Analysis

August 24, 2012

Summary: The car bomb explosion that rocked the southern Turkish city of Gaziantep on August 20, killing nine people including three children, has sharpened debate as to whether Turkeys support for Syrian rebels is boomeranging in the form of greater separatist violence at home. After protracted efforts to persuade Assad along the path of reform, Turkey is now firmly committed to regime change in Syria. Critics of Turkish policy, including the main opposition Republican Peoples Party, say the Turkish approach has backfired and some are calling for Turkeys foreign minister to resign. Syrian bombing raids on towns near the Turkish border have strained Turkeys resolve and credibility. Meanwhile Kurdish PKK separatists, perhaps emboldened by other Kurdish action in the region, have escalated attacks. If this continues, Turkey might feel compelled to attack Syria.

Turkeys Syrian Gamble: Enter the Kurds

by Amberin Zaman

Introduction The car bomb explosion that rocked the southern Turkish city of Gaziantep on August 20, killing nine people including three children, has sharpened debate as to whether Turkeys support for Syrian rebels is boomeranging in the form of greater separatist violence at home. Members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) swiftly blamed Syrias President Bashar al-Assad for the terrorist attack that hit a newly thriving province, which borders Syria and whose rise symbolizes the empowerment of overtly pious Anatolian entrepreneurs under nearly a decade of AKP rule. Samil Tayyar, an AKP lawmaker from Gaziantep, declared that the attack was revenge for the [July 18] explosion in Damascus that killed four of Assads top aides, and claimed that it had been orchestrated by the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Syrias national intelligence. Tayyars talk of revenge appeared to vindicate the Syrian regimes earlier claims that Turkey was involved in the assassinations (Turkey denies any role). At the same time, it was a reaffirmation of Ankaras narrative that Syria is using the PKK to destabilize Turkey. This narrative is fraught

with risk. It not only distracts from Turkeys stance against Assad that he must go because he is murdering his own people but will also complicate Turkeys efforts to solve its own festering Kurdish problem and could also strain relations with Washington. After protracted efforts to persuade Assad along the path of reform, Turkey is now firmly committed to regime change in Syria. Leaders of Syrian rebels operating under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are based in Turkey. And it is an open secret that Turkey has become one of the main transit hubs for the flow of rebel weapons into Syria. Wounded FSA fighters are treated in Turkey, and the rebels move freely across the Turkish border. There are reports that Al-Qaeda affiliated radical militants are among them. Critics of Turkish policy, including the main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP), say the Turkish approach has backfired and some are calling for Turkeys foreign minister, Ahmet Davutolu, to resign. They charge that Davutolu, the architect of Turkeys zero problems with neighbors policy, has brought Turkey to the brink of war to no apparent gain.

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Analysis
Fully a year after Turkey formally pulled the plug on Assad, he remains in power, albeit badly weakened. For all of Turkeys efforts, the Syrian opposition remains as fragmented as ever. Despite electing a secular Kurd as its leader, the Istanbul-based Syrian National Council continues to be dogged by allegations that it is under the Muslim Brotherhoods thumb. To Turkeys chagrin, Washington appears to be distancing itself from the group. Arguably, the biggest blowback came last month when Assad ceded control of a string of mainly Kurdish towns along the Turkish border to an outfit called the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKKs Syrian arm that was established in 2003. Massoud Barzani, leader of semi-independent Kurdish northern Iraq, brokered a power-sharing deal between the PYD and its far weaker rivals who are grouped under the umbrella of the Kurdish National Council. Barzanis initiative was aimed at tempering the PYDs influence, but there are few signs that the PYD is willing to abide by its terms. This new Kurdish zone of influence has deepened Turkish fears of an independent Kurdistan that might eventually encompass Turkeys own restive Kurds. Barzani is now hailed among Ankaras chief regional allies,1 yet suspicions linger over his true motives, not least because of his dogged resistance to Turkish demands that he take military action against PKK leaders based in his territory. And though FSA fighters have seized control of substantial chunks of territory along the Turkish border, the ejection of Assads forces on the ground has not prevented his air force from continuing to bomb towns within a stones throw from Turkey. The most recent example is the town of Azaz, which lies some seven kilometers south of the Turkish city of Kilis. On August 15, Syrian fighter jets bombed Azaz, which the FSA had supposedly liberated a month earlier. At least 40 people, most of them civilians, were killed in the attack, which prompted hundreds to flee to Turkey. At the last count, some 70,000 Syrians were sheltering in Turkish camps. The assault on Azaz put another big hole in Turkeys credibility. Prime Minister Erdoan had warned that any Syrian jets flying within proximity of the Turkish border would be considered legitimate targets after Syria downed a Turkish F-4 jet on June 22. But in this event, Turkey chose not to respond.
1 see Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds: From Red Lines to Red Carpets, May 14, 2010

Just as well, most Turks would say, for even the AKPs staunchest supporters are queasy about going to war against Syria. Taking on Syria means taking on Assads staunchest ally, Iran (and, some would argue, Russia), and relations with the Islamic Republic have already taken a nose-dive. This was in evidence when Irans chief of general staff, Hassan Firouzabadi, blamed Turkey along with Qatar and Saudi Arabia for the bloodshed in Syria, warning that It will be Turkeys turn if it continues to help advance its current policy in Syria. It may have been no coincidence that even as the general delivered his threats, PKK militants were battling Turkish forces in a sliver of land wedged between Iran and Iraq. The battle on the edge of the southeastern town of Semdinli in Hakkari province raged for two weeks, marking the first time in its 28-year separatist campaign that the militants held their ground for so long. On August 10, the Turkish army declared victory, but the PKK continued to strike as far west as the Aegean coastal resort of Foca, killing two soldiers on August 9. In a further brazen act, the PKK kidnapped CHP lawmaker Huseyin Aygun on August 12 and held him for two days. The PKK has denied responsibility for the car bomb attack in Gaziantep, claiming it had called off its fight during the Ramadan holidays. Yet on the day of the Gaziantep carnage, a landmine thought to have been planted by the rebels in Hakkari killed two soldiers. At least 10 more Turkish soldiers have been killed in separate PKK attacks since August 22. Lots of Risk Little Return Should PKK violence further escalate, public pressure will mount on the government to retaliate. Trapped by its own rhetoric, Turkey might feel compelled to attack Syria, most likely by carrying out airstrikes against regime targets. This could prompt Iran to weigh in on Assads side, perhaps by allowing the PKK to operate freely from its territory, restricting access to Turkish trucks, and interrupting the flow of natural gas to Turkey. Alternately (or concurrently), Turkey might move against the Syrian Kurds by setting up a buffer zone along the border areas where they are concentrated. It doesnt seem to matter that PYD leader Salih Mohammed has said he wants dialogue with the Turks and is not seeking indepen-

Analysis
dence, or that the flat topography of the areas inhabited by Syrias Kurds make it an unlikely haven for guerrillas. (There is no evidence to date that the PYD has engaged in hostile activity against Turkey). Turkish troops on Syrian soil would become a target, opening up a new front against the PKK and the PYD, which has vowed to resist Turkish intervention. At this point, Ankara would likely pile pressure on Barzani to take its side, which he is unlikely to do because of an inevitable backlash from his own people. The alliance between Turkey and Barzani would unravel. And what if Turkey were tempted to provide the FSA with the kinds of weapons shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles for instance meant to accelerate Assads fall? Would the FSA then have to prove its gratitude by taking on the PYD? Ankara will undoubtedly also renew its calls for decisive action by the Obama administration. In the likely event that Washington continues to shy away from direct intervention in Syria, the widely held conspiracy theories that this is because 1) it wants Turkey to do its dirty work for it 2) the real target is Iran, 3) the goal is to pit the Shias against the Sunnis iv) the other is to establish an independent Kurdistan, and 4) the biggest winner is Israel, might infect the AKP leadership too. (Never mind that U.S. intervention would have prompted the exact same thinking.) Getting Out of the Hole For all its bluster, Turkey has wisely steered away from military confrontation with Syria. It is not likely to act without U.S. backing. It is too early to predict whether Turkeys embrace of the armed opposition will pay off, or if Ankara will have a decisive say in Syrias future when Assad falls. A protracted civil/sectarian war looks increasingly likely. If Turkey is to remain immune, it must desist from conflating its Kurdish problem with the war next door and take up the PYDs offer for dialogue, if only behind closed doors. Turkeys Kurdish problem was manufactured neither by Syria nor by the United States. It is homegrown. By the AKPs own admission, a military solution has proved to be no solution at all. Yet over the past year, the AKP has severed secret talks with the PKK in favor of a securitybased approach. The mass arrests of Kurdish activists accused of PKK membership has continued unabated. The evidence against many is patchy. The sole means to defeat the rebels is to rob them of public support. This can best be achieved by rewriting Turkeys constitution in ways that satisfy the Kurds long running demands for greater cultural and political rights. Erdoan continues to command the kind of popularity that makes this saleable. At the same time, the government will need to hold its nose and resume talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. If Ocalan were to call on the PKK to lay down its arms, the majority of the rebels would obey, because they continue to trade on his name, and hardline terrorists would be marginalized. Such steps might blunt Erdoans presidential ambitions, but they would also pull the country back from the abyss that Turkey seems to be rapidly approaching.
About the Author
Amberin Zaman is the Istanbul-based Turkey correspondent of the U.K. weekly The Economist. Zaman, who is Turkish, also writes a column twice a week for the mass circulation Turkish daily Haberturk.

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