Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

141993 March 17, 2006

Tiniman-an: (Sgd.) Narcisa Avila2 Respondents stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of the property as owners. They also assumed the payment of realty taxes on it. Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner Januario Adlawan who informed them that they had until March 1982 only to stay in Avilas place because he was buying the property. Respondents replied that the property had already been sold to them by Avila. They showed Adlawan the July 17, 1979 document executed by Avila. On January 6, 1983, respondents received a letter from Atty. Joselito Alo informing them that Avila had sold her house and share in lot no. 348 to his clients, the spouses Januario and Nanette Adlawan. Considering the sale to the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and peaceful possession of the property, they demanded that Avila execute a public document evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila refused. Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29.3Docketed as Civil Case No. T-53, the complaint was subsequently amended to include annulment of the deed of sale to the spouses Adlawan, specific performance, partition and damages as additional causes of action. Respondents anchored their claim over the property to the July 17, 1979 private document which they presented as Exhibit "A." Avila denied having offered to sell her property to respondents. She claimed that respondents gave her an P8,000 loan conditioned on her signing a document constituting her house and share in lot no. 348 as security for its payment. She alleged that she innocently affixed her signature on Exhibit "A" which was prepared by respondents and which they now claim as a private deed of sale transferring ownership to them. The trial court rendered its May 9, 1995 decision in favor of respondents. It declared Exhibit "A" as a valid and lawful deed of sale. It nullified the subsequent deed of sale between Avila and the spouses Adlawan. Avila was ordered to execute a formal and notarized deed of sale in favor of respondents. It also held petitioners liable for moral damages and attorneys fees. Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In its July 30, 1999 decision, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Petitioners sought a reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in ruling that the transaction between respondents and Avila was an absolute sale, not an equitable mortgage. They assert that the facts of the case fell within the ambit of Article 1602 in relation to Article 1604 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage because they religiously paid the realty tax on the property and there was gross inadequacy of consideration. In this connection, Articles 1602 and 1604 provide: Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

NARCISA AVILA, assisted by her husband Bernardo Avila, Spouses JANUARIO N. ADLAWAN and NANETTE A. ADLAWAN, NATIVIDAD MACAPAZ, assisted by her husband EMILIO MACAPAZ, FRANCISCA N. ADLAWAN and LEON NEMEO, Petitioners, vs. Spouses BENJAMIN BARABAT and JOVITA BARABAT, Respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 30, 1999 decision1 and January 19, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50899. The subject of this controversy is a portion of a 433-square meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Toledo City, Cebu. The entire property is designated as cadastral lot no. 348 registered in the name of Anunciacion Bahenavda. de Nemeo. Upon her death, ownership of the lot was transferred by operation of law to her five children, petitioners Narcisa Avila, Natividad Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon Nemeo and Jose Bahena. These heirs built their respective houses on the lot. In 1964, respondent Benjamin Barabat leased a portion of the house owned by Avila. His co-respondent, Jovita Barabat, moved in with him in 1969 when they got married. Avila subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City. She came back to Toledo City in July 1979 to sell her house and share in the lot to her siblings but no one showed interest in it. She then offered it to respondents who agreed to buy it. Their agreement was evidenced by a private document dated July 17, 1979 which read: ALANG SA KASAYURAN SA TANAN: Nga ako, NARCISA AVILA, nagpuyo sa siyudad sa Cagayan de Oro, 52 aos ang panu-igon, minyo ug may mga anak magatimaan ning maong kasulatan nga akong guibaligya sa kantidad nga walo ka libo ka pesos (P8,000.00) ang bahin nga balay ug yuta nga sinunod ko sa akong mga ginikanan ngadto sa magtiayon nga Benjamin ug Jovita Barabat, mga lumulupyo sa siyudad sa Toledo. Nga ang maong lote ug balay ana-a mahimutang sa Poblacion, Toledo City kansang mga utlanan mao kining musunod: Atubangan ---------- N. Rafols Street Dapit sa Tuo ---------- yuta ug mga panimalay sa Magsuong Natividad Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Jose Bahena ug Leoning Nemeno Dapit sa wala ---------- kanal sa tubig Dapit sa luyo ---------- lote nga kumon sa magsuong Nemeno

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes of the thing sold; (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws. xxxxxxxxx Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. They also claim that the court erred in denying them the right to redeem the property and in ruling that there was implied partition by the acts of the parties. We rule in favor of respondents. For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and (2) their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.4Here, both the trial and appellate courts found that Exhibit "A" evidenced a contract of sale. They also agreed that the circumstances of the case show that Avila intended her agreement with respondents to be a sale. Both courts were unanimous in finding that the subsequent acts of Avila revealed her intention to absolutely convey the disputed property. It was only after the perfection of the contract, when her siblings began protesting the sale, that she wanted to change the agreement. Furthermore, contrary to petitioners claim, the trial court found that it was respondents who took over the payment of real property taxes after the execution of Exhibit "A." There is no reason to depart from these factual findings because, as a rule, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Court and generally will not be reviewed on appeal to us.5 There is no reason for us to deviate from this rule. Petitioners claim of gross inadequacy of selling price has no basis. They failed to introduce evidence of the correct price at the time the land was sold to respondents in 1979. How can we therefore conclude that the price was grossly inadequate? In the absence of evidence as to the fair market value of a parcel of land at the time of its sale, we cannot reasonably conclude that the price at which it was sold was inadequate.6 Petitioners rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil Code to justify their right of redemption. This is incorrect. These provisions state:

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. xxxxxxxxx Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only had there been co-ownership among petitionerssiblings. But there was none. For this right to be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or coowner(s).7 However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the property was sold to respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by partition. The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.8 By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned in common as his own because his share in it remains intangible and ideal.9 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition.10 Here, the particular portions pertaining to petitioners had been ascertained and they in fact already took possession of their respective parts. The following statement of petitioners in their amended answer11 as one of their special and affirmative defenses was revealing: F-8. That all defendants [i.e., petitioners] in this case who are co-owners of lot 348 have their own respective buildings constructed on the said lot in which case it can be safely assumed that that their respective shares in the lot have been physically segregated although there is no formal partition of the land among themselves.12(emphasis supplied) Being an express judicial admission, it was conclusive on petitioners unless it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was in fact made.13 Petitioners proved neither and were therefore bound by it. The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in common among those to whom it belongs.14 By their own admission, petitioners already segregated and took possession of their respective shares in the lot. Their respective shares were therefore physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners right to redeem any part of the property from any of their former co-owners was already extinguished. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership,15 once a property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.16

Under the law, subject to certain conditions, owners of adjoining urban land have the pre-emptive right to a lot before it is sold to third parties, or the redemptive right if it has already been sold. In particular, Article 1622 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban land is so small and so situated in that a major portion thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought merely for speculation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of any adjoining land has a right of pre-emption at a reasonable price. If the re-sale has been perfected, the owner of the adjoining land shall have a right of redemption, also at a reasonable price. When two or more owners of adjoining lands wish to exercise the rights of pre-emption or redemption, the owner whose intended use of the land in question appears best justified shall be preferred. However, this provision does not apply here. Aside from the fact that petitioners never raised it as an issue, the conditions provided for its application were not met. While the property may be considered as urban land, it was not shown or even alleged that its area and location would render a major portion of no practical use within a reasonable time. Neither was there any allegation to the effect that the disputed property was bought merely for speculation. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 30, 1999 decision and January 19, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50899 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION ULPIANO BALO, LYDIA BALO-LUMPAS, EUGENIO BALO, ULPIANO BALO, JR., NIDA BALOMORALETA, NORA BALO-CATANO, ZAIDA BALO, JUDITH BALO-MANDREZA, DANILO BALO and RONILO BALO, P e t i t i o n e r s, G.R. No. 129704

Eugenio and Maria Balo in representation of her father Maximino Balo would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate parent of his father, assuming that she is the child of Maximino Balo. 2. The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo have been settled and its obligations have been paid. The properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano repurchased the said properties and has been, together with his children, openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate properties in question.

Present: PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

3.

- versus -

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ENRIQUE ASIS and JOSEFINA GARRIDO, R e s p o n d e n t s. Promulgated:

Private respondent filed her comment/opposition to the motion to dismiss.[4] In an Order dated 12 September 1996, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[5] The trial court held:

September 30, 2005 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

The complaint clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo, Sr., and Maria Pasagui Balo had two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino. The plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao; while the defendants are children of the late Ulpiano Balo, Sr. and Felicidad Superio. The complaint enumerates/annexes 13 tax declarations in the name of Eugenio Balo, Sr. marked as Annexes A to M. The plaintiff as an heir prays that these parcels of land be partitioned in accordance with Article 982 of the Civil Code which states: The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion. The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts. Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.[6]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 279, was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas, Eugenio Balo, Ulpiano Balo, Jr., Nida Balo-Moraleta, Nora Balo-Catano, Zaida Balo, Judith Balo-Mandreza, Danilo Balo and Ronilo Balo, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Abuyog, Leyte, Branch 10, alleging that she (private respondent) and petitioners are the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. According to her, these lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who, at the time of the filing of the complaint, were already deceased. The Balo spouses were survived by their two (2) children, Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, the latter likewise deceased. Private respondent is the daughter of Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. Petitioner Ulpiano Balo is the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., while the other petitioners, the children of Ulpiano, are Eugenios grandchildren. Private respondent further alleged in her complaint that immediately upon the death of her grandfather, Eugenio Sr., the petitioners took possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and consent. The petitioners being her uncle and cousins, private respondent earnestly requested them that they come up with a fair and equal partition of the properties left by her grandparents. The petitioners having outrightly refused her proposal, private respondent filed the complaint.[1] In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] on the following grounds: 1. Failure to state a cause of action - plaintiff, though she claims to be a daughter of Maximino who died sometime in 1946, failed to allege whether or not she is a legitimate child. Plaintiffs failure to allege legitimacy is fatal considering the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code.[3] To allow Plaintiff to inherit from the estate of the spouses

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7] which the RTC denied in its Order[8] dated 07 November 1996.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] before the Court of Appeals. After the filing of Comment and other pleadings, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In a resolution dated 16 April 1997, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and accordingly dismissed the same. The Court of Appeals justified the dismissal in the following manner: It is an established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. When a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.[10]

amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.[15]

Specific instances whereby the rule admits certain exceptions are provided as follows: . . . Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.[16]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] which the Court of Appeals denied in a resolution dated 30 June 1997.[12] Hence this petition for review[13] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners cite the following grounds for the allowance of their petition, to wit:

I WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PLAINTIFFS TITLE IN A PETITION FOR PARTITION IS FATAL TO ITS CAUSE OF ACTION. II WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION AND ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, WAS WAIVED, OR WAS OTHERWISE ABANDONED.[14]

Applying the foregoing, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion. Instead, it should have proceeded to determine whether or not the trial court did commit grave abuse of discretion as alleged by the petitioners. The Court of Appeals having failed in this regard, it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the petitioners. Contrary to petitioners contention, allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for partition may be found in private respondents complaint.[17] Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.[18] Moreover, the inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.[19] In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. (Garcon vs. Redemptorist Fathers, 17 SCRA 341) If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits. (Galeon vs. Galeon, 49 SCRA 516-521)[20]

At the threshold of the instant petition for review is the correctness of the appellate courts dismissal of the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners. In resolving to deny the petition, the Court of Appeals relied on the long established jurisprudence that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. The general rule regarding denial of a motion to dismiss as a basis of a resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari is that: . . . [A]n order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to

Section 1, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs

cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violate of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[21]

applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. For instance, if the plaintiff had in this action impleaded all of the persons who would be necessary parties defendant to an action to compel acknowledgement, and had asked for relief of that character, it would have been permissible for the court to make the judicial pronouncement declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to be recognized as the natural child of Maximo Briz, and at the same time to grant the additional relief sought in this case against the present defendants; that is, a decree compelling them to surrender to the plaintiff the parcel of land sued for and to pay her the damages awarded in the appealed decision. The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil. 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

In her Complaint, the private respondent made the following assertions: . . . That the afore-described parcels of lands were originally owned by Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who are now both deceased and after their death, were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, both surnamed Balo, the later (sic) being already dead. That plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her fathers death, had inherited her fathers share of the inheritance. That defendant Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants in this case. The defendants took possession of the above-described real properties immediately after the death of plaintiffs grandfather Eugenio Balo, Sr. without her knowledge and consent. That plaintiff is desirous that the above-described real properties be partitioned between her and defendants. That plaintiff has proposed to the defendants that the above-described real properties be amicably partitioned between them by mutual agreement in a very fair and practical division of the same, but said defendants refused and continue to do so without any justifiable cause or reason to accede to the partition of the said properties.[22]

To further reiterate that in partition proceedings, dismissal prior to answer is premature, this Court has held: In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.[26]

The foregoing allegations show substantial compliance with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as required under Section 1, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[23] On the insistence of petitioners that private respondent first prove her legitimacy before an action for partition may be maintained, this Court, in the case of Briz v. Briz,[24] pronounced that proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. We said:[25] . . . In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here

The case of Vda. De Daffon v. Court of Appeals[27] is almost most appropriate. In said case, the action for partition filed by the plaintiffs was met by a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants based on the grounds of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the denial was affirmed by the appellate court and by this Court. We held there that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. We further expressed our dismay over the delay in the resolution of the said case due to the fact that the issue of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss was elevated to this Court by petitioner and counsel instead of just filing an Answer and meeting the issues head-on.

On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, it is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners did not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed;[28] otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.[29] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42803, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 12 September 1996, is AFFIRMED. This case is ordered remanded to the court of origin which is directed to resolve the case with dispatch. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement:
(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola; (b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola; (c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola; (d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the real father of said minors.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO, JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et al., respondents. G.R. No. 72694 December 1, 1987 PARAS, J.:

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. But the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUES: Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola. Does prescription run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership HELD: YES. There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-ininterest. Although, some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition was filed in the trial court have been in actual possession and enjoyment of several portions of the property in question, this does not provide any proof that the Island in question has already been actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly. The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. NO. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the coownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 497 of the New Civil Code, provides that the assignees of the coowners may take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner.

FACTS: In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among others:
(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located in the Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares; (2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property; (3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island; (4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).

b) SECOND DIVISION c) REYNALDO BALOLOY and ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE, Petitioners, G.R. No. 157767

Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing plaintiff in his peaceful possession in the land in question; Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in question, and to declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper, form, document or proceeding the defendants may have, as null and void and without any effect whatsoever as far as the land in question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of the plaintiff; In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in favor of the plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned; Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorneys fee plus P500.00 for every appearance or hearing of his lawyer in court; P1,500.00 as consultation fee;P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.

Present: d) - versus PUNO, J., Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: ALFREDO HULAR, Respondent. September 9, 2004 x------------------------------------ --------------x

e)

Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable in the premises.[3]

DECISION

The Evidence of the Respondent The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property, where a house of strong materials was constructed, was agricultural, while the rest was residential. The respondent also averred that the Spouses Estopin declared the property in their names under Tax Declaration No. 4790. On the north of the agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to Biriran, while north of the residential portion was a creek (canal) and the property of Iluminado. When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of Astrologo Hular, married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 1961, Lagata executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] over the residential portion of the property with an area of 287 square meters, including the house constructed thereon, in favor of Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent, then resided in the property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hulars permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. In l977, Lorenza Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential land in the latters name under Tax Declaration No. 6841.[6] Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North, Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Page; West, Pedro Grepal and Esteban Grepal.[7] Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on lands in Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino Estopin; West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to 4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under Tax Declaration No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion) Alejandro Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.[8] On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 3353 with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado.[9] The latter declared the property in his name under

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51081, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871. The antecedents are as follows:

On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that his father, Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Sitio Page, Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part of Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado Baloloy, the petitioners predecessorin-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over the property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his name. The respondent later discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the property of his father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent, even if the residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the property in the concept of owners for more than 60 years. The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus: a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in question;

Tax Declaration No. 5359.[10] Iluminado filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of Lot No. 3353 on January 5, 1960.[11] He indicated in his application that the property was not occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public land. In support thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased about one-half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of absolute sale attached to said affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-half portion, but for economic reasons, no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that the improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees.[12] The Bureau of Lands processed the application in due course. In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 near the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house. On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources approved Iluminados application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No. 3353 with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540 was thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.[13] On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale over a portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito Hije, the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminados children.[14] Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.[15] Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others,[16] who continued to reside in their house.[17] Sometime in l991, the respondents house helper was cleaning the backyard, but was prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their father Iluminado owned the land where the respondents house was located. To determine the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of Balbedina, Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353[18] showing that the house of Iluminado was constructed on Lot No. 3353[19] near the road behind the houses owned by Astrologo and Alfredo.[20] The engineer discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only.[21] In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that Iluminados house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that the respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and even if the respondent was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions had long since prescribed. The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to DISMISS this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof, and/or DECIDE it in favor of the defendants by UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT No. P-16540 and ordering plaintiff to:

1. 2. 3.

RESPECT defendants proprietary rights and interests on the property in question covered by OCT No. P-16540; VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set foot on it ever again; PAY defendants: a) MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH; b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS at P1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST; c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00 d) ATTYS FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES of P100,000.00; and e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.

DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent with law and equity.[22]

The Evidence for the Petitioners Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his house on Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the presence of his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353 certified by a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters.[23] As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on February 7, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy siblings and those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353.[24] In the said sketch plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No. 3347 had an area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hulars claim over the property, the petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The fallo of the decision reads: a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question, consisting of 1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled to the peaceful possession thereof; Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned within fifteen (15) days counted from the finality of the decision, failing in which, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to execute the necessary document of reconveyance of the title in favor of the plaintiff after an approved survey plan is made; Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in question at their own expense within fifteen (15) days after the decision has become final; Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses; To pay the costs.

b/

c/

d/

e/

SO ORDERED.[25]

The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area of 1,405 square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin owned, and which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court also held that Iluminado committed fraud in securing the free patent and the title for the property in question, and that when Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of absolute sale on the residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it formed part of Lot No. 3353. It further held that the action of the plaintiff to nullify the title and patent was imprescriptible. The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit Tax Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of Astrologo Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that Lot No. 3347 was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been mooted by its decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof. The Present Petition

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publicianaand a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.[27] Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.[28] The absence of the respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[29] Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that he failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the evidence of that of his opponent.[30] He who claims a better right to real estate property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also the identity thereof.[31] In Huy v. Huy,[32] we held that where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name appears therein.[33] Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified. The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was coconut, and not residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular, she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina, now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed their houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father Iluminado; hence, they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit that, whether the house of Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.

The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The issues for resolution are: (1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court; (2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and for damages; and (3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property through acquisitive prescription. The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this Court.[26] We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, to declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and (c) damages and attorneys fees. It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In contrast, the RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale executed by Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666 square meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot was actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot No. 3347 was declared as part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The trial court concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute sale executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot No. 3347. The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions. The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less.[35] When she sold the property to Martiniano Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property of Lino Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the south and of Lino Estopin on the north. In the meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was established between the property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The property of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, which was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651 square meters and was coconut land[36] and that his property was bounded on the south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran.[37] Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary the trail (road) going to Biriran. Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951.[38] Under the deed of absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by Lino Estopin.[39] The English translation of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court relied upon, is incorrect. The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the boundary of the property on the south is con camino, Lino Estopin, while the English version of the deed, indicates that the property is bounded on the south by Lino Estopin. Being an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties therefore should prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax Declaration No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south by a trail, [40] and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin. The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondents reliance on the testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced. First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent, Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted that there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale: Atty. Dealca: Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that way back in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; 41 to 44? A 1941.

Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A

And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase? That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property. My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do you confirm that? Yes, Sir. From whom? From Irene Griarte. Were you present when that sale was consummated? I was not there. So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from Irene Griarte? No, Sir. You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually drafted and executed? There was. Have you seen the document? I did not see but there was a document. You maintain there was a document but you did not see a document, is that it? In my belief there was a document. In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not see a document? I insist there was a document. That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a document? Well, during the sale that document was used. How was it used when you did not see that document? When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document, but I insist there was a document. Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that there was a document when you contend that you did not see any? There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a document. You cannot sell a property without document? (sic) Is that your belief? Yes, Sir. But you did not see any document?

Q A

Q A Q

Atty. Diesta: Already answered. Witness:

A Atty. Dealca: Q A

I did not see.

You said that that document was used when the property was sold by Lino Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . . In 1961. Yes.[41]

However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure to adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim that his father acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must prevail.[42] Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declarations over the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961. The documents are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed ownership over the disputed property and that Lino Estopin acquired the same from her. After all, such tax declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive prescription.[43] Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790 covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to the respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the boundary of the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the petitioners claim. [44] Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the ground that it was mooted by its decision. Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminados claim of ownership of Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A propos is our ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45] As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing the totality of the evidence We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and possessors of the subject lot just because it is adjacent to their titled property. Precisely, the boundaries of defendants titled property were determined, delineated and surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog and thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in order that the extent of their property will be known and fixed. Since the subject lot was already found to be outside their titled property, defendants have no basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of the cadastral survey as a process of determining the exact boundaries of adjoining properties will be defeated. Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession over the adjacent subject

lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral survey of Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to November 1925; (2) defendants titled property was one of those lots surveyed and this was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3) during the survey, it was already determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast, southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756. From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were already determined and delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part of Lot No. 4443, it means that during that time defendants predecessors-ininterest never claimed ownership or possession over the subject lot. Otherwise, they would have complained so that the subject lot could be excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent lots. It is obvious then that defendants predecessors only claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them. The contention of defendants that they and their predecessors-ininterest occupied and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is not true.[46]

Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[47]we ruled that: Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and enforceable and that it was perfected at the very moment that the parties agreed upon the thing which was the object of the sale and upon the price. The parties herein had agreed on the parcel of land that petitioner would purchase from respondent PNR, and the same was described therein; thus, petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set aside the technical description in this agreement and insist that it is the legal owner of the property erroneously described in the certificate of title. Petitioner can only claim right of ownership over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed of sale and nothing else.[48]

Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only a portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is understandable, since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not own. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET. Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their right to cross-examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative weight. The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale which he (Balbedina) executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under the said deed of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted

of 4,651 square meters. The affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. ... It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio Notary Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight. Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo P. Cunanan[49] cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners. Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347 under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the property was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises. Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition to his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice