1

Chapter 1 THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

1.1 Introduction The concepts of means and ends are central to the understanding of the morality of human acts. An individual performs an act in order to achieve a certain purpose or intention. The action which is being made to achieve a certain purpose is properly called as means. The purpose or intention done by the agent is properly called as end. Hence, ends and means are the primordial requirement in the morality of human acts.1 Immanuel Kant, a seventeenth century German thinker of a great renown, laid the foundations for his ethics in his short but influential Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. His ethical view is called deontologism for its emphasis on duty or obligation (i.e. deontos in Greek).2 In his moral philosophy, the sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome(end) that is achieve by the action(means), but the motive that is behind the action. Kant stated: An action come from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose [end] to be attained by it, but in the maxim according with which it is decided upon; it depends therefore not in the realization of the object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which, irrespectively of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been performed.3 It is clear then in the above statement that Kant considered the ends and the means of an action as his bases in determining how human action can be moral. Hence
1 J. Murray, Principles of Conduct (New York: Inter-Varsity Press, 1957), 18. 2 Anthony Kenny, A Brief History of Western Philosophy vol. 2 (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publisher, 1998), 270. 3 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. H.J. Paton (New York: Routledge, 1948), 13.

for him, evil methods can never be justified no matter how noble the motive is. Almost two hundred years after the death of Immanuel Kant, Joseph Fletcher, a theologian who was born in East Orange, New Jersey, formulated one ethical theory. His ethics is called situation ethics. This theory states that the moral norm depends upon a given situation, but whatever this situation may be, one must always act in the name of Christian love. He claimed that if there is right and wrong, it is merely determined by the desired purpose of the situation. He stated, Only the command to love is categorically good [moral]. We are obliged to tell the truth, for example, only if the situation calls for it. Act responsibly in love, and everything else without exception, all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms, are only contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation.4 Decision making therefore should be based on the circumstances of a particular situation, and not on the fixed law. Fletcher believed that the love or agape is the only absolute. Thus, he believed that as long as love is the intention, the end can justify the means.5 This study is primarily undertaken to come up with a comparative analysis of Immanuel Kants deontology and Joseph Fletchers situation ethics.

1.2 Statement of the Problem The main purpose of this study is to make a comparative analysis of Immanuel Kants deontology and Joseph Fletchers situation ethics. Specifically, the researcher seeks to answer the following:
4 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), 120. 5 Ibid.

1. What is Immanuel Kants deontology? 2. What is Joseph Fletchers situation ethics? 3. What are the similarities and differences between Kants deontology and Fletchers situation ethics?

1.3 Significance of the Study This study is undertaken in order to compare and contrast Immanuel Kants deontology and Joseph Fletchers situation ethics. This study is significant because it will contribute to the knowledge of curious readers who will read this philosophical work, who might also deal with the same problem in the future regarding this matter. In addition, this study will serve as a good reference for those professors and students, especially at the Rogationist Seminary-Cebu, who want to know more about the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Joseph Fletcher. Finally, this study is significant because this will help those students in philosophy or other persons who want to make a thesis about the related topics of moral philosophy of Kant and Fletcher.

1.4 Scope and Limitation The primary goal of this study is to arrive at a clear comparison and contrast between Immanuel Kants deontology and Joseph Fletchers situation ethics. Specifically, the researcher will focus on the ends and the means which they are dealing

in their respective moral philosophy. This study therefore contains the exposition and discussion of the possible similarities and differences between Kants and Fletchers moral philosophy. Furthermore, this study will make use of the related books and internet resources. This study does not tackle any other topics and subjects other than Immanuel Kants deontology and Joseph Fletchers situation ethics.

1.5 Definition of Terms To avoid ambiguity and confusion, the following terms are defined: Autonomy. Refers to a subjection of the will to its own law or in other words, the ability to make yourself do what you tell yourself to do.6 Autonomy of the Will. Refers to the property the will has of being a law to itself.7 Deontology. Refers to a moral theory according to which the rightness or obligatoriness of an action is not exclusively determined by the value of its consequences, but here other considerations can also be relevant: For instance, that the action fulfills a premise or complies with a divine command.8 Duty. Refers to the objective necessity to act from obligations, that is, what a person ought to do.9 End. Is that which completes or finishes a thing, and it is that for which the

6 Robert C. Solomon and Jennifer K. Greena, Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics through Classical Sources, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 23. 7 Kant, Moral Law, 101. 8 Solomon and Greena, Morality and the Good Life, 14. 9 Kant, Moral Law, 81.

thing is finish.10 Good Will. The only thing that is good without qualification or restriction. That is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense is an absolute or unconditioned good.11 Heteronomy. Doing what other people tell you without deliberation or affirmation on your part.12 Interest. Is that in virtue of which a reason becomes practical, that is, becomes a cause determining the will.13 Love. It seeks the neighbors best interest with careful eyes to all the factors in the situation. Fletcher distinguishes this love from friendly love (philiac) and romantic love (eros).14 Law of love. Is the power of love to discover what the situation demands.15 Maxim. Is a principle upon which we act. It is a purely personal principle and it may be good or it may be bad.16 Means. Refers to what contains merely the ground of the possibility of an action whose effect is an end.17 Personality. It is the first-order concern in ethical choices.18 Principle. Is that from which a thing in any way proceeds.19
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Paul Glenn, Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy (Montana: B. Herder, 1968), 48. Kant, Moral Law, 18. Solomon and Greena, Morality and the Good Life, 14. Ibid. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 79. Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 14. Kant, Moral Law, 17. Glenn, Ethics, 48 Solomon and Greena, Morality and the Good Life, 14. Henri Grenier, Philosophy of Nature, vol. 2 (Canada: St. Dunstans University, 1975), 14.

Reverence. A unique feeling which is due, not to any stimulus of the senses, but to the thought that will is subordinated to such a universal law independently of any influence of the senses.20 Situation Ethics. Basically claims that man is capable of making loving decisions. Consider the situation, what seems best for you and do the most loving thing.21 Teleology. According to this theory, it is the goodness or badness of the consequences and nothing else the rightness or obligatoriness of any action.22 Will. It is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational, the power to choose and implement a persons own action.23

1.6 Research Method This study is purely library research. The researcher will use the descriptive method in coming up with an exposition of Kants deontology and Fletchers situation ethics which will then be subjected to a comparative analysis.

20 21 22 23

Kant, Moral Law, 17. J. Murray, Principles of Conduct, 182. Solomon and Greena, Morality and the Good Life, 15. Kant, Moral Law, 14.

Chapter 2 LIFE, INFLUENCES, AND RELATED STUDIES

2.1 Brief Biographical Accounts 2.1.1Kants Biography Kants life is famously characterized by outward uneventfulness.24 Immanuel Kant was born in1724 in the East Prussian city of Knigsberg, where he spent almost all of his days.25 Both of his parents were devoted followers of Pieties branch of the Lutherian Church, and it was largely through the influence of their pastor that Kant, who was the fourth of eleven children, but the eldest surviving son, obtained an education.26 Since Immanuel Kants parents were Pieties, they brought Kant into the Pieties movement where it impacted a permanent influence upon his thought and pastoral life.27 He praised those whose Pietism was genuine, among whom he numbered his parents, as outstanding, having the highest thing men can possess, that calm, that serenity, that inner peace, undisturbed by any passion.28 He entered at the University of Konisberg in 1740 at the age of sixteen. At the University of Knigsberg, Kant studied Natural Science, Mathematics, Philosophy and was exposed to the Leibniz-Wolffian system and Newtons theories.29 The main
24 Sebastian Garner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Routledge, 1998), 9. 25 Ibid. 26 Mortimer Adler, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 33 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990), 56. 27 Frederick Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. 6, from Wolff to Kant (London: Doubleday Dell Publishing, 1959), 180. 28 Garner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, 10. 29 Ibid.

influence upon his mind, however, was that of Martin Knutzen, professor of Logic and Metaphysics. Knutzen was a disciple of Wolff, but he had a particular interest in Natural Science, lecturing Metaphysics, Astronomy and Mathematics, as well as Philosophy.30 In this school, he wrote his writings which are mostly scientific in nature and retained a deep interest in the subject. After Kant graduated, he taught as a professional tutor before he applied to the University of Konigsberg as a formal lecturer during 1755.31 He continued as a lecturer for fifteen years, twice failing to receive an appointment as a professor. But in 1770, he was appointed finally as an official professor of Logic and Metaphysics. Over the preceding years, Kant had published a number of works, the majority on scientific-cummetaphysical subjects, which had earned him a secure reputation within Germany as a powerful, independent thinker. Kant is known for his critical philosophy, especially from rationalism, which include his series of critiques, the first one entitled Critique of Pure Judgment (1781), the second Critique of Practical Reason [Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals] (1788), and the last Critique of Judgment (1790) which have changed the course of modern philosophy.32 Kant spent his time in Konigsberg. Kant was also known to be a solitary man, hard working in spite of frail health, forgetful yet friend to be valued. Immanuel Kant was a habitual person, that according to the people of Konigsberg, he always had his three Oclock walk and even gave the name

30 Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. 6, 181. 31 Dabney Townsend, Aesthetics: Classic Readings from the Western Tradition (London: Wadsworth, 1988), 117. 32 Ibid.

Philosophers Walk.33 Even after his death the people missed this little mans habit of his three oclock walks. He rested in peace at the beginning of the Napoleonic wars in 1804, 12th of February due to hypochondria.

2.1.2 Fletchers Biography Joseph Francis Fletcher was born in East Orange, New Jersey, on April 10, 1905. His parents separated when he was nine, after which his mother returned to her family home in Fairmont, West Virginia, to raise her two children. His experiences working for the Consolidation Coal Company and the Monongahela Coal Mine led to his lifelong sympathy for the working conditions of coal miners and set the stage for a life of social activism.34 Fletcher entered West Virginia University at Morgantown when he was 17. Already a member of the education staff of the United Mine Worker's Association, Fletcher was jailed during his first college year for defying an injunction against speaking in public for the miner's union. A self-proclaimed democratic socialist, his interests in philosophy and history led him to study the utilitarians Bentham and Mill and the pragmatists Peirce, Dewey, and James. Two significant things happened during his second year in college: he met his future wife, fellow student and poet Forrest Hatfield (of the famous feuding Hatfields), and he became an active Christian in the Episcopal Church. Fletcher embraced Christianity because of his social ideals. Through his work in the church he hoped to further the cause of social justice, especially

33 Solomon and Greena, Morality and the Good Life, 249. 34 Encyclopedia of World Biography on Joseph Fletcher, [article online]; available from www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404702192.html2004; 12 July 2010.

economic democracy for workers.35 An outstanding student, Fletcher was denied a degree by the university because he refused to participate in compulsory military training. Such training was required of male students in land-grant universities by federal law. However, an honorary doctorate was conferred on him by West Virginia University in 1984. In 1922, after only three years of college, Fletcher entered Berkeley Divinity School. Working the summer of his first year in a program called "Seminarians in Industry," he was assigned to the Plymouth Cordage Company factory where he discovered and exposed a blacklist of union sympathizers that included Bart Vanzetti, the Italian anarchist. During his second summer he volunteered for the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee in Boston. His last year at seminary was spent collaborating on a book with Spencer Miller, education adviser of the American Federation of Labor, titled The Church and Industry..36 After completing divinity school in 1928, Fletcher pursued graduate studies in economic history at Yale. There he won the John Henry Watson fellowship and in 1930 went to London to study under R. H. Tawney at the London School of Economics. During this period he formulated the tenets of his theology of social redemption. He was heavily influenced by theologians Walter Rauschenbusch, Washington Gladden, and William Temple.37 On his return to America during the era of the Great Depression, Fletcher continued his union activism and teaching. In 1936 he became dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in Cincinnati, where he developed a school of social training for seminarians.
35 36 Ibid. Ibid. available from

37

Joseph Francis Fletcher, [article online]; http://www.yourdictionary.com/biography/joseph-francis-fletcher; 12 July 2010.

11

He taught courses in labor history and New Testament at the University of Cincinnati and social ethics at Hebrew Union College. He also raised support for and taught volunteer courses in a labor education night school supported by local unions.38 In 1944 Fletcher accepted the Robert Treat Paine Chair in Social Ethics at the Episcopal Theological School of Harvard University, where he taught Christian social ethics. For several years he also taught business ethics in the Musser Seminar at the Harvard School of Business Administration. He continued his social activist teachings for union organizations and was twice attacked and beaten unconscious by anti-union thugs while lecturing in the deep South. Along with two fellow Harvard professors, Fletcher was redbaited and subpoenaed by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who charged the professors with being Communists or at least Communist sympathizers.39 The Lowell Lectures given by Fletcher at Harvard in 1949 were precursors of his treatise on ethical issues in medicine, Morals and Medicine (1954). This book gave a biological direction to his social ethic and was the first non-Catholic treatment of medical ethics. It is considered the pioneering work of a new discipline - biomedical ethics - and subsequently established Fletcher as the "father of modern biomedical ethics."40 In 1966 Fletcher published the controversial best-seller situation ethics, which he described as his "fat pamphlet," setting forth his theory of moral action. Although written within the context of Christianity, the theory was and is independent of Christian presuppositions. Fletcher espoused a consequentialist ethic and methodology based on

38 39 40

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

loving concern, or agape. He proclaimed that human beings are more important than moral rules and those appraisals of consequences rather than rules should guide moral decision making. His primary concern was with particular cases rather than general principles. "Situation Ethics" has been formally embraced as a category of consequentialist ethics.41 In 1967 Fletcher gave up his faith in Christianity and subsequently eschewed any religious or secular dogma. Upon retiring from the Episcopal Theological School, he moved to Charlottesville, Virginia, where he was the first (and only) person to hold the title of professor of medical ethics in the Program in Human Biology and Society at the University of Virginia. He served as visiting scholar there until his death from cardiovascular disease on October 28, 1991.42 A prominent speaker, Joseph Fletcher lectured at over 450 universities and medical schools throughout the United States, Europe, and Asia. He was a visiting scholar at St. Andrew's University in Scotland and Cambridge University in England, where he was a fellow of Clare College. He was also a visiting professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo. He was awarded honorary doctorates from West Virginia University, Berkeley Divinity School, and the Episcopal Theological School. In 1984 the Hastings Center awarded him the Beecher Award. He was an elected honorary member of Alpha Omega Alpha, the national medical honor society. In the early 1980s the Mohawk Nation made him a full-fledged brave in the Clan of the Turtle. He was also named "Humanist Laureate" by the Academy of Humanism in

41 42

Ibid. Ibid.

13

1983.43

2.2 Theoretical Framework 2.2.1 Kants Influences There was a great exposition of philosophy in Germany in the time of Immanuel Kant. But there were already great intellectuals in Germany prior to his time. The conflicts of thoughts of the rationalists and the empiricists offered Kant a unique and distinctive way of explaining things which became the foundation of the philosophical works he formulated. Kants philosophical works were not solely derived from his ideas, but rather they were also product of some philosophers who influenced him and eventually helped mold his thought. His philosophical works were upshots of some philosophers whom he adhered and opposed in some way. Thus, Kant was influenced by many philosophers who contributed a lot in constructing his philosophical thought. David Hume David Hume was a renowned empiricist. In the fields of ethics, Kant was influenced by Hume especially in determining what is right and wrong. For Hume, it was neither our reason nor our experience that determines the difference between right and wrong. It was simply our sentiments.44 This idea of Hume was opposed by Kant by asserting the difference between right and wrong was a matter of reason and not sentiment.45

43 44 45

Ibid. Richard Schacht, Classical Modern Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1993), 222. Jostein Gaarder, Sophies World (New York: Farrar, 2004), 279.

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten was German philosopher who influenced Kant especially in his views on various moral duties of man to God, and to others. In the time of Kant, the study of human nature was generally trended under the heading of empirical psychology. It was Baumgartens treatment of this science that Kant used over many years as a text for his lectures in anthropology.46 The influence of Baumgarten led Kant to believe on the role of morality in mans various duties to himself and to others.

Martin Knutzen Kant considered him as a great professor that even Kant himself did not want to replace Knutzen in the chair as professor of Logic and Metaphysics. His philosophy was reconciled Pietism and the philosophy of Von Wolff. The influence of Knutzen led Kant in his reconciliation between rationalism and empiricism and so reconciling Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian natural philosophy.47

Another famous German philosopher Christian Von Wolff led Kant in formulating his ideas concerning ethics. Wolff asserted, Morality involves a quest to make one self and other more perfect. Thus by improving your body and mind, you make
46 47 175. Ibid. Paul Guyer, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0 (New York: Routledge, 1998),

15

yourself more perfect and by not harming, but by helping others, you make others more perfect.48 Kant adhered some of Wolffs contentions. The same with Wolff, Kant proposed that man can express his moral obligation in a single principle.49 Thus, Kant created his moral principle called categorical imperative. In the same manner with Wolff, Kant also asserts that morality comes from the authority of human reason and cant simply invent by God. He stated that no one, not even God, can be the author of the laws of morality, since they have no origin in will, put instead a practical necessity.50

Kants concerns on human morality and his theory of justice were influenced by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his work Social Contract. It was Rousseau who taught Kant the importance of freedom and autonomy. It was also from Rousseau that Kant derived the idea that human beings in the social condition inevitably acquire the illusion of inequality.51 Upon reading Rousseaus work, Kant noted I learned to respect human nature, and I should consider myself far more useless than the ordinary working man if I did not believe that this view could give worth to establish the rights of man.52

2.2.2 Fletchers Influences John Stuart Mill

48 49 50 James Fieser, Moral Philosophy Through the Ages (London: Mayfield Publishing, 2001), 175. Ibid.

Ibid. 51 Glen W. Wood, Kants Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9. 52 Ray Bellington, Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 1995), 109.

In the area of situation ethics, Fletcher equated love with Mills utilitarian principle greatest good for the greatest number,53 and he interpreted this formula variously to mean the greatest amount of neighbor welfare for the largest number of neighbors possible.54 Such a conception of love, however, overlooks the more distinctively Christian understanding of agape as an act that is directed essentially toward the service of the greatest need of even the least of humanity.

Walter Rauschenbusch As theologian, Joseph Fletcher was heavily influenced by theologians Walter Rauschenbusch, Washington Gladden, and William Temple.55 Walter Rauschenbusch was a Christian theologian and Baptist minister. It was Rauschenbusch influenced to Fletcher that man has a social responsibility towards his society. Moreover, it was also Rauschenbusch who gave the idea to Fletcher regarding the four elements in the notion of responsibility. Of these, the second was that it includes our interpretation of the demand being made upon man in every decision making situation. The third was that that our response looks forward to the reactions of others, and the fourth was that it takes account of the givenness of our social solidarity. But Fletcher focused on the first element, that is, the factor of response as the key to responsibility. Hence, Fletcher contended, Responsibility cant be laid down according to any set principles but must be ever again recognized in the depths of the soul;

53 54

Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 95. Ibid. 55 Joseph Francis Fletcher, [article online]; http://www.yourdictionary.com/biography/joseph-francis-fletcher; 12 July 2010.

available

from

17

according to the demands of each concrete situation.56

Washington Gladden Washington Gladden was a Christian theologian and Baptist minister. He was a key figure in the Social Gospel movement in the USA.57 Gladden contributed to the idea of Fletcher that agape, as distinguished from any other love, is the love of the commandment. Gladden stated agape refers to will rather than emotion and often conveys the idea of showing love by action.58 In like manner, Fletcher contended that agape is not enjoyment of a wonderful emotion, not even the ecstasy, but the responsibility towards your neighbor.59

William Temple William Temple was an outstanding church and civic leader, who could speak with insight to statesmen as well as to religious leaders.60 He reported Doctrine in the Church of England showed how modern biblical and doctrinal criticism could legitimately be used to interpret traditional positions.61 It was William Temple who influenced Fletchers contention that if there is right or wrong, it depends upon the situation or circumstances. Temple believes that the rightness of an act is nearly and perhaps always depends upon the situation.62 It was also

56 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 233. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 48. 59 Ibid., 26. 60 William Temple, [article online]; available from www.answers.com/topic/william-temple; 12 July 2010. 61 Ibid. 62 William Temple, Christianity and Social Order (London: SCM Press, 1950), 75.

Temple who taught Fletcher that forming an ethical system based on love is the best way of expressing the notion of love thy neighbor, which Jesus Christ taught in the Gospel of the New Testament Bible.

2.3 Review of the Related Literature In order to understand the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Joseph Fletcher, the researcher uses other materials to make them as the points of reference in interpreting Kants and Fletchers basic contention. The following books and related literatures are important for the researcher to start his study.

J. Thomson. Garrett. On Kant. 2000. This book provides a brief and accessible insight into the ideas of Immanuel Kant. Thus, it contains the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant specifically his moral imperatives. Moreover, this book contains the life of Kant who was being influenced by other philosophers. It presents also the major philosophical works of Immanuel Kant.

Ian P. McGreal. Great Thinkers of Western World. 1992. It contains the major ideas and classic works of more than one hundred outstanding western philosophers, scientist, psychologist, and theologian. This book is then related to the study, specifically to Kant, since it discusses also the major ideas of Kant. By understanding the general idea of Kants moral philosophy, it purports that it

19

will serve as a guide in order to understand the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

Donald Palmer. Looking at Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter. 1998. This book takes philosophy seriously, but not gravely. As the subtitle indicates, the goal of this book is to lighten the load a bit.63 First, it presents an overview of the Western philosophy from sixth century BC. to the middle of the twentieth century. It introduces the central philosophical ideas of the West and their evolution in a concise, readable format without trivializing them.64 Second, it follows timed-honored medieval tradition, by illuminating the margins of the text.65 So then, the study of Immanuel Kants moral philosophy would be as lighter as it is compared to the other books which delve also in the field of history of philosophy. Since it is made easy, the study therefore is facilitated and easy to comprehend in some sense.

Raymond Blakney. Immanuel Kant Reader. 1960. Raymond Blakney expresses the four parts of Immanuel Kants Critiques in this book. It gives thorough explanation in a commentary form. Those works are entitled as The Critique of Pure Judgment, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Practical Reason and lastly the Critique of Judgment. However, the researcher will give emphasis
63 Donald Palmer, Looking at Philosophy: the Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter (California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1992), vii. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.

on the second part of this book, which gives thorough explanation to the moral philosophy imposed by Kant. Since this book is an extensive explanatory material, it would be a sidetrack on which the researchers study would put eminence on every word, most especially on Kants moral philosophy. It is then related since it tackles the moral philosophy of Kant.

Corazon L. Cruz. Contemporary Ethics. 1993. Corazon Cruz explains analyses and distinguishes a number of key concepts from moral notions of a subjective or relative morality, testing their coherence before going to explore the nature of goodness. Among the moral philosophy which is discussed in this book, situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher is included. The moral philosophy of Joseph Fletcher can be found on chapter three of this book. Though it gives a slight amount of explanation regarding the latter, it is important since it gives a precise and concise commentary on Joseph Fletcher regarding his situation ethics.

Louis P. Pojman. The Moral Life: An Introduction Reader in Ethics and Literature. 2002. Louis Pojman brings together an intensive and varied collection of 82 classical and contemporary readings on ethical theory and practice. This book is divided into four sections covering the nature of morality, moral theories, moral issues, and applied ethics. This book is related since it features insightful part and introduction as well as biographical sketches, abstracts, and study questions in Kants moral philosophy.

21

Borton Poter. The Good Life: Alternatives in Ethics. 1995. The author discusses general issue in ethics and various approaches to moral problems that have been made in philosophy and religion. Each chapter of this book has accompanying case studies constructed around problems that occur in everyday life. The moral philosophy of Joseph Fletcher called situation ethics is discussed in this book. The six proposition of Fletcher which is the gist of his situation ethics is highlighted in the discussion. Nevertheless, it gives also commentary and reflection regarding the matter. Hence, this book therefore is related since it tackles the moral philosophy of Joseph Fletcher.

Robert L. Holmes. Basic Moral Philosophy. 1998. This book is designed for use as a brief introduction to the ethical theories. Included are the sections on various forms of ethical theory: Ethical Relativism; Consequentialism (Fletcher), Divine Command Theory; Egoism, Deontology (Kant); Justice; Virtue Ethics; and Feminist Ethics. This book is related since it discusses the moral philosophy of Joseph Fletcher and Immanuel Kant.

Judith A Boss. Ethics For Life: A text with Readings, 3rd ed. 2001. It provides a clear, well organized overview of theoretical ethics that employs a contemporary tone and framework. It tackles on Kants moral philosophy and provides the biographical account and Influences of Immanuel Kant. It is then very useful to the researcher because the researcher can get insights and idea regarding the moral

philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

T.L.S.Sprigge. The Foundations of Ethics. 1990. Timothy Sprigge developed his own positive account of the nature and foundations of moral judgment, while at the same time serving as a guide to the range of views on the matter which have been given in modern philosophy. Immanuel Kant is one of the moral philosopher which discussed on this bookit pays due regard to conventional opinion as to the moral philosophy of Kant. It has also a historical views and reflections about the matter. Hence, this is of great help since it delves to the philosophy of Kant especially on his categorical imperative.

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Chapter 3 KANTS DEONTOLOGY This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion of the moral philosophy of Kant. Kants ethics, which is popularly known as deontology, is based on the primacy of duty over the ethical consequences of human acts. This chapter tackles the concept of good will in Kants ethics. Consequently, the concept of duty and its three formulations will be exposed thoroughly for here lays the manifestation good will. After which, duty as describe in the concept of imperative and its two main types namely the hypothetical and categorical imperatives will be talked over. Then, the three diverse formulations of categorical imperative will be discussed thoroughly.

3.1 Good Will Kant begins the Section I of his book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals with the concept of good will. His concept of good will is the only thing that is good-initself which man can conceive without any restriction or clarification. There is nothing that is possible to think of anything in the world, even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.66 Man cannot conceive of anything else, in any possible world, that has special value of good will, it is alone good in all circumstances.67 Furthermore, Kant says the good will is good in-itself by virtue of volition.68 It is
66 Kant, Moral Law, 59. 67 Arnulf Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Thomas E. Hill Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 23. 68 Kant, Moral Law, 60.

seen though the act of willing or intending to an end. The value of a good will cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional; it is not a matter of attaining some desired end or an effect.69 Kant says: A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is in itself, and considered by itself to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even of the sum-total of all inclinations.70 Kant points out that a good will is good-in-itself; not on agents desired end or accomplishment but depend solely on its own incomparable goodness even if it is unable to produce the result it aims.71 A good will continues to have its own unique goodness even where, by some misfortune, it is unable to produce the results at which it aims.72 Like as jewel, good will would still be shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value.73 Good will shall always be seen as good-in-itself whatever effect it might produce.

3.2 Duty Kant proceeds to make several important remarks about duty. The concept of duty is the central to Kants moral philosophy for here lays the morality of human action. If one needs to understand human goodness, one must examine the concept of
69 70 71 72 73 Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 24. Kant, Moral Law, 60. Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 24. Kant, Moral Law, 61. Ibid.

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duty74 The manifestation of good will is seen by virtue of acting for the sake of duty. 75 Duty, for Kant, plays an important role in determining the rightness and wrongness of an action. Kant defines the concept duty as acting not from immediate inclination but on action which coincides good will.76 Kants moral worth proceeds when it is done for the sake of duty and not out of immediate inclinations or self interest.77 He states: The concept of duty which is already present in a sound of natural understanding and requires not so much to be thought as merely to be clarified always holds the highest place in estimating the total worth of actionsan action which set asides all immediate inclinations.78 Kant says that an action has a moral worth when it is done for the sake of duty and not on immediate inclinations or self-interests. He distinguishes duty from other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest and self-preservation. It is easy to decide whether an action is good, that is, if it is done from duty and otherwise if it is done from some purpose of self-interest.79 He further argues that an action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will.80 Acts have moral worth only if it is done out of duty. Worthy acts are based on a maxim that expresses our commitment to do what is right, whatever inclinations one may have. Kant presents the analysis of his concept of duty in a series of three formulations.

3.2.1 First Formulation of Duty

74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Kant, Moral Law, 63. Aune Bruce, Kants Theory of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 7. Kant, Moral Law, 63. Bruce, Kants Theory of Morals, 7. Kant, Moral Law, 63. Ibid. Guyer, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Readers Guide, 20.

Kants first formulation of duty pertains to the motive of duty. Kant proposes this formulation as a human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination still less because it is done from self-interest but because it is done for the sake of duty.81 He asserts that a human action is not morally good if it is done out of personal interest.82 Kant emphasizes that an action is good because it is done out of direct inclination. However, this has no moral worth if on the first place, self-interest takes into action. The first formulation of Kants concept of duty practically, if an action, even it is in harmony with duty, loses its moral worth if it is done out of selfish desires.83 Thus, Kant says, to act regardless of any self-interest but of duty alone, may lead man to preserve the moral worth of his action.84 Kant presents as example on acting for the sake of duty rather than from immediate inclination or selfish interest. In the act of giving, the act of generosity done solely out of immediate inclination is praiseworthy. But this action has no moral worth. In contrast, an act of generosity done solely for the sake of duty has more distinctive moral worth. Kant says: The inclination for honor, which is fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral worth, namely, the performance of such action, not from inclination, but from duty.85 Noticeably, Kant here wants to make a distinction between an action done from

81 82 83 84 85

Kant, Moral Law, 63. Ibid., 64. Bellington, Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 112. Ibid. Kant, Moral Law, 64.

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immediate inclination and action done for the sake of duty.86 The former have no genuine worth because it is done solely on the expenses of personal interest and desires, whereas the latter expresses a genuine worth because it is for the sake of duty which is coincided with good will. A moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest namely, that one does good, not from inclination, but from duty which the good will operates in it.87 Thus, Kant asserts that inclination is relation to motivation whereas an action done out of duty are the actions which governed by a good will.88 3.2.2 Second Formulation of Duty Kant proceeds to make the second formulation of duty. The second proposition expresses the formal principle of duty which states that an action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the result it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim-the principle of doing ones duty whatever that may be. 89 Kant avers that the moral worth of an action does not take its source from the fulfillment of the proposed end, but on the formal principle, that is, doing what is ought to be done for the sake of duty.90 If the action is done for the sake of duty, its moral worth will not vanish even though misfortune arises. Hence, the dutiful action derives its moral worth from the maxim under which is done, and not on the accomplishment of its aim. However one must consider that Kant gives two kinds of maximmaterial and formal. The material maxim refers to a particular action with its particular motive and its intended results while the formal refers to an action that is empty of any particular

86 87 88 89 90

Ibid. Ibid. Bellington, Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 114. Kant, Moral Law, 65. Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 31.

desires and particular results.91 Since the moral worth of an action cannot be desired from its intended results, it eventually follows that the moral worth cannot be derived from a material maxim. On the contrary, it is in the formal maxim that an action has a moral worth since it is done out of duty. Only such dutiful action can be morally good.92

3.2.3 Third Formulation of Duty The third proposition of Kants concept of duty highlights the importance of action with respect to law. His third formulation states that duty is the necessary of acting out of reverence for the law.93 To act out of reverence to the law is acting on the maxim of performing ones duty for its own sake.94 Regardless of any inclination, every individual must act with respect to the law. This law is being referred to us as universal law. Kant upholds that if the action which is morally good [not a maxim of personal desires and ends], it must be acted reasonablythat is, rational beings must act on the law valid for all as such independently of their particular desires and inclinations.95 Kant purports, It may seem to be a kind of law which the good man is supposed to reverence and obey. It is a law which does not depend on our desire for particular consequences and does not in itself even prescribe any particular action: all it imposes on us is law abidingness for its own sake the conformity of actions to universal law as such.96 The obedience that Kant has in mind here is obedience for moral law and not
91 92 93 94 95 96 Ibid. Ibid. Kant, Moral Law, 65. Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 32. Guyer, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Readers Guide, 40. Kant, Moral Law, 67.

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for obedience or respect for the rules of a legal system. Obedience is a motive with two aspects. One aspect of it is recognizing the moral law as a rational standard to which man is bound; another motive is the feeling cause by this recognition. This feeling is akin to awe and fear and as Kant says, it results from self conceit which may lead to particular consequences of desire.97 Furthermore, to obey and respect moral law is to acknowledge it as a source of rational requirements and to act in it accordingly.98 Nevertheless, Kant holds, man should sufficiently rational to understand it, able to follow it, and liable to have personal inclinations that push against it.99 Because of the obstacle due to mans impulses and desires, Kant purports that there is a law which we ought to act upon and obey for its own sake. This law is what Kant calls as the categorical imperative.

3.3 Imperative The idea of imperative in Kants moral philosophy is centered to the understanding that there is one law which one ought to follow and obey for its own sake. It is a command that comes from the conception that all rational beings have the power to act in accordance with principles where one is called to follow. Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws in accordance with principles and only so he has a will.100 Kant says that an idea of imperative is a normative principle, indicating how an agent ought to act, rather than merely factual propositions stating that certain means are
97 98 99 100 Ibid. Guyer, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Readers Guide, 41 Bellington, Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 121. Kant, Moral Law, 76.

necessary to our ends.101 Meanwhile, man, by his very nature as rational, has the capacity to act in accordance with his conception of laws and principles and so it follows that he has a will. Kant says that the action of man derived from laws uses reason in order for a will, which is practical reason, to be acquired.102 The practically good is that which determines the will by concepts of reason and therefore not subjective causes, but objectivethat is, on grounds valid for every rational being as such.103 Kant says that man does not automatically follow certain laws; rather, he uses his reason as a guiding principle in all his actions. He argues that the use of reason in man is to determine whether his action is morally good or evil.104 Kant does not rely merely on empirical experience. Thus, Kant says that the imperative serves as a command or an indicator that would tell man what action is good and therefore necessary. 105 This imperative has two main types which Kant calls hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

3.3.1 Hypothetical Imperatives One of the two main types of imperative which Kant presents is his concept of hypothetical imperative. He defines this concept as an action solely intended as means to attain something else. Hypothetical imperative represents the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or that one might will). 106 Imperative is hypothetical when the rational agent acts basing on the facet that taking
101 102 103 104 105 106 Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 51. Ibid. Kant, Moral Law, 77. Ibid. Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 60. Ibid.

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certain means is necessary to achieve personal ends and happiness.107 This imperative is expressing the idea that an action is good as means to an intended end. Typically, hypothetical imperative has the general form If one wills the end, one is ought to do such a such108 For instance, if a man wants to finish his thesis in the first semester, he should double his time. If a man aims to do well in philosophy, he is ought to read carefully. This imperative precisely expresses the idea that an action done by the agent is good as means to their relative and contingent ends. Relative ends of an agent are valuable primary to the agent himself. This is contingent and not really necessary i.e. it is not really necessary to adopt these ends in order to be rational. Furthermore, this kind of imperative is based on individual feeling, emotions and desires or personal inclinations. An imperative of this kind lacks the element of necessity which is not obligatory to everybody else because every person is different from the other.109 Kant calls such imperative as problematic because it prescribes means to possible ends, in contrast to the actual end (happiness) that he thought all human beings have.110 Therefore, hypothetical imperative may only be applicable to one person and not to everyone else.

3.3.2 Categorical Imperatives Another type of imperative that Kant discusses is his famous concept of categorical imperative. This concept is opposed to the preceding type of imperative.
107 108 109 110 Ibid., 57. Bellington, Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 122. Kant, Moral Law, 78. Ibid.

Kant defines this concept as expressing the idea that an action is good in themselves, not merely as means to further ends. If the action is represented as good-in-itself and therefore necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical.111 It represents an object as objectively necessary with itself, without relation to another end. Moreover, Kant says that man could be hardly called morally good if he acts for his own satisfaction and desires. To be good, one must act in such a way regardless of whether doing so promote ones contingent and relative ends, that is, an action willed by personal desires and inclinations.112 In order to be moral, one must act in accordance to the general principle of morality in order for him to be called morally good regardless his personal interest and desires. This is what Kant calls categorical imperative; a law wherein all men ought to follow for its own sake.113 There is only one categorical imperative, but this can be formulated in three diverse formulations. These formulations comprise the totality of the categorical imperative and therefore these are related to each other.

3.3.2.1 Formula of Universal Law of Nature The first formulation of the categorical imperative is the universal law of nature. Kant formulates this imperative in this manner: Act only on in accordance with such maxim through which you can at the same time will that become a universal law of

111 112 113

Ibid. Ibid., 80. Ibid.

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nature.114 This formulation is essentially identical to the formulation derived from the common conception of duty which expresses the universal form of the moral law. 115 For instance, if man wills the action, he must take into consideration that his action must be applicable for all and universally valid including himself. Kant would say that before an act to be moral, one must act on the maxim that is universalized or universally accepted by mankind and be acceptable to all.116 Distinctly, immorality springs when the action is not in conformity with the whole humanity and applicable only to oneself. Hence, immorality springs from the contradiction of the universal law of nature. Kant states: We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a universal lawthis is the general canon for moral judgment of our action. Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cant be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction, but alone be willed is what ought to be moral.117 By using the example given by Kant, this notion will be elaborated. A man feels sick and reduces to despair because of a series of evil with life but he is still in possession of his reason as to ask whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is this: For love of myself, I make it my principle to shorten my life when by I longer I exists, the more it threatens evil. Now, can this principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature? Practically, one can immediately see a contradiction in a system of nature whose law is to destroy life.118 Kant says that the act of killings ones life has a purpose or reason for doing so, but at the same time, it cannot be a maxim valid for everyone.119 This acting in this case; this
114 115 116 117 118 119 Ibid., 82. Bruce, Kants Theory of Morals, 47. Ibid. Kant, Moral Law, 84. Zweig, Immanuel Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 63. Ibid.

would not exist as nature. Kant explains: It is then seen at once that a system of nature by whose law is to stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy life would contradict itself. Hence, this maxim cant possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle of duty.120 The example given above is a principle of ones own advantage and therefore one based this in ones self-interest and desires. This may be consistent with ones own whole future welfare; but the problem here lies in the act itself. Is this alright? Examining this action for ones own advantage in the light of the universal principle will never become a universal law of nature because it will certainly contradict itself and therefore contradicts to the universal principle. Thus, in all sense, it is unlawful.

3.3.2.2 Formula End in Itself The second formulation is what Kant calls as the formula of end in itself. He formulates this formulation in this manner: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as means.121 This principle gives importance to every rational being, that is, treating everybody as end of every action and never as means. As such, every human has an inherent dignity that is respectable and thus everyone is called not to disregard nor degrade this dignity.122 In this manner, every being is called to act not only for themselves but also
120 121 122 Kant, Moral Law, 86. Ibid. Guyer, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Readers Guide, 91.

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for the benefit of all. That is to say, that in every action, man must not merely treat himself as means but also an end of his own action. Kant says: Man and generally any rational being exist as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrary used by this or that will in all his actions, whether they concern him or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.123 Man should not be used for the attainment of ones personal motives. All rational beings should not be treated as an instrument because it dishonors their very own nature as a person. It reduces man to thing. Kant further explains: Being whose existence depends not on our will but on natures, have nevertheless, if they are rational beings, only a relative value as a means, and are therefore called thing; rational being, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as end in themselves, that is something which must not be used merely as a means.124 Kant gives another example elaborating this concept. The act of making a pact between a master and his housemaid: the housemaid makes promise to his master that she will clean the house to receive a due salary. Similarly, the master also promises that he will pay the housemaid properly. Consent can be seen here in both parties. Now, if the master keeps his promise, one can say that the housemaid is not treated merely as means. But if the master does not keep his promise, on the contrary, the master just used the housemaid as means in cleaning the house. He reduces the housemaids into thing. Kant would say that all rational beings are called to exploit other people for their own personal advantage and benefit. This is so because every individual is an end in itself and not merely as a means of every intended action.

123 124

. Kant, Moral Law, 86 Ibid.

3.3.2.3 Formula of Kingdom of Ends The last formulation which Kant calls the formula of kingdom of ends synthesizes the first two formulations. It elaborates that all the maxims that man is capable of, through their own construction of law, ought to synchronize with an ideal kingdom of end as a kingdom of nature. Kant expresses this formulation in this manner: Every rational being must act as if he were by his maxims in every case legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the universal law (of all rational being).125 It is presented in the previous discussion that all rational beings as subjects are grounded on the categorical imperative. As such, the law which they are bound to obey must be the product of their own will so far as they are rational agents. So to say, the idea of the will of every being will make universal law. This is what Kant calls kingdom of ends.126 Rational beings must act with due regard to himself that he is part of the universal kingdom of ends as a legislating member.127 Man must consider himself as part of the universal principle and he himself is a legislator of the general principle. He legislates the universal principle in a possible realm of ends through his actions. Nevertheless, he does not regard merely himself as a means for the attainment of something, but rather, an end of his own maxim. He is also subject to his own maxim. Kant contends: For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as end in themselves. Hence result a systematic union of rational beings by common objective laws, that is, a kingdom which a kingdom may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws
125 126 127 Ibid. Guyer, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Readers Guide, 91. Kant, Moral Law, 87.

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have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means.128 When all men come together under the same universal principle wherein everybody including itself is treated not only as means but also an end in all sorts of action, they come to form the so-called kingdom of ends. Kant notes: By kingdom I understood the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole, that is to say, we can conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the proceeding principle is possible.129 Kingdom of ends is made possible through mans own making of law wherein he himself is subject to it. Hence, the applicability of certain action to all human beings is a valid ground for the creation of the kingdom; it is the sole foundation of the kingdom of end. Everybody acts as a community of persons, that is, as a member who legislate their own laws wherein they themselves are subject to it.

128 129

Ibid. Ibid.

Chapter 4 FLETCHERS SITUATION ETHICS

This chapter presents a thorough discussion of Joseph Fletchers concept of situation ethics. Fletcher offers an ethical alternative, a new morality he calls situation ethics. His situation ethics is a teleological approach to morality which centers its idea on the norm of love. Fletcher believes that by forming an ethical system based on love, he is best expressing the notion of love thy neighbor, which Jesus Christ taught in the New Testament of the Bible. The following topics will be discussed: the four working principles of situation ethics namely pragmatism, relativism, positivism and personalism. Then the application of these four working principles can be seen on Fletchers concept of love which will be consequently discussed. Finally, the six fundamental principles of love will be show forth to express how love be applied in a situation. 4.1 Principles of Situation Ethics Fletchers basic ethical idea is founded on the fundamental presuppositions which he termed four working principles of situation ethics. These four presuppositions are pragmatism, relativism, positivism and personalism. They will be set forth and

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discussed in ones interest, so that one can know what presuppositions130 are at work.

4.1.1 Pragmatism The first presupposition of Fletchers situation ethics is the concept of pragmatism. Pragmatism, according to Fletcher, is an act of dealing with the situation in the light of empirical applications. It is an act dealing with a concreteness and adequacy of facts rather than abstract fixed principles and a priori reason.131 To be pragmatic is not basing mans ethical decision on the level of our reason; rather, it is based on a concrete experience. Moreover, the pragmatic presupposition asserts that an action we impart in a given situation is right if and only if it works for loves sake. Pragmatic point of view is solely right if it is done out of the expediency of lovenothing else this is the only norm of situation ethics. Fletcher believes that in the course of action an agent should perform, pragmatism should be taken into consideration that is, to act solely on the basis of empirical data rather than basing it form pure reason alone.

4.1.2 Relativism The concept of relativism is another important principle in Fletchers concept of situation ethics. He defines relativism as avoiding the plague of absolutism such as natural law and to relativize them in the situation which they are called for.132 It means that rules [absolutes] are not applicable always in ethical decisions, they depend solely
130 Presuppositions here designate thing which an agent should assumed beforehand before making an ethical decisions. In doing an action, agents should involve or imply things which would determine them to act accordingly. See Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 40. 131 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 40. 132 Ibid.

upon the given situation. Nonetheless, these absolute rules must be relative by means of love. Love alone can relativize all the absolute rules such as civil law and natural law. 133 Thus, the relativistic presupposition asserts that everything is relative to one universal norm namely; love.134 Furthermore, Fletcher believes that absolute rules such as thou shall not steal, may become relative if love is best served in a given situation.135 If love demands stealing food for the hungry, as for the case of Robinhood, stealing is justified. An act is moral if it is done on the account of love towards neighbors if love is best served in a given situation.136 So long as there is love as an end for whatsoever means one will take, the action is justified. This norm of love however, does not absolutize the relative. It doesnt mean that if stealing food for the sake of the hungry may be justified, then anything goes. Fletcher doesnt take a relative do whatever the situation demands and make it into an absolute.137 The norm of love in situation ethics may relativize the absolute but it does not absolutize the relative.138

4.1.3 Positivism

133 Alice Dietcrich and Von Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1966), 182. 134 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 45. 135 Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 182. 136 137 138 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 45. Ibid. Gabriel Fackre, Storm Over Ethics (Philadelphia: United Church Pres, 1967), 13.

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Another working principle is positivism. Fletcher defines this concept as opposed to the naturalistic point of view. Positivistic principle states that values derive from our natural tendency to act accordingly in a concrete situation, not from our reason. To be positivistic, one should assume beforehand that values are already present in a concrete situation, reason can note facts and infer relations, but it cannot find values.139 Fletcher believes that mans reason cannot uncover the right course of an action. A man decides his values; he does not derive them from a source outside himself. His feelings are involved in his moral values; his moral values are not based upon prescriptions.140 Moreover, in the course of action, an agent must start with a positive choiceto deal his natural tendency to act accordingly in love as situation would appear and call for it. Making moral decisions in situation ethics is not based on mans reason or any prefabricated laws and norms; it is based on the natural tendency to act in love in a given situation.141

4.1.4 Personalism The fourth and the final working principle of Joseph Fletchers situation ethics is the concept of personalism. Personalistic presupposition of Fletcher says that persons are the ultimate moral values. Things are not inherently valuable but only persons have the great sense of value. Fletcher states: Situation ethics puts people first at the center of all concern, not things. An obligation is to person, not to things; to subjects. Not object the
139 140 141 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 46. Ibid. Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 183.

situationist is a who askers (who will be helped?). That is, situationists are personalistic.142 Only person must be the first priority and centers of all interest in ethical decisions. Persons are more important than rules or things. Value is always value for a person rather than something with absolute independent existence.143 Personality is therefore the first order concern in ethical choices.144 In addition Fletcher contends; Love is of the people, by people, and for people. Things are to be used; people are to be love. It is immoral when people are used and things are loved. Loving actions are the only conduct permissible.145 When we reverse by loving things and using people, our action is immoral. Situation ethics puts people first. Persons are more important than any things, directives or laws.

4.2 Love Joseph Fletchers situation ethics is centered on the idea of love. The idea of love, Fletcher believes, should be the boss-principal in situation ethics. Love is the source of principle, the hinge principle upon which all other virtue hang. It is not one virtue among others, but one principle among equals.146 He says that this is the only law of Situation Ethics, and that so long as the action is the most loving thing to do, it is the moral thing to do. Fletcher further discusses that no action is good or right in itself. It depends whether it helps or hurts people, whether or not it serves loves purpose understanding love to be personal concernin the situation.147
142 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 47. 143 Joseph Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), 23. 144 Dietcrich et. al., Morality and Situation Ethics, 184. 145 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 51. 146 Ibid. 147 Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 25.

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Moreover, Fletchers situation ethics reduces the whole Christian ethics to the single maxim, love with care and then what you will, do. This love is not a desire. This love is founded on the agapeic love. Agapeic love is giving lovenon-reciprocal, neighboring-regardingeven an enemy.148 Fletcher distinguishes this love from friendly love (philiac) and romantic love (eros). The former and the latter have their place in human affairs but they are not what agapeic love means in Fletchers situation ethics.149 Erotic and philiac love, for situation ethics, are emotional; but the subjective principle of situation ethics is will, a disposition, it is an attitude not a feeling.150 Moreover, Fletcher purports that There is only one ultimate and invariable duty in situation ethics and its formula is Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. this is the whole of moral duty.151 Love for neighbor is the primary duty of situation ethics. The idea of love in Fletchers situation ethics is the focal point of obligation towards neighbors. Love seeks the neighbors best interest with careful eyes to all the factors in the situation.152 Man should act lovingly towards his neighbor, but it will depend solely in a given situation. This idea of love in Fletchers situation ethics will be elaborated by means of the six fundamental principles of love.

4.3 The Fundamental Principles of Love Fletcher explains the new morality by means of six basic propositions of love here lays the heart of the explanation of situation ethics. The rock bottom issue in situation ethics is love, this love is presented through a series of six propositions; They
148 149 150 151 152 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 79. Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 186. Ibid. Ibid. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 79.

will be set forth to show how love works in ethics decision making.153 The following propositions are fundamentals of situation ethics. The first one points out to the nature of value. The second reduces all value to love. The third equates love and justice. The fourth frees love from sentimentality. The fifth states the relation between means and ends. The final proposition validates every judgment within its own context.

4.3.1 First proposition Fletchers first proposition of love states that only one thing is intrinsically good; namely love: nothing else at all.154 He believes that love is the only thing that is intrinsically good, always and everywhere with regards to the circumstances. If love is the only intrinsically good, therefore malice155 is the only thing that is intrinsically evil. He states: What makes an act right is its loving purpose; it is the only intrinsically good as opposed to malice which is the only intrinsically bad. [They are] not hypnotized by some abstract law, [for example] thou shall not lie.156 For situationists, nothing has any moral worth except as it helps or hurts persons either human or divine, neighbor or God. Good and evil are extrinsic, these become right or wrong upon a given situation.157 Good and bad are things that happen to what one says and does, whether verocious or not, depending upon how love is best served in a given situation.158 The goodness and badness of an act are not in the object

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid., 57. 155 Fletcher used this as a desire to inflict injury, harm, or suffering on another, either because of a hostile impulse or out of deep-seated meanness. It is an evil intent on the part of a person who commits a wrongful act injurious to others. For more details see Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 59. 156 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 59. 157 Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 186. 158 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 63.

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themselves; for instance, killing is an action and the action of killing has the property of being bad. The goodness and badness of an act depend solely on the situation itself. The rightness of an act depends if love is best served in the situation. Loving thing to do is always the good thing to do.159

4.3.2 Second Proposition The second proposition of Fletcher pertains to the reducing of all values to love alone. This proposition states that the ruling norm of situation ethics is love; nothing else160 Fletcher states; Love is a univalent or monolithic [constituting single unit] standard. It shoulders aside all codes. The situation ethics reduces law from a statutory system of rules to the love concern alone. This is why Jesus [referring to God] replaced the precepts of torah161 with the living principle of agapebeing good will at work in partnership with reason, seeking the neighbors good radically, nonpreferentially.162 Situation ethics sets all intrinsicalist ethics, all given natural or objective valid laws and maxims, whether of the natural law or the scriptural law varieties.163 Fletcher rejects universals of any of these intrinsicalist theories. He believes that only love is
159 Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 25. 160 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 63. 161 Torah is the primary document of Christianity during ancient times. Torah, which means "teaching, is God's revealed instructions to the Jewish People. It teaches Jews how to act, think and even feel about life and death. The Torah contains 613 commandments. The Ten Commandments are considered the most important commandments of the Torah. The Torah also contains stories that teach us about God's relationship with the Jewish People. For more details see The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed, s.v. Torah by Robert Gwinn. 162 Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 16. 163 Arthur J. Dyek, On Human Core: An Introduction to Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 123.

objectively valid and universal which can be applied in a given situation. All values that can be found on absolute rules or norm may be reduced to a single maximnamely love, nothing else. Moreover, love is not jealous law to itself. It does not share its power with the other kinds of law, either natural or supernatural.164 Love can even capable of desecrating the holies of holies, the very tabernacle of the altar.165 Fletcher cites Jesus on his account who left no doubt about being the solitary commandment when he put his approval of the action of David because of his love towards neighbor in the paradigm of altar bread;166 But He said to them, Have you not read what David did when he became hungry, he and his companions, how he entered the house of God, and they ate the consecrated bread, which was not lawful for him to eat nor for those with him, but for the priests alone?167 Hunger is a human need; therefore, it may justify doing whatever natural law may forbid. Nevertheless, the motive of preserving ones life from the death of hunger must be the priority coincided by the norm of love alone.168 Fletcher avers that Jesus left no doubt whatsoever that the ultimate norm of Christian decision is love; nothing else. 169 The motive of love is a noble one; it is a situationists tradition to present the exclusive motive for moral action-- love.170

164 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 73. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid., citing the Holy Bible. 167 In such case, David, running for his life, came to the place of worship and sacrifice supervised by Ahimelich the priest. He asked Ahimelich food for himself and his companions, but the only food available was bread consecrated in the ritual of the offerings. This bread, as Jesus pointed out was forbidden to David by law, and was to be eaten (after the ritual) by priests alone. But Ahimelich gave it to David and his men to satisfy their hunger. For more details see Mt. 12: 3-4 NAB 168 Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 186. 169 Ibid. 170 Robert Holmes, Basic Moral Philosophy (London: Wadsworth Publishing, 1998), 57.

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4.3.3 Third Proposition The third proposition of Fletcher pertains to love as equated to justice. This proposition states that love and justice are the same and it quiet simply states that justice is love distributed nothing else.171 This proposition, according to Fletcher, can be expanded into The greatest amount of love for the greatest amount of people. 172 Fletcher states; Justice is love! Justice is agape working out its problems. Justice is love using its headcalculating its duties. This situation ethics, seriously for a social policy, forms a coalition with the utilitarian principle of the greatest good of the greatest number of course it reshapes into the most love for the most neighbors.173 Granting that justice, according to the classical definition, is giving to each man what is due; Fletcher says that love must be distributed to attain greater benefits. 174 Fletcher believes that love must seek for the greater benefit of all people. Its primary concern is to give what is good that can be attained in the course of action and thus majority of people would benefit from it. For instance, Fletcher proposes an example wherein a resident physician on service, deciding whether to give the hospitals last unit of plasma to a young mother of three or to an old drunk man, may force to make a tragic choice between love or justice. A physician may think that choosing the good of the mother and her children means ignoring loves non-preferentially to the old drunk man. But love must be preferential. 175
171 172 173 174 175 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 87. Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 17. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 89. Dietcrich and Helderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 187. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 91.

Fletcher argues that to prefer the mother in that situation is the most loving thing to do, and therefore just because love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed.176

4.3.4 Fourth Proposition Another key idea of situation ethics is the fourth proposition, Love wills the neighbors good, whether we like him or not.177 This proposition distinguishes love from sentimentality or a mere feeling towards something. Fletcher states; To love Christianity is a matter of attitude, not a feeling. Love is discerning and critical; it is not sentimental situation ethics love is definitely agapeic not erotic. Erotic and Philiac love are emotional, where as the effective principle of situation ethics [love] is will, disposition, it is an attitude, not a feeling.178 Fletcher says that love is discerning and critical, not sentimental.179 Agapeic love is a creative, redemptive goodwill towards mans neighbor. Christian love is a nonselfish love of all people; it desires to satisfy the neighbors need, not ones own. It is not an emotion or affection.180 It is primarily an active determination of the will. That is why it is commanded as feelings cannot.181 Love in Fletchers situation ethics is benevolence, literally means good will.182 Love is founded not on feelings that produce by our sentiments. It does not seek the deserving; it is not judgmental when it makes its judgments. It does not reserve itself to

176 177 178 179 180

Ibid. Ibid., 103 Ibid. Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 21. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 109.

181
182 Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 21.

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the responsive; it is therefore a volitional love.183 Fletcher contends that Love in situation ethics is a matter of loving the unlovable, unlikable.184 It is the same with what Jesus said to his disciples Love your enemies for if you will love those who love you, what reward have you, is basically claiming that one must love one another whether one like it or not.185 There is no command, no obligation; no duty to love if love is affectionas it assuredly in both romantic [eros] and friendship love [philia].186 The radical obligation of situation ethics is to love based on agapeic lovenot erotic and philiac. Love wills thy neighbors love whether we like him or not.187

4.3.5 Fifth Proposition The fifth proposition of Fletcher pertains to the relationship between means and ends. Fletcher states this proposition as only the end justifies the means, nothing else.188 Mans actions are neither good nor bad; however, these may become bad if a loving consequence takes place, and bad if otherwise.189 If an action causes harm, it is wrong, on the other hand, if good comes out of it, it is right. Man cant claim to be right by following a rule, knowing it will cause great harm.190 Furthermore, Kant asserts that when man decides choices, the end justifies the means.191 This assertion of Fletcher is opposed to the classical rule in moral theology
183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 111. Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 188. Ibid. Ibid. Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 21. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 107. Ibid. Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 21. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 116.

which allows us to do good actions just because the necessary means happens to entail some evil effects.192 All ends and means are justified according to the changes and chances of unlimitedly diverse situation.193 The only self-validating end in situation ethics is love and this can justify whatsoever actions whether good or bad according to the situation.

4.3.6 Sixth Proposition Fletchers sixth proposition is concerned to the idea that there are no legalistic laws to follow aside from love itself.194 He formulates this proposition as love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively.195 Fletcher contends here that there are no rules about what should or shouldnt be done in each situation, man decides there and then what is the most loving thing to do.196 Situation ethics always suspects prescriptive of falsifying life and dwarfing moral statue.197 For instance, legalism always emphasize order and conformity to the law. When love decisions are made, they are relativeif loves reign and not law. 198 Love plots the course of morality according to the circumstances.199 Only the obligation is absolutethe obligation to stand by our decisionbut the situation themselves are relative to the situation.200

192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200

Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, 22. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 131. Ibid. Ibid., 134. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 139. Ibid. Dietcrich and Hilderbrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, 191. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 142. Ibid.

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Chapter 5 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF KANTS DEONTOLOGY AND JOSEPH FLETCHERS SITUATION ETHICS

This chapter contains a comparative analysis of the fundamental concepts of Kants deontology and Fletchers situation ethics. This study sees relations and commonalities between the two philosophers with regard to the given exposition in chapters 3 and 4. On the other hand, there are concepts in which Kant and Fletcher exhibit distinction between the given discussions on their moral philosophies.

5.1 Points of Similarities 5.1.1 Similarities on the Key Concepts of Ends and Means The ends and means are the two key concepts that can be found on Kants deontology and Fletchers situation ethics. Both Kant and Fletcher consider the ends and means as the basis of moral action. Basically, Ethical choices for them must be founded on the concept of end and means in ethics. They both believe that before an agent decides an action to be taken, one should bear in mind that a certain end awaits or will arise from it. Similarly, before an end is attained, there must be a certain means to fulfill before achieving the end. Man usually puts an act as a means to accomplish an end, different from the act itself. Hence, the two philosophers believe that end and means are the necessary constituents of human act.

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5.1.2 Kants Good Will and Fletchers Love as a Subjective Maxim The concept of good will and love are identified as a maxim or principle in Kants and Fletchers moral philosophy. Both Kant and Fletcher have defined a maxim as a subjective principle of volition. Kants subjective maxim is the good will while for Fletcher is love. Kant acknowledges the idea that good will as one that naturally possessed by the subject and which does the right thing. His concept of good will as a maxim is not based on other directives or standards that are external to the agent; rather the agent himself is the author of this maxim. In other words, the agent itself is the one who is responsible for this maxim to flourish. Similarly, Fletchers situation ethics has a maxim wherein love decides in a given context. Love works with maxim but not with rules. This love is purely subjective; man decides what love is in any given context.201 This love as a maxim for Fletcher is subjective because decisions must be made within the situation as it is perceived to be by the subject. Kant and Fletcher put the burden or the responsibility on the action taker, rather than upon prefabricated directives.

201

Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 79.

5.1.3 Kants Second Formulation of Duty and Fletchers Fourth proposition of Love Both Kant and Fletcher have excluded the performance of an act out of self interest and inclination. This similarity can be seen on Kants second formulation of duty and Fletchers fourth proposition of love. For Kant, moral action is performed out of duty rather than inclination and selfish interest for the person performing it. Kant dismisses such emotions as irrelevant to morality. He believes that a human action is not morally good if it is done out of personal interest. Joseph Fletcher would agree to Kants contention that selfish interest is not an appropriate motive for moral action. Fletcher states that love in situation ethics is a matter of attitude, not a feeling. Love is discerning and critical; it is not sentimental.202 Fletcher and Kant need the protection of selfinterest of others as a means of achieving certain ends.

5.1.4 Kants Second formulation of Categorical Imperative and Fletchers Personalism Kant and Fletcher have their similarity regarding on the concept of a person. They both believe that persons are more important than things and must be consider as the center of ethical decisions. Kants second formulation of categorical imperative prohibits on using person as a means to attain some further ends. The centrality of the person is fundamental in Kants ethics. As the second formulation of Kants categorical imperative would say, So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in
202 Ibid.

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every case as an end, never as means.203 Every person has a value and should be considered as the core of moral choices. Likewise, the fourth presupposition of Fletchers situation ethics called personalism says that persons are the ultimate moral value. This means that placing people first before things must be the great priority. Fletcher adheres to this contention of Kant that value always reside in a person, rather than a thing or something with an absolute independent existence.204 Hence, Fletcher and Kant believe that person is more valuable than things and one should consider this in making moral decisions.

5.2 Points of Differences 5.2.1 Kants Deontology and Fletchers Teleology Both Kant and Fletcher considered the ends and means as the basis of moral action. However, a difference can be seen on the approaches of each philosopher towards moral dilemmas. Kant, as a deontologist, believes that morality is characterized by focusing upon the adherence of the concept of duty. It is primarily grounded on the action of an agent. On the other hand, Fletcher, as a teleologist, says that moral systems are characterized by focusing on the consequences which any action might have. For him, for as long as there is love in intending to an end, the end can justify the means. 5.2.1.1 On Kants deontology Kant says that in order for the action to be morally right, one must act for the sake of duty. The morality of an action does not reside on its consequences but the motive which is represented by good will and manifested on acting for the sake of duty.
203 204 Kant, Moral Law, 86. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 47.

He contends that in order to make correct moral choices, one must have an understanding of what will be the appropriate means of acting to an intended end. When one makes choices which results in the correct consequences but the means are not done out of duty, then one is acting immorally. For Kant, an action is only moral when it is done out of duty regardless of the consequences of an action. Hence for him, the means justifies the end.

5.2.1.2 On Fletchers Teleology Unlike Kant, Fletcher put the morality of an action on the consequences of an action rather than the action itself or the means that is being made in attaining the end. An action is to be considered good or evil based on the situation in which they are performed. Fletchers situation ethics basically states that sometimes, other moral principle can be cast aside in certain situation if love is best served.205 For as long as there is love that is behind the action being made, the end could justify the means of an action.

5.2.2 Differences on the Approach to Morality Although both theories are directed towards the same end, that is, to create a fundamental theory on how one should act morally, a distinction can be drawn on the process of attaining this fundamental principle. Kant uses rational approach to morality
205 Ibid.

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which is based on pure reason alone, whereas Fletcher uses a principle which is based primarily on the empirical data.

5.2.2.1 Kants Categorical Imperative The idea of a categorical imperative says that mans reason is necessary as a
guiding principle in all his actions. It does not rely on empirical data but instead dealing

with concepts, because all concepts of morality deal with certain values, such as duty, good will and obligation. Kant also argues that moral necessity is established by reason and not by experience because experience can only establish that a moral principle is true or valid under certain conditions and not that a moral principle is necessarily true or valid under all conditions.206 Nevertheless, for Kant, one must first deal with the ways in which these concepts are understood. Thus, his deontological theory is emphasizing that the approach to morality cannot be merely an empirical inquiry, and that it must be based on pure practical reason.

5.2.2.2 Fletchers Concept of Pragmatism If Kants deontology uses rational principle as his approach to morality, Fletchers situation ethics on the other hand uses empirical principle. The fourth presupposition of Fletchers situation ethics called pragmatism states that mans ethical
206 Kant, Moral Law, 78.

decision is not on the level of reason; rather it is based on a concrete experience. 207 The situation ethics of Fletcher is primarily founded on experience and thus may be called empirical. Nonetheless, it accords decisive weight on the particular circumstances or consequences. Fletcher believes that the wrongness of an act cannot be seen on the pure reason or any law but resides solely on the experience of an individual in a given situation. The rightness of an act can be verified through the actual experience of an individual. Hence, it uses empirical principle which is based from experience.

207

Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 40.

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Chapter 6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusion and

recommendations. The findings will be presented based on the answers to the question stipulated in the statement of the problem while the conclusion will be based on the findings themselves. Recommendations for future researches will also be given.

Findings Based on the exposition and analysis given in chapters three, four and five, the researcher has come up with the following findings: Kants ethical notion is centered on the idea of duty. The moral worth of an action can be seen when it is done for the sake of duty. This acting from duty is not out of immediate inclinations or self-interest nor from the result it attains or seeks but from a formal principle or maxim--the subjective principle of volition. Furthermore, to be moral, man must have a rational assumption that there is a categorical imperative wherein all men ought to follow for its own sake. The categorical imperative of Kant comprises the three diverse formulation: First, one must act on the maxim that is universalized or universally accepted by mankind and be acceptable to all; Secondly, Persons should be treated as end but at the same time as end, person, who is dignified, is more important than thing. Finally, kingdom of ends is made when all men come together under the same universal principle wherein everybody including itself is treated not only as means but also an end in all sorts of action. Kant puts emphasis on the action

of an agent rather than the end to be achieved by it. In Fletchers situation ethics, the moral worth of an action is founded on the idea of love which means that an ethical action is one that is imbued with love. Ethical choices in an empirical situation must center and focus on the idea of love. This purely subjective love for Fletcher is the ruling norm of situation ethics. It is the only thing which is intrinsically good; it is not emotional or affection; it is not a selfish desire. Fletcher believes that as long as there is love as a motive, the end can justify the means. Moreover, his situation ethics is not on the level of reason but on a concrete experience. It avoids the absolute and relativize them by means of love. Furthermore, its values are derived from the natural tendency to act accordingly in a concrete situation and not from mans reason. In addition, person is the primordial concern of ethical choices. Both Kant and Fletcher adhere that ends and means are the primordial requirements in the morality of human act. They both believe that Personal inclinations and self-interests are irrelevant to morality; these cannot be used as means in achieving a certain end. Both of them believe that man is the one responsible for his maxims to be carried out and this is not based on the other directives or standards but by the agent itself. Nonetheless, value, for the two philosophers, always resides in a person, rather than a thing. Kant and Fletcher also exhibit differences in their approaches to their respective moral philosophy. Kant's theory is primarily grounded on the means of an agent whereas Fletcher's theory is concerned on the end that is attained by the means. Kant's Deontology is based on the principle of reason whereas Fletcher's situation ethics is based solely on the empirical data.

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Conclusion Based on the aforementioned findings, the researcher has arrived at the following: On the account of two philosophers who have similarities on key concepts of ends and means as the constituents of human act, man is entitled to act considering the means and ends of his action. Moreover, both Kant and Fletcher exclude acting from personal inclinations and desires and put person as the center of moral decisions. Therefore man, to be called moral, is called to act regardless of these personal inclinations and desires considering that persons are more important than things or any laws and norms. Furthermore, these two philosophers exhibit differences as regards to their approach in moralityKant is a pure deontologist while Fetcher is a teleologist or a consequentialist. As such, every man, as endowed with the faculty of willing, is capable of grasping good whether on the basis of principles of reason or empirical principles.

Recommendations The following studies are recommended: 1. Philippine Reproductive Health Bill in the Light of Immanuel Kant's Deontology. 2. Concept of Duty in Immanuel Kant and William David Ross' Philosophy: A Comparative Study. 3. The End Justifies the Means: A Critique on Joseph Fletcher's

Situation Ethics. 4. A Comparative Study of Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics and Peter Singer's Utilitarianism. 5. Joseph Fletchers and Peter Abelards Moral Philosophy: A Comparative Study.

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William Temple. Article Online; Available from www.answers.com/topic/williamtemple; 12 July 2010.