Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The
non-government
organizations
(NGOs)
in
the
microfinance
(MF)
sector
are
expected to play a vital role in the delivery of financial services to the low-income group, particularly in rural areas, because of their comparative advantage over other types of organizations. The NGOs are able to reach the poor better than other entities and are also more efficient in the use of their assets in serving the poor. However, silent opposition against income tax imposition has been brewing among the NGOs since the rule was implemented, but nobody has initiated collective action to lobby the position of the NGOs. The Microfinance Council of the Philippines (MCPI) now takes it upon itself as the national network of microfinance institutions to make a stand on behalf of its member-NGOs. The income tax imposition in 2007 on these NGO-MFIs, which are supposedly tax-exempt entities, has resulted in the following arguments and issues: The inconsistency in implementation has created, or will create sooner or later, an artificial competitive advantage among some players, thus disrupting the market forces. Income tax imposition creates inefficiency in a mechanism aimed at redistributing wealth to the poor. Income tax imposition could lead to eventual market deadweight losses, as NGOs could pass the tax burden to the micro entrepreneurs, who in turn, could leave their enterprises. If income tax is imposed on the NGO-MFIs indiscriminately, then it should be imposed as well on all other types of NGOs. With the MCPI as the client, this policy analysis aims to come up with a solution that will serve the interests of the main stakeholdersthe NGOs in the sector, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the social investors or donors, and finally, the poor or the MF clients. Bases for evaluation of policy alternatives are equity, efficiency, political acceptability, and ease of implementation. Four policy alternatives are considered: 1. Status quo 2. Apply income tax of 5 percent on gross income from microfinance transactions of the NGO-MFIs
3. Impose tax of 32 percent (based on current corporate tax) on net income from non-MF source 4. Exempt NGO-MFIs from income tax as long as they apply for exemption and meet the required performance standards. It is recommended that tax-exemption be extended to the NGOs that apply and meet the performance standards. It favors all four stakeholders in terms of promoting equity and efficiency (except for those NGOs who will not meet the standards). Although it may encounter some problems in the area of political acceptability and ease of implementation, these matters may be addressed before the policy takes effect. To address the potential problem in implementing this policy, it is imperative for the MCPI to consult the NGOs, big and small alike, in setting the performance standards to be used as bases for tax exemption. The reinforcement of PCNCs function as an accrediting body for the NGOs is critical in the implementation, particularly in evaluating the NGOs performance, thus MCPI has to gain the cooperation of this agency. As for the NGOs adopting a new system for client profiling, the cost-benefit presentation is key to influencing the NGOs. The NGOs must realize that adopting a new system is cheaper in the long run than paying 2 percent tax on gross income. Market deadweight losses due to the micro entrepreneurs leaving their enterprises for potential employment or contractual labor can also be avoided if the NGOs are made to realize that it will be cheaper for them to work on their efficiency than to pass on the burden of tax to clients. The average price elasticity of the NGOs is -7.039. This figure means that for every one percent increase in loan interest (e.g. 1 percent of 36 percent interest on loan), an NGO will lose seven clients. At worst, it could be 128 clients per 1 percent increase in interest. Finally, it is necessary for the MCPI to lobby for the amendment of the Republic Act 8425 Sec. 3J to expand the definition of microfinance from merely a credit and savings mobilization program to include other financial services extended to the micro level and intended to create social benefits, such as the micro insurance. Although the amendment will not affect the proposed policy solution, it could be an opportune time to address this matter together with issue of income tax imposition on the NGOs.
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
AND
STATEMENT
OF
POLICY
PROBLEM....................................................................1
Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1
Problem..................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Client .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Beneficiaries............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Role
of
the
Policy
Analyst .................................................................................................................................................. 6
PRESENTATION
OF
CRITERIA
FOR
EVALUATING
THE
POLICY
OPTIONS .................................. 22
APPLICATION
OF
CRITERIA
AND
PROJECTION
OF
OUTCOMES ...................................................... 24
RECOMMENDATION ............................................................................................................................................ 39
WORKS
CITED ......................................................................................................................................................... 42
INCOME TAX IMPOSITION ON NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR
INTRODUCTION
AND
STATEMENT
OF
POLICY
PROBLEM
Background
of
the
Policy
Task
Silent
opposition
against
income
tax
imposition
has
been
brewing
among
the
non-government
organizations
(NGOs)
engaged
in
microfinance
since
the
rule
was
implemented
in
2007,
but
nobody
has
initiated
collective
action
to
define,
articulate,
and
lobby
the
position
of
the
NGOs.
While
some
NGOs
are
religiously
monitored
by
the
local
Bureau
of
Internal
Revenue
(BIR)
office,
others
are
preparing
for
the
eventual
audit
of
the
agency,
which
they
anticipate
could
happen
any
time
soon.
The
Microfinance
Council
of
the
Philippines
(MCPI)
now
takes
it
upon
itself
as
the
national
network
of
microfinance
institutions
to
make
a
stand
on
behalf
of
its
member-NGOs.
Further,
the
author
asked
one
of
the
key
social
investors
on
the
burning
issues
in
the
sector
and
income
tax
imposition
was
the
top
concern
identified.
Since
the
author
closely
works
with
the
MCPI
and
this
social
investor,
the
policy
analysis
task
is
a
good
venue
to
formally
assess
the
options
of
the
NGO-MFIs
in
relation
to
this
tax
issue.
access
to
financial
services.
Organizations
involved
in
microfinance
may
be
wholesalers
(i.e.
those
who
lend
to
microfinance
institutions)
and
retailers
(i.e.
those
who
extend
financial
services
directly
to
poor
individuals).
The
retailers
or
microfinance
institutions
(MFIs)
may
be
banksmostly
rural
banks
and
cooperatives
bankscooperatives,
and
non-government
organizations
(NGOs).
Based
on
the
MIX
Market
data,
the
NGOs
served
almost
67
percent
of
the
countrys
microfinance
beneficiaries
in
2009.
The
rural
banks
covered
32
percent
of
the
total
number
of
microfinance
borrowers
and
the
rest
were
part
of
the
cooperative.
Because
of
the
differences
in
their
nature
of
ownership
and
operations,
different
tax
laws
govern
banks,
cooperatives,
and
NGOs
that
are
engaged
in
microfinance.
While
banks
are
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Bangko
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas
and
the
cooperatives
under
the
Cooperative
Development
Authority,
the
NGOs
are
pretty
much
left
on
their
own
except
for
their
accreditation
as
donee
institutions,
which
is
a
function
of
the
Philippine
Council
for
NGO
Certification,
Inc.
(PCNC).
The
NGOs
are
registered
in
the
Security
and
Exchange
Commission
as
not-for-profit
corporations
and
as
such
they
are
covered
by
the
tax-exemption
law
under
the
Tax
Reform
Act
of
1997
or
Republic
Act
No.
8424
(Title
II,
Chapter
IV,
Sec.
30G;
see
Annex
2.).
In
2003,
the
BIR
issued
Revenue
Memorandum
Circular
No.
76-2003
(see
Annex
3.),
which
emphasized
that
although
non-stock,
non-profit
corporations
are
exempt
from
the
payment
of
tax
on
income
received
by
them
as
such
organization,
they
are
however,
subject
to
the
corresponding
revenue
taxes
on
their
income
derived
from
any
of
their
properties,
real
or
personal,
or
any
activity
conducted
for
profit
regardless
of
the
disposition
thereof
(i.e.
rental
payment
from
their
building/premises).
The
bureau
reasoned
in
its
memorandum
that
they
have
had
substantial
revenue
lossesdue
to
the
non-implementation
of
taxes
due
to
non-stock,
non-profit
corporations.
In
2007,
the
BIR
issued
yet
another
memorandum,
the
Revenue
Regulations
No.
14-2007,
which
aimed
to
rationalize
the
tax
exemptions
of
these
entities
[NGOs
engaged
in
microfinance]
based
on
existing
laws
and
regulations
and
the
relevant
tax
treatment
of
the
profits
derived
in
relation
to
their
delivery
of
microfinance
services.
Specifically,
the
regulation
stipulates
that
income
of
such
NGOs
from
microfinance
activities,
and
which
are
not
in
respect
of
their
registered
activities
covered
by
Section
30
of
the
Tax
Code
of
1997,
as
amended,
regardless
of
the
disposition
made
of
such
income,
shall
be
subject
to
tax
under
the
Tax
Code
of
1997,
as
amended.
(See
Annex
4.)
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
2
This
applied
tax
meant
32
percent
on
net
income
(Sec.27A)
or
2
percent
on
gross
income
(Sec.27E.1),
whichever
is
higher.
This
tax
regulation
on
the
NGO-MFIs
elicited
negative
reaction
from
the
sector.
The
NGO-MFIs
believe
that
this
revenue
regulation
leaves
much
room
for
BIR
examiners
in
the
field
to
interpret
or
misinterpret
the
provisions
under
this
section
and
therefore,
there
is
a
need
to
propose
revisions
or
additions
to
this
particular
section
to
clarify
the
regulation.
(Microfinance
Council
of
the
Philippines)
Indeed,
depending
on
the
BIR
officer
assigned
in
the
NGOs
areas,
the
32-percent
tax
is
applied
either
on
the
total
net
income
of
the
NGO
or
on
its
other
income
such
as
rent.
This
inconsistency
in
implementation
has
created
artificial
competitive
advantage
among
some
players,
thus
disrupting
the
market
forces
or
the
level
playing
field.
In
2009
alone,
for
example,
the
BIR
could
have
collected
income
tax
from
the
19
NGO-MFIs
registered
under
the
MIX
Market
amounting
to
Php151.8
million,
that
is,
if
32
percent
on
net
income
were
applied.
Although
taxes
are
intended
to
redistribute
wealth,
in
practice
and
as
written
also
in
literature,
hardly
are
taxes
used
in
this
manner.
The
NGO-MFIs
argue
that
this
amount
could
have
been
used
to
increase
the
loan
portfolio
extended
to
the
poor
as
micro
capital,
instead
of
giving
back
to
the
governmentsomething
that
is
against
the
very
essence
of
R.A.
8425,
which
supports
microfinance
through
policies
that
promote
expansion,
among
others.
In
the
given
example,
the
Php151.8
million
could
have
been
given
as
start-up
capital
to
some
30,365
poor
households.
Therefore,
tax
imposition
will
create
inefficiency
in
a
mechanism
aimed
at
redistributing
wealth
to
the
poor.
Further,
some
NGO-MFIs
said
that
they
have
no
choice
but
to
pass
on
the
tax
to
the
micro
borrowers
to
keep
their
operations
sustainable,
making
the
poors
cost
of
capital
higher.
In
turn,
such
an
increase
will
likewise
raise
the
hurdle
rate
or
return
on
investment
required
of
the
micro
entrepreneurs
(as
it
is,
the
interest
on
micro
loans
is
already
high
at
an
average
effective
rate
of
50
percent
per
annum).
Based
on
rational
expectation,
these
micro
entrepreneurs
would
either
pass
on
the
cost
of
doing
business
to
the
end-consumers
or
would
be
squeezed
out
of
the
market
(and
resort
to
pamamasukan/informal
employment,
which
is
neither
always
available
nor
always
a
better
option).
In
this
sense,
tax
imposition
might
lead
to
eventual
market
deadweight
losses.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
3
Still, some NGO-MFIs have been clamoring that they be exempt from the income tax because 1) they do not operate to generate profit and 2) they are governments allies in advancing the social reform agenda (to put it bluntly, they are doing governments job). International funding agencies that normally provide equity to the NGOs in the form of grants support these NGO-MFIs stand. According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (2002) or CGAP1, the reason for exemption from profit tax is the principle that the NGO is rendering a recognized public benefit and does not distribute its net surpluses into the pockets of private shareholders or other insiders, but rather reinvests them to finance more socially beneficial work. (Although) There are always ways to evade the spirit of this non-distribution principle, such as excessive compensation and below market loans to insidersthese potential abuses probably occur no more commonly in NGOs engaged in micro lending than in other types of NGOs. (Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest) It is a known practice that some NGOs, not only in microfinance, are created by for-profit organizations for tax purposes (as tax shield or for tax deduction and/or exemption). Thus, if income tax will be imposed on the NGO-MFIs, then it should be imposed as well on all other types of NGOs. From policy analysis perspective, microfinance service is characterized by rivalrous consumptionthat is, the money borrowed by one client cannot be used by anotherand by excludable ownershipthat is, service providers have full control and ownership of the services. By these virtues, microfinance service is a private good where market forces or competition has been working well for more than two decades now. According to Bardach (2005), when markets are working reasonably well, it is hard for government to intervene without creating important inefficiencies in the economy, inefficiencies which would likely make the sum of private troubles even greater than they were previously. This is precisely the case of the income tax imposition on NGO-MFIs by the government.
1
CGAP
is
made
up
of
29
international
donor
agencies
that
support
microfinance.
Page 4
Problem
The
income
tax
imposition
on
the
NGO-MFIs
resulted
in
the
following
arguments
and
issues:
The
inconsistency
in
implementation
has
created,
or
will
create
sooner
or
later,
an
artificial
competitive
advantage,
thus
disrupting
the
market
forces
or
the
level
playing
field.
Tax
imposition
creates
inefficiency
in
a
mechanism
aimed
at
redistributing
wealth
to
the
poor.
Tax
imposition
could
lead
to
eventual
market
deadweight
losses,
as
micro
entrepreneurs
leave
their
enterprises
for
potential
employment.
If
income
tax
is
imposed
on
the
NGO-MFIs
indiscriminately,
then
it
should
be
imposed
as
well
on
all
other
types
of
NGOs.
Client
The
Microfinance
Council
of
the
Philippines,
Inc.
(MCPI)
is
the
only
national
MF
network
in
the
country
composed
of
38
MFIs
and
7
support
organizations.
It
aims
to
promote
poverty
alleviation
by
supporting
the
MFIs
ethical
and
inclusive
financial
and
non-financial
services,
and
provide
capacity
building
programs
to
its
member- organizations.
It
also
aims
to
achieve
excellence
in
governance,
stewardship,
and
service
towards
staff,
clients,
and
communities.
As
such,
MCPI
wants
to
make
a
stand
on
the
tax
issue
based
on
rational
analysis.
The
MCPI
posits
that
paying
taxes
is
justifiable,
as
long
as
it
will
not
make
the
microfinance
market
less
efficient.
In
fact,
MCPI
considers
making
tax
work
for
the
sector
by
incentivizing
those
NGOs
that
cater
to
the
very
poor
clients
and
to
those
in
hard-to-reach
and/or
high-risk
areas.
However,
one
limitation
of
this
proposition
is
that
not
all
NGOs
determine
the
poverty
status
of
their
clients
or
have
the
capacity/technology
to
do
so.2
2
In
2004,
a
pilot
study
shows
that
some
NGOs
non-poor
clients
upon
entry
into
the
program
comprised
about
40
Page 5
Beneficiaries
Although
the
NGO-MFIs
are
bound
to
benefit
from
the
policy
resolution
that
this
paper
aims
to
contribute,
the
projected
social
benefit
will
spillover
to
the
microfinance
clientsthe
poor
Filipino
households
in
general.
Page 6
Source:
Weimer
and
Vining
(1999).
Policy
Analysis:
Concepts
and
Practice
(42)
Page 7
worth of asset to do the same. The average cost per borrower of an NGO is US$70, while a banks is US$118. However, there are some areas that the NGOs prove inefficient or make one wonder if the NGOs are using its funds properly. Some NGOs invests heavily on capital such that the NGOs capital to asset ratio averages 27 percent, compared to the banks 17 percent average. The bank with the highest capital-asset ratio registered 44 percent, which is still lower than three NGOs with ratio from 49 percent to 61 percent. Some NGOs indicate under-utility of funds, that is, they put their money in investments instead of building their loan portfolio. The NGOs proportion of loan portfolio to asset ranges from a high of 88 percent to a low of 52 percent. These figures combined with their capital would mean that their allocation for other assets (i.e. cash, short-term investments, and other receivables) would be between 2 percent and 30 percent. Although there is no rule as to how much of its assets should an NGO-MFI allocate to its loan portfolio, mission-wise it should put most of its assets in operations or services; otherwise, it would be no different from the banks, lending investors, and other non-bank financial institutions. Noteworthy also that 11 out of the 20 reporting NGOs in the MIX Market have erroneous data, that is, the sum of their capital and loan portfolio exceeds their total assets. Further, it seems that the NGOs are making money more than the banks do. The NGOs average yield on portfolio is a nominal annual rate of 47 percent, while the banks average is 31 percent. The net income over financial revenue of NGOs is almost 26 percent on average while the banks is only 18 percent. One now would ask if the NGOs are over pricing or if they are simply more efficient than the banks, or both. This, combined with the NGOs level of assets averaging over US$12millionsome NGOs are even bigger than some banks, whose average assets amounted to almost US$16millionmakes the NGO-MFIs potential sources of government revenues. For complete data, see Table 1 on next page.
Page 9
Page 10
Computation
of
Taxes
Many
NGO-MFIs,
in
practice,
separate
their
financial
incomes
from
other
incomes
when
reporting
their
financial
conditions,
thus:
The
Tax
Reform
Act
of
1997
sections
31
and
32
(Annex
5.,
however,
presents
general
definitions
of
some
financial
terms
as
follows:
SEC.
31.
Taxable
Income
Defined.
The
term
taxable
income
means
the
pertinent
items
of
gross
income
specified
in
this
Code,
less
the
deductions
and/or
personal
and
additional
exemptions,
if
any,
authorized
for
such
types
of
income
by
this
Code
or
other
special
laws.
SEC.
32.
Gross
Income.
(A)
General
Definition.
Except
when
otherwise
provided
in
this
Title,
gross
income
means
all
income
derived
from
whatever
source,
including
(but
not
limited
to)
the
following
items:
(1)
Compensation
for
services
in
whatever
form
paid,
including,
but
not
limited
to
fees,
salaries,
wages,
commissions,
and
similar
items;
(2)
Gross
income
derived
from
the
conduct
of
trade
or
business
or
the
exercise
of
a
profession;
(3)
Gains
derived
from
dealings
in
property;
(4)
Interests;
(5)
Rents;
(6)
Royalties;
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
11
Financial Revenues Less: Financial Expenses Financial Income Add: Other Income Less: Other expenses Less: Tax
Gross Income (current tax base*) X,XXX.XX Net Income (Before Tax) (current tax base*) Net Income After Tax
(7) Dividends; (8) Annuities; (9) Prizes and winnings; (10) Pensions; and (11) Partner's distributive share from the net income of the general professional partnership. BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 76-2003 emphasized the need to collect taxes that are applied on the other income of the NGO-MFIs, which may include but is not limited to rent, sale of assets, and offering of products and services not directly related to the operation of microfinance. In consonance with this circular is the BIR Revenue Regulations No. 14-2007, stipulating that income of such NGOs from microfinance activities, and which are not in respect of their registered activities covered by Section 30 of the Tax Code of 1997 shall be subject to tax equivalent to 32 percent of net income before tax (or simply referred to as net income from henceforth) or 2 percent of gross income, whichever is higher.
Stakeholders
In
this
policy
analysis,
four
key
stakeholders
are
considered:
the
BIR,
the
NGO- MFIs,
the
donors
and
social
investors,
and
the
microfinance
beneficiaries.
The
BIR
is
mandated
by
law
to
assess
and
collect
all
national
internal
revenue
taxes,
fees
and
charges,
and
to
enforce
all
forfeitures,
penalties
and
fines
connected
therewith,
including
the
execution
of
judgments
in
all
cases
decided
in
its
favor
by
the
Court
of
Tax
Appeals
and
the
ordinary
courts
(Sec.
2
of
the
National
Internal
Revenue
Code
of
1997;
see
Annex
6.).
Its
mission
is
to
collect
internal
revenue
taxes
for
the
government.
(Bureau
of
Internal
Revenue)
In
issuing
Revenue
Regulations
No.
14-2007,
the
BIR
could
very
well
be
referring
to
the
incomes
generated
by
the
NGOs
that
are
not
directly
connected
with
the
micro- credit
and
micro-savings,
as
these
two
services
are
the
only
ones
included
in
the
legal
definition
of
microfinance
stated
in
the
Social
Reform
and
Poverty
Alleviation
Act
or
R.A.
8425,
Section
3.
These
income
sources
may
include
micro-insurance.
Since
its
nature
is
also
financial
(as
opposed
to
trading
of
goods
or
provision
of
human
resource- based
services),
this
income
type
is
incorporated
in
the
Financial
Revenue
item.
Since
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
12
there is no segregration of financial income types, the BIR loses revenue taxes from, in this example, micro-insurance. Other financial but non-microfinance-related revenues are income from foreign exchange and interests earned from investment instruments. Another source of income of the NGO-MFIs is trading of goods either as part of business development of their clients or as part of providing basic services to the communities (e.g. water supply, solar-powered lighting). Another is prviding services in the form of consulting and training programs. These items fall under the Other Income but unlike other other income, such as gains from the sale from assets that can be easily monitored by the BIR through the legal proceedings involved, these items cannot be easily kept track thus the BIR stands to lose revenue taxes on these non-microfinance activities. Based on the MIX Market data in 2009, the reporting NGO-MFIs net income is estimated using two approaches (exact net income figures are not published). One is by deriving financial revenues, financial expenses, and operating expenses from the data provided and computing for the net income using the formula in the previous section. Two is by multiplying the given return on asset rates (which is the ratio of net income to total assets) by the given total assets to get the net income figures. Comparing the net income figures derived from these two approaches, the difference is most likely the other income generated by the NGO-MFIs. Except from one NGO (Kasagana-Ka) that had no difference in the computed income figures, the rest have too big a gapover a million dollars for three NGOsto be attributed to mathematical discrepancies or errors. (See Table 2 on next page.) Based on these two arguments, the BIRs tightening up of its regulations is thus justified. However, it has gone amiss on two accounts: 1) it came out with the memorandum without prior consultation with the NGO-MFIs; and 2) after its issuance, there was no communication as to how the taxation would be implemented. Worse, the revenue district offices have varying interpretations of the regulation, determining tax charges in different ways, thus eliciting negative reactions from the NGOs.
Page 13
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
14
The
NGO-MFIs,
on
their
part,
share
different
sentiments.
Some
believe
that
it
is
only
but
right
to
pay
taxes
to
government.
Besides,
they
opine
that
tax
would
force
the
NGOs
to
be
efficientthat
is,
to
be
more
conscious
of
their
expenditures
and
capital
investmentsand
thus,
be
as
competitive
as
the
microfinance-oriented
banks.
Further,
taxing
the
NGOs
would
discourage
for-profit
organizations
from
establishing
NGOs
to
avoid
paying
taxes.
On
the
other
hand,
others
want
tax-exemption
by
the
virtue
of
their
being
NGOs.
As
they
are
supporting
the
government
in
its
poverty
alleviation
program
and
are
the
most
effective
in
reaching
the
grass
roots,
taxing
them
would
only
hamper
their
work.
The
tax
money
could
be
used
in
their
microfinance
operations,
as
a
way
of
redistribution;
and
taxes
in
the
hands
of
the
government
are
not
necessarily
spent
that
way
although
redistribution
is
one
of
the
main
intentions
of
the
tax
system.
Finally,
should
the
NGOs
pass
on
the
taxes
to
the
microfinance
clients,
the
costs
of
services
would
increase
and
thus
may
discourage
the
clients
from
borrowing
(and
therefore
defeating
the
very
purpose
of
the
microfinance
program).
The
interests
of
the
social
investors
and
donors
are
considered
as
well
in
this
analysis
as
they
are
the
ones
who
usually
finance
the
operations
of
these
NGOs
either
in
the
form
of
grants
that
go
into
the
NGOs
fund
balance
or
subsidies
and
soft
loans
that
go
their
operations.
The
Section
101
of
the
Tax
Reform
Act
of
1997
exempts
these
donations,
regardless
whether
from
domestic
or
foreign
sources,
that
are
intended
to
effect
social
benefit
(Annex
7.).
Taxing
the
NGOs
therefore
is
in
effect
taxing
the
funds
from
these
stakeholders
group
that
are
intended
to
create
social
benefits.
On
the
flip
side,
some
NGOs
include
grants
and
donations
in
their
financial
revenues
to
improve
their
sustainability
figuresin
short,
they
use
these
tax-free
funds
for
window- dressing.
Finally,
the
ultimate
stakeholders
in
this
issue
are
the
microfinance
clients,
because
they
are
bound
to
be
affected
either
positively
or
negatively
by
tax
policies.
They
could
be
compelled
to
pay
the
added
cost
of
taxes;
worse,
they
could
not
be
served
at
all
by
the
NGOs,
as
operating
in
their
areas
may
prove
unviable
with
the
plus-tax
cost
structure.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
15
Gross Income (current tax base at 2% tax*) X,XXX.XX Net Income (current tax base at 35% tax*) Net Income After Tax
Add: Other Income Gross Income Less: Other expenses Net Income (Before Tax) Less: Tax Net Income After Tax
X,XXX.XX
Alternative
3:
Create
of
Micro
Enterprise
Development
Institution
(MEDI)
Such
has
been
proposed
in
the
Senate
Bill
2596
of
2008
An
Act
Governing
the
Creation
and
Accreditation
of
Micro
Enterprise
Development
Institutions.(See
Annex
8.)
Under
the
bill,
a
capital
requirement
of
not
less
than
Php50
million
shall
be
imposed
on
MEDIs;
in
turn,
these
organizations
shall
be
exempted
from
taxes,
local
and
national,
including
the
documentary
stamp
tax.
However,
2
percent
of
the
gross
income
derived
by
the
MEDIs
shall
be
remitted
to
the
National
Government
as
contribution
to
the
Peoples
Development
Trust
Fund
(established
under
R.A.
No.
8425).
The
bill
clarifies
that
the
term
gross
income
means
gross
receipts
less
sales
returns,
allowances,
discounts
and
other
costs
of
services.
Further,
it
stipulates
that
interest
expenses
of
a
MEDI
shall
be
deductible
from
gross
receipts
as
part
of
cost
of
services
in
arriving
at
gross
income.
The
term
gross
income
shall
exclude
donations.
Financial
Revenues
paid
Less: Financial Expenses Financial Income Add: Other Income Less: Other expenses Net Income (Before Tax) Less: Tax Net Income After Tax
*net of sales returns, allowances, discounts and other costs of services including interest expenses
However,
there
is
no
mention
of
policy
that
would
govern
those
NGOs
with
less
than
Php50
million
capitalization,
thus
implying
status
quo
for
the
smaller
players.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
17
At the forefront of the lobbying of this bill is TSPI Development Corporation, an NGO-MFI. Many other NGOs do not support the bill, however, for the reason that they were not consulted in the writing of the bill.
Micro insurance
Add: Net other income (proposed tax base at 32%) Less: Other operating expenses Net Income (Before Tax) Less: Tax Net Income After Tax
A
tax
rate
of
32
percent
shall
be
applied
on
net
other
income,
following
the
provisions
of
the
corporate
tax
law.
One
point
of
contention
that
may
be
raised
against
this
alternative
is
the
inclusion
of
micro
insurance
and
other
services
that
provide
direct
benefits
to
the
microfinance
clients
to
the
taxable
income
source.
Technically,
such
services
are
not
included
in
the
definition
of
microfinance
in
R.A.8425
Sec.
3J
(see
also
page
2)
but
are
in
fact
financial
services
at
micro
level.
Thus,
alongside
this
proposal,
amendment
of
the
R.A.
8425,
which
was
enacted
in
1997,
must
be
proposed
to
include
other
appropriate
products
that
came
later
in
the
market
in
the
definition
of
microfinance.
Micro
insurance,
for
example,
was
introduced
in
the
market
in
2001.
Should
this
be
approved,
then
the
accounting
systems
of
the
NGO-MFIs
must
be
adjusted/re-programmed
to
segregate
the
Other
Revenue
items
from
the
Financial
Revenues.
Alternative
5:
Exempt
NGO-MFIs
from
income
tax
as
long
as
they
apply
for
exemption
and
meet
the
required
performance
standards
This
proposal
follows
the
premise
that
the
NGOs
are
effective
in
reaching
the
grass
roots
and
efficient
in
the
use
of
assets.
The
performance
standards
that
will
qualify
the
NGOs
for
tax
exemption
may
be
the
following
(based
on
the
MIX
Market
data),
but
subject
to
refinements
and
approval
of
the
NGOs
upon
consultation
with
them:
asset
per
client:
US$150
or
Php6,600
loan
portfolio-asset
ratio:
at
least
69
percent
operating
or
administrative
expenses:
not
more
than
36
percent
of
the
loan
portfolio
(or
not
more
than
20
percent
based
on
the
PESO
standard)3
percentage
of
poor
clients
(upon
entry)
to
total
new
clients:
80
percent
Should
an
NGO
fail
to
meet
any
one
of
these
performance
standards,
it
will
be
subject
to
tax
of
2
percent
on
gross
income.
3
Based
on
the
set
of
performance
standards
for
all
types
of
microfinance
institutions
by
the
Technical
Working Group that was convened by the National Credit Council called the P.E.S.O Standard. The acronym stands for Portfolio quality, Efficiency, Sustainability, and Outreach. Public Policy Analysis: Income Tax Imposition on NGO-MFIs Page 19
Financial Revenues Less: Financial Expenses Financial Income Add: Other Income Less: Other expenses Net Income (Before Tax) Less: Tax Net Income After Tax
This
proposal
is
a
refinement
of
House
Bill
6016
that
was
passed
in
March
2009.
The
bill
proposed
tax
relief
on
the
qualified
NGOs,
as
as
incentive
for
their
support
to
the
governments
poverty
alleviation
efforts.
It
exempts
the
NGOs
from
payment
of
value
added
tax,
income
tax,
other
percentage
taxes
and
gross
receipts
taxes,
and
likewise
mandated
the
BIR
to
issue
tax
exemption
certificates
to
NGO-MFIs
duly
screened,
evaluated
and
approved
for
such
by
the
DOF
(no
elaboration
though
on
the
qualification
for
exemption).
(Macabeo)
As
in
India,
the
NGO-MFIs
are
tax-exempt
only
if
they
apply
for
it,
which
would
require
them
to
subject
themselves
to
government
monitoring.
Should
this
alternative
be
approved,
monitoring
of
the
performance
standards
of
the
NGO-MFIs
will
be
an
issue.
Offhand,
either
BIR
carries
the
cost
of
monitoring
or
the
Philippine
Council
for
NGO
Certification,
Inc.
(PCNC)
does.
PCNC
is
a
non-stock,
non-profit
corporation,
which
was
established
in
1998
by
several
NGO
networks
(e.g.,
Caucus
of
Development
NGO
Networks
(CODE-NGO),
Philippine
Business
for
Social
Progress
(PBSP),
Association
of
Foundations
(AF),
League
of
Corporate
Foundations
(LCF),
Bishops-Businessmen's
Conference
for
Human
Development
(BBC),
and
the
National
Council
for
Social
Development
Foundation
(NCSD).
It
has
been
duly
designated
by
the
Secretary
of
Finance
as
an
Accrediting
Entity
to
establish
and
operationalize
a
system
to
determine
the
qualification
of
non-
stock,
non-profit
corporations
or
organizations
and
NGOs
for
accreditation
as
donee
institutions.
The
Secretary
of
Finance
and
the
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue
oversee,
monitor,
and
coordinate
with
PCNC
to
ensure
that
the
provisions
of
these
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
20
Regulations are complied with. (BIR Revenue Regulations No.13-98 Sec. 1d; see Annex 9.) Since the accreditation of the NGOs for tax purpose has been PCNCs main responsibility, then the accreditation of the NGO-MFIs for the similar purpose could be logically assumed in this office.
Page 21
Page 22
Efficiency.
This
criterion
means
optimization
of
the
use
of
resources.
Specifically,
the
alternative
should
encourage
the
NGOs
to
maximize
the
productivity
of
their
resources
and
to
be
prudent
with
their
spending
and/or
investments
in
terms
of
social
benefits
they
create,
and
not
in
terms
of
profit
to
the
organizations
or
individuals.
Since
part
of
their
funds
comes
from
the
donors,
these
donors
would
also
be
interested
in
the
prudent
expenditure
of
the
NGOs
as
a
result
of
the
policy
solution.
This
criterion,
in
BIRs
perspective,
means
efficiency
in
collection,
while
for
the
poor,
efficiency
of
the
alternative
means
reaching
to
as
many
of
them
and
serving
as
many
of
their
needs
as
possible.
Political
acceptability.
The
alternative
must
be
acceptable
to
both
the
NGOs
and
the
BIR.
The
donors
and
the
poor,
although
they
are
key
stakeholders,
play
a
remote
part
in
the
political
underpinnings
of
the
microfinance
sector
and
do
not
have
direct
involvement
in
the
backroom
operations
or
transactions
of
the
NGOs.
Practicality
and
ease
of
implementation.
The
alternative
must
be
easily
applied
and
implemented,
not
subject
to
many
interpretations,
and
must
not
be
an
administrative
burden
to
any
organization;
otherwise,
the
alternative,
if
approved,
will
not
be
implemented
correctly
and/or
will
be
resisted
by
the
parties
involved.
Based
on
consultation
with
client,
equity
is
its
top
priority,
followed
by
efficiency,
then
political
acceptability.
Thus
the
criteria
will
be
given
weights
as
follows:
Equity
and
fairness
40%
Efficiency
30%
Political
acceptability
20%
Practicality
and
ease
of
implementation
10
%
Each
alternative
will
be
given
a
rating
per
criterion
thus:
1
2
3
4
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
23
yield
on
portfolio
of
47
percent).
Should
this
happen,
the
poor
would
either
pass
on
the
higher
cost
to
their
end-customers/buyers
or
totally
drop
out
of
the
microfinance
program
to
seek
other
sources
of
income
(contracted
labor,
for
example).
Both
ways,
deadweight
losses
in
the
economy
would
be
created.
Below
is
the
price
elasticity
computation:
The
average
price
elasticity
of
the
12
NGO-MFIs
with
complete
Mixmarket
data
is
-7.039,
which
means
that
for
every
1
percent
increase
in
interest
(e.g.
1
percent
of
50
percent
interest
means
0.5
percent
increase)
an
NGO
would
lose
7
clients.
Worst
case,
an
NGO
may
lose
128
clients.
Suppose
these
12
NGOs
increase
their
interest
rates
by
4
percentage
points
or
10
percent
of
the
average
interest,
then
collectively
they
might
lose
between
840
clients
(assuming
an
elasticity
of
-7.039)
and
15,360
clients
(assuming
the
worst
elasticity
of
-128.36).
Efficiency.
The
pressure
that
taxation
exerts
of
the
NGOs
financials
is
likely
to
encourage
them
to
run
their
operations
more
efficiently.
This
efficiency,
if
attained,
enables
the
NGOs
to
reach
to
more
poor
people;
however,
if
NGOs
fail
to
do
so,
they
are
likely
to
limit
their
operations.
Experience
shows
that
collection
is
inefficient
in
the
status
quo
due
to
the
differing
interpretation
of
the
policy
by
the
BIR
officials.
Besides,
applying
tax
on
net
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
25
income
will
encourage
the
NGOs
to
spend
in
order
to
increase
its
operating
expenses
and
thereby
decreasing
its
taxable
net
income.
This
is
a
rational
option
for
the
NGOs,
for
reason
that
it
would
be
better
off
spending
the
money
for
the
organization
(e.g.
declaring
bonuses,
joining
training
programs,
traveling)
than
paying
it
out
in
the
form
of
taxsomething
that
does
not
support
the
both
the
BIRs
and
the
donors
interests.
Political
acceptability.
The
status
quo,
initiated
by
the
BIR,
is
certainly
not
acceptable
to
the
NGOs.
Practicality
/
ease
of
implementation.
On
the
NGOs
part,
no
adjustments
in
their
systems
or
reporting
are
required.
On
BIRs
end,
however,
the
inconsistency
in
its
implementation
is
an
indication
of
the
status
quos
impracticality.
7.9.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
26
Based on the rating and criteria for evaluation, this alternative is given a score of
Page 27
Alternative
2:
Apply
income
tax
of
5
percent
on
gross
income
from
microfinance
transactions
of
the
NGO-MFIs
Equity
and
fairness.
The
proposed
policy
protects
the
smaller
NGOs
with
capitalization
of
not
more
than
Php10
million.
Although
some
NGOs
argue
that
the
start-ups
need
some
leeway
before
they
get
established
in
their
operations,
others
could
abuse
this
provision
by
creating
several
small
NGOs
to
avoid
taxes.
However,
the
donors
would
tend
to
favor
this
alternative
in
that
most
of
their
interest
would
be
protected.
Similar
to
alternative
1,
this
proposed
tax
policy
limits
the
outreach
of
the
NGOs
in
that
the
fund
that
could
be
used
for
their
microfinance
operations
is
remitted
to
government
instead.
As
an
example,
assuming
this
is
applied
in
2009,
(see
Estimated
Financial
Income
[equivalent
to
gross
income]
on
Table
2
on
page
11),
government
would
have
collected
Php169
million,
which
could
be
translated
to
almost
34,000
micro
loans.
Similar
to
alternative
1
still,
the
NGOs
could
pass
on
the
taxes
to
the
borrowers,
which
would
create
deadweight
losses
in
the
economy.
The
issue
on
elasticity
in
Alternative
1
also
applies
in
this
case.
Efficiency.
This
alternative
would
likely
have
mixed
results
in
terms
of
promoting
efficiency
among
the
NGOs.
Those
who
will
be
taxed
will
tend
to
be
more
conscious
of
managing
their
resources
but
probably
not
the
smaller
NGOs.
Further,
the
smaller
NGOs
might
be
discouraged
to
expandespecially
if
they
are
not
assured
they
could
achieve
dramatic
expansion
such
that
their
marginal
income
would
exceed
the
tax
consequent
to
their
growththus
ultimately,
the
unreached
poor
will
suffer.
Donors
will
also
tend
to
favor
this
alternative,
as
tax
applied
on
the
gross
income
discourages
imprudent
expenditures
of
the
management
(that
is,
with
or
without
spending,
their
tax
will
be
the
same).
Likewise,
BIRs
collection
will
be
more
efficient
since
the
provisions
are
no
longer
subject
to
different
interpretations.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
28
Political acceptability. This alternative may be acceptable to many NGO-MFIs but probably not to the big ones (specifically the 25 MCPI-member NGOs that account for practically 70 percent of the countrys total microfinance clients). It may also prove acceptable to the BIR, as potential tax collection of Php169 million is only 11 percent less than what it could have collected under the current policy. Practicality / ease of implementation. The proposed policy can be easily implemented, on both BIR and NGO part, since the provisions are cut and dried. Based on the rating and criteria for evaluation, this alternative is given a score of 7.8.
Page 29
Page 30
Alternative
4:
Impose
tax
on
net
income
from
non-MF
source
Equity
and
fairness.
Under
this
proposed
policy,
no
NGO
will
be
protected
or
excluded
and
thus,
no
NGO
can
be
used
to
avoid
taxes,
except
for
those
that
are
engaged
in
microfinance
only
(which
is
probably
only
few
because
of
the
new
products
launched
in
the
market
in
the
recent
years
and
the
MCPIs
campaign
to
the
MFIs
to
go
beyond
provision
of
credit
alone).
Similarly,
no
provision
in
the
alternative
would
hinder
the
NGOs
from
growing.
Since
donors
money
usually
goes
to
microfinance
operations,
this
alternative
protects
their
interests
in
that
only
non-microfinance
activities
will
be
subject
to
tax.
Assuming
that
the
discrepancy
in
the
estimated
incomes
in
Table
2
on
page
13
represents
the
other
income,
and
applying
the
income
tax
of
32
percent,
then
BIR
would
have
collected
almost
Php79
million
in
taxes.
Efficiency.
The
selective
nature
of
the
alternative
will
encourage
neither
efficiency
in
the
microfinance
operations
of
the
NGOs
(due
to
absence
of
pressure
on
the
NGOs
to
achieve
so)
nor
servicing
of
other
needs
of
the
poor
(due
to
tax).
Consequently,
the
NGOs
may
not
expand
their
operationsthough
there
is
nothing
in
the
alternative
that
may
directly
result
in
this
NGO
behaviorfor
the
reason
that
the
non-microfinance
products
and
services
are
necessary
to
be
viable
in
the
market.
Thus,
the
effect
of
this
policy
may
go
against
the
MCPIs
campaign
for
the
MFIs
to
go
beyond
providing
credit
alone.
The
donors
interest
will
be
protected,
however,
because
the
NGOs
can
record
the
(personal)
benefits
under
expenses
in
non-microfinance
activities
to
minimize
tax,
which,
on
the
other
hand,
is
not
supportive
of
BIRs
goal.
Further,
BIRs
collection
may
not
be
efficient
under
this
alternative
since
the
current
accounting
practice
does
not
require
separation
of
micro-insurance
and
other
financial
products
that
produce
social
benefits,
which
are
technically
not
included
in
the
legal
definition
of
microfinance,
from
the
NGOs
financial
revenues.
Political
acceptability.
As
taxation
is
simply
dividing
the
same
pie
between
the
NGOs
and
the
BIRthat
is,
BIRs
loss
is
the
NGOs
gain
and
vice
versathis
alternative
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
31
provides a good compromise between the NGOs and the BIR. Assuming this proposed policy is applied in the 2009 sample data (see Difference in Estimated Net Incomes [which could be attributed to other incomes generated by the NGOs] Table 2 on page 11), tax collected would have been 50 percent lower than what BIR could have collected under the status quo. Practicality / ease of implementation. This alternative may not be easily implemented on the part of both the NGOs and BIR since the current accounting practice does not require separation of microfinance and non-microfinance financial accounts. Based on the rating and criteria for evaluation, this alternative is given a score of 9.6.
Page 32
Page 33
Alternative
5:
Exempt
NGO-MFIs
from
income
tax
as
long
as
they
apply
for
exemption
and
meet
the
required
performance
standards
Equity
and
fairness.
Under
this
proposed
policy,
no
NGO
will
be
favored,
as
tax
exemption
will
be
granted
to
all
who
apply
and
meet
the
following
performance
standards
(exact
metrics
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
NGOs):
o asset
per
client
(US$150
or
Php6,600)
ensures
that
assets
are
maximized
in
serving
clients
and
that
NGO
will
be
encouraged
to
increase
the
number
of
clients
and
not
just
go
for
the
big
borrowers
that
bloats
the
portfolio.
The
median
asset
per
client
in
the
sample
is
$150
or
roughly
Php6,600.
Further,
if
a
client
moves
out
of
poverty
within
(the
average
estimate
of)
five
years
after
joining
the
program,
then
an
NGO-MFI
will
have
to
generate
new
clients
constantly
to
replace
the
graduates.
With
this
assumption,
the
estimated
average
asset
per
client
will
be
around
Php6,400,
which
is
not
so
far
from
the
median.
o loan
portfolio-asset
ratio
(at
least
69
percent)
ensures
that
assets
are
allocated
to
loan
portfolio
and
not
to
for-profit
investments.
The
ratio
of
the
19
NGOs
(erroneous
datum
is
excluded)
in
the
sample
averaged
69
percent
while
median
is
close
at
68
percent.
o operating
or
administrative
expenses
(not
more
than
36
percent
of
the
portfolio)
limits
expenses
to
a
reasonable
level.
The
mean
operating
expense
of
the
20
NGOs
is
the
same
as
the
median
at
36
percent.
However,
the
P.E.S.O.
standard
requires
that
it
be
no
more
than
20
percent.
o percentage
of
poor
clients
(upon
entry)
to
total
new
clients
(80
percent)
encourages
the
NGOs
to
lend
to
the
poor
clients.
At
present
only
a
number
of
NGOs
are
profiling
their
clients
according
to
their
poverty
status
and
some
are
working
to
achieve
80
percent,
which
is
deemed
an
acceptable
proportion.
The
performance
standards
will
ensure
that
the
NGOs
will
be
doing
their
functions
well
and
that
there
will
be
no
pseudo-NGO-MFIs
that
will
be
used
for
tax
avoidance.
By
the
same
virtue,
the
donors
interest
will
also
be
protected
and
ultimately
the
poor
are
bound
to
gain
if
the
microfinance
sector
will
be
made
more
effective.
However,
those
who
will
not
meet
the
performance
standardsespecially
those
who
do
not
profile
their
clients
yetand
therefore
not
enjoy
tax-exemption
might
pass
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
34
on the burden of tax to the borrowers and thus create deadweight losses in the economy (as in Alternatives 1 and 2). Efficiency. Given the performance standards required by this alternative, it will most likely lead to a more efficient operation of the NGO and with outreach (asset per client) as an indicator, more people could be reached by the microfinance services. The efficiency standard (operating expenses), coupled with the tax base on gross income, ensures that the donors interest will be protected. BIR collection will also be more efficient with the help of the PCNC. Political acceptability. Although this proposed tax exemption will most likely be attractive to the NGOs, the required performance standards may not be acceptable to them. On BIRs part, this alternative will result in the least amount of tax revenues for the government at Php67 million (computed based on the assumption that all 20 NGOs in the sample did not meet the performance standards) in 2009. Practicality / ease of implementation. As for the BIR, this alternative may be the most convenient, as PCNC will assist them in the accreditation. However, for the NGOs, this alternative could be the most difficult, as it requires them to adopt a new system for client profiling. Based on the rating and criteria for evaluation, this alternative is given a score of 12.0, the highest among the four alternatives.
Page 35
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
36
If the four alternatives would be ranked according to the evaluation criteria, it would be as follows: 1. Alternative 5: Exempt NGO-MFIs from income tax as long as they apply for exemption and meet the required performance standards (12 points) 2. Alternative 4: Impose tax on net income from non-MF source (9.6 points) 3. Alternative 1: Status quo (7.9 points) 4. Alternative 2: Apply income tax of 5 percent on gross income from microfinance transactions of the NGO-MFIs (7.8 points) In the computation of costs and benefits, the total for each stakeholder is aggregated to come up with the total sectoral costs and benefits. Still, using this computation, Alternative 5 has the highest positive total sectoral net benefit of more than Php1 billion and the highest sectoral benefit-cost ratio of 39. Even under a more realistic scenario, whereby only half of the NGOs will comply with the performance standards, still Alternative 5 will have generated a total sectoral net benefit of Php582 million and a sectoral benefit-cost ratio of 12.79. (See Table 4 for Cost- Benefit Comparison per Alternative on next page.)
Page 37
Page 38
RECOMMENDATION
Alternative
5granting
income
tax
exemption
to
NGO-MFIs
provided
that
they
apply
for
it
and
that
they
meet
the
required
performance
standardsis
hereby
recommended.
Aside
from
generating
the
highest
potential
net
benefit
(between
Php582
million
to
Php1,165
million)
and
benefit-cost
ratio
(between
12
and
39),
it
favors
all
four
stakeholders
in
terms
of
promoting
equity
and
efficiency
(except
for
those
NGOs
who
will
not
meet
the
standards).
Although
it
may
encounter
some
problems
in
the
area
of
political
acceptability
and
ease
of
implementation,
these
matters
may
be
addressed
beforehand.
To
address
the
potential
problem
in
implementing
this
policy,
it
is
imperative
for
the
MCPI
to
consult
the
NGOs
in
setting
the
performance
standards
to
be
used
as
bases
for
tax
exemption.
In
communicating
with
the
NGOs,
the
MCPI
must
emphasize
that
the
indicators
and
measures
attached
in
this
policy
analysis
are
subject
to
the
NGOs
approval
and
that
they
serve
only
as
discussion
points.
However,
the
constraints
that
prevent
redistribution
of
wealth
to
the
low-income
groups
are
the
very
same
constraints
to
implementation
of
this
policy.
As
of
2007,
of
the
300
NGOs
nationwide,
only
62
have
reporting
capability,
which
is
a
function
of
both
management
information
system
and
human
resources.
Several
of
these
NGOs
are
single-branch,
operating
locally,
often
in
high-risk
or
far-flung
areas,
or
both.
In
short,
many
of
these
small
NGO-MFIs
are
technologically-
and/or
resource-challenged,
isolated
from
the
mainstream
sector.
Chances
are,
only
the
big
NGOs
will
participate
in
sectoral
consultation.
The
challenge
therefore
to
MCPI,
as
the
national
network
of
MFIs,
is
to
engage
the
smaller
NGOs
in
the
discussion.
As
for
the
NGOs
adopting
a
new
system
for
client
profiling,
the
cost-benefit
presentation
is
critical.
The
NGOs
must
realize
that
adopting
a
new
system
is
cheaper
in
the
long
run
than
paying
2
percent
tax
on
gross
income.
On
average,
NGOs
would
have
paid
Php3
million
each
in
taxes
in
2009
(i.e.
2
percent
tax
on
gross
income).
However,
installing
a
client
profiling
system
would
cost
an
NGO
an
initial
outlay
of
over
Php1.5
million
and
a
recurring
expense
for
maintenance
of
Php300,000
annually.
The
tax
savings
of
Php3
million
exceed
the
cost
of
installing
a
new
system
at
Php1.5
million,
thus
it
makes
sense
for
the
NGOs
to
make
their
system
more
efficient.
Public
Policy
Analysis:
Income
Tax
Imposition
on
NGO-MFIs
Page
39
Aside from the fact that it earned the highest rating, this alternative also addresses the concerns posed by the currently enforced policy. There will be no more inconsistencies in the implementation as the policy cuts across all NGO sizes and all microfinance and non-microfinance services. The metrics for exemption also makes the assessment process objective and less subject to interpretation than the current policy. Further, the reinforcement of PCNCs function as an accrediting body for the NGOs will facilitate the implementation of this tax policy. With the performance standards as safeguard against leakages and inefficiencies, the tax imposed will aid the microfinance sector achieve its primary goal to redistribute wealth to the poor. Market deadweight losses due to the micro entrepreneurs leaving their enterprises for employment can be avoided once the NGOs realize that it will be cheaper for them to work on efficiency than to pass on the burden of tax to clients. Based on the five-year data of the 12 NGOs in the MIX Market report, the average price elasticity of the NGOs is -7.039. This figure means that for every one percent increase in loan interest (or yield on portfolio in this case, which is used as a proxy indicator of interest for the purpose this study), an NGO will lose seven clients. (See Table 3 on page 24 for computation of price elasticity for NGOs.) This case may be particularly true if the clients perceive that the increase in interest is not justified, say, by increase in the services offered by the NGOs. Data show that at worst, an NGO may lose as many as 128 clients with a one-percent increase in price (however, the model does not include all other factors that may affect the number of borrowers). The NGOs should look at the lost social benefit by multiplying this number of lost clients by their lost incomes to get the magnitude of the impact.
Page 40
Because of the exemption extended to the performing NGOs, then the issue of imposing income taxes to all other types of NGOs for equity purposes will now lose ground. Finally, it is necessary for the MCPI to push for the amendment of the Republic Act 8425 Sec. 3J to expand the definition of microfinance from merely a credit and savings mobilization program to include other financial services extended to the micro level and intended to create social benefits, such as the micro insurance. Although the amendment will not affect the proposed policy solution, it could be an opportune time to address this matter together with tax imposition.
Page 41
WORKS
CITED
Bardach,
Eugene.
A
Practical
Guide
for
Policy
Analysis:
The
Eightfold
Path
to
More
Effective
Problem
Solving
.
2005.
Bureau
of
Internal
Revenue.
About
Us.
2004.
19
November
2010
<http://www.bir.gov.ph/about/about.htm>.
Consultative
Group
to
Assist
the
Poorest.
"Guiding
Principles
on
Regulation
and
Supervision
of
Microfinance."
Consultative
Group
to
Assist
the
Poorest,
March
2002.
31.
Macabeo,
Abigail.
"Press
Releases."
07
March
2009.
House
of
Representatives
of
the
Philippines.
31
October
2010
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=3146>.
Microfinance
Council
of
the
Philippines.
Microfinance
Industry
Assesment
A
Report
on
the
Philippines.
Assessment
Report.
Pasig,
2008.
The
Microfinance
Information
Exchange.
MIX
Market.
25
October
2010
<http://www.mixmarket.org/>.
Page 42