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Immigration and Social Justice: Towards a Progressive European Immigration Policy?

Author(s): Richard Black Reviewed work(s): Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 64-75 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622925 . Accessed: 26/06/2012 16:07
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Immigration and social justice: towards a progressive European immigration policy?


Richard Black
Stepping back from current debates over immigration in the new 'Fortress Europe', this paper examines moral and philosophical auguments for an alternative and more 'progressive' immigration policy. Despite recent interest within geography in principles of social justice, the extent to which such principles reach beyond particular societies or nations has rarely been considered explicitly. The notion of social justice may be extended to the question of immigration, without taking the position that migration should itself be seen as a 'human right'. Even within relatively conservative contractarian and communitarian conceptions of social justice, a number of suggestions can be made for 'progressive' policy options, in particular by focusing on the communal rights and duties of societies rather than the human rights of individual migrants. key words immigration social justice European policy membership identity

Schoolof Africanand Asian Studies,Universityof Sussex,Falmer, BrightonBN1 9QN received17 August 1995 revised manuscript

Introduction The 'right' to migrate, to be a migrant or stranger, appears everywhere to be on the retreat. Within Europe, public opinion towards migrants appears daily to become less welcoming: from racist violence in Germany and elsewhere (Bjorgo and Witte 1993) to debates in France, especially on the supposed 'threat' posed to French society and identity by immigration from Islamic countries (Wieviorka 1992) and, more recently, to a rising vote for the extreme right in local elections in the east end of London (Husbands 1994b). In turn, government policy can frequently be seen to mirror or indeed provide tacit support for this hardening of public attitudes, with amendments to the constitutional position on asylum in Germany, through to the introduction of more restrictive policing of borders, visa controls and deportations of illegal residents in most European countries, from the Mediterranean fringe to Scandinavia. In the policy arena especially, but also often in academic writing, the structure of discourse appears firmly rooted in debates emanating from the increasingly anti-

immigration stance of governments; in turn, those opposing such policy developments have appeared limited to just that, with little debate over wider directions for a more 'just' or 'progressive' policy towards international migration. Writing in the mid-1980s - perhaps in retrospect a period of relatively little antagonism towards migrants - Dummett (1986, ix) argued that the debate over immigration in the UK was not between two alternative policies but between 'proposals for racial restriction on the one hand, and opponents of new restrictions on the other'. This would now appear to be the pattern over Europe as a whole. As new restrictions are proposed or put in place, greater or lesser opposition is raised in different countries related to the nature of the proposals and the government majority, the pattern of migration and the influence of the media but few voices are raised to propose a constructive alternative for immigration policy. Academic work in turn has frequently focused on the consequences of exclusionary policies and practices for immigrant communities in Europe (Bovenkerk et al. 1991) and the nature of development of such

TransInst Br Geogr NS 21 64-75 1996 ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) 1996

The geopolitics of international migrationin Europe policies (Baldwin-Edwards 1992; Thumerelle 1992) but appears to have contributed little to the debate from a more radical perspective. Of course, there are exceptions. In Spain, the 1984 Law on Refugees and Asylum was considered at the time as a progressive and pioneering law, although it was never really implemented in a truly liberal manner and has since been modified to make it more restrictive (Malheiros 1995). Meanwhile, decisions to admit residents of Macau to Portugal after the colony's return to Chinese rule contrasted sharply with parallel decisions in the UK on Hong Kong residents. Even in Germany, scene of some of the worst racist violence against immigrants, there is renewed debate about alternative immigration policies (Habermas 1993), with calls for the federal government to drop the notion that Germany is not a country of immigration and to introduce quotas for the orderly entrance of migrants. Practical examples of alternative policies in action can also be found, although largely outside Europe: Canada and Australia may both provide examples of a different approach to immigration, notwithstanding their rather different demographic circumstances to those of Europe and criticisms that have been levelled at the sometimes 'racist' operation of their immigration systems (Castles 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Robinson 1992, 1993). Learning from experience in other countries provides one way forward perhaps for thinking about policy alternatives but potential models are not numerous. They include the operation of wider concepts of who is a refugee and therefore eligible for entry (examples include definitions contained within the Organisation of African Unity's Convention on Refugees or the Cartagena Declaration in Latin America); different and perhaps 'fairer' procedures for dealing with immigrants; and the possibility of introducing immigration quotas. However, the standpoint of this paper is that, in addressing the question of a 'progressive' policy, it is useful to start from a wider notion of what is just or morally defensible. There has recently been a revival of interest within geography in notions of social justice (e.g. Harvey 1992, 1993; Smith 1994a). Harvey (1992, 593) reflects, for example, on the search for 'some higher-order discourse to which everyone could appeal', arguing that it is both possible and desirable to draw upon some form of 'metatheory' in dealing with distributional issues,

65 whilst Smith (1994a, 1) seeks to place social justice - questions concerning 'the distribution of society's benefits and burdens, and how this comes about' at the heart of human geography. By trying to incorporate some of the claims of 'distant others', both authors are responding to postmodern critiques of their own and other earlier writings on social justice, that 'universalist' claims obscure the cultural specificity of western philosophical discourse. Nonetheless, despite this openness to the claims of 'distant others', the renewed concern with social and distributional justice has remained implicitly if not explicitly centred on relations within specific states, societies and/or communities rather than betweenthem. For example, drawing on the work of Young (1990), Harvey (1993, 54) suggests 'breaking out of the local' as one route to of resurrect some generalprinciples socialjusticewhile criticismsof universalattendingto post-structuralist 'others'. ising theorywhich marginalizes However, this appears limited to accepting openness to those 'others' whom one might encounter within a given community. Indeed, for Young, the development of a moral point of view arises from such concrete encounters and not simply from an impartial concern for all or from independent reasoning. Harvey (1993, 56) appears to accept this notion, although he makes a brief caution that the multiple mediated relations that constitute ... society across space are just as importantand as 'authentic' unmediatedface-to-face as relations. For neither author is there a direct consideration of the rights of individuals to be in a particular place, except perhaps an explicit assumption that state boundaries are not coincident with moral boundaries. Harvey's argument is illustrated mainly by examples from within North American cities with few clear pointers on the extent to which individual or communal responsibility to some higherorder notion of justice might extend beyond national state borders. There are some exceptions to this apparent myopia and, in particular, some geographical writing explicitly concerned with social justice and morality as it applies to the situation of 'distant others'. Thus Smith (1994b) considers the moral case for whether geographical inquiry should focus on 'distant others' at all. He suggests that 'where people are can be a relevant difference' (ibid.,360) and that

66 partiality in the selection of places on which to work is inevitable. However, a balance needs to be struck between 'narrow concerns for particular others and the impartiality implicit in an unrestricted caring' (ibid.,361). On a slightly different tack, Corbridge (1993, 461) considers the needs and rights of 'distant strangers'. He makes a coherent minimal argument for development activism to draw on the work of the philosopher John Rawls (1971) (see below) whilst addressing at least some postmodernist criticisms of 'universalist' theories of social justice. However, the arguments of both Smith and Corbridge are targeted specifically at the involvement of people in 'rich' countries in the 'development' and/or 'research' of 'poor' countries; they do not tackle the alternative linkage of the migration of 'poor' people to the 'rich' world. In this paper, which draws on the work of both geographers and philosophers, the possibilities and arguments for an alternative and more 'progressive' immigration policy are considered. In the first section, alternative conceptions of social justice are reviewed, from which it can be concluded that, from a number of perspectives, a more just immigration policy could be envisaged. From here, discussion turns in more detail to the work of the philosopher Michael Walzer (1983), who addresses the ethical question of 'what responsibilities do states have in responding to migration?' rather than 'what are the inalienable rights of migrants?' It is suggested that the latter is a line of reasoning which is unlikely to carry much weight in concrete political debates over immigration policy. Nonetheless, principles of social justice which fall short of declaring migration as an inalienable human right do provide a context in which a more positive political attitude towards migration and the rights of migrants might be developed. Thus, even measured against the (relatively conservative) philosophical principles currently adhered to by European states, there is considerable scope for improvement in immigration policy. With some extension to the notion of social justice itself, it is possible to suggest further 'progressive' steps for immigration policy without the necessity to call for an absolute removal of borders as the only 'just' policy. Conceptions of social justice

Before moving onto the specific question of immigration and the contribution of political

Russell King et al. in assessing the relationship between philosophers immigration and social justice, it is useful to begin discussion with a summary of what is or might be meant by social justice. Harvey (1992, 594) suggests there are at least four competing 'theories of justice' which he places in a hierarchy: i. a positive law view, which holds that justice is simply the upholding of existing law; ii. a utilitarian view, which holds that justice is the pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number and which, on this basis, might distinguish good and bad laws; iii. a social contractview, traced by Harvey from Rousseau to John Rawls, which holds that justice is based on a form of unwritten contract between members of a society and which seeks mutual benefit for all and protects certain inalienable rights of members even if this runs contrary to the 'greatest good' principle; and iv. a natural rights view, which holds that justice is about the protection of natural and inalienable rights per se. To these, Harvey (ibid., 594) adds various 'intuitionist and relative deprivation theories' which 'exist in an entirely different dimension'. Whilst not drawing on such theories, this paper will consider one further distinct and increasingly important theories. school of thought, that of communitarian Disregarding the view that there is no such thing as social justice, or that considerations of social justice play no part in practicalpolicy development whichever of the above positions is taken - an argument can be developed for a more progressive or just immigration policy than presently exists. For example, if a 'positive law view' is taken, states should strive at least to comply with their existing commitments in international treaties and laws, something which, as Dummett (1986) points out, is frequently not achieved. In turn, from a utilitarian perspective, an argument for a more progressive law would need to appeal to economic or other benefits for the greater number (by weighing up those benefiting and those losing from immigration). Both of these arguments are simple and, perhaps, also uncontentious in the sense that if 'breaking the law' or clear economic or other benefits could be demonstrated, it would not require an appeal to philosophical argument to convince most policy-makers that a change might be necessary. In this sense, the difficulty is a practical one of demonstrating that such law-breaking is inherent to the current system or that potential

The geopolitics of international migrationin Europe benefits are real. On the latter point, economic and demographic benefits are variously demonstrated (Schmidt and Zimmermann 1992; Simon 1989; Layard et al. 1992) and challenged (Coleman 1992; Hopkinson 1992; Ritzen and van Dalen 1992) by different authors, such that an unambiguous conclusion is not easily reached. At the other end of Harvey's hierarchy, an equally simple but much more contentious argument could be made for an alternative immigration policy. If migration is seen as a 'natural right', then freedom of movement would be a necessary step for all states. Ironically, this policy - no barriers to movement at all - is often assumed to be the only progressive alternative to a more restrictive policy and thus is again made without further recourse to arguments about justice. In practice, various arguments for migration as a right originating in political philosophy can be identified. For example, Nett (1971) argues that a primary condition of human rights as currently understood is to aim for more equal opportunities. Thus the right to migrate may be seen as a basic right, in that it removes situational disopportunity. This right has two elements:

67 because to deny it would be an infringement of liberty (under Rawls' first principle, basic liberties do not include freedom of movement) but because to allow it would be in the interest of the least well off. However, this begs the question of whether justice does indeed extend beyond the bounds of the particular society in question. Extension of Rawls' arguments to the international sphere has occasioned a large literature (cf. Barry and Goodin 1992; Hoffman 1981) which it is possible only to touch on here. First, it is worth noting that Rawls specifically confined his comments to a single society since justice depends on the free compliance of members of such a society. However, the major point of attack on this limitation is that the sort of 'contract' that he saw as underpinning relations within a state can also be seen to exist betweenstates at global and regional levels. As Beitz (1979) notes, Rawls recognized the similarities when considering the 'law of nations' and defining what constitutes a just or unjust war. Beitz (ibid., 149-50) extends this, arguing that Rawls'passingconcernfor the law of nationsseemsto miss the point of international In justicealtogether. an world, confining principlesof social interdependent justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nationsso that othersmay benefitfromliving in 'just'regimes.

the right of people who are trappedin overcrowded areasor areaswithoutsufficient resources go where to resources not so takenup [and]the rightforpeople are to move away from oppression,persecution,unfair restrictionor even disagreeablesocial environments He suggests the international application of a and social orders.(ibid., 218, 219) 'global difference principle' (i.e. Rawls' second principle) to people rather than states, although he Nonetheless, there is a danger that this position is seen as one of no control and thus no policy rather does not then move on to consider explicitly the than as a moral position rooted in a theory of implications of such a principle for migration and within particular states. A similar point justice. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in order citizenship to provoke fear of possible consequences amongst is made by Barry (1989) who argues that states citizens of the host state, it is often alluded to by have a duty to redistribute wealth to other less those who propose increasing restrictions as the well-off states, although he is clearly not willing to extend this principle to free movement of peoples only alternative policy. (Barry 1992). The most comprehensive case for extending Contractarian theories of justice and Rawlsian justice in this way, and specifically for immigration including migration as an option, is made by According to John Rawls (1971), it can be held that Carens (1987) based, again, on the existence of social justice within an ideal society is based on, forms of 'contracts' between societies on which, for and may be legitimated through, two principles: example, trade relations rely. Under Caren's forcertain equal liberties for all (first principle) and mulation, restrictions on immigration in a just state the permitting of social and economic inequalities could be morally justified only where such immibut only so long as these are to the advantage of gration constituted a threat (through its size or the least well off (second principle). Under such a nature) to public order or to the institutions conception of justice applied internationally, free- based, one might assume, on liberal democracy dom of movement would be upheld, not so much that maintain justice. However, the similarity here

68 to the conclusions of Nett (1971), who argues for a 'human right' to migrate providing this does not threaten the 'just' institutions of the host society, underlines thegeneral implication of this argument - that there should be no barriers to migration (in principle) - and produces the same political difficulties encountered by advocates of a natural or human right to migrate. A slightly more limited solution is provided by Hoffman (1981), who again argues that there are some transnational activities which cannot be reduced to their national components, notably business transactions and migration. However, Hoffman divides his discussion of moral responsibility towards migration between treatment of refugees and that of migrant workers. In the former case, he agrees with Carens that effortof all but ethicalaction requiresa co-operative the poorest of countries to rule out the degrading of perpetuation camps,and to providefor ... resettlement. (ibid., 224) The only exception being 'real instances of supreme necessity limiting a nation's capacity to absorb refugees' (ibid., 225). However, he accepts the more general point that ties within a particular nation or community are generally stronger than those at an international level, such that moral obligations to migrants in general are more limited. In seeking a mid-point between political realism and this more limited morality, he suggests that the most appropriate form of regulation of migration is to establish bilateral treaties between specific countries. Communitarian theories of justice and immigration Beyond such theories of social justice based on the notion of a 'social contract', one of the more sophisticated analyses in recent years of the role of social justice criteria in immigration policy is Michael Walzer's book, Spheres of justice (1983). Writing from a 'communitarian' perspective, Walzer (ibid., 48) outlines what he regards as the duties of states and peoples towards 'necessitous strangers'. He bases his argument directly on the distinction between members and non-members of a society. Using alternative analogies of the state as a neighbourhood, club or family, Walzer argues that, in principle, nations are like 'perfect clubs', in the sense that they may decide freely and authoritatively who should be allowed to join and may,

Russell King et al. therefore, exclude any potential immigrant. Indeed, such a right to exclude is important since, to use another analogy, affluentand free countriesare, like elite universities, besieged by applicants. They have to decide on their own size and character. 32) (ibid., Such an argument concurs with the Rawlsian view that justice is confined to members of a society or state. For example, the central right of states (or clubs or families) to exclude potential members is absolute, rooted in the notion that this is the only long-term way to protect the coherence and identity of the group. Drawing on the work of Sidgwick, Walzer (ibid., 39) argues that to teardown the walls of the stateis not... to createa world without walls, but ratherto createa thousand of petty fortresses[since][t]he distinctiveness culture and groupsdependsupon closure. However, unlike the Rawlsian view in which the 'contract' at a societal level is primarily a mechanism for working out individuals' moral responsibilities to each other, in Walzer's view states and communities are also seen as having moral responsibilities. In this context, Walzer goes on to argue that the right of societies or states to exclude is constrained in certain ways. For example, he suggests that states are also like families and that citizens therefore believe themselves to be morally bound to particular groups of outsiders, such as those who are ethnically related or in need of refuge because of threats to their basic human rights. Moreover, once admitted to the state 'family', such groups must be entitled to full membership since to live within a household, without being a member of that household, is untenable as a long-term position. The state is also constrained not to expel existing inhabitants unless, as in a family context, they represent an immediate threat to members of the family. Finally, the principle of mutual aid - or need to provide support to those least well off - is also supported by Walzer and is seen as being as strong for states with respect to outsiders as it is for individuals within a state. However, Walzer suggests that this is likely to be better served by a state exporting wealth than by 'importing citizens'. As it stands, Walzer's argument would appear to present a convincing moral case for defence of the status quo in terms of immigration policy in that its major points cover areas already accepted by the majority of European states. For example, most

The geopolitics of international migrationin Europe west European states are signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and accept in principle the duty to provide asylum to those in severe danger in their own countries and most are also committed to the principle of 'mutual aid', even if only through relatively meagre overseas aid budgets. In turn, states' duties towards those with kinship ties to its own citizens are enshrined in policy. For example, German and Greek policy towards those of German or Greek ethnicity in other states - notably of the former Soviet Union allows or even encourages their migration (Jones and Wild 1992; Voutira 1991). Meanwhile, if - as Walzer suggests they should be - those 'foreigners' identified as eligible for membership based on other criteria (e.g. refugees) are considered as full members, the principle of duty towards family members can also be extended. Thus, even in those states of Europe with no 'diaspora' or kinship ties with other groups worldwide, there is generally legislation allowing for migration of relatives of immigrants already accepted as national residents on the grounds of 'family reunification'. Within the bounds of Walzer's theory an argument for a more 'progressive' or 'just' immigration policy would need to be focused on states meeting the duties that they currently accept in principle: honouring the spirit as well as the letter of the 1951 Geneva Convention, for example, or perhaps responding more liberally to the claims of family members of current residents wishing to come to Europe, taking into account less Eurocentric notions of family structure (Leigh 1986). An argument could also be made for a harmonization of European policy and procedures towards migrants in order to remove inequality of treatment across Europe and, indeed, to seek a common policy which would be fair and open rather than more restrictive. In addition, Walzer's comments about the need for equal treatment of those admitted to residence could be used to argue against the current proliferation of 'statuses' of migrants (and especially 'refugees') across Europe, such that full citizenship became attainable for all migrants that are admitted across different countries. Such a perspective provides us with some philosophical foundation on which to build a more just immigration policy, addressing at the very least the question of whether states have any responsibilities to those who are not members or citizens. However, some problems with Walzer's conclusions can be identified and additional principles on

69 which to base immigration policy outlined from within a broadly communitarian framework without necessarily moving completely to the contention that states should admit all comers. First, a recent attack on Walzer's position has come from the Swedish sociologist Tomas Hammar (1990), who argues that Walzer was wrong to focus only on two 'gates' of entry into a society (physical entry and full citizenship), suggesting that once one is attained, the other must follow. Instead, Hammar suggests that there are three 'gates' where states may exercise control over the admission of migrants, namely immigration regulation, regulation of domicile and residential status, and naturalization. According to Hammar, providing that immigrants who pass any 'test' on entry may proceed to secure domicile and residential status, passing through the final gate of naturalization is not necessary. Indeed, he identifies a new category of people in Europe in particular - 'denizens' who have the right to residence but not to permanent membership of the host society. Essentially, this is an argument about whether immigration policy should be based on the permanent entry of potential citizens or whether there is an alternative model for immigration. At present, the more liberal immigration regimes worldwide such as that of Australia, for example - are based on this principle of permanent entry and citizenship (Castles 1992). But, at the same time, there is much criticism of some European countries, for example, for failing to give 'guest workers' longerterm security and rights. However, Hammar's argument is based in part on the conclusion that migrants do not necessarily wish to attain full citizenship if, as is often the case for both 'economic' migrants and 'refugees', return to their home country is the long-term goal. Similarly, those EU nationals moving within the new 'Fortress Europe' have already been extended rights equivalent to those of host-country nationals, without the necessity for full citizenship. In this context, in particular, 'denizen' status might be regarded not as a 'second-class' solution for migrants but as an acceptable and just alternative to citizenship, providing it guarantees certain social and political rights. Following on from this, if Hammar's position is accepted, a question mark can also be placed over Walzer's assumption that the 'closure' of a society at its borders is necessary in order to preserve that society's identity and/or culture. For, if migrants

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freely perceive themselves as temporary residents of a society and the host society regards migrants in the same way, then there is no long-term necessity for cultural 'adaptation' on either part, nor any likelihood of a territorial claim or right to affect liberal democratic institutions on the part of the migrant group - Walzer's principal argument for maintaining immigration controls. In practice, such an argument can also be pursued even if migrant groups are not temporary residents in their own perception or in law. It could be argued that it is perfectly possible, for example, for migrant groups to coexist with 'host' groups within a particular geographical space whilst maintaining cultural distinctiveness. Difficulties arise primarily when 'self-determination' becomes more than the right to cultural distinctiveness - involving the right to political autonomy and/or control of territory, where another element of 'just society' is threatened or, perhaps, when there are very large numbers of migrants (Dummett and Nicol 1990). Social justice, territory and relations between states The relationship of societies to territory,in particular, is an issue on which there has been much geographical writing. Following Soja (1989), for example, it can be argued that socially created space is integral to the production and reproduction of any society, such that spatial or territorial conflict is perhaps inevitable between immigrant and host societies, mitigated only, for example, by the subjection of migrant groups to domination by their hosts. Such a view would imply limitation of access to territory as the crucial issue rather than limitation of full membership of a society. However, an alternative perspective is identified by Taylor (1992), who argues that the spatiality of states is breaking down, albeit in a contradictory manner. Thus, in a united Europe, for example, control of territory is increasingly of less importance, although, for an individual, membership of a particular state remains important because of the significant and varying roles of different states in such issues as social welfare. In the case of migrant groups in western Europe, calls for control over territory or community affairs have been rare if not non-existent, even for longstanding immigrant minorities. (An interesting contrast is provided, though, by so-called 'national minorities' where the demand for self-determination is very often rooted in attempts to

Russell King et al. redefine the territorial boundaries of nation-states (cf. Grigoriou 1994).) In turn, interesting exceptions - such as the call by the Hasidic Jewish community in north London to establish the territorial markers of an eruv for religious purposes - arguably test our notion of what control over territory actually means, emphasizing the distinction between physical and socially created space. Meanwhile, the growth of the EU has been a process allied at least in part to the creation of a space for free movement in which migrants are part of the accepted order of that community and in which, therefore, identity is less related to space and territory.Nonetheless, the European notion that identity and culture is allied uniquely to place is still powerful: witness the failure of western Europe to suggest a nonterritorial solution to 'ethnic conflict' in the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, Husbands (1994a) has argued that a 'moral panic' in some European countries is rooted in part in deep anxieties held by indigenous people about the resilience of their own national identities. In this sense, without allowing immigration policy to be based on the fears of those who do believe, for example, that Islam represents a cultural threat to western values, a rejection of such notions must be handled with care, even in a fully united Europe. In addition to looking for weaknesses in Walzer's argument, it is also possible to extend it in order to make a rather stronger statement of states' responsibilities towards non-citizens. For example, there tends to be an assumption that migration is something that 'happens' to, for example, Europe, without Europe having taken any active part in the creation of pressure to migrate. Therefore, Walzer's specification of the responsibilities of states is limited to general pronouncements about the need to provide refuge and economic aid, with the one exception of specific responsibility towards kinrelated groups. Indeed, some authors have argued that the right to seek refuge from persecution is unequal, in the sense that, although such a right may exist for migrants, it is unenforceable against any particular state. In practice, however, western Europe is often deeply implicated in the creation of economic and political conditions which give rise to migration pressures. For example, it might be argued that the role of EU states in the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as 'national' states and its promotion of the ethnically divisive Vance-Owen peace plan (and subsequent 'safe havens' which were not safe)

The geopolitics of international migrationin Europe have contributed directly to the flow of 'refugees' from the former Yugoslavia. Thus the EU could be said to have some additional moral responsibility towards people who do not accept the ethnic division of that state, even where they are not in direct fear of persecution or directly affected by the conflict. Such a position is perhaps implicitly, if not explicitly, accepted by European states which have on the whole been willing to grant temporary residence to those opposed to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Less obviously, the role of the Common Agricultural Policy in depressing world prices of agricultural goods could be seen as a contributory factor in the economic collapse of certain nations which in turn promotes the necessity to migrate. A more recent example concerns the role of European colonial policy in Rwanda which might be seen as a 'root cause' of the genocide in, and collapse of, that country in 1994 (Lemarchand 1970; Newbury 1988). In his search for direction on principles of social justice, Harvey (1992) comes close to this line of reasoning, suggesting a principle that might be labelled 'solidarity against oppression' as the basis on which higher-order philosophical judgements might be made. In this sense, European states (and/or the EU) could be seen as having special obligations towards people from particular parts of the world where they have been influential in maintaining or supporting regimes which abuse human rights or preside over economic policies which systematically impoverish certain sections of their population. Of course, this principle has already been followed by the US during the 1980s, albeit from a different geopolitical perspective, in providing refuge to those perceived as fighting against communist regimes. Interestingly, such a principle also has something in common with the arguments of Nozick (1974), who puts forward one of the most restrictive visions of the duties of states in the field of social justice within modern philosophy. Nozick (ibid., 149) argues that [t]heminimalstateis the most extensivestatethatcan be justified. Any statemoreextensiveviolatespeople's rights [whilst] no person or group (is) entitled to controlall the resources, jointlydecidinghow they are to be doled out. Rather, people are entitled to the distribution of resources that already exist. However, the limitation on this position is, as Nozick suggests, that it is relevant to consider how distributions of

71 resources came about. 'Rectification' of injustice wreaked in the past may be morally defensible. In a general sense, it might be argued that such 'rectification' is unlikely to solve the worst cases of international inequalities since the world's poorest countries tend to be those that are resource-poor rather than poor as a result of exploitation through capitalism or colonialism, for example. However, a better case might be made in the field of migration where, on the whole, it appears that migrants do wish to come to developed countries with which they have some cultural affinity (e.g. language) and where, in practice, such connections reflect exploitative relations in the past. Ways forward for social justice in European immigration policy Drawing on the various arguments outlined above for 'justice' in the field of immigration policy (or foreign policy more generally), it is suggested that 'minimalist' positions based on principles of social justice could be associated with the 'contractarian' line of John Rawls or the 'communitarian' stance of Michael Walzer. Whilst rejecting large-scale immigration, both authors do nonetheless argue for - or allow some room to argue for - the existence of duties on the part of states with regard to particular kinds of immigrants (rather than the 'natural rights' of migrants). From a communitarian standpoint, in particular, attention in developing a more progressive immigration policy should be given to refugee policy, policy towards those with some kinship tie with current residents (i.e. policy towards 'national minorities' such as the German Aussiedler and towards family reunification) and overseas aid policy as an alternative to permitting large-scale migration of the world's poor. As Hathway (1991) points out, this broadly reflects the current perspective of most western states, although even here there is much scope for improvement in policy, concentrating, for example, on other common features of almost all theories of social justice, such as the need for equitable and fair treatment of migrants. At the other extreme, all of the theories outlined above agree on the need to maintain some level of immigration control in order to prevent threats to public order or to the institutions of a just society (e.g. democracy and the rule of law) in the receiving country. For example, if the level of immigration were of a significant magnitude and promoted

72 change in the host society of a kind that threatened to undermine principles of social justice themselves, the overall impact of such immigration could not be considered as promoting the cause of social justice. In this sense, it seems reasonable that states should have the ability to control immigration in order to guard against such an outcome, although samples of such 'threats' do not readily appear at least in modern European states. A more thorny question is posed by the contention of Freeman (1986) that free movement of peoples cannot coexist with the preservation of nationally based welfare states, since a requirement of the welfare state is a closed system within which resources can be channelled in an orderly fashion to the less advantaged of a society. However, one response to this problem might be to question the justification of high levels of social welfare in a given closed society if these are based on systematic exploitation of those excluded from that society. Such a question has been raised by Smith (1994a) in the context of the justification for maintenance of the higher living conditions enjoyed by South Africa's white population and the difficulties of extending these conditions to the majority of citizens given the unjust system that created such differentials in the first place. It is also implicit in Beitz's (1979, 152) criticism of Rawls and his argument for a 'global difference principle'. In practice, beyond the minimalist position of the right of a state founded on social justice to preserve the institutions that maintain such justice (and some provision of welfare), the question then becomes one of what further changes in immigration policy might be considered as appropriate in furthering the cause of justice, both within a particular state or group of states, such as the EU, and within the world more generally. In this respect, the tendency of a number of writers is towards more freedom of migration (cf. Barry and Goodin 1992). As Fielding (1993, 41) puts it, there appears to be something unjust about a situation in which thosewho own capitalcanmakea livingby using that capitalalmostanywherein the world;however,those who do not own capitalmust makea living by selling theirlabourpower ... only in 'their'own country. However, given the political infeasibility of a 'no borders' policy, it becomes important to consider other ways in which such freedom of movement can be promoted.

Russell King et al. One way around this problem has already been attempted within the EU, through the removal of borders by mutual agreement within a particular 'union' of states. In principle, this opens the possibility of increased cross-cultural contact, at least between European nations, and a more flexible attitude towards citizenship and residence rights. However, besides the apparent inability of European governments fully to implement this policy (it was not until 1995 that full free movement envisaged under the Schengen Agreement was implemented and, even then, this was only in certain European countries, one of which - France - effectively reneged on its commitments for 'security reasons' after only a few months of participation), its major pitfall has been the clear exclusivity of the policy and the notion of 'Europe' embodied in it. Thus the Europe that is being created is less a cosmopolitan 'melting pot' and more a 'white' fortress in which, for example, ethnic minorities are clearly more likely to be subject to random identity checks, whether they are citizens or not. In turn, the terms of the Dublin Convention, which limits residence of asylumseekers to the country they first entered within Europe, confirms the notion that freedom of movement is not intended to be for all, even within the fortress. Attempts have been made in a similar direction in terms of the development of the North American Free TradeArea (NAFTA) and, despite more recent limitations on freedom of movement of people rather than capital and an ominous turn of events in terms of immigration policy and practice in California, this particular example, unlike 'Fortress Europe', holds out the possibility of links across the global 'rich-poor' divide. It is certainly feasible that such arrangements could be promoted elsewhere and that arguments for controlled migration could be made within them. In the case of Europe, this would involve the identification of principles upon which agreements with particular third parties should be developed. Such a policy is perhaps most likely to be pursued on the grounds of economic expediency but it is also reasonable to argue for such a policy on the grounds of political or economic solidarity with certain states or peoples, perhaps as part of a wider political agreement. In such a case, we would not be talking about 'no borders' but a managed migration environment in which 'justice' or, at the very least, particular economic or geopolitical ends were promoted.

The geopolitics of international migrationin Europe In this context, one of the messages of the philosophical discussion contained in this paper is to question whether the individual-level focus normally associated with discussions of 'human rights' is apt in migration settings. In both contractarian and communitarian systems, not only individual rights but also communal rights might be respected: rights, such as those recognized by Walzer, of communities to exclude those who constitute a threat to the community but also rights of communities in poor and overcrowded places to relief from their plight, whether such relief is provided by 'mutual aid' or by some sort of controlled migration. If the 'right' to migrate were seen as vested in communities in this way, rather than being a right of individuals, and if it were limited by quota, this might constitute a solution to the plight of the group wishing to migrate whilst limiting any possible threat to the rights of the receiving community. If decisions about immigration are, in turn, to become harmonized at a European level, attention also needs to be paid to the way in which 'Europe' itself is defined and the extent to which this is inclusive or exclusive of non-European 'others'. The signs, though, are not encouraging. Indeed, Richmond (1994, xv) goes so far as to talk of a new 'global apartheid' in which the predominantly 'White'and wealthy countriesof
North America, Europe and Australasia endeavour to protect themselves from what they believe are imminent threats to their territorial integrity and privileged lifestyles.

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Finally, Richmond's comments underline deep and genuine - fears amongst many policy-makers, and much of the public at large, concerning immigration but these are fears which can be addressed by further and, perhaps, more practical geographical inquiry. For example, there is often an underlying assumption, perhaps derived from Ravenstein's classic 'laws of migration', that, unless immigration controls are imposed, migration necessarily increases over time. Thus, for example, a recent background report on immigration and asylum policy emanating from the European Commission (1994) recognizes the need for strengthening integration policies for legal immigrants but nonetheless refers to the need to take action on migration pressure. However, as a hypothesis, the inevitable and continuous rise of migration pressure remains to be proven: for

example, despite numerous warnings (cf. Brym 1991; Grecic 1991; Layard et al. 1992), such pressure for emigration from the former Soviet Union to Europe has largely failed to materialize whilst classic migration flows in history-such as that from Europe to North America, from southern to northern Europe or from the Caribbean to the UK - can be seen in retrospect to have undergone distinct phases of increase followed by decline and indeed return (Byron 1994; King 1993; Thomas 1954). In turn, as Richmond (1994) points out, given that much current migration is conflictrelated, the raising of barriers may itself result in further conflict, stimulating more rather than less migration. In this context, the task remains for geographers, alongside other social and political scientists, to consider in more detail the lessons of migration history, encompassing an understanding of the causes of migration and its consequences, and to ensure that findings reach the public domain to inform political decision-making. In turn, just as there is an increasing realization that questions relating to inequality, within cities, for example, can be informed by discussions about social justice, so too can such considerations be extended to the field of migration where global inequality constitutes such an important context underlying migration streams. Within such a debate, the importance of respect for human rights, whether individual or communal, both within and between states and groups of states, remains a fundamental issue, not least in addressing human-rights abuses that force people to move against their will as refugees. But such a debate can be pursued, and indeed perhaps should be pursued, without recourse to the argument that the individualright to migrate is necessarily a fundamental principle of social justice.

Acknowledgements Versions of this paper were first presented at a workshop of the IBG Limited Life Working Party on the 'Geopolitics of international migration in Europe' and at the IBG conference at the University of Northumbria at Newcastle in January 1995. I am grateful for the perceptive critical comments of participants in the workshop, especially Tony Fielding, and for the helpful suggestions of anonymous referees.

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