Tsunami Countermeasures at Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS based on the Experience of Fukushima Accident

Kazuyuki Nagasawa*, Hideaki Kiyoura* and Masashi Fukushima* * Tokyo Electric Power Company INC. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, which had its origin in the inundation caused by the large tsunami, occurred due to the loss of multiple safety functions simultaneously. The most serious problems were the simultaneous loss of all AC and DC power sources extending over a long period of time and the loss of heat removal function employing emergency seawater systems extending over a long period of time. Therefore, we learned that adequate preparation is important to be able to reliably initiate success paths which will successfully remove heat and cool the spent fuel pool and reactor in order to prevent core damage even if all power sources are lost. On the Japan Sea side, there are no boundaries where large plates subduct as happens on the Pacific side and it is believed that there will be little likelihood of a large tsunami strikes on the Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS, but it was decided to adopt thorough tsunami countermeasures against the design basis tsunami in order to fully ensure the safety of the station. On adopting countermeasures, it was independently set that the potential tsunami height was 15m as adequately large tsunami. Though the design basis tsunami was not defined at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS, the design basis tsunami would be expected to be lower than 15m. The following countermeasures have been adopted. (1) Measures for preventing inundation of the site and avoiding impact of the tsunami (Units 1~4) An seawall of reinforced concrete and a solid basic structure sufficiently capable of withstanding the wave force of a tsunami and seismic motion will be constructed to a height of approximately 10m (approximately 15m above sea level). (ref. Fig.1,2) (Units 5~7) An elevated ground seawall, which is able to sufficiently withstand even seismic motion and the force of a tsunami, was constructed using amended soil-cement to a height of approximately 3m (approximately 15m above sea level) and connected to elevated ground at both ends of the site so as to function as a solid seawall. (2) Measures for preventing inundation of buildings Tide barriers and panels are mounted on penetrations and other openings in the reactor building outer walls so as to reliably prevent seawater from inundating the building. (This work will be carried out on Units 1~4 where there are openings at a height of up to 15m above sea level.) (ref. Fig.1) (3) Measures for preventing inundation of important equipment rooms inside building By making the doors to important equipment rooms watertight, inundation of such equipment is reliably prevented even if seawater flows into the building. (ref. Fig.1,3) As mentioned above, various inundation prevention measures have been adopted, but power sources, coolant injection and heat removal functions have also been redundant and diversified so that the power stations safety functions will reliably operate even if power sources in operation are lost. (4) Maneuverable emergency safety measures 121

Even if all AC power sources are lost, the following maneuverable machinery and materials have been secured and deployed, providing the capability to maintain cooling of the core and spent fuel as well as functions for monitoring from the main control room. [Deployment of vehicles] Power-generating vehicles, Air-cooled gas turbine powergenerating vehicle, Alternative heat exchanging vehicles, Fire engines, Debris removal vehicles (5) Enhancement of coolant injection and heat removal functions Even if the coolant injection functions in use are lost, ensuring that there are multiple alternative coolant injection functions (e.g. injection by fire engines, diversification of water sources, etc.) provides the capability to cool the reactor, etc. with sufficient water volume. (6) Emergency response training New procedures for responding when power and other functions are lost due to a tsunami have been formulated, and comprehensive training in safety measures has been conducted using the deployed power-generating vehicles, fire engines and other equipment to verify the effectiveness of the procedures. For the reasons stated above, the emergency safety measures implemented so far based on the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS have diversified safety capabilities and improved safety even further. We will continue to strive to make thorough safety improvements about the Kashiwaki Kariwa NPS.
Illustration of Units 1~4

Fig.1 Outline of tsunami countermeasures

Fig.2 Seawalls

Fig.3 Watertight door

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