41 (1) MOSKOS CLASSIC - From Institution To Occupation

Armed Forces & Society
http://afs.sagepub.com From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization

Charles C. Moskos, JR Armed Forces & Society 1977; 4; 41 DOI: 10.1177/0095327X7700400103 The online version of this article can be found at: http://afs.sagepub.com
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From Institution to
Occupation
TRENDS IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Jr.

Northwestern University
military can be understood as a social organization which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends. It is from this perspective that we apply a developmental analysis to the emergent structure of the armed forces. Developmental analysis entails historical reconstruction, trend specification, and, most especially, a model of a future state of affairs toward which actual events are heading.I Developmental analysis, that is, emphasizes the &dquo;from here to there&dquo; sequence of present and hypothetical events. Stated in a slightly different way, a developmental construct is a &dquo;pure type&dquo; placed at some future point by which we may ascertain and order the emergent reality of contemporary social phenomena. Models derived from developmental analysis bridge the empirical world of today with the social forms of the future. Put plainly, what is the likely shape of the military in the foreseeable future?
AUTHORS NOTE:
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Support ~Mp~o~/royM Army AUTHORSNOTE: during from C/.~..4r~ preparation of and SocialSciences all findings interpretations
the The usual caveat that author is especially stressed. and
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ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 4. No. I, November 1977 ® 1977 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
41
42
Initially, presented to
two models-institution versus occupation-will be describe alternative conceptions of military social organization. These models are evaluated as to which best fits current empirical indicators. The basic hypothesis is that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. Second, there will be specification of some expected organizational outcomes in the military system resulting from the shift to an occupational model.
INSTITUTION OR OCCUPATION
Terms like institution or occupation have obvious limitations in both and scholarly discussion.2 Nevertheless, they contain core
popular
connotations which serve to distinguish each from the other. For present purposes these distinctions can be described as follows. An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling; they generally regard themselves as being different or apart from the broader society and are so regarded by others. To the degree ones institutional membership is congruent with notions of selfsacrifice and dedication, it will usually enjoy esteem from the larger community. Although renumeration may not be comparable to what one might expect in the economy of the marketplace, this is often compensated for by an array of social benefits associated with an institutional format as well as psychic income. When grievances are felt, members of an institution do not organize themselves into interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought it takes the form of &dquo;one-on-one&dquo; recourse to superiors, with its implications of trust in the paternalism of the institution to take care of its own. Military service traditionally has had many institutional features. One thinks of the extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations. It is also significant that a paternalistic renumeration system has evolved in the military corresponding to the institutional model: compensation received in noncash form (e.g., food,
43
housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, payments to service members partly determined by family status, and a large proportion of compensation received as deferred pay in the form
of retirement benefits. The military variant of
professionalism historically has been consistent with the institutional model.3 The traditional milieu of the service academies has been likened to that of a seminary.4 Certainly the multitiered military educational system for career officers-as typified by the command schools and the war colleges-is as much institutional reinforcement as it is narrow professional training. Moreover, unlike civilian professionals for whom compensation is heavily determined by individual expertise and can even be in the form of fee for service, the compensation received by the military professional is a function of rank, seniority, and need-not strictly speaking, professional expertise. (The exception to this occurs, interestingly enough, when the military organization takes into account-via the mechanism of off-scale compensation-certain professionals whose skills are intrinsically nonmilitary, the notable example being physicians.) To compound matters, there are societal forces eroding the institutional features of the professions within and outside the military.5 An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. In a modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations. The occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization. A common form of interest articulation in industrial-and increasingly governmental-occupations is the trade union. Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model. This in the face of repeated recommendations of governmental commissions that the armed services adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay, allowances, and tax benefits into one cash payment, and which would eliminate compensation differences between married and single personnel, thus conforming to the equal-pay-for-equal-work principle of civilian occupations. Such a salary system would set up an employeremployee relationship quite at variance with military traditions. Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there has been some accommodation to occupational imperatives. Special supple-
44
proficiency pay have long been found necessary to recruit and retain highly skilled enlisted personnel. The distinction between institution and occupation can be overdrawn. Reality, moreover, is complicated in that the armed forces have had and will continue to have elements of both the institutional and occupational types.6 There are also important differences between the various services, the most obvious being faster-paced technological development in the air force and navy compared to the army and marine corps. But the heuristic value of the typology is deemed valid. It allows for a conceptual grasp of the basic hypothesis that the overarching trend within the contemporary military is the erosion of the institutional format and the ascendancy of the occupational model. Although antecedents predated the appearance of the all-volunteer force in early 1973, the end of the draft served as the major thrust to move the military toward the occupational model. In contrast to the all-volunteer force, the selective service system was premised on the notion of the citizens obligation-with concomitant low salaries for lower enlisted personnel-and the ideal of a broadly representative enlisted force (though this ideal was not always realized in practice). The occupational model clearly underpinned the philosophic rationale of the 1970 report of the Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (&dquo;Gates Commission Report&dquo;).7 Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of an institution, captured in words like &dquo;duty,&dquo; &dquo;honor,&dquo; &dquo;country,&dquo; the Gates Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards. Actually, the move toward making military remuneration competitive with the civilian sector preceded the advent of the all-volunteer force. Since 1967, military pay has been formally linked to the civil service and thus, indirectly, to the civilian labor market. From 1964 to 1974, average earnings in the private economy rose 52% while regular
ments and
military compensation-basic pay, allowances, tax advantages-rose 76% for representative grade levels, such as lieutenant colonels and master sergeants.8 Even more dramatic, recruit pay from 1964 to 1976 increased 193% in constant dollars compared to 10% for the average
unskilled laborer.9 It is important to stress that although the army was the only service to rely directly on large numbers of draftees for its manpower needs, all the services were berieficiaries of the selective service system. It is estimated that close to half of all voluntary accession into the military
45
in the peacetime years between the wars in Korea and Vietnam were draft-motivated. The draft was also the major impetus for recruitment into the ROTC and the reserve/guard units. Termination of the draft and the rise in military pay have been two of the most visible changes in the contemporary military system, but other indicators of the trend away from the institutional format can also be noted: (1) proposals to eliminate or reduce a host of military benefits, e.g., subsidies for commissaries, health care for dependents, and major restructuring of the retirement system; (2) the increasing class and racial unrepresentativeness of the ground combat arms; (3) the separation of work and residence locales accompanying the growing numbers of single enlisted men living off base; (4) the burgeoning resistance of many military wives, at officer and noncom levels, to participating in customary social functions; (5) the high rate of attrition and desertion among enlisted personnel in the post-Vietnam military; and (6) the increasing tendency of active-duty personnel to bring grievances into litigation. The sum of these and related developments is to confirm the ascendancy of the occupational model in the emergent military.
CONSEQUENCES OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL MODEL
A shift in the rationale of the military toward the occupational model implies organizational consequences in the structure and, perhaps, the function of the armed forces. This discussion should not be construed as advocacy of such organizational consequences or even of their inevitability. But it does suggest that certain outcomes can be anticipated if the military becomes even more like an occupation. Two changes, in particular, are presently apparent in military social organization: the growing likelihood of unionization and the increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks. Although seemingly unrelated, both such organizational changes derive from the ascendant occupational model. Trade Unionism
The possibility that trade unionism might link with the armed forces of the United States was barely more than a remote thought just a few years ago. Today, there are signs that such an eventuality could
46
pass. The growing militancy of previously quiescent public employees at municipal, state, and federal levels may be a percursor of similar activity within the military system.10 Many Western European countries, including several members of NATO, have long-standing military trade unions.&dquo;It has been the advent of the all-volunteer
come to
force which has made unionization of the American armed forces a strong possibility. Reliance on monetary incentives to recruit military members is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism. In 1975, the National Maritime Union (NMU), a union affiliated with the AFL-CIO, reported that it was considering organizing sailors in the U.S. Navy. For some time, the independent Association of Civilian Technicians (ACT) has been a union for civilians who work full-time for the reserve and National Guard (almost all of whom are also members of the units employing them). Of the various possibilities for military trade unionism, the most substantial initiatives, by far, are those of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), affiliated with the AFL-CIO. In its 1976 annual convention, the AFGE amended its constitution to extend membership eligibility to military personnel serving on active duty. The majority of the AFGEs 325,000 members are civilian employees working on military installations. In mid-1977, the AFGE was conducting a referendum to decide whether the union should proceed toward a full-fledged drive
to
organize military personnel.l2
Such groups as the AFGE, NMU, and ACT are staunchly patriotic, conservative in their approach to social change, and professed breadand-butter unions. There is no connection between these unions and the radical, self-styled servicemens unions that appeared in the late years of the Vietnam war. But there is a potentially disquieting implication if these established unions succeed in organizing the military: the politicization of the armed forces arising from the usually close working relationship between the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party at national and local levels Military unions face a number of legal obstacles. Current defense department directives allow service members to join unions, but forbid commanders from negotiating with them. Additionally, legislation has been introduced in recent congressional sessions to prohibit unionization of the armed forces. Even if Congress passed a law prohibiting military unions and the president signed the law, its constitutionality certainly would be tested in the courts. Military commanders already are permitted to negotiate with unionized civilian employees on military
47
installations, and, since 1975, they have also been delegated explicit
authority to sign local labor agreements with civilian personnel. Even though military unions are anathema to the service associations, almost all senior officers, and many civilians, there is a widespread view among all ranks of military personnel that the institutional
qualities of military life are being undermined. Much of this dissatisfaction focuses on the perceived erosion of military benefits and the job insecurities resulting from periodic reductions in force. Not so well understood is that the institutional features of the military system may have been traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military personnel in the all-volunteer force. The potential for unionization is great precisely because military social organization has moved in the direction of the occupational model, while much of its membership
harkens to the social supports of the older institutional format. It is also possible that a unionized military would not be accorded the favor that it presently enjoys from the public (which is prone to view the military as the embodiment of a calling).4 Indeed, society might view a military union in more crass terms than would be anticipated because of a reaction against public employee unions in general.
Civilian Technicians
Trends toward
military
unionization
are
organizational develop-
ments that could be incorporated, albeit with some strain, into the structure of the armed forces, but another consequence of the ascendant
occupational model departs entirely from formal military organization. This is the use of civilians to perform tasks which, by any conventional measure, would be seen as military in content. The private armies of the Central Intelligence Agency long have been an object of concern within the regular military command. But what is anomalous in the emerging order is that, rather than assigning its own military personnel, the U.S. government increasingly gives contracts directly to civilian firmswith salary levels much higher than comparable military rates-to perform difficult military tasks. In other words, the very structure of the military system no longer encompasses the full range of military functions. One finds it difficult to overstate the extent to which the operational side of the military system now relies on civilian technicians. The large warships of the U.S. Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of contract civilians, the so-called &dquo;tech reps,&dquo; who
48
serve
permanently aboard these ships. Major army ordnance centers, including those in combat theaters, require contract civilians to perform necessary maintenance and assembly. Missile warning systems in Greenland are, in effect, civilian-manned military installations operated by firms responsible to the U.S. Air Force. In Southeast Asia and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Government gave contracts to private companies, such as Air America and Vinnel Corporation, to recruit civilians who performed military activities. In Isfahan, Iran, the Bell Helicopter and Grumman companies established a quasi-military base staffed by former American military personnel who trained Iranian pilots.15 During the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, chartered
civilian aircraft were used to rescue American nationals under virtual combat conditions. The American monitoring force in the Sinai was
contracted out to private industry, with the government retaining only policy control. External political considerations obviously impinge on decisions to use civilian contracts for certain military tasks. It may be that the employment of civilian technicians overseas does not symbolize a national commitment to the same extent as would the deployment of uniformed personnel. Apparently, in certain roles requiring high levels of technical sophistication, civilians are simply more cost effective than military personnel. Nevertheless, if task efficiency is the issue, a more nagging implication is that military personnel cannot or will not perform long-term arduous duty with the efficacy of contract civilians. If this were to become the norm, beliefs conducive to organizational integrity and societal respect-the whole notion of military legitimacy-become untenable. The trend toward the employment of contract civilians to perform military tasks could be the culmination of occupational ascendancy in the military purpose.
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of the ascendant occupational model in the armed forces alerts one to, and makes sense out of, current organizational trends in the social structure of the military. If there is concern with current developments-the possibility of trade unionism, excessive reliance on contract civilians, service morale, and the like-then attention ought to be focused on the root cause and not just on the overt symptoms. To describe observable trends in military organization
49
is not to mean they are inevitable. 16 But developmental analysis reveals the impetus and probable outcomes of present trends in the emergent
military.
NOTES
1. Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswells Developmental Analysis," Western Political 2 (1958): 229-242. 2. Robert Dubin, ed., Handbook of Work, Organization, and Society (Chicago:
Quarterly
Rand McNally, 1976).

3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free
Press, 1960).
4. John P. Lovell, "The Service Academies in Transition," in Lawrence J. Korb, ed., The System of Educating Military Officers in the U.S. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: International Studies Association, 1976), pp. 35-50. 5. Elliott A. Krause, The Sociology of Occupations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
pp. 84-108. 6. Although the conceptual referent differs from the hypothesis of the ascendant occupational model presented here, there are certain parallels to be found in Jacques van Doorn, "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West," Armed Forces and Society 1 (1975): 147-158. 7. The Report of the Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). 8. Steven L. Canby and Robert A. Butler, "The Military Manpower Question," in William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber, eds., Arms, Men, and Military Budgets (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), pp. 186-187. 9. Tulay Demirles, "Adjusted Consumer Price Index for Military Personnel and a Comparison of Real Civilian and Military Earnings, 1964-1973," Technical Memorandum, TM-1200 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1974), p. 9. 10. An overview of the precedents and potentialities for military unionization is Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard Samhoff, Unionizing the Armed Forces (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977). 11. On Western Europe, see the "Special Symposium on Trade Unionism in the Military," Armed Forces and Society 2 (1976): 477-522; also Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, "Trade Unions in the Armed Forces," paper presented at the Conference of the British Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, April 1976. 12. "Organizing the Military," The Government Standard [the official organ of the American Federation of Government Employees] (May 1977): 11-14. 13. In June 1977, Congress was considering repeal of the Hatch Act which since 1939 has banned federal employees from participating in political activities. One consequence of repeal of the Hatch Act would be removal of restrictions on the use of government employee union funds for political purposes. Washington Post (June 9, 1977): 1. 14. David R. Segal, "Civil-Military Relations in the Mass Public," Armed Forces and Society 1 (1975): 215-230; David R. Segal and John D. Blair, "Public Confidence in
50
the U.S. Military," Armed Forces and Society 3 (1976): 3-12; John D. Blair and Jerald G. Bachman, "The Public View of the Military," in Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal, eds., The Social Psychology of Military Service (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976), pp. 215-236. 15. U.S. Congress. Senate. Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). 16. To phrase discussion of the emergent military solely in terms of factors internal to the military organization is to beg the larger question. Ultimately, the organizational direction of the armed forces is connected with more general values of citizen participation and obligation. Even though there is renewed talk of reinstituting conscription in the wake of recruitment inadequacies of the all-volunteer force, this possibility is viewed as unlikely in the current political climate. More salient, a return to the draft might well result in troop morale and discipline problems exceeding what the military system could accommodate. Perhaps the time is opportune to consider a voluntary national service program—in which military service is one of several options—which would be a prerequisite for future federal employment. Such a program would be philosophically defensible by linking future employment by the taxpayer to prior commitment to national service. It would meet pressing national needs in both the civilian and military spheres and make public service an essential part of growing up in America. Most important, it would clarify the militarys role by reinvigorating the ethic of national service.
CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Jr., is Professor of Sociology, Northwestern University. He of The American Enlisted Man and numerous articles on American military affairs, and the editor of Public Opinion and the Military Establishment. His current research is on the Greek-American community.
is the author

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Armed Forces & Society

http://afs.sagepub.com From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization

TRENDS IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Jr.

THE OCCUPATIONAL MODEL

organize military personnel.l2

Rand McNally, 1976).

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