing frequency assignments in the 1 559 1 610 MHz band and the 1 164 1 215 MHz band that have the potential to interfere with those GNSS operations be moved to other frequency assignments or bands, where feasible. 3. For GBAS, frequency coordination is necessary to ensure that other transmitters in the 108 117.975 MHz or adjacent bands (e.g. ILS, VOR, VHF Digital Link 4 (VDL-4) and FM stations) do not cause harmful interference. 4. Timing vulnerabilities need to be addressed through system design. The current practice of time transfer makes use of GNSS but it also uses alternative methods as back-ups. Suitable system design can result in the ability to meet required timing accuracies for many days and sometimes indefinitely in the absence of GNSS.

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SUMMARY

In their planning and introduction of GNSS services, countries should: a) assess the sources of vulnerability in their airspace and utilize, as necessary b) provide effective spectrum management and protection of GNSS frequencies to reduce the possibility of unintentional interference; c) take full advantage of on-board mitigation techniques, particularly inertial navigation systems; d) where it is determined that terrestrial navigation aids need to be retained as part of an evolutionary transition to GNSS, give priority to the retention of DME in support of INS/DME or DME/DME RNAV for en-route and terminal operations, and to the retention of ILS or MLS in support of precision approach operations at selected runways; and e) take full advantage of the future contribution of new GNSS signals and constellations in the reduction of GNSS vulnerabilities.

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