You are on page 1of 13

Sept.

22, 2011

RTC LUCILA Actual Moral Exempl ary VICTOR Actual LEGAS PI Actual Moral Exempl ary attys fees costs 174,100 .77 100,00. 00 10,00.0 0 96,825. 15 6,328.1 8 10,000. 00

CA 241,861 .81 200,000 .00 100,000 .00 96,825. 15 6,328.1 8 25,000. 00

IX: DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT B. KINDS OF DAMAGES 1. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
Sept. 29, 2011

request + amt for lost income 1 Million 500,000 .00 107,583 .50

SC 241,861.81 400,000.00 200,000.00

2. MORAL a. CONCEPT
Article 2217, CC. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS) 269 SCRA 433 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997 FACTS - About 7:45 pm, 28 Feb 1987: a Pantranco bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. Before it reached the corner of Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Porfirio Legaspi, which was moving along Congressional Avenue heading towards Roosevelt Avenue. - As a result, the points of contact of both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA. - Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment. - As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries which required major surgeries and prolonged treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries. The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to pieces. (cost of repair estimated at P107,583.50.) - The victims of the vehicular mishap pray for an increase in the award of damages, over and above those granted by the appellate court. Victor, husband of Lucila, claims compensation/damages for the loss of his right to marital consortium which, according to him, has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his wife. - Pantranco asks for exoneration by invoking an alleged fortuitous event as the cause of the mishap. They say that while bus driven by Jose Malanum was cruising along EDSA, a used engine differential accidentally and suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus. Said differential hit the underchassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the center island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses.

96,825.15

16,000.00 100,000 .00 50,000. 00 50,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00

25,000. 00 YES

50,000. 00 YES + interest

+6% legal interest from date of RTC decision until actual payment

ISSUES How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are victims of vehicular accidents entitled to? 1. WON the bus driver was negligent and such negligence (and not a fortuitous event) was the proximate cause of the accident 2. WON Victors claim for deprivation of the right to marital consortium as a factor for the award of moral damages is proper 3. WON social and financial standing of Lucila can be considered in awarding moral damages 4. WON exemplary damages should be awarded 5. WON loss of earnings may be a component of damages in this case 6. WON the 10% reduction of the estimated actual damages on the pickup was proper HELD 1. Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues which SC can not pass upon in the absence of conflict between the findings of the trial court and the CA. 2. NO - For lack of factual basis, such claim of deprivation of the right to consortium cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time. - Petitioners cited a California case, Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, as authority for the claim of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal 1 fellowship and sexual relations. In the Rodriguez case , it was ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.

1Rodriguez

involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16 months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when the husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe. The wife testified how her life had deteriorated because her husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how her social, recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her husband's pain, mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her damages for loss of consortium.

Page

Page

- Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral damages to Victor &/or Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium" cannot be properly considered in this case. Victor's claim, although argued before CA, is not supported by the evidence on record. 3. NO - The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. - But, it is still proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. And it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the complaint and this appeal! 4. YES - in view of CAs finding of gross negligence on the part of Pantranco: "Public utility operators like the defendant, have made a mockery of our laws, rules and regulations governing operations of motor vehicles and have ignored either deliberately or through negligent disregard of their duties to exercise extraordinary degree of diligence for the safety of the travelling public and their passengers." - Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal: "it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors." - Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on the discretion of the court. 5. For Lucila, NO. - CA already considered this when it stated that the award of P25k included compensation for "mental anguish and emotional strain of not earning anything with a family to support." - Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven with ITRs. The alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it partakes of actual damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty. - For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim of Legaspi that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that during said period he did not have any income. 6. YES - SC takes judicial notice of the propensity of motor repair shops to exaggerate their estimates. An estimate is not an actual expense incurred or to be incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by the complainants themselves. Epilogue - In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.

- Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. -Francisco vs. GSIS: there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. - Cocoland Devt Corp vs. NLRC: additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom. - Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. - Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. - There is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick: amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.

b. PROOF AND PROXIMATE CAUSE


MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA 95 SCRA 672 TEEHANKEE; January 28, 1980 FACTS - Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged in the pawnshop business in 1968 and in the buying and selling of jewelry. - Sometime before April 23, 1968 Josefine Roco Robles, one of her agents, informed her that millionaire logger Marino Bautista was interested to buy big diamond stones. MirandaRibaya went to visit Bautista and at the sight of his huge house, she became convinced that he indeed was as rich as Josefina had portrayed him to be. > Miranda-Ribaya then offend to sell to the Bautista ten pieces of jewelry for the total amount of P224,000. After some haggling (But I thought they were rich!), MirandaRibaya settled for P222,000 (Para naman two thousand lang!). > Miranda-Ribaya was paid through two Equitable PCI cheques, one for P112,000 and the other for P110,000. In return, she issued a voucher as evidence of payment. > The next day, Miranda-Ribaya went back to see Bautista to request him to break up the P110,000 cheque into smaller amounts. She had to share some of the money with Miss Gisioco who owned some of the jewelry sold. She was then issued 4 Bank of America cheques with the following amounts: P14,000, P84,000, P12,000 and P50,000. - April 24, 1968 Miranda-Ribaya sold four pieces of jewelry to Bautista for P94,000 in Bautistas office. She was then issued four Bank of America checks amounting to the total price of the pieces of jewelry. She again issued another voucher as proof of payment. - The original owners of some of the jewelry sold by MirandaRibaya wanted to have them back so Miranda-Ribaya went to Bautistas house. She brought with her three pieces of jewelry to be offered in exchange for some of the jewelry she wanted to take back. Since his wife and daughter were not home, Bautista requested Miranda-Ribaya to leave the jewelry with him so he could show the jewelry to his wife and daughter first. - Bautista did not return the jewelry but instead sent MirandaRibaya a P45,000 cheque as payment for the three pieces of jewelry she left with him. She also heard that these pieces of jewelry were given away by Bautista as gifts.

- Miranda-Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the post-dated checks neared their maturity date but she was unable to do so. Worse, when she deposited the cheques, the bank dishonored them because the accounts were closed. - Following a hunch acquired from years of experience as a pawnshop dealer, Miranda-Ribaya ran a check on the different pawnshops in Manila and discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to Bautista were pledged to different pawnshops. - Bautista promised to settle his obligations with MirandaRibaya but was unable to do so despite repeated demands. He eventually surrendered the pawnshop tickets to MirandaRibaya who was then able to regain possession of the pawned pieces of jewelry. She recomputed Bautistas obligations and found that he owed her P125,460.79, not including the amount she had given to Gisioco. - The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Miranda-Ribaya but did not award damages to her for insufficiency of evidence. Respondents Comments: > Bautista claimed he had acted "in utmost good faith" and that damages in any concept could not be assessed against them > Neither did the appellate court look favorably upon MirandaRibayas claim for damages, saying that petitioner did not mention mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock in her testimony. Neither could exemplary damages be awarded because these damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the appellate court was not prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of discretion in this regard. ISSUE WON the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper HELD YES Ratio In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish fright and the like. There must be clear testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injuries. Plaintiff must testify to his said injury and this should not merely be inferred from certain proven facts. Reasoning - In her testimony, Miranda-Ribaya established that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation, she had suffered "extreme - anguish (without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep for three months," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelry and borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelry wrongfully acquired by respondents from her. - Even if Miranda-Ribaya failed to use the precise legal terms, it is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and evidence has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint. - Having established the moral damages, petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages. The wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil contract. Disposition the decision of respondent court insofar as it denies petitioners' claim for damages is hereby set aside. In addition to the amounts awarded in the affirmed judgment of the lower court, petitioners are further awarded moral and exemplary damages equivalent to twenty-five per cent (25%) of the principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by the lower court.

DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP) NARVASA; January 29, 1997 FACTS - The Del Rosarios' charged Metal Forming Corp (MFC) with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc. - MFC sold to the public roofing materials known as "Banawe" shingles which they advertised to be structurally safe and strong. Del Rosarios purchased a quantity and had installed in their house. However when typhoon Ruping came, portions of the roof were blown away by strong winds and this also led to the damage of the interior of their home. - The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events, contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. The plaintiffs reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003.00 "representing the estimated cost of the repair, restoration and/or replacement of the damaged areas and items in plaintiffs' house and the cost of the inspection conducted by the independent adjuster..." They also prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of P3,000,000,00, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.00. ISSUE WON the Del Rosario spouses are entitled to moral damages HELD YES - That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger." - As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals, among other precedents: It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968]) - As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation to petitioners. - Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was justified by the Trial Court as follows: Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been duly and substantially proven by the defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the

Page

testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house caused sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger, thereby entitling him to Moral Damages which should be assessed at P500,000.00. "The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity or reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins. Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 745)." - This Court also agrees with the Trial Court - However, the same statutory and jurisprudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered.

time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (article 2185 CC)." - The defendants appealed to CA, which certified the case to SC because the issues raised are purely of law. - NOTE: Section 10 of Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court authorized a judgment on the pleadings where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. ISSUE WON the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on the pleadings HELD YES - The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue. In a long line of cases, SC has consistently held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts." Disposition Case is remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.

RAAGAS v TRAYA 22 SCRA 839 CASTRO; Feb 27, 1968 FACTS - spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI Leyte against spouses Traya and Bienvenido Canciller. - Complaint alleges that on or about April 9, 1958, while Canciller was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by the Traya spouses, the vehicle ran over the Raagas' three-year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death. Defendants Comments > They specifically deny that Canciller was "driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right side of the road" > it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the defendants are not to blame for the accident which was "entirely attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child and negligence of his parents; > defendants-spouses have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough study of his background as a truck driver; and that each time they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of his physical condition and the mechanical fitness of the truck assigned to him. Lower Court > plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the claim that the defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but as well "admitted material allegations" of the complaint. This motion was set for hearing on June 18. On the previous day, however, defendants counsel requested for postponement as he was sick. The lower court denied the request for lack of "proper notice to the adverse party," and considered the case submitted for decision upon the filing of the plaintiffs' memorandum. - On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. - The lower court reasoned that the denial of the charge of reckless driving "did not affect the plaintiffs' positive allegation in their complaint that the truck . . . did not have a current year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when the accident occurred," "this failure . . . has the effect of admitting hypothetically that they operated . . . the said car without proper license . . . when the accident occurred," "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the

ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE 55 SCRA 339 ESGUERRA; January 28, 1974 NATURE: Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS - Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against defendant spouses Lauro and Rosa dela Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of 5 years in violation of Sec.118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Law). He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father. - Defendants filed their answer, stating that the petitioner has no cause of action against them as his father is still living; that petitioner is not the only son of Ciriaco and that the sale of the property in question was well beyond the 5 year prohibition period. - During pre-trial, petitioner admitted the claims of the defendants: his father was still living, that he has siblings, and that the sale did not take place within the prohibited period. The CFI, in view of such admissions, dismissed Roques complaint and held that he had no cause of action, no legal capacity to sue and that he is prompted with malice and bad faith in alleging false statements in his complaint. He was also

Page

ordered to pay the defendants P2000 for actual, moral and exemplary damages. - Petitioner then filed an appeal to the CA which certified the case to the SC as it involved purely a question of law. ISSUE WON the award for moral damages by reason of the unfounded civil action was proper HELD NO Ratio Art.2219 enumerates the cases when moral damages may be recovered. A clearly unfounded suit is not included in the enumeration and cannot be basis for an award of moral damages. Reasoning - It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages may be recovered (Art. 2219). - A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art.2219 in respect to moral damages. - Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in analogous cases to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art.2219, as it did in Art.2208; or else incorporated Art.2208 by reference in Art.2219. - Art.2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting, the special torts referred to in Art.309, par. 9, Art.2219 and in Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219). - While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art.2217) and its causal relation to the defendants acts because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. - The trial court and the CA both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondents were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages. Disposition the dismissal order is affirmed with modification that only attys fees are awarded to respondents.

PEOPLE V BUGAYONG PANGANIBAN; December 2, 1998 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of RTC Baguio FACTS - Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan were married and had 3 children, ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE, the private complainant herein. The spouses separated. Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita Yu. Later, Alberto and Leticia started living together with another woman and another man respectively. Leticia cohabited with the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG and had a child, CATHERINE BUGAYONG. - the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE hold his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia. At that time CATHERINE who was 6yrs. old was also inside the same room and her father, the accused was letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene if she did not hold his penis. When the penis was already hard and stiff, he placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out from the penis. CATHERINE saw this incident. - Arlene Cauan accompanied by her father Alberto Cauan and her aunt Marilyn Yu, Carmelita Yu and Rosie Yu went to the NBI to file a complaint. - Arlene gave her sworn statement. Alberto Cauan also gave his sworn statement. - Arlene testified that her stepfather had been doing the same act when she was still in Grade 3 and was nine years old. She also said that there were occasions when BUGAYONG played first with his penis then touched her vagina with his penis until a white substance came out of it and that was the time BUGAYONG would pull back his penis. Arlene said that the penis of BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina and she got hurt. - The trial court held that the accused raped the victim in 1993, not in 1994. Notwithstanding the rather encompassing allegation in the Information that the crime was committed before and until October 15, 1994, the trial court ruled that it could legally convict the accused for the crime committed in 1993. The primordial consideration in determining the sufficiency of the averment in the Information as to time is whether the accused was accorded the opportunity to prepare a defense. In this case, the trial court observed that he was not so deprived. Furthermore, it noted that the Information charged more than one offense, but that the accused failed to interpose an opposition. - The Information charged appellant with statutory rape committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several times. In the instant appeal, accused asserts that this allegation regarding the date of the commission of the offense violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. - Appellant claims a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that he was unable to prepare properly for his defense or to anticipate the evidence to be controverted ISSUE WON accused may be convicted of rape committed in 1993, under the present Information, which accused him of committing the said crime before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several times. HELD: YES Ratio Indeed, the determinative factor in the resolution of the question involving a variance between allegation and proof in respect of the date of the crime is the element of surprise on the part of the accused and his corollary inability to defend himself properly. The records of this case belie appellants claim of surprise.

Page

Reasoning - It is doctrinal that the precise time of the commission of an offense need not be alleged in the complaint or information, unless time is an essential element of the crime charged. - If vagueness afflicted the aforementioned text of the Information, it was cured by the victims Sworn Statement, which was expressly made an integral part of the Information. The victim categorically alleged that she had been raped by appellant in 1993 when she was in grade three - Furthermore, appellant could not have been oblivious to the victims Sworn Statement, for he requested and was given an opportunity to rebut the same in his Motion for Reinvestigation. - It will be noted that appellant was charged with rape committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several times. Said acts are alleged in only one Information which, as a general rule, is defective for charging more than one offense. However, appellant failed, within the prescribed period, to file such motion on the ground of duplicity. He is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. - appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. Despite the duplicitous nature of the Information, he did not object to such defect. Moreover, he was given the chance to defend himself in court and to cross-examine the complainant. - the Court rigorously examined the records and arrived upon the conclusion that his guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The victims clear, categorical and straightforward testimony indubitably demonstrated the culpability of appellant for the dastardly acts committed before and until October 15, 1994 - The foregoing shows that appellant sexually assaulted complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape under Article 335 (3) of the RPC. Moreover, appellant is also guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on October 15, 1995. - The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape. - Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, the Court resolved that moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Disposition The appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to pay Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Article 2220, CC. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. FRANCISCO V GSIS 7 SCRA 577 REYES JBL; March 30, 1963 NATURE Appeal by the Government Service Insurance System from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. FACTS - CFI ordered GSIS to abide by the terms of the contract created by plaintiff's offer and its unconditional acceptance, with costs against the GSIS. Trinidad J. Francisco (plaintiff) appealed separately (L-18155), because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees she claimed. - October 10,1956: Trinidad J. Francisco mortgaged in favor of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound. This was in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400K, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her. - January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up to that date Francisco was in arrears on her monthly installments in the amount of P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00. GSIS itself was the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale. - February 20, 1959: the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, proposing to pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would agree that after such payment the foreclosure of my daughter's mortgage would be set aside. As for the balance, Atty. Francisco proposed for GSIS to take over the administration of the mortgaged property and to collect the monthly installments, amounting to about P5,000, until the balance is paid. - February 20 1959: Atty. Francisco received a telegram containing an approval of his request. It was signed by Andal. - February 28 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted to GSIS, through Andal, a check for P30K. GSIS received the amount of P30K, and issued an official receipt No. 1209874, dated 4 March 1959. It did not, however, take over the administration of the compound (as was proposed by Atty. Francisco). - Remittances, all accompanied by letters, corresponding to the months of March, April, May, and June, 1960 and totalling P24,604.81 were also sent by Francisco to GSIS from time to time, all of which were received and duly receipted for. - Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29 January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26 February 1960, respectively, which were signed by Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to the System the one-year period for redemption had expired.

c. CASES WHERE ALLOWED


Article 2219, CC. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Page

Respondents Comment > The remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in foreclosing the mortgage. ISSUES 1. WON the telegram generated a contract that is valid and binding upon the parties 2. WON Francisco is entitled to damages (moral damages in the outline) HELD 1. YES, the contract is binding. Ratio If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority Reasoning - GSIS does not disown the telegram, and even asserts that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from the letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and signed "R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo Monasterial, legal counsel. - In remitting the payment of P30,000 advanced by her father, Trinidads letter to Mr. Andal quoted verbatim the telegram of acceptance Mr. Andal sent. - Notwithstanding this notice, the defendant System pocketed the amount, and kept silent about the telegram not being in accordance with the true facts, as it now alleges. This silence, taken together with the unconditional acceptance of three other subsequent remittances from plaintiff, constitutes in itself a binding ratification of the original agreement. 2. NO, Francisco is not entitled to damages. - The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual or compensatory damages because it could not determine with reasonable certainty the difference between the offered price and the actual value of the property. - Without proof the Court cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the practice of lending institutions in the country is to give out as loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral. - There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code. ART. 2220 Disposition The appealed decision if affirmed, with costs against GSIS. EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO) VITUG; June 25, 1999 NATURE Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the instant petition for review on certiorari a modification of the decision, dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the 07th November 1994 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Manila declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit.

FACTS - On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency business, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages. - Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987. - The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de Vega had not been specifically authorized by Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the latter remain(ed) in its possession up to the present, mean(t) that the amount redounded to the benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect that payment made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor." ISSUE WON moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasidelict that did not result to physical injury to the offended party HELD NO Ratio Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. - An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: "1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; "2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; "3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; "4) Adultery or concubinage; "5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; "6) Illegal search;

Page

"7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; "8) Malicious prosecution; "9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; "10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. "The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover moral damages. "The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this Article, in the order named." - Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, [In this latter case, moral damages may be recovered even in loss of or damage to property.] moral damages may aptly be recovered. - This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. - Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees, [Article 2208(4), Civil Code; such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. - The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the award of moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain undisturbed. No costs.

i.

UNFOUNDED SUITS

MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC) 271 SCRA 558 KAPUNAN; April 18, 1997 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro Mla Drug Inc. - Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical products from Metro Drug since 1976. They had good record with Metro Drug. - Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc., which became a concessionaire of a small

Page

area right inside the hospital compound and it operated a drugstore. Said drugstore had some transactions with the plaintiff as supplier of pharmaceutical products. Subsequently the Cooperative was dissolved and it stopped operating. Solomon Silverio, Jr. leased from the City of Manila the site previously occupied by the Cooperative and put up a drugstore on the same. - Lamenta delivered pharmaceutical products to the said store (8 times). - The first to the seventh deliveries were received by Luz Espares,the 8th delivery was received by Hilda Rodrigona. Both were never the employees of the defendants. - In partial payment of these receivables Solomon Silverio, Jr. issued a check under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios in the amount of P14,180.46, which was subsequently dishonored on the ground of insufficient fund. - Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full redemption of the dishonored check and full payment of outstanding account for P27,938.06. - When Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for the disputed claim, Editha Mijares referred him to Mr. Silverio as the new operator and concessionaire of the drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as the cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations. Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram addressed to Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram, Editha Mijares again directed Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio, the new owner of the drugstore. - RTC: Complaint dismissed; plaintiff ordered to pay the defendants P30,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees CA: Reversed ISSUE WON moral damages should be awarded to the Mijares spouses (bec of malicious prosecution) HELD: NO - Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]). Reasoning - Mijares spouses failed to show that private respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. - In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). - Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). - Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]). - If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

DE LA PEA V CA (TAN) 231 SCRA 456 BELLOSILLO; March 28, 1994 NATURE Appeal from the decision of CA dismissing petitioners action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent. FACTS - Pantaleon De La Pena imputes fraud and misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923 over the same. - Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands. - However, another party also filed a Homestead Application for the same. - Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea who thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative case when the portion transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." However, no such application was filed. - Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, herein private respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la Pea's land. - On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted and it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought. - Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Pea who cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute. - On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." But the conflict over the 3/4hectare portion continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor conducted his own five (5) days later. After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the latter built a fence around the property to prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process. - On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. When it was discovered that private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P7923 which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly amended to implead him.

- The MTC and CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that possession be restored to the petitioner.. - On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. -Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his free patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946. - After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the 1970 Survey. Since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of government property" without even applying for the same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied. Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings. - The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision in toto. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has legal standing in the suit 2. WON the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation against the petitioner are proper HELD 1. NO - Petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea has absolutely no standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance. 2. NO Ratio It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. However, petitioner's possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit. - An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. Disposition Affirmed, with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is DELETED.

Page

J MARKETING V SIA 285 SCRA 580 FRANCISCO; January 29, 1998 NATURE: Appeal from decision of CA FACTS - J Marketing was company engaged in the business of appliances and motorcycles. It received from Kawasaki motors one brand new, color blue motorcycle, which was stored in the company bodega. However (4 years after receipt), the company found out that the motorcycle was missing, and immediately reported this to the police. - The companys representative, Caludac, tried to trace the lost motorcycle to Felicidad SIa (defendant herein), who brought a motorcycle from a Renato Pelande. Allegedly, Caludac went to the house of Sia and examined the chasis and motor numbers of the motorcycle in his possession, and found out that the chasis and motor numbers have been tampered with to jibe with the chais and motor numbers of a motorcycle previously purchased by Pelande from J Mktg. - When Caludac confronted Sia about the questionable motorcycle, Sia refused to surrender possession of the motorcycle and instead told Caludac to file a case in court. Hence, J mktg filed a complaint for replevin against Sia. Sia, in rd turn, filed a 3 party complaint against Pelante (which was subsequently declared in default). - RTC dismissed J mktgs complaint but awarded damages (moral and exemplary) and attys fees. CA affirmed RTCs decision. ISSUE WON award of moral and exemplary damages and attys fees is proper HELD 1. NO Ratio No damages can be charged on those who may exercise their rights in good faith, even if done erroneously. Reasoning - A person's right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous. - J mktg precisely instituted the replevin case against Sia based on the latter's own challenge to the former that if they really had a right on the motorcycle, then they should institute the necessary case in court. When J mktg, through Caludac, did sue Sia, it cannot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross and evident bad faith or was done maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule Sia. - Moreover, the adverse result of an action - dismissal of petitioner's complaint - does not per se make an act unlawful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a premium on the right to litigate. - The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner circumstances which are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damages was not present. - With respect to the attorney's fees, an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to the winning party. Everything points to the fact that petitioner honestly thought that they had a good cause of action, so that notwithstanding the dismissal of their case, no attorney's fees can be granted to private respondent. - Considering that Sia claims to be the owner of the motorcycle, J mktg was compelled to sue him. When Sia "necessarily" became a party defendant no attorney's fees and

litigation expenses can automatically be recovered even if he should win, as it is not the fact of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather the attendance of special circumstances - the enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 NCC. - There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner's persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney's fees cannot not be recovered as cost. Disposition Decision of CA AFFIRMED

COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL) 301 SCRA 459 MENDOZA; December 29, 1999 FACTS - 1989 > SITI and Cometa filed a criminal case against Guevara for falsification of Public Documents (State Investment House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara) The basis of the aforesaid case is a forged Affidavit of Undertaking with its application of a License to Sell its townhouse units in the RSG Condominium-Gueventville II. The signature therein purporting to be that of Cometa is not Cometas signature. - Consequently, a criminal information was filed against Guevara in RTC Makati (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Reynaldo s. Guevara, Accused) - Upon the filing of the information, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against Guevara. Guevara posted the necessary bail bond and the warrant for his arrest was lifted. - After the prosecution had rested its case, Guevara filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence, contending that all the evidence submitted by the prosecution do not suffice to show that he had committed the crime for which he has been accused - March 26, 1992 - RTC Makati issued an order, granting Guevara's Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case for falsification of public documents against him - it is clear that the defendants had maliciously prosecuted Guevara, to his and HBI's embarassment, damage and prejudice. The criminal case filed by the defendants against Guevara had absolutely no basis in fact and in law. Quite clearly, defendants had filed the aforesaid case with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring Guevara, in his capacity as Chairman of GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC and/or to influence the appellate courts to decide in their favor, their appeal of the lower court's decision in the GIDC case. ISSUE WON requisites for malicious prosecution are present HELD YES - a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges the following: (1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by improper and sinister motives - first TWO requisites are sufficiently alleged in the complaint. - the FOURTH requisite malice in which a a general averment is sufficient in view of Rule 8, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed the criminal case for the purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in his capacity as chairman of Guevent Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to

Page

10

Page

appropriate the remaining unsold properties of the corporation, may be considered sufficient. - To be sure, lack of probable cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows, therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. - Obviously, a determination that there was no probable cause cannot be made to rest solely on the fact that the trial court, acting on private respondent Guevarra's demurrer to evidence, dismissed the criminal prosecution, just as it cannot be made to turn on the fact that the Department of Justice reversed the fiscal's findings and ordered the criminal case against private respondent Guevarra to be filed in court. The first would transform all acquittals into veritable countersuits for malicious prosecution. On the other hand, the second would result in the dismissal of all complaints for malicious prosecutions. - Accordingly, the inquiry should be whether sufficient facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal action, the defendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution acted without probable cause. This Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, "probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban. In this case, even if we consider the allegations in the complaint as true, as well as the order of the trial court annexed thereto, we do not find the same sufficient to establish the absence of probable cause. - To prove that the subject UNDERTAKING (Exhibit "N") is falsified, the prosecution presented the testimony of complaining witness REYNALDO COMETA to prove that as President of the STATE INVESTMENT he did not execute the document of undertaking and thus, the subject document (Exhibit "N") is falsified and his signature thereat is not his signature. To corroborate the testimony of COMETA, the NBI handwriting expert LUZVIMINDA C. SABADO, submitted the questioned Documents Report No. 278-688 dated 21 June 1988 to show that the signature above the name of COMETA in the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N") and the specimen signatures of COMETA WERE not written by one and the same person (Exhibit "Y"). - To prove that accused falsified and/or caused the falsification of the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N"), the prosecution presented the records of the HOUSING BOARD which include the "Official Form" letter-application (Exhibit "J") submitted by accused together with the required documents enumerated therein which supposedly included the undertaking to release mortgage. The testimony of a HOUSING BOARD official, Ms. Floredeliza Manuel was presented to testify as an official of the HOUSING BOARD the standard procedure is that the BOARD requires from applicants for authority such as that applied for by accused, the following requirements were quoted by the prosecution in page 5 of their OPPOSITION and reproduced hereunder: - there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence to prove that accused is the author of this falsified document - trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish "a prima facie case against accused private private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra." However, prima facie evidence is different from probable cause. Prima facie evidence requires a degree or quantum of proof greater than probable cause. "It denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused." On the other hand, probable cause for the filing of an information merely means "reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent

state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person has committed the crime." What is needed to bring an action in court is simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. In the terminology of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is required for bringing a criminal action is only such evidence as is sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. Disposition petitioners' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the complaint against petitioners is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

ii.

LABOR CASES

TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC 299 SCRA 608 ROMERO; December 3, 1998 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS - In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as Food Server for a period of thirty-six (36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials. - Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of P11,950.00 in placement fees and other charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise asked to undergo a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System, a duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be Fit of Employment. - Petitioner asked Osdana to sign another ContractorEmployee Agreement which provided that she would be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with a salary of two hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It was this employment agreement which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). - Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She was assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and, contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation as waitress. She was made to work a gruelling twelve-hour shift, without overtime pay. - Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined at a housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22, 1993, during which period, she was not paid her salaries. - Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not compensated. - Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana was again confined for no apparent reason. During this period, she was still not paid her salary. - On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial tasks. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh conditions. She was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated by activities requiring repeated flexion, pronation, and supination of the wrist and characterized by excruciating pain and numbness in the arms. - Osdana underwent two surgical operations. Between these operations, she was not given any work assignments even if

11

Page

she was willing and able to do light work in accordance with her doctors advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period between February to April 22, 1994. - Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25, 1994. The medical report stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms and she was discharged on the second day of the operation. - Four days later, however, she was dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. - Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a complaint before the POEA. ISSUES WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no factual or legal basis for the award and, (b) holding petitioner solely liable for her claims despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its principal, GCC. HELD - The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC were based mainly on the facts and allegations in Osdanas position paper and supporting documents. We find these sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the questioned decisions. Generally, findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if supported by substantial evidence. This Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein public respondents that the facts and the evidence on record adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer of petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the employment contract and illegal dismissal committed by petitioners principal. - Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by reason of disease or illness, viz: Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x. - Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. - Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Osdanas continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms. Besides, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is not a contagious disease. - Petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its claims. If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily

obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. - As regards the monetary award of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid salaries and salary differential granted by public respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for being contrary to law, evidence and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave abuse of discretion. - Although this contention is without merit, the award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. - While it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdanas actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC. - As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the no work, no pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all. - With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. - Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint and several. Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to petitioners interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the foreign principal. Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdanas monetary claims because it was the only respondent named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.

12

iii.

TAKING OF LIFE
March 9, 2000

PEOPLE V PIRAME G.R. No. 121998 QUISUMBING

FACTS: Teodorico Cleopas, Epifanio Cleopas and Florencio Pirame, were charged with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and Teodorico Cleopas entered a plea of not guilty. Epifanio Cleopas was not arraigned, being at large. Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame were found guilty of murdering Pedro Torrenueva. The accused are ordered to indemnify the surviving spouse of the deceased victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of P50,000.00 each and the amount of P23,214.00 representing burial and incidental expenses and P50,000 representing moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. ISSUE: WON the award of moral and exemplary damages were justified. HELD: No. Torrenuevas widow DID NOT TESTIFY ON HAVING SUFFERED
ANY MENTAL ANGUISH OR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FROM THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND. The absence of any generic aggravating

and hit the former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also left the premises and went home. On the way, he met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house. - TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of attempted homicide. He was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleons death, 10K for actual damages, and 10K as moral damages. On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual damages. - Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He maintains that it was self-defense. ISSUES 1. WON all elements of self-defense were present 2. What are the proper damages to be rendered? HELD 1. NO - Unlawful aggression was not proven. - When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed because of the open admission of the killing. - To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. - Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression of the part of the victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed, it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression. When Jerry Boston testified to hearing someone say, Caloy, I will kill you, he did not categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible that Carlos escaped his alleged ambush with out a scratch. 2. CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. - On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K) must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. - The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K was not substantiated. Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court. It was deleted. Disposition petition for review is DENIED. The decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the increased amount of 50KThe award of actual damages is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

circumstance precludes the award of exemplary damages. DOCTRINE: Proof of suffering must be attested to justify the award of moral damages.

ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE) YNARES-SANTIAGO; December 9, 2002 NATURE: Instant petition for review of the decision of the CA. FACTS - Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression by the victim was not proven. He was convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. In this petition, the Court affirmed CA decision but modified the damages. - Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both pleaded not guilty. - At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking on their way home after coming from a birthday party. When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help. - Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he was standing in front of Jerry Boston house, about 7 meters away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon. - Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline. - Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police. - In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert

Page

13

You might also like