Bo - 2012 - Labor Case Digest Jan-Mar - 2011)

January 2011
Labor Law
APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT, Validity
Atlanta Industries, Inc. And/Or Robert Chan, v. Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Et. Al. G.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011 Brion, J.:
FACTS:
Atlanta Industries, Inc. (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes. Almoite and Costales (respondents) were employed by petitioner as early as December 2003, while Sebolino and Sagun were employed as early as March 2004. Respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman. Two apprenticeship agreements were entered between Atlanta Industries, Inc. and private respondents, one in 2004 and the other in 2005. After the second apprenticeship agreement expired the respondents were dismissed, hence they filed a case for illegal dismissal. In defense, Atlanta Industries, Inc. argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the apprenticeship agreements were valid.

HELD:
NO. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were executed in violation of the law and the rules. The agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). Moreover, with the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the employees, the employer, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees.
Labor Law
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, Regular Employment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship.
HELD:
YES. The respondent employees were already rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The respondent were regular employees because they occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in petitioner employers usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the respondents as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
Labor Law
PETITION, Failure to Attach Documents
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition may be dismissed for failure to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule and the compromise agreement.
HELD:
NO. The Court, in addressed the issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, held that the phrase of the pleadings and other material portions of the record xxx as would support the allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. The crucial issue to consider then is whether or not the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein. The Court finds that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support the petitioners allegations. If any, the defect in the petition lies in the petitioners failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents mentioned, especially several pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect, however, is not fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly summarized the labor tribunals rulings. We, thus, find no procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the merits.
Labor Law
COMPLAINT, Reinstatement
Prince Transport, Inc. and Mr. Renato Claros v. Diosdado Garcia, Luisito Garcia, Et. Al. G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011 Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), is a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land; respondents were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager. Sometime in October 2007 the commissions received by the respondents were reduced to 7 to 9% from 8 to 10%. This led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees. Ranato Claros, president of PTI, made known to Garcia his objections to the formation of a union and in order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas). The business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment. Hence, the respondent-employees filed complaints against PTI for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. PTI contended that it has nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order to reinstate respondents was valid considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before the CA and respondents never questioned the award of separation pay.
HELD:
YES. It is clear from the complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement. Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The general prayer is broad enough to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought. Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. In the instant case, aside from their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and equitable.
Labor Law
NLRC, Factual Findings
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded not only respect but finality.
HELD:
YES. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence.[16] It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC.
Labor Law
PETITION, Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition filed with the CA is fatally defective, because the attached verification and certificate against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.
HELD:
NO. While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. In a number of cases, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. In the present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action. Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping. In the first place, some of the respondents actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Labor Law
PETITION, Verification
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition filed with the CA is fatally defective, because the attached verification and certificate against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.
HELD:
NO. With respect to the absence of some of the workers signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants-appellants Rizal Beato, et al., meaning that there were more than one appellant who were all workers of petitioners. In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. Indeed, the absence of a verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on a case. Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of action.
Labor Law
DISCIPLINAARY MEASURES, Management Prerogative
Primo E. Caong, Jr., Et Al. v. Avelino Regualos
G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011 Nachura, J.:

FACTS:
Caong, Tresquio, and Daluyon (petitioners) were employed by Regualos (respondent), under a boundary agreement, as drivers of his jeepneys. In the said agreement, the petitioners are to drive the jeepneys of the respondent with the obligation to pay boundary. Due to failure to pay their boundary, Regualos barred the petitioners to use his jeepneys until they have paid their boundary in arrears. Regualos made inquiries and discovered that his lessees contracted loans with third parties and used the income of the jeepneys in paying the loans. Thus, on November 4, 2001, he gathered all the petitioner-drivers in a meeting and informed them that, effective November 5, 2001, those who would fail to fully pay the daily rental would not be allowed to rent a jeepney on the following day. Petitioners thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that they were denied due process. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioners were merely lessees of his jeepneys, and that they were not employees of the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of suspending drivers pending the payment of arrears in boundary obligations is reasonable.
HELD:
YES. It is acknowledged that an employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline on his employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, if warranted, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative. Indeed, the manner in which management conducts its own affairs to achieve its purpose is within the managements discretion. The only limitation on the exercise of management prerogative is that the policies, rules, and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.
Labor Law
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, Jeepney Driver
Primo E. Caong, Jr., Et Al. v. Avelino Regualos G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011 Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Caong, Tresquio, and Daluyon (petitioners) were employed by Regualos (respondent), under a boundary agreement, as drivers of his jeepneys. In the said agreement, the petitioners are to drive the jeepneys of the respondent with the obligation to pay boundary. Due to failure to pay their boundary, Regualos barred the petitioners to use his jeepneys until they have paid their boundary in arrears. Regualos made inquiries and discovered that his lessees contracted loans with third parties and used the income of the jeepneys in paying the loans. Thus, on November 4, 2001, he gathered all the petitioner-drivers in a meeting and informed them that, effective November 5, 2001, those who would fail to fully pay the daily rental would not be allowed to rent a jeepney on the following day. Petitioners thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that they were denied due process. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioners were merely lessees of his jeepneys, and that they were not employees of the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists.

HELD:
YES. It is already settled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but only get the amount in excess of the so-called boundary that they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to negate the relationship between them as employer and employee.
Labor Law
DISMISSAL, Constructive Dismissal
The University Of The Immaculate Conception, Et Al. v. NLRC G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011 Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
Teodora C. Axalan is a regular faculty member in the University of the Immaculate Conception holding the position of Associate Professor II. Aside from being a regular faculty member, Axalan is the elected president of the employees union. From 18 November to 22 November 2002, Axalan attended a seminar in Quezon City on website development. Axalan then received a memorandum from Dean Maria Rosa Celestial asking her to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for having been absent without official leave. Axalan claimed that she held online classes while attending the seminar. She explained that she was under the impression that faculty members would not be marked absent even if they were not physically present in the classroom as long as they conducted online classes. From 28 January to 3 February 2003, Axalan attended a second seminar in Baguio City on advanced paralegal training on which dates Axalan was absent. An ad hoc grievance committee was created, and upon its recommendation Axalan was suspended for a year for her AWOL charges. On 1 December 2003, Axalan filed a complaint against the University for Illegal Suspension and constructive dismissal in the Labor Arbiter. The University moved to dismiss on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The university maintained that jurisdiction lay in the voluntary arbitrator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was constructively dismissed.

HELD:
NO. Respondent cannot be considered to have been constructively dismissed by the petitioner during her period of suspension. Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to quit. In this case, there was no cessation of employment relations between the parties. It is unrefuted that respondent promptly resumed teaching at the university right after the expiration of the suspension period. In other words, respondent never quit. Hence, she cannot claim to have been left with no choice but to quit, a crucial element in a finding of constructive dismissal.
Labor Law
JURISDICTION, Labor Dispute
The University Of The Immaculate Conception, Et Al. v. NLRC G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011 Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
Teodora C. Axalan is a regular faculty member in the University of the Immaculate Conception holding the position of Associate Professor II. Aside from being a regular faculty member, Axalan is the elected president of the employees union. From 18 November to 22 November 2002, Axalan attended a seminar in Quezon City on website development. Axalan then received a memorandum from Dean Maria Rosa Celestial asking her to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for having been absent without official leave. Axalan claimed that she held online classes while attending the seminar. She explained that she was under the impression that faculty members would not be marked absent even if they were not physically present in the classroom as long as they conducted online classes. From 28 January to 3 February 2003, Axalan attended a second seminar in Baguio City on advanced paralegal training on which dates Axalan was absent. An ad hoc grievance committee was created, and upon its recommendation Axalan was suspended for a year for her AWOL charges. On 1 December 2003, Axalan filed a complaint against the University for Illegal Suspension and constructive dismissal in the Labor Arbiter. The University moved to dismiss on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The university maintained that jurisdiction lay in the voluntary arbitrator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction in the case at bar.
HELD:
NO. Although Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, Article 262 of the same Code provides the exception. For the exception to apply there must be agreement between the parties clearly conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on record showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration. As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes of the administrative hearing held on 20 February 2003, the parties in this case clearly agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.
Labor Law
DISMISSAL, Due Process
Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corp. and/or Jess Manuel v. Irene R. Ranchez G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011 Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, Irene Sanchez, was a probationary employee of Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation (petitioner Supermarket) for a period of five months, or from October 15, 1997 until March 14, 1998.She underwent six (6) weeks of training as a cashier before she was hired as such on October 15, 1997. Two weeks after she was hired, respondent reported to her supervisor the loss of cash amounting to P20,299.00 which she had placed inside the company locker. Jess Manuel, the Operations Manager of petitioner Supermarket, ordered that respondent be strip-searched by the company guards. However, the search on her and her personal belongings yielded nothing. On November 5, 1997, information for Qualified Theft was filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Respondent was constrained to spend two weeks in jail for failure to immediately post bail. After her release, she could no longer return to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was denied the due process.

HELD:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and procedural due process. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal, except for just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be terminated, a written notice containing a statement of the causes of termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. The due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not be supplanted by police investigation or court proceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is considered independent of the administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely solely on the findings of the Prosecutors Office. They are mandated to conduct their own separate investigation, and to accord the employee every opportunity to defend himself.
Labor Law
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, Probationary Employment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
YES. A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an authorized cause; and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Strained Relations
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reinstatement rather than payment of separation pay.
HELD:
NO. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. However, due to the strained relations of the parties, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement, when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On the one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other, the payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust. Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each other and are awarded conjunctively.
Labor Law
DISMISSAL, Neglect of Duty
Hospital Management Services Medical Center Manila v. Hospital Management Services, Inc. Medical Center Manila Employees AssociationAFW G.R. No. 176287, January 31, 2011 Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Edna De Castro was a staff nurse at petitioner hospital. She was hired on September 28,1990. Between 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. of March 24, 1999, while respondent De Castro and wardclerk orientee Gina Guillergan were at the nurse station on night duty, one Rufina Causaren, an 81year-old patient confined for gangrenous wound on her right anterior leg and right forefoot and scheduled for operation on March 26, 1999, fell from the right side of the bed as she was trying to reach for the bedpan. Because of what happened, the niece of patient Causaren staying in the room was awakened and she sought assistance from the nurse station. Instead of personally seeing the patient, respondent De Castro directed ward-clerk orientee Guillergan to check the patient. The vital signs of the patient were normal. Later, the physician on duty and the nursing staff on duty for the next shift again attended to patient Causaren. Petitioner hospital created an investigation committee. In the investigation report, the Investigation Committee found that the subject incident happened between 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. of March 23, 1999, contrary to the averment of De Castro and the other staff nurses that the incident took place between 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 am of March 24, 1999. The committee recommended the dismissal from employment of De Castro. On July 5, 1999 the HRD officer of the petitioner issued a notice of termination upon respondent De Castro, effective at the close of office hours of July 20, 1999, for neglect of duty and alleged violation of company rules and regulations amounting to serious misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of De Castro was valid and justified.

HELD:
NO. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Labor Law
DISMISSAL, Negligence in Patient Management
Hospital Management Services Medical Center Manila v. Hospital Management Services, Inc. Medical Center Manila Employees AssociationAFW G.R. No. 176287, January 31, 2011 Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Edna De Castro was a staff nurse at petitioner hospital. She was hired on September 28,1990. Between 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. of March 24, 1999, while respondent De Castro and wardclerk orientee Gina Guillergan were at the nurse station on night duty, one Rufina Causaren, an 81year-old patient confined for gangrenous wound on her right anterior leg and right forefoot and scheduled for operation on March 26, 1999, fell from the right side of the bed as she was trying to reach for the bedpan. Because of what happened, the niece of patient Causaren staying in the room was awakened and she sought assistance from the nurse station. Instead of personally seeing the patient, respondent De Castro directed ward-clerk orientee Guillergan to check the patient. The vital signs of the patient were normal. Later, the physician on duty and the nursing staff on duty for the next shift again attended to patient Causaren. Petitioner hospital created an investigation committee. In the investigation report, the Investigation Committee found that the subject incident happened between 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. of March 23, 1999, contrary to the averment of De Castro and the other staff nurses that the incident took place between 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 am of March 24, 1999. The committee recommended the dismissal from employment of De Castro. On July 5, 1999 the HRD officer of the petitioner issued a notice of termination upon respondent De Castro, effective at the close of office hours of July 20, 1999, for neglect of duty and alleged violation of company rules and regulations amounting to serious misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Castro was negligent.

HELD:
YES. Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation. The Court emphasizes that the nature of the business of a hospital requires a higher degree of caution and exacting standard of diligence in patient management and health care as what is involved are lives of patients who seek urgent medical assistance. An act or omission that falls short of the required degree of care and diligence amounts to serious misconduct which constitutes a sufficient ground for dismissal.
Labor Law
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Compensable Illness
Alexander B. Gatus v. Social Security System G.R. No. 174725, January 26, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
FACTS:
Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac beginning on January 1, 1972. He was a covered member of the SSS (SS No. 02-0055015-6). In the course of his employment in Central Azucarera de
Tarlac, he was certified fit to work. However, on August 12, 1995 he was confined and upon discharge he was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery Disease (CAD). On account of his CAD, he was given SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits. On February 1, 2002, he became an SSS retirement pensioner. He optionally retired from Central Azucarera de Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of service on January 31, 2002, at the age of 62 years. Sometime in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-related. Gatus, on the other hand, contended that he had contracted the disease due to the presence of harmful fuel smoke emission of methane gas from a nearby biological waste digester and a railway terminal where dieselfed locomotive engines had "spewed black smoke", as well as other harmful smoke emissions which he was exposed to for 30 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the SSS to demand the recovery of the EC benefits already paid to petitioner Gatus.
HELD:
YES. The burden of proof lies upon the claimant to prove that he is entitled to the benefits accorded by law. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Accordingly, the claimant must show, at least by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection, not a direct causal relation. He was expected to show that the illness or the fatal disease was caused by his employment and the risk of contracting the disease was increased or aggravated by the working conditions. Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the working environment for a period of time does not ipso facto make the resulting disability compensable.
Labor Law
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, Primary Element
Gregorio V. Tongko v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. and Renato A. Vergel de Dios G.R. No. 167622, January 25, 2011 Brion, J.:
FACTS:
Gregorio Tongko was hired as an insurance agent by respondent The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife). However, Tongko argues that for 19 years, he performed administrative functions and exercised supervisory authority over employees and agents of Manulife, in addition to his insurance agent functions. In these 19 years, he was designated as a Unit Manager, a Branch Manager and a Regional Sales Manager, and now posits that he was not only an insurance agent for Manulife but was its employee as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tongko is an employee of Manulife.

HELD:
NO. Control over the performance of the task of one providing service both with respect to the means and manner, and the results of the service is the primary element in determining whether an employment relationship exists. Petitioner asserts that his employer Manulifes control over him was demonstrated (1) when it set the objectives and sales targets regarding production, recruitment and training programs; and (2) when it prescribed the Code of Conduct for Agents and the Manulife Financial Code of Conduct to govern his activities. However, the court ruled that all these appear to speak of control by the insurance company over its agents. There are built-in elements of control specific to an insurance agency, which do not amount to the elements of control that characterize an employment relationship governed by the Labor Code. They are, however, controls aimed only at specific results in undertaking an insurance agency, and are, in fact, parameters set by law in defining an insurance agency and the attendant duties and responsibilities an insurance agent must observe and undertake. They do not reach the level of control into the means and manner of doing an assigned task that invariably characterizes an employment relationship as defined by labor law. To reiterate, guidelines indicative of labor law control do not merely relate to the mutually desirable result intended by the contractual relationship; they must have the nature of dictating the means and methods to be employed in attaining the result. Petitioner is an insurance agent not an employee.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, Elements
People of the Philippines vs. Teresita Tessie Laogo G.R. No. 176264, January 10, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Appellant Teresita Tessie Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy, a travel agency firm. The facts of the case stated that Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante
Lopez, Edwin Enriquez and Rogelio Enriquez, was introduced by Gary Bustillos to Susan as somebody who could help them find work abroad. They all paid a considerably huge amount of cash as placement fee and for the processing of their papers. Appellant issued a corresponding receipt bearing her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no word was heard from either Susan or appellant and the promises remained unfulfilled. It was also discovered that neither of the accused nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his companions, filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. The trial court promulgated a Decision finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming appellants conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

HELD:
Yes. Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad, as shown in this case. The follow up transactions between appellant and her victims were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the victims bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy, with two of the said receipts personally signed by appellant herself. Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting together made complainants believe that they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Execution of Waiver and Quitclaim
Bernadeth Londonio and Joan Corcoro vs. Bio Research, Inc. and Wilson Y. Ang G.R. No. 191459, January 17, 2011 Carpio Morales, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bernadeth E. Londonio (Bernadeth) and Joan T. Corcoro (Joan) were hired by respondent Bio Research Inc. (Bio Research) as graphic/visual artists. In a Memorandum Bio Research informed its employees including petitioners that pursuant to its plan to reduce the workforce in order to prevent
losses, it would be severing their employment with the company. Bio Research filed an Establishment Termination Report with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) stating that it was retrenching 18 of its employees including petitioners due to redundancy and to prevent losses. Bernadeth and Joan were in fact retrenched. Joan accepted her retrenchment pay in the sum of P9,990.14 and executed a Quitclaim and Waiver. Bernadeth refused to accept hers. Petitioners later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioners claimed that their dismissal was done in bad faith and tainted with malice, being retaliatory in nature, following the filing by Bernadeth of a complaint against one of Bio Researchs managers, for a sexual harassment incident that occurred in his office. Bio research went on to stress that as Joan had already received her separation pay and had in fact signed a waiver and quitclaim in its favor, she is estopped from challenging the validity of her dismissal. In finding against Bio Research, the Labor Arbiter held that since Joans receipt of her salary for the period April 11, 2005 April 18, 2005, the amount which was lumped with her retrenchment pay, was conditioned on her signing the quitclaim, the execution thereof was done through force, hence, not valid. The NLRC affirmed the LAs decision. The Court of Appeals to which respondents assailed the NLRC resolutions by certiorari, sustained the ratio decidendi behind the NLRC decision in favor of petitioners. Specifically with respect to Joan, however, it pronounced that she could no longer question the legality of her dismissal in light of her execution of the quitclaim and waiver.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employees execution of a final settlement and receipt of amounts agreed upon forecloses his right to pursue a claim for illegal dismissal.
HELD:
No. Absent any showing that the appellate court ignored, misconstrued and misapplied facts and circumstances of substance, its affirmance of the NLRC decision holding that petitioners were illegally dismissed stands. An employee illegally retrenched is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and privileges, as well as to payment of full backwages from the time of her separation until actual reinstatement, less the amount which he/she received as retrenchment pay.
Labor Law
JURISDICTION, Labor Arbiter
Renato Real vs. Sangu Philippines, Inc. et al. G.R. No. 168757. January 19, 2011 Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato Real was the Manager of respondent corporation Sangu Philippines, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower for general services, like janitors, janitresses and other maintenance personnel, to various clients. Petitioner, together with 29 others filed their respective Complaints for illegal dismissal against the latter and respondent Kiichi Abe, the corporations Vice-President and General Manager. These complaints were later on consolidated.
With regard to petitioner, he was removed from his position as Manager through Board Resolution 2001-03 adopted by respondent corporations Board of Directors. Petitioner complained that he was neither notified of the Board Meeting during which said board resolution was passed nor formally charged with any infraction. He just received from respondents a letter stating that he has been terminated from service. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner and his co-complainants has been illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter found no convincing proof of the causes for which petitioner was terminated and noted that there was complete absence of due process in the manner of his termination. Respondent claimed that petitioner is both a stockholder and a corporate officer of respondent corporation, hence, his action against respondents is an intra-corporate controversy over which the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The CA sided with respondents and affirmed the NLRCs finding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an intra-corporate controversy and thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD:
No. This case is not an intra-corporate controversy but a labor case cognizable by the labor arbiter. To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy that is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two tests must be applied: (a) the status or relationship test, and (2) the nature of the controversy test. The first test requires that the controversy arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations among the stockholders, members or associates of the corporation, partnership or association, between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates; between such corporation, partnership, or association and the public or between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns its franchise, license or permit to operate. The second test requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. The Court in this case held that petitioner is not a corporate officer because he was not validly appointed by the Board, thus, failing the relationship test, and that this is a case of employment termination which is a labor controversy and not an intracorporate dispute, thus failing the nature of the controversy test.
Labor Law
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Review of Decision
Grand Plaza Hotel, Corp. vs. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) G.R. No. 178296, January 12, 2011 Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered the holding of a certification election. After the preelection, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list of its
members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondent's Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings. The certification election pushed through. Respondent emerged as the winner. Petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner. Petitioner posits that once it is determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is present, cancellation of registration should follow; it becomes the ministerial duty of the Regional Director to cancel the registration of the labor organization, hence, the use of the word "shall." Petitioner points out that the Regional Director has admitted in its decision that respondent failed to submit the required documents for a number of years; therefore, cancellation of its registration should have followed as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition for cancellation of respondent's registration as such is conferred to the BLR.
HELD:
No. Jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Director's inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter could not himself perform. The DOLE Secretary, as the person exercising the power of supervision and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasi-judicial function entrusted by law to the BLR Director. The DOLE Secretary's act of taking over the function of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latter's inhibition from the case and the objective to "maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau itself.
Labor Law
UNION REGISTRATION, Cancellation
Grand Plaza Hotel, Corp. vs. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) G.R. No. 178296, January 12, 2011 Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered the holding of a certification election. After the preelection, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondent's Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings. The certification election pushed through. Respondent emerged as the winner. Petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner. Petitioner posits that once it is determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is present, cancellation of registration should follow; it becomes the ministerial duty of the Regional Director to cancel the registration of the labor organization, hence, the use of the word "shall." Petitioner points out that the Regional Director has admitted in its decision that respondent failed to submit the required documents for a number of years; therefore, cancellation of its registration should have followed as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's registration as a legitimate labor union should be cancelled.

HELD:
No. The amendment introduced by RA 9481 sought to strengthen the workers right to selforganization and enhance the Philippines compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87. ILO Convention No. 87 provides that workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. The ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its activities, which is true in our jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and cancellation of registration for that matter, involve serious consequences for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on the organization. The Court in this case took note of the fact that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted its financial statement for the years 1996-1999. With this submission, appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the said period.
Labor Law
WAGES, Payment Pending Reinstatement
Social Security System vs. Efren Capada, et al. G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011 Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay
against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents. Labor Arbiter Gan, declared Islriz Trading guilty of illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which granted the appeal. The NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan. Finding that respondents failure to continue working for petitioner was neither caused by termination nor abandonment of work, the NLRC ordered respondents reinstatement but without backwages. Respondents averred therein that since the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution was already issued for the enforcement of its reinstatement aspect as same is immediately executory even pending appeal. But this notwithstanding and despite the issuance and subsequent finality of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered respondents reinstatement, petitioner still refused to reinstate them. Thus, respondents prayed that in view of the orders of reinstatement, a computation of the award of backwages be made. The office of the Labor Arbiter issued an undated Computation of respondents accrued salaries. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the petition of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
RULING:
Yes. Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, the employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court or tribunal. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court or tribunal. It likewise settled the view that the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries.
Labor Law
COLLECTION OF ACCRUED WAGES; Two-Fold Test
Social Security System vs. Efren Capada, et al. G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011 Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents. Labor Arbiter Gan, declared Islriz Trading guilty of illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which granted the appeal. The NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Gan. Finding that respondents failure to continue working for petitioner was neither caused by termination nor abandonment of work, the NLRC ordered respondents reinstatement but without backwages. Respondents averred therein that since the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution was already issued for the enforcement of its reinstatement aspect as same is immediately executory even pending appeal. But this notwithstanding and despite the issuance and subsequent finality of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered respondents reinstatement, petitioner still refused to reinstate them. Thus, respondents prayed that in view of the orders of reinstatement, a computation of the award of backwages be made. The office of the Labor Arbiter issued an undated Computation of respondents accrued salaries. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the petition of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent employees should be barred from collecting the accrued wages.
HELD:
No. After the Labor Arbiters decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. The two-fold test in determining whether an employee is barred from recovering his accrued wages requires that (1) there must be actual delay or that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters Decision. Respondents have the right to collect their accrued salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiters Decision ordering their reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning the same because petitioners failure to reinstate them either actually or through payroll was due to petitioners unjustified refusal to effect reinstatement. In order to enforce this, Labor Arbiter Castillon thus correctly issued the Writ of Execution dated March 9, 2004 as well as the Order dated June 3, 2004 denying petitioners Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and granting respondents Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break-Open Order. Consequently, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding these issuances and in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it.
February 2011
Labor Law
ABANDONMENT, Elements
E. G. & I Construction Corporation vs. Ananias P. Sato G.R. No. 182070 February 16, 2011 Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Sato (respondent) was hired by E.G. & I Construction Corporation (petitioner) as a grade operator. He held the position for more than 13 years. Sato discovered that petitioner corporation had not been remitting his premium contributions to the SSS. When Sato kept on telling petitioners to update his premium contribution, he was removed as a grade operator and made to perform manual labor. Petitioner corporation told Sato that they could no longer afford to pay his wages and was advised to look for employment in other construction companies. Sato had been blacklisted and was prevented from entering the project sites. Berdin, Parantar and Lacida Jr (respondents) were hired as a
steelman/laborer, a steelman and a laborer respectively. The project engineers of respondents instructed them to affix their signatures on various documents. They refused to sign because they were written in English which they did not understand. Irked by their disobedience, the project engineer terminated their employment. On the same date they were given their weekly wages. However their wages were short of 3 days worth of wages as penalty for their refusal to sign. The following day, they were not allowed to enter the work premises. Respondents filed their respective complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay and SIL pay. Petitioner denied that the respondents were illegally dismissed. According to petitioners, respondents abandoned their work when they failed to report for work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents abandoned their work.

HELD:
No. For abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The employer has the burden of proof to show the employee's deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient. There must be an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue his employment. The reason why respondents failed to report for work was because petitioner corporation barred them from entering its construction sites. It is a settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. Petitioner corporation failed to show overt acts committed by respondents from which it may be deduced that they had no more intention to work. Respondents filing of the case for illegal dismissal barely four (4) days from their alleged abandonment is totally inconsistent with our known concept of what constitutes abandonment.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Burden of Proof
FACTS:
Sato (respondent) was hired by E.G. & I Construction Corporation (petitioner) as a grade operator. He held the position for more than 13 years. Sato discovered that petitioner corporation had not been remitting his premium contributions to the SSS. When Sato kept on telling petitioners to update his premium contribution, he was removed as a grade operator and made to perform manual labor. Petitioner corporation told Sato that they could no longer afford to pay his wages and was advised to look for employment in other construction companies. Sato had been blacklisted and was prevented from entering the project sites. Berdin, Parantar and Lacida Jr (respondents) were hired as a steelman/laborer, a steelman and a laborer respectively. The project engineers of respondents
instructed them to affix their signatures on various documents. They refused to sign because they were written in English which they did not understand. Irked by their disobedience, the project engineer terminated their employment. On the same date they were given their weekly wages. However their wages were short of 3 days worth of wages as penalty for their refusal to sign. The following day, they were not allowed to enter the work premises. Respondents filed their respective complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay and SIL pay. Petitioner denied that the respondents were illegally dismissed. According to petitioners, respondents abandoned their work when they failed to report for work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. The Court sustained the ruling of the CA. Petitioner corporation failed to prove that respondents were dismissed for just or authorized cause. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a valid cause. The CA ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed. A written notice of dismissal is not a pre-requisite for a finding of illegal dismissal. Respondents did not abandon their work. They were refused entry into the companys project sites.
Labor Law
MONEY CLAIMS, Burden of Proof
FACTS:
Sato (respondent) was hired by E.G. & I Construction Corporation (petitioner) as a grade operator. He held the position for more than 13 years. Sato discovered that petitioner corporation had not been remitting his premium contributions to the SSS. When Sato kept on telling petitioners to update his premium contribution, he was removed as a grade operator and made to perform manual labor. Petitioner corporation told Sato that they could no longer afford to pay his wages and was advised to look for employment in other construction companies. Sato had been blacklisted and was prevented from entering the project sites. Berdin, Parantar and Lacida Jr (respondents) were hired as a steelman/laborer, a steelman and a laborer respectively. The project engineers of respondents instructed them to affix their signatures on various documents. They refused to sign because they
were written in English which they did not understand. Irked by their disobedience, the project engineer terminated their employment. On the same date they were given their weekly wages. However their wages were short of 3 days worth of wages as penalty for their refusal to sign. The following day, they were not allowed to enter the work premises. Respondents filed their respective complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay and SIL pay. Petitioner denied that the respondents were illegally dismissed. According to petitioners, respondents abandoned their work when they failed to report for work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were entitled to money claims.

HELD:
Yes. As to the award of monetary claims, the CA decided in favor of the grant of the same. Petitioner corporation belatedly submitted copies of the weekly time record, payroll, and acknowledgement receipts of the 13th month pay. There was no explanation given why said documents were not submitted before the Labor Arbiter in order to establish their authenticity and correctness, and to give respondents the opportunity to refute the entries therein. As a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even as the employee must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances, and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of the worker have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.
Labor Law
CERTIFICATION Registration ELECTION, Petition for Cancellation of Union
Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011. Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a Petition for Certification Election. KML claimed that it was issued its Certificate of Registration by the DOLE on May 18, 2001. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. LEGEND also claimed that KML committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain employees attended its general membership meeting when in reality some of them were either at work, have already resigned or were abroad. KML claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union
could not be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action for cancellation of union registration. KML claimed that the instant petition has become moot because the certification election sought to be prevented had already been conducted. On June 30, 2005 CA reinstated the ruling of Med-Arbiter which canceled the certificate of registration of KML.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance therefore nullifying the petition for certification of election and other KMLs activities.
HELD:
Notwithstanding the finality of the Decision canceling the certificate of registration of KML, we cannot subscribe to LEGEND's proposition that the cancellation of KML's certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance. At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation. It is clear that a certification election may be conducted during the pendency of the cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning union is presumed to possess the legal personality to file the same.
Labor Law
LABOR UNION, Collateral Attack on Legal Personality
Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011. Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a Petition for Certification Election. KML claimed that it was issued its Certificate of Registration by the DOLE on May 18, 2001. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. LEGEND also claimed that KML committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain employees attended its
general membership meeting when in reality some of them were either at work, have already resigned or were abroad. KML claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union could not be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action for cancellation of union registration. KML claimed that the instant petition has become moot because the certification election sought to be prevented had already been conducted. On June 30, 2005 CA reinstated the ruling of Med-Arbiter which canceled the certificate of registration of KML.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election.
HELD:
No. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition for certification election filed by respondent union by questioning the validity of the respondents union registration. The Court held that legitimacy of the legal personality of respondent cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it. The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.
Labor Law
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, Review of Facts by the Court of Appeals
Nelson A. Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011
Leonardo De Castro, J. FACTS:
Petitioner Culili was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician and his basic salary was increased. Due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. As
part of the first phase, ETPI offered to its employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier age and a retirement package. This offer was initially rejected by the ETEU, ETPIs duly recognized bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. After consultations with ETEUs members, ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs. ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and the corresponding retirement package. Of all the employees who qualified to avail of the program, only Culili rejected the offer. ETPI proceeded with the second phase which necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs departments. The functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit, were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by another employee. ETPI informed Culili of his termination. from employment. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent-company and its officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court Of Appeals has a power to reeview facts in a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
HELD:
While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts, this general rule admits of exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, these findings may be examined by the courts. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found itself unable to completely sustain the findings of the NLRC thus, it was compelled to review the facts and evidence and not limit itself to the issue of grave abuse of discretion.
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Liability of Corporate Officers

Labor Law
Petitioner Culili was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician and his basic salary was increased. Due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. As part of the first phase, ETPI offered to its employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier age
and a retirement package. This offer was initially rejected by the ETEU, ETPIs duly recognized bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. After consultations with ETEUs members, ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs. ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and the corresponding retirement package. Of all the employees who qualified to avail of the program, only Culili rejected the offer. ETPI proceeded with the second phase which necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs departments. The functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit, were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by another employee. ETPI informed Culili of his termination. from employment. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent-company and its officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the corporate officers should be held personally liable.

HELD:
As a general rule, a corporate officer cannot be held liable for acts done in his official capacity because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members. To pierce this fictional veil, it must be shown that the corporate personality was used to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act, or to evade an existing obligation, or to confuse a legitimate issue. In illegal dismissal cases, corporate officers may be held solidarily liable with the corporation if the termination was done with malice or bad faith. Moral damages are awarded only where the dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may avail if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. In the present case, the Court held that petitioner failed to prove that his dismissal was orchestrated by the individual respondents and their acts were attended with bad faith or were done oppressively
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Redundancy
Petitioner Culili was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician and his basic salary was increased. Due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. As part of the first phase, ETPI offered to its employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier age and a retirement package. This offer was initially rejected by the ETEU, ETPIs duly recognized
bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. After consultations with ETEUs members, ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs. ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and the corresponding retirement package. Of all the employees who qualified to avail of the program, only Culili rejected the offer. ETPI proceeded with the second phase which necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs departments. The functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit, were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by another employee. ETPI informed Culili of his termination. from employment. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent-company and its officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that petitioner was validly dismissed. There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater than what is reasonably required to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position becomes redundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The Court has been consistent in holding that the determination of whether or not an employees services are still needed or sustainable properly belongs to the employer. Provided there is no violation of law or a showing that the employer was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act, the soundness or wisdom of this exercise of business judgment is not subject to the discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. However, an employer cannot simply declare that it has become overmanned and dismiss its employees without producing adequate proof to sustain its claim of redundancy. Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant, such as but not limited to: preferred status, efficiency, and seniority. The Court also held that the following evidence may be proffered to substantiate redundancy: adoption of a new staffing pattern, feasibility studies/ proposal on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and the approval by the management of the restructuring.
Labor Law
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, Notice Requirements
Petitioner Culili was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician and his basic salary was increased. Due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. As part of the first phase, ETPI offered to its employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier age and a retirement package. This offer was initially rejected by the ETEU, ETPIs duly recognized
bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. After consultations with ETEUs members, ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs. ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and the corresponding retirement package. Of all the employees who qualified to avail of the program, only Culili rejected the offer. ETPI proceeded with the second phase which necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs departments. The functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit, were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by another employee. ETPI informed Culili of his termination. from employment. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent-company and its officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process when he was terminated.
HELD:
There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive whether the termination of employment was based on the provision of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural the manner in which the dismissal was effected. There is a psychological effect or a stigma in immediately finding ones self laid off from work. This is why our labor laws have provided for procedural due process. While employers have the right to terminate employees it can no longer sustain, our laws also recognize the employees right to be properly informed of the impending termination of his employment. Though the failure of respondent-company to comply with the notice requirements under the Labor Code did not affect the validity of the dismissal, petitioner is however entitled to nominal damages in addition to his separation pay.
Labor Law
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, Right to Self-Organize
Petitioner Culili was employed by ETPI as a Technician in its Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician and his basic salary was increased. Due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. As part of the first phase, ETPI offered to its employees who had rendered at least fifteen years of service, the Special Retirement Program, which consisted of the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier age and a retirement package. This offer was initially rejected by the ETEU, ETPIs duly recognized bargaining agent, which threatened to stage a strike. After consultations with ETEUs members, ETEU agreed to the implementation of both programs. ETPI re-offered the Special Retirement Program and
the corresponding retirement package. Of all the employees who qualified to avail of the program, only Culili rejected the offer. ETPI proceeded with the second phase which necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of a number of ETPIs departments. The functions of the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit, Culilis unit, were absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy and his functions were absorbed by another employee. ETPI informed Culili of his termination. from employment. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent-company and its officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of ULP.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Thus, an employer may be held liable for unfair labor practice only if it can be shown that his acts interfere with his employees right to self-organization. Since there is no showing that the respondent companys implementation of the Right-Sizing Program was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees right to self-organization, there is no unfair labor practice to speak of in this case.
Labor Law
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, Project Employees
Exodus International Construction Corporation, et al. v. Guillermo Biscocho, et al. G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011
Del Castillo, J. FACTS:
Petitioner is a duly licensed labor contractor for the painting of residential houses, condominium units and commercial buildings. In the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired respondents as painters on different dates with the corresponding wages. Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the respondents abandoned their job and were not dismissed by the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment of job and that the respondents should be reinstated but without any backwages. On appeal, petitioner alleged that the reinstatement of respondents to their former positions, which were no longer existing, is impossible, highly unfair and unjust. It further alleged that the project they were working on at the time of their alleged dismissal was already completed. Having completed their tasks, their positions automatically ceased to exist. Thus, there were no more positions where they can be reinstated as painters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were project employees.

HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that there are two types of employees in the construction industry. The first is referred to as project employees or those employed in connection with a particular construction project or phase thereof and such employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which they are assigned. The second is known as non-project employees or those employed without reference to any particular construction project or phase of a project. Respondents belonged to the second type and are classified as regular employees of petitioner. It is clear from the records of the case that when one project is completed, respondents were automatically transferred to the next project awarded to petitioners. There was no employment agreement given to respondents which clearly spelled out the duration of their employment and the specific work to be performed and there is no proof that they were made aware of these terms and conditions of their employment at the time of hiring. Thus, it is now too late for petitioner to claim that respondents are project employees whose employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which they are assigned. Nonetheless, assuming that respondents were initially hired as project employees, a project employee may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following factors concur: (1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project; and (2) The tasks performed by the alleged project employee are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. In this case, the evidence on record shows that respondents were employed and assigned continuously to the various projects of petitioners. As painters, they performed activities which were necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioner, which was engaged in subcontracting jobs for painting of residential units, condominium and commercial buildings. As regular employees, respondents are entitled to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Burden of Proof
Exodus International Construction Corporation, et al. v. Guillermo Biscocho, et al. G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011
Del Castillo, J. FACTS:
Petitioner is a duly licensed labor contractor for the painting of residential houses, condominium units and commercial buildings. In the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired respondents as painters on different dates with the corresponding wages. Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the respondents abandoned their job and were not dismissed by the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment of job and that the respondents should be reinstated but without any backwages. On appeal, petitioner alleged that the reinstatement of respondents to their former positions, which were no longer existing, is impossible, highly unfair and unjust. It further alleged that the project they were working on at the time of their alleged dismissal was already completed. Having completed their tasks, their positions automatically ceased to exist. Thus, there were no more positions where they can be reinstated as painters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed.
HELD:
NO. Although In cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact that he was dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof. In the present case, the Court held that there was no evidence that respondents were dismissed or that they were prevented from returning to their work. It was only respondents unsubstantiated conclusion that they were dismissed. As a matter of fact, respondents could not name the particular person who effected their dismissal and under what particular circumstances. Absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioners had dismissed respondents, the latters claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.
Labor Law
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, Security Guards
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Ronald P. Valderama G.R. No. 186614, February 23, 2011 Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Respondent was hired by petitioner, a security agency, as a security guard. He was assigned at the Philippine Heart Center until his relief on January 30, 2006. Respondent was not given any assignment thereafter. Thus, on August 2, 2006, he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay, with prayer for damages against petitioner. To refute the claim, petitioner alleged that respondent was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was constructively or illegally dismissed.

HELD:
The Court held that respondent was constructively dismissed. In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him
where his service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary off-detail or the period of time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six months. The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the employer. In the instant case, the failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive dismissal.
Labor Law
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, Defense of Abandonment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has abandoned his job.

HELD:
NO. The Court held that respondent was illegally dismissed. The jurisprudential rule on abandonment is constant. It is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intent, manifested through overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. In this case, petitioner failed to establish clear evidence of
respondents intention to abandon his employment. Except for petitioners bare assertion that respondent did not report to the office for reassignment, no proof was offered to prove that respondent intended to sever the employer-employee relationship. Besides, the fact that respondent filed the instant complaint negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.
Labor Law
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, Defense of Abandonment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has voluntarily resigned.

HELD:
NO. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. Thus, the acts of
the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment. Should the employer interpose the defense of resignation, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. On this point, the Court held that petitioner failed to discharge its burden. Moreover, the filing of a complaint belies petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily resigned.
Labor Law
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT, Properties Covered
Paquito V. Ando v. Andresito Y. Campo, et al. G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011 Nachura, J.
FACTS:
The respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims against PACSI and petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and directed PACSI and petitioner to pay a total of P422,702.28, representing respondents separation pay and the award of attorneys fees. Petitioner and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision with modification of the award for separation pay to four other employees who were similarly situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property belonging to petitioner and his wife. The petitioner filed an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the RTC and claimed that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties.
ISSUE:
Whether the Notice of Sale over the property owned by the petitioner and his wife is null and void.
HELD:
YES. The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Labor Law
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISION, Jurisdiction
Paquito V. Ando v. Andresito Y. Campo, et al. G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011 Nachura, J.
FACTS:
The respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims against PACSI and petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and directed PACSI and petitioner to pay a total of P422,702.28, representing respondents separation pay and the award of attorneys fees. Petitioner and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision with modification of the award for separation pay to four other employees who were similarly situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property belonging to petitioner and his wife. The petitioner filed an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the RTC and claimed that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties. The RTC denied the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, petitioners remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has the jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
HELD:
NO. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. The NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with third-party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon. There is no doubt that petitioners complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a third party in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party,i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.
Labor Law
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Final and Executory Judgment
Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. and Dennis T. Villareal v. Joel P. Dejapa, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Myrna Manzano G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011 Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Joey Dejapa filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc., Dennis T. Villareal and Tom Madula. The LA dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit. Respondent filed his appeal with the NLRC which affirmed the LA decision. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed their Comment thereto. On August 29, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC decision and resolution. The CA found that petitioner company was respondent's employer and that Tom Madula was not really an independent contractor, but petitioner company's Operations Manager. It ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner company. The decision became final and executory on February 27, 2004, and an entry of judgment was subsequently made. The LA issued a Writ of Execution for the implementation of the CA Decision. Pursuant to the said writ of execution, petitioners' deposit in the UCPB in the amount of P736,910.10 was garnished. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on the ground that it can be held liable only insofar as the reinstatement aspect and/or the monetary award were concerned, pursuant to the CA Decision, but not to backwages. The LA issued its Order partially granting petitioners' Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Respondent then filed before the CA a Very Urgent Motion for Clarification of Judgment, praying that the CA Decision dated August 29, 2002 be clarified to the effect that petitioner be made solely liable to the judgment award and, as a consequence thereof, to order the NLRC and the LA to implement the same and to direct the UCPB to
release the garnished amount of P736,910.10 to the NLRC Sheriff and for the latter to deposit the same to the NLRC cashier for further disposition. The CA rendered the assailed Resolution granting respondent's motion for clarificatory judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA decision which became final and executory may be altered.
HELD:
NO. As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable, except under these recognized exceptions, to wit: (a) clerical errors; (b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and (c) void judgments. What the CA rendered on December 10, 2004 was a nunc pro tunc order clarifying the decretal portion of the August 29, 2002 Decision. The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. Petitioners' action is merely a subterfuge to alter or modify the final and executory Decision of the CA which we cannot countenance without violating procedural rules and jurisprudence.
Labor Law
PLACEMENT FEE, Proof of Excessive Collection
Avelina F. Sagun v. Sunace International Management Services, Inc. G.R. No. 179242, February 23, 2011 Nachura, J.
FACTS:
A complaint for alleged violation of Article 32 and Article 34(a) and (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, filed by petitioner Avelina F. Sagun against respondent Sunace International Management Services, Inc. and the latters surety, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, before the POEA. Petitioner applied with respondent for the position of caretaker in Taiwan. She allegedly paid P30,000.00 cash, P10,000.00 in the form of a promissory note, and NT$60,000.00 through salary deduction, in violation of the prohibition on excessive placement fees. She also claimed that respondent promised to employ her as caretaker but, at the job site she worked as a domestic helper and, at the same time, in a poultry farm. Respondent denied petitioners allegations and maintained that it only collected P20,840.00, the amount authorized by the POEA and for which the corresponding official receipt was issued. It also stressed that it did not furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment as it was duly received, passed upon, and approved by the POEA. POEA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The POEA Administrator found that petitioner failed to establish facts showing a violation of Article 32, since it was proven that the amount received by respondent as placement fee was covered by an official receipt; or of Article 34(a) as it was not shown that respondent charged excessive fees; and of Article 34(b) simply because respondent processed petitioners papers as caretaker, the position she applied and was hired for. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Secretary of Labor which partially granted petitioners motion. Respondent appealed to the Office of the President which affirmed the Order of the Secretary of
Labor. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied. Respondent filed a petition for review with CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which decided in favor of respondent. The appellate court reversed the rulings of the Secretary of Labor and the OP mainly because their conclusions were based not on evidence but on speculation, conjecture, possibilities, and probabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner were substantial to show that respondent collected from her more than the allowable placement fee.
HELD:
NO. In proceedings before administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, or that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The promissory note presented by petitioner cannot be considered as adequate evidence to show the excessive placement fee. It must be emphasized that a promissory note is a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. A person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. Moreover, as held by the CA, the fact that respondent is not a lending company does not preclude it from extending a loan to petitioner for her personal use. As for the deductions purportedly made by petitioners foreign employer, we reiterate the findings of the CA that there is no single piece of document or receipt showing that deductions have in fact been made, nor is there any proof that these deductions from the salary formed part of the subject placement fee.
Labor Law
RETRENCHMENT, Notice of Requirement
Plastimer Industrial Corporation and Teo Kee Bin v. Natalia C. Gopo, et al., G.R. No. 183390, February 16, 2011 Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Personnel and Administration Manager of Plastimer Industrial Corporation (Plastimer) issued a Memorandum informing all its employees of the decision of the Board of Directors to downsize and reorganize its business operations due to withdrawal of investments and shares of stocks which resulted in the change of its corporate structure. The employees of Plastimer, including the respondents were served written notices of their termination effective 13 June 2004. Plastimer and Plastimer Industrial Corporation Christian Brotherhood (PICCB), the incumbent sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees, entered into a MOA relative to the terms and conditions that would govern the retrenchment of the affected employees. Plastimer submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report containing the list of the employees affected by the reorganization and downsizing. The affected employees, including respondents, signed individual Release Waiver and Quitclaim. Thereafter, respondents filed a complaint against Plastimer and its President Teo Kee Bin before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and full backwages, underpayment of separation pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Respondents alleged that they did not voluntarily relinquish their jobs and that they were required to sign the waivers and quitclaims without giving them an opportunity to read them and without explaining their contents. Respondents further alleged that Plastimer failed to establish the causes/valid reasons for the retrenchment and to comply with the one-month notice to the DOLE as well as the standard prescribed under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Plastimer and the employees. Petitioners countered that the
retrenchment was a management prerogative and that respondents got their retrenchment or separation pay even before the effective date of their separation from service.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to comply with the one-month notice to DOLE rendered the retrenchment illegal.
HELD:
NO. While notice to the DOLE was short of the one-month notice requirement, the affected employees were sufficiently informed of their retrenchment 30 days before its effectivity. Petitioners failure to comply with the one-month notice to the DOLE is only a procedural infirmity and does not render the retrenchment illegal. In Agabon v. NLRC, we ruled that when the dismissal is for a just cause, the absence of proper notice should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. Instead, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Here, the failure to fully comply with the one-month notice of termination of employment did not render the retrenchment illegal but it entitles respondents to nominal damages.
Labor Law
RETRENCHMENT, Validity
FACTS:
The Personnel and Administration Manager of Plastimer Industrial Corporation (Plastimer) issued a Memorandum informing all its employees of the decision of the Board of Directors to downsize and reorganize its business operations due to withdrawal of investments and shares of stocks which resulted in the change of its corporate structure. The employees of Plastimer, including the respondents were served written notices of their termination effective 13 June 2004. Plastimer and Plastimer Industrial Corporation Christian Brotherhood (PICCB), the incumbent sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees, entered into a MOA relative to the terms and conditions that would govern the retrenchment of the affected employees. Plastimer submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report containing the list of the employees affected by the reorganization and downsizing. The affected employees, including respondents, signed individual Release Waiver and Quitclaim. Thereafter, respondents filed a complaint against Plastimer and its President Teo Kee Bin before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and full backwages, underpayment of separation pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Respondents alleged that they did not voluntarily relinquish their jobs and that they were required to sign the waivers and quitclaims without giving them an opportunity to read them and without explaining their contents. Respondents further alleged that Plastimer failed to establish the causes/valid reasons for the retrenchment and to comply with the one-month notice to the DOLE as well as the standard prescribed under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Plastimer and the employees. Petitioners countered that the
retrenchment was a management prerogative and that respondents got their retrenchment or separation pay even before the effective date of their separation from service.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid cause for retrenchment.

HELD:
NO. The fact that there was a net income in 2003 does not justify the Court of Appeals ruling that there was no valid reason for the retrenchment. Records showed that the net income of P6,185,707.05 for 2003 was not even enough for petitioners to recover from the P52,904,297.88 loss in 2002. Article 283 of the Labor Code recognizes retrenchment to prevent losses as a right of the management to meet clear and continuing economic threats or during periods of economic recession to prevent losses. There is no need for the employer to wait for substantial losses to materialize before exercising ultimate and drastic option to prevent such losses.
Labor Law
QUITCLAIMS, Validity
FACTS:
The Personnel and Administration Manager of Plastimer Industrial Corporation (Plastimer) issued a Memorandum informing all its employees of the decision of the Board of Directors to downsize and reorganize its business operations due to withdrawal of investments and shares of stocks which resulted in the change of its corporate structure. The employees of Plastimer, including the respondents were served written notices of their termination effective 13 June 2004. Plastimer and Plastimer Industrial Corporation Christian Brotherhood (PICCB), the incumbent sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees, entered into a MOA relative to the terms and conditions that would govern the retrenchment of the affected employees. Plastimer submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report containing the list of the employees affected by the reorganization and downsizing. The affected employees, including respondents, signed individual Release Waiver and Quitclaim. Thereafter, respondents filed a complaint against Plastimer and its President Teo Kee Bin before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and full backwages, underpayment of separation pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Respondents alleged that they did not voluntarily relinquish their jobs and that they were required to sign the waivers and quitclaims without giving them an opportunity to read them and without explaining their contents. Respondents further alleged that Plastimer failed to establish the causes/valid reasons for the retrenchment and to comply with the one-month notice to the DOLE as well as the standard prescribed under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Plastimer and the employees. Petitioners countered that the retrenchment was a management prerogative and that respondents got their retrenchment or separation pay even before the effective date of their separation from service.
ISSUE:
Whether the waiver or quitclaim is valid.

HELD:
YES. The Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. The respondents were sufficiently apprised of their rights under the waivers and quitclaims that they signed. Each document contained the signatures of the PICCB President, and the counsel for the union, which proved that respondents were duly assisted when they signed the waivers and quitclaims. The Court ruled that the waivers and quitclaims that respondents signed were valid.
March 2011
Labor Law
ABANDONMENT, Elements
Harpoon Marine Services, Inc., et al. v. Fernan H. Francisco GR No. 167751, March 2, 2011 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Respondent averred that he was unceremoniously dismissed by petitioner Rosit. He was informed that the company could no longer afford his salary and that he would be paid his separation pay and accrued commissions. Petitioners presented a different version of the events and refuted the allegations of respondent. Petitioner Rosit indeed talked to respondent not to dismiss him but only to remind and warn him of his excessive absences and tardiness, as evinced by his Time Card covering the period June 1-15, 2001. Instead of improving his work behavior, respondent continued to absent himself and sought employment with another company engaged in the same line of business, thus, creating serious damage in the form of unfinished projects. Petitioners denied having terminated respondent as the latter voluntarily abandoned his work after going on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) beginning June 22, 2001. Petitioners contended that when respondents absences persisted, several memoranda informing him of his absences were sent to him by ordinary mail and were duly filed with the DOLE on August 13, 2001. Upon respondents continuous and deliberate failure to respond to these memoranda, a Notice of Termination dated July 30, 2001was later on issued to him.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
YES. The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that respondent incurred unexplained and habitual absences and tardiness. A scrutiny of the time card and payroll discloses that respondent incurred only three days of absence and no record of tardiness. As aptly held by the NLRC, the time card and payroll presented by petitioners do not show gross and habitual absenteeism and tardiness especially since respondents explanation of his three-day absence was not denied by petitioners at the first instance before the Labor Arbiter. No other evidence was presented to show the alleged absences and tardiness. Jurisprudence provides for two essential requirements for abandonment of work to exist. The failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship x x x manifested by some overt acts should both concur. Further, the employees deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning should be established and proven by the employer. Petitioners failed to prove that it was respondent who voluntarily refused to report back for work by his defiance and refusal to accept the memoranda and the notices of absences sent to him. The CA correctly ruled that petitioners failed to present evidence that they sent these notices to respondents last known address for the purpose of warning him that his continued failure to report would be construed as abandonment
of work. There was no proof on how these notices were given to respondent. Neither was there any other cogent evidence that these were properly received by respondent. The fact that respondent employee never prayed for reinstatement and has sought employment in another company which is a competitor of petitioners cannot be construed as his overt acts of abandoning employment. Neither can the delay of four months be taken as an indication that the respondent employees filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is a mere afterthought. Records show that respondent employee attempted to get his separation pay and alleged commissions from the company, but it was only after his requests went unheeded that he resorted to judicial recourse.
Labor Law
CORPORATE OFFICER, Solidary Liability
Harpoon Marine Services, Inc., et al. v. Fernan H. Francisco GR No. 167751, March 2, 2011 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Respondent averred that he was unceremoniously dismissed by petitioner Rosit. He was informed that the company could no longer afford his salary and that he would be paid his separation pay and accrued commissions. Petitioners presented a different version of the events and refuted the allegations of respondent. Petitioner Rosit indeed talked to respondent not to dismiss him but only to remind and warn him of his excessive absences and tardiness, as evinced by his Time Card covering the period June 1-15, 2001. Instead of improving his work behavior, respondent continued to absent himself and sought employment with another company engaged in the same line of business, thus, creating serious damage in the form of unfinished projects. Petitioners denied having terminated respondent as the latter voluntarily abandoned his work after going on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) beginning June 22, 2001. Petitioners contended that when respondents absences persisted, several memoranda informing him of his absences were sent to him by ordinary mail and were duly filed with the DOLE on August 13, 2001. Upon respondents continuous and deliberate failure to respond to these memoranda, a Notice of Termination dated July 30, 2001was later on issued to him.
ISSUE:
Whether Rosit, the President of the corporation should be solidarily liable with the corporation.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner Rosit should not be held solidarily liable with petitioner Harpoon for the payment of respondents backwages and separation pay. As held in a case, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. As such, they should not be generally held jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation. The general rule is grounded on the theory that a corporation has a legal personality separate and distinct from the persons comprising it. To warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, the officers bad faith or wrongdoing must be established clearly and convincingly as bad faith is never presumed. In the case at bench, the records are bereft of any other satisfactory evidence that petitioner Rosit acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his authority as company president. Indeed, petitioner Rosit informed respondent that the company wishes to terminate his services since it could no longer afford his salary. Moreover, the promise of separation pay, according to petitioners, was out of goodwill and magnanimity. At the most, petitioner Rosits actuations only show the illegality of the manner of effecting respondents termination from service due to absence of just or valid cause and non-observance of procedural due process but do not point to any malice or bad faith on his part. Besides, good faith is still
presumed. In addition, liability only attaches if the officer has assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation.
Labor Law
LABOR ORGANIZATION, Collateral Attack on Legal Personality
Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms [SMCC-SUPER], Zacarrias Jerry Victorio Union President v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation G.R. No. 169717, March 16, 2011 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
The Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region. The respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the Charter Certificate, "Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization," and "Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor Code in relation to Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997. The union registration was, thus, fatally defective. The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company. As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.
ISSUE:
Whether the legal personality of the petitioner union may be collaterally attacked.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually
managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
Labor Law
LABOR ORGANIZATION, Membership of Supervisory Employees
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the inclusion of supervisory employees makes the petitioner union not a legitimate labor organization.
HELD:
NO. While there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Labor Law
LABOR ORGANIZATION, Registration
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner union failed to comply with the requisite documents for registration because the Charter Certificate were not executed under oath.
HELD:
NO. As readily seen from the then prevailing rule provided in Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. As to the charter certificate, the said rule indicates that it should be executed under oath. The Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the local/chapter's officers certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of. Petitioner union's charter certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization
upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution and by-laws -- the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records.
Labor Law
REINSTATEMENT, Accrued Backwages
Pfizer, Inc., et al. v. Geraldine Velasco G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative. Because of her high-risk pregnancy she was advised a bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. While she was still on leave, PFIZER served a "Show-cause Notice" mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks". Private respondent Velasco denied the charges. She received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation where a certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing her as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. She asked for additional time to answer the second Show-cause Notice. Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. A "Third Show-cause Notice," was sent to her. Finally, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment. The Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the private respondent is entitled to reinstatement and payment of backwages during the period of appeal.
HELD:
YES. The Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. It cannot be denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential framework, respondent is entitled to payment of her wages for the period after December 5, 2003 until the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her dismissal was legal and for just cause. Thus, the payment of such wages cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment on respondent's part.
Labor Law
REINSTATEMENT, Immediately Executory Order
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the private respondent was immediately reinstated.

HELD:
NO. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement awardwould certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order.
Labor Law
REINSTATEMENT, Terms and Conditions
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the reinstatement to a new work location constitutes a valid reinstatement.

HELD:
NO. under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll." It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee. Applying the foregoing principle to the case, it cannot be said that PFIZER's had shown a clear intent to reinstate respondent to her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position. To begin with, the return-to-work order PFIZER sent respondent is silent with regard to the position or the exact nature of employment. Even if we assume that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZER's letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms and conditions" as her previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent to report to its main office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondent's previous job had her stationed in Baguio City (respondent's place of residence) and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including her relocation benefits.
Labor Law
TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER, Willful Disobedience
Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc., Lorenzo Y. Sumulong III v. Virginia E. Pacia G.R. No. 171189, March 9, 2011 Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Virginia E. Pacia was hired by LREI. At the time of her dismissal, she was the assistant manager and officer-in-charge of LREI's Accounting Department under the Finance Administrative Division. Pacia was directed to prepare a check worth P150,000.00 as partial payment for LREI's outstanding obligation to the BPI-FB. Pacia did not immediately comply with the instruction. After two repeated directives, Pacia eventually prepared the check. She was again directed to prepare a check in the amount of P175,000.00 to settle the balance of LREI's outstanding indebtedness with BPI-FB. Pacia once again was slow in obeying the order. To explain her refusal to immediately follow the directive, Pacia reasoned out that the funds in LREI's account were not sufficient to cover the amounts to be indicated in the checks. She was issued a memorandum ordering her to explain in writing why she refused to follow a clear and lawful directive. Pacia replied in writing and explained that her initial refusal to prepare the checks was due to the unavailability of funds to cover the amounts and that she only wanted to protect LREI from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law. Pacia received a notice of termination stating that she was being dismissed because of her willful disobedience and their loss of trust and confidence in her. Pacia then filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice due to Harassment, Constructive Dismissal, Moral and Exemplary Damages against LREI and Sumulong. Subsequently, Pacia filed an Amended Complaint to include the charges of illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination because of willful disobedience was valid.

HELD:
NO. The Court held that respondent employee was illegally dismissed. The offense of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of two (2) requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that is characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioner employer to prepare checks in payment of petitioners obligations, respondent employees initial reluctance to prepare the checks, although seemingly disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting the petitioner employer from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority. The Court takes into consideration that respondent employee, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she was tasked to do it.
Labor Law
WAGES, Facilities and Supplements
SLL International Cables Specialist and Sonny L. Lagon v. NLRC, Roldan Lopez, et al. G.R. No. 172161, March 2, 2011 Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
Zuiga, Caete and Lopez (respondents) were hired by petitioner Lagon as apprentice or trainee cable/lineman. The three were paid the full minimum wage and other benefits but since they were only trainees, they did not report for work regularly but came in as substitutes to the regular workers or in undertakings that needed extra workers to expedite completion of work. After their training, Zuiga, Caete and Lopez were engaged as project employees by the petitioners. For several projects, respondents worked as project employees. On May 21, 1999, private respondents for the 4th time worked with Lagons project in Camarin, Caloocan City with Furukawa Corporation as the general contractor. Their contract would expire on February 28, 2000, the period of completion of the project. For reasons of delay on the delivery of imported materials from Furukawa Corporation, the Camarin project was not completed on the scheduled date of completion. Faced with economic problems, Lagon was constrained to cut down the overtime work of its workers, including private respondents. Thus, when requested by private respondents on February 28, 2000 to work overtime, Lagon refused and told private respondents that if they insist, they would have to go home at their own expense and that they would not be given anymore time nor allowed to stay in the quarters. This prompted respondents to leave their work and went home to Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cost of food and lodging provided by petitioner to the respondent employees should be included in the computation of the wages received by respondents.
HELD:
NO. The Court makes a distinction between facilities and supplements. Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborers and his familys existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law, they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same. In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers basic wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by petitioner employer for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while they were working at their respective projects. Thus, the Court is of the view that the food and lodging, or the electricity and water allegedly consumed by respondents in this case were not facilities but supplements which should not be included in the computation of wages received by respondent employees.
Labor Law
WAGES, Proof of Payment
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were indeed paid wages higher than the prescribed minimum.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that as a general rule, a party who alleged payment of wages as a defense has the burden of proving it. Specifically with respect to labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer, the rationale being that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. In this case, petitioner employer, aside from bare allegations that respondent employees received wages higher than the prescribed minimum, failed to present any evidence, such as payroll or payslips, to support their defense of payment. Thus, petitioner employer utterly failed to discharge the onus probandi.
Labor Law
WAGES, Value of Facilities
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cost of the facilities must be included in the computation of wages paid.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that before the value of facilities can be deducted from the employees wages, the following requisites must all be attendant: first, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and finally, facilities must be charged at reasonable value. Mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees wages. These requirements, however, have not been met in this case. Petitioner employer failed to present any company policy or guideline showing that provisions for meals and lodging were part of the employees salaries. It also failed to provide proof of the employees written authorization, much less show how they arrived at their valuations. At any rate, it is not even clear whether respondent employees actually enjoyed said facilities.

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January 2011

APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT, Validity

Whether or not the apprenticeship agreements were valid.

NLRC, Factual Findings

PETITION, Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping

G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011 Nachura, J.:

Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists.

Whether or not respondent was constructively dismissed.

Whether or not the respondent was denied the due process.

Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed.

Whether or not the dismissal of De Castro was valid and justified.

Whether or not De Castro was negligent.

Whether or not Tongko is an employee of Manulife.

Whether or not appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

Whether or not respondent's registration as a legitimate labor union should be cancelled.

Whether or not the respondents abandoned their work.

Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed.

Whether or not the respondents were entitled to money claims.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, Liability of Corporate Officers

Whether or not the corporate officers should be held personally liable.

Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of ULP.

Whether or not the respondents were project employees.

Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed.

Whether or not the respondent was constructively or illegally dismissed.

Whether or not the respondent has abandoned his job.

Whether or not the respondent has voluntarily resigned.

Whether there was a valid cause for retrenchment.

Whether the waiver or quitclaim is valid.

Whether the respondent was illegally dismissed.

Whether the private respondent was immediately reinstated.

Whether the reinstatement to a new work location constitutes a valid reinstatement.

Whether or not the termination because of willful disobedience was valid.

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