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Success Path to the Cold Shutdown in Fukushima Daini NPS

Katsuichirou HIJIKATA* , Kazuyuki NAGASAWA **and Hiroyuki SHIBATA*** * General Manager, Nuclear Seismic Engineering Center, Tokyo Electric Power Company ** Manager, Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, Tokyo Electric Power Company *** Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, Tokyo Electric Power Company

1. Prolusion Although Fukushima Daini NPS faced with a critical situation that the heat removal functions were lost due to tsunami generated by The Great East Japan Earthquake, the Cold Shutdown was achieved by recovery of the heat removal function provided by hard efforts of staffs. They are still proceeding with restoration activities for keeping the Cold Shutdown. 2. Impact of The Great East Japan Earthquake i. Overview of Fukushima Daini NPS Fukushima Daini NPS has four boiling-water reactors with 1100MW, and each unit mainly consists of Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and Heat Exchanger Building which contains sea water systems for cooling Residual Heat Removal system (RHR).(Fig.1) All units were under operation at the time of the earthquake. ii. Impact of the Earthquake Approx At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, The Unit 1Unit 2Unit Unit 4 3 180km From Great East Japan Earthquake whose epicenter Fukushima Reactor Turbine NPS Building Building was on the Pacific Coast occurred, and seismic intensity was 6+ at Fukushima Daini Epicenter NPS. (Fig.1) Due to the earthquake, all units were automatically tripped, and all off-site Fukushima Heat Exchanger NPS power supply systems except for one system Building were lost. However, no damage to safety Fig.1 Fukushima Daini NPS and epicenter related SSCs was caused by seismic impact. iii. Impact of the Tsunami Heat Exchanger Buildings Inundation height Subsequently, the Tsunami rushed toward were inundated (O.P. : height above sea level) Fukushima Daini NPS at around 15:30. (Fig.2) Heat O.P. +7.0~7.5m Exchanger Buildings were inundated by flooding through their doors broken by tsunami wave force. Unit4 Unit3 Unit2 Unit1 Therefore, sea water systems lost their functions by inundation, except for one system of Unit 3. Owing to O.P. +15~16m avoidance of one system from inundation fortunately, Unit 3 could remove residual heat of reactor by RHR. Inflowed
C

G eo E ye

Ran up intensively

3Success Path to the Cold Shutdown Fig.2 Inundated area i. Process to the Cold Shutdown (Fig.3) Although Units 1, 2, 4 lost the heat removal functions by the Tsunami, they could keep cooling reactor by water injection systems which didnt need the sea water systems, owing to securement of one off-site power supply system and avoidance of water injection systems from inundation. (Fig.4) Technical Support Center (TSC) established a prioritized restoration strategy based on the field walk down, and set priorities on recovery of RHR cooling systems 123

during water injection. Materials and equipment necessary for the recovery were procured urgently, replacement of motors and temporary cabling for power supply were implemented promptly. RHR of all units started operation on March 14 by restoration activities, and the Cold Shutdown of all units was achieved at 7:15 on March 15 finally. (Fig.5)
Reactor Building
Water RPV Steam
MSIV

High Pressure Water Injection Depressurization & Low Pressure Water Injection Preparation of PCV Venting Field Walk down & Establishment of Prioritized Strategy Responses Procurement of Materials and Equipment Motor Replacement & Temporary Cabling Heat Removal by RHR Cold Shutdown (all units)
Dry-Well (D/W)

MUWC
( Make-Up Water System)

Condensate Storage Tank

Heat rejection by opening SRVs Suppression Chamber (S/C) Temperature increase

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump

RCIC
( Reactor Core Isolation Cooling )

Equipment cooling system was not available Heat Exchanger Building Inoperable by flooding
RHR-Cooling water (RHRC) Pump RHR-Sea water (RHRS) Pump

Sea

3/12
Occurrence of Earthquake

3/13

3/14

3/15 7:15

Time

Fig.3 Outline of responses

Fig.4 Water injection


kPa[gage]

ii. Key Factors PCV design maximum pressure : 310kPa[gage] a) Flexible responses based on Emergency Operation Procedure 300 3/14 3/13 High pressure water injection by RCIC, and seamless switch RHR started D/W spray (S/C cooling ) to low pressure water injection by MUWC as alternative water 200 injection measure after depressurization. (Fig.4) D/W spray and S/C spray by MUWC in order to mitigate PCV 100 3/12 D/W spray S/C spray pressure and temperature.(Fig.5) 0 3/11 3/13 3/15 3/17 b) Field Walk down (Check of Equipment Status) Field walk down in the dark under continuous tsunami alerts. Fig.5 S/C Pressure Prioritized restoration strategy based on Field Walk down. (Unit 1) c) Emergency procurement for materials and Equipment Emergency procurement of motors, cable, mobile power vehicles, fuel oil, and mobile transformers. (Motors were transported by trucks and a helicopter of SDF.) d) Restoration activities (Fig.6) Inspection of pumps inundated and replacement of motors. Temporary cabling from survived power cubicles in Rad-Waste Building and Unit 3 Heat Exchanger Building. (About 9 km cable was laid by about 200 personnel within a day) e) Organizational integrity and professionalism Establishment of TSC under supervision of Site Superintendent. Maintaining accountability of emergency response units by setting clear goals, and reporting/visualizing situation to TSC. Professionalism which incited staffs to devote themselves to Fig.6 Restoration restoration activities all night long, even in the case their family activities were visited by the earthquake and the tsunami. 124

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