1 Russell Rockwell Left Forum New York City, 2006 Panel on 65th Anniversary of Reason and Revolution: Marcuses

Heglian Marxism Today

Marcuses Hegelian Marxism Today Marcuses seminal Reason and Revolution was the first systematic published analysis of Hegel's major works from a Marxist standpoint. In addition it was the first work in English to present a serious analysis of Marxs 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, or humanist essays. While Marcuses 1950s-1970s works have received more attention, todays deep theoretical and social crises may be fertile ground for taking another look at Marcuses most comprehensive statement of the relationship of philosophy and critical social theory. After a brief overview of the work, this paper will (1) assess Marcuses analysis of the relationship of philosophy, specifically Hegels dialectic, and Marxs theory of the abolition of capitalism; (2) review some of Marcuses theories against the background of the dialogue on these issues with the MarxistHumanist Raya Dunayevskaya; and (3) argue that the goal of abolishing capitalism can best be conceived by a return to the origins and by further development of the HegelianMarxian dialectic in the U.S. Overview of the Work To this day Reason and Revolution stands as one of the major Marxist treatments of Hegel. It views Marx's work as grounded in Hegel's concept of dialectic. Theoretically, Marx's work is presented as a critique not only of capitalism, but also, at least implicitly, as the foundation for a critique of Stalinist Communism. Marcuse's book contains a critical analysis of Hegel's major works such as the Phenomenology of Mind,

the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of History and the Philosophy of Right. In addition there are several subsections on Marxs early humanist essays and a particularly striking analysis of Marxs Capital, which connects Marxs theory of alienation or reification to his theory of value. As an example, Marcuse writes, [T]he social world becomes a negative totality only in the process of an abstraction, which is imposed upon the dialectical method by the structure of its subject matter, capitalist society. We may even say that the abstraction is capitalisms own work, and that the Marxian method only follows this process. Marxs analysis has shown that capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor. This economy step by step retreats from the concrete of human activity and needs, and achieves the integration of individual activities and needs only through a complex of abstract relations in which individual work counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary labor time, and which the relations of men appear as relations of things (commodities). This Hegelian-Marxian heritage is counterposed to what Marcuse considered to be the essentially conservative world-view of positivism, which teaches people "to view and study the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid laws"(1941, p. 326). In the preface to the original edition, Marcuse(1941, p. vii) argues that "the rise of Fascism calls for a reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy." One major theme of his work, he writes, is that it "will demonstrate that Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice"(1941, p. vii). A second major theme is Hegel's link to Marx. Marcuse writes that he "tried to go beyond mere restatement" in his "survey of the structure of Hegel's system," in order to connect it "particularly with the Marxian theory"(1941, p. vii). A third theme, he continues, is the critique of positivism, a theory "which undertook to subordinate reason to the authority of established fact." Positivism counterposes itself to the negative and critical character of Hegel's dialectical concept of Reason, where Hegel's "critical and rational standards, especially his dialectics, had to come into conflict with the prevailing social reality"(1941, p. vii).

3 Review of the Introduction to Part IIFrom philosophy to social theory A common misperception has persisted that the thesis of Marcuses R&R was that Hegel produced a philosophic system, which reached the height of abstraction, and that the characteristic turn in Marx was to concrete social theory. However, From philosophy to social theory, Marcuses introduction to RRs Part on The Rise of Social Theory, explains things differently: Marcuse writes that, the transition from philosophy to the domain of state and society had been an intrinsic part of Hegels system. His basic philosophic ideas had fulfilled themselves in the specific historical form that state and society had assumed, and the latter became central to a new theoretical interest. Philosophy in this way devolved upon social theory [Hegels] system brought philosophy to the threshold of its negation and thus constituted the sole link between the old and the new form of critical theory, between philosophy and social theory (p. 251, 253). Beginning with this thesis Marcuse proceeds to show two sides of the transition to social theory, that is, he presents a dialectic relationship of (1) how the inner workings of western philosophy necessitated the transition to a critical theory of society; and, (2) how historical efforts that distinguish the modern era entered into and shaped the philosophic interest. Marcuse states that in order to understand (1) (how the inner workings of western philosophy necessitated the transition to a critical theory of society), one must first understand the way in which the historical efforts that distinguished the modern era entered into and shaped the philosophic interest. The social forces at work in this historical surge, Marcuse writes, used philosophy in its predominately rationalist form. While I have no time to go into the details here, Marcuse summarizes five ways in which the middle-classes, with Reason as its critical slogan, used philosophy to promote its political and economic development. However briefly, Marcuse summarizes these five as follows: (1) the world as rational implied that

4 it could be comprehended and changed by mans knowingful action; nature was regarded as rational in its very structure, with subject and object meeting in the medium of reason; (2) reason is not once and for all restricted to a pre-established order; (3) reason involves universalitymans acts are those of a thinking subject guided by conceptual knowledge; with concepts as his instruments, the thinking subject can penetrate the contingencies and recondite devises of the world and reach universal and necessary laws that govern and order the infinitude of individual objectsthe universal is as real as the particular; it only exists in a different form, namely as force, dynamis, potentiality; (4) thought unites the manifold in society as well as nature; the subject of thought, the thinking ego, uniform in all people, is the ultimate basis of a rational organization of society, a proposition that recognizes the essential equality of all people. (In addition to equality, freedom is implicit in this subjectivity). Marcuse writes: The thinking subject is not chained to the immediately given forms of being, but is capable of transcending them and changing them in line with his concepts. The freedom of the thinking subject, in turn, involves his moral and practical freedom. For the truth he envisions is not an object for passive contemplation, but an objective potentiality calling for realization. The idea of reason implies the freedom to act according to reason (p. 255). (5) Finally, Marcuse explains, the freedom to act according to reason, was regarded as exercised in the practice of natural science (p. 255). The scientific mastery of nature, developing side-by-side with the effort to transform the world into a commodity market, resulted in reason coming under the sway of technical progress. Marcuse writes on this: The human world was presented as governed by objective laws; analogous or even identical with the laws of naturethe more reason triumphed in technology and natural science, the more reluctantly did it call for freedom in mans social lifeunder the pressure of this process, the critical and ideal elements slowly vanishedthe representative philosophers of the middle-classreconciled their

5 philosophic rationalism with the flagrant irrationality of the prevailing social relations, and inverted human reason and freedom so that they became ramparts of the isolated soul or mind. (p. 256) After this description of how historical efforts entered into and shaped the philosophical interest, Marcuse notes the other side: how the workings of western philosophy necessitated the transition to a critical theory of society. Here the figure is Hegel. Marcuse writes that Hegel broke with the tendency of introversion, and he proclaimed the realization of reason in and through given social and political institutions. Dialectic brought philosophy to grips with social reality. It recognized that, the truth philosophy sought was a totality of pervasive contradictionsphilosophical concepts now came to reflect the actual movement of reality (p. 257). Next follows the conclusion to Marcuses introduction to the section of The Rise of Social Theory; I want to emphasize it because it is the key to entering into and understanding the critical approach to Marcuses analysis I will take in the remainder of this talk. The critique centers on the question of the relationship of Hegels system and Marxs theory of the abolition of capitalism. I will develop this critique alongside, (1) considerations of Marcuses following section on The foundations of the dialectical theory of society, particularly the section titled The negation of philosophy, which opens the section; and, (2) Marcuses correspondence with the Marxist-Humanist Raya Dunayevskaya on the topics of Hegel and the Hegel-Marx relationship. Marcuse writes in respect to the role of the dialectic in the process that brought philosophy to grips with social reality: It resulted in the dissolution of the harmonious world of fixed objects posited by common sense and in recognition that the truth philosophy sought was a totality of pervasive contradictions. Philosophical concepts now came to reflect the actual movement of reality, but since they were themselves patterned on its social

6 content, they stopped where the content stopped, that is, in the state that governed civil society, while the ideas and values that pointed beyond the social system were stowed away in the realm of absolute mind, in the system of dialectical philosophy. This passage refers directly to Hegels late works, his mature system, especially the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. (The Encyclopedia consists of three books: The Science of Logic; the Philosophy of Nature; and, the Philosophy of Mind.) The Philosophy of Mind consists of an Introduction, followed by parts on Subjective Mind, Objective Mind, and Absolute Mind. Hegels major work, which followed the Encyclopedia, is the Philosophy of Right. This work elaborated in great detail the conceptslaw, the family, morality, ethics, civil society, and the stateHegel first developed in the Objective Mind section of Philosophy of Mind. Here I want to note as an aside that Marcuse in R&R treated Philosophy of Right quite extensively but referred to Philosophy of Mind only sparingly (for example, in the passage I just quoted above). However, clearly even the mere references are important. Another telling example of this type of reference can be found in the very midst of Marcuse analysis of Philosophy of Right, where Marcuse writes: Some of the gravest misunderstandings that obscure the Philosophy of Right can be removed simply by considering the place of the work in Hegel's system. It does not treat with the whole cultural world, for the realm of right is just part of the realm of mind, namely, that part which Hegel denotes as objective mind. It does not, in short, expound or deal with the cultural realities of art, religion and philosophy, which embody the ultimate truth for Hegel . . .Even Hegel's most emphatic deification of the state cannot cancel his definite subordination of the objective to the absolute mind, of the political to the philosophical truth (my emphasis, RR) (Hegel, 1969, 178).

As I quoted him above, Marcuse wrote that the ideas and values that pointed

7 beyond bourgeois or capitalist society were stowed away in the realm of absolute mind, in the system of dialectical philosophy. But Marcuse concludes his introduction, From philosophy to social theory, with a statement that implied that the Hegelian dialectic itself should not be viewed as already overcome by concrete social analysis. Marcuse writes, The Hegelian methodreached further than the concepts that brought it to a conclusion. Instead, according to Marcuse, the Hegelian dialectic could only be properly grasped and overcome by its realization. Marcuse however comes close to posing this in terms of the perseverance of the Hegelian method versus its content, a judgment apparently inconsistent with his earlier statement found in the opening statements of the Introduction. The historical heritage of Hegels philosophydid not pass to the Hegeliansthey were not the ones who kept alive the true content of his philosophy. The critical tendencies of the Hegelian philosophy were taken over by, and continued in, the Marxian social theory. (p. 252). And Marcuse closes the introduction with this conclusion: Through dialectic, history had been made the very content of reason. Hegel had demonsrated that the material and intellectual powers of mankind had developed far enough to call upon mans social and political practice to realize reason. Philosophy itself then made direct application to social theory and practice, not as some external force but as to its legitimate heir. If there was to be any progress beyond this philosophy it had to be beyond philosophy itself and, at the same time, beyond the social and political order to which philosophy tied its fate

The foundation of the dialectical theory of societythe negation of philosophy After having completed a consideration of Marcuses Introduction to The Rise of Social Theory we are in a good position to understand The negation of philosophy, a key subsection of the chapter titled The foundation of the dialectical theory of society. Besides this initial subsection and a concluding subsection on The Marxian dialectic,

8 the chapter includes other subsections on Kierkegaard and Feuerbach, who Marcuse analyzes as philosophers representative of a post-Hegelian trend built around the conviction that with the close of Hegels system in absolute mind there was, as Marcuse puts it, only one medium left in which the the truth could be found and put into operation, namely mans concrete, material existence. But Marxs theory was clearly unique even vis a vis people like Kierkegaard and Feuerbach and hence was not itself representative of this trend. Marcuse shows this by examining Marxs early writings as well as Capital, and summarizing all this in the first subsection, The negation of philosophy, and in the concluding subsection, The Marxian dialectic. Here I will be able to say just a few things on the Negation of philosophy subsection. In Negation of philosophy Marcuse states that even Marxs early writings are not philosophical. They express the negation of philosophy, though they still do so in philosophical language. But in Marxs system, according to Marcuse, all categories refer to the negation of the existing order, while in Hegels system categories terminate in this order. In Hegel, Marcuse writes, [R]eason [is] the sole universal standard of society; [Hegels philosophy] recognized the role of abstract labor in integrating divergent individual interests into a universal system of wantsit described the history of civil society as the history of the irreconcilable antagonisms inherent in the social order (p. 259) Marcuse even attributes the foundation of Hegels philosophy to Hegels specific interpretation of the subject-object relation. Hegel defines the traditional epistemological antagonism between subject (consciousness) and object as a reflection of a definite historical antagonism. In Hegel, the first object is an object of desire, something that needs to be worked up to satisfy a human want. In the act of

9 appropriation, however, the object appears as the otherness of the human person. In the relationship to an object of desire and labor a person is not with him or her self but dependent on nature, chance, and the interests of others. Hegel describes the ensuing process as social: it leads to alienationthe individuals are overpowered by things they themselves have made. Marcuse concludes: The realization of reasonimplies the overcoming of estrangement, the establishment of a condition in which the subject knows itself and possesses itself in all its objectsthis demonstration of the role of labor, and of the process of reification and its abolition is, Marx declares, the greatest achievement of Hegels [early, great work] Phenomenology of Mind (p. 260). Yet, Marcuse writes, Marx pointed out that the antagonisms of civil society are set at rest in the monarchic state, and all the contradictions are finally reconciled in the realm of the absolute mind, but the existence of the proletariat, contradicts the alleged reality of reason---if the exercises of absolute mindart, religion, and philosophyconstitute mans essence, the proletarian is forever severed from his essence, for his existence permits him no time to indulge in these activities (p. 260, 261). Marcuse concludes this part of his discussion by referring to Marxs 1843 Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right. Marcuse writes that Marx showed there that the existence of the proletariat not only vitiates the rational society depicted in Hegels Philosophy of Right; all of bourgeois society and every individual in it is vitiated as well. Marcuse writes: Laboras Hegel himself showed determines the essence of man and the social form it takes. If the existence of the proletariat then bears witness to [quoting Marx] the complete loss of man, and this loss results from the mode of labor on which civil society is founded, the society is vicious in its entirety and the proletariat expresses a total negativity: [in Marxs words] universal suffering

10 and universal injustice. The reality of reason, right, and freedom then turns into the reality of falsehood, injustice and bondage. (p. 261).

The existence of the proletariat thus gives living witness to the fact that the truth has not been realized. History and social reality themselves thus negate philosophy. The critique of society cannot be carried through by philosophical doctrine, but becomes the task of socio-historical practice. This concludes Marcuses negation of philosophy, which serves as the prelude to brief but profound analyses of, on the one hand, Kierkegaard and Feurbach, and Marx on the other. As I mentioned, Marcuses analysis of Marx here is original and profound in both the conceptualization of the relationship between the young Marx of the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts and the mature Marx of Capital. In this sense it represents a most important milestone in the recreation of the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic. An equally important moment, however, is the link to Marcuses work developed in Raya Dunayevskayas Marxist-Humanism. This link was characterized by both appropriation and critique. Dunayevskayas personal correspondence with Marcuse between 1954 and Marcuses death in 1978 offers a particularly important vantage point from which to view this relationship. While I cant begin to summarize the correspondence here, a most important year in the context of our topic today was the initial one beginning in late 1954. The main discussion revolved around the contemporary social relevance and practical implications of Hegels absolutes, particularly Absolute Mind, the culminating concept of Hegels system laid out in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. In key exchanges Dunayevskaya corresponded with Marcuse on the implications of her recent analysis of Hegels Philosophy of Mind. In the several years prior to contacting Marcuse Dunayevskaya had been corresponding on the subject of the Hegel-

11 Marx relationship with CLR James and Grace Lee, who together with her represented the leadership of the Johnson-Forest, or State-Capitalist tendency, of American Trotskyism. A key letter among this exchange documents her analysis of Hegels Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, an analysis she told Marcuse that she realized only later had begun at the point in Hegels text where Marxs analysis had broken off in his Critique of Hegelian Dialectic, perhaps the most important of Marxs 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. With this background in mind, I will contrast Dunayevskayas with Marcuses approach to the Hegel-Marx relationship: Dunayevskaya notes at the beginning of her May 20, 1953 letter to Grace Lee, which is mostly on the late Hegel work Philosophy of Mind, that she had just plunged into a reading of Philosophy of Mind, followed by sections from the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. In addition to reading these works of Hegel, Dunayevskaya notes that she had also read two of Marxs works: The Civil War in France, and the final part of Volume Three of Capital. Dunayevskayas reading and noting this part of Capital, Volume Three is especially important for assessing the relationship of Marxs and Dunayevskayas respective readings of Hegel. A little later I will quote the relevant passage from Capital, Volume III. But let us begin with Marxs CHD. The last of Hegels work Marx took up in Critique of Hegelian Dialectic was Philosophy of Mind, in particular the Introduction. Hegels introduction to Philosophy of Mind is comprised of ten paragraphs, 377-386. These paragraphs summarize the entire Philosophy of Mind. In Critique of Hegelian Dialectic Marx quoted paragraphs 381 and 384. In her 1953 letter, unaware of the significance at the time, Dunayevskayas assessment of Philosophy of Mind began with the very next

12 paragraph, 385. In the following I will characterize Marx and Dunayevskayas reading of Hegels Philosophy of Mind. In Critique of Hegelian Dialectic Marx critically presented all of Hegels concepts, and their transitions, central to Hegels system as expressed in the Encyclopedia. Marxs manuscript broke off abruptly at paragraph #384, two paragraphs before the end of Philosophy of Minds Introduction, quoting Hegel thus: The Absolute Mind, this is the highest definition of the absolute. To understand the significance of Dunayevskayas beginning her analysis in the paragraph following the one where Marxs CHD manuscript broke off, it is necessary to point out the structure of the Introduction to Philosophy of Mind. Again, the Introduction is comprised of ten paragraphs, 377-386. Paragraphs 377-380, which Marx does not comment upon, recount the history of the concept of Mind. Marx takes up the second section Hegel titled, What Mind or Spirit Is, and quotes from the first and last paragraphs381 and 384of this section. In turn, Dunayevskayas analysis of this Introduction to Philosophy of Mind takes up its final section, paragraphs 385 and 386, which Hegel titled, Subdivision. This Subdivision differs from the previous section, What Mind Is, which Marx ended on. What Mind is is concerned with definitions. The Subdivision concerns movement. In the Subdivision Hegel examines three stages of development of Mind. These stages of Mind seem to parallel the system as a whole, Logic-Nature-Mind. However, Hegel particularizes Mind itself as Subjective Mind-Objective Mind-Absolute Mind.

13 Final two Paragraphs Paragraph #385 In paragraph #385 Mind Subjective is the ideal totality of the Idea, it is, Hegel writes, self-contained and free. Mind Objective is the form of realityMind, Hegel says, realized in a world produced and to be produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Finally, Hegel says, Absolute Mind is, the unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is and forever produces itself. Paragraph #386 Paragraph #386 is the final paragraph of the Introduction, moving from definition to the intrinsic movement of dialectic, it demonstrates that only the concept of Absolute Mind is adequate for a concept of freedom. Hegel states that the stages of Subjective Mind and Objective Mind, which he fully explicates in the Introductions prior section, What spirit or mind is, express essentially, the disproportion between the concept and reality. But Hegel issues a qualification. Both the disproportion between concept and reality and the activity of overcoming this disproportion are intrinsic to Absolute Mind. Hegel describes the identification of Subjective Mind, Objective Mind and Absolute Mind as a result of steps in the activity of liberationfinding a world presupposed before us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it.

14 At this point in her analysis of the two final paragraphs of Philosophy of Mind Dunayevskaya notes that Hegel next argues against the abstract logicians rigid application of the disproportion between the concept and reality, and the way in which this disproportion is treated as a moral and religious concernthe wish to go further, Hegel says, is [quote] reckoned a mark of audacity, if not insanity, of thought. (Think of all the post-Marx Marxiststhe abstract logicians of today, or of the not too distant pastwho fetishized stages and phases, state property forms, income equality, etc. instead of fully projecting what Marx intended with his concept of the abolition of capitalism). While Marxs 1844 manuscript broke off before the Subdivision in the Introduction to Philosophy of Mind where Dunayevskaya analyzed how Hegel took up the issue of necessity and freedom, it is striking how Marxs third volume of Capital returns, at least conceptually, to this Hegel text. Recall Dunayevskayas account of Hegels paragraph #385, the opening paragraph of the Subdivision: Mind Subjective is the ideal totality of the Idea, it is, Hegel writes, self-contained and free. Mind Objective is the form of realityMind, Hegel says, realized in a world produced and to be produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Finally, Hegel says, Absolute Mind is, the unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is and forever produces itself.

15 By comparison, in Volume 3 of Capital, Marx too wrote about necessity and freedom: The realm of freedom really begins only where labor determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material production properFreedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most appropriate for their human nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis. The reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite (Marx, 1976, p. 959). I think this passage is very interesting to consider in relationship with Marcuses statement that philosophy devolved upon social theory, or that Marxs theory represented the negation of philosophy. If not indicative of Marxs actual return to that part of the text of Hegels Philosophy of Mind that Marx had not proceeded to in his 1844 Critique of Hegelian Dialectic, there is a striking conceptual affinity of this passage (taken from Volume III of Capital) with Hegels introductory summary of his systemculminating Philosophy of Mind. Hence, it might be said that the negation of philosophy takes on contemporary importance especially as an understanding of how the actual process of this negation happened in theory. Hence it might be said that Marxs final analysis of the social relationships of capitalist society depended upon a return to Hegels account of the dialectic of freedom and necessity. Any new attempts to overcome capitalism will probably need to begin from this highpoint.