Paper No.

6648

DAM DISASTERS
by

Edward Gruner, A.M.I.C.E.

Partner, Gruner Brothers, Consulting Engineers, Basle
For discussion at an Ordinary Meeting on Tuesday, 19 February, 1963, at 5.30p.m. and for subsequent written discussion

SYNOPSIS

The Paper mentions several recent failures and the resultant damage of dams by flooding. The causes of different types of failure are reviewed and brief histories givenof the exampleschosen. The effects of reservoirs on the balance of nature are mentioned, the design ofdams is considered suggestions advanced and for the protection of persons and property. The question of insurance against damage is raised. The author concludes that every dam which impounds water presents a potential danger and risk of sudden disaster is ever inescapable. the for

INTRODUC~ON
DURING the following were added to the list of recorded dam disasters: 1961 The failure of a dam in the Babii Yar gorge of the Ukraine as the result of overtopping due to high winds. The flood released inundated the lowerlying parts of the city of Kiev. The failure of the Panshet dam near Poona in India during the monsoon rains, and the consequential destruction of the Khadekvasla dam a few miles downstream. The failureof the Hyokiri dam 125 miles south of Se01 in South Koreaas the result of torrential rains.

F ~ DDUE TO NATURAL DAMS S 2. Out of 265 floods recorded in the Rhone Valley in Switzerlandno fewer than a tenth were caused by the breaching of glacial barriers. Lake Maeryelen which lies adjacent to the Aletsch glacier has been the cause of periodic disasters, the 1913 when 7800 acre-ft of water were suddenly released. most recent occurring in The unusual phenomena associated with such disasters had been observed by Alpine herdsmen from very early times and they had noticed that on occasion the ice barrier would lift and suddenly releasethe water stored inthe lake. 3. A more recent example such natural disasters occurred in of 1934 when the Trans-AndeanRailway wasbreachednearMendoza in the Argentine. Investigations showed that the Nevado glacier had blocked the valley of the Rio Plonio and had created a temporary of 46 800 acre-ft. At its peak the flood lake
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DISASTERS GRUNER ON DAM

released by the Nevado glacier was between fiveand six times greater than the flow which could be accounted for by the passage beneath the glacier-clearly indicating that the barrier had floated, allowingthe lake to empty and that it had afterwards subsided again. 4. It sometimeshappens that rivervalleysbecomeblockedbylandslides. The barriers thus created subsequentlyerode so rapidly as to release a destructive flood. In 1960 asevere earthquake in south Chilecausedalandslidewhich f blocked the outlet o lake Rinihue. The lake level rose 86 ft representing three millionacre-ft of stored water. A critical situation was thus createdwhich menaced the port of Valdivia on the Pacific coast. This perilous situation was mitigated by cutting a 5-ft wide ditch across the barrier which allowed the impounded water to escape. The escaping water rapidly eroded the pilot channel which very soon attained a width of 270 ft. These measures had the effect of the restricting the peak of the flood to 250 OOO cusecs and although lower quarters of the town were inundated to a depth of 4 ft an even worse disaster was undoubtedly prevented.
D M OF ANTIQUITY A S

5. The building of dams is as old as the recorded history mankind. T a e of rcs of these ancient damsare found todayin both the old and the new worlds and bear witness to the achievements of civilisations which have long passed away. 6 One such dam built of earth is to be found in the valley ofthe Orontes near . Horn in Syria. It was old in the days of Strabo the Greek geographer who by this ancient dam is fed by visited it 2000 years ago. The reservoir formed clear springs and in consequence has enjoyed an exceptionallylonglife. In time, however, piping gradually developed beneath foundations and prior to its the reconditioning of the embankment i 1934, its ability to hold water had n virtually disappeared. In spite of its long record the new dam, which retains 172 080 acre-ft o water, nearly met with disaster in March f 1961 when high winds combined with an exceptionally high reservoir level, caused overtopping of the embankment.

REIXIRDED FALLURES DAM 7. The earliest record of a dam failure relates to an earth embankment near Grenoble which failed in 1219 after 28 years service. A list of 1764 dams has been published in America, giving all those built up to 1959. Of these 33 had failedbetween 1918 and 1958. Five of these failures wereclassed as major disastersinvolving the loss of 1680 lives.Twothirds of the failures were attributed to geological and technicalcauses. The number of failures was as greatest among multiple darns (10%), while among those classed concrete arch a gravity d m failure occurred in lessthan 1%. Up to this time there had been no recorded failure of an arch dam. 8. In 1961 the Spanish publication Revista de Obras Publicas mentioned a list of 1620 dams. Over the 145 years between 1799 and 1944,308 of these had b e the subject of serious accidents. In the case of over half of them en actual breaching had not occurred,while in77 cases the cause of failure was not described. Of the failures listed were classed as earth embankments, 14 were 163 described as dykes, 70 were concrete gravity dams, two were arch dams, seven were multiple arch dams, while 52 were of other types.

GRUNER ON DAM DISASTERS

49

9. The causes of failure of the dams listed were attributed as follows:Foundation failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 % Inadequate spillway. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 % Poor construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12% Uneven settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10% Highporepressurein the caseof pumpedfillembankments . 5% Acts of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3% Embankmentslips . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2% Defective materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2% Incorrect operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2% Earthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1%

Total . . 100% 10. The determination of the cause of a dam failure is often difficultand the reason assigned must inevitably depend some extenton the judgement of the to engineer. For example, where a dam possesses no well defined cut-off, failure might be attributed to engineering design, to insufficient grouting, or to percolation. Sometimes an attempt has been made to distinguish between failures arising from human errors and failures due to force majeure. The distinction is quite arbitrary and is clearly dependent upon the state of the science of dam building at the time.

EXAMPLESFAILURES OF 11. Theconstruction of the MohammedAli barrage north of Cairo was commenced in 1835. In 1867, however, the works had to be abandoned following a blow-out beneath the foundations as the result of piping. At the time of its construction the theory of the flow of water through sands was not understood and it was only in 1857 that Darcy published his theory governing flow through sand strata. Since that time a proper understanding of the flowof water under such conditions has made it possible to build permanent waterretaining structures on sand foundations. 12. On 1 December, 1923, the Gleno dam in the Bergamese Alps in north Italy suddenly failed. The extent of the ensuing disaster was fortunately 17 mitigated by the partial absorbtion of the flood in lake Iseo lying miles downstream. Subsequent analysis of the design of the Gleno dam revealed the existence of shear stresses along a curved surface varying from 28 to 41 lb/sq. in. It was the high intensity these shearing stresses combined with workmanof poor ship which led to the failure of the dam. The Gleno disaster occurredat a time when dam design was in a state of evolution and engineers were anxious allay to public disquiet and to satisfy themselves that existing dams built in accordance withacceptedtheory and underpropersupervision weresafe.Whilemuch attention was paidat this timeto the theoretical aspects design no attempt was of made to study the flood wave which followed sudden destructionof the dam. the 13. On 26 November, 1927, the El Habra dam in Algeria failed when, as the result of an unusual flood, the reservoir rose 13 ft above its normal maximum level. A Government Commission which enquired into the disaster attributed the failure partly to the high specific gravity of the muddy water in reservoir the and partly to the effect of uplift pressure acting on horizontal joints in which the mortar haddeteriorated. As aresult of this accidentFrenchengineers
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GRUNER ON DAM DISASTERS

devoted much attention to the general question of uplift and the method of allowingfor it instabilitycalculations. The FrenchMinistry of Agriculture proposed that the problem of uplift should be dealt withby reducing the value assigned to the specific gravity of the masonry and suggested that the assumed weightof the masonry should be reduced by 0.2 tons/cu. m. Maurice Levy went so far as to suggest that the specilic gravity should be reducedby 1 0ton/ . cu. m. and that over and above this a further allowance should be made for uplift pressure. 14. In November 1925 disasterovertook the smalltown of Dolgarrogin North Wales as the result of a blow-out beneath the base of the Eigiau dam, a concrete structure which had beenbuiltsomeMteenyearspreviously. The water released by the blow-out caused the overtopping and destruction of the Coedty dam-a small embankment which lay about two miles downstream. This event subsequently led to the introduction of legislation to protect the public. 15. On 12 March, 1928, the St Francis dam belonging to the Los Angeles through the St Francis water undertaking, failed released a flood which swept and valley into the Santa Clara river and thence into the Pacific ocean. The disaster was investigatedby no less than five separate commissions, representing different interests. Their reports were published within one month of the event and all were unanimous in attributing the cause of the failure to defective foundations. No blame was laid on the structural design of the dam. Following the disaster the State of California enacted legislation which required that the design and construction of dams should in future be supervised by a competent authority. 1 . On 9 January, 1959, the sudden failure occurred of the de Tere Vega 6 dam-a buttress structure built on a tributary of the Douro river in Spain. Failure occurred during the first 6lling of the reservoir and was said to have started near the left abutment initiating the successive collapseof 17 buttresses. The contents of the reservoir, amounting to 6300 acreft, was discharged within twenty minutes. The disaster occurred in the depth of winter and owing to the severity of the weather no official inspection the site was made until the followof ing April. It has to be recorded that in spite of the heavy loss of life, the report of the Commission which investigatedthe causes of the disaster has never been made public. 1 . On 25 March, 1960, the earthfill dam at Oros in the State of Ceara in 7 Brazil, which was still under construction, was overtopped by a flood and i 15 n hours the major part of the embankment was washed away. The construction programme had not been achieved and the dam was in a vulnerable state when 21 and 25 March, heavy rains caused the the rainy season arrived. Between flow of the Jaguaribe river rise to 80 OOO c u s e c s of which only one fifth could to be dealt withby the diversion tunnel. In consequence the remainder was stored behind the embankment. A critical situation arose and it proved impossible to raise the dam with necessary speed. Events soon became out of control with the the result that the water flowed over the of the embankment. Over l miIIion top a. of fill were washed away in a few hours leaving a gap660 ft wide. At its yd peak the flow through thebreachreached 340 ooOcusecs. The floodwaters were discharged down Jaguaribe valley and in three days reached the Atlantic the 210 miles away. In viewof its importance in developing the economy of the country the Oros dam was reconstructed and hasbeen in service since February 1961 to the benefit of the arid region which it serves.

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51

18. The history of the 180-ft high dam on the Banabuiu river, a tributary of the Jaguaribe, was more fortunate. At the time of the storm which destroyed the Oros dam it too was under construction but it proved possible in this case to confine the flood waters to a temporary spillway and thus save the main embankment,
CAUSES OF D M FAILURES A

19. A study of past dam failures has revealed that such causes a neglect of s maintenance, defects in construction or faulty operation of the outlet works can account for only the minority of the recorded disasters. In the majority of cases failure occurred because the knowledge available at the time of the event proved to be incomplete. 20. Among the major causes of destruction ranks the percolation of water through a dam or its foundations. Since the time of Levy many experiments have been made determine uplift pressures, but date no universally accepted to to method of determining such pressures has been put forward. Observations of pore water pressures in American dams have shown the value of installing a drainage system behind the upstream face. A feature of the design of recent dams in Siberia is the adoption of drainage systems extending deep into the foundation Professor rock. Terzaghi has expressed the opinion that the evaporation of seepage water from the downstream face of a dam may cause surface stressesof the order of tenths of a pound per square inch. However, no method of measuring such pressure has yet been devised. 21. Recent experiments carried out by the Hungarian Hydrographic Service show that the level of a water table is sensitive to changes in barometric pressu~, These changes in level are the result of evaporation or condensation and as a consequence the ground above the water table is subject alternately to the upward diffusion of water vapour and to downward percolation of condensate. This phenomenon causes internal changes stress inan embankment and tends of to enhance its natural stratification. The presence of this water vapour is sometimes disclosed by differences in the growth of vegetation on the downstream slope.
D LB R T DESTRUCnON OF DAMS EIEAE The number of dams which have failed greatly exceeds the number of those which have been deliberately destroyed by enemy action. History, however, records instances in which military commanders have resortedto the destruction of a dam as a means of either eliminating enemy forces or of denying them the passage of a river. Coming to more modern times an unsuccessful attempt was madeduring the Spanish Civil Warthe troopsof General Franco by to blow up the Ordunte dam near Bilbao, a concrete gravity structure 130 ft high. Fifteentons of explosives placed were in an inspectiongalleryand detonated but without achieving intended result. the 23. In December 1938 a partyof German armyofficers visited the Aswan dam for the purpose of studying the best method of encompassing its destruction. Had this taken place 3-9 million acre-ft of water would have been suddenly released down the valley of the Nile with consequences which can readily be imagined. 24. In September 1941 theSovietarmywithdrawingbefore the German advance took the drastic step of destroying the Dnjeprogues dam. The road

22.

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GRUNER ON DAM DISASTERS

over the dam was packed with Russian fugitives when 90tons of explosives were set offin the inspection tunnel. The explosion destroyed the upper part of the dam over a length of 660 ft. The flood which was released through the breach attained a peak of 1 260 OOO cusecs, or 75% more than the estimated extreme natural flood of 720 OOO cusecs, a factor which may serve indicate the scale of to the catastrophe. 25. On the night of 16 March, 1943, the Mohne damin the Ruhr was successfully bombed by the Royal Air Force. It was the devastating consequences of this event which brought home to those acquainted with facts the realization the of the vulnerability of great centres of population and industry occupying a valley dominated by a great volume of stored water. On the same night similar attacks were made on the Eder dam, a masonry gravity structure, and the Sorpe dam, an earth embankment. These attacks were less effective than that on the Mohne dam and it was held in certain quarters that solid masonry dams could not be breached by bombing provided the crest thickness exceeded about 50 ft, and that embankments were less vulnerablethan dams of concrete or masonry. 26. In this nuclear agethe destruction of dams by hostile action has lost much of its significance for it is now possible by means of a nuclear bomb to spread the contents of a lake or reservoir far and wide over a countryside in the form of radioactive rain.
INADEQUACY OF SPILLWAYS

27. It has been pointed out that something like onequarter of recorded dam spillway capacity. Estimates of failures has been attributed to insufficient on future floods have the past usually been based an extrapolation of available in records in accordance with the Gaussian theory. More recently attempts have been made to determine a value for the maximum possible theoretical flood which could arise by considerations of the purely physical factors involved. However, values determinedin this way may appear unrealistic when compared with past records may lead to the adoption of extravagant spillway capacities. and Probably a sounder and more logical methodof estimating design floods isthat based on the unit hydrograph which provides a means of relating the physical characteristics of a river basin to actual observed discharges. 28. Recent advances in methods estimating design floods have accomof been panied by changes in the method of providing for their safe passage. Where conditions are suitable the total design flood can be divided into two parts. A normal type of spillway can be used to deal with floods of the order of those recorded in the past, while a destructible sectionof the dam can be provided to act as a fuse plug to provide additional relief in the event of a catastrophic flood. An extension of this conception has been studied in the Soviet Union with the object of protecting long embankment darns. The suggestion is to armour such an embankment by laying concrete slabs, like tiles on a roof, to permit the safe discharge of water in the event of overtopping.
FLOODS EXTREME 29. Recent experience in connexion with the Rio Negro in Uruguay demonstrates the difficulty of making a reliable forecast of extreme floods. When the Rincon de Bonete Hydroelectric Scheme was designed 1935 flood records in were at that time available for a period of 27 years.Thegreatestfloodrecorded

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53

was 135 OOO cusecs, although there was a tradition that an exceptional flood of even greatermagnitude had occurredduring the days of the earlysettlers. From extrapolation of the years on record, a design flood of 325 OOOcusec~ was adopted. This flood was intendedto be dealt withto the extent of 200 OOO cusecsby a permanent spillway, the balance being temporarily stored in the reservoir which had a surface area of 282 OOO acres. 30. In April 1959 the catchment area of the Rio Negro was subjectedon three occasions during a period of four weeks to a climatic condition known locally as the Sudestada Prolongada. Under this condition cold air coming up from the Antarctic meets the warm moist air of the sub-tropical zone of the Atlantic seaboard. The sudden cooling effect arising from the temperature differences between the two air masses (estimated on this occasion as 23F) causes intense precipitation. On the occasion in question 14-2 million acre-ft of water were precipitated over an area of 9.4 million acres during a period of ten days. AS the ground surface had previously been saturated a very high runoff occurred (80% of the rainfall). The inflow into the Bonete reservoir attained a peak of 605 OOO cusecs. Of this total, 340 000 cusecs were discharged over and around the dam, flooding the power station, while the balance was temporarily stored in the reservoir which rose 15 ft above its designed maximum level. 31. Had the dam failed it would have suddenly released 1 1 million acre-ft of water, equivalent to one third of the volume of lake Constance. The consequences would have been catastrophic. The possibility that such a failure was imminent had been broadcast to the public and the knowledge undoubtedly adversely affected the efforts of the rescue teams. The design flood adopted for the Rincon de Bonete dam was thought at the time to have a probability of occurrence of once in a thousand years, yet the flood which actually occurred and within 14 years of its completion would, onthe same basis of calculation, have a theoretical probabilityof once in half a million years. Meteorologists have since expressed the opinion that the peculiar conditions set up by the Sudestada of Prolongada might conceivably give rise to a temperature differential as much the as 35F. If this were to happen the precipitation released over catchment of the Rio Negro might reach the astronomical figure of 21 million acre-ft. 32. To release safely such enormous floodsthe spillway would haveto be so large as to render the scheme quite uneconomic. This is a situation with which the engineer is sometimesfaced; the choice of either providing at great cost for the passage of floods which may never occur-and in so doing perhaps render the scheme uneconomic-or taking a caIculated risk of disaster by adopting more modest assumptions.

EFFECT RESERVOIRS ON NATURAL REGIME OF 33. Those who are responsible for the operation and maintenance of dams should appreciatethat such works interfere with equilibrium of nature. It is the not only the fish which have to adapt themselves to the new conditions, but changes may be introduced in the environmental factors governing plant and animal life. The exploitation of a catchmentarea not only reducesthe incidence of floods but where water is diverted often leads marked reduction the total to a in flow carried by the stream bed. In consequence vegetation tends to encroach ar upon the natural water course adversely affectingits ability to c r y away flood water. Thus people may be misled into settling in valley bottoms which as the

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result of control works appear to safe, only suffer in the event exceptional be to of floods.
34.

PLANNING RIVER BASINDEVELOPMENT As the need grew for making an ever more efficient use water resources of

the ideaofcompleteriverbasindevelopmentarose. In recenttimessuch proposals have often been political in their conceptand have involved the preparation of schemes for the unified control of international rivers affecting the rights of two or more independent sovereign states. Where international politics control the activities of the engineer, purely technical considerations are likely is to be subordinated to the necessity of achieving a solution which acceptable to the governments concerned. Thus a solution which is based solely on technical considerations oftenhas to be rejected or amended to meet the need of reaching a practical compromise, and in the process the responsibility of the individual engineer is often lost. It is naturally disappointing the engineer who is anxious to to make the best possibleuse of natural resources, to see his plans whittled down or changed by his political masters. DAM DESIGN 35. In the 1920s there was a marked rise in number of dams built throughthe out the world. At that time the choice of type and the details of design were generally the sole responsibility of the engineer concerned. There were virtually own no regulations in force provide guidanceand each engineer carried on his to shoulders the full responsibility for the outcome of his work. Up to that time the design and construction of dams had lain inthe exclusive domainof the civil engineer. It soon became recognized however that the design of a dam should be considered in close association with the properties the ground on which it of was to stand; as a consequence a closer collaboration grew up between the engineer and the geologist. Many engineers at the time were conscious that the basis of dam design was largely empirical and because of this attempts were frequently made to check the validity of their assumptions by making measure ments of the behaviour of the works after completion and by exchanging information with other members of their profession. At a meeting of the World Power Conference in Berlin in 1929 this awareness of the deficiencies in the science of dam design construction ledto the foundation of the International and 1948 meetingsof the Commissionhave CommissiononLargeDams.Since been held at intervals of three years. 36. Safety and economywereamong the subjectsdiscussed at the International Congress on Large Dams held in Paris 1955. It was then said by one in of the contributors that the evolution of dam design shouldbe directed towards making more effective use of the materials of construction. This philosophy had led in France to anincreasing preference forarch dams as opposed to those relyingmainlyondeadweight for stability.Thisisshown by thefact that between 1924 and 1934 only two arch dams were constructed as compared with fifteen of the gravity type. However, during the ten years1944 to 1954 only four gravity dams were built as compared with no less than twenty-six arch dams. 37. The same contributor to the 1955 Congress pointed out that the profile of a gravity dam can only be reduced encroaching on its factor of safety and by that such dams might become unsafe should the uplift exceed design assumpthe tions, or should the level of the reservoir rise to a higher value than had been

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assumed. He pointed out that arch dams not only make a better use of the materialsemployedbut offer agreaterinherent factor of safety.Extreme examples of the employment of the arch principle are the Gage dam in France, with a heightof 115 ft and the Tolla damin Corsica witha height of 235 ft. 38. During the discussion at the Paris conference it wasclaimedby other speakers that gravity dams were more suitable sites which presented heterofor geneous foundations, since they were better able to adapt themselves to changes in the physical characteristics of the rocks. Becauseof this it was generally accepted that arch damswere not suitable if irregular settlementor deformation of the foundations was anticipated. An Italian speaker suggested that further study of these problems would assist in reducing the areas of ignorance which surrounded them and so lead to further economies of design. He added, however, that it wasalwaysprudent to maintain an adequatefactor of safety. These divergent views represent two schools of engineering thought; the one trusting to theory, the other preferring to be guided by experience. Discussion on these lines was continued at the Congress held in Rome in 1961 and the views expressed were summarized by the General Reporter dealing with underground works associated with dams. In presenting the views expressed at the Congress he suggestedthat for any given site the type of design adopted should represent the best which could be chosen in the light of the engineering and scientific knowledge available. He also drew attention to the fact that all dams are subject to gradual deterioration,and that because of lack of homogeneity in the foundations the factorof safety might in fact be lower the value assumed than in design.
BOUNDARY BETWEEN SAFETY AND
DISASTER

whichwere built by those who were in their day acknowledged masters of their profession. In spite of the inherent soundness the original design it is not always possible of to recognize potential weaknessesand once such a weakness has been discovered it may be too late to remedy. 40. Recently a small earthdam in Bavaria was endangered by piping but in this case it was possible to prevent a failure by emptying the reservoir through the bottom outlet. An unexpected situation confronted the Albinasca dam in Switzerland when test grouting operations caused artesian water under a head of sevenatm to break out. It was subsequently noted that a crackhad developed across a corner of one of the monoliths. Fortunately the gravity type of design localized the effect and it was possible to carry out remedial measures.

39. It has to be recorded that disasters have overtaken dams

D R BLT OF DAMS UAIIY 41. Suggestionsthat a definite life be attributed to an individual dam must can be consideredin the light of experience. In Scandinavia for instance it has been found that soft water attacks concrete and serious deterioration can take place in a few years, while extreme temperature variations can also produce rapid disintegration. There are few dams of any significance over a hundred years old, although there are several important oneswhich are approaching their centenary. In the main ageing of dams can be attributed to two f a c t o r w n e physical and the other chemical.Thephysicaleffects are brought about by changes in the forces acting on the dam, including those due to temperature

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variations, while chemical attacks arise from the penetration of the dam by aggressive waters leadingto the leaching out of some of the constituents of the concrete and resulting eventually in its complete disintegration. Studies in this field have been carried out by the Tbilisi ResearchInstitute in the Soviet Union. It should not be overlooked that many of the great irrigation works of antiquity were eventually destroyed becauseknowledge of those who built them was not the passed on to later generations who inherited the responsibility for their care. Such experience brings home the obvious truth that all dams are subject to natural decay and that their preservation requires continual maintenance.
PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC

42. In 1877 the Swiss Federal Parliament introduced legislation which brought the control of water courses under federal supervision. The Act was revised as the result of the destruction of the Mohne dam and it was again amended in 1953 to provide compensation for those who might suffer from the destruction of a dam,whether as the result of natural causes or enemy action. A further amendment in 1957 brought within the scope of federal control all dams more than 33 ft in height, and all reservoirs with a volume in excess of 39 acreft. The Act in its present form provides that both design and construction shall be properly supervised and stipulates the precautions which shall be taken in the event of a dangerous situation arising. To date, however, the Swiss regulations makeno provision for the periodic inspectionof the works once they have been completed. 43. In 1930 as a result of the Dolgarrog disaster, the BritishParliament passed the Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Act.The Act providesthat theowner obtain at intervals of of a reservoir containing more than 5 million gallons shall not more than ten years a certificate from a duly authorized engineer evidence as of the safety of the reservoir. 44. In 1933 the German authorities prepared a setof draft regulations covering the design, construction and operation of dams. In 1953 these draft regulations were superseded by DIN 19700. While this code possesses no mandatory authority, it has nevertheless proved value as a means of reminding of the owners of dams of their duty to the public. The code was drafted by a team of 69 specialists and as might be anticipated is too elaborate and detailed for ease of application. As an example, regulation 3.322 requires that the hydrostatic conditions set up in the floor of the reservoir shall be investigated, while regulation 3.7 lays down how deformation of both the dam and reservoir shall be determined. Regulation 5.2 requires that in the event of danger the custodian of the dam shall not only inform the ownersimmediatelybutshallissuea warning to the inhabitants of the area which might be affected. 45. The Federal Government of the U.S.A. exercises no authority over the design and construction of dams. Instead the responsibility is delegated, as may be appropriate, to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, The TennesseeValley Authority and the U.S. Corps of Engineers, or if the dam serves a farming community the responsibilitylieswith the Department of Agriculture.This division of responsibility is rather surprising in a country which has been the scene of so many dam disasters. Moreover, on comparing the various sets of regulations it is found that considerable diversity exists between the different authorities. For example,thoseissued by the Corps of Engineersspecifya

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higher factor of safety than those of the Bureau of Reclamation, possibly implying the recognition of greater latitude in the quality of maintenance to be expected. If a companyor a public authority in the United States wishes to build a dam the designs have to be submitted for approval to one of the authorities mentioned above. In recent years several states including California, Oregon and South Carolina, have issued their own regulations coveringthe design and construction of dams. 46. The Water Code on the Supervision of Dams issued in 1960 by the Department of Water Resources of the State of California states that if it is found that an unsafe condition exists the Department shall take such action as is necessary to render or cause the condition to be rendered safe (paragraph 6392). Paragraph 6371 of the same Code states that evidence shall showthat a sufficient portion of the dam has been removed to permit the safe passage of floods down the water-course across which the dam was located. 47. In France the state electricity authority, Electricit6deFrance,issued instructions covering the supervision of their own dams:theseinstructions provide for regular inspection. However no provisionmade is for any independent inspection sincethe inspector concerned is himselfan employee of the authority. 48. Usually the deterioration of a dam is a slow process, effect of which is the not always apparent to the eye of the observer. The conclusion that the safety of a dam can no longer be confidently assumed is one which must be reached by the engineer on the basis of his general experience. Such a conclusion clearly carries important financial implications for the owner who may find himself compelled to undertake heavy expenditureas an alternative to abandoning the works completely.

FLOOD ROUTING 49. In the belief that war was imminent the effect of a flood arisingfrom the breaching of the Cancan0 I dam in the Italian Alpswasstudied by D e Marchi in 1940. The results of this theoretical study have since been checked by e model tests. The method developed by D Marchi has beenused to prepare flood maps relating a seriesof reservoirs which might to inundate Swiss territory. For instance the Sihl reservoir near Einsiedeln lies a flat basin holding OOO in 72 acre-ft of water. The water is impoundedby a concretedam and an earth dyke and should it ever be destroyed the water released would inundate parts of Zurich including its railway marshalling yards. The water discharged by a breach in the Sihl dam could be retained by building a subsidiary dam further down the valley. Although such a precautionary measure may appear fantastic its cost would in fact compare favourably with that which would arisein the event of a failure of the dams in service. 50. The necessity for suchmeasuresmay arise suddenly.However, it is probable that in peace time the public would remain indifferent the risks and to might even view the taking of such precautions with a certain amount of SUSpicion. To beeffective at timesof international tension any warning system must be capableof being put into immediate effect, since with modem weapons it is now possible destroy a series dams by means of rockets virtually withto of out warning and to a sequence designed to insure maximum flooding. During the last war flood-warning systems were organized to cover all major Swiss reservoirs. The experience gained from the Oros and Malpasset disasters make

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it clear that such warning systems should be maintained in peace time. As the passage of the head of a flood wave is a function of time, those living at some distance below the dam may be given a chance to escape provided they are warnedingoodtime and are told what action to take.Levelslikely to be reached by the peak of a flood can be marked on the sides of the valley and appropriate safe areas can be selected. The progress of a flood wave down a valley can be passed on to the inhabitants by radio signals. In the case of the Malpasset disaster both the electric power lines and the telephone system were swept away before any warning could be issuedthe people of Fdjus. to 51. Special difficulties over control of water conservation works likely the are to arise where catchment areas affect more than one country. This is especially so in Central Europe where a flood arising from the bursting of a reservoir, for instanceintheBlack Forest or the Silvrettaregion,would inundate Swiss territory, while a flood arising from a reservoir in the Engadine would affect Austria. Similarly a flood from a reservoir in the Jura region would extend into France. Because this of interdependence between the ownership of reservoirs and their possible effects the countries concerned should endeavour to agree upon safety precautions.
RESPONSIFIIUIY FOR DAMAGE

52. In most countries the courts will hold, in a case of action for damages, that compensation forthe damage suffered shall the responsibilityof the party be which has caused the damage. 53. In Great Britain responsibility for injury under Common Law appearsto be covered by a court ruling in 1868 in the case of Rylands U. Fletcher when it was decided that the person who for his own purpose brings on his own land and collects and keeps there anything likely be mischieveous if it escapes must to for keep it in at his peril,and if he does notdo so he is prima facie answerable all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. And upon authority this we think is established to be the law whetherthe thing so brought be beasts or water or filfth or stenches. 54. In Switzerland the Code of Obligations states in paragraph 58 that the owner of a buildingor a work is underan obligation to cover any damage arising out of defective construction or fabrication, except in cases where responsibility has been delegated to a third party.

SCALE DAMAGE OF
The following are some examples the material losses arising from recent of disasters: Netherlands, 1953-The damage resulting from a storm surge in the North Sea was estimated at L42 million. France, 1959-The damage caused by the collapse of the Malpasset Dam was estimated at E22 million. Chile, 1960-The damage due to an earthquake was estimated at E20 million. Morocco, 1960-The damagecaused by theAgadir earthquake has never been computed. 56. Wherethecost of makinggoodthe loss sufferedbyacatastropheis beyond the capacity of country concernedit becomes necessaryto seek interthe nationalassistance.Suchassistancemay be renderedon a voluntarybasis
55.

GRUNER ON DAM DISASTERS

59

or the help to be rendered may be fixed by previous international agreement.

P e s for voluntaryassistance,althoughfairlyfrequent,usuallymeetwitha la relatively poor response. In the case of the Netherlands, for instance. the money received from sources outside the country represented only one tenth of the damagc+-while that received in respect of the Chile and Agadir catastrophies was on an even smaller scale. In the case of Malpasset, offers of foreign help or were at first refused-possibly to avoid the legal implications of such aid Simply out of national pride. Moreover. there isin France a body called the Secours (ORSEC) which exists the purpose alleviating for of Organisations des hardship as the result of such disasters.
INSURANCE It is worth recording that an attempt to set up an international fund was made in 1927 under thetitle of Union lnternationale des Secours. Of the original 43 countries which subscribed only 23 are now left. Contributions to the fund represented one tenthof the scale applyingto subscriptions to the old Leagueof Nations. Changes in international exchange led rates to difficulties in the administration of the fund, contributions were reduced and the fund was left with O, an available balance of only E50 O O the governments concerned undertaking to make further contributions should the need arise. Although the agency set up under the League of Nations is no longer effective, the need for organized international assistance is todayno less urgent than it was in 1927. 58. D E. R. Froelich of Zurich has suggested that the assistance received r to be by a member country from such international body might be proportional to an the amount which it would be prepared to provide in the case of a disaster to another member. The extent of a disaster might be defined in terms of national of income. Thus in the case of Switzerland a figure 0.2 per cent would represent a s u m of E5 million. All losses are relative. In the United States the recent series of hurricanes caused losses estimated to range between 44 and E137 million. Although these are large sums they do not in terms of the wealth of such a country as the United States represent a calamity on a national scale. Each country would subscribeto the fund in proportion to its national income, and in giving assistance another member the contribution which it would itself to make to the relief fund would be proportionalto t own wealth. Thus the rich i s countries would bear a larger share of the cost of relief than the poorer ones. The proposal differs from the accepted principles of insurance in committhat the ments of the contributors would be proportional to their means. 59. The development of nuclear power carries with it the risk that a serious accident to areactormightresult in heavy claims for compensation. In the United Kingdom the owner of a reactorrequired to take out aninsurance is policy under which claims to a maximum of E5 million are covered. In the hs event of the claims exceeding ti s u m it is understood that the State would come to the aid of the claimants.
57.
CONCLUSIONS

60. Our present knowledge of the forces which lead to the deterioration of dams is incomplete and much help can be obtained in filling the gaps in our knowledge by making close study of disasters when they occur. The breaching a of an ice barrier offersan example of how anatural obstruction, causing atemporary interference with the equilibrium of nature, reaches a sudden climax in

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the slow process of restoring that equilibrium. Natural barriers and man-made darns are both governed by the same law of decay. Every dam which impounds water presents a potential danger which should neither be under- nor overestimated. The risk of sudden disaster is for ever inescapable, and while knowledge and vigilance may reduce such a risk it can never be entirely banished. All man-made works carry within them the seeds of their own decay and eventual destruction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. A. STUCKY. Der Talsperrenbruch Val Gleno. SchweizerischeBauzeitung vol. 83, im no. 617,1924 2. H. E. GRUNER.NeuereUntersuchungenanGrossenTalsperrendesAuslandes. Schweizerische Bauzeitung vol. 127, no. 8, 1946 3. D6partement Federal l'hterieur. de Publication YInspecteur de F6d6ral des Travaux Publics. Commission Suisse Grands des Barrages. Mesures, observations et essais sur les Grandr Barrages Suisses, 1919-1945, Berne 1956 4. West German Regulations. Fachnormenausschuss Wasserwesen Deutschen im Normanausschuss (DNA) Stauanlagen,RichtlinienfurdenEntwurf,Bauund Betrieb, Teil I, Talsperren DIN 19700, February 1953 5. A. COYNE. Economy and safety of different types of concrete dams. 5th Congr. Int. Comm. Large Darns, Paris 1955 6. Swiss ReguIations. Bundesgesetz uber dieEranzung des Bundesgesetzes betreffend Wasserbaupolizei.Vollziehungsverordnung zu Artikel3bisdesBundesgesetzes 1957 betreffend Wasserpolizei (Talsperrenverordnung) 9th July 7. A. Corn. New dam techniques. Proc.Instn-civ. Engrs, vol. 14 (Nov. 1959), PP. 275-290 8. B%sh Regulations. Reservoirs(SafetyProvisions)Act 1930. 20 & 21 Geo 5 , Ch. 51. Nuclear Installation (L.icensing and Insurance) Act 1959. 7 & 8 Elk. 2, Ch. 46 9. U.S.A. Regulations. California,Division 3 oftheWaterCode,Supervision of Darns 1960: Rules and regulations pertaining supervision of damsi California to n Oregon,OregonRevisedStatues;540.350 Water Law; 540.380Rulesandregulations 10. G. WUSTE~~ANN. Betrachtungen uber die Ursache des Bruches der Talsperre von Malpasset bei Fr6jus. Neue Ziircher Zeitung No. 1068, 30 March, 1960 11. G. W~STEMANN. Bruch des Erddammes r a . Neue Zurcher ZeitungNo. 2544, Der O 27 July, 1960 12. Talsperrenprobleme. OesterreichischeWasserwirtschaft, 1960, No. 8/9 Springer Verlag, Vienna 13. E. R. FROELICH. Kalamiat. Neue Ziircher Zeitung No. 1280,8 April, 1961 Die 14. A. U.HUGGENBERGER.DasVerhaltenunddieSicherheitvonTalsperren. Neue Ziircher Zeitung No. 1335, 12 April, 1961 15. A. CASAGRANDE.Controlandseepagethroughfoundationsandabutments of dams. Gdotechnique, vol. 11,1961, pp. 161-181 16. SIR CLAUDB INGLIS. The Poona Flood Disaster of12 July, 1961. Proc. Instn civ. Engrs, vol. 22 (May 1962), pp. NlO-Nll.

The Paper was received on 5 October, 1962. Written discussion on this Paper should be forwarded to reach the Institution before 15 March, 1963, and will be published in or after July 1963. Contributions should not exceed 1,200 words.-SEC.