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Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (IEM3) Paper PR28 THE SEISMIC SAFETY EVALUATION PROGRAMME OF THE ATUCHA I (CNA-I) NPP-ARGENTINA AT THE LIGHT OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NPP ACCIDENT
Technical Session 2: Seismic and Tsunami Safety
A.R. Godoy and J.J. Johnson (James J. Johnson & Associates) Alicia Couto and Carolina Romano (Nucleoelctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA))
Background: Atucha I
Atucha I
PHWR (Heavy water reactor) - KWU (Germany), 357 MWe capacity; CNA I started in June 1968 and commercial operation in June 1974; 72% availability over 37 years; Internal event PRA models; Operator - Nucleoelctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA) No seismic design.
Main Objectives of the Seismic Safety Evaluation Programme for Atucha I NPP
Evaluate and quantify the seismic capacity of CNA-I
Ability to cope with a specified earthquake ground motion at the site CNA-I as-is conditions Estimate the seismic safety margin defined by High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Take into account the lessons learned from the experience of all recent strong earthquakes in Japan and their effects on nuclear power plants.
Specific Objectives of the Seismic Safety Evaluation Programme for Atucha I NPP
Demonstrate the seismic safety margin conditional on Review Level Earthquake ground motion (RLE) Confirm no cliff edge effects exist Identify weak links and vulnerabilities in physical and operational aspects due to seismic events. Provide input for risk informed decision making. Identify and prioritize possible upgrades.
Phase 2: Development of the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, Training Class
SSEL for walkdown April 2012, Final August 2012
Easy fixes (cabinet top bracing, raised floors, batteries/battery racks, DG flooding potential) Many easy fixes were installed during outage!!
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Phase 2: Development and Review of Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, and Training Course
Success paths
Two for safe shutdown - one mitigates small LOCA; Containment and containment isolation; Spent fuel cooling. Refuelling Machine and tilting bottle (continuous operation) Fire extinction system
NA-SA-CNA I personnel (systems, operations and engineering staff) developed success paths (training and peer reviewed by JJJ Team) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
627 items In accordance with methods applied to address Fukushima issues, e.g., European stress tests
Phase 2: Development and Review of Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, and Training Course Training Course:
Familiarity and training NA-SA staff in Seismic Evaluation Methods (SMA and GIP) approaches for Plant Walkdown (Phase 4) and maintaining seismic capacity in the future (configuration control) Participants
Atucha I and II, Embalse, NA-SA Headquarters, CAREM (about 25 personnel) Systems, engineering (civil/structural, mechanical, electrical, I&C, etc.), operations Completed 5- 9 March 2012 Buenos Aires (Monday Thursday) and Atucha site (Friday) Training materials delivered (hard copy, electronic copy)
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Phase 3: Seismic Response and Structure Capacity Evaluation: Part 1 Seismic Response
Seismic response
Structures and buildings housing SSEL systems and components Seismic demand (80% NEP conditional on RLE)
In-structure response spectra generated at the levels required by the location of the SSEL items Forces/moments in structures for capacity evaluation
Structures to be analyzed (5) Demonstrated in many studies to be one of the most important elements in seismic safety evaluation programmes
Excessive conservatism leads to un-needed upgrades and modifications and may lead to mis-identification of important contributors to HCLPF or risk Key for fracture mechanics evaluation of RCS as in CNA-II
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0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
Frequency (Hz)
10.00
100.00
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Status
Detailed plant walkdown 4 weeks, completed 4 May 2012 Documentation near completion
HCLPF calculations on-going
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Advantages
Consistent electronic record of walkdown results long term storage, printed copies, revisions for future activities Summary Excel table yielding data for decision-making (operator, regulator, reviewers)
Disadvantages
Dressed out use difficult Need additional photos from those of iPad lighting, resolution
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Feedwater tank floor above day tank no anchorage - block wall adjacent
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Building
Reactor Building-S Reactor Building-S Reactor Building-S Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building CNAI - CNAII CNAII CNAII CNAII
Floor Item Room Row/Col/ Elevation Elevation No. Cabinet (m) (m)
0.50 0.50 0.50 6.00 6.00 23.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 -2.00?? 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.50 0.47 0.47 0.00 1.70 1.70 2.00 2.00 -2.00?? 1.50 0.00 0.00 1-307 1-307 1-307 2-311 2-311 2-600 2-600 2-600 -600 2-600 Tunnel CNAII CNAII CNAII
TB11S06 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-251 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-252 TB21S06 TB31S06 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-253 HA51 Cabinet I&CP SEWS-05-002 HB53 Cabinet I&CP SEWS-05-003 RA01S04 AOV SEWS-13-001 Pressure safety valve (m RA01S06 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-004 RA02S06 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-005 RA07S01 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-006 RA07S02 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-007 IXION CABLE C Cable DS SEWS-26-008 Cabinet IXIONCabinet IXION I&CP SEWS-05-010 BAZ16 Switchgears MCC, LVS, MVSSEWS-01-011 XKA -20 Diesel Generator EG SEWS-09-009
HA HB RA RA RA RA RA IX IX IX IX
1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01
Equipment ID No.
BELOW Lead for CAP SPEC DEM SPEC CAP>DEM? EVAL OK? AUX EVAL RELAY OK? ANCHOR INTER OK? Master EQUIP OK? same / ROB with Same as Similar to ~40'? (B) (B) (B) (C) OK? (D) (E) OK? (F) (G) for ROB? (B) similar?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA N/A 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak ISRS ISRS ISRS ISRS ISRS N/A RLE Peak RLE Peak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown N/A N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown Yes Yes Yes Yes No No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Unknown Unknown L No No L No No L No L No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No M No TB11S06 TB11S06 HA51
TB11S06 TB21S06 TB31S06 HA51 HB53 RA01S04 RA01S06 RA02S06 RA07S01 RA07S02 IXION CABLE C Cabinet IXION BAZ16 XKA -20
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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Future Activities
Phase 5 Configuration Management Essential to maintain seismic capacity of CNA-I Procedures to be developed
Designs include engineering Sign offs on new installations and replacement items engineering, systems, operations Can use SEWS methodology as aid and documentation
Containment and containment systems evaluated to seismic hazard probability of exceedance of 10-5
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Future Activities
Geotechnical to be evaluated (steep slope pump house and plant grade, etc.) Seismically- induced fire and flooding evaluation Collaboration with CNA-I fire and flooding experts In-building seismically induced flood (sprinkler system, tank failures, etc.) - completed during walkdown Yard sources of seismically induced flood External to plant boundary flood potential Consequences to turbine building DG flooding, etc.
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Future Activities
Seismic instrumentation
None installed. In the process of procurement. Shutdown and re-start decisions difficult if earthquake ground motion is felt
Operations
Need procedures to address occurrence of ground motion at Atucha site. IAEA SR 66 is being used. Training
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THANK YOU
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