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Political Law Separation of Powers Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District

t of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991


HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests and qualifications concerning members of Congress For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent and impartial, a separate body from the legislative HRET members are entitled to security of tenure regardless of any change in their political affiliations HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party

FACTS: Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as Representatives of the 4th district. Pineda won in the elections, prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the HRET, which decided in favor of the latter. However, before promulgation of the decision, Congressman Camasuras membership with the HRET was withdrawn on the ground that he was expelled from the LDP. As such, the decision could not be promulgated since without Congressman Camasuras vote, the deicison lacks the concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal. ISSUES:

Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to promulgate its decision Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in the political alliance of its members

RULING: HRET is a non-political body

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives: Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members. The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature. Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.) To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. xxx xxx xxx The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the

constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.) Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its decision? The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogative The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal. Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET? As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. HRET members enjoy security of tenure

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

G.R. No. L-10520: Lorenzo Taňada & Diosdado Macapagal vs Mariano After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. [G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957] TAADA vs.CUENCO FACTS: Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado asmembers of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power,authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominatetwo (2) more Senators." RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts.To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does notseek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shallchoose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose theSenators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law hasprescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a veryenlightening study on judicial selflimitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall beexercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have beenvalidly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the

powers of acoordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertainupon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of thePhilippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon theconstitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquireinto the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by theExecutive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settledwithout inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have,not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evadedwithout violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issuebefore us is political or not.In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinaryparlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum(supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by thepeople in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are calledu p o n t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member andspokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of itsCommittee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largestnumber of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. TheSenate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations whichare claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicialdepartment to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in agiven situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformitywith such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider anddetermine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the ElectoralTribunal, valid and lawful?Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal whichshall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, threeof whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as thecase may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votestherein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgadowhobelong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null

and voidand have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party,and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of saidTribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated bythe party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly,the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each ElectoralTribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of theSenate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, asmembers of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by theSenate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senatemerely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco andDelgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, AlfredoCruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, theadoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof isfounded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with theJustices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balanceof power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the ElectoralTribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of saidTribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violationthereof are null and void.It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the SenateElectoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it isconceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution.Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adoptedmaintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in atribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated bythe majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having thesecond largest number of votes in the House concerned.Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to thefact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt heshould nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. Thesame is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously,Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen thealready disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party.Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if thesame were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the SenateElectoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of theSupreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal,the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the politicalparties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide openfor the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pendingbefore said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove toforestall.In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specifiedin the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominatenot more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having thesecond largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three(3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither

these three (3)Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having thesecond largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee onRules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by theSenate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Althoughrecommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of themajority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, asheld in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned,conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano JesusCuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they arehereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunaland from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With thequalification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

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