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1AC Plan: The United States federal government should pass land claims recognition legislation applying to property beyond the Earths mesosphere. OST is currently effective and ensures international compliance through peer-pressure Pindjack 10 (Peter Pindjak, Graduate Scholar- work for the Center for Security Studies, 21 July 2010, New Prospect for Space
Arms Control, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=118951) Some arms control critics have already pointed out that the PPWT would be unverifiable. But one must remember that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which bans the placement of WMDs in outer space and on celestial bodies, includes no verification mechanism and has been known to work well. It appears that it is rather the intrinsic peer-pressure of signatories not to violate an international treaty of strategic importance that provides for a strong guarantee of compliance. After all, the sophisticated US Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system would certainly be capable of detecting most if not all prospective attacks originating from hostile spacecraft. While the placement of weapons in outer space would continue to be unverifiable, a violation of the PPWT would most likely be detected by the US and also by Russia and China as they continue to improve their space surveillance capabilities. President Obama stands at critical juncture of space arms control. Living up to the challenges outlined in his space policy will surely pose a challenge; however, if he manages to overcome domestic political restraints, he could make a true difference by agreeing to the first legal agreement banning placement of any types of weapons in outer space.

Current interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty prevents private property rights and holds the US responsible for corporate violations International Institute of Space Law, Statement by the Board of Directors * Of the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding The Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Outer_Space_Treaty_Statement.pdf, no date, JPW Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. The object and purpose of this provision was to exclude all territorial claims to outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. As of March 2004, the Outer Space Treaty has been ratified by 98 nations, and signed by an additional 27 countries. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides that States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, that is, private parties, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. Article VI further provides that the activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. Therefore, according to international law, and pursuant to Article VI, the activities of non-governmental entities (private parties) are national activities. The prohibition of national appropriation by Article II thus includes appropriation by non-governmental entities (i.e. private entities whether individuals or corporations) since that would be a national activity. The prohibition of national appropriation also precludes the application of any national legislation on a territorial basis to validate a private claim. Hence, it is not sufficient for sellers of lunar deeds to point to national law, or the silence of national authorities, to justify their ostensible claims. The sellers of such deeds are unable to acquire legal title to their claims. Accordingly, the deeds they sell have no legal value or significance, and convey no recognized rights whatsoever. According to international law, States party to a treaty are under a duty to implement the terms of that treaty within their national legal systems. Therefore, to comply with their obligations under Articles II and VI of the Outer Space Treaty, States Parties are under a duty to ensure that, in their legal systems, transactions regarding claims to property rights to the Moon and other celestial bodies or parts thereof, have no legal significance or recognised legal effect.

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Private commercialization of space is inevitable that will constitute a major OST violation Frank Sietzen Jr., has been a writer, editor, and analyst for such publications as Military Space, Space Business News, Popular
Mechanics, Space Calendar, Space Policy, Washington correspondent for SpaceDaily and reporter for United Press International, Director of Communications, Intergovernmental Relations, and Editor-in-Chief National Space Society, 2001, Aerospace America, Commercial space: A global commons?, http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=125&ArchiveIssueID=17 Commercial spacehowever its customers grow and whoever exploits its resourcesis here to stay, and it will change the way the U.S. and other space powers view space exploration and technology as elements of their industrial base. "The presumption of most observers today is that the growing privatization of orbital systems is merely one component of a widening trend toward a global economy whose emergence and continued expansion are inevitable," says Watts. If the expansion continues, he suggests, this confidence in the commercial element will be well placed. But he warns that such long-term projections "remain as predictable as the local weather." Space should be seen as a commons, but one whose needs have a mix of solutions, government as well as business. Whatever the mix, space as a sector should not be overlooked in future assessments of national economic needs, as it has been in the recent past.

U.S. violation of the OST leads to the Treaty collapse other states wont use coercion necessary to enforce the regime Hickman and Dolman 2 (John Hickman is an associate professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at
Berry College in Mt. Berry, Georgia. He has written many papers dealing with space policy and Everett Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Forces School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2002 (Resurrecting the Space Age: A StateCentered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime, Comparative Strategy: Volume 21, Number 1 (2002), Page 20, Available Online to subscribing institutions at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/014959302317350855) Thus a state party need merely announce its intention to withdraw and then wait one year. Withdrawal of a single state party to the treaty, however, would not necessarily terminate the treaty between the other state parties. Yet, the decision of an important state not to be bound by a regimecreating treaty obviously endangers the entire treaty. The decision of the United States or China to withdraw from the OST would have far greater implications for the survival of the international space regime than the same decision by Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, or Papua New Guineathe equality of states under international law remains nothing more than a useful fiction. For the OST to remain good international law, it must be accepted as such by the major space faring states of the 21st Century: the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China. One defection from the regime by a member of this group would no doubt lead to its effective collapse, as the remaining space faring states are unlikely to use the kind of coercion necessary to enforce the regime. A more likely response to such a defection is a scramble to make similar claims to sovereignty, based on historical precedent and effective occupation. Similar rushes to stake claims for territory sovereignty in other celestial bodies might follow.

OST consultation process is key to dissuading weaponizers and avoiding misunderstandings from escalating to conflict Marder 8 (Center for defense information, CDI Research Assistant, CPR for the OST: How Chinas Anti-Satellite Weapon Test
Can Breathe New Life into Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, June 2008, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/ChineseASATtest.pdf DA; 6/26/11) Finally, the most valuable benefit of consultation procedures would be transparency and information-sharing between spacefaring states. Keeping fellow OST members in the know helps reduce the threat of accidents and misunderstandings that could escalate into conflict and reduce[s] the paranoia that arises in climates of secrecy among competitive actors. 48 The greatest danger of placing weapons in space is the mistrust and insecurity that would arise in other nations. The Outer Space Treaty, in its preamble, states one of its goals to be recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. 49 The greatest injury to this globally averred ambition is an arms race in our common outer space. Article IX provides an effective deviceinternational consultations to dissuade potential space weaponizers from carrying out their plans. To maintain Article IXs standing as valid international law, it must be insisted upon in all appropriate circumstances. The Chinese ASAT test of January 2007 was one such event. In deeming this test inappropriate, but not illegal, many nations missed their chance to assert the validity of Article IX. But the ship has not yet sailed, and states should reexamine the test before other nations follow suit. The objectives of the Outer Space treaty are as poignant now as ever; though the moon colonies it imagines may still be decades in the future, the specter of a weaponized space is a present threat.

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Weaponization leads to nuclear war Micheal Krepon, co-founder of Stimson and director of the South East Asia and Space Security programs, 2004, Weapons in the
Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option, Arms Control Today, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/Avoiding_the_Weaopnization_of_Space.pdf To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage US or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and spacebased, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of US and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space. US space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like US war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces.

Space weaponization kills US soft power

Coffelt 5 Writer at USAF Air University (Christopher A., June 2005, The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy, http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/2328/) Weaponizing space also decreases the United States ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form coalitions of the willing. The United States currently enjoys a significant superiority in air/land/sea combat power, robustly enhanced and enabled by space capabilities. In this position of advantage, it makes little strategic sense to disrupt the status quo with the deployment of destabilizing, offensive weapons in space. Putting weapons in space or pursuing an offensive space strategy upsets an advantageous status quo and overplays the United States hand, shortening the period of advantage. Moreover, if, as some believe, the world is on a path to the inevitable weaponization of space, there are clear advantages in assuming the follower role

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US soft power is key to solving every major impact Stanley 7- Member of the National Security Advisement Board Elizabeth Stanley, PhD in Government From Harvard University,
Assistant Professor at George Town University, Member of the National Security Advisement Board of Sandia National Laboratories, International perceptions of U.S. Nuclear Policy http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/2007/070903.pdf Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions and given the interdependent nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category. In contrast to a states hard power (military and economic might), soft power (a states culture, values and institutions) provides an indirect way to influence others. Soft power is an invaluable asset to: (1) keep potential adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to their causes; (2) influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) convince allies to support and share the international security burden. The United States needs soft power assets (including the moral high ground) to solve these problems multilaterally and proactively. For example, one of the wicked problems (problems having complex, adaptive, unpredictable components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global proliferation of WMD. Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can address effectively alone. To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the rest of the world to participate in the process. Given how complex the WMD proliferation problem is, this requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the problem with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the problem is. This common problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the United States, when US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are perceived as unilateral and hypocritical. Indeed, this paper suggests that many international actors appear to view US policy and actions as one of the contributors to the WMD proliferation problem. In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the right solution is. Given their different understanding, it is not surprising that the wicked problem becomes even thornier to address. In short, how other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation. (continued) How important is soft power, anyway? Given its vast conventional military power, does the United States even need soft power? Some analysts argue that US military predominance is both possible and desirable over the long term, and thus soft power is not important. But a growing consensus disagrees. These analysts argue that soft power is critical for four reasons. First, soft power is invaluable for keeping potential adversaries from gaining international support, for winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for convincing moderates to refrain from supporting extremist terrorist groups. Second, soft power helps influence neutral and developing states to support US global leadership. Third, soft power is also important for convincing allies and partners to share the international security burden.14 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the increasing interdependence and globalization of the world system, soft power is critical for addressing most security threats the United States faces today. Most global security threats are impossible to be countered by a single state alone. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed and failing states, conflicts over access to resources, are not confined to any one state. In addition, disease, demographic shifts, environmental degradation and global warming will have negative security implications as well.15 All of these potential threats share four traits: (1) they are best addressed proactively, rather than after they develop into full-blown crises; (2) they require multi-lateral approaches, often under the umbrella of an international institution; (3) they are not candidates for a quick fix, but rather require multi-year, or multi-decade solutions; and, (4) they are wicked problems. Given these four traits, soft power is critical for helping to secure the international, multi-lateral cooperation that will be necessary to address such threats effectively.

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Current interpretations of the OST that block private property rights are based on English common law, which is a bad standard for space exploration the aff reinterprets the OST based on French civil law and marks the beginning of a new legal regime that fills vacuums in international legislation Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, * Alan Wasser is the Chairman of The Space Settlement Institute and a former CEO of the
National Space Society. He is a former member of the AIAA Space Colonization Technical Committee, former member of the Board of Directors of ProSpace, and a former Senior Associate of the Space Studies Institute. His Space Settlement Initiative was featured in the 2005 book RETURN TO THE MOON (Apogee Books). ** Douglas Jobes is the President of The Space Settlement Institute and a promoter of space exploration and settlement. He has been published in The Space Review and in the American Astronautical Societys (AAS) SPACE TIMES magazine. For more details, see http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/, Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 73 Winter 2008 Number 1, pg. 47-52, http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/jal73-1Wasser.pdf, JPW
IV. RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP If private property claims in space are legitimate under the Outer Space Treaty, must the nations of the world pretend that they are not, or could they publicly acknowledge that they are? White points out that, under international law states may do whatever is not expressly forbidden. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed. 40 Clearly, if the Outer Space Treaty does not ban private property ownership, it certainly does not contain a separate, special provision expressly forbidding nations from recognizing that fact. The long-accepted legal doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius says that, when interpreting statutes, we should presume things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. 41 So what motivates those who proclaim that the treaty does ban such recognition of private property?

Some of those who make that claim believe only governments and government employees belong in space at all, ever, as a matter of principle and safety. 42 Others are trying to justify their own competing approaches to space development. For example, some scientists want the Moon reserved for research alone and everyone else kept away. 43 Some are fearful that development of competitive space settlements might lead to armed conflict. 44 And there are even people who believe that private property itself, especially all land ownership, is an abomination, and should be made illegal in the new world of space. 45 For these advocates, whether or not the Outer Space Treaty actually bans private property claims, it shouldand for them, that is the same thing. As a result of such conflicting viewpoints, little progress toward space settlement has been made in the thirty years since the Apollo program. V. DIFFERING LEGAL SYSTEMS: COMMON LAW VERSUS CIVIL LAW Some critics of private ownership of extraterrestrial land only take into consideration the provisions of English common law. 46 With common law, ever since William The Conqueror confiscated the old nobilitys lands after 1066, all property rights have derived ultimately from the King, or sovereign. So these critics feel that a ban on private ownership is automatically implied by the Outer Space Treatys ban on national appropriation. 47 Some even say that private property in space would be impossible because it would need national sovereignty in space. 48 However, in countries like France, which follow civil law, property rights have never been based on territorial sovereignty. 49 Instead, they are based on the natural law principle of pedis possessio or use and occupationthat individuals mix their labor with the soil and create property rights independent of government. 50 Government merely recognizes those rights. 51
Wayne White explains this point well. The relationship between property and sovereignty differs under common law and civil law systems. The common law theory of title has its roots in feudal law. Under this theory the Crown holds the ultimate title to all lands, and the proprietary rights of the subject are explained in terms of vassalage. Civil law, on the other hand, is derived from Roman law, which distinguishes between property and sovereignty. Under this theory, it is possible for property to exist in the absence of sovereignty. 52 This is why [i]n the discussions leading to the conclusion of the [Outer Space] treaty, France [a civil law country] indicated more than once that she was not altogether satisfied with the wording of Article II . . . . Frances representative was thinking in particular of the risks of ambiguity between the principle of non-sovereignty which falls under public lawand that of nonappropriation, flowing from private law. 53 A key realization is that the common law standard cannot be applied on the Moon, where sovereignty itself is barred by international treaty. As John Locke wrote, As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property. 54 In other words, ownership can flow from the use of the land. A.F. van Ballegoyen points out, Before the emergence of the nation-state it was both normal and self-explanatory for non-state actors to own territory. Contemporary emphasis on the state as sole organizer and regulator of both domestic and world affairs ignores the enormous potential of non-state actors to efficiently organize affairs up to a certain point. 55 In sum, there appears to be

no explicit ban on private property claims in the Outer Space Treaty, as there would have been in the Moon Treaty. In addition, there is no explicit ban on nations recognizing such private property in good faith, and what is not explicitly prohibited in international law is generally permitted. VI. CONFUSION WITH INVALID ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM Others who feel that land claims recognition would be a violation of international law are confusing recognition of a settlements land claim with what

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Dennis Hope, a seller of novelty Lunar land deeds, does 56 or are confusing it with a covert U.S. seizure of the land for itself. In fact, the Space Settlement Prize Act 57 legislation proposed by co-author Alan Wasser as an example of one way such legislation could be formed shows how a land claims recognition law could be structured so that claims would only be based on true occupation and use of the land, with the U.S. not seizing or claiming the land in any way. The only
claims recognized would be those made by permanently inhabited settlementsmade by people who are, by then, inhabitants of the Moon, and are no longer Earthlings. 58 If residents of Earth want to own an acre of Lunar land, they would have to pay the residents of the Moon for it, thus rewarding these Lunarians for risking their lives and fortunes to open the space frontier for all mankind. 59 When the IISL recently issued a statement aimed

at discrediting claims like Dennis Hopes claims to the Moon (i.e., claims with no legal basis such as use and occupation), some of those who confuse The Space Settlement Initiative 60 with Hopes Lunar Embassy claims, tried to pretend that the IISL statement applied to both. 61 One of the authors of this paper, Alan Wasser, contacted the Board of the IISL to ask if the statement did, in fact, apply to both. Dr. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana replied personally to say that it certainly did not. He wrote the Statement was without prejudice to any future regime which might or should be developed. The statement indeed implies that there is a need for further work to be done to cover the future developments relating to activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. 62 Noted space lawyer Declan J. ODonnell states that the legal basis for Lunar land claims recognition, as described in the Space Settlement Prize Act, is a valid approach to real property rights in space resources. He further stated that compared to most of the proposals out there, [the] basic assumptions are not radical at all. 63 Passing land claims recognition legislation now would mark the beginning of a new legal regime that would fill the current vacuum of enabling legislation. This regime would base property rights outside of this planet on natural and civil law.

When international treaties are ambiguous, each signatory must interpret for itself what its obligations are if the US government decides that private property rights are legit, then theyre legit Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, * Alan Wasser is the Chairman of The Space Settlement Institute and a former CEO of the
National Space Society. He is a former member of the AIAA Space Colonization Technical Committee, former member of the Board of Directors of ProSpace, and a former Senior Associate of the Space Studies Institute. His Space Settlement Initiative was featured in the 2005 book RETURN TO THE MOON (Apogee Books). ** Douglas Jobes is the President of The Space Settlement Institute and a promoter of space exploration and settlement. He has been published in The Space Review and in the American Astronautical Societys (AAS) SPACE TIMES magazine. For more details, see http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/, Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 73 Winter 2008 Number 1, pg. 58-61, http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/jal73-1Wasser.pdf, JPW Regardless of their views on the questions raised so far, the one observation on which nearly every expert agrees is that, as space lawyer Ezra Reinstein states: The Outer Space treaty is riddled with ambiguities. It is silent, outside of affirming freedom of
exploration and use, as to what sort of rights parties can claim in celestial bodies. It is silent as to the circumstances under which these unspecified property rights might vest, that is, what a person must do to gain whatever property right are available. 94 In fact, the framers of the Outer Space Treaty

were deliberately ambiguous about private property, as opposed to nationally owned property, to allow ratification of the Treaty by both the U.S., which wanted to encourage private enterprise in space, and the U.S.S.R., which did not. 95 The U.N.s Dr.
Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, a space lawyer, is one of those who declares that the ambiguities were not only deliberate but also the right thing for the timeThis was not a pressing concern in 1967, when the Outer Space Treaty was ratified. It was perfectly acceptable at the time to consign a deeper discussion of property rights to future negotiation, as the United Nations did. 96 As prominent space lawyer Rosanna Sattler wrote in the University of Chicago Law Review, The provision of the Outer Space Treaty which has caused the greatest controversy and discussion is found in Article II . . . . The appropriation provision of the treaty is arguably unclear and undefined and therefore unwork- able. 97 There is even some argument that this provision conflicts with the requirements of other multi-lateral treaties. 98 Kurt Anderson Baca goes even further. He points out that Article IIs provision on use and appropriation conflicts with other multi-lateral treaties, contradicts other parts of the Outer Space Treaty, and is so vague and ambiguous that it can only be considered an expression of a wish, rather than a binding rule on anyone. 99 The most obvious of those self-contradictions is that the very first words of the Outer Space Treaty are, [The States Parties to this Treaty], Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of mans entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . . 100 Yet, by confusing the question of private property and thereby discouraging private investment, the Treaty itself has blocked that common interest of all mankind for more than three decades now. Unfortunately, in this kind of international law, unlike normal

domestic law, there is no judge nor court with the authority to provide a binding ruling, so the difference of opinion and ambiguity will persist. 101 When a treaty is ambiguous, each signatory must interpret for itself what its obligations are. 102 Therefore, regarding the ques- tion of whether the U.S. should recognize a settlements claims, the opinion of the U.S. government matters most. If the government decides it would not be an exercise of sovereignty, then it would not be an exercise of sovereignty. White points out that The Law of Treaties states: A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 103 Clearly, the ordinary meaning of the term national appropriation is appropriation by a nation.

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And, no country has clarified the OST in its national legal framework the first country to do so sets a pattern that other countries will follow this is proven by previous cases in international law Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, * Alan Wasser is the Chairman of The Space Settlement Institute and a former CEO of the
National Space Society. He is a former member of the AIAA Space Colonization Technical Committee, former member of the Board of Directors of ProSpace, and a former Senior Associate of the Space Studies Institute. His Space Settlement Initiative was featured in the 2005 book RETURN TO THE MOON (Apogee Books). ** Douglas Jobes is the President of The Space Settlement Institute and a promoter of space exploration and settlement. He has been published in The Space Review and in the American Astronautical Societys (AAS) SPACE TIMES magazine. For more details, see http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/, Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 73 Winter 2008 Number 1, pg. 47-52, http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/jal73-1Wasser.pdf, JPW Some experts argue that the very obligation to regulate private space activities authorizes and requires states like the U.S. to establish reasonable interim regulations for private property ownership in space until a new treaty is negotiated that resolves the current ambiguities. 89 Professor Gabrynowicz proposes that the treaty could be modified by the establishment of, . . . national laws that fill in or clarify legal gaps in the international regime. Like the development of the maritime law that preceded it, the national laws of spacefaring and space-using nations can develop space law. This approach has been taken in numerous space activities: launches, telecommunications, commercial remote sensing, Earth observations and astronaut codes of conduct, among others. 90 And, she adds, [n]ow this is a particularly relevant time for this particular route. 91 Robert P. Merges and Glenn H. Reynolds suggest that, . . . some purely national law will emerge as a standard, or at least as a model for other countries to follow. In other legal areas, national leaders have effectively established patterns that have been followed by other countries: commercial law in the United States (as seen in the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods) and patent law in Great Britain come to mind. Similarly, in the space context, other countries could adopt the basic framework devised in the pioneer country. Alternatively, private entities could specifically opt into coverage under the pioneer countrys lawsfor example, by choice of law provisions in private contracts. 92 Thus, they argue a jurisdictionally limited legal regime could emerge as the de facto international standard. 93

Unilateral action is best, wont violate the OST, and has a precedent in law regarding the high seas Ty Twibell, J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of Missouri- Kansas City School of Law, B.S., Public Admin istration, Southwest
Missouri State University, 1994, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 589, pg. 610, published in 1997, JPW The problems with international methods in changing space law are obvious. Changes in domestic law often take a significant amount of time. Moreover, when many nations around the world have to agree on one thing, international changes often take much longer. It can take years for a nation to sign an agreement. For example, nations have slowly signed the 1979 Moon Treaty over a period of several years. Conversely, if the world-wide common consensus is the same, changes can occur very fast. When it looks like international changes could take many years, unilateral action may be more attractive. n365 One obvious solution would simply be for the United States to ignore the 1967 Space Treaty's nosovereignty provision. n366 However, such an action would carry with it many negative international repercussions and could threaten United States investment in space. n367 Further, success in space commercialization, because of the enormous investments required, may depend on international cooperation. Professor Reynolds proposes a better solution. The United States could simply state that it would recognize the claims of those who discover valuable mineral deposits by both citizens and non-citizens of the United States. n368 Recognition of these claims and the protection of these claims from third parties "would not constitute 'national appropriation' or the exercise of sovereignty over territory, but rather, the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over its citizens and of its power to protect them against third [*641] parties." n369 This action would be consistent with principles in analogous law sharing the res communis character of space. n370 Similar to White, Reynolds cites the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, "which established a mechanism for recognizing mining claims by United States ventures regarding deep seabed mineral deposits outside the territorial jurisdiction of any nation." n371 Instead of creating an international scheme for adopting a body of law similar to the Deep Seabed Act, Reynolds merely proposes that it is a good precedent and a supporting basis for unilateral action. Reynolds states that "[b]ecause the Act applies to an international common area, the high seas, with the same res communis legal character as outer space, it provides an interesting precedent for unilateral United States efforts to recognize property rights in outer space pending some agreed-upon international regime." n372

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And the government agrees that property rights are key Presidents Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, June 2004, A Journey
to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/moontomars/docs/M2MReportScreenFinal.pdf, JPW Property Rights in Space. The United States is signatory to many international treaties, some of which address aspects of property ownership in space. The most relevant treaty is the 1967 UN Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (the Space Treaty), which prohibits claims of national sovereignty on any extraterrestrial body. Additionally, the so-called Moon Treaty of 1979 prohibits any private ownership of the Moon or any parts of it. The United States is a signatory to the 1967 Space Treaty; it has not ratified the 1979 Moon Treaty, but at the same time, has not challenged its basic premises or assumptions. Recommendation 5-2 The Commission recommends that Congress increase the potential for commercial opportunities related to the national space exploration vision by providing incentives for entrepreneurial investment in space, by creating significant monetary prizes for the accomplishment of space missions and/or technology developments and by assuring appropriate property rights for those who seek to develop space resources and infrastructure. Because of this treaty regime, the legal status of a hypothetical private company engaged in making products from space resources is uncertain. Potentially, this uncertainty could strangle a nascent spacebased industry in its cradle; no company will invest millions of dollars in developing a product to which their legal claim is uncertain. The issue of private property rights in space is a complex one involving national and international legal issues. However, it is imperative that these issues be recognized and addressed at an early stage in the implementation of the vision, otherwise there will be little significant private sector activity associated with the development of space resources, one of our key goals.

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In context of land develop means make available for commercial use this is most analogous to space Warren W. Matthews, Jr., Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Alaska, 3/15/91, Kenai Borough v. Cook Inlet Region & Salamatov
Native Assoc. , 807 P 2d 487, http://www.touchngo.com/sp/html/sp-3671.htm The meaning of the term "developed" under ANCSA is a question of federal law. Consequently, the primary consideration in determining meaning is the intent of Congress. Although it is well established that ambiguities in ANCSA are to be resolved favorably to Natives, Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664, 670-71 (D. Alaska 1977); People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 873 (D. Alaska 1979), if congressional intent is clear, we must defer to it. Hakala v. Atxam Corp., 753 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1988). One indication of congressional intent is the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. In the context of raw land,8 the common meaning of developed includes subdivided property which is ready for sale. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged (1968), defines develop in a land context as follows: to make actually available or usable (something previously only potentially available or usable) . . . .: as (1): to convert (as raw land) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes  they ~ed several large tracts on the edge of town; also: to alter raw land into (an area suitable for building)  the subdivisions that they ~ed were soon built up . . . . Cases dealing with the term "developed" in the context of land confirm that "develop" connotes conversion into an area suitable for use or sale. Winkelman v. City of Tiburon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 415, 421 (Cal. App. 1973) The term `developed' connotes the act of converting a tract of land into an area suitable for residential or business uses) Muirhead v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 258 So.2d 232, 233 (Miss. 1972) (same holding); Prince George's County v. Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d 737, 742 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) ("Develop [is defined as] the conversion of raw land into an area suitable for residential or business uses." (Quoting Webster's New International Dictionary, (2d Ed. 1959)); Best Building Co. v. Sikes, 394 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Tex. App. 1965) (court approved trial court finding based in part on extrinsic evidence that "developed" included subdividing, building streets, and installing utilities).

Real estate law in space is necessary for predictability White 97 http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml P roceedings, 40th Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space, p.370 ( IISL 1998). Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. with permission. Released to AIAA in all forms Attorney at Law, 4465 Kipling Street, Suite 200, Wheat Ridge, Colorado 80033 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty[1] does not provide a positive regime for the governance of space development. The 1979 MoonTreaty[2] provides a regime for development, but that regime prohibits real property rights. For that and other reasons, most nations have not signed or ratified the Moon Treaty. A development regime which provides some form of property rights will become increasingly necessary as space develops. Professionals foresee an integrated system of solar power generation, lunar and asteroidal mining, orbital industrialization, and habitation in outer space. In the midst of this complexity, the right to maintain a facility in a given location relative to another space object may create conflict. Such conflicts may arise sooner than we expect, if private companies begin building subsidiary facilities around space stations. Eventually large public facilities will become the hub of private space development, and owners will want to protect the proximity value of their facility location. It also seems likely that at some point national governments and/or private companies will clash over the right to exploit a given mineral deposit. Finally, the geosynchronous orbit is already crowded with satellites, and other orbits with unique characteristics may become scarce in the future. The institution of real property is the most efficient method of allocating the scarce resource of location value. Space habitats, for example, will be very expensive and will probably require financing from private as well as public sources. Selling property rights for living or business space on the habitat would be one way of obtaining private financing. Private law condominiums would seem to be a particularly apt financing model -- inhabitants could hold title to their living space and pay a monthly fee for lifesupport services and maintenance of common areas. Even those countries which do not have launch capability would benefit from a property regime. Private entities from the developing nations could obtain property rights by purchasing obsolete facilities from foreign entities that are more technologically advanced. A regime of real property rights would provide legal and political certainty. Investors and settlers could predict the outcome of a conflict with greater certainty by analogizing to terrestrial property law.

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Analogies are necessary in outer space law Peterson, Department of Political Science at Columbia University PhD, M.A. in political science,Upsala College BA, summa cum laude, Professor of Political Science, Associate Professor, 1997, The use of analogies in developing outer space law,
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=173182&jid=INO&volumeId=51&issueId=02&aid=173181 Even imposition involves some elements of mutually understood meaning, since the target has to understand what acts or statements are being demanded. Bargaining and persuasion are even more dependent on a shared conceptual framework with which actors can define the problem, assess the stakes involved, identify potential solutions, and agree on a particular one.5 Understanding the process by which the superpowers converged on treating outer space as a common area and developing outer space law accordingly requires understanding the mental mechanisms by which political actors acquire, transmit, and refine common conceptual frameworks.6 Though analogical reasoning is only one of several types of human reasoning that can serve as the requisite mental mechanism, it is more successful than others when actors need to develop a workable conception of a new problem or issue quickly. Inductive reasoning, for example, fails for lack of enough information about the new concern to permit a "bottom-up" generation of organizing concepts from particular observations. Deductive reasoning fails for lack of a sufficiently well-developed theory of the new concern to provide the assumptions and postulates needed for a "top-down" elaboration of expectations. Reasoning by analogy, which permits the transfer of assumptions and postulates from a well-known field to an unfamiliar one, provides the necessary cognitive resources for developing a working conception of the new issue or problem. Understanding the process of reasoning by analogy improves our comprehension of outer space law development in two ways. First, it explains the development of the superpower consensus defining outer space as a common area rather than as one subject to national claims. Once this conception was in place, the superpowers and other states were able to agree on the main outlines of outer space law. Second, the patterns of analogical reasoning illuminate certain facets of the later evolution of outer space law by indicating which proposals are more or less likely to be considered seriously. One subsequent debate, triggered by proposals to treat lunar resources as the "common heritage of mankind," provides a good example of this sifting effect

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