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Heidegger's Romantic Personalism Author(s): Benjamin Crowe Reviewed work(s): Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 161-179 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27745020 . Accessed: 14/08/2012 13:07
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History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 22, Number 2, April 2005

HEIDEGGER'S ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

Benjamin Crowe

his "Letter on Humanism," written in the aftermath of the Second relates the following incident: "Soon after Be In World War, Heidegger he tells us, "a young friend asked me, 'When ing and Time appeared," are you going to write an ethics?'" (G9 353/268). Heidegger's "answer," written some twenty years later, does not completely settle the issue. It is clear, however, that he regards this question after relating this story, he writes: Immediately as an important one.

Who can disregard our predicament? Should we not safeguard and secure the existing bonds even ifthey hold human beings together ever so tenuously and merely for the present? Certainly. (G9 353/268) seems to recognize the salience of his young friend's Here, Heidegger it seems, at least in this passage, that importantly, question. More is at least somewhat sensitive to concrete moral and social Heidegger a issues. And yet, at the very end of his "letter," Heidegger expresses about enlisting deep hesitance these sorts of questions: philosophy in the service of addressing

It is time to break the habit of overestimating philosophy and of is needed in the present world thereby asking too much of it.What in thinking; less crisis is less philosophy, but more attentiveness With its saying, literature, but more cultivation of the letter. . . . thinking lays inconspicuous furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous than the furrows that the farmer, slow of step, draws

throughthefield. (G9 353/276)

in this attitude Heidegger's insensitivity to suffering, to the real move ordinary men and women, and to his own (al issues that moral to address these issues.1 From this leged) responsibility as a philosopher see

that can cure the moral ills of than making pronouncements seems to suggest that philosophers should withdraw society, Heidegger life of the mind. This all seems innocent into a quiet, inconspicuous such as John Caputo, enough, at first glance. But some commentators, Rather

161

162
perspective, Humanism" Few

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

"answer" to his young friend in the "Letter on Heidegger's seems like an attempt to dodge the issue. want

Humanism"

of such importance that philosophers ought only to enter into a discussion of itwith the greatest reticence and caution that they can to under muster. To understand why he held this view, it is necessary stand his own values, and the relation way of doing philosophy. I. is by no passage quoted above, from the "Letter on Humanism," some concern for means the only place where Heidegger expresses practical, moral, or social issues. On the contrary, his essays, lectures, are filled with indications in and correspondence, that his work was The between what he valued and his

a matter

of his thought as a whole. In reflect the larger ambiguities is a reflection not the present essay, I will argue that this ambiguity to moral but rather of his profound of Heidegger's issues, insensitivity concern for a particular moral ideal. Heidegger to be thought morality

to deny, however, that Heidegger's thought concern for concrete human is, at its core, motivated by an abiding in the "Letter on life.2 Hence, the ambiguities of Heidegger's response commentators

true of motivated large measure by such a concern. This is especially his writings from the period preceding Being and Time.3 It is clear that, and that its primary con forHeidegger, is serious business, philosophy cern is not with abstruse theoretical problems but rather with fostering valuable At ways of life. first glance,

seems to be incompatible with Hei this assertion of the concept of "value." This critique first emerges in degger's critique in the 1930s, and is again the years following World War I, resurfaces in the "Letter on Humanism." Understood made correctly, explicit the claim that Heidegger this critique does not invalidate however, is motivated [Wer?]" is by a concern with valuable ways of life. 'Value a central concept in the so-called "Baden" school of neo-Kantianism, and by Heidegger's Doktorvater, exemplified by Wilhelm Windelband Heinrich Rickert. On this view, a "value" is an a priori norm grounded in transcendental

as such [Bewu?tsein "consciousness ?berhaupt].''4 this concept as part of his overall critique ofmodern Heidegger rejects that philosophy.5 To say, however, subjectivity and of transcendental or cares about "values" is not to say that "values" something Heidegger he endorses this particular concept, or to ignore his strident critique of can be used in the informal sense of an "philosophy of value." Value' idea, ideal, or activity that motivates that the term is used here. a person, and it is in this sense

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

Right testimony conclusion written intellectual at the outset of his academic

163

without a goal" (S 68). A year later, in a letter to Rickert, Heidegger again contends that philosophy must have its origin in "the basic streams of life and the fullness of culture and spirit" (HR 38). Heidegger's personal letters to Blochmann contain numerous claims of a similar nature. For I and the collapse of the example, just prior to the end ofWorld War Wilhelmine shares his convictions about the social Reich, Heidegger duties of intellectuals: must come, and which is How itwill shape up after the end?which our only salvation?is is certain and unshakeable uncertain. What is the demand on truly spiritual people not to become weak now, but rather to take decisive leadership in hand, and to instruct the people for truthfulness, and for a genuine appreciation of the genuine goods of Dasein. (HB 12) In the early 1920s, Heidegger to be congenial found Karl Jaspers In his letters to ideas about the proper motives of philosophy. convictions on the expresses his own characteristic Jaspers, Heidegger to these academic

nature of in 1916, Heidegger the complementary emphasizes and immediate life-experience. He couches this idea inquiry in explicitly religious terms: "Philosophy as a rationalistic construction as irrational experience is from life is powerless?mysticism detached

career, Heidegger gives eloquent behind his life's work. In the to the deep motivations lying on the doctrine of categories, to his post-doctoral dissertation

matter.

in the humdrum that today, and who leads a pseudo-existence of today's hustle and bustle, does not know where he stands" aspect of this claim emerges a (HJ 42). The distinctively Heideggerian bit later in the same letter, where Jaspers is told that an effective "up not heaval" or "revolution [Umsturz]" can only occur "inconspicuously," realized routine through bombastic jeremiads on the "decay of culture." While Heidegger he is committed to the seriousness and responsibility of philosophizing, of philosophy who trivialize it with their ridicules the "medicine-men" "fearful, miserable handiwork" (HJ 42).

is a matter of a "fundamental Philosophy struggle," not quiescent "business" and detached "indifference" (HJ 29). On July 14, renewal "will 1923, Heidegger argues that real cultural and educational never be attained has not yet through merely writing books. Whoever

way of life that involves

of candor in which one These early letters present us with moments can gain a clear glimpse of the deep motivations work behind Heidegger's as a philosopher. What is ultimately at stake for him is not whether or some contribution to the "academic business," but rather not he makes own values and to his vocation as a philoso that he remains loyal to his is both motivated by life, and is itself a philosophy pher. For Heidegger, a passion for certain very specific values.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

in more public settings. also expressed these convictions Heidegger For example, in his lecture course for theWinter Semester of 1919-1920, comments on the "radicalism" of philosophy: Heidegger of problems that is genuine, original, living, continually ploughing up the ground anew, never resting?genuine science, which our age, and the nineteenth century, have lost, and which one cannot define ahead of time for the newly dawning age, but which has to be lived anew. A living concern, personal being and creating (? radicalism). (G58 5) talk of a "personal" "living concern" with philosophy is not Heidegger's intended to suggest that the discipline belongs solely in the quiet of the study or in the silent inwardness of the philosopher himself. Heidegger's of the vocation ... a consciousness

of the philosopher, while clearly something that has to be personally appropriated, is not at all a private matter. Instead, the essence of this vocation is that it forces one into the very heart of the social, cultural, and political maelstrom "a genuine motivation job is to articulate of the day. The philosopher's for the fates (tasks) that fall

vision

to it, to its generation, and to humanity" (G58 150). The image that this remark suggests is of a series of concentric circles, each representing a level of concrete concern: individual, generational, and inter-genera

tion, which is itself faced with its own unique in turn, is part of the stream The generation, in her own modest way, is called philosopher,

own tional. Philosophy draws its very life-blood from an individual's "anxious worry [BekiimmerungY for her own life. At the same time, the is always part of a larger whole, i.e., the genera individual philosopher problems and promises. to which a of humanity, to contribute.

he revisits these ideas a few years later. "Hermeneutics," Heidegger the Dasein which is in each case writes in 1923, "has the task ofmaking our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its

to itself in this regard, hunting down the Dasein being, communicating alienation with which it is smitten" (G63 15/11, emphasis added). Self overcome and replaced by something that Heidegger is to be alienation calls "wakefulness" (G63 15/12). The whole project here is undertaken for itself" (G63 in [life] a radical wakefulness "with a view to developing "will itself remain unimport this focus, hermeneutics 16/12). Without of life the alienation ant" (G63 20/15). The target then is overcoming from itself.

as some in these passages It is noteworthy that life is characterized case our own." Earlier, of this at the beginning thing that is "in each as follows: "'Facticity' is the defined his object lecture course, Heidegger designation we will use for the character of the being of'our' 'own' Das in in each case 'this' Dasein ein. More precisely, this expression means:

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

165

dust and ashes," a matter that has been forgotten and left behind by bent on the construction of speculative philosophers systems.6 Heidegger con is ultimately not just concerned with "facticity" as a philosophical cept, but rather with facticity as "a how of being, an indication which (G63 7/5). That is, Heidegger points to a possible path of being-wakeful" in more than a is concerned with the possibility of being an individual singularity and unique his life's work.

its being-there for a while at theparticular time" (G63 7/5). Heidegger's concern is what Franz Rosenzweig calls "T, who am indeed dust and I fore- and surname, I ashes.' I, a completely common private-subject,

merely formal sense, with owning up to one's ness. This is the value that ultimately motives II.

what "authenticity" means, and where it comes from, is understanding to understanding the indispensable of Heidegger's the ambiguities key attitude toward moral philosophy or ethics. The goal of this section is to show that "authenticity"
personalism.

was deeply concerned with a value that Heidegger one point as "wakefulness." at that he describes and other These terms are ways of indicating what readers of Being and Time are more familiar with as authenticity. The central claim of this essay is that It has been shown

is Heidegger's

version

of what

I call Romantic

something like "being true to one Intuitively, "authenticity" means self." Charles Taylor has shed substantial light on the nature and origins of this idea in a recent monograph. This is his characterization: is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point ofmy life, I miss what being human is forme.7 There Taylor argues that the source of this ideal can be found in Herder, and in the poets and artists of the Sturm und Drang Schleiermacher, as the successors. Reacting their Romantic against what they perceived

of the Enlightenment, and intellectualism these abstract universalism figures tried to reassert the value of the concrete individual as something and of being true to one's individuality as a valuable uniquely valuable, in order to way of life. One might call this idea "Romantic personalism" accentuate both its historical talk of "genuineness," he committed himself In the Summer origins and its basic claims. Heidegger's and "authenticity" all reveal that "wakefulness," to his own version of Romantic personalism. of 1919, Heidegger or in other words expresses his admiration forRomantic personalism

Semester

for the "German movement,"

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

of this line of thought (G56/57 134/114f.). In practice, this development cult of genius and the study of history as into the aesthetic translated the action of great personalities.8 Heidegger wants to purge this tradition of these problematic ideas, while at the same time vigorously asserting the importance of the core value of "genuineness" or "authenticity."

admires Herder's He particularly assertion (G56/57 133-134/113-114). of the unique value of each nation and age. At the same time, there are elements of this tradition that Heidegger wants to reject, particularly the role of the Cartesian-Kantian concept of "subjectivity" in the subsequent

sheds from later on in this lecture course, Heidegger In a passage on the essential core of the Romantic to tradition that he wants light more problematic elements: preserve, while casting off the Moreover, there are genuine life-experiences, which grow out of a life-world (artist, religious person). Depending upon the genuine of there arises the phenomenon motivational possibilities, genuine life-intensification (in the opposite case, minimizing of life). This phe nomenon is not determined by a feeling of experienced content. There are people who have experienced much in various "worlds" (artisti cally, etc.) and yet are "inwardly empty." They have reached only a

"superficial" experience of life. Today the forms of life-intensification are becoming ever more pregnant, fraught with meaning. "Activism" The "free German youth is in motive genuine, in form misguided. is in form genuine, but without fertility in its setting of movement" goals. These (G56/57 208/175f.) remarks per highlight many of the core elements ofRomantic status of the artist, the distinction between sonalism: the paradigmatic a passionate, resolute life and one that is "minimized" and "superficial."

of his ideals. The youth tion about both the content and the provenance reaction against the perceived movement was a bastion of neo-Romantic of bourgeois poets like society. The work of Romantic superficiality into factored significantly like George, and neo-Romantics H?lderlin, this movement's The valuable ideals. "core" of Romantic in Hei also appears personalism in The role of the "personal" with Blochmann. degger's correspondence that the "own This means life is repeatedly emphasized. the renewal of most existence" of individuals is the engine that drives genuine social and of "inner wakefulness" and that the attainment cultural regeneration, success in this regard (HB 7). or "inner truthfulness" holds the key to tries to clarify a religious conceptual framework, Heidegger Deploying

is also significant is the fact that the "religious person" Particularly taken to be exemplary. Indeed, the genuinely "religious person" serves work. His measured as a model for authenticity throughout Heidegger's also provides important informa for the youth movement enthusiasm

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

167

years later, Heidegger again presents his ideal to his friend Blochmann. This time, he sketches it out in considerably more detail. It is a rationalistic misjudgment of the essence of the personal stream of life, if one intends and demands that it vibrate in the same broad and sonorous amplitudes that well up in graced moments. Such claims grow out of a defect in inner humility before the mystery and grace

the point by saying that "Every accomplishment gains the character of to of an inner belonging final validity in the sense of genuineness, i.e., a central I and its god-directed of purpose" A few steadfastness (HB 7).

character of all life.We must be able to wait for the tautly strung intensities of meaningful life?and we must remain in continuity so much to enjoy them as to mold them with these moments?not into [eingestalten] life?in the continuing course of life, they are taken along and incorporated into the rhythm of all future life.. . . [H]aving is only genuine when it is truly lived, oneself with understanding i.e., when it is at the same time a be-ing. By this I do not intend the rather triviality that one must now also adhere towhat is known?but a vehement life, a turning inwards [Innewerden] to one's own unique (though not theoretical) total spiritual direction. (HB 14) intensified, com again one can see the ideal of a passionate, of life, the rejection of the over-rationalization of life way a stress on the characteristic of modern, post-industrial society, and value of vocation. These ideals are all consonant with Romantic per Here sonalism. These same ideas in Heidegger's well-known letter appear in which he announces his formal break with

mitted

to Fr. Engelbert Krebs, Roman Catholicism:

It is difficult to live as a philosopher?inner truthfulness regarding oneself and in relation to those for whom one is supposed to be a teacher demands sacrifices, renunciation, and struggles which ever remain unknown to the academic technician. I believe that I have the inner calling to philosophy and, through my research and teaching, to do what stands inmy power for the sake of the eternal vocation of the inner man, and to do itfor this alone, and so justify my existence [Dasein] and work ultimately before God. (S 70) another im repeated reference to the "inner" expresses Heidegger's like Schleiermacher feature of Romantic People portant personalism. used this sort of language quite often. It even shows up and Kierkegaard inNietzsche's early work. Taylor has described the way inwhich earlier notions of the "moral sense," of an inner voice that guides a person's of the ideal of authenticity.9 actions, factored into the development of conversion, theran Pietism, which stressed the lived experience also an important tributary in this stream of thought. Heidegger's Lu was

em

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ployment overtones

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

of the language of "inwardness" again of Romantic of his own appropriation testifies to the religious personalism.

derives from Indeed, his own unique brand ofRomantic personalism the religious roots of this tradition. This his attempt to reappropriate Wilhelm Dilthey, whom attempt was inspired by Heidegger's reading of he regarded to be the deepest thinker among the Romantic personalists. liked to say that Dilthey was, at bottom, really a theologian, Heidegger

own appreciation for Romantic and he duly noted Dilthey's poets and shared a Romantic thinkers (S 151, 153). Indeed, Dilthey suspicion of and metaphysical views of history that systems grand metaphysical eclipse

tions, and individuals (GSl 41/92).Dilthey foundbiographical writing

to be particularly interesting as an expression lives: "The progress and destiny of the human the individual has an "intrinsic of the value of individual

the uniqueness

and

irreducible

value

of particular

cultures,

na

in its dignity as an end in itself (GSl 33/85, emphasis added). For

value in the world of human

will

is here apprehended

Dilthey, Most Dilthey's

spirit" (GS7 212/333).

for Heidegger's important claim that Christianity of the value of the individual of religious clearly was thinking on these matters was source for the the historical

recognition

of the individual.

The which it had been forcedbymedieval thought (GSl 352f./186f.).

Reformation had was of decisive significance in this regard (GSl a profound and Kierkegaard,

"emancipation" the immediacy

traces the modern Dilthey to the protest of religious feeling and life against the metaphysical systems into

384?./218;GS2 39ff.). Dilthey also holds thatLutheran Pietism, which individual (GS7 183ff./204f.; GS6 288ff.).
thinkers like Schleiermacher influence on personalist was a powerful assertion of the religious value of the

In many passages from his lectures and essays during this early ideas about period, Heidegger more or less explicitly endorses Dilthey's interest in autobiography this subject. For example, he shares Dilthey's literature (G58 58f.). He also regards Christianity, and in confessional in in its primitive and "mystical" forms, as paradigmatic particularly toward the stances of an "intensifying concentration [ZugespitztheitY self (G58 60f.). Importantly, Heidegger makes an effort to distance this of "subjectivity," something from the conceptual apparatus phenomenon to do (G58 205). "Having oneself" in an authentic way that Dilthey failed sub of the theoretical self-presence ject (G58 155f.). The aim of exploring the religious sources of Romantic core of this tradition.10 was to retrieve the valuable personalism nothing to do with the serene Based articulated

has

in large part on his readings of early Christianity, Heidegger life is one that an ideal of "authentic" life.11An authentic

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

169

begins with some sort of interruption of the normal course of events, of the the humdrum reality of the everyday. This interruption provides on her life as a whole, and to occasion for a person to gain perspective to being a person of a certain sort. This com make a new commitment mitment renewed requires a continually struggle to remain loyal to own unique way of being human. During the 1920s, oneself and to one's in an attempt to indicate the employs diverse vocabularies Heidegger of life that he envisions. calls this ideal "existence Later, Heidegger [Existenz]." Contrasting the quotidian "circumstances" of life with the "situation," Heidegger the idea thusly: explains In contrast to circumstances, the situation of factical lifemeans the stand taken by life in which it has made itself transparent [durch sichtig] to itself in its falling and has, in concrete anxious worry at to the the particular time, seized upon the possible countermovement of its care. (NB 10/118) falling to portray life has become self-aware, is here attempting Heidegger that has suddenly become cognizant of the unsatisfying superficiality of its wonted ways. One has "seen through [durchsehen]" the life that one has been living. This represents a chance to seize one's life as ones responsibility for one's life. Rather than tranquilly drifting through life, one takes a stand on oneself as a person of a cer In is emphatically tain sort. This possibility indexed to the individual. mean for a specific individual other words, the content ofwhat itmight own, to take ultimate

way

to live in this way is opaque to the theoretical gaze. The whole point, after all, is that one's life is one's own. While the basic contours of "in can be sketched out (largely in a negative ner truthfulness" or Existenz fashion), the nature of the ideal detailed formulations. These itself is such that it precludes

any

are critical for understanding curious passages Heidegger's blend of enthusiasm and reticence with regard to talking about moral on his view, would issues. To trot out formulae or decision procedures, be to invade the space that should only be determined by each individual time." Yet, to refuse all mention of a moral ideal would "at the particular is more than just an "academic be to give up on the idea that philosophy business." continued position, to think about these these convictions became

As Heidegger out his philosophical work firmly entrenched.

issues and to even more

III.
(1) that Heidegger's Up to this point, it has been established in large measure motivated by a concern with a particular thought is value, and

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

in question is best understood (2) in place, we can understand in terms of Romantic how

(1) can be true, is often very reticent about doing ethics despite the fact that Heidegger or moral philosophy in the usual ways. Heidegger's thinking is moti vated by a concern with particular individuals being "authentic," being or owning up to their own unique true to themselves, individuality. For

(2) that the value personalism. With

to steer clear of anything with even the hint of this reason, he wants about it. Heidegger's conviction is that one cannot foster the pedantry or by making value being true to oneself by proclaiming world-views to regulate about how people are supposed normative pronouncements their lives and make decisions. decide to talk But, the lingering question is, why does Heidegger at all, given his worries for about authenticity about the potential must be kept in mind here distortion and ideological pedantry? What on life's being "in each case my own" is that Heidegger's emphasis its social nature. does not eclipse an equally strong acknowledgment

on the social "world," the context of meaningful relations, dependent which a person inhabits. From very early on in his career, Heidegger in enabling one stresses the role of community and social relationships to make sense of life (G58 32ff.).

For Heidegger, the intelligibility each individual life is importantly of

into of "factical life-experience" divides total phenomenon Heidegger three interlocking contexts: the "environing world [Umwelt]," the "with the point is world [Mitwelt]," and the "self-world [Selbstwelt]" Again, in that the intelligible sense of things in our lives is partly grounded to other people: "the book we have used was bought at a person" (SZ 118/153f.). So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such The broken skis in the corner call to mind our trip with someone, the table speaks to us of family dinners (G63 90f./69f.). Our understanding their reference

of ourselves and of our world is never isolated from the social relations in which we stand. Indeed, those whom we call "others" are those from whom we do not, by and large, distinguish ourselves. That is, the "others" are those amongst whom we ourselves belong; our world is a "shared"

world (SZ 118/154?.).

The issue for Heidegger, then, is this: how can someone committed in to the value of authenticity effectively engage with other people such a way as to foster this value? The answer does not lie in impos program on people. That ing some common framework or ideological or systems of values are not required, beyond simply is, shared values of each. The goal is not to the authenticity each person's commitment on the same course of action, but rather so much that everyone agree does occur, it is in each case "determined by that, if such agreement

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

one's own Dasein that matters that has been grasped in each case

171

here is the "inner truthfulness of a worthwhile, self-culti life" (G56/57 5/4), which is certainly not a "matter for universal vating humanity or for a public" (G63 19/15). Heidegger spells out these ideas an early letter to Karl Lowith. Here, he asserts that quite directly in a real bond between can only be achieved individuals through mutual commitment to liberating one another for their own struggle to achieve "inner truthfulness." It is only important that we agree that what really matters for each of us is to go to the radical, uttermost limit forwhat and how each of us understands the "one thing necessary." Perhaps we are far apart with respect to "system," "doctrine," and "position," but we are together as human beings alone can be together: in existence

Dasein bestimmt]" (SZ 122/159). The only thing [je eigens ergriffenen

in one's own way

[Existenz].(HL 32)

and Time, Heidegger maintains that "communication" and are the best ways to bring about not paternalistic "struggle," pedantry, a genuine community of persons to au (SZ 384/436). Not submission a shared ideal of individual integrity, constitutes the thority, but rather foundation for real solidarity. What Heidegger envisions is a "commu nity of struggle [Kampfgemeinschaft]," more explicitly in his correspondence lauds the "exceptional and independent fgemeinschaft] something which he articulates with Karl Jaspers. Heidegger community of struggle [Kamp

In Being

that I find all too rare these days" between himself and has already been made ofHeidegger's (HJ 29).12 Mention Jaspers hopes a "revolution for [Umsturz]" in university and cultural life, which must take its cue from an "invisible community," not a political party (HJ

42). Heidegger certainly did not share many philosophical, political, or commitments with Jaspers. What he did share was a mutual religious commitment to revitalizing philosophy and the university. For him, this is much more important than having a common ideology.

this model using a slightly In Being and Time, Heidegger describes different vocabulary. Here, he argues that genuine community is founded on a commitment to being the "conscience" of other people (SZ 298/344). uses the term 'conscience' more gen the way Heidegger Understanding erally

instantiation (or rather one's own unique own way within a context of it) of having to live one's own life in one's lit up. These that one has not created is momentarily of possibilities calls them in 1919) are moments of "life-intensification" (as Heidegger which the human condition

content to this claim. In ??55-60 of provides more substantial and Time, he uses 'conscience' or the 'call of conscience' as ways of Being in lifewhen the complacency the structure of rare moments articulating in of everyday "business as usual" is interrupted. These are experiences

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singular

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

to undertake the project of "inner truthfulness," of opportunities public. To be the "conscience" refusing to lose oneself in the anonymous of another person is to act as such an opportunity. to being the "conscience" of another is some kind of alternative as a passage from Being and Time makes clear (SZ 122/158). paternalism, attacks a tendency toward what he calls "standing in Here, Heidegger [einspringen]" for another person and so contributing to her natural ten The its i.e., to be inauthentic. Despite dency to abdicate self-responsibility, benevolent intentions, this sort of activity ultimately robs the other person of her dignity by treating her as if she were a child, one who is incapable of radical loyalty to herself. A bit later in Being and Time, Heidegger his model of emancipatory characterizes interpersonal solidarity: [A] solicitude which does not stand in for the other so much as leap ahead [vorausspringt] of him in his existentiell ability to be, not in order to take "care" away from him, but rather to give it back to him in the first place authentically and as such. This solicitude is essential to authentic care?i.e., it concerns the existence [Existenz] of the other and not some what with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become transparent for himself in his care and to become free for it.

(SZ 122/158?.)

objective here is not to relieve another person of the burden of to be herself, but rather to serve as an occasion for her to fully em having individual. brace this burden, and to take a stand on herself as a unique The This earlier talk of "leaping ahead" inBeing and Time recalls Heidegger's Just as the "voice of conscience" talk of "exemplary living [Vorleben]." so or "univocally calculable maxims," gives no "practical injunctions" of another in the same way a person concerned with the authenticity enacts 1918 this concern in unobtrusive captures letter to Blochmann (cf. SZ 294/340). exemplification the idea quite clearly: A

in an exemplary way life can only be lived in advance Spiritual and shaped so that those who ought to partake of it are [vorgelebt] immediately seized by it in their existence [Existenz]. The value of spiritual realities, insight into duty, and the will to fulfillment is only stirred up and liberated [l?sen sich . . .aus] as the fruit of a vigorous and enduring awakening that is inwardly nourished without theoreti cal and didactic assistance and bridges. (HB 7). 'vorleben' is used for the ideal that is later called 'vorausspringen in Being and Time. This is an idea that shows up again and again in work. ahead," living," being the "exemplary "Leaping Heidegger's are of another, sharing a "community of struggle"?these "conscience" it means vision of what all different ways of fleshing out Heidegger's Here, to interact with other people on the basis of a mutual commitment

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

to authenticity as an ideal. At

173

Heidegger, philosophy as has already been shown, philosophy is not a private ideal. Moreover, but one that takes place in community. As such, Heidegger's endeavor, model of interpersonal solidarity grounded in a concern for authenticity as well. An examination must apply to it of his explicit remarks on the nature of the practice of philosophy confirms this supposition. lecture courses at Freiburg, Heidegger tries this point by divorcing philosophy from "world-view" (G56/57 a world-view is a systematic 220/187). In the circle of neo-Kantianism, of the meaning and purpose of human life and human cul presentation on theoretically certain a priori norms. For Heidegger, ture, grounded to make In some of his earliest

is motivated,

this point, itmust be recalled that, for first and foremost, by this very

this represents precisely the sort of dictatorial mode of philosophy that to reject on the basis of his own commitments. In the he his compelled winter semester of 1919-1920, for example, Heidegger explicitly rejects both sides of the neo-Kantian project (i.e., a science of "value" and the mere construction of a world-view based upon it): "Philosophy?neither of subject matter and objects (validity of propositions); investigation nor sermonizing, direction or regulation; rather, a leading practical not the practical usefulness that understands; of norms, but [F?hrung] rather genuine possibilities of leading and of cultivation [Bildung]" (G58 the goal of regulating life through a priori 113f.). While repudiating

is still committed to the claim that philosophy does norms, Heidegger a role to play in individual and social "cultivation have [Bildung]." That is, he does not want to retreat from the confusing bustle of "world-views" into the cool room of "scientific" philosophy, but rather is seeking to a way of doing philosophy that moves beyond this dichotomy as early as This is, of course, precisely the idea expressed altogether. in the passage from his post-doctoral dissertation 1916, quoted at the of this essay. beginning articulate During summer semester porary attempts at "applied" of contem renunciation 1920, Heidegger's is even more emphatic: philosophy

insofar as it remains loyal to itself, is not to be defined Philosophy, in such a way that itmust rescue or save the age, the world, etc., or must alleviate the misery of the masses, or must make human beings happy, or cultivate or enhance culture. All of this signifies the direc tion of an anxious worry in which what it all comes down to simply vanishes. All world-view philosophy corrupts the original motive of philosophizing. (G59 170) It is the downfall of genuine philosophy. Ideology, or "world-view," later commitments make Heidegger's is well-worth noting that these political activities all the more puzzling. His early work, while not at all

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indifferent to concrete concerns, is devoid of explicit ideological flavor so apparent in his writings from the mid-1930s.13 However, throughout the early 1920s, Heidegger again and again stresses the independence of philosophy from ideology. He is repelled by the claim that philosophy

should somehow "stand security for the coming period of culture and the to fate of humanity." As he puts it in 1923, "philosophy has no mission take care of universal humanity and culture, to release future genera or to interfere with tions once and for all from care about questioning, them simply through wrongheaded claims to validity" (G63 18/14).

Once again, it is absolute crucial to recognize that, for Heidegger, the repudiation of the usual ways of advocating cultural renewal does not entail that philosophy must lose itself in tranquil theorizing of pure "science." As he points out to his students in 1919, the "scientific man . . .does not stand in isolation. He is connected to a community of simi larly striving 4/4). Heidegger's researchers view with its rich relations renew to students" themselves (G56/57 only by is that "life-relations

of a worthwhile is required is the "truthfulness 5/4). What [wertvolle] life" (G56/57 5/4). Or, as he puts and self-cultivated [sich aufbauenden] it a bit later on, "Only life, not the noise of frenetic cultural programs, is 'epoch-making'" (G56/57 5/4). views about the social and cultural positive Heidegger's are derived ultimately to the from his commitment or, as he calls it in 1919, of the "truthfulness of a authenticity, of ideal is a re-working while and self-cultivated life." This philosophy themes from the Romantic tradition. As has discussed, Heidegger and religious figures these

returning [imR?ckgang] to the genuine origins of the spirit" (G56/57

role of ideal of worth central

exemplars during his attempt to sketch out his ideal of doing "But just as the awe of the religious man makes him silent philosophy: in the face of the ultimate mystery, just as the genuine artist lives only in his work and detests all art-chatter, so the scientific man is effective

already been personalist inherits from this tradition the view that artists invokes life. Heidegger exemplify an authentic

(G56/57 5/4). Just as only by way of the vitality of genuine research" or religious life is a vocation, so too must philosophy art emerge from an "inner calling" (G56/57 5/5). claim is that consistency requires a person committed Heidegger's as an ideal to relate to other people in a very specific to authenticity this goal is not by promulgating way. The proper way to accomplish or ideologies, but rather through dialogic "struggle [Kampf]" programs For a phi of "inner truthfulness." and inconspicuous exemplification and who regards them as who shares these commitments, losopher, that ideology or normative this means the very life-blood of philosophy,

HEIDEGGERS ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

"world-view" something The gaard's has no place. to the attention

175

of theway oneself" (G9 42/36).

oft-discussed concept

Instead, one must be content with calling of others by first of all traveling "a stretch of "formal indication" plays an important from Kierke

role in concretizing Heidegger's vision here. Borrowing that notion of "indirect communication," contends Heidegger discourse should aim at pointing a person into a "situa philosophical in which the formal sense or meaning of a claim is tion of enactment" realized in the "Letter

spicuous the furrows that the farmer, slow of step, draws through the field" (G9 a philosopher might "compel" someone to 364/276). More negatively, "reflection" by challenging the complacent self-images, the "masks," that locked in an inauthentic way of life. Herbert Marcuse, keep individuals influenced by Heidegger, modern

in the temporal particularity of that moment.14 As he puts it on 'Humanism'": "With its saying, thinking lays incon furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous than

aims to replace with "inner truthfulness." Besides ity that Heidegger also furrows" of formal indication, Heidegger "laying inconspicuous wants to break up the level ground of "one-dimensionality" by calling into question the conceptual and "masks" behind which individuals societies hide from the task of self-responsibility.

of famously decried the "one-dimensionality" one could use the idea back from Marcuse, society. Borrowing as a way of describing the sort of superficial banal "one-dimensionality"

In the Summer calls this side of Semester of 1920, Heidegger activity the "rigor" of philosophy, which "must heighten philosophical in the facticity of Dasein, and anxious worry in its constant renewal must ultimately make actual Dasein is insecure" (G59 174). Philosophy a "motion on Heidegger's as a "counter-motion," to be understood, view, that life inflicts upon itself constant struggle of factical, (G61 132/99). Philosophy join "the its own ruinance, a struggle that interpretation against philosophical the process of the actualization of philosophizing" always accompanies against [Gegenbewegtheit]" the "ruinance" must

(G61 153/114).
states that "the Report" from late 1922, Heidegger of gaining access to [life] and of truly safekeeping genuinely fitting way itself hard for itself" (NB 3/113). This is it can only consist in making a philosopher: the sole duty of In the "Natorp This [i.e.,making things hard] is the only duty philosophical research can be required to fulfill, unless of course itwants to miss its object it easy, all the seductive compromising of completely. All making needs, all the metaphysical tranquilizers prescribed for problems that have been for the most part derived from mere book learning?the

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

basic intention of all of this is from the start to give up with regard to the task that must in each case be carried out, namely, bringing the object of philosophy into view, grasping it, and, indeed, preserv

13) ing it. (NB 3f./l

moral

from all of this? Heidegger's reticence about in a direct way stems from this abiding con addressing cern with the "duty" of a philosopher. While called to promote and to means an authentic to live it life, a philosopher (who exemplify what is also constrained shares Heidegger's values) by her commitments a one from promulgating to authenticity. These constraints preclude What issues world-view leftwith Heidegger the more

can be concluded

or even from giving a rigid definition of one's values. One is inconspicuous praxis of "making things hard," which, is the only "genuine" way to lead. contends,

University of Utah

NOTES
1. See John Caputo, "Thinking, Poetry, and Pain," Southern Journal ofPhi losophy, vol. 28 (1989), pp. 155-181; Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); and uSorge and Kardia: The Hermeneutics of Factical Life and the Categories of the Heart," in Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays inHis Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 327-344. in Hei 2. See Jean Grondin, "The Ethical and Young Hegelian Motives degger's Hermeneutics of Facticity," inReading Heidegger From theStart, pp. 'Existentialism' Revisited," 345-360; Michael E. Zimmerman, "Heidegger's Robert International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3 (1984), pp. 219-236 ; "The Double Concept ofPhilosophy and the Place ofEthics inBeing Bernasconi, and Time," Research inPhenomenology, vol. 18 (1988), pp. 41-57; Lawrence 'We: Ethical Implications ofHeidegger's Being and Time Vogel, The Fragile Northwestern University Press, 1994). Even Caputo seems to 111.: (Evanston, recognize this dimension ofHeidegger's thought. See his "Hermeneutics as the Man," Man and World, vol. 15 (1982), pp. 343-368. Recovery of 3. In his seminal study ofHeidegger's early work, John van Buren devotes many pages to the "indications of ethics" in that can be found there. See The Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Press, 1994), pp. 319-362. 4. See, for example, Wilhelm Windelband, "Kulturphilosophie und transzen in die dentaler Idealismus," Pr?ludien: Aufs?tze und Reden zur Einf?hrung 4th Auflage, vol. 2 (T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1911). Philosophie,

HEIDEGGER'S ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

177

5. Heidegger's critique of neo-Kantian "philosophy of value" can be found, among other places, in these texts: G56/57 46/38f. (1919), G58 21, 73, 109 (1919-1920), G59 68ff. (1920), G60 291f. (1921), G87 42f., 50, 64 (1937), G67 25, 32, 41, 117ff. (1938-1939), and G48 62ff. (1940). 6. Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical and Theological Writings, trans. Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), p. 53. 7. Charles Taylor, The Ethics ofAuthenticity University Press, 1991), p. 29. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

8. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1996), pp. 55-70. In these pas Kant's critical philosophy, in particular sages Gadamer shows the importance of the Critique ofJudgment, forRomantic aesthetics. 9. Taylor, The Ethics ofAuthenticity, pp. 26-27. 10. It isworth pointing out that, like other Romantic personalists, Heidegger was also keenly interested in artists as exemplars of an authentic life. In his case, Van Gogh seems to have had a particular powerful attraction. See Heidegger's assessment ofVan Gogh in Summer Semester 1923 (G63 32/26f.). 11. The role ofChristian thought in the formation ofHeidegger's philosophy is explored more extensively inmy Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, forthcoming from Indiana University Press. 12. This characterization letter (HJ 33). of their turbulent friendship is repeated in a later "blood and soil" views in a Socialism, and theGreeks

13. Charles R. Bambach discusses Heidegger's recent study,Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).

14. See John Van Buren, "The Ethics ofFormale Anzeige in Heidegger," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 2 (1995), pp. 157-170.

REFERENCES
1.Works by Heidegger BZ Der Begriffder Zeit (T?bingen:Max Niemeyer, 1989)/77ieConcept
of Time, G9 trans. William McNeill (New York: Blackwell, 1992). vol. 9: Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klos Gesamtausgabe, McNeill ed. William termann, (Cambridge: 1976)/ Pathmarks, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

178
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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Gesamtausgabe, vols. 56/57: Zur Bestimmung Sadler (London: Athlone der Philosophie 2000).

Towards the VittorioKlostermann, 1987)/ Definition of (Frankfurt:

Philosophy, trans. Ted Press, vol. 58: Grundprobleme G58 Gesamtausgabe, Vittorio Klosterman, 1993). (Frankfurt: der Ph?nomenologie

vol. 59: Ph?nomenologie der Anschauung und des G59 Gesamtausgabe, Theorie der philosophischen Ausdrucks. (Frankfurt: Begriffsbildung Vittorio Klostermann, 1993). vol. 60: Ph?nomenologie G60 Gesamtausgabe, Vittorio Klostermann, (Frankfurt: 1995). vol. 61: Ph?nomenologische G61 Gesamtausgabe, in die ph?nomenologische toteles. Einf?hrung Vittorio des religi?sen Lebens zu Aris

Interpretationen

(Frankfurt: Forschung Klostermann, 1985)/ Phenomenological Interpretations of trans. Richard Aristotle: Inititation intoPhenomenological Research, Indiana University Press, 2001). (Bloomington: Rojcewicz

vol. 63: Ontologie der Faktizit?t) G63 Gesamtausgabe, (Hermeneutik 1988)/ Ontology: Hermeneutics of (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, trans. John Van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Facticity, Press, HB Martin 1995). and Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel, Heidegger ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche 1918-1969, 1989). ed. and Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920-1963, Heidegger Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, Heideggers an Karl

Schillergesellschaft, HJ Martin Walter

1990).
HL in Zur philoso L?with," der Zeit, ed. Vol. 2: Im Gespr?ch phischen Aktualit?t Heideggers, Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto P?ggeler (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klos termann, 1990), pp. 27-39. "Drei Breife Martin andere Dokumente, termann, 2002). ed. Alfred Denker (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klos

HR Martin Heidegger and Heinrich Rickert,Brief 1912 bis 1913 und

NB

zu Aristoteles (Anzeige Interpretationen Situation)," f?r Philoso Dilthey Jahrbuch vol. 6 (1989), pp. der Geisteswissenschaften, phie und Geschichte with in Connection Interpretations 228-274/"Phenomenological "Ph?nomenologisiche der hermeneutischen Aristotle: 111-146. An Indication Buren, of the Hermeneutical Situation trans. John Van in Supplements, ed. John Van (1922)," Buren), pp.

HEIDEGGER'S ROMANTIC PERSONALISM

S SZ John Van Buren, ed., Supplements: From the Earliest Essays

179
to

Being and Time and Beyond (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002).

vol. 2: Sein und Zeit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Gesamtausgabe, termann, 1977)/ Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie Edward Robinson and Row, 1962). (New York: Harper

Klos and

2.Works by Dilthey
GSl vol. 1: Einleitung in die Geisteswissen Schriften, schaften (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1959)/ Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected to theHuman ed. Rudolf A. Works, Vol. 1: Introduction Sciences, Gesammelte Makkreel Press, GS6 Gesammelte and Frithjof Rodi 1989). (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

in die Schriften, vol. 6: Die Geistige Welt: Einleitung zur Poetik, des Lebens, Zweite H?lfte: Abhandlungen Philosophie Ethik, und P?dagogik (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1958).

GS7 Gesammelte

Schriften, vol. 7:Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften 1958)/ Wilhelm (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, Selected Works, Vol. Ill: The Formation of theHistorical Dilthey, World Rodi and Frithjof ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel Sciences, Press, 2002). (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University in theHuman