Angara vs Electoral Commission G. R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 JOSE A. ANGARA, Petitioner ,vs .

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, Respondents. FACTS: On Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Angara was elected Member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as member-elect. On Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed the Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members and fixing December 9, 1935 as the last day for filing a protest against election of any member. The Electoral Commission adopted said resolution no. On December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua (losing candidate) filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against Angara. Since the protest of Ynsua was filed on Dec. 8 or 5 days after the last day (Dec. 3) fixed by the National Assembly for the filing of protest Angara filed a Motion To Dismiss the Protest. The electoral Commission denied the motion to dismiss. Angara elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE/S: 1) HAS THE SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTROVERSY UPON THE FOREGOING RELATED FACTS, AND IN AFFIRMATIVE, 2) HAS THE SAID ELECTORAL COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EX-CESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING THE COGNIZANCE OF THE PROTEST FILED AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THE PREVIOUS CONFIRMATION OF SUCH ELECTION BY RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY? RULING: 1) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond constitutional res-trictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary, and here, by the Supreme Court in justifiable and appropriate cases.

Here is an actual controversy involving a conflict of a grave constitutional nature on which the Supreme Court has the inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining the constitutional boundaries. 2) The Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as it was originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it the power to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed 'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.

Summary: La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos (GR 127882, 2 December 2004)
La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos [GR 127882, 2 December 2004] Resolution En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources Held: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise

their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal Blaan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the States need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

Demetria v Alba G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987 FACTS: Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 with a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The contents of PD 1177 particularly that of the first paragraph of section 44 extends the privilege of the president to discriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department of any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi and fulfill the requisites for suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens. HELD: The petitioners comply with the legal standing both as concerned citizens and taxpayers. As concerned citizens, the petitioners bring the suit in quest of law and justice. The issue cries out to be solved as justice demands not only for the vindication of the outraged right but also for the guidance of the bench and bar, and as a restraint upon the future. Furthermore, the petitioner has standing to sue as taxpayer. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers. They have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. The Supreme Court granted the instant petition. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 was also declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of NA/BP sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 77. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Sec 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment." Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from 1 dept to another here.