Beaulieu 2002

Images Are Not the (Only) Truth: Brain Mapping, Visual Knowledge, and Iconoclasm Author(s): Anne Beaulieu
Reviewed work(s): Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 2002), pp. 53-86 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/690275 . Accessed: 23/06/2012 14:40
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Images Are Not the (Only) Truth: Brain Mapping,Visual Knowledge, and Iconoclasm
Anne Beaulieu Universityof Bath
of Representations the active brainhave served to establisha particulardomainof competencefor brain mappersand to distinguishbrain mapping'sparticular contributions to mind/brainresearch.At the heart of the claims about the emergingcontributionsof functional brain mapping is a paradox:functional imagers seem to reject representations while also using themat multiplepoints in theirwork.Thisarticle thereforeconsiders a love-haterelationshipbetweenscientistsand theirobject:the case of the iconoclastic imager.Thisparadoxical stance is the resultof theformationof an interdisciplinary approachthatbringstogethera numberof scientifictraditionsand theirparticularstandards of what constitutesscientific evidence. By examiningthe various ways in which images are deployed and rejected, the origins of these conflicting tendencies can be traced to the technological, methodological, and institutionalelements in the work of functional imagers. This approach provides insight into the current demarcationof imaging and reflects on features of visual knowledge.
Brain mapping has become a highly visible endeavor over the past decade-often literally so, as rainbow-coloredimages of thinking,feeling, dementing,or developingbrainsbecome familiarsights. This new streamof research relies on a number of technologies, primarilypositron emission tomography(PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to traceactivity in the brainwhile subjectslie in scannersand performvarious tasks. These experimentsinvolve large numbersof steps before any results can be obtained:tasksarecarefullydesignedto isolate particular components of mentalprocesses (i.e., looking at a false font versus looking at real letters to isolate letterrecognition),scans are averagedand normalized,functional
AUTHOR'SNOTE:The authorwishes to thankthe anonymousreviewersof Science, Technology, & HumanValuesas well as Ad Prins,PaulWouters,and MaartenDerksenfor helpful comments and suggestions on an earlierversion of this article. & Vol. 2002 53-86 Science, Values, 27 No. 1, Winter Technology, Human ? 2002SagePublications
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scans of blood flow are correlatedto anatomicalscans of the brain, and so forth(see Figure 1). The resultsthatcome out of these experimentsare predominantlypresentedas visual maps of the brainin action, as picturesof the mind at work, or as snapshotsof thoughts. Since the mid-1980s, brainmappingresearchhas rekindledandreconfigof ureda materialistapproachto the understanding mentalfunctionanddysthe function.It has also rehabilitated brain-based studyof highermentalprocesses, includingthe study of consciousness.l In the case at hand, like with the "gene of the week" in genetics research,the "localizationof the month" providesa concreteunit of scientific knowledge,usually a visual representation of a function in relation to the brain. The import of conceptualizing genetic knowledge as unitarylinguistic constructs(DNA as code, the Book of Life) has been much examined as to the impact of this metaphoron the organizationof both research and public perceptions of the project (Van Dijck 2000; Kay 2000). Similarly,the dominanceof specific (mainlyvisual) in modes of representation otherfields has recently been analyzed (Galison and 1997;Stafford1991, 1996; Treichler, Cartwright, Penley 1998), with the and constitutea particular novel thatdigitalrepresentations might suggestion form of visual knowledge. This articleexplores researchers' understandings of digitalrepresentations the way they areused as devices for the demarand cation of a new streamof research. Given that a wealth of visual representationsaccompanies this new approachto the study of mental phenomena,what is the role of images in these developments?What does it mean that mental functionsbecome visible? The answer given to both questions by researchersinvolved in brain mappingwould be this: very little. They would generally arguefor a highly circumscribed of images in brainmapping;brainmappersinsist thatthey role do not know the brainthroughimages and thatthese "prettypictures"are at best useful visual aids when giving talks. Such an answeris not very surprisingto scholarsof science and perhaps especially not to those studyingtechnology.The case has been madethatthis of wealthof visual representations to be expectedin the popularization sciis entific research.2 Withregardto brainmappingresearchspecifically,thereis some evidence thatthe visual elementplays a role in the attractiveness this of researchto some mediaoutlet.The science editorof Newsweekexplainshow a story on brainmappingarose:
In the case of the PETcover [story],these was a paperpresentedat the Society of Neuroscience[Meeting].... The editorssaw thatandthought,"Well,gee the picturesare gorgeous. Maybe there'smore thatcan be said of this."(quotedin Dumit 1995, p. 93)
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Figure 1. A paradigmatic brain mapping experiment. SOURCE: Image courtesy of Dr. Marcus Raichle, Washington University.
In additionto providingbeautifulvisual material,these images have also takenon whatmightbe called an iconic role, standingfor whatI have termed "themind-in-the-brain" (Beaulieu2000a). The coversof numerouspsychology and neurosciencetextbooksare adornedwith functionalimaging scans of the brain,althoughtheircontentsmightdeal only very sparinglywith that type of research.These biological rainbows,however,are widely particular used to figurethe highermentalfunctions-broadly defined--evoking concepts rangingfrom consciousness to humanness.3 But besides fulfilling a popularizingand iconic role, these images also aboundin researchsettings as partof the experimentalwork of researchers. The rise of a wealth of visualizations of the functioning brain has been trendby some analysts,a signalthatimages areincreaslabeledan important in to ingly important scientificknowingand"inundating" neuroscience,specifically (Stafford1996). Othershave been criticalof these representations, often attackingbrainscans' imagingcomponentin relationto the materialist aspects of this research(Goertzel 1995; Paller 1995; Schmitt 1995; Wolf This 1997; Fodor 1999). Yet, for brain mappers,the visual is a nonstarter.
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excerpt is from an interview between anthropologists and pioneers of

imaging: Dumit:Do you have a favoriteimage? Int.:No! Dumit:I was curious. Do you consideryourself a visual person? Int.:(pauses) Probablyyes, but I have to think aboutthat. Dumit:Right. Int.:Let me put it this way. If I look at an image or at numbers,I am more concerned with what it representsthan how it representsit. I don't know if that answersyour question, but I am trying it. (Dumit 1995, p. 96) Beaulieu:Now PET is a visual technology,what do you thinkthe promiseof that
is-
Int.:PET is a visual technology? Beaulieu:Huh, an imaging technologyInt.:Why do you call it a visual technology?Why do you wantto associate vision with imaging? Beaulieu: Hum [pause]. I'm afraidI wasn't neutralenough. PET results take a visual form. Do you thinkthat is an importantaspect? Int.:No, I don't! Actually it's sort of a radiologicmisnomer.(Senior Researcher, trainedas a physician)
In these excerpts,pacifying work on the partof the intervieweris needed to maintaindialogue between clashing conceptions of what is going on in functionalimaging. Why this clash? The argumentthat pretty pictures are also does not explain the way representations4 peruseful for popularization vade research environments.Yet, researchersinsist they do not know the of brainby seeing it, by makingits activityvisible. Denials of the importance imaging, in a setting where visual representationsare abundant,leave the analystperplexed-and, indeed,at the heartof claims aboutthe contributions of brainmappingis a paradox.Researchersrejectthe visual yet maintainits use in their work. This article thereforeconsiders a love-hate relationship between scientistsand theirobject-the case of the iconoclastic imager.The is paradoxicalstance towardrepresentations analyzed here by examining a numberof tropesused to discuss scans andmaps in brainmapping,with particularemphasison discussions of what counts as evidence andthe way data are constituted.The analysis presentedhere thereforeconsidershow images andthe visual can seem both centraland marginalto the empiricsof a group 1999). (Knorr-Cetina The visual as problematicshould be understoodin relationto a tradition in thatorderstypes of evidence hierarchically modem Westernscience, with
images and some forms of visual knowing generally low on the scale relies on the ordering 1995). This hierarchy (Stafford1991, 1996;Cartwright of ways of knowing the world, which providebetteror worse access to truth aboutthe way things are, appealingmerely to the senses (perception),or to themind (reason).This orderingof image, text, numberis not absolute,howaccordever,and there are other ways of constitutingvisual representations to linguistic or quantitative logics (e.g., as graphs)thatenhancetheirstaing ethos ratherthana pictorialone.5 tus by associatingthem with a quantitative Uses of the digitalin the contextof functionalimagingpartlyreconfigurethis when they are regardedas picturesof numbers.This reconfigurahierarchy, can tion is partialand fragile, however,since digital representations also be read optically (which might happen when popularizing),thereby lowering theirstatus. By examining the various ways in which images are deployed and of rejected,the origins of these conflicting tendenciesin the treatment representationscan be traced to the technological, methodological, and institutional elements in the work of functionalimagers. Beyond making sense of thisparadox,anthropologically providesinsightinto speaking,this approach the currentdemarcationof a new stream of research with regardto other kinds of medical and scientific research-the development of a new 1999; Loewy 1992). This analysistherefore epistemicculture(Knorr-Cetina follows the way brainmappersdemarcatetheirobject and methods,through theirexplanationsandresearchpractices.To do this, I drawon interviewsand how researchers fieldworkandpresenta numberof tropesto help understand make sense of their relationshipto scanningdata.6 of Representations the active brain have served to establish a particular domainof competence for brainmappers,an emerging group at the boundariesof cognitive andneuralscience, andto distinguishbrainmapping'sparIn research.7 the course of identifyingthe to ticularcontributions mind/brain I variouslogics thatorderthe use of representations, also reflect on the function for brain mapping of maintainingsuch an ambiguous stance toward since the demarcationof this new streamof research images. Furthermore, my primarilyrevolves aroundits use of representations, analysis also contributesto the discussion about the growing use of authoritative imaging in technoscientific culture. As any and all images become possible, there remainsthe need for guidelines for "choosingwhat possibilities are acceptable, above and beyond theirtechnologicalfeasibility"(Stafford1996). It is precisely such a case of complex rule making that I examine here.
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The Use of Representations, the Abuse of Images

Below is an excerpt from an explanation of the goals of functional imaging, where a strict definition of the epistemological basis of imaging is used by this researcher. This explanation was offered in reaction to questions about the importance of the visual, of imaging in using PET. This researcher was setting me straight about my misplaced interests, revealing in the process the link between world and measurement used by functional imagers. What we're doing is acquiringdata. Every naturalobject, a tree, a human,a planeis in four dimensions,it has spatialextent, and it has behaviorover time. We'retryingto measurein those fourdimensions.... So insteadof probingthe brainby making one little measurement,say like people used to do with Co2 coming out of veins, that's just a one dimensional measurementover time. Therewas no 3-D componentto that, so now we're able to measurethe brain as more appropriately a three-dimensional object over time. So you could do thatfor the brain,you could do that for your foot, you could do that for anyor appropriate thing. So the fact thatwe're scanningin 4-D, is thatparticularly for inappropriate the brain? It's just the same as any other physical object. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a physician) The brain is an object in four dimensions; the goal is to assess these dimensions. But in this realist mode, the fact that the measurements are displayed over space is not relevant for the object, in the sense that it is not epistemically constitutive of it. (Note, however, that the previous technique could only probe, make one little measurement.) In this description, a distinction between the object out there and a given mode of measurement is maintained, so that the representation of the data is secondary. This is also a way of maintaining a distance between scientific work and its presentation. A focus on the representation is missing the point: Now,is thatever thepoint of any of these studies, is whatthepictureslook like? Not really.It isn't. It gives you a good impressionof the dataquality,manypeople want to show a data slide, so people can get an assessmentvisually of the signal to noise. It's hardto trustas dataa publicationin which you haven'tseen any of the rawdata.'Cause itjust mightbe noise. So if they show you theirraw datain some form,you makean assessmentas to whetheryou shouldpay attention to this studyor not. But beyond thatwhatthey'retalkingaboutis whatthe mental operationwas that they used, what the paradigmwas, what trickthey used to isolate this out;they may show you a pictureto provethata functionthat you thoughtwas unitaryis reallytwo. And it's two becauseit has differentcogdifferentreactiontimes, or, andit's two spatially,andI'll nitivecharacteristics, show you a pictureof it and it's here andhere. So thepoint is for you to look at thatand to admirethat it's laid out over space ? No, thepoint is so you can see
thatthere'snot a lot of overlap,that it's two discreteareas and so twoprocess-
as trained a physician) Researcher, added]. (Senior ingareas[emphasis
to the Butwithoutattributing (entire)significanceof the representation what the pictureslook like, I will arguethat an importantrole is played by these are in pictures.It is important manyrespectsthatthese measurements laid out of in space because this forms the basis of many of the particularities functional mapping's contributionsover other modes of measurementof the brain.Besides spatiality,anotheraspect of the empirics of functionalbrain of imaginghighlightedin the explanationaboveis the importance quantification. Activity in the brainconsists of measurementsin a numberof dimensions (ideally,four), andthese resultsare statistics(ideally,significant).This if themewill be exploredlater,butnote thatfor researchers, these picturesare picturesof anything,they arepicturesof numbers.This is the aspect of their they representations emphasizeagainandagainwhendiscussingtheirwork. Both quantificationand spatiality, the two elements that subtend the empiricsof functionalimaging,havecomplex historiesthatI canonly briefly in sketchhere. I will concentrateon showing how these elements participate the claims of functionalimaging in relationto otherdisciplinesby analyzing a numberof tropes thatrecurin discussions of functionalimaging's knowldetecedge claims. These tropespoint to the ways in which the quantitative to tion of activity,its attribution an areaof the brain,andthe constructionof a stratespacefor relatingthese two elements areall based on representational gies that are highly specific to functional imagers. Taken together,tropes of and relatingto quantification spatialityenable a contextualization knowledge claims of brainmapping. in of The understanding representations the functionalimaging commuby nity is furthercharacterized a strongdivision between two possible functo tions, negativeand positive. The latterconcernsthe use of representations communicatewith colleagues and the public and is addressedbriefly at the end of this analysisto providea necessarycontrastwith the negativeuse. The of public understanding these images, itself multiple and complex, is discussed at length elsewhere (Beaulieu 2000b). The main concern here is the role that is explicitly denied to representationsand thereby defined negatively: images do not form the empiricalbasis of functionalimaging. Within this negation,two types of tropesarise, each positioning functionalimaging in relationto scientific ideals and demarcatingfunctionalimaging from less scientific endeavors. The first redefines scans as representations of and quantitation aims to establish the scientific foundationsof the research pursued ("They'renot pictures, they're statistical maps"). Related to this theme is the constitution of research as independent from the imaging
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technologies used (not prettypictures).A second group of tropes distances fromthe clinical applicationsof (PET)imaging theworkdone by researchers is not a radiologicalscience")andthe nuclearmedicineoriginof PET. ("This
Rhetorical Representations: When Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words?

Trope1: "They'renot pictures,they're statisticalmaps. So you're showing hard evidence."
in The abundanceof representations neuroscientificcontexts that overwhelms the neophyte8clashes with the conceptions of researchersthat they in areinvolvedin makingmeasurements the brain,not obtainingimages of it. had to An interestingexceptionI encountered this attitudeamongresearchers to do with a once-off experience,often markingpioneeringmoments.In such cases, the researchersacknowledged the significance of seeing when the visualization enabled by the technology led to a kind of witnessing. For example,
[The visual] had an initial impact,it was extraordinarily exciting to see things that had never been seen before. I remember several occasions at the wherewe saw thingsthatno one hadever seen before. Like the Hammersmith, substantia nigraworking.So thereis an impact,which I guess is the same as the impact of looking througha telescope and seeing something that no one has ever seen before, the impactof the momentwhen looking at a comet, which is trainedas a psychologist) excitingto see. (SeniorResearcher, extraordinarily
The sensory is associatedwith experience,the momentof discovery or first observation,and not with reasoning. A sense of wonder is associated with event,butordinary day-to-daypracticeof seeing, when relatedto a particular scientific investigationdoes not fall undersuch a category.Seeing is not the one techniqueof investigation; does not do this workbecause one is ordinary visually oriented. Researchersinsist on the fact thatthey arenot involvedin observationbut the in measurement work.The dataof researcharedescribedas quantitative: of work is done using "a colored representation a set of statisticalvalues" (JuniorResearcher,trained as physician). Explanationsof representations focus on the measurementwork involved in making scans, and visual eleof are mentsof these representations often discussedas an emergentproperty the quantitativedata. The data are measurementsof phenomena,and they define complex phenomena in a way that imaging, as a pictorial strategy,
could not achieve. The phenomenon,the instrument'suse, and the undermode. in are standingof the representation aligned, integrated a quantitative This insistence on the quantitativeis one of the strategiesthat preventsthe of "proliferation meaning"prized by artists and not by scientists (Bastide that can be made of the 1990), narrowingthe possibility of interpretations can results.Although the representation be altered,made to look better,its referentremainssolidly quantitative:
Particularlynow with image editing and enhancing, you can manipulate images, and ultimately,one should be able to trackeverythingback down to tablesof numbers,which arelocationsof activationsin Talairach space, it's the a sortof conceptthatunderneath glossy exterior,there'sa strongskeleton,that refersback to [inaudible]that is what gives some coherence and credibility. (SeniorResearcher,trainedas a physicist)
Joe Dumit (1994) labeled this reliance monosemy, a quality of the information providedby scans, but more generallyit is also one of the main features of and builtintothebrainmapper's understanding production representations. referent the embracingof the quantitative The rejectionof the visual and the same breath,evoking progress: involvedis often done in
But I thinkthatfor a field to grow up-and everybodythinksthe same, I don't think I'm giving you views that are differentfrom anybody else, in the best places, I don't thinkI'm puttingforwardviews thatarethe slightestbit heretical-it becomes importantthat it become quantitative,science doesn't just deal with pictures, it deals with counting things, graphing things, plotting things. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a psychologist)
Brain mappers perform experiments where brain functions are variables, whereresponsesaretestedstatisticallyandgroupdataarecarefullyanalyzed. Researchersthereforealign their empiricalbasis, the scans and maps they use, with a quantitativeand experimentalapproachratherthan a visual and a one. In theirunderstanding, visual label reducesthis workto observational observation.Such observationsmight be useful for the neurosurgeon,who mustplan an intervention-but not for the scientistwho seeks to experiment and analyze. Differentgroupsusing functionalimaging have slightly differentcriteria and as to whatconstitutesan experiment,9 differencescan also be found with neighboringgroups of researchers.These differences in the way scans are valuedare significantfor the scientific statusof brainmapping.A frequently recurringexpression in discussions of representationis the phrase "pretty pictures."
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Speakingof the visual, the intervieweehasjust explainedhow it is significant for communicatingwith the public:
Beaulieu: But it's also valued among scientists. Int.: Within the field we know what we are doing. I'm talking about at one removed.If you'renot in the brainimagingfield, it's very easy to dismiss brain imaging as pseudo-science.Those of us in the field know what those pictures, which are so pretty,underlie,what they represent.I'm not saying that is not something that is usable scientifically. (Senior Researcher, trained as a physicist)
The description of functional imaging work as making pretty pictures invokesagainan accusationof lack of scientificpurposethroughassociations with a nonscientific, visual,andphotographic possiblyeven popular, approach. This pejorativedescriptionis often heard coming from psychologists who critiquethe way functionis studied.Makingprettypicturesof the brainis at best observationaland not the scientific study of function throughthe complex experimentaldesigns prized by psychologists.to The phrase"prettypicture"has links to the previoustrope,since it points to the sensitiveissue of (lack of) scientific sophistication.It also relatesto the nexttrope,since it defines brainmappingworkas dependenton the technolowhose apparatus does the work. gies used, invokingthe passivephotographer The prominenceof technologyin functionalimagingis difficultto overcome: a PET scannerand cyclotron cost up to U.S.$7 to $10 million, and a single PET scan costs aboutU.S.$1,500. This is especially truegiven the low-tech context in which much of this work is done. Functionalimaging is "littlebig science,"whereaspsychology and neurologyare not highly technologically dependentfields of research.This overidentificationwith the technologies they use is counteredin generalways by functionalimagersby insisting that functionalimaginghas moved into mainstream neuroscienceand sometimes
seeming to avoid imaging in describing their work.it More specific strategies
will be discussed below. In terms of the status of representations,therefore, functional imagers definitionof their representations. arguefor a quantitative Representations, when understood partof an imagisticregister,areonly acceptedas markers as of momentsof discovery.Otherwise,a discussionin visual termsof the representations used by imagers is considered a lack of understandingof the approachand phenomena these researchersare investigating. Sometimes, suchdescriptionsarepreciselyaimedat questioningthe statusof theresearch (just pretty pictures). But for brain mappers,the proper understandingof functionalimaging is to see it as an experimentalstrategythatmeasuresand explores the brain quantitatively,not one that visualizes it. Interestingly,
researchers also connect an explanationfor the use of the visual or visualization to the complexity of theirquantitative data-their dataare actuallysuch complex quantitativemeasurements(and their relationships)that they can best be renderedvisually, since in neuroscientificparlance,vision is the sensory modality with the broadestbandwidth. If representations quantitative, properway of understanding are the them must also involve a quantitativerationality.This is the basis of the second trope.
them." Trope2: "I have no truckwith people who look at images and interpret
This trope also negates the visual, but it is directed at a different kind of demarcationof these scientists' work, setting researchersapart from the clinic. The clinicians are image oriented,to the researcher'schagrin.Measurementsin quantitative formshouldbe enoughto understand scans, but the they are not.
In our clinical work, we providea list of all brainareas,the metabolicratefor that patientin thatarea, and the normalrangefor thatareabased on our files. And whetherthatperson is plus or minus two standards deviationsof the normal rangefor each area.Wealso provide the color images because the physicians want it, butwe would be happyon our clinical reportsjust supplyingthe numericalinformation[emphasisadded]. (quotedin Dumit 1995, p. 105)
Clinicians therefore desire a beautiful image of the brain, a desire Dumit (1994) has analyzed as a culturallybased longing for insight into what subtendsourpersonhood.But the clinician'sdesireis the researcher's aberration. It reduces the work to scan making, a technicians'occupation.A quotation above indicatesthatto link PET and vision is a "radiologicmisnomer." This oppositionto radiology recurredseveral times in interviews:
Well, I thinkthatin the field thatI'm involvedin, which is functionalmapping, we have maintainedthe traditionof quantitation, even if it's relativequantitative or statisticallevel quantitative, statisticalparametric and has map (SPM)12 been criticalto that.So there'sno questionwe would simply inspect images in a radiological sense to make diagnosis or conclusions. That's just not in the ethos at all of what we do and it's neverbeen in my ethos. (SeniorResearcher, trainedas a physician)
A number of threads can be followed to explain these moves to distanciationfrom the clinic. First,it is a distinctionthatrelatesto the historyof the developmentof these scanners.PET scannerswere developed in nuclear medical settings, and while a numberof potentialuses were suggested, the
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But mostenthusiasticallypursuedwas thataimed at tumordetection.13 even withinthe earlyresearchon cerebralblood flow, therewere those workingin and the traditionof autoradiography those orientedto nuclearmedicine. At this point, it seems that the clinical and researchdistinctions were already articulated along the lines of image versus number.T4 Themarkedcontrastbetweenresearchandclinical goals in using imaging technologiesis also expressedin debates aboutthe very way in which these are representations to be understood.Inthe 1980s, a debatearoundthe interand of pretation PETscanswas foughtout betweenthe quantitative qualitative approachto PET scans at a workshopon PET analysis and subse(visual) quentlyinjournals.One side claimedthatclinical PETcan producerepreseninsisted on a quantitative tationsthatcan be understoodvisually;researchers and a quantitativeevaluation.In this debate, PET scans were measurement seen as highly processed data-involving normalizations,statistical tests, and the use of complex models typical of physics research (Carson 1991). Cliniciansarguedthatcertainelements of this process were mainly relevant in the (physics) researchcontext of PET's developmentand that some complex datacorrectionsmight be bypassed withoutcompromisingthe validity of scans-with the benefit of increasingthe clinical usefulness of PET.Furthermore,even when no objections were raised against quantificationas was arguedto be an even better being overly complex, the visual appearance basis for judgment15than quantitativeindications (in the form of rates describedin tables and lists) (DiChiro and Brooks 1988). The researcher's analyticapproachwas not welcomed in the clinic, where it was considered The and possiblyunnecessary, oftenunfeasible.16 reverseremains impractical, true:visual evaluationdoes not belong in the scientificethos of mappers.The versusvisual inspectionseems to have subsidedin debateaboutquantitation the 1990s, as research-oriented journals developed and meetings were held separately. of the Anotherway of understanding importance the distinctionsresearchis ers makebetweenvisual evaluationanda quantitative approach to look at a Writingin theJournalof Neuropsychiatry proposalforcrossingthisboundary. and Clinical Neuroscience, clinical researcherAndreassenand colleagues use proposedgoing from a clinical to research-oriented of imaging. While "many of these techniques have been developed and marketedas clinical tools to permitphysiciansto look andrenderajudgmentas to whethera structure or functions is normalor abnormal"(p. 125), the clinical tools can be consists in retrieving adaptedto serve researchpurposes.The transformation the quantitative:
originally Essentially,the challengeof image analysisis to convertinformation meant for visual gestalt processing into a quantitative and mathematicaltool thatprovidespreciseestimatesof structure size, shape,volume, or physiological activity.(Andreassenet al. 1992)
Andreassen'slab offereda numberof tools for this purpose.17Note thatin this process, not only does the understanding changes (from visual gestalt) but also thatprecisionis to be gainedanddiscreteelementsto be measured(size, of volume, etc.). Similarly,measuringreplaces an understanding the whole andimproveson the scanas gestaltimage;multifactored becomes quantitation the goal ratherthanthejudgmentof normalor abnormalappearance. (While the focus hereis on the mainquantitative/visual distinctions,a numberof featuresof imagingcouldalso be shownto contrast betweenlabandclinic:theuse of color, for example.18) go from a clinical image to researchdata, one To must shift from looking to measuring, from visual understanding to quantifying. A furtherreason for this boundarywork may be found in the precarious positionPEThas occupiedas a clinical tool. As a very expensivetechnology, PET's clinical presence has been particularlycontroversialin the Western economic contextof the 1980s (Kevles 1997). But the costs have not been the only challenge to PET's clinical acceptance.Technically,the need for an onsite cyclotron makes the use of PET a big enterpriseeven for academic/ researchorientedhospitals (Fricket al. 1992). The regulationof tracerproductionhas also been perceivedas threatening wider distribution PET the of scanners.19 regularintervalsfor the past threedecades, PET has been said At to be on the cusp of becoming clinical or of losing what little foothold it had and or acquired20 has seen its clinical efficacy problematized downrightchallenged (Powerset al. 1991; VolkowandTancredi1986). Maintainingassociations with clinical PET,which is challengedin termsof safety,clinical usefulness, andeconomic liability,is thereforenot appealingto researchgroups. These discussions of the role that representations not play are therefore do indicativeof the ideals thatfunctionalimagingis pursuing.Furthermore, they also show how these ideals in brainmapping'sempirics are relatedto disciplinaryand technological contexts. Those "who look at images and interpretthem" are thereforeclinicians using PET.21 They are those who have different(or less) technological support,a differentexpertiseandgoals thatclearlydiffer,althoughtheyuse some of the same technology.The argumentsaboutthe visual/quantitative understanding of these representationsexpress the depth of these differences.22 Claims to scientific status and degrees of greaterscientific legitimacy can
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that thereforebe understood the rejectionof definitionsof representations by focus too closely on "thevisual,"which is not scientificbecausenot quantitainvolved(judgtive, whichbelongs in the clinic becauseof the understanding and which too closely ties the work to imaging technologies and ment),23 observation.
Demonstrating Space and Showing Location and the Persistence of the Pictorial The next tropesto be discussed all sharean evocationof space. In putting of forththeparticular contributions brainmappingresearch,the possibilityof new spaces for explorations(quiteliterally)andthe insightsto be openingup derivedfrom relatingdifferentkinds of informationto the space of the brain are key elements, which are also entwined with the use of representations.
Trope3: "Forthe firsttime in the historyof neuroscience,it is now possible to 'observe' cognitive activityin the intacthumanbrain"(CabezaandNyberg 1997, p. 1).
Functional imagers stress the power of brain imaging technologies to encompass the entire brain of normal subjects. The space enclosed by the skull has been penetrated:
These technologies have breachedthe biological limitationsimposed by the and inaccessibilityof the functioningbrainto directobservation investigations, since they allow directassessmentof brainfunctionin the normalliving human being. (Tancrediand Volkow 1992, p. 549)
The elementsof directness,in vivo study,andnormalitythatthe technologies allow are consideredtrulyuniqueto functionalimaging. Furthermore, brain functionhas become moredirectlyaccessible. This is a commonformulation of the powers of imaging. Being able to view the normalhumanhas meant studyingdifferentkinds of subjects:
While computedtechnology (CT) was a means of viewing the internalanatomy of the human body, PET extended that view to organ function. Brainin behaviorrelationships human,long theprovence[sic] of neuropsychologists and cognitive psychologists studyingpatientswith brainlesions, could not be pursuedwith ratherremarkable accuracyin normalsubjectsas well. (Raichle 1996, p. R3)
Ratherthan relying on accidents of nature(strokes, tumors) that would affect functionandtherebygive some (indirect)informationaboutthe localization of functions,researcherscan study activationsin normallyfunctionthandisruptedfunction.It also meansa different ing brains-function, rather stimulations,which are done on patientswith approachthan intraoperative because the brain pathologies justifying such interventions.Furthermore, imaging technologies can retrievethe signal of the brainnoninvasively,the considerednormal.Again, this contrastswith the intraspace is undisturbed, operativestimulations,which are done on patientswhose brainsareaffected by surgicalprocedures.This possibility also contrastsin obvious ways with anotherdirectmode of study,which consists in studyingpatientswith lesions in life and correlatingtheir disfunctions with postmortemstudies of brain anatomy. Being able to see inside the brainspace in vivo relies on featuresbuiltinto the technologies used in brain mapping. Both origin stories and technical descriptionsof PET insist on the importanceof the creationof the means for For images from the measurementsmade by the detectors.24 reconstructing example, x-ray CT
immediatelystimulatedscientists and engineers to consider alternativeways and of creatingimages of the body's interiorusing similarmathematical comThis quickly led to the introduction puterstrategiesfor image reconstruction. of positronemission tomography(PET)which was, in effect, a meansof doing in tissue autoradiography vivo in humans.(Raichle 1996)
The manipulationof data in different space retrievingthe space of the braininside the scanneris consideredfoundationalto modernor maturePET To technology.25 be able to measurein 4-D, therefore,the relationbetween the space of the braininside the scannerandthe space of the digitalimage had to be constructed.Representationsin PET imaging are the productof the recoveryof the originin space of the signal, andthis is builtinto the scanning the technology.Tomography, technologicalpossibilityof makingthese kinds of images, is also the key to placing brainactivity in space. A furtherline of argumentalso corroborates significanceof the spatial the dimensionfor functionalimaging:new technologies, such as magnetoencephalography (MEG), and older ones, such as electroencephalogram (ERP/
of EEG), have been enrolledas partof the armamentarium brainmappingin the early 1990s on the basis of the spatial informationthey could convey.26 As these technologiesprovidespatialdata,they come to be consideredas part of the brain-mapping of tools. This association tells of the centralityof box
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spatialinformationof functionalimaging technology.Tools are appropriate if they can providedataaboutthe brainin such a way thatthey can be represented in space-precisely as measurementslaid out over space. If by the mid-1970s PET providedtomographicdata, having data represented in a physiologic space was not meaningful.The need to create a special space in which to understand PETwas an important item on the agendaof the growing PET communityin the early 1980s. The spatialityof PET measurements long been a core concern;PETwas saidto present"achallenge has to an old discipline,"namely, neuroanatomy(Mazziotta 1984). It provided metabolicmeasurements the tomographicspace of the scanner,which had in to be both distinguishedfrom and reconciled to the anatomicalspace of the brain.This could be describedas the attemptto reconcile the pictorialrenditions of anatomywith quantitative measuresof metabolicactivityin a digital space. The physiological dataprovidedby PET was eventuallyconstructed so that it could be layered onto an anatomicalspace (see Figure 2). The relationto anatomicalspace was thereforean importantelement in who establishingthe credibilityof PETwith neurologistsandneurosurgeons were early users of PET.But the anatomicalspace is particular, suited to the needs of imagers,workingin a digital contextand strivingto be quantitative. The anatomyof imagersdiffers from thatof otherneuroscientists:locations in functionalimagingaredefinedquantitatively, a Cartesianspace, andnot in by a linguistically ordered nomenclature.In constructinga measurement ethos of the functionalimagersordersthe visual and space, the quantitative These developmentsin linguisticconventionsof anatomistsand clinicians.27 functional imaging have resulted in technologies that produce traces in explicit spaces and modes of analysis thatrely on well-defined spatialcomponents and anatomicalreferents.These are not post hoc contextualizations of functionalimaging databut are integralto obtainingit. These elements of functionalimaging are also relevantto understanding otherclaims made the in by functionalimagers.Representations 4-D arethe productof PET methIn odology and technology,not an afterthought. introducinganatomyto the understandingof PET, brain and mind, function and anatomy, could be mappedby being correlatedin a common space.
Trope4: Concretenessof mind. For functionalspecialization,every guess was thattherewas some specialization. It came as no surprisethat you would get these little patches when you stimulatedpeople with motion or color, therewas no greatparadigmshift, but by virtuethatit was clearly evident, thatyou could see thefunctional specialbefore [emphasisadded].(Senior Researcher,trainedas a physician)
izationin action,it suddenly a statusthatit didn'thave acquired concrete
Figure 2.The use of Talairachspace for analyzing positron emission tomography (PET)data and anatomical scans is very widespread. SOURCE: PET Consortium, Imagereproduced courtesyof International Neuroimaging VA and Tools. Center,MPLS Medical Center,Visualization AnalysisSoftware Imaging NOTE: is a Cartesianspace, whereeverypointis labeledwithan x, y, zcoordinate, This enablingthe matchingof different types of data accordingto location.This figureis a screenshot of softwareused by brainmappers.The windowon the rightrepresents On mergedfunctional (PET)and anatomicaldata (magneticresonance imaging). the leftare slide bars (corresponding the x, y, and z axes), whichallowthe user to move to different slices and navigatethe space of the brain. through
New evidence using functional imaging techniques provides a "concrete status" to theories of brain functions. Since these studies are done in normal humans, researchers state, the full range of the mind's functions can be studied and also made concrete. Having access to the normal human brain is a significant element. For example, it is argued that many of the higher cognitive functions are in the frontal lobes, so that animal studies are of limited use since "the biggest discrepancies between man and animal are found in the frontal lobes" (Frith et al. 1991). In functional imaging, the normal human brain can therefore be used as a basis for those studying the mind.
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of Thegoal of cognitive neuroscienceis to identifythe neuralsubstrates cognitiveprocesses.Ourchancesof achievingthis goal haveradicallyincreasedduring the last decade by the introductionof functional neuroimaging techniques.... Forthe firsttime in the historyof neuroscience,it is now possible to "observe"cognitive activity in the intact human brain. (Cabeza and Nyberg 1997, p. 1) Brain imaging provides such a tool for deepening one's understanding of the mind by inscribing it into the space of the brain. Those cognitive scientists interested in a deeper understandingof how the humanmindworksnow believe thatit is maximallyfruitfulto proposemodels of cognitive processes that can be assessed in neurobiological terms. (Gazzaniga1989, p. 2) Imaging technologies are considered to provide the best methods to make the move described above-using the brain to test the mind. Indeed, functional imagers often point out that psychologists do not deal with the brain but with a construct they call the mind. What the functional imaging methods have to offer is a grounding in the brain of these constructs: It all dependsif they care aboutwhere things arelocatedin the brain.If they're that cognitive psychologists, then they don't understand all objects are in four dimensions,notjust one. Cognitivepsychologists tend to thinkof the mind as the being only in time. But the mind has a physical counterpart, brain.And if you wantto adequatelystudythe mind,you need to studythe brainas well. And that moves you into four dimensions, and that means you actually represent where the propertiesare in those three dimensions and thatyou need to study of them,in space,overtime,andthatis a shortcoming theirs.(SeniorResearcher, trainedas a physician) The brain as a space in which to ground the study of mind is overlooked by as they are on process, in terms of time, and not on psychologists-focused the implementation of these processes in a material realm. Brain mappers credit themselves with a better object of study; they represent properties where they lie. The way in which the mind is made concrete through being studied with functional imaging again focuses on the use of spatiality. The experimental methods of brain mapping rely on spatial differences (see Figure 3). Specifically, the experimental paradigm in brain mapping distinguishes functions through their correspondence to measurements of activity laid out in space rather than to the time needed to accomplish them. The contrast between the tasks represents a particular operation, and this operation is then considered to be implemented in the area (or areas) that differ.
/ Beaulieu Brain Mapping 71
The subtractionmethod based on the work of Donders and Steinberg (Draaisma1989) has thusbeen adaptedin this field througha shiftfrom measurementin time to measurementin space. This shift is a determinantin muchof the phenomenaof cognitivepsychology into phenomena translating thatcan be studiedwith functionalimaging.This experimentalapproachhas been ratherinelegantlyformulatedas the "where" question.Thus, wherehas been describedas the questionaboutthe humanbrainbest answeredby brain mapping'sconvergingdisciplines (Wood 1994). But where has not always been the key questionfor cognitive psychology (Raichle 1998). The particular contributionthat functional imaging provides is to penetratethe brain space and allow the studyof the mind in thatspace ratherthantreatingit as a seriesof events in time. Accusationsof a lack of sophisticationin manipulating the functionbeing studiedhave been made by some cognitive psychologists (as noted in the discussion of prettypictures above). But the imagers counterthatthe cognitive scientists' measurementsare less direct:
by observingthe inputandoutputresponses... they arenot ableto demonstrate the mechanismsby which the organworks.This is formalistic,whateverboxes theyputit, these boxes arenot ontologicallycommitted,so that'sa majordrawback. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a neuroscientist)
Because based on external measurements(reaction time or accuracy of responses),cognitive psychologists can only providean indirectmeasureindirect,in the sense thatit will not measureactivityin the space of the brain. Brain mappingpresumablydeals with ontologically committedversions of functions-this commitmentis based on exploiting,on one hand,the quantitative for scientific legitimacy and the spatialityof the brainfor a concrete materialbasis for the study of mental functions. Functionalbrain imaging and thereforerelies on the constitutionof spaces for measurements measurein relation to those spaces. Showing that mental proments of activations cesses are somewherein the braininvolves technologies and methodologies of space reconstructionof PET and on the subtractionmethod. By making and showing their measurementsin the brainbased on spatial differentials, the the anatomicalspace of the brainmust be rendered,reintroducing pictoof rial traditionin the representations functional imagers. While the point may not be abouthow the picturelooks, as one interviewargued,the point is very muchaboutseeing the activitybeing laid out in threedimensions,which is a feat accomplishedby invoking conventionsfor representingspace. Throughtheirprivilegedaccess to the studyof functionand its biological in territory the study imagersthereforecarveout a particular implementation, functional of functionsin the brainsof normal,living subjects.Furthermore,
72 Science, Technology,& HumanValues
Figure 3.The experimental strategy of brain mapping. SOURCE: Image courtesy of Dr. Marcus Raichle, Washington University. NOTE:Tasks are performed in the scanner by the subject; the resulting activations are recorded on scans. Activations are subtracted, then averaged between subjects.
imagers distinguish their work from animal experiments because they work on humans and can therefore encompass the highest, typically human functions-the mind. Brain mappers also distinguish their approach in terms of space from other types of investigation of the human brain. Trope5: Seeing the entire brain."Youfind a braincorrelate,namely, change in blood flow. Of course, comparedwith EEG, it's a bettercorrelate.It's better trainedas definedspatially,andit covers the entirebrain." (SeniorResearcher, a neuroscientist) Another distinctive claim of functional imaging is the possibility of imaging the entire brain. This has implication for demarcating imaging work from both neuroscientific approaches and neuropsychological studies, which have been concerned with localization or mapping work (in the general sense of
attributingfunctions to locations). The apprehensionof the brain in its entiretyprovides a differentterritoryfor investigationthan the space of the brainthat is availableto other methods, such as intraoperative stimulation, where only a very small partof the brainis visible and manipulable.Other methods make one small measurementby probingthe brain,whereasfunctional imaging can encompass the whole volume of the head. Since localization researchis the coupling of functional and location, a differentversionof a territoryleads to differentdefinitionsof functions.The possibility of measuringall processes in the entirebrainsubtendsthe claims of functionalimagingthatit can investigatethe brainat a systems level. This argumentis often used to show the break between the localizationists and functionalimaging. Since they do not equate one region with one function, systems-level investigationsmarkthis type of mappingas a new endeavor. methodsof neuropsychologyor intraoperative Thus,in contrastto traditional stimulation,functionalimaging does not show only the essential areasfor a functionbut an entiresystem thatsubtendsa function.Measuringactivityin the brainat a systems level has been an important result of collaborationsof psychologists and neuroscientists.
First,as you know,the results are bound by the methods. So if you work with some single unit recordings,you tend to be shortsighted,you will understand details of local computations,but you have no idea whatsoever,how the organ is functioningat the systems level. Nobody had any ideas aboutthe functionat the systems level... and one of the majorlandmarks this immense, we can is call it parallelprocessing,butwe call it multipleneuronalpopulationsor multiple synaptic populations collaborate to produce functions of the brain.... [Neuropsychologists]tend to interpret theirresultsin the traditional localizationisticway. They had no idea how disperse, I wouldn't say diffuse, butdispersedit really is... the brainreallydoes workthis way with these huge populations.So I think that's very fortunate.That is why the methods are so efficient. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a neuroscientist)
Accordingto this pioneerof functionalimaging, withoutbeing able to measure these entire systems spreadall over the brain,the way the brainworks could not be understood.Being able to considerfunctionsas systems (andnot as unitary, with particular places in the brain,which once removedwill affect that one function leaving the rest of the brainundisturbed)is a major only methodological leap, a change of mindset. Such claims to measuringthe simultaneityof activationsof partsof the brain,of measuringat the systems levels, furtherrelies on detectinggroupsof areasconnectedin space and the layeringof functionaland anatomicalinformation.28
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Conclusion Images of Mind and Graphs of Numbers in Space I have examineda numberof redefinitionsin relationto functionalimaging: what constitutes a modem PET scanner, what makes a technology a functionalimagingtechnology,what constitutesa properbasis for analyzing PET data, and how the highest humanfunctionscan be investigatedexperimentally.The answers to these questions have to do with the possibility of Linkedto these modes of measurements are providingspatialmeasurements. the particularknowledge claims that have arisen from functional imaging: seeing the brainat a systems level andmakingmindphenomenavisible in the humanbrain.These claims, which set functionalimaging apartfrom other approachesand other groups of investigators,are linked to the representations of functional data in a dimensional space: pictorial conventions are mobilizedto relatefunctionaldatato the substanceof the brain.Thus,in spite of the distancingfrom imaging contexts and from the visual discussed in the first part, the argumentsand claims of functional imagers rely to a great extenton aspectsof these traditions.It appearsthatwhile an epistemicrole is often denied to representations, their use does contributeto the study of the brainspecific to functionalimagingthroughrelianceon the spatialityof data. The ambiguous relationshipsof imagers to their representationstherefore stem from the fact thatmuch of the empiricsthatsubtendtheircontributions to the study of the brainis achievedby using pictorialconventionsto render space-the very tradition from which functional imagers try to distance themselves by insisting on quantifications. Havingidentifiedthe two majorcomponentsthat subtendthe empiricsof brain mappers, the attitude of researchersto the use of images becomes clearer.These researchersare not entirelyiconoclastic in thatthey do accept that images play a role, but they do fear too great a reliance on the icon-a seductionof the senses and the neglect of the greatertruththat lies beyond The and representations. quantitative the spatialarenot always easily reconciled in the representationalstrategies of brain mapping. When tensions arise, and researchersseem concernedby the overemphasison representations, it is because of the ambiguous relationshipof these two elements, which traditionally characterize different ways of knowing. When balance is maintained, a positive role is readily granted to representations. Insofar as they function as tools for communicationand not as an empirical basis or style of evaluation,representations praisedfor their directness are and synthetic power, which imagers see as legitimately deployable in
communicationswith colleagues or the public. But the dangerof improper still understanding lurks;credentialsare necessaryto be properlyvisual and
scientific. Let's takean SPM.To the uninitiated, they will see a pictureas an activityin the brainandat some level they will see thatas the activityandthey will forgetthat it has to be takeninto accountthatthatis not the activity,thatis a coloredrepresentationof a set of statisticalvalues. And those values have been smoothed spatially,andin time, in the case of fMRI. They've been warped.They've been realigned.They've been throughall kinds of crunch,and in setting out to simplify, the picturecan to some extent deceive. (JuniorResearcher,trainedas a physician)
To see a pictureas transparent, the activityin the brain,is not an approprias ate way of seeing; measurements mustbe understood termsof theirquantiin tative production,not simply in terms of the phenomenathey represent.29 Yet,in othersettings,it is preciselythe seductionof the viewer throughan optical, intuitive understandingof representationsthat enables functional imagers to communicate effectively. Researchers acknowledge the effiin ciency of representations drawingthe attentionof the public to theirwork, the lay public will understandthem differently.This marks yet although anotherimportant demarcation,drawinga boundarybetween what is scientific and what falls outside science and into the popularrealm. WhatI wish to highlighthere arethe demarcations researchers that themselves make in relationto representations and, more specifically, how these relate to the difficulty of reconciling image and number,as brain mapping constitutes its object as quantitativemeasurementsin space. The image speaks for itself, but not in quite the same way to everyone-the pictorial aspects of these representations predominatein the public's understanding. One of the consequencesof this dualregisteraroundrepresentations thatit is allows neuroscientiststo have it both ways: to make claims with scientific integritywhile providingvisually exciting materialsfor the public to understandintuitively-and because of this understanding, gatherfurthersupport for research. But the possibility of workingboth crowdshas certainlimits;the intuitive is not scientific and thereforedangerous.Other scientists also monitor the boundarybetween lay and scientific discourses, and functionalimagers are awareof the possibility of a backlash.
Uncritically,everybodygets excited aboutimaging.It's a double-edgedsword, becauseit's nice to get into the mediabutalso sometimestendsto be denigrated
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by other scientists in other scientific domainsas glitz and showboatingrather thanseriousscience. As faras I'm concerned,we aredoing seriousquantitative systemsneuroscience.We arevery conscious thatwe aredoing three-andfourin dimensionaldataanalysis.The fact thatthe datais actuallyrepresentable an appealingvisual form is extra. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a physicist)
The restraintof scientists is thereforeboth the need to be silent aboutthe difficultiesand contingencies of digital imaging (Lynch 1991) and the need for researchersto observe a certain restraintin presenting their work in nonscientific terms. This is not platonic rhetoric of technoskeptics to to denouncevisual corruption, use Stafford's(1996) phrase,but rathergatekeepingbetween the rationalityof the scientific world and the intuitivereathat soningof the public.Whenrepresentations scientistsbelieve invokeintuare itive, nonscientificmodes of understanding used, the threatis all the more The powerful.30 epistemics of functionalimagers cannot include the purely pictorialor imagistic withoutrenouncingclaims to be pursuingquantitative, scientific experiments. Mixed Traditions, Hybrid Objects The researchpursuedwith functionalimaging technologies and methods as is construedby its practitioners the crossroadsbetweencognitivepsycholand neuroscience: ogy
It has come to the point, as it often happensin science, thata discipline arises betweentwo existing disciplines.I don't thinkthatwill go away.The discipline is not PETandfMRI. It's all the methodsfor imaging,evokedpotential,MEG, unitedaroundthe fact thatwe can do thingswith the humanbrainthatwe never could do.... It's not cognitive psychology, it's not neuroscience, it's somewhere in the middle. (Senior Researcher,trainedas a neuroscientist)
The formationof an interdisciplinary approachbrings togethera numberof of standards what constitutesscienscientific traditionsand theirparticular to tific evidence (theirempirics).It also contributes the paradoxof the iconois clastic imager,whose hybridobjectof the mind-in-the-brain constitutedby strategies. drawingon distinctrepresentational After aboutten years of functionalimaging research,therehave recently been calls to reviewthe researchagenda.Interestingly, manyof the criticisms of the currentstate of researchand proposalsfor futuredevelopmentsalso practicein functionalimaging. The point to place given to representational resultsprovidedby functionalimaging have been labeled as limitedbecause it is geographic(Mountcastle1998)-a criticism that rebukesthe emphasis
on the spatialin functionalimaging research.In the same vein, othersargue thatwhile the neophrenologyof the pastyearshas been necessaryandcontinues to provide unique insight (into the entire, normalhuman living brain), need to considerit as an empiricalbasis andnot as an end in itself researchers (Frackowiak 1998). Knowing the answer to "where" should be used to should answerquestions about how the brainworks. These representations be used as the startingpoint for furtheranalysis, as observationson the basis can of which researchers theorize,andas the materialsfromwhich principles of brainorganizationwill be discovered.Maps will lead to principlesand to models of brainfunction.3'As one researcherpredicted,"So once the field grows up [and] becomes less interested in mapping, it will be numbers" trainedas a psychologist). Such statementsmakes sense (SeniorResearcher, in terms of a hierarchyof types of scientific evidence, here shown to be embracedand reproducedby the researchersusing imaging. According to functionalimaging aspiresto scientific status; this particular understanding, an empiricalbasis is being built, and as a field matures,the representations used will be purified and tend toward the quantitative.This may be yet another instance of the rejection of the visual to discover (by nonvisual means)what is "hiddenbeyond the phenomenaltide"(Stafford1991). If the currentresearchagenda is transformed addressotherquestions aboutthe to the mind-in-the-brain, style of empiricswill also change and the importance of representations will be altered. Others enthusiasticallypredict that future development is possible for brainmappers,although
the acceptanceof brain mappingdata, either from an individualmodality or providedin composite, will be enhancedby display approachesthat provide and datapresentations images thatareimmediatelyrecognizableto individuals witha knowledgeof cerebral and (Mazziotta Toga1996,pp.454-55) anatomy.
Datawill have to be translated into a formthatallows a visual understanding, the immediate,clinical, image-baseduse. If the resultsof researchare to be will to applied,representations haveto be adapted a differentunderstandingthe measurementsof scientists will have to be broughtmore closely in line with the anatomical,pictorialtraditionof the clinic. These two scenariosfurther highlight the tensions in brainmapping'sempirics, involving complex representations. At the heart of the paradoxicalunderstanding representations this of in field is the dual appeal to the graphicaland pictorial. Functionalimaging makes use of the pictorialtraditionof anatomicalrepresentations provide to spatialreferentsto the datait produces(activityin the brain)and convey the
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notion of controlof the space of measurement (seeing the entirebrain).Yetit also distantiatesitself from the traditionalvisual understanding accomthat panies these anatomical representationsand invokes a graphical tradition wherethe correspondence representation of image to worldis one of quantity and measurement,not one of depiction. Making images of the mind in a bounded brain provides an important basis for biological explanationsof behavior.Functionalimaging research has been directedat finding the physical substratesof mind, the underlying causes of deviantbehaviorand disease. In some ways, this projectis comparableto the phrenologicaland localizationistprojectsof the nineteenthcentury, where faculties were linked to bumps and pathological functions to brainregions. But brainmappingis constructedas measuringactivity in the complex space of the living, actingbrain,rejectingboth the shallow studyof the surface of phrenology and the anatomo-clinical stance of the localizationists' postmortem correlation. Furthermore,understandingthe empiricsof brainmappingnot only makes sense of the rejectionof the clinical visual diagnosis discussed in the firstpartbut also explainsthe particular version of anatomydeveloped by brainmappers(the many permutations of the x, y, z Talairachbrain space). Functionalimagers do not value skills of visual recognition;instead,they investthe space of the brainwith a graphical and efficacy that allows quantitation calculation. This analysis also sheds light on the ambiguousrelationshipof researchers to the representationsthey use and proposes that this relationship is shapedby criteriaof scientific credibility,on one hand and, on the other,of the ways in which brainmappingcarves out a terrainof expertisein relation to other disciplines based on tools and techniquesavailable.These two elementscan be shownto sustainbothan iconoclastic stancetowardthese representation while also providing motivations for the sustained use of representations. The paradoxof images in functionalimaging is thereforethe resultof the attempt to segregate various aspects of representations.While efficiently evoking control and knowledge of space and simultaneityof measurement, must be used with care and cannot simply be presentedas representations visual proofs without endangering claims to scientific status. Even in nonscientific contexts, the visual argument must be used circumspectly. Hence, researchersseparatethe visual appearancefrom the content, seeing from reasoning, and imaging from experimentingyet rely on the synthetic to powerof representations maketheirobjectandto inscribenew phenomena in the space of the brain. By observing the hopes and anxieties aroundrepresentations,this analysis reveals importantdynamics in the developmentof a scientific, research-
Beaulieu / BrainMapping 79
oriented project. What constitutes relevant empirical strategies are deeply rooted in material,disciplinary,and institutionalcontexts from which this new projectarises.Numerouscase studieshave shownthatwhile all sciences deal with signs to some extent,they do so differently,withinlogics thatcan be characterizedas "epistemic cultures"(Knorr-Cetina1999) or traditionsof evidence (Galison 1997) and thatcan be observed.This case shows thatcultures can also clash and that seemingly contradictorystatementsare in fact sensible in highly specific hybridcontexts-the repercussionsof empirical dissonance(image/number). Galison (1997) has suggestedthatnew formsof imaging using computerizedcounters that turn numbers into images has markedthe integrationof traditionsof evidence in physics, that:
the tension between analog technicalknowledge and digital technical knowledge is a deep one andthatthis division has cut acrossdisciplinaryboundaries. The weaving togetherof the two traditionsin the last few decades representsa previouslyhiddenunifyingtrendin an age of scientific specialization.Homolhave coalesced. (p. 41) ogous and homomorphicrepresentations
The case of functional brain imaging shows ratherthat while kinds of knowledgehave been integratedandreshapedto some extent,differencesdo endure(at least for a time) as tensions visible in futurescenarios.This may be because Galison'scase of mixed traditionsis situatedwithin a fairlyrigid lab situation.Functionalimaging has had a much less structured environmentso that differenttraditionsof evidence live on in the clinic and in the various researchsettingswherebrainmappingis done, challenginganddestabilizing these attemptsat syncretism.The case of brainscannerimaging, which can bothanalogueanddigitaldiscourses,stressesthe way differentregissupport ters may be used to both make claims and to claim scientific statusfor one's work.Finally,this case highlightsthe importanceof context-sensitiveanalyses of representations understand persistenceof analogue and digital to the registers.While the use of visual tools in science seems to be increasing,no and single dynamiccapturesall new developmentsin the production manipulation of visual data. Notes
1. See Changeuxand Ricoeur (1998) and Russo (1999) for discussions of recent work. 2. Galison (1997), among others, showed how the image is privilegedin popularization of physics research.He noted thatimages are rhetoricallypowerful(in a Latouriansense) to carry the existence of new phenomenainto new realms.I havediscussedelsewherehow this is also the case for brainimaging,throughrelianceon an understanding the visual representations of based on photographicrealism (Beaulieu 2000b).
80 Science, Technology,& HumanValues 3. Examplesof this use of brainscans arenumerousandeasy to find in the science sectionof any bookstore.Consider,for example, the cover of the volume edited by StephenRose (1999), FromBrains to Consciousness,which juxtaposes gray anatomicalscans (brains)and rainbowcolored functionalscans (consciousness). 4. To make this argument,I will be considering changing and contrastingdefinitions of what I, as a studentof the visual, would call images in brainmapping.I will use the termrepresentationto describe this changing object, which has differentmeanings in the neuroscientific sphere,in the populardomainand in my own discussion.This decision allows me to discuss the ways in which meaningsarecontested,negotiated,or simply takenfor granted.It also highlights the unacknowledgedwork performedwith representations-the work involved in inscribing them in particular traditions,of makingthem picturesor graphs.Finally,this neutraltermmay also be a useful boundaryobject with which to enterinto a dialogue with the variousgroupsthat withoutevoking the negativereactionsillustratedin the interview producethese representations excerpts. 5. See Lynch (1991) for a contrastof optical versus digital modes of scientific work. 6. The fieldworkmaterialused herearisesfromperiodsof studyin two leadinglaboratories involvedin functionalimaging in EuropeandNorthAmerica(1997) andfrom observationsand interviews at various international events in the brainmappingcommunity(1996-1999). The of encounteredin fieldwork. excerptspresentedhere arerepresentative attitudesand arguments Researchers quotedall mainlyuse brainmappingas theirmethodof investigation. They areidentified here accordingto theirfield of trainingandcareerpoint, since brainmappinghas an interdisciplinarycharacterand very few of its membersactuallyreceiveddegrees or were primarily trainedin it. 7. Groupsof researchersneed to maintainan identityto have theirparticular contributions Such an identitycan be builtthrough recognizedandto claim scientificor professionalauthority. demarcation workby using rhetoricalstrategies(Derksen 1997). Demarcationsmustyield more thansimply the possibility of havingan enclosed circle in which to develop scientific theoriesit must also createa demandfor a particular kind of knowledge or expertise(Derksen 1999). In the case at hand,the formatof the knowledgeclaims of researchers be shownto be reconfigwill ured in particular contexts to bettercreate such a demand. 8. I recalljotting down in my notes thatI was seeing more images at my first brainconference thanat any film or arthistorylectureI had ever attended.This contrastbetweenthe empirical basis and the mode of expressioncan also be explainedby the associationof hierarchiesof ways of knowing-art historiansseek to heightentheirinsightinto artthroughlinguisticexpression of theirvisual understanding, while brainimagers,having a strongerempiricalbasis, relain tively speaking,can affordto make their expression visual. I am also a participant this-the first version of this text contained no illustrations.Gould (1998) noted the distinction in the visual componentin the rhetoricalstyle of scientists and humanists. 9. Even withinresearchactivitiesusing PET,thereis a hierarchy frommoreto less quantitaare tive, dependingon the way measurements made:"Thereareconflicts betweenthose who use it qualitativelyandsuperficiallyandthose who use it analytically,by theirnature" (Phelps 1991, then goes on to contrastvarioustypes of research, quotedin Dumit 1995, p. 92). This researcher andthe likely reactionof neurochemists (fromthe highly quantitative end) to clinical research: I don't like that, you don't know what you are talking about.What are the units of your data,depressionon this axis versuscolor on this axis? So thereare a lot of factions within PET,because it does go from basic chemists and biologists to clinical investigators,and theircriteriaof an experimentis quite different.(quotedin Dumit 1995)
Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 81 tasksso thatfunc10.This complex experimental design especially focuses on manipulating can tions/processingstages/operations be distinguished.Cognitivepsychologists focus on very specific componentsof tasks,for example,distinguishingvisually presentedanimalsfromvisually presentedtools. Functionalimaging has investigatedfunctionsat a less specific level, with early experimentsdistinguishingcognitive from visual activations,for example. More recent work has producedmore sophisticatedactivationparadigms,but the degree of specificity in tasks performedis still not as great as in cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychologists also of focus on measuresof time and error/accuracy responses. This contrastof measurementsin time and space will be furtherdiscussed below. 11. Argumentsabout the need to distance the researchendeavor from the technological for meansalso arosein discussionsto set up the Organization HumanBrainMapping.The foundationof a professionalorganizationbased on the common use of technologies was resisted as unnecessaryor even a dead end because of the perceivedhazardsattachedto overidentification with technologies if brainmappingwas to thrivein mainstreamneuroscience. 12. Statisticalparametric mapis a formatcommonlyused to orderfunctionalactivationdata. 13. In relationto PET,some of the earlygoals in nuclearmedicinewere to developa tool that would compete with x-ray CT, for example, by allowing imaging of structureof organs that could not be detectedby x-ray(Wagner1992). A pioneerof mappingstudiesrecountsthe efforts as tryingto regaingroundlost to CT:"Nuclearmedicine brainscans, which had been a stapleof the practiceof nuclearmedicine, were quickly replacedby x-ray CT" (Raichle 1996a, p. 189). There was also a tension between the clinically orientedimagers and those who wanted to do in autoradiography humanswith it. Raichle arguedthe rightcourse was to hold off from clinical applications,because it did not provide anatomicaldatathat was alreadyunderstoodclinically that of measurements were not. The link between measurement brainblood flow and but,rather, brainactivity was not a significantpartof the PET agendauntil about 1984 andbecame a measurementof cognitive processes a few years later.MaturePET (in a technological sense) had alreadybeen developed for ten years at thatpoint. 14. Louis Sokoloff, husbandof nurseand aircraftpilot Betty Kaiser,workedwith Kety and Schmidtat the Universityof Pennsylvaniaandlaterat the NationalInstituteof MentalHealth.A pioneer of the methods on which PET is based, he was said to be uninterestedin detectionby the citing an aphorismby Lord imaging. He reaffirmed alignmentof science and measurement, Kelvinthathangson his office wall: "Whenyou cannotexpressit in numbers,yourknowledgeis of a meagerand unsatisfactory kind"(Kennedy 1991, p. 188). 15. A streamof science andtechnology studiesresearchanalyzes the professionalization of vision (seeing as a learned activity and not as a self-evident, biologically determinedsensory of activity)andthe codificationof the understanding visual evidence.These analysesemphasize the construction the directnessof the image as embeddedin learnedskills of vision andclaims of to professionalexpertisein apprehending directness.Vision is shownto be the resultof varithis ous social, interactiveprocesses and not a given perceptualattribute. This last body of scholarship includes both analyses of the historicalmoments in the formationof vision (Crary1990; Cartwright1995;Treichleretalo1998; Pasveer 1992; Kember1991; Yoxen 1987) as well as the individualsocialization of seeing as a professionalpractice(Goodwin 1994, 1995). 16. The clinical gaze is not itself simple andunproblematic (see note 15). Therearerulesfor visual understanding, which arealso embeddedin technologiesandtraditions evidence.Many of analyses of this skill follow this (Foucauldian)line: Visually based scientific surveillance requiresthat the expert's gaze be "clarifiedin orderthat the disease should give up its hidden secrets into the domain of the visual" (Marshall1990, in Terryand Urla 1995). 17. Andreassenet al. (1992) notedthatobserverintervention sometimesnecessaryin using is some of these tools, but she also redefined seeing in mechanistic terms. The observer is also
82 Science, Technology,& HumanValues into describedas technicallyincorporated the machineas in this otherarticleon an analysis tool developedby anothergroup:"Themethodsdescribedhere seen to takeadvantageof the patternanatomicalimages while adherrecognitionqualitiesof the humaneye with noisy, low-contrast ing to a pre-definedframeworkfor anatomicalmapping"(Evanset al. 1988). Perceptionis best replacedby indefatigableautomatedtools, which might feed reason only the most rationalof percepts:images of numbers. 18.Besides color,therearemanyotherconventionsfor these representations-such as view, slicing,or the use of shading,andso forth.The developmentof conventionsfor the use of color in medicalimaging would deserve a book-lengthstudy.See Kevles (1997) for a sketch of some of the issues (especially pages 207-8). Forexample, an Americanresearcher explainedin a lecture atthe humanbrainmappingconferencein 1996 thatthe use of color for medical imaging is not differencesintocategoricalvariables." allowedin the UnitedStatesbecause"itturnsquantitative Qualityand quantityclash. 19. Especiallyin the UnitedStates,the regulationof the radioactivetracersrequiringthemto receiveFDA approvalas thoughthey were drugshas been bemoanedas holding backthe spread of the technology (Coleman 1993). 20. For a descriptionof PET's trials, see Lumsdon (1992), Gershon(1995), and Coleman (1993); for a descriptionof PET'spromise,see Sawle (1995) andFeindelandYamamoto(1978). 21. Withthe following exception:seniorresearchers might occasionally speakof looking at rawdata,which can be useful to an experienceduser-rather thanalways looking at thresholded images (significance-tested, normalized data). In this role, scans are "exploratorypictures" (Galison 1997). in 22. The lab-clinicrelationwithin the institutionswhere I did fieldworkwere mirrored the ways these distinctionswere madeandthe ease with which lab-clinicboundarieswerecrossedin each setting. In the institutionwhere there was little interactionwith clinical work, the distinction between qualitativeand quantitative approacheswas firm ("I have no truck"),while at the were secondinstitution,opinionsaboutthe usefulnessof qualitativeandquantitative approaches expressedin more relativeterms ("differenttools for differentpurposes"). 23. The observeris consideredto be problematicand might best be replacedby a quantitative, mechanicalobjective set of scan evaluationprogramsfor some researchers.For example, "Mazziotta envisions a day when a patientwith an undiagnoseddisorderwill simply undergoa brainscan and have his data warpedinto the brain-mapping database,producinga precise and he quantifiableanswer. 'Currently,' laments, 'we look at the screen and say, "thatlooks like, it See could be..." ' (Availablefromhttp://www.bruin.ucla.edu/feature/challenge/maptext.htm). also note 17. 24. See, for example, Hoffman,Hanson,and Coleman (1993), Phelps (1991), Rich (1997), and Ter-Pogossian(1992). 25. Specifically,PET III is often referredto as the first of modernPET scanners,because it usedcoincidencedetectionandreconstruction algorithmsbasedon the algorithmsdevelopedfor CT by Hounsfieldand Cormackin 1972. 26. This shift is visible in descriptionsof the technologies, in editorials, or articles that reviewfunctionalimaging.Forexample,EEG/MEGwere addedto the subtitledlist of technologies of the Journalof Neuroimagingin 1994, stressingthatthey were now able to contributeto the studyof humancognition andperceptionas well as clinical workbecausetheycould be made spatiallyrelevant.MEG "is treatedas a brainimaging techniqueratherthan as a type of ERP recordingbecause most recentMEG methodsprovidea 'map'of activityover the whole cortex" (Hugdahl 1995, p. 327). This is due, in part,to developmentsin modeling that allowed better attribution the sourceof the signal (Wood 1994) and in an increasednumberof sensors (from of
Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 83 12 to 20 sensorsto arraysof 120 to 150). This resultedin a betterlink of the activationsto specific sites; the source of the signal is less uncertainthan before, when differenttypes of activations could have been responsiblefor the same detectedpattern(e.g., Mountcastle1998). The notion of space is a determinantfeature to make these technologies part of the functional imaging armamentarium. 27. This issue of standardized conventionshas been so centralto the workof representational functional imagers that sharing references to Talairach, the publication at the basis of the to imagers'system for creatinga space, has been used as a marker measurethe growingproduction of functionalimaging work. See Fox (1997). 28. Not surprisingly, psychologists and cognitive scientists question the notion of "funcif tion"thatis used in these studies,neuroscientists' criticismcomes fromthe brainend. They challenge the meaningof the signals detectedby PET.Here,too, hierarchiesof evidence are at play. Recentpronouncements the foundationalprinciplesof neuroscience(see Mountcastle1998) on state that the ultimatecause of mental activity is the neuron-so that researchersdealing with measurements neuronalactivityare sometimescriticalof imagingbecauseblood flow is couof pled, but only loosely so, to the activity of neurons. One researcherwho had moved from researchusing EEG to imaging describedgoing from evidence to suggestion, from physiology to metabolism.The link between neuronalactivityandblood flow has at times been a controversial topic in the imaging community. 29. This responsibilityto see properlyechoes what I evoked earlieras one of the enduring aspects of modernconcepts of scientific ideals:reason'sduty to monitorthe senses. This notion surfacesin moralterms,where, in the face of the developmentof more and more imaging technologies, scientistsmustbearthe responsibilityof properscientificknowingandnot be deceived of by the transparency images (Crease 1993). An image, the argumentgoes, can fool one into an would not. This aligns ratiothinkingone understands objectin a way a graphor measurement and nality,properunderstanding, moralresponsibilityas one mode of dealing with images and intuitiveunderstanding, uncertainknowledge, and seductionas another. 30. This may add a furtherlayer to Lynch's (1991) programof understanding opticism in termsof "a set of instructionsfor performingactions in accordwith the variousoptical knowledge-productionmachines;a disciplinarycompliance on the partof the subjects in those systems"(p. 58). This dynamicof backlashreinforcesthe scenariosof compliancewith rationality (i.e., not visual) and the maintenanceof the boundarybetween the scientific and the popular. 31. See, for example, Friston(1998).
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86 Science, Technology,& HumanValues Russo, E. 1999. Consciousness studies:Birthof an empiricaldiscipline? The Scientist 13 (10): 14,25. Sawle, G. 1995. Imaging the head: Functionalimaging. Journal of Neurology,Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry58:132-44. Schmitt,G. 1995. Brightred spots or-The meaningof the meaning[Peercommentaryof Precis of Images of Mind]. Behavioraland Brain Sciences 18:327-83. art Stafford,B. 1991. Bodycriticism:Imagingthe unseen in enlightenment and medicine.Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. . 1996. Good looking: Essays on the virtue of images. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. dichotomywith special reference L., Tancredi, andN. Volkow.1992. A theoryof the mind-brain of to the contribution positronemission tomography.Perspectivesin Biology and Medicine 35(4): 549-71. Ter-Pogossian,M. 1992. The origins of positron emission tomography.Seminars in Nuclear Medicine22 (3): 140-9. Terry,J., and J. Urla. 1995. Deviant bodies: Criticalperspectives on differencein science and popular culture.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress. Treichler,P., Lisa Cartwright,and ConstancePenley, eds. 1998. The visible woman: Imaging technologies,gender,and science. New York:New YorkUniversityPress. Van Dijck, Jose. 2000. The language and literatureof life: Popular metaphors in genome research.In Wild science: Readingfeminism, medicine and the media, edited by Janine and Marchessault Kim Sawchuk,66-79. New York:Routledge. H. Wagner, 1992. Positronemission tomographyat the turnof the century:A perspective.Seminars in Nuclear Medicine 22 (4): 285-8. 6-10. on Wolf, T. 1997. Sorry,but your soul just died. The Independent Sunday,2 February, HumanBrainMapWood,C. C. 1994. Humanbrainmappingin bothtime andspace [Editorial]. ping, pp. iii-vi. Yoxen,E. 1987. Seeing with sound:A studyof the developmentof medicalimages. In Thesocial constructionof technological systems, edited by Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and TrevorPinch, 281-303. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.
in AnneBeaulieuis a lecturerin science, culture,and communication the Department of Psychology at the Universityof Bath, Calverton Down, Bath, United Kingdom.Her researchaddressesthe interactionof biological knowledgeand digital technologiesand She the development neuroinformatics. continuesher ethnographicstudyof the brain of on mappingcommunity, which this article is based.

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Images Are Not the (Only) Truth: Brain Mapping, Visual Knowledge, and Iconoclasm Author(s): Anne Beaulieu

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excerpt is from an interview between anthropologists and pioneers of

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The Use of Representations, the Abuse of Images

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thatthere'snot a lot of overlap,that it's two discreteareas and so twoprocess-

as trained a physician) Researcher, added]. (Senior ingareas[emphasis

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Rhetorical Representations: When Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words?

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izationin action,it suddenly a statusthatit didn'thave acquired concrete

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