The Classical Problem of Evil Refuted

Luke Griffiss-Williams 2009

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Introduction Confronted with suffering people respond in a multitude of ways, for some suffering strengthens faith in a God who walks alongside them in their pain, while others conclude that a loving God would have prevented their suffering, ergo God either does not exist or is unloving. Others while not seeing suffering as conclusive proof of Gods non-existence see it as compelling evidence that Zie1 probably doesnt exist.2 Stackhouses introduction to the Problem of Evil illustrates that suffering as confronted by most people does not involve a reasoned analysis of a philosophical problem, instead taking the form of a personal trauma leading to question How could God let this happen?3 Rowan William writing after the Asian tsunami, suggested that if some religious genius did come up with an explanation of exactly why all these deaths made sense4 this explanation would not provide confidence in God, but actually make people feel worse. The existence of suffering in the world is variously attributed by theists to punishments sent by God,5 the result of a metaphysical battle between God and the personification of evil, the devil,6 or the result of human action.7 In all three approaches Christians agree that evil and suffering are only able to occur with the permission of God. Confronted by a situation in which we claim that we would relive suffering if able, it appears that Gods refusal to do so suggests that humans are more loving than God. Mackie charges theists with the belief in a loving God who allows evil as being positively irrational.8 The theist is as such in a precarious position; providing an explanation for why God allows suffering is unlikely to comfort the grieving, and could result in a charge of philosophising pain, at the same time a failure to present a solution to the problem , leaves theists open to Mackies charge.

Zie is a gender neutral pronoun used in preference to he or her it is capitalised throughout this paper when used in reference to God. 2 The British Humanist Association has funded advertisements on London buses from January 2009 displaying the statement Theres probably no God. Now Stop Worrying and enjoy your life. McCandless (2008:n.p.) 3 Stackhouse (1998:1-2) 4 Rowan Williams (2005:n.p) 5 Bucay (2006) n.p 6 Russell 1977:17, 7 Strobel 2002:16. 8 Mackie 1871:92

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Despite the dangers of philosophising suffering this paper will address whether the Classical Problem of Evil represents a real contradiction within theistic belief. This approach is taken as personally if the problem was to be able to prove an unsolvable paradox my own faith would be seriously damaged. This paper is not of sufficient length to consider the Evidential Problem of Evil although it will be briefly outlined in the conclusion. This paper will provide a summary of assertions forming the problem, addressing each assertion in turn and demonstrating areas requiring revision. Conclusions will be drawn based on revision required.

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The Classical Problem of Evil Assertions Implicit in the question How could God let this happen? is the belief that God knew what was going to happen, could have prevented it, but choice not to; as such Hume asks, is God incapable of preventing evil, or unwilling to do so?9 The problem as first described by Epicurus can be summarised by the following set of assertions:10 (A1) Evil exists (A2) God exists (A3) God is perfectly good. (A4) God is omnipotent (A5) God is omniscient (A6) A perfectly good being would eliminate evil as far as it could, and as soon as it could. These assertions create a conflict in which one or more assertion in the set is necessarily untrue, and must be refuted by the theist.

10

Hume (2006/1779:64) adapted from Adams and Adams 1990:2

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(A1) Evil Exists While most of us might agree with what in general terms we mean by the word evil defining it philosophically is a little more difficult. We might refer to the act of stabbing someone as evil but we probably agree that doing so to protect a small child was not evil. The circumstance in which an action is committed dramatically effect whether we consider an act to be evil. Evil is not in itself a thing, we can not put evil in a bottle, and so defining it is very difficult. The most common definition used when referring to the Problem of Evil is any ill or subtraction from a perfect state of affairs; hence, a burnt cake could be referred to as an evil as in a perfect world the cake would not be burnt. This use of the word does not carry a moral judgment, but instead identifies that something is less than it could or more importantly, should be. The type of evil of greatest concern to humanity is suffering, which we will define as a situation that subtracts from a perfect state and causes distress. If a burnt cake does not distress us then we are unlikely to declare its not fair and ask questions about why this has been allowed to happen, it is then evils that result in suffering that our the primary concern of the problem of evil, these can be seen as falling primarily into two categories: 1. Moral Evil - wilful acts of free agents11 resulting in suffering. 2. Natural Evil - natural disasters, disease and illness resulting in suffering. As already mentioned, there is a difficulty in defining evil as it is not an object we can identify, but is instead a statement that something that has happened which takes away from a perfect, or desire state of affairs. This difficulty has resulted in two arguments being put forward to refute the existence of evil. The first is that evil is illusionary an argument proposed by Mary Baker Eddy in the 19th Century.12 The argument has had little impact on theodicy as it is counterintuitive, requiring the dismissal of evidence of suffering in preference to (arguably) the more limited evidence of Gods existence. For the Christian this view is in conflict with the premises that Christ suffered and died on the cross13 and so cannot be adopted as a response to the Problem.

11

Within this definition it is noted that the wilful acts of spiritual beings other than humans might be included. 12 McCullough 1975:12. 13 McGrath 207:211.

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The second, and more important argument is one put forward by Aquinas in response to the question of whether God created evil. Aquinas argued that evil is not a created thing with an existence in and of itself. Rather evil is a privation of good in something that would be expected to have that good by its nature, 14 evil and suffering representing a dysfunction not a function.15 Applying the privation argument to natural phenomenon an earthquake can be viewed as good in performing as an earthquake should; despite a consequence of this good being a privation of human life. Likewise those actions of humans in accord with their natures (as created/intended) are not of themselves negative even when they cause a privation in some other thing/being. Applied to moral evil the privation argument suggests that some acts of free beings result in privations of their own nature or the nature of other beings/things as a consequence of a choice made to act against their nature as created or intended. As yet a philosophical sound response to this argument has not been forthcoming; as such a revision is required of the first assertion, from Evil exists to The privation of good exists. There is a danger in this revision that suffering might be seen as marginalised, it is noted that the lack of mention of suffering is not intend to marginalise it but to place it into a wider context of privation.

14 15

Aquinas 1948/ 13 Century Summa Theologica 1.49.1. Vardy 1992:22-34.

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(A2) God exists Evidence is not requested or required within the set to substantiate this claim Instead the Classical Problem of Evil as discussed in the introduction, attempts to show that one item of the set must be false ie, if ever other part of the set is correct then the fault must lay in the belief in God. It is worth mentioning here that a response that can be offered against The Problem is that there is some compelling evidence for the existence of God, and that this evidence is equal or greater than the evidence against the existence of God. If you where, for example, to provide an apparently flawless argument to show that I do not have any hands, I might reasonable rely on my use of them, my experience of having hands, that I can see them, feel them etc. This raises questions other whether I am correct to dismiss your argument as being convincing but wrong, or whether I am in fact delusional.

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(A3) God is perfectly good Aquinas states that God alone is good essentially.16 however, Aquinas description of good refers not to any moral status but rather to perfection in according to the constitutions of its own being, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfection, and attaining to something else as the end. The first of these definitions while useful for defining humans as good in as much as they conform to their design is of little assistance in showing that a good being must by necessity oppose privations of good. The inclusion of the statement that God is perfectly good is intend to suggest an opposition to the privation of good, as such a better rendering of this assertion might be God is perfectly good, and perfectly loving. This definition embraces Johnsons description of perfectly loving as the willing of good in another (Johnson 2005/1992:266).

16

Aquinas 1948/ 13 Century Summa Theologica 1.6.3

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A4) God is omnipotent Omnipotent was defined by Descartes (15961650) as referring to an ability to do anything whether logically impossible or not (Vardy 1992:27 and McGrath 2007:216). Cheung (2003/2001:102) arguing that God can do only things which are logically possible suggests that to view God as being capable of doing the logically impossible is nonsensical, and moves into categorical fallacy where by we suggest the ability to make a square circle. William of Ockham (c.1288 - c.1348), argued that God has potentia absoluta, being able to commit to a course of action which then becomes irreversible, having made such choices God has potential oridnata, being able to act only in accordance with the limitations that Zie has ordained, and irrevocably imposed (McGrath 2007:218). This argument suggests that to limit Gods ability by denying Zies ability to self restrict future actions (such as God will not lie) creates a conflict with the statement that God can do anything logically possible. While attempting to solve one problem, this creates another in that it requires God to be capable of change, something traditionally denied by theists. Potentially God would have reduced power with each irrevocable choice made, and as such God while once being omnipotent now has relatively less power. The relevance of this to the Problem of Evil is that the argument that God is omnipotent could be used to suggest that God is able to prevent the privation of good in two cases simultaneously where a conflict exists. E.g. if a fire is good, and a tree is good, but a forest fire destroys the tree, an omnipotent being can allow the fire to consume the tree and preserve the tree simultaneously. The argument that God cannot do what is logically impossible enables an argument that says for a fire to be a fire, and a tree to be a tree where the two are in conflict the privation of one must occur as such an intervention can not defend both events/objects/people. The problems inherent in Ockhams argument with the gradual limiting of Gods power require further exploration, however for the purposes of this paper his argument will be rejected in preference to Cheungs description of God as omnipotent in that God is capable of doing anything that is logically possible.

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(A5) God is omniscient Significant debate exists as to whether omniscience is a logical concept. The arguments surrounding this are somewhat complex, a full consideration of the topic being beyond the scope of this paper. Cantors proof indicates that omniscience is a logical impossibility17 in addition to which Holt (2004:n.p) raises three objections suggesting that God can not have experiential knowledge or middle knowledge, and that Gods freewill and foreknowledge present a logical contradiction.18 A satisfactory answer to these difficulties has yet to be forthcoming resulting in this premise being accepted on faith alone (Sobel 2004:369-397) Despite these difficulties, the inclusion of A5 in the Problem of Evil set serves primarily to show that God knows of the existence of evil/privation of good. While A5 as worded shows God as having knowledge of every privation of good, even if only one case existed in which God was aware of a privation of good and had not intervened would allow the argument of the problem of evil to maintain that a conflict exists if it can be shown that God could have (as Omnipotent) and should have acted to end it. As such no worthwhile gain can be made from a Christian perspective by challenge the assertion that God is omniscient and it remains a tenant of Christian faith.

17 18

Everitt 2004:288 see also Dawkins 2006:77-78

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(A6) A perfectly good being would always eliminate evil expediently as far as it could. A1-A5 does not provide a necessary contradiction, as such A6 must introduce a contradiction for a problem to be shown. The revised form of A1 (Privation of good exists) requires a revision of A6 to maintain its membership of the set: A perfectly good and loving being would always prevent the privation of good expediently as far as it could. Plantinga (1977:19-21) proposes this assertion19 requires revision to recognise that a loving being should not prevent a privation of good where doing so would generate a greater privation of good,20 and that where only one of two equal privations can be resolved it is not incumbent on a loving being to resolve both.21 As was shown when assessing omnipotence, Christians do not claim that God can do the logically impossible in this way. This necessitates a further revision to A6: A perfectly good and loving being would always prevent the privation of good expediently as far as it could, when doing so would not: a) Generate a greater privation of good than it eradicated. b) Prevent the removal of a privation of good that is greater in significance than that which is addressed. Plantingas revision removes the apparent conflict in the set, and as such requires the questioner to return to A3 (Privation of evil exists) and propose a revision suggesting that Privation of evil exists, which could be removed by an omnipotent being without generating a greater or equal privation of good, or preventing the removal of a privation of an equal or greater significance.

19

Plantingas arguments have not been directly quoted as they address Evil not the privation of Good, instead the principles of his argument have been applied. 20 e.g. in the case of someone with a bruised leg, a surgeon could cure the pain by removing the leg but doing so would result in a greater evil. 21 i.e. two people in a burning building with only time to save one of them.

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For this to be sustained an example must be provided in which this situation is shown to exist. While emotive examples such as a fawn dying painfully over 5 days in a forest fire, or a young girl being beaten and raped may make it difficult to imagine that an intervention is not possible without creating a greater or equal privation, proving that such a privation does not exist is impossible; not least as it requires the production of a scale on which the various relative privations arising from an incident might be judged. Until evidence can be found to show a convincing case in which this situation occurs this statement can be rejected, and as such the set A1-6 do not present a necessary contradiction as applied to Christian belief.

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Conclusion This paper has shown that the apparent paradox created by the Classic Problem of Evil is unsustainable as it relates to a philosophical problem. The failure of the classical problem to prove an internal contradiction within theism has resulted in the argument being for the most part abandoned (Inwagen 1991:135) in favour of the Evidential Problem of Evil as presented by Draper who argues that: our knowledge about pain and pleasure represents significant negative evidence in relation to theism.22 Such a claim proposes a hypothesis of indifference whereby the weight of evidence regarding the human condition and nature is seen to point to existence on earth as being unrelated to the actions of either benevolent or malevolent non-human being persons (Draper:1989:332). This proposition has been vigorously debated between atheist and theist, with theist such as Inwagen (1991) refuting it. While it has been shown that it is not irrational to believe in God in the light of suffering an answer has not been provided to Why did God let this happen? all that has been demonstrated is that it is possible to believe that God had/has a reason for allowing suffering/the privation of good the two most commonly proposed reasons for allowing suffering to exist being soul-making and the maintaining of freewill. Approaching this question singly from a philosophical and logical position is not intended to marginalise the real pain experienced by individuals, it is however considered necessary by this author for the theist to be able to demonstrate that belief in God can not be proven as irrational. Accepting that the privation of good may serve a purpose or be necessary need not, as Williams fears, lead us to philosophise pain. The Christian response to evil and suffering reaches its pinnacle at the Cross, with the declaration that while we will not be spared suffering, we are not required to endure it alone. Questions remain regarding the level of intervention exercised by God on the created universe. While most Christians would agree God is capable of, and does intervene to minimise privations in some situations, many reject a concept of God being actively involved in sending or preventing storms and famines as they occur daily throughout the world. A fully integrated theology of intervention has yet to be proposed
22

Draper (1989:331)

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but remains necessary if a fuller understanding of why the privation of good is allowed by God currently such an integrated theology of intervention remains illusive.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Marilyn McCord and Adams, Robert Merrihew (Editors) (1990) Oxford Readings in Philosophy: The Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press Aquinas, Thomas (1948/13th Cent) Summa Theolgica,(tr. The Fathers of the English Dominican Provonce), New York: Benzinger Bros. Bucay, Saleh Ampaso (2006) AIDS, A Severe Punishment from God! [Online] http://www.maranao.com/articles/AIDS%20A%20Severe%20Punishment %20from%20God.htm Accessed 10 Dec 08 Cheung, Vincent (2003/2001) Systematic Theology, Boston, MA: Reformation Ministries International Dawkins, Richard (2006) The God Delusion. Bouston: Houghton Miffin Co. Draper, Paul. Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists, Nos No.23. 331-350 Everitt, Nicholas (2004) The Non-existence of God, London: Routledge Inwagen, Peter Van (1991) The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence 135-165 in Tamberlin, James E. (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion 1991, Astacaderg,CA: Ridgview Holt, Tim (2004) Problems with Divine Ominiscience Arguments for Atheism [Online]http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/arguments-for-atheism/problemswith-divine-omniscience/ Accessed 08 December 2008 Hume, David (2006/1779/) Dialogues concerning natural religion. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications; repr., (1779) London: Robinson Johnsone, Elizabet A. (205/1992) She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theologial Discours . New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company Mackie, John (1971) Evil and Omnipotence in Mitchell, Basil ed. The Philosophy of Religion, London: Oxford University Press McCandless, Kevin. (2008) Atheists Run Ads Saying God Probably Doesnt Exit CNSNEWS [Online] http://www.cnsnews.com/Public/Content/article.aspx? RsrcID=38019 McCullough H.B. 1975 Theodicy and Mary Baker Eddy Sophia Vol.14, Num. 1, March 1975. 12-18 McGrath, Alister (2007), Christian Theology: An Introduction, (4th ed.,) Oxford: Blackwell

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Plantinga, Alvin (1977/1974) God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Russell, Jeffery Burton (1977) The Devil, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Sobel, Jordan Howard (2004) Logic and Theism : Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Strobel, Lee (2002 ) The Case for Faith, Grand Rapids, MI:Zondervan Williams, Rowan (2005) Article on the Asian tsunamin for the Sunday Telegraph printed 2 January 2005. [Online] http://www.portsmouth.anglican.org/faq/questions_about_faith/god_suffering_an d_the_tsunami_by_rowan_williams/ Vardy, Peter (1992) The Puzzle of Evil. London: Fount

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