Global Climate Change LTD.: Market Efficiency or Governance Failure? Addressing The Distributive Fairness of REDD+

Global climate change Ltd.: market efficiency or governance failure?
Addressing the distributive fairness of REDD+.

Thesis for the degree of Master of Science
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM | POLITICAL SCIENCE SPECIALISATION: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE Prepared for: Dr. P. Pattberg (supervisor) and Dr. P. Pennings (second reader) Prepared by: Arjen Leemburg (VU student number: 2048957), Amsterdam, 6 August 2012
Thesis for the degree of Master of Science Consisting of 16,441 words

Front cover illustration created by Pearse Gaffney, commissioned by Arjen Leemburg
1. Abstract
In order to finance climate change mitigation projects, the global climate change regime has devised a number of programmes that resulted into an institutional inclination headed for the privatisation of the environment (Harvey, 2010; MacNeil and Paterson, 2012). One of the most prominent efforts in this regard is the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) scheme. The REDD+ scheme is designed to protect and nurture carbon-absorbing forests throughout the world, by means of putting a price tag on carbon. But, is such a scheme fair? As the existence of such carbon-absorbing forests is of crucial importance for all human life, carbon-absorbing forests can be regarded as global public goods. An important characteristic of these global public goods is that they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Kaul, 2012, p. 39). Thus, does commodifying global public goods interfere with the legitimate governance of such goods? The puzzle to which this research is aiming to find answers for is whether the REDD+ schemes are addressing the fairness of the distribution of climate change accordingly. Is the REDD+ scheme able to distribute the financial means equally and fair among the participating beneficiaries? Or, are considerations with regard to fruitful investment opportunities playing a significant role concerning the allocation of REDD+ capital? This paper responds to this issue by conducting a quantitative analysis that includes indicators that are able to measure the fairness of the spatial distribution of REDD+ capital. The outcomes are then bolstered by including a case study that accounts for a detailed examination of a REDD+ project in Cambodia. The answers to these questions will lead to a response to David Harveys claim that the current global climate change regime is a neo-liberal strategy to commodify global public goods (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Harvey, 2010; Harvey, 2004).
Keywords
Carbon finance; Cambodia; climate equality; distributive justice; earth system governance; economic geography; global public goods; REDD+; World Bank.
THE DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS OF REDD+ | THESIS M.SC. POLITICAL SCIENCE | ARJEN LEEMBURG (2048957)
Acknowledgement
The empirical evidence in this thesis relating to the Cambodian case study is obtained through sources that provided documents that have to be treated with a degree of confidentiality. Please note that this version of the thesis does not include the empirical evidence from the Cambodian case study.
Table of contents
1.
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.
Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1 Global climate change and the response of the global climate change regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 The REDD+ architecture and the VCO market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3 The carbon economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.4 Distributive justice in governing global public goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5 Questions left unanswered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.
Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.
Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 4.1 Defining the dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 4.2 Translating indicators for distributive justice into independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3 Identifying other independent factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.4 Formalising the research design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.
Testing the degree of fairness in REDD+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.1 Quantitative analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2 Qualitative analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.1 Placing the results into existing literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.2 REDD+ and the earth-systen governance context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.
Annex I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Annex II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
List of Figures
1. Global climate change and vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. The REDD+ architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. REDD+ carbon credit process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Illustration of the theoretical assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. Causal relationship: distributive justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Causal Relationship: business considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Scatter plot regression analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8. Mechanisms of REDD+ in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
List of Tables
1. The dependent variable REDD+ investment per country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2. Regression analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3. Revenues from REDD+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
2. Topic
On the first of April 2009, HRH Prince Charles arranged a meeting with G20 leaders during which he urged to bring global climate mitigation programmes up to speed (Prince of Wales, 2009). In early April 2009, I was able to host a meeting of heads of state and government at which it was agreed to establish an informal working group to look at the issue of climate change. As it turns out, it seems the quickest and most cost-effective way to buy time in the battle against catastrophic climate change is to find a way to make the trees worth more alive than dead (Ibid, p. 2). This call for action resonated well among the participants, as the mitigation scheme he referred to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is endorsed by a long-list of high-profile politicians, academics, cultural leaders and business leaders, including; David Cameron, Hillary Clinton, Robert Redford, Jeffrey Sachs and Robert Zoellick (Gilbertson, 2010; UN-REDD, 2012). Disregarding the degree to which these leaders have helped to materialise REDD+, the global climate change regime has embraced the REDD+ scheme as one of the prime mitigation efforts by the global community to address global climate change (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010; UN-REDD, 2012). Further, a crucial element of the REDD+ scheme is that it allows for a prominent role of private actors to participate in this global climate change mitigation programme (Corbera, Estrada and Brown, 2010). This chapter will shed light on the role of REDD+ within the global climate change regime, the economic principles supporting the scheme and delivers a review of the academic critique voiced thus far. As it is paramount to acknowledge carbon-absorbing forests as a global public good in context of the distributive justice discussion, the latter half of this chapter will concisely revisit relevant work in this field. This will help to build a conceptual framework that is able to test the claim that is rooted in political economy and economic geography that REDD+ is a deceptive scheme that reinforces an unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits of global climate change (Harvey, 2010; Lohman, 2011).
2.1 Global climate change and the response of the global climate change regime
Humans are responsible for releasing more than 2,000 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere since the inception of the Anthropogenic era (Page, 2008, p. 557). The current levels of human induced green house gas emissions will inevitably lead to an unprecedented change to the biodiversity in a wide variety of regions (Bellard, et al. 2012, p. 375). At the current rate of biodiversity change, our generation is about to witness the sixth mass extension of species in the history of the Earth (Barnosky, et al., 2011). Further, carbon emissions, as an independent factor, play an important role in relation to food deprivation, health, migration, economic development and resource conflicts (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007; UNFCC, 2008). Deforestation accounts for approximately fourteen to eighteen percent of global greenhouse gas emissions during the early 2000s (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010, p. 89). Calculating the percentage of carbon added to the atmosphere by deforestation since the start of the Anthropocene is even more noteworthy: Charlotte Streck (2008, p. 241) estimated this contribution at 36 percent since 1850. Hence, the global climate change regime has identified deforestation as one of the main pillars with regard to its global climate change mitigation commitments (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; Corbera and Schroeder, 2010).
In response to global climate change, complex sets of governance bodies at various levels are applying themselves to counter the problem of global climate change (Keohane and Victor, 2011). At the international level, numerous parties are involved with responding to this irrefutable global issue (IPCC, 2007). These parties include national governments, international institutions, non-governmental organisations, development agencies and business representatives (Biermann, 2011; Keohane and Victor, 2011; Roberts, 2011). The collection of stakeholders at this level is often referred to as the global climate change regime (Roberts, 2011, p. 776). The key task of this regime is to negotiate a sufficient answer to global climate change that is acceptable for all the stakeholders involved, and is at the same time effective enough to act in response to human induced climate change. The response of the global climate change regime is grouped into two categories: mitigation and adaptation (Adger, et al., 2006). The links between the impacts, the adaptive capacity and the adaptation requirements in relation to vulnerability are summarised in figure one. Mitigation and adaptation do not necessarily act independently from one another, large sums of adaptation capital are being used to fund mitigation projects and proportional amounts of mitigation yields are funnelled to adaptation projects (Baer, 2006, pp. 131-133). Omitting a detailed discussion on contrasting mitigation with adaptation, the dominant issue in negotiating effective measures relates to responsibility and vulnerability (Adger, et al. 2006; Fssel, 2010, pp. 598-601; Grasso, 2011, pp. 361-364). Elucidated in a simplified manner: who is to blame for global climate change, and who is most vulnerable to global climate change?
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram, identifying global climate change vulnerability. Diagram based on the global climate change vulnerability concept developed by Isoard, Grothmann and Zebisch (2008).
With the complicated governance structures as a backdrop, REDD+ is one of the few mitigation efforts that are regarded as acceptable, fair and effective by most parties involved in the global climate change regime (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010, pp. 90-94). Nicholas Stern identified tackling deforestation as the most cost-effective way of complying with the IPCC targets (Stern, 2006). Incorporating standing forests into the global carbon emission economy is perceived as one of the most appealing options to mitigate carbon emissions. This belief is based on the conviction that a market-based system will provide a sustainable stream of revenue for REDD activities (removing funding from the political whims of conventional aid streams), greater sums of capital, greater investment, more flexibility for private interests and consequently more ecological success (West, 2010, p. 303). Hence, enticing private capital into REDD+ projects equals a more effective manner of protecting forests covers. For those actors that can be held accountable for emitting carbon, participating in REDD+ is economically more attractive than reducing emissions within their current operations (Kinzig, et al., 2011; Lohman, 2011). Thus, the political costs of implementing a scheme that allows businesses and governments to import the right to emit carbon are not as high as restructuring economies in a carbon friendly manner in the industrialised world (mainly in China, North-America and Europe). Another crucial argument why REDD+ is a politically desirable scheme relates to the fact that it allows private investors to insert capital into the scheme, thus: governments are relieved from accounting for the whole sum of capital required to preserve and nurture carbon-absorbing forests (Munden Project, 2011). When referring to the efforts of governments and how this is perceived with voters, Brennan (2009, p. 317) concludes as follows: the average consumer-voter-taxpayer is going to lose out in all this, the net cost of the scheme is essentially born by consumers in return they will get a global emissions reduction that is a very tiny fraction of the whole and perhaps with negligible climate effects. Therefore, from a rational choice perspective, the majority of a ballot (at least if only climate policies are decisive for ones political preference) would favour climate policies that would neglect the issue of global climate change. Essentially, the issue of global climate change relates to the problem of the tragedy of the commons (Kaul, 2012). Henceforth, the rationale for mitigating global climate change has to be sought in justice theories (Ibid).
2.2 The REDD+ architecture and the voluntary carbon market

In a world in which the power and autonomy of nation-states (in particular for developing nation-states) has considerably eroded in favour of global markets, corporations and institutions, issues of inequality should increasingly be addressed by the international community (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 4). The REDD+ scheme is an example of how issues of inequality are increasingly being addressed by an international set of actors. Lipschutz and McKendry (2011) view that the development of the global climate change regime in stemmed in the development of a new rule, led by neo-liberal policies in which the power of the nation-state diminishes. These neoliberal practices (also referring to REDD+) are a result of the merger of the public sector and the private sector (Ibid). Although the conference of the parties (COP), during which schemes such as REDD+ are discussed and decided on (UN-REDD, 2012), is centred on negotiations of nation-states, Lipschutz and McKendry (2011) argue that the enduring influential pressure of private parties might alter the set of preferences of certain actors present during such meetings.
COP 16 in Cancun was an important milestone for the development of the REDD+ framework. As it was agreed to work towards incorporating REDD+ into the compliance market, investors perceived this as a signal that REDD+ will be one of the prime mitigation mechanisms (Hamilton, Peter-Stanley and Marcello, 2011). For example, the state of California allows offsetting the consumption of carbon by enabling emitters to purchase REDD+ carbon credits (UN-REDD, 2012). This is an important development, as investors regard the participation of businesses and governments from the United States (a country that has the largest mitigation potential) a crucial indicator of the long-term success of carbon markets (Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 2011). COP 17 in Durban in December 2011 ensured a long-term commitment to REDD+ by installing a REDD+ exchange market in Oslo and by assigning more adaption capital to REDD+ projects (UN-REDD, 2012, pp. 3-14). Recent discussions during the RIO+ 20 Earth Summit delivered similar results (United Nations, 2012). Figure two demonstrates the complexity of the current REDD+ architecture, as it currently stands. As the scheme is a hybrid between market-mechanisms and development aid (through adaptation funds), it is inappropriate to regard REDD+ as a mechanism completely financed thought market-mechanisms. Rather, just over half of the accumulated capital influx of REDD+, which currently stands at USD 2.6 billion (UN-REDD, 2012), originates from direct investments from other nation-states and adaptation funds. This capital is bypassed through non-market funding mechanisms.
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram, exhibiting the REDD+ architecture and its manner of working. Diagram based on the interpretations from Bumpus and Liverman (2008, p. 139) and Corbera and Schroeder (2010, pp. 91-96).
REDD+ is incorporated into the voluntary carbon (VCO) market (UN-REDD, 2012). The market value of the total voluntary carbon market for 2010 accumulated to USD 424 million (Hamilton, Peter-Stanley and Marcello, 2011, p. 26). Within the voluntary market, REDD+ projects account for 29% or USD 123 million of the total market size (Hamilton, Peter-Stanley and Marcello, 2011, p. 28). The motivations for public parties and private parties to participate in the VCO market is rooted in either corporate responsibility objectives, purchasing credits in anticipation of increasing pricing (hedging) and offsetting mandatory industry and governmental carbon reductions (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2012). A recent survey discovered that 61 percent of FTSE 100 companies (traded at the London Stock Exchange) participated in offsetting the carbon footprint on VCO markets during the year 2009 (Ibid, 2012, p. 14). Apropos the mechanics of earning REDD+ credits, figure three illustrates the functioning of the scheme. Essentially, an institutional body usually via the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), commissioning licensed evaluating agencies evaluates the historical context of deforestation and the carbon stock present in a certain area (UN-REDD, 2012). The project developer (either funded by public or private capital) can then earn carbon credits by means of mitigating the further decrease of carbon-absorbing forests or by increasing the carbon absorbing capacity (Hamilton, Peters-Stanley and Marcello, 2011). These carbon credits can then be sold on various VCO markets, as highlighted in figure two.
Figure 3. REDD+ carbon credit accreditation process (UN-REDD, 2012; Hamilton, Peters-Stanley and Marcello, 2011).
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In order to entice developing countries into participating in REDD+, the global climate change regime has raised USD 108.1 billion in long-term commitments (twenty to fifty years) thus far (UN-REDD, 2012, p. 4). This finance is meant to help countries setting up projects, by for example compensating local stakeholders, setting up the institutions to manage REDD+ projects, developing property rights infrastructures and supporting private REDD+ project developers (Ibid, pp. 4-16). Given the vast amounts of capital inserted into REDD+ and the breadth of participants in the scheme, most literature concludes that REDD+ is a scheme that is likely to evolve in the foreseeable future (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2012; Hamilton, Peters-Stanley and Marcello, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 2011; United Nations, 2012; UN-REDD, 2012; West, 2010).
2.3 The carbon economy

The concentration of carbon dioxide in the air is now intimately connected to a million different places on the earth through economic transactions (Robertson, 2012, p. 378). The development of such a carbon credit economy has to been seen in light of the changing role of the state with regard to economic policies (Harvey, 2010). As a consequence of the neoliberal context within which responses to climate change have emerged, those responses have deviated from a prior focus on command-and-control mechanisms, such as: regulation, planning, developing technologies (MacNeil and Paterson, 2012, p. 232). Harvey finds that governance structures, on the global and state level, are locked into a state-finance nexus (Havey, 2011, p. 83). Harvey criticises the relentless dependency of states on capital markets, as this impedes the development of the poor. Bumpus and Liverman (2008, p. 131) conclude that markets are seen as the most effective way to reduce emissions. So, why are markets perceived as imperative instruments to mitigate global climate change? Markets, among the most durable of human institutions, tend to arise when resources are recognised to be scarce (Kinzig, et al. 2011, p. 603). Many goods that are crucial for human-survival are sold on global markets (Hart and Moore, 1990). Agricultural products and fossil fuels are prime examples of such essential goods (Ibid). Kinzig et al. (2011) argue that it is problematic that the prices of goods that are produced by means of reducing the carbon sequestration capacity (i.e. replacing forests with farmland) do not incorporate the social costs of eradicating public goods. Hence, in order to integrate the social costs of consuming products that undermine the quality of public goods, such as forests, public goods should be commodified. Thus, in order to preserve public goods, the only way forward is to create an integrated global market with well defined property rights and pricing mechanisms that include all the social costs of impairing public goods (Ibid, p. 604). By commodifying carbon, REDD+ will be able to attract large sums of private capital that can be regarded as additional resources to protect forests covers (Munden Project, 2011). Like the new derivatives, carbon commodities work through a process of radical disembedding in this case, disembedding the climate issue from the historical question of how to organize for structural, long-term change capable of keeping remaining fossil fuels in the ground (Lohman, 2011, p. 90). Consequently are those actors that are profiteering from emitting carbon the most, as being the economically well off, able to export their liabilities of mitigating their emissions to other regions, whilst continuing their economic activities. Hence, carbon markets facilitate openings for emitters to continue their polluting economic activities, without being penalised for it.
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Paul Collier, a prominent economist at Oxford University and former World Bank director, found that property rights are a central issue concerning protecting forest covers (Collier, 2011, p. 19). Collier refers in his research to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Haiti, property rights are not arranged in a proper fashion and as a result Haiti only has two percent tree-cover. On the other side of the Island, the Dominican Republic managed by means of implementing a strict property rights framework to arrive at 37 percent tree-cover. Collier concludes that people will not bother to plant or protect trees on land they do not own (Ibid, p. 27). Strict property rights arrangements on natural liabilities such as carbon emissions would ensure the basis of a well functioning carbon economy (Ibid, p. 54). Colliers main argument is that as long as carbon credits are being traded at a decent level of about twenty to thirty dollars per tonne, capitalism does not have to be antagonistic for the environment (Ibid, p. 177). Collier then concludes by arguing in favour of the development of the carbon economy, using utilitarian approaches that are not uncommon within neo-liberal economic frameworks (Kaul, 1999). It is important to understand that Colliers view is rather common within the community of REDD+ leaders (West, 2010). HRH Prince Charles, who is regarded as a normative leader with regard to the development of the REDD+ scheme, subscribes to the remedies advocated by scholars such as Collier and Stern (Ritter, 2012). Both Collier and Stern have been commissioned by the British government and international policy formulating institutions to advice on identifying effective antidotes for reducing the level of carbon emissions (Collier, 2011; Stern, 2007). The focus within discussions concerning the transformation towards a carbon-emission free economy is centered around market-equilibrium and effectiveness on mainly a utilitarian scale. Many scholars and nongovernmental organisations are critical of such approaches, due to the neglect of the distribution of fairness among the many actors involved in schemes such as REDD+. A paramount issue with regard to installing market-mechanisms to manage a global public good is that it is based on the scarcity of rights (Heal, 1999, p. 236). Suppose that carbon-friendly industries will replace carbonemitting industries. Inevitably the price of carbon-credits will decrease, this then leads to what Harvey would call the over-accumulation of capital (Harvey, 2004, p. 65). As a consequence, capital will be withdrawn from mitigation projects such as REDD+ in favour of other, more profitable activities that could include replacing forest-cover with agricultural land. Hence, the protection of carbon absorbing forest-covers is dependent on industries and individuals reluctant to alter their production and consumption processes in such a way that would account for reducing the carbon emissions levels. In this regard, the commodification of carbonabsorbing forest-covers is a temporal fix. Hence, the long-term economic-efficiency of REDD+ is uncertain. As the purpose of this research is to analyse the current distributive fairness of the distribution of capital within REDD+, considerations of long-term efficiency will be left out of the analysis. It is however important to understand the limitations of carbon as tradable commodities, in particular in relation to governance architectures of global public goods.
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In the current system of supply and demand, deteriorating carbon-absorbing forests might indeed be protected from extinction by providing market-incentives that encourage private actors to protect rain forests. However, following the market logic, this might actually lead to a situation where other products from rainforests mainly agricultural land, wood and palm oil would go up in price (Lohman, 2011). The only response to such an event is to make the price of carbon higher, enabling it to overcome issues with regard to opportunity costs. A conspicuous issue that is related to opportunity costs, but often neglected by institutions that endorse REDD+, is that the price of carbon should also cover local demands for food and fuel. A study on the opportunity costs concerning the implementation of REDD+ in Tanzania concluded that the price of carbon should be at least in the range of USD 20.00 to USD 25.00 in order for Tanzanian REDD+ projects to become economically viable (Fisher, et al., 2011, p. 164). The point made by Fisher, et al. (2011) relates to the matter of uneven positions in terms of the return on investment capacities of the regions participating in REDD+. Following Harveys logic of over-accumulation (Harvey, 2010; Harvey, 2004), capital will inevitably be funneled to regions where it can achieve a high profit. This will result into some regions experiencing a carbon-rush, whereas other regions will be neglected in favour of more profitable activities with regard to land-use. As a result, by placing the governance of forests into the hands of markets, some regions can anticipate for accelerated rates of deforestation (Lohmann, 2011), as the neo-liberal institutions (such as the World Bank) involved in promoting REDD+ are actively endorsing the development of liberal property-rights frameworks throughout the developing world (Harvey, 2010; Norton Rose, 2011). Therefore: given the unequal distribution of opportunity costs among REDD+ countries, is it appropriate to construct market-mechanisms to govern carbon-absorbing forests?
2.4 Distributive justice in governing global public goods

Public goods defined as a concept has its roots in the 18th century, when scholars such as David Hume and Adam Smith reflected upon the difficulties of accommodating the common good (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999, p. 3). The nature of public goods is embedded in its non-excludable and non-rivalrous character (Ibid, 1999, pp.4-16). In this respect, it is undeniable that goods that absorb or retain carbon, such as carbon absorbing forests, can be regarded as global public goods (Kaul, 2012, p. 39). Without such a public good, the planet would become unfit to live at for all human life (UNFCC, 2008). Further, the ability to enjoy the benefits of carbon absorbing forests the capacity to store carbon and the ability to maintain biodiversity is nonexcludable and non-rivalrous as we all live in the same atmosphere. Global climate change, as a global public good, is generally perceived as a classic example of market failure (Kaul, 2012; Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999). A market failure in this framework relates to the inefficient allocation of goods by a free market system (Sandler and Arce, 2012, pp. 55-63). There is no Pareto Optimal, meaning that if actors behave along the lines of self-interest, the outcome for the market as a whole is inefficient (Ibid). As the emissions of carbon lead to undesirable outcomes, on a net basis, for all human life (IPCC, 2007), market interference is legitimate and commendable (Rawls, 1972). Harvey (Harvey, 2011; Harvey, 2004; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008) also relates this market-failure of global climate change to the issue of inequality with regard to those that economically gain from emitting carbon in relation to those that are subject to the consequences (Leichenko and Obrien, 2006).
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With concern to the equal distribution of REDD+ funds, Cerbu, Swallow and Thompson (2010) analysed all the REDD+ projects up until the end of 2009. The authors conclude that there is an unequal distribution of REDD+ activities; investors whether public or private have a preference for those countries with the greatest forestbased emission potential (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010, p. 92). What is not incorporated in this analysis are factors such as responsibility and vulnerability, hence it is crucial to gain further understanding of how concepts of responsibility and vulnerability in relation to global climate change are defined. The question whether it is appropriate to design global climate change mitigation programmes along the lines of market equilibrium has to be sought in the realm of distributive justice theory. Utilitarian scholars, such as Rawls, perceive fair distributive justice as: the main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net-balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it (Rawls, 1972, p. 22). This idea relies on the principle that each man in realising his own is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains (Ibid, p. 23). Relating this principle to the governance of climate change mitigation projects: as long as the overall gains compensate for individual losses, and as longs as there is a fundamental threshold with regard to the losses, inequality should be tolerated. Rawls view on how public goods should be managed relates to the conception that an economic system is not only an institutional device for satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants in the future (Ibid, p. 259). Thus, the preferences of the majority whether to emit carbon or to limit the emission of carbon is reflected in the price of carbon. The individual should have the right to emit, bearing in mind the price he or she has to pay for it, that is determinded by a system of markets in which prices are freely determined by supply and demand (Ibid, p. 270). Scrutinising the liberal views on how to govern global public goods, many scholars have addressed issues surrounding such goods, relating it to free-riding issues, vulnerability and responsibility (Adger, et al., 2006, pp. 4-16; Marino and Ribbot, 2012, pp. 323-325). These libertarian ideas are problematic because they deny the significance of unequal starting points, postulate the legitimacy of their favorite procedures, and end up affirming the fairness of status quo (Paavola, Adger and Huq, 2006, p. 267). Thus, those that are responsible for overconsuming public goods should compensate and should be made accountable for the damage inflicted on those that are most vulnerable. Rather, the current global climate change regime is dividing the world up into climate winners and loser (Leichenko and Obrien, 2006, p. 110-114). In this constellation, the winners are those actors that have been able to free ride and the losers are those actors that are now dealing with consequences: the most vulnerable. Does REDD+ also reinforce this status quo? Scholars such as Adger, Bumpus, Harvey and Leichenko would agree, whereas other academics (e.g. Collier, Sachs and Stern) would argue that REDD+ allows the most vulnerable to develop in a sustainable manner and that the net benefits for all should be the leading guidance in discussions concerning the governance of global public goods. As discussed in former paragraphs, the debate between liberal scholars and scholars that address distributive justice is centred around whether the net-benefits for all should be the principal objective, or if equality with regard to sharing the benefits and burdens of global climate change should be the foremost aspiration of the global climate change regime. As the position of parties with regard to burden sharing is diverse and some parties have advantaged positions, the liberal position that all parties should have equal obligations is invalid (Paavola, Adger and Huq, 2006; Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal, 2002). The common denominator for equity principles is that costs and/or benefits be distributed in (rough) proportion to actor scores on some dimension (Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal, 2002, p. 6).
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Kapstein (1999, pp. 108-112) identifies another problem with the creation of markets for global public goods. When analysing how another public good, social justice, is managed during an era of economic liberalisation, Kapstein finds that there is no system in place for compensating the most vulnerable on the international level. But on the national level, many welfare states compensate the most vulnerable for the detriment caused by the volatile international economic system (Ibid, p. 111). Such a compensation scheme does not exist on such a scale for the most vulnerable with regard to climate change (Paavola, Adger and Huq, 2006). And as the countries that are responsible for dilapidating the environment by means of emitting carbon to the atmosphere are to a certain extent unwilling to compensate the damages caused (Grasso, 2011), is it fair to install a marketmechanism that allows individuals to emit as much as they can pay? As global climate change can be regarded as a life-support common that is essential for all human species, it is inappropriate to allow certain actors to pay off their debt to the most vulnerable by means of their economic capabilities (Baer, 2006, p. 133). Armatya Sen (1999) subscribes to this conception by arguing that the harm inflicted to the most vulnerable should not only be measured in economic terms, as this denies some crucial elements of human survival and human contentment. For example, the costs of communities having to flee from their native soil due to climate change are hard to measure as such a disbandment might have severe consequences for the overall contentment with life of a community. With regard to following the principles of distributive justice formulated by Hume, Nozick and Rawls marketefficiency may help to distribute the burdens and benefits in a fair manner, but only if such a market mechanism or the institutions involved distribute the burdens and benefits of global climate change in a fair manner (see: Adger, et al., 2006; Grasso, 2011). A number of welfare states have demonstrated that a public good such as social justice can be managed in a fair manner in the context of a post-Washington consensus neo-liberal environment (see: Kapstein, 1999). Kapstein (1999) argues that the institutions that arrange the redistribution of capital are a critical determinant with regard to establishing distributive justice.
2.5 Questions left unanswered

As the maturation of the REDD+ scheme is likely to accelerate after the RIO+20 conference (as stated in the outcome document of the RIO+ 20 conference: United Nations, 2012), questions surrounding the fair distribution of the finances and obligations that are linked to the REDD+ scheme are of paramount importance. Thus far, the literature taken into account leaves the reader with an incomplete answer. It is yet unclear whether the financial means of REDD+ are funneled to where it is most needed, relating it to the question if REDD+ adequately addresses issues surrounding distributive justice. As the REDD+ scheme leaves the majority of public and private investors with the freedom of choice to decide where to infuse capital, the prime puzzle is if REDD+ sufficiently directs its funds to countries where it is most needed according to distributive justice indicators set and if this corresponds with the economic logic. The answer to this question can then be seen as a contribution to the debate whether the global climate change regime is failing to address vulnerability and fairness within the context of global climate change.
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3. Framework
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Much of the critique voiced in the previous chapter derives from a political-economical and economicalgeography theoretical perspective. The spatial expansionist nature of capitalist systems has created wealth at some locations, but has also caused deprivation at other locations (Harvey, 2010; Lohman, 2011). As the route leading to getting access to REDD+ funding requires governments to cooperate with private partners for either developing projects or to sell credits onto the voluntary carbon market, concerns around the competitive capabilities to attract capital are on the agenda of many developing countries (Corbera, Estrada and Brown, 2010). Capital will inevitably flow to where the return on investment is highest, whilst accounting for the risks of doing so (Krugman, 1990). Harvey (2011) uses the analogy of weather systems to exemplify the infinite quest of profit in capitalist systems. Like weather-systems, economic systems can be divided into low-pressure and highpressure areas, depending on certain uncontrollable underlying conditions. This notion of the inherent inequality relating to the economic principles that are embedded in the capitalist system left many critical theory scholars no option but to conclude that such schemes are ill equipped in dealing with public goods (Lohman, 2011). Thus, applying such market-based mechanisms to REDD+ will lead to an unbalanced distribution of funding; countries with an advantaged set of characteristics will receive more capital than countries with a less attractive set of characteristics. Ceteris Paribus, the capacity per tree to absorb carbon then becomes a crucial determinant to where capital is being invested. However, as the political and economical contexts are diverse, other considerations might prevail when it comes to making investment decisions. This notion of inequality is confirmed by Bumpus and Liverman (2008): credits created by the CDM and VCO markets in the developing South are valued less than those created in the industrialised North because of the perceived risks and costs of creating carbon in the developing South (Ibid, p. 142). Thus, the rules of economic efficiency (Krugman, 1990) will dictate that carbon developers and traders will extract the low-hanging fruit of cheap carbon reductions from the developing world (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, p. 142). As this creates a mechanism that allocates credit for low-cost-cabon-reduction (Ibid, 2008, p. 142), an unequal spatial distribution of over-accumulation at low-cost locations and under-investment at high-cost locations is inevitable (Harvey, 2011, pp. 184-214). This point relates to Harveys finding that a capitalist investment is in a continuous quest for at least three percent compound growth (Harvey, 2011, p. 139). Key in this debate is the issue of property rights (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Collier, 2012; Harvey, 2010; Lohman, 2011). Harvey (2010) finds that an efficient system of capital accumulation can only materialise under the condition that property rights are commodified and privatised, whilst the state acts as the agent of redistribution and regulation (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, p. 142). Property rights are of paramount importance to every capital owner when making an investment decisions (Hart and Moore, 1990). In relation to REDD+, land tenure rights and carbon credit ownership play a crucial role (Corbera, Estrada and Brown, 2010). Among neoliberal scholars it is often assumed that customary land tenure rights impede economic development (Collier, 2011; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). Firmin-Sellers (1995, pp. 873-879) found that the institutions enforcing the propertyrights framework are essential for development of an economy: investors must have confidence in the institutions supporting the property-rights infrastructure. The productive potential of private property rights depends upon the political institutions through which property rights are designed and enforced (Ibid, p. 878).
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The World Bank is an international institution that addresses the underdevelopment of a commercially viable legal framework by initiating numerous projects that ought to lead to an institutional development of the management of property rights (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2012; Norton Rose, 2011). Seemingly there is a causal effect in respect of the development of carbon property rights and the attainment of REDD+ projects. Clearly the assignation of private property rights is a condition of possibility for the creation of such markets, as it creates the potential commodities to be traded (MacNeil and Paterson, 2012, p. 233). This condition of rights feeds into Harveys argument that marketing-mechanisms survive by distributing gains to private hands (Harvey, 2011, p. 126). This inherently leads to an unequal distribution of REDD+ investments, as there is a variety in key variables that play a vital role with regard to property rights and economic viability. For example: a carbon-absorbing tree in Costa Rica is in principle identical to a carbon-absorbing tree in Cameroon, but the opportunity-costs of setting up a REDD+ project are subject to variety. These theoretical underpinnings form the basis of the framework developed in the latter half of this chapter. As the literature from both liberal and historical-materialist strands gives prominence to the unbalanced spatial nature of capital, it is incisive to assume that a market-base scheme such as REDD+ will advance in an unequal manner. Further does the cited research confirm Harveys (2004) notion that a proper installation of property rights is a prerequisite for capital to settle at a certain location. Figure four (next page) hypothesises the consequences for a number of carbon forests if the contextual conditions, that are chief for capital owners in relation to making investment decisions, are unequal.
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Figure 4. Illustration of the theoretical assumptions applied to the REDD+ architecture.
In figure four, carbon forest A represents the most favourable conditions for setting up carbon-forest project. For this carbon-absorbing forest, the property rights are well arranged and enforced by competent and stable institutions. Further, the opportunity-costs in relation to extracting the carbon sink capacity are low and the economic yields are high as a result of these low costs. Ergo, project developers and investors will have a preference for forest A. Eventually, the majority of capital that generates carbon credits will originate from forest A. This development is vested in the economic principle that REDD+ projects will be developed at the lowest possible cost, hence there will be simply more carbon credits available in forest A, in comparison to forest B and forest C. Carbon forest C will demonstrate a deficiency in private investments for setting up REDD+ projects, as the project will lack the confidence that property rights will be managed accordingly. Additionally, the profit potential does not weigh up against the opportunity-costs and other risks involved with the project. With regard to carbon forest B, either the conditions concerning the property rights are not optimal or the opportunity costs are out of balance in relation to the return on investment. These theoretical assumptions lead to the following research question:
Does REDD+ ensure a balanced distribution of capital among the participating states?
Central to answering this question in the appropriate manner is to derive correct conceptions of balanced distribution from the literature taken into account. This balanced distribution relates to conceptions of distributive justice. As the theoretical assumptions would instinctively respond with a no, it is crucial to also incorporate conceptions concerning property rights and economic viability.
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4. Design
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Translating the theoretical assumptions into measurable variables alone is not sufficient in terms of evaluating the fairness of REDD+. Even if the theoretical assumptions materialise, this does not necessarily foreshadow an uneven distribution of the burden and benefits of the scheme under scrutiny. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to not only finding the appropriate indicators for scaling the attractiveness of investing in REDD+ projects on a comparative basis, but to also identify the relevant measures for distributive justice. By doing so, the analysis will be able to test the claim that market equilibrium does lead to an unfair distribution of capital. On top of these considerations, the principal analysis of the design ought to be devised in a quantitative manner. This is imperative as the objective of the paper is to scrutinise the distributive justice of REDD+ as an aggregate, relating it to the discussion of the legitimate management of global public goods. As most data is accessible, relevant and reliable on the country level (UN-REDD, 2012; World Bank, 2012), the research can be most articulate on a country basis. Subsequently, a supplementary step will be taken to recapitulate on the findings in a qualitative fashion.
4.1 Defining the dependent variable

Measuring the REDD+ investment on a country level in a comparative manner involves number of variables. Comparing forest covers in this regard is not sufficient, as some forests might include more trees with carbonabsorbing qualities than other forests (Fischer, et al., 2011). It is therefore crucial to take into account the different levels of carbon stock per country. Hence, this research will calculate the REDD+ investment per metric tonne carbon stock. With regard to calculating the REDD+ investment per country, this research will take into account all investments that have come through voluntary carbon market regardless if they derive from private or public resources. Thus, the dependent variable is conceptualised in the following manner: Y = the total of REDD+ investment in country A divided by the aggregate of carbon stock in country A. By constructing the dependent variable in such a fashion, the causal mechanism is able to test the hypothesis that REDD+ capital will be directed at the more profitable projects and will ignore responsibility and vulnerability.
4.2 Translating indicators for distributive justice into independent variables

Recapitulating literature on vulnerability and responsibility is imperative in order to pinpoint the independent factors in relation distributive justice. In this analysis, the independent variables relating to deforestation rates, carbon emissions per capita and income per capita are regarded as crucial to measure the degree of distributive justice of REDD+. Further is it also important to incorporate the principal objective of REDD+, namely ensuring the net-protection of the global public good at locations where the net-losses in terms of forests covers are largest.
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4.2.1 X1: Deforestation measured in carbon stock change
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REDD+ is designed to address deforestation, specifically with regard to carbon absorbing tree covers, to ensure the preservation of the global public good. Hence, investments should be directed at the most vulnerable carbon forests. As the locations of the relatively most vulnerable forest covers are often located in regions where other economic activities relating to deforestation prevail, it is too easy to assume that REDD+ capital is automatically directed at such forests (Fisher, et al., 2011; Gilbertson, 2010). Current stakeholders might stick to their guns and refuse to participate in REDD+ activities as this would undermine their current economic activities. Wang, Stennes and van Kooten (2012, 136-138) establish a correlation between the profitability of economic activities and levels of deforestation. Therefore will it be easier for REDD+ project developers to establish projects at locations where there are less economic activities and thus lower levels of deforestation. The lower levels of opposition will allow the developer to nurture and grow forest covers in a more efficient manner. Hence, measuring the deforestation rate on a country basis is an imperative element in measuring vulnerability.
4.2.2 X2: CO2 emissions per capita

In order to identify responsibility, it is crucial to understand what accountability relates to in association with global climate change. The contribution to the problem appears to be an approach that is rooted in a common understanding in terms of who is responsible for global climate change (Grasso, 2011; Page, 2008). Contribution in this sense relates to the amount of carbon emitted by a certain country (Page, 2008). On the country level, this translates into the following conceptualisation: the countries that have emitted the least amount of carbon to the atmosphere should receive more financial assistance (in the form of REDD+ finance) to preserve their natural assets, in comparison to their dirtier counterparts. This taps into the conviction of distributive justice scholars that individuals that have emitted the least should also mitigate the least, rather similar to a structure not uncommon for western European welfare states in which the richest individuals contribute to the well being of the poor (Kapstein, 1999).
4.2.3 X3: GNI per capita index

Vulnerability in relation to global climate change on a country level can be measured in many ways. This paper opted for using a conventional method of measuring vulnerability, namely GNI per capita. Although this approach denies Sens approach of incorporating non-economic indicators with regard to measuring vulnerability (Sen, 1999, pp. 28-43), it is important to note that every concept must have a core minimal definition, which is shared by all users of the concept (Mair, 2008, p. 190). As many institutions and scholars (see for example: Collier, 2012; UN-REDD, 2012; World Bank, 2012) do not incorporate other conceptions of vulnerability, GNI per capita is an indicator that is generally perceived as unbiased with regard to measuring discrepancies in relation to having the capacity to deal with climate change (Fssel, 2010, pp. 599-602; Grasso, 2011). Another reason for incorporating an income index is that such an index also relates to the adaptive capacity of individuals (see figure one). This logic includes the inference that there is a positive correlation between financial means and adaptive capacity (Adger, et al., 2006; Page, 2008).
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Figure five (below) explores how the three indicators of distributive justice are positioned in a causal model. The causal chain on the left side of the model relates to the set of institutions and regimes that are responsible for establishing a certain degree of distributive justice. The right side of the model expresses the causal model that provides an account of the unequal spatiality of capital inflicted by a set of disparate economic drivers that are yet to be conceptualised.
X1
Deforestation rate
BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
X2
CO2 emissions
per capita
X3
GNI index
Y = REDD+ investment per metric tonne carbon stock
Figure 5. Illustration of causal relationship between distributive justice and the dependent variable.
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In contrast of distributive justice parameters, do business considerations provide an account of the neo-liberal causal narrative that is assumed to be in operation with regard to REDD+. Although the literature reflected upon in this research thus far provides insightful information on how market-based climate change mitigation projects unfold on a more abstract level, this research is in need of documentation that accounts for a comprehension on how investors make their decisions. In other words: what are the considerations of businesses when establishing or investing into REDD+ project at a certain location? The prime source in this section will be the Cambodian case study, but also other documents from consultancy agencies, non-governmental organisations and international institutions will be reflected upon.
4.3 Identifying other independent factors

It is of crucial importance to identify the relative weight of the independent factors that relate to addressing distributive justice against causal determinants that give an account of economic considerations. In order to do so, this section aims at identifying operationalise-able independent factors that are considered to be paramount to private investors when it comes to making investment decisions with regard to REDD+.
4.3.1 Cambodian REDD+ project (confidential)

This section has been removed for reasons of confidentiality.
4.3.2 Relation independent factors with carbon investment literature

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4.3.3 Mitigating confounding factors
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Correlation does not equal causation (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p. 480). Certain correlative outcomes might stem from confounding factors that are not incorporated into the research design. For example, the noninvestment of REDD+ capital in country A might be rooted in a government that is unwilling to participate in the REDD+ scheme for whatever reason. This then leads a low score on the distributive justice scale, by which the underinvestment in this regard originates from the supply side. This does not necessarily have to be problematic as the research is interested in the overall distributive justice and recognises the complex and sometimes incoherent governance architectures. As such, the risk of incorporating a logical fallacy into the research outcomes is alleviated by means of including confounding factors into the qualitative section of the design (Gerring, 2012, p. 312). This paper will aim to account for that obstacle by also closely examining a single case study in addition to the quantitative study. By doing so, potential confounding factors can be identified and addressed. This is executed by means of revisiting the Cambodian case study subsequent to the quantitative analyses. Hence, the research is able to amplify the wider context under which the effect materialises. A couple of prime considerations for businesses to decide to invest in one area, rather than other areas are left out of the equation as they are meaningless in this design. These considerations include the soft-factors that call upon the conscious of businesses to not to invest in countries with corrupt regimes or regions subject to conflict. As these considerations are not part of the causal mechanism under scrutiny, it is fair to consider them as obsolete (Gerring, 2012, pp. 268-288). As it is crucial to understand that REDD+ is a public-private partnership, the extent to which business considerations play a role as independent factors might be blurred as the analyses also incorporates projects that have a more development aid nature. Nevertheless, given the assumed hybrid nature of the nation-state, neoliberal mechanisms of economic efficiency are deeply embedded in the institutions of the nation-state (Lipschutz and McKendry, 2011, pp. 370-374).
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4.4 Formalising the research design
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Figure six exhibits the conceptualised causal mechanisms of distributive justice and the considerations capital owners make with regard to making investment decisions within REDD+. The business considerations hypothesized in the theoretical framework do indeed, to a certain degree, matter to XXX and are therefore incorporated into the design.
X1
Deforestation rate
X4
Strength of private landlease rights
BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
X2
CO2 emissions
per capita
X5
FCI
X3
GNI index
X6
Legal property rights index
Y = REDD+ investment per metric tonne carbon stock
Figure 6. Illustration of the causal relationship between distributive justice, business considerations (independent variables) and the dependent variable.
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5. Testing the degree of distributive fairness in REDD+
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By having identified and conceptualised the relevant causal framework, the latter part of this paper will focus on sharing the results of the quantitative analysis, which is preceded by presenting the indicators of the causal model. Subsequently, the results will be discussed in light of other findings and the Cambodian case study. The complete overview of the data can be found in Annex one.
5.1.1 Constructing the dependent variable

The REDD+ investment per metric tonne is translated into an indicative variable by dividing the total of REDD+ investments by the total carbon-absorbing capacities of forests. The voluntary REDD+ plus database (2012) accounts for supplying data on REDD+ funding on a country basis. The level of investments accounts for the period 2006 May 2012. To complete the calculation of the dependent variable, the Tropical Conservation database is used to estimate the level of carbon stock in living forest biomass (Tropical Conservation Science, 2012). The results are set out in table one.
Table 1. Overview of REDD+ investment per metric tonne on a country base. Data on accumulated REDD+ investment retrieved from the REDD plus partnership database (REDD plus partnership, 2012). Data on carbon stock in living biomass obtained from the Tropical Conservation Science database (Tropical Conservation Science, 2012).
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5.1.2 Constructing the independent variables
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For calculating the deforestation rate of carbon stock in living forest biomass, data from Tropical Conservation Science (2012) is applied in an equation to compare the difference between carbon stock between 2010 and 1990. The data with regard to the CO2 emissions per capita and GNI per capita derive from the World Bank database (2012). The legal strengths of property rights index of the Property Rights Alliance (2012) are applied to analyse the strength of property rights from a private property perspective. The access to land-rights data is sourced from the Investing Across Border agency (World Bank, 2012), a subsidiary of the World Bank, supported by private companies such as KPMG, Delloite and Baker and McKenzie (Ibid). The formula of the model under scrutiny can be formalised as follows:
=a+
.x1 + .x2 + .x6
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5.1.3 Statistical analysis
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By implementing the indicators into a regression analyses, the statistical relevance and correlation of the model is tested. Figure seven provides a brief visual summary of the findings deriving from the quantitative analysis, whereas table two accounts for a complete overview of the statistical findings. As some datasets were incomplete in terms of measuring all the independent variables of the countries that can be found in table one, the regression analysis only includes 47 cases. Fourty-seven cases is however sufficient to draw a statistical inference, whilst taking into consideration the shortcomings of a statistical analysis of a low N (Agresti and Finlay, 2009). An important country that is missing in the quantitative analysis is China (the country that has received the most funding thus far). China will be touched upon in the latter half of this chapter.
REDD+ investment per metric tonne
Independent variables on an indexed scale
Figure 7. Correlation of the six independent variables, presented on an indexed scale. The coloured lines refer to the either negative or positive correlation found with regard to the relationship between the independent variables and the effect.
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The statistical analysis demonstrates that in relation to the dependent variable, the deforestation of carbon absorbing forests (.16 significance level) and the levels of CO2 emissions per capita (0.092 percent significance level) account for the highest relevant statistical correlation. Sample size has a profound effect on tests of statistical significance. With a sample of sixty people, a correlation has to be at least .25 (in magnitude) to significantly different from zero (at the .05 level) (Allison, 1999, p. 57). Although Agresti and Finlay (2009) advice to use the 95% confidence level as a rule of thumb, Allison (1999) points at the difficulties at getting statistically significant results in small samples. Rather than increasing the p levels to 0.1, researchers should lower the p level to .01 to allow for the possibility that the p value is underestimated (Allison, 1999, p. 58). Thus, table two demonstrates that only the negative correlation between REDD+ investments and the contribution to the problem (CO2 emissions) comes close to a statistical inference. However, the low R square the total of the model accounts for an R square of 0.1113 indicates that the goodness of fit of the two variables within the model is not anywhere near perfection. This means that the model is deficient in terms of incorporating all the relevant explanatory factors. Hence, other factors, that might perhaps be rooted in political wheeling and dealing, soft factors such as the reputation of the host country or ad hoc decision-making do account for the remaining explanatory factors.
N = 47 REDD+ investments per metric tonne 2 R Significance
Deforestation
CO2 emissions -0.077 (-0.262) 0.062 0.092
GNI per capita
Land-lease rights
FCI index
Legal property rights strength
0.048 (0.166) 0.041 0.167
0.04 (0.016) 0.030 0.936
-0.015 (-0.066) 0.013 0.692
-0.088 (-0.104) 0.024 0.799
0.030 (0.045) 0.016 0.404
Table 2. Statistical inferences derived from the regressions analysis (B / standardised B in parentheses).
The variables related to GNI per capita and business considerations are in this analysis not relevant. Hence, this analysis establishes that the statistical significance is too low to conclude with an inference that business considerations concerning REDD+ investments have played an instrumental role thus far. Even if the statistical findings would have been included, there appears to be a negative causal relationship between the business considerations and the level of REDD+ investments. Hence, the statistical results are to a great extent inconclusive and do not hint at a clear pattern of investments along the lines of the independent variables derived from the literature.
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5.2.1 Qualitative analysis: Cambodia (confidential)
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5.2.2 Qualitative analysis: other findings and observations
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Concerning the data collected for the purpose of the regression analysis, there a number of interesting individual observations that require some detailed attention. An interesting observation is that China has received more REDD+ capital than Brazil. This is interesting given that Chinas contribution to the problem exceeds that of Brazil and that Brazil is far more vulnerable to global climate change than China, to say the least. When evaluating the literature on REDD+ and China, it is rather interesting to observe the vast amounts of private REDD+ projects in China (Barr and Sayer, 2012, p. 5). A rather precarious project that stands out is the SinoForest Corporation, which is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Ibid, p. 6). The market capitalisation of all the REDD+ projects of the Sino Forest Corporation accumulates to USD 5.7 billion according to Morgan Stanley (Ibid). After suspicions of fraud and malpractice, the Ontario Securities Commission launched an investigation against the company (Ibid). The findings of this investigation are appalling. The investigators dubbed it the Madoff moment for commercial tree-planting initiatives in China (Ibid, p. 7). Millions of REDD+ capital that was directed at reforestation activities ended up in off-shore funds on the Virgin Islands, meanwhile local and national officials where bribed to affirm the astonishing levels of reforestation of carbon-absorbing forests (Ibid). Although this case is an extreme example, it does highlight the issue of REDD+ institutions lacking to oversight the just distribution of REDD+ capital. Thus, the research by Bar and Saver (2012) and the findings in Cambodia highlight the severe inadequate management on the part of the official REDD+ institutions, perhaps due to the unwillingness of nation-states to hand-over the control and monitoring of the implementation of REDD+ to the global level at a centralised institution (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008). Another interesting case is Burundi. The quantitative analysis identified the Republic of Burundi as an outlier, in terms of that it has high levels of levels of deforestation, but that the Rebublic of Burundi is also receiving disproportionate amounts of REDD+ finance, in relation to its African counterparts that demonstrate slightly lower levels of deforestation. An answer to this puzzle is vested in the fact the World Bank has identified the Republic of Burundi as a priority (Republic of Burundi, 2010, p. 4) given the alarming levels of deforestation (Ibid). In response to this issue, many World Bank employees are involved at helping the Republic of Burundi to become an attractive haven for REDD+ capital. This does indeed also incorporate land-rights reform, given the accelerating population growth in rural areas (Ibid). The question is however, why does the World Bank address such a distributive issue rather prominently in the Republic of Burundi, but not in other African states such as Liberia, Uganda and Zambia? Has this do to with the political willingness to welcome institutions like the World Bank to interfere with national policies? Or, are public and private parties simply not interested in assisting Liberia to the degree as demonstrated in the Republic of Burundi?
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6. Conclusions
6.1 Placing the results into the existing literature
30
The analysis in this research demonstrates that REDD+, in its current format, is partially ill equipped in terms of devising a mechanism that is able to fairly distribute the burdens of global climate change. A major issue that will remain problematic with a market-based in REDD+ relates to economic viability. The regions that are most vulnerable to accelerating levels of deforestation are in sub-Saharan Africa (Fisher, et al., 2011), but that is not necessarily the region where REDD+ finance is being invested at sufficient levels. The quantitative analysis found that there is a neglect of countries such as Liberia, Uganda and Zambia with regard to funneling REDD+ finance. Although REDD+ does account, to some degree, for investing at locations where the levels of deforestation are highest, and allocation of funds according to the conception of responsibility, the literature that criticised REDD+ for facilitating enhanced inequality is not completely incorrect. The effect found in the statistical analysis could also hint at a spurious relationship between REDD+ investments and the contribution to the problem (Allison, 1999; Agresti and Finlay, 2009), as previous literature already established a relationship between the location of the most vulnerable forests and deficient economic development that results in low emission levels of carbon (see for example: Grasso, 2011; Paavola, Adger and Huq, 2006; Robertson 2012). Going back to the issue of adaptive capacity, i.e. vulnerability, the analysis demonstrates that there is no identifiable causal link between GNI per capita and REDD+ investments. This can be regarded as a mismanagement of carbon-absorbing forests when recognising them as global public goods, incorporating social justice and equality conceptions about the governance of such goods (for example: Baer, 2006; Kapstein, 1999; Leichenko and Obrien, 2006; Sen, 1999). Liberal scholars, appreciating the distributive justice perceptions of Rawls and Nozick, would point at the net benefits REDD+ delivers to all individuals consuming this global public good. However, does that legitimise the global climate change regime to ignore the high levels of deforestation in Zambia (a country that has a low GNI per capita and has a relatively low influx of REDD+ capital see analysis)? This research denies the claim that business interests alone determine the allocation of REDD+ capital. Such business considerations do not play a dominant role (see analysis) and are diminished by the institutions that currently govern REDD+ at the global level (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010). Although the claims by Bumpus and Liverman (2008), Harvey (2010) and Lohman (2011) are exaggerated, there is some truth to it. The case study demonstrates, that although the project developer appears to be considerate with regard to local stakeholders, a lions-share of the revenues earned by selling carbon credits are funneled back to XXX via XXX. Such postcarbon credit transactions are not monitored by the involved institutions, and thus is it hard to conclude if REDD+ capital ends up in the hands of local stakeholders. XXX is aiming at helping local communities to alter their modes of living and is supporting local development by financing health and education projects. However, this is not a precondition of REDD+ on the global level, as setting such conditions is the responsibility of the host country (Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 2011; United Nations, 2012). For example: Barr and Saver (2012) highlighted how REDD+ projects in China are relentless cash machines that have no regard for local community support. Hence, the claim by the UN-REDD regime (2012) and the World Bank (2012) that REDD+ capital will help local communities to develop is ambiguous.
30
31
The erratic patterns of REDD+ investments indicate an incoherent implementation of the scheme. This is not surprising given the hybrid nature of REDD+ (Lipschutz and McKendry, 2011). Some projects are commercial, whereas others can be characterised as development aid. Accordingly, a fair distribution of financial means on a global scale has not materialised. Projects on an individual basis might be successful in terms of redistributing the burdens of global climate change, REDD+, as the aggregate of projects, fails as a mechanism to fairly redistribute its financial means in an adequate manner.
6.2 REDD+ and the earth system governance context

The research in this paper demonstrated that although the REDD+ scheme is still too a large degree in the development stage and is subject to a discussion within the international community to finalise the definitive conditions of the scheme an unequal distribution of the mitigation funds is a paramount issue. The results hint at an uncoordinated and ad-hoc basis of REDD+ in terms of the fair allocation of capital. REDD+ does not adequately address fairness nor is it spatially implemented via the routes that capital tends to follow. In relation to the findings, a call for better steering efforts by the global climate regime is appropriate. Distributive justice should have a prominent role concerning developing the design of the scheme. This is crucial as governments and adaptation funds are currently accounting for the lions-share of investments in REDD+, and have thus the means to address distributive justice. Only USD 123 million of the total USD 497 million provided to REDD+ projects in 2010 derived from the designated VCO markets in which private actors can participate (Hamilton, Peter-Stanley and Marcello, 2011, p. 26). But, as the maturation of REDD+ involves the complete funding of REDD+ through the VCO markets, or eventually the CDM markets (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2012), governments and adaptation funds should accelerate altering the unfair distribution by means of allocating capital to the most vulnerable. As issues of unequal burden-sharing play an important role within adaptation funds (Grasso, 2011), it is interesting that issues of vulnerability and adaptive capacity are not given much prominence within the institutions governing REDD+ (United Nations, 2012; UN-REDD, 2012), given the further incorporation of REDD+ into the private markets and thus the increased attractiveness for private investors to set up REDD+ projects. The case studies included manifest the difficulties of coordinating a fair distribution of means on the global level. Some governments are rather active in raising REDD+ finance, whereas other governments are reluctant to do so. Further does the case study demonstrate that a race to the bottom, with regard to governments offering investors the best preconditions and the lowest fees, could be a serious threat to the fair distribution of REDD+ finance. This is a conspicuous obstacle in relation to arriving at a legitimate outcome. So, what are the alternatives? Other options, that have thus far been unexplored, would move the governance of carbonabsorbing forests away from market-based schemes that are turning trees into tradable derivates. Nordhaus (2009) is one the many scholars calling for a global carbon tax. Under a carbon tax policy, developing countries require Northern investments in low carbon technologies to reduce the costs of climate change (Nordhaus, 2009, p. 6). Although such an approach would remove the speculative nature of REDD+, a carbon tax requires a rather strong authoritative body on the international level, with the power to reinforce the protection of forests on the ground. This is necessary as the economic incentive to destruct carbon-absorbing forests would still be present. But, the development of such a carbon-tax regime on the global level is rather unlikely, given that: the failure of countries to adopt the lightest possible nonbinding declaration under-scores the bleak prospects of the consensus based UN process for responding to climate change (Dimitrov, 2010, p. 22).
31
32
Rather, the global climate change regimes are developing on a more local and national level, but also among private networks (Doherty and Schroeder, 2009). Pattberg and Stripple (2008) affirm this notion of the growing complexity of the global climate regime by for example pointing at the C40 cities climate reduction commitments, corporate responsibility programmes and a diverse range of national policies (Pattberg and Stripple, 2008, p. 373). It is therefore important to encourage all the actors involved to head in the same direction, an inclusive body such as REDD+ would have more capacities to do so, rather than the top-down approach of enforcing a global tax upon everyone. This does not mean that a global tax, without the procedural constraints, does not have the qualities to address distributive justice issues in a better fashion. The redistributive capacities of the welfare state to mitigate the inequalities of the consequences of the global economic system (also a global public good) are a powerful example of why such a scheme is in principle desirable (Kapstein, 1999; Kaul, 2012; Leichenko and Obrien, 2006). A central issue in the debate whether REDD+ should exist is rooted in the claim that the only way of effectively protecting carbon-forests is to turn them into tradable commodities that are able to compete with other products that are related to deforestation, such as palm-oil and wood. The argument here is that the possibility to profiteer from free riding will lead governments and local stakeholders to decide to logging trees, and that only economic incentives will help to tackle this problem. What Harvey perhaps overlooks is that numerous forests already suffer from the consequences of commodifying land by market pressures relating to food production, the infinite quest for fossil fuels and minerals and population growth (see for example: Doherty and Schroeder, 2011). These pressures are often stronger than international bodies telling nation-states and local stakeholders not to destroy carbon-absorbing forests. Again the free rider problem dictates that there is no incentive to nurture forests rather than destroying them. This relates to the same problem of not committing to mitigation projects in the industrialised world, as touched upon by Brennan (2009). Rational choice theory commands that there is no economic rationale for protecting forest covers. Thus the only remedy in this regard is to also put a price tag on carbon, until the moment that there is an earth-system governance architecture in place that is better equipped in dealing with problems of the tragedy of the commons in relation to global climate change and can force national governments to commit to reduce the level of deforestation. Despite all the shortcomings, REDD+ is a start to the solution of this specific problem, as it might proof hard to establish a global policing institution that will penalise countries not obeying to certain objectives (Biermann, et al., 2012). But, as a tool to govern global public goods it requires some thorough rethinking and steering in the direction of addressing the level of exposure to climate change on the global regime level. Legitimacy, also relating to procedural justice, should be key in this debate.
32
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8.1 Annex one

The data collected for the quantitative analyses.
38
country
carbon stock in living forest biomass 1990 (metric tons)
Y: REDD+ carbon stock in REDD+ investment living forest investment: per metric biomass 2010 accumulated 2006 tone in USD (metric tons) - May 2012 - May 2012
X1: Deforestation rate 19902010. Lost cabon stock. X2: CO2 metric tons emissions
X3: GNI per capita 2010 in USD X4: FCI
X5: strenght X6: Physical of landproprty lease rights rights index
Albania Algeria Argentina Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Brazil Brunei Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Chili China Colombia ECR Congo Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Guyana Honduras India Indonesia Jamaica Kenya Lao Peoples Republic Liberia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mexico Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Panama Papua New Guinea
49000000 78000000 3414000000 54000000 84000000 195000000 332000000 296000000 4877000000 81000000 355000000 25000000 609000000 3292000000
49,000,000 70,000,000 3,062,000,000 54,000,000 80,000,000 171,000,000 263,000,000 336,000,000 4,442,000,000 72,000,000 292,000,000 17,000,000 464,000,000 2,696,000,000
$2,000,000.00 $5,000,000.00 $5,000,000.00 $6,000,000.00 $250,000.00 $6,000,000.00 $9,000,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $40,250,000.00 $360,750,000.00 $250,000.00 $40,000,000.00 $5,000,000.00 $23,250,000.00 $14,750,000.00
0.0408 0.0714 0.0016 0.1111 0.0031 0.0351 0.0342 0.0119 0.0091 0.0058 0.0035 0.1370 0.2941 0.0501 0.0055
1.0000 1.1143 1.1150 1.0000 1.0500 1.1404 1.2624 0.8810 1.0979 1.0880 1.0880 1.2158 1.4706 1.3125 1.2211
0.739 0.698 0.797 0.7 0.5 0.699 0.427 0.522 0.663 0.718 0.838 0.331 0.316 0.523 0.482
3960.00 4390.00 8620.00 5330.00 700.00 3810.00 780.00 1870.00 1810.00 9390.00 31000.00 550.00 170.00 750.00 1200.00
0.37 0.4 0.38 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.24 0.13 0.35 0.63 0.51 0.32 0.07 0.2 0.31
80.7 na 79.3 78.5 100 na na na 85.7 na na 74.9 na 92.9 73.6
na na 48 na 30 na 50 na 13 21 100 10 5 40 30
68119000000 62,607,000,000
2936000000 722000000 1294000000 4414000000 7032000000 3487000000 233000000 114000000 289000000 2710000000 564000000 365000000 106000000 1629000000 517000000 2223000000 48000000 525000000 1186000000 666000000 1778000000 173000000 2822000000 317000000 13000000 2186000000 190000000 1878000000 2040000000 602000000 506000000 60000000 2016000000 429000000 2537000000
2,861,000,000 635,000,000 1,349,000,000 6,203,000,000 6,805,000,000 3,438,000,000 238,000,000 114,000,000 219,000,000 2,710,000,000 381,000,000 281,000,000 96,000,000 1,629,000,000 330,000,000 2,800,000,000 48,000,000 476,000,000 1,074,000,000 585000000 1626000000 144000000 3212000000 282000000 7000000 2043000000 223000000 1692000000 1654000000 485000000 349000000 37000000 1085000000 367000000 2306000000
$16,250,000.00 $14,000,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $448,000,000.00 $8,000,000.00 $165,250,000.00 $4,500,000.00 $250,000.00 $39,250,000.00 $10,500,000.00 $34,250,000.00 $15,500,000.00 $1,000,000.00 $79,250,000.00 $7,000,000.00 $304,250,000.00 $207,750,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $28,250,000.00 $37,500,000.00 $18,250,000.00 $9,250,000.00 $28,000,000.00 $22,000,000.00 $24,000,000.00 $8,000,000.00 $44,750,000.00 $33,000,000.00 $28,250,000.00 $24,000,000.00 $41,000,000.00 $7,500,000.00 $10,000,000.00 $12,000,000.00 $13,500,000.00 $15,500,000.00
0.0057 0.0220 0.0030 0.0722 0.0012 0.0481 0.0189 0.0022 0.1792 0.0039 0.0899 0.0552 0.0104 0.0486 0.0212 0.1087 0.0160 0.0833 0.0593 0.0349 0.0312 0.0057 0.1944 0.0068 0.0851 1.1429 0.0219 0.1480 0.0167 0.0145 0.0845 0.0215 0.2703 0.0111 0.0368 0.0067
1.0262 1.1370 0.9592 0.7116 1.0334 1.0143 0.9790 1.0000 1.3196 1.0000 1.4803 1.2989 1.1042 1.0000 1.5667 0.7939 1.2549 1.0000 1.1029 1.1043 1.1385 1.0935 1.2014 0.8786 1.1241 1.8571 1.0700 0.8520 1.1099 1.2334 1.2412 1.4499 1.6216 1.8581 1.1689 1.1002
0.343 0.328 0.805 0.687 0.71 0.286 0.744 0.689 0.363 0.674 0.541 0.574 0.353 0.633 0.625 0.547 0.617 0.727 0.509 0.524 0.329 0.48 0.4 0.761 0.359 0.453 0.77 0.582 0.322 0.483 0.485 0.589 0.295 0.459 0.768 0.466
470.00 620.00 10120.00 4270.00 5510.00 2240.00 6810.00 5030.00 14460.00 7650.00 1250.00 2740.00 590.00 2870.00 1870.00 1270.00 2500.00 4800.00 810.00 1040.00 200.00 430.00 330.00 7760.00 600.00 1000.00 8930.00 2850.00 440.00 na 490.00 1110.00 370.00 1230.00 6970.00 1300.00
0.02 0.19 0.75 0.62 0.59 0.31 0.52 0.35 0.28 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.54 0.51 0.31 0.39 0.05 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.62 0.33 0.05 0.59 0.48 0.36 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.25 0.42 0.58 0.36
na na 85.7 96.4 85.7 na 100 na 74.9 na 90 78.6 na na 78.6 92.6 78.6 na 78.6 na 57.7 94.5 na 78.5 80 90 81.3 86.8 53.1 na na 72.1 na 78.5 na na
10 5 na na 15 1 18 na 10 17 40 9 2 20 12 23 17 na 3 3 2 1 1 76 1 na 43 na 1 na 1 18 na 6 20 na
16335000000 13,017,000,000
38
39
Peru Philippines Russian Federation Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Sudan Suriname Thailand Tunisia Turkey Uganda Vietnam Zambia Zimbadwe
8831000000 641000000 32504000000 35000000 377000000 247000000 191000000 1521000000 3168000000 908000000 6000000 686000000 171000000 778000000 2579000000 697000000
8560000000 663000000 32500000000 39000000 340000000 216000000 182000000 1393000000 3165000000 880000000 9000000 822000000 109000000 992000000 2416000000 492000000
$26,250,000.00 $89,000,000.00 $8,000,000.00 $10,000,000.00 $18,000,000.00 $10,000,000.00 $3,000,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $3,250,000.00 $19,500,000.00 $17,000,000.00 $1,000,000.00 $6,000,000.00 $34,750,000.00 $23,000,000.00 $6,000,000.00
0.0031 0.1342 0.0002 0.2564 0.0529 0.0463 0.0165 0.0029 0.0010 0.0222 1.8889 0.0012 0.0550 0.0350 0.0095 0.0122
1.0317 0.9668 1.0001 0.8974 1.1088 1.1435 1.0495 1.0919 1.0009 1.0318 0.6667 0.8345 1.5688 0.7843 1.0675 1.4167
0.725 0.644 0.755 0.429 0.459 0.336 0.51 0.408 0.68 0.682 0.698 0.699 0.446 0.593 0.43 0.376
4700.00 2060.00 9900.00 520.00 1080.00 340.00 1030.00 1270.00 6000.00 4150.00 4160.00 9890.00 500.00 1160.00 1070.00 460.00
0.56 0.49 0.53 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.11 0.27 0.34 0.55 0.49 0.57 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.2
79.3 68.8 85.7 89.2 85.6 44.4 91.1 71.4 na 80.7 85.7 85.7 71.4 77.3 71.4 na
14 19 12 na 4 na na 3 na na na na 1 15 2 7
total / average
200142000000.00
188254000000 $2,568,000,000.00
0.0136
1.063148725
39
8.2 Annex two

The SPSS output based on the regressions analysis as referred to in the main text.
40
Coefficientsa Model (N=47) Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients B (Constant) Deforestation CO2emissions 1 GNI LandleaseContract PropertyRights FCI .115 .048 -.077 .004 -.015 .030 -.088 Std. Error .078 .044 .058 .044 .038 .115 .104 .166 -.262 .016 -.066 .045 -.142 Beta 1.479 1.405 -1.722 .081 -.399 .257 -.844 .147 .167 .092 .936 .692 .799 .404 t Sig.
40

Global Climate Change LTD.: Market Efficiency or Governance Failure? Addressing The Distributive Fairness of REDD+

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Global Climate Change LTD.: Market Efficiency or Governance Failure? Addressing The Distributive Fairness of REDD+

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Global climate change Ltd.: market efficiency or governance failure?

Addressing the distributive fairness of REDD+.

Thesis for the degree of Master of Science Consisting of 16,441 words

2.2 The REDD+ architecture and the voluntary carbon market

2.3 The carbon economy

2.4 Distributive justice in governing global public goods

2.5 Questions left unanswered

Figure 4. Illustration of the theoretical assumptions applied to the REDD+ architecture.

4.1 Defining the dependent variable

4.2 Translating indicators for distributive justice into independent variables

4.2.2 X2: CO2 emissions per capita

4.2.3 X3: GNI per capita index

Y = REDD+ investment per metric tonne carbon stock

4.3 Identifying other independent factors

4.3.1 Cambodian REDD+ project (confidential)

4.3.2 Relation independent factors with carbon investment literature

Y = REDD+ investment per metric tonne carbon stock

5. Testing the degree of distributive fairness in REDD+

5.1.1 Constructing the dependent variable

.x1 + .x2 + .x6

REDD+ investment per metric tonne

Independent variables on an indexed scale

N = 47 REDD+ investments per metric tonne 2 R Significance

CO2 emissions -0.077 (-0.262) 0.062 0.092

GNI per capita

Legal property rights strength

0.048 (0.166) 0.041 0.167

0.04 (0.016) 0.030 0.936

-0.015 (-0.066) 0.013 0.692

-0.088 (-0.104) 0.024 0.799

0.030 (0.045) 0.016 0.404

6.2 REDD+ and the earth system governance context

Collier, P. (2011). The Plundered Planet. London: Penguin Books.

Rawls, J. (1972). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

http://cancuntalks.blogspot.nl/2010/12/burundis-second-national-communications.html (accessed on 4 August 2012).

Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thompson Reuters Point Carbon (2011). XXX.

http://iab.worldbank.org/Data/Explore%20Topics/Accessing-land (accessed on 12 June 2012).

8.1 Annex one

carbon stock in living forest biomass 1990 (metric tons)

X3: GNI per capita 2010 in USD X4: FCI

X5: strenght X6: Physical of landproprty lease rights rights index

80.7 na 79.3 78.5 100 na na na 85.7 na na 74.9 na 92.9 73.6

8.2 Annex two

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