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intRoduCtion
Mission CReep wRit lARge
The U.S. Militarys Embrace of Stability Operations
You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and

politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military

power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.

President John F. Kennedy, remarks to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, June 7, 1961

The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nations interests.... The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2010), U.S. Department of Defense

n November 28, 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense released Directive Number 3000.05,1 which requires stability operations to be treated on par with offense and defense in every aspect of military preparation. In its directive, the Pentagon offered only a very general characterization of stability operations: Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. Notably, the mission includes civilians, involves the establishment and maintenance of order, and applies equally in peacetime and in conflict.

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Stability operations also represent the U.S. armed forces nascent steps into more traditionally civilian territory. Although conducted in support of and in cooperation with civilian authorities, the militarys objectives in stability operations differ dramatically from defense, deterrence, or victory:
Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for cratic institutions, and a robust civil society.2 securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, demo-

Stability operations are thus readily differentiated from the armed forces traditional offensive and defensive missions and represent a dramatic change in the militarys perception of its role and responsibilities. This is the armed forces most fundamental adjustment since the establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947, and it is arguably more foundational than the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reorganization.3 Military leaders are touting this as a revolution, and it is playing out in doctrine and in changes to training, force structure, and procurement. Military leaders now are calling for U.S. forces to be prepared for full-spectrum operations entailing the application of combat power through simultaneous and continuous combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability, and civil support.4 Despite being so recent, moreover, the change is wholehearted, with a fully developed legitimizing logic that goes something like this: The military has a surplus of conventional capabilities but a deficit for conducting the kinds of operations being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. As these kinds of operations have predominated since the end of the Cold War and, arguably, even during the Cold Warthe military must adapt. It must be ready for operations in a complex era of persistent conflict, terminology that shows up in some form or another in working papers, articles, and new doctrine and that indicates that the change is in response to a new and challenging strategic environment.5

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The shift in priorities is even evident in word choice. In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), stability operations were described as a subset of irregular warfare (IW), a broad category of operations including counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), and foreign internal defense (FID).6 In the 2010 QDR, however, all references to IW were dropped in favor of more specific references to each of the components of the category.7 This change was made in part to allay confusion; including stability operations with the other components of IW made little sense, since stability operations can include any military or civilian effort to establish order and can take place simultaneously with indeed, can play a prominent and necessary role inany of the other elements of IW. Stability operations, moreover, can also be undertaken during peacetime or as a part of conventional war. In peacetime, stability operations involve efforts to shape host nations environments, with the goal of helping to prevent tensions and reduce the likelihood of conflict. Where conflicts have arisen, stability operations are intended to promote room for negotiations and reduce the causes of strife. In war, stability operations are supposed to mitigate the negative and long-term effects of combat on civilian populations and address underlying causes of tension. As war winds down, stability operations are used in an effort to create opportunities for accords, begin processes of rebuilding, and limit the likelihood of renewed violence.8 By elevating stability operationsof all the IW componentsto a primary mission alongside offense and defense, the DOD has signaled that the militarys job has expanded. It is not only to win battles, defeat enemy forces, and deter aggressors but actively, alongside civilian counterparts, to promote stability through the provision of controlled and nonviolent environments, improved governance, and economic growth. This unprecedented emphasis on stability operations thus effectively represents a new raison dtre for the U.S. military. The U.S. operations in Iraq precisely mirror the swing from emphasizing fighting and winning the nations wars to the embrace of stability operations. In fact, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds vision of the war in Iraq was as a showcase for the then-current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which he championed in the Pentagon. The RMA was intended

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to bring conventional warfare into the twenty-first century, emphasizing speed, lethality, accuracy, flexibility, and information dominance, all rooted in state-of-the-art technology. The military was to be a dominant, highly professional, and efficient fighting force. Nation building was anathema to this view, and Rumsfeld often stated that he opposed using U.S. forces for such tasks, including for postcombat reestablishment of peace.9 Thus, the secretary of defense expected the war in Iraq to be a rapid, overwhelming defeat of Saddam Husseins forces, followed by the withdrawal of American troops. When asked in 2003, before the war began, how long it might last, he responded: It could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months.10 And he was rightif the wars duration is measured by the time between the first deployment of U.S. forces and the declaration of victory, if the end of the war was the defeat of Saddams military and the toppling of his government.11 But well over six years, billions of dollars, thousands of casualties, and one surge later, American troops were still in Iraq, conducting counterinsurgency and nation building, the kind of slow, manpower-intensive, low-tech operations that Rumsfeld particularly despised and that the military more generally had always undertaken as a sideline to the main event. As will be discussed in chapter 2, responding to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2006 the Army and the Marine Corps together published new counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasizing the importance of stability operations for success in COIN. Less than two years later, the Army published a new version of capstone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, which included stability operations new elevated role, and a keystone stability operations manual, FM-07, Stability Operations. There have thus been two transformations in the past ten years, the much-touted and oft-debated RMA and the quieter but arguably more significant elevation of stability operations. Arguably rooted in weapons systems that began development in the 1970s, the RMA accelerated with the end of the Cold War and the consequent drawdown in U.S. military forces, the advent of new technologies (especially information technologies), and lessons from the 1991 Gulf War. But even as the military implemented the RMA, troops were being deployed in increasing numbers to a different kind of battlefield, one on which these new capabilities were only marginally

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useful. Peace operations, counterdrug ventures, counterinsurgency efforts, and ultimately stability and reconstruction missions could not be conducted as stand-off operations. They required large numbers of troops rather than the RMAs preferred small footprint and were far more dependent on elusive human intelligence than the kinds of electronic, satellite, and signal intelligence that underpinned information supremacy in the RMA. Just as the lessons learned from the Gulf War reinforced the RMA, the lessons learned from the OOTW of the immediate postCold War period and the recent and challenging operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are the roots of the militarys current transformation. Questions inevitably arise from this dramatic adjustment to the militarys mission and the concomitant changes in organization, doctrine, and training. The first: Is this shift as radical as it appears? DODD 3000.05, FM 3-0, the new U.S. Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual, and incipient joint doctrine seem to represent a sea change in how the military perceives both threats and its own role.12 Yet some argue that this has been more evolutionary than revolutionary and reflects not a dramatic departure but rational next steps in the militarys development. The military has always undertaken stability operations: reconstruction after the American Civil War entailed extensive nation building, as did the massive postWorld War II efforts in both Europe and Japan, not to mention all the stability operations that have been conducted as elements of COIN, disaster relief, or peacekeeping. Thus, as a means of offering some context, this study begins in chapter 1 with a long view of the militarys involvement inand opinion ofstability operations. An overview of doctrinal development over the past twenty years in chapter 2 then provides some insight into how substantive a change has really taken place, as does the assessment in chapter 3 of the militarys changing organization, force structure, education, and training. The second question: If this is truly a new direction for the military, what led the infamously stubborn institution to change course so dramatically and in such a relatively short period of time? There have been many explanations offered for the new policy, but none of them satisfactorily explains the timing of DODD 3000.05. Chapter 4 offers a new approach to thinking

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about the political dynamics that resulted in the shift in the armed forces mission. Once the politics of change are scrutinized, it is useful to examine, as is done in chapter 5, the meaning of this much broader mission both in terms of military capabilities and as it affects policy options. Capabilities and policy are deeply interrelated, and changes in one affect the other. In terms of stability operations, military capabilities will be shaped by changes in training, force structure, and equipment that are a function of policy. Policy options will, in turn, be affected; the militarys shift toward stability operations is intended to broaden the militarys utility to civilians as they attempt to manage conflict, promote peace, and encourage democracy. Having these enhanced tools at their disposal may affect policy makers calculations regarding foreign policy. It is likely to change the balance of responsibilities among domestic actors. The militarys transformation and more expansive application will also change international perceptions of the U.S. military and U.S. foreign policy more generally, creating an unpredictable ripple effect as friends and opponents adjust to this change in the U.S. armed forces. Finally, the assumption underlying the entire transformation needs further assessment to determine whether this shift in approach is a positive, visionary development or a potentially dangerous detour for both the military and the nation. Chapter 6 examines in conclusion whether the military isor ever has beenthe correct tool for addressing instability. While it seems that the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are that the military needs better preparation before conducting these kinds of operations, perhaps the lesson should instead be that we should avoid these kinds of operations altogether and seek more cost-effective, constructive, and long-term means of influencing the international environment in ways conducive to protecting American interests. Overall, this book means to demonstrate that DOD 3000.05 represents a significant change from previous practices, to identify and examine the dynamics that led the Pentagon to adopt this new approach, and to consider the implicationsfor the military, for policy makers, and for U.S. interests more generallyof elevating stability operations to a primary mission.

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one
stAbility opeRAtions in Context
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

defining stability opeRations

DOD Directive 3000.05, in elevating stability operations to the equivalent of combat operations, defines them as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.1 This definition is broad enough, with the inclusion of establish... order, that almost any military operation could fall within it. Joint doctrines definition of stability operations is far more specific, though it still includes establishing a secure environment: various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.2 FM 3-0, the Armys capstone doctrine, defines stability operations as efforts to promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat,

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political and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.3 Like the preceding definitions, this one leaves room for a wide range of military actions, as long as they are in the service of shaping the environment. Ultimately, the term refers to the application of a group of operations in support of establishing and maintaining order. The group of operations includes most of the same tasks that fell under previous categories (such as LIC and OOTW), but by refining the way they are presented, specifically in the service of promoting stability, they become less a disparate bunch of unrelated undertakings and more a toolkit for a specific objective. They include:
Peace operations, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement Humanitarian and civic assistance Noncombatant evacuations

The broad subcategory of security assistance with foreign military sales, Shows of force Arms control international military education and training, and more

Support to insurgencies Combating terrorism

Support to counterdrug operations Support to domestic civilian authorities4

Each of these is a potential tool for the promotion or maintenance of order and thus can be considered a form of stability operation. The relationship between COIN, FID, and stability operations is worth parsing in more detail, since the three are so closely connected, often overlap, and are sometimes, incorrectly, used interchangeably. FID refers to civilian and military efforts to help a host nations government implement its internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and thus comprises stability operations undertaken in support of a foreign administration. COIN is the full range of military and civilian efforts undertaken to combat an insurgency; U.S. forces involvement in COIN can involve direct military

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engagement with insurgents, but it is usually focused on support for host nation governments COIN efforts, including the provision of military training, materiel, and advice as well as development assistance and other stability operations. References to both FID and COIN inherently include reference to stability operations, since these comprise a huge portion of both efforts. Stability operations, however, are not restricted to either of these categories and can include everything from routine peacetime engagement, such as security assistance, to peacekeeping, and to stabilization and reconstruction efforts as a conventional war moves into its final phases. Clearly adjusting terminology to emphasize stability operations rather than broad categories like OOTW or IW is more than simply semantic, even though stability operations often involve precisely the same tasks that fell under previous groupings. As operations other than war, the tasks were defined by what they were not; as stability operations, they are defined as part of a larger strategic objective.5 This change in nomenclature reflects the shift in priorities and in the perception of the militarys appropriate role. Whereas these tasks were once considered distractions from war, they are now considered part of war itself, part of full-spectrum operations, and as tasks often necessary simultaneously with combat. More importantly, they are also seen as valuable peacetime strategies and as required for successfully concluding conflict and creating lasting peace. Suddenly, American military leaders are taking Clausewitzs dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means more to heart than ever before.6 Despite the new appreciation for such operations significance, the very broadness of the concept of stability operations can have drawbacks. Stability operations can involve a wide variety of tasks that will be undertaken in varying circumstances; use different types, combinations, and numbers of troops and units; require different kinds of equipment; and rely on different forms of training. Some tasks are more akin to conventional combat operations or are more readily undertaken by personnel prepared for such contingencies:
Shows of force

Noncombatant evacuation operations

Arguably, some elements of foreign internal defense and counterterrorism

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Some tasks promote training and experience for conventional combat:

Security assistance

Security force assistance

Humanitarian and civic assistance Some aspects of arms control7

Some tasks will require more specific training to prepare the forces for restrictive rules of engagement, the presence of civilians, the need for interagency cooperation, and the potential for strategic outcomes of apparently minor tactical decisions:
Peacekeeping

Peace enforcement

Support to insurgencies

Many elements of foreign internal defense, and aspects of counterterrorism

It is thus not surprising that stability operations are expected to accomplish quite a bit, including both development and coercion:
Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment. They include developmental, cooperative activities accomplish stability goals through engagement and response. The mili-

during peacetime and coercive actions in response to crisis. Army forces tary activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability.8

But, in the context of changing views, it is important to note that different stability operations tasks and activities will have different requirements and, more importantly, different relationships withand effects on readiness forconventional warfighting.

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