Serva Et Al

Journal of Organizational Behavior J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005) Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/job.
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The reciprocal nature of trust: a longitudinal study of interacting teams

MARK A. SERVA1, MARK A. FULLER2* AND ROGER C. MAYER3
Department of Accounting and MIS, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, U.S.A. School of Accounting, Information Systems, and Business Law, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, U.S.A. 3 Department of Management, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, U.S.A.
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Summary
This research develops and investigates the concept of reciprocal trust between interacting teams. Reciprocal trust is dened as the trust that results when a party observes the actions of another and reconsiders ones trust-related attitudes and subsequent behaviors based on those observations. Twenty-four teams of systems analysis and design students were involved in a 6-week controlled eld study focused on the development of an information systems project. Each team was responsible for both developing a system (development role) and for supervising the development of a system by another team (management role). Risk-taking actions exhibited by one team in an interacting pair were found to predict the other teams trustworthiness perceptions and subsequent trust. The level of trust formed in turn predicted the teams subsequent risk-taking behaviors with respect to the other team. This pattern of reciprocal trust repeated itself as the teams continued to interact over the duration of the project, thus supporting our model of reciprocal trust. Findings also indicate that trust and trust formation can occur at the team level. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction
Researchers from management and related elds agree that trust has important organizational and interpersonal consequences (Argyris, 1964; Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan, 2000; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Spreitzer & Mishra, 2002; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). While much is known about trust, several areas can benet from additional attention. Few studies have empirically examined trust between parties over time (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). This scarcity is understandable, considering the inherent complexities of longitudinal research. However, given the apparent relationship between trust and organizational performance, it is important to understand how trust is nurtured and eroded as parties interact. In addition, the question of whether or not teams can exhibit trust remains an open research question. Although trust
* Correspondence to: Mark A. Fuller, School of Accounting, Information Systems, and Business Law, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4729, U.S.A. E-mail: mark@wsu.edu Contract/grant sponsor: Lerner College of Business.
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 17 July 2003 Revised 12 November 2004 Accepted 8 March 2005
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research focused on individuals is important, groups and organizations are more than collections of individuals. Hence, research also needs to address the development of trust in these more complex social settings. This study contributes to the growing literature on trust by examining team-based trust in a longitudinal context. In addition, this research denes and develops the concept of reciprocal trust using an established theoretical framework (Mayer et al., 1995) by examining whether one partys actions inuence the level of trust formed in another party. This research extends prior ndings by examining the dynamic interplay of the determinants of trust over time. We also differentiate reciprocal trust from the concept of mutual trusttwo concepts that on the surface appear similar. We focus specically on trust at the interteam level of analysis. Examining trust at the group level of analysis is in line with calls for research (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Mossholder & Bedeian, 1983; Rousseau, 1985) that have stressed the importance of isomorphismconsistent construct conceptualizations across levels of analysisto facilitate multilevel and cross-level inferences. Other researchers have noted that although conceptually clear multilevel work on trust is needed, an understanding of trust in an organizational context is being hampered by a lack of such clarity in published studies (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). By validating the Mayer et al. (1995) model at an interteam level, we facilitate future multilevel and cross-level work.
Trust
A foundation for this study is the Mayer et al. (1995) framework for trust. This model posits that trustworthiness, in the form of beliefs about another partys ability, benevolence, and integrity, are the predominant determinants of trust. Mayer et al. (1995) also posit that trust can result in risk-takingi.e., behaviors that open the trustor up to the possibility of losswhich they label risk-taking in relationship. Consistent with the Mayer et al. (1995) model, we dene trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). Party can refer to a group, allowing the denition to be employed for our purposes. By dening a groups trust in another group as a willingness to be vulnerable to that group, trust is differentiated from both perceptions of the other team (i.e., trustworthiness) and from the risk-taking behaviors which may occur for reasons other than trust. Mayer et al. (1995) emphasized the importance of making this differentiation. The willingness to be vulnerable can manifest itself in a variety of risk-taking behaviors dependent upon the context. In an investment situation, trust may result in relinquishing control of personal resources to a nancial planner. In personal relationships, trust may result in disclosing sensitive information. In our context of interacting teams in a project development environment, trust may result in other behaviors which we discuss more completely below. It is important to note that if trustworthiness perceptions of the other party change, a partys willingness to be vulnerablei.e., trustmay be immediately affected. On the other hand, it takes time for a change in trust to manifest itself in a different level of risk-taking behavior.
Team trust
The majority of trust research has focused on an individual as the trustor of interest. While examining individuals is interesting and important, we explore whether or not a team as a whole can exhibit trust. Indeed, Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (1996b) stress the importance of extending trust to the group and organization levels of analysis and call for additional research specically targeting this important
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)
THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST
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topic. Consistent with the model presented by Mayer et al. (1995), a groups trust for another can be thought of as a shared belief by members of a focal group about how willing that group is to be vulnerable to a target (i.e., trustee) group. Previous studies have proposed that trust can occur at both the group and organizational level (Currall & Judge, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), although empirical conrmation has been needed. Moreover, interorganizational trust was described by Zaheer et al. (1998) as a collectively held trust orientation toward the partner rm. This latter view is consistent with the approach to intergroup trust taken in this paper. This shift from interpersonal to interteam trust is signicant for at least two reasons. First, interacting teams have become common. Thus, understanding how to nurture effective interactions between teams is critical to performance. Second, groups are not simply collections of individualsthey exhibit characteristics reective of the whole. Thompson and Fine (1999) showed that groups have been dealt with theoretically as supraorganisms for many decades (e.g., McDougall, 1920). In this and other work, Thompson and her colleagues note that the use of the group as a unit of analysis as an information processor has become accepted in organizational research. As she states in the introduction to a special issue of Basic and Applied Social Psychology, the unit of analysis is no longer the individual information processor . . . but the interacting group and dyad . . . . [The focus of the special issue is] how interacting individuals and groups create meaning and act upon collectively developed cognition, motivation, and emotion (Thompson, 1998, p. 3). Trust may be one of the characteristics that are inuential in group and inter-group performance.
Reciprocal trust
While previous research has examined both the antecedents and consequences of trust, fewer studies have explored whether existing trust (and its behavioral consequences) has a role in establishing another partys trust over timein effect, demonstrating that trust may beget more trust (Das & Teng, 1998). Reciprocity may be critical in understanding trust in relationships (Blau, 1964). Trust forms in the mind of the trustor. It cannot be observed by others, and therefore cannot directly affect either perceptions held by or behaviors of other individuals or groups. The risk-taking behaviors that are believed to result from trust are evident to others, however, and it is these behaviors that may provide the stimulus that can encourage subsequent demonstrations (both positive and negative) of trust in return (Boon & Holmes, 1991; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Research that examines the development of trust in virtual teams, for example, concluded that one teams actions affected another teams subsequent perceptions of trust (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999). In addressing the trust that occurs between parties, the concepts of mutual trust and reciprocal trust have overlapped. We assert that mutual trust is conceptually different from reciprocal trust. Mutual trust exists when two people have complementary trust for one another, and when each perceives that the other is aware of his intent and his trust (Deutsch, 1958). Under mutual trust, researchers assume that each party has roughly the same level of trust for the other party (Nelson & Cooprider, 1996; Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). Mutual trust also presents a static picture of complementary trust without addressing how actions and context have affected present levels of trust. To reciprocate, however, means to give and take mutually; to show or feel in response (Webster, 1984, p. 584). Reciprocal trust implies an active process of exchange of trust between parties, particularly when it results from a trustees previous demonstration of trust. Equivalence is not a requirement of reciprocal trust. We dene reciprocal trust as the trust that results when a party observes the actions of another and reconsiders ones attitudes and subsequent behaviors based on those observations. Our concept of reciprocal trust is not a distinct type of trust, but rather it is a dynamic process through which trust grows or diminishes. Describing reciprocal trust requires examining the process by
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which actions result in trust between interacting parties. This requires the measurement of one partys actions, and the measurement of another partys trust-related reaction to those actions. It is important to note that the focus of this study is the reciprocal nature of trust between interdependent teams. Although the intragroup dynamics through which a groups level of trust is formed are also of great interest, examination of that process is beyond the scope of this research. Figure 1(a) illustrates a conceptual model of reciprocal trust between teams based on the Mayer trust model (Mayer et al., 1995). Within a specic context (e.g., interacting teams involved in a systems
Team A Perceives Team B to be Trustworthy (Trustworthiness)
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Figure 1. (a) A conceptual model of reciprocal trust. (b) Hypotheses and studied relationships Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)
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development project), Team A perceives Team B to have some level of trustworthiness, which results in Team As level of trust in Team B. Team A subsequently takes a risk by performing an action that results in its being vulnerable to Team B. Such actions have been called risk-taking in relationship, or RTR (Mayer et al., 1995). The RTR increases or decreases Team Bs perceptions of Team As trustworthiness, depending on whether Team As action is perceived positively or negatively. Team B responds by updating its prior perceptions of As trustworthiness, and increasing or decreasing its trust and RTRs with respect to Team A. This constitutes an actionreaction cycle where both Team As and Team Bs trust can be inuenced by each other. In this way, one teams trust and resultant risk-taking behaviors may encourage future trust and risk-related actions of another team. This concept of actionreaction is well documented in the complementary eld of game theory (Axelrod, 1984). What game theory ignores, however, are the beliefs that motivate the actions and reactions. Game theory research equates cooperation with trust. Cooperation can, however, exist without trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust can breed cooperation in circumstances where other means of producing cooperation (e.g., the use of coercion) are not possible or are likely to be unsuccessful. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the two. Unlike game theory research, the current study examines not only behaviors but also considers the perceptions and attitudes that underlie the behaviors.
Study Overview and Hypotheses

Our context for studying the evolution of trust between interdependent teams involves two interdependent teams interacting on a systems development project. Within the project, a development team provides a solitary source of technical knowledge for a management team who must rely on the development team to construct the solution. The management team is also a unique source of important information, since it provides the initial requirements and feedback that allow the development team to successfully complete its job. The management team on the project sets forth requirements and is responsible for overseeing a development team charged with the construction of an information system. We propose three hypotheses and test them over four time periods, each of which lasts about 10 days (Figure 1b). Figure 1(b) illustrates the same information as the feedback model illustrated in Figure 1(a), but introduces time periods into the representation. The rst two hypotheses are designed to conrm the Mayer et al. (1995) model of trust extended to the team level of analysis. Specically, the rst hypothesis examines whether the trustworthiness factors (i.e., ability, benevolence, and integrity) predict team trust. The second examines the effect of trust on later risk-taking actions specic to the project management context. The third hypothesis focuses on reciprocal trust by examining whether the actions of one team relate to the perceptions of its trustworthiness held by the other team. These hypotheses are discussed more thoroughly below.
Trustworthiness hypothesis
Mayer et al. (1995) posits that three primary factorsability, benevolence, and integritycan parsimoniously encompass the concept of trustworthiness, the immediate precursor to trust. This particular framework has been used by numerous other researchers studying the antecedents of trust (Bauer & Green, 1996; Robinson, 1996). Previous research, for example, has indicated that trust in another is inuenced by perceptions of the other partys ability to accomplish a task important to the trustor,
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where ability is the set of skills or attributes that enable the trustee to have inuence (Butler, 1991; Cook & Wall, 1980). Thus, exhibited ability can be expected to positively inuence trust because the trustee will be perceived to have more capacity to help the trustor. In turn, benevolence is the degree to which the trustor believes that the trustee has goodwill or positive intentions toward the trustor (Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Similar to ability, the more a trustee exhibits behaviors that show they value the trustors needs and seek to protect the trustor, the greater the resulting trust on the part of the trustor should be. Finally, integrity is a trustors perception that the trustee adheres to acceptable values, which could include issues such as consistency, honesty, and fairness. A trustee who shows that they follow values that the trustor likes should be more trusted. Other researchers have also proposed that factors similar to integrity play a role in trust (Butler, 1991; Lieberman, 1981; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Based on this rationale, we propose: Hypothesis 1: One teams perceptions of another teams ability, benevolence, and integrity will predict the rst teams trust in the second team.
Risk-taking in relationship hypothesis

Mayer et al. (1995) also proposed that trust leads to behavioral consequences. These risk-taking behaviors make the trustor vulnerable to the trustee. As mentioned earlier, the consequences of trust (i.e., the specic RTRs) are dependent upon the context in which trust is studied. Since this research focuses on the relationships between teams interacting in management and development roles in a systems development project, risk-taking behaviors specic to this management teamdevelopment team context are identied and developed. For the development team role, we explore two types of risk-taking behaviors that can result from trust in this context: formalizing and scoping. Development teams may reduce their perceived risk by formalizing communications regarding project-related outcomes and procedures such as requiring a project charter, project schedule, and resource assignments. Project documentation, change request forms, or public staff meetings can serve as a contract, protecting developers from exposure to risk (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998). We posit that since formalizing communication reduces risk (documentation allows a team to prove what was planned or discussed), development teams who do not trust their management teams will formalize more. Another common method used to reduce project risk is to control the projects scope by restricting a management teams capacity to change project specications. Allowing project requirements or specications to expand beyond initial expectations (known as scope creep) is a primary cause of unmet deadlines and budgets (Abdel-Hamid & Madnick, 1991; Zmud, 1980). While related to formalization, project scope control activities keep the requirements of the project in line with estimated time and resources so that the development teams efforts will be judged a success. A development team that trusts its management team should exert less effort to protect itself from increases in scope, which increases its project risk by not meeting time or budgetary goals. For the management team role, we examine two types of risk-taking behaviors that would be a consequence of trust in this context: monitoring development team progress and delegating tasks to the development team. Researchers have proposed that trust in business relationships can reduce the need for monitoring (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). In one study, researchers found that veterinarians delegated riskier tasks to employees in whom they had more trust (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996a). Others have also proposed similar effects of trust (Fox, 1974). Thus, in a project management context, if a management team trusts its development team, it should delegate more risky tasks to the development teamsuch as delegation of decision-making regarding the design
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of a project deliverable or greater discretion over the amount of communication expected to keep management informed. A second type of risk-taking action is the extent to which one party monitors another (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; Fox, 1974). Computer-based monitoring, for example, has become common in the workplace, especially if management believes employees are using company time inappropriately (George, 1996). Such monitoring may result from managements lack of trust in the employees. Previous management research has found that trust is negatively related to controlbased monitoring (McAllister, 1995). In our information systems development project, management teams that do not trust their development team should monitor more since they will likely feel the need to oversee the developers progress. In sum, we hypothesize that a team that trusts its counterpart team will act in a way that may put it at risk to the other team. It should be noted that in some instances increases in risk-taking actions should be reected in increases in certain types of behaviors, although in other instances increases in risktaking may cause decreases in a behavior. For example, increases in managements trust may lead to RTRs like increased delegation of tasks to the development team, or reduced monitoring of development team actions. In sum: Hypothesis 2: Team trust will be positively related to its risk-taking actions toward the trusted team.
Reciprocal trust hypothesis

As discussed earlier, trust itself is not visible to the interacting teams. The process of reciprocal trust occurs, however, as a team observes the behaviors of another team and perceives them as a signal of trust. The observing team then modies its perceptions of the rst teams trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, or integrity). These perceptions immediately inuence the second teams trust in the rst team, which in turn affects the second teams own RTRs. These behaviors are observed and interpreted by the rst team, and the cycle continues. As explained by Das and Teng, When a trustee realizes that a trustor has taken considerable risk in trusting her, she tends to be motivated to behave in a trustworthy manner (Das & Teng, 1998, p. 503). This research posits that the best explanation of the mechanism for reciprocal development of trust is through the linking of one teams RTRs to another teams trustworthiness perceptions (i.e., perceptions of the trustees ability, benevolence, and integrity). The reciprocal nature of I trust you because you trust me (McAllister, 1995) will continue as long as teams continue to interact. A more concrete illustration may be useful. If a management team does not trust a development team, it may more closely monitor the progress made by the development team (monitoring) to avoid taking a risk at the development teams hands. Interpreting these actions as a lack of trust, the development team may attempt to protect itself, including formalizing communications (so messages are not lost) and requiring detailed change requests as a form of project scope control (so the development team reduces its risk of falling behind schedule, even at the expense of a more suitable systems development effort). These development team behaviors may be interpreted by the management team as indicators of reduced development team ability, benevolence, or integrity (the factors of trustworthiness), which in turn decreases the management teams trust in the development team. Such a reciprocal process could continue through the life of a project, as trust is developed or eroded through multiple interactions. It should be noted that actions may be interpreted differently depending on the context in which they occur. For example, increased scoping may be viewed as acceptable and professional early in a project, but may be interpreted negatively later in a project. We propose: Hypothesis 3: One teams risk-taking behaviors will be related to the other teams perceptions of the rst teams trustworthiness.
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Organizational Context
The Sample Data were collected in a senior-level systems analysis and design class taken by students who had elected to minor in management information systems while majoring in another business discipline (accounting, marketing, operations, nance, or management). The MIS minor program is consid ered to be one of the elite programs within the business college. Admittance to the MIS minor is competitive: students must have a 3.0 GPA to be admitted to the program. Students tend to be highly motivated, and recruiters often seek out these students for their top positions. Placement information indicates that the majority of the students took positions in the accounting, consulting, and nancial services industry within the mid-Atlantic region. The Team Task In addition to teaching the basics of systems analysis, an objective of the class is to encourage teamwork and to develop students project management skills. The development project used in this classwhere students were charged with not only developing an information system, but also supervising the development of another teams systemwas a unique approach to educating students on the intricacies of the systems development process. By having each student team perform the roles of developers and managers, students reported that they learned important development skills, but also understood the development process from the managers perspective. They also better understood the importance of communicating using models and diagrams, for example, because managers often do not understand technical jargon. Despite the complexity and added work necessary for students to participate in the project, evaluations of the courseand its learning opportunitieswere quite high. Timeline Data were collected over a 6-week period in 2000.
Methods
The purpose of this study is to examine the development of reciprocal trust between teams. The nature of this goal introduced several complexities. Our desire to control for task complexity across teams and to randomly assign participants to teams suggested the use of an experimental design. Two key concerns, however, have been raised about the efcacy of studying trust in a traditional laboratory setting (Schoorman et al., 1996b). First, the development of trust may be best studied when repeated interactions occur over a sustained period of time, so that participants have time to develop a meaningful level of trust. Second, participants must be engaged in a way that is important and salient to themi.e., for trust to matter participants must have something valuable to gain or to lose. For this study, a setting and methodology was needed that could gain much of the control available in a lab setting while engaging interdependent teams over a signicant period of time in a realistic, salient task in which they had a stake in the outcome.
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Project task
The task chosen for this study was the development of a system (i.e., a website) in a senior-level information systems analysis and design class. Ninety-four advanced undergraduate students in two sections of a public university in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States participated in this study. Students were randomly assigned to one of 24 teams: 22 teams consisted of four students and two consisted of three students. Each team was responsible for both developing a system (development role) and supervising the development of a system by another team (management role). Thus, our sample included 22 separate project team dyads. We tailored the research design to provide an environment conducive to studying trust over time. The teams were mutually dependent upon one another for success, so each party had something to lose or gain. Teams were engaged in a signicant, real project from their perspective, so potential losses and gains were salient. The environment was as tightly controlled as possible, reducing the effects of extraneous variables (e.g., lay-offs, new management). Finally, there was sufcient interaction over a prolonged period of time (approximately 40 days) to develop a meaningful level of inter-team trust. Teams had both face-to-face interactions and the other teams project deliverables to provide information for evaluating trustworthiness. The team structure for the class resembled a circle, with a given team (e.g., Team 2) managing another team (e.g., Team 3) on one project and being managed by yet another team (e.g., Team 1) on a second project. In its managerial role, a team was responsible for establishing requirements for the required system and for providing feedback to the development team. In its development role, the team was charged with fullling the management teams requirements by constructing an information system. The development project lasted about 6 weeks. Four project deliverables were exchanged by the interacting teams over the course of the project, one every 10 days. Although a team in the managerial role depended on its development team to produce a technology solution that met its specications, the development team depended on its management team to provide clear and timely specications, accurate feedback on progress, and recognition and rewards for performance. Each teams project grade depended in part on the other teams performance. This eld design within a university class provided certain advantages by allowing for a level of control not available in a corporate setting. Participants were randomly assigned to teams. The sample was relatively uniform in terms of experience, such as students technical knowledge and grade point averages. The basic interaction between management teams and development teams was standardized across dyads, which gave each team an equal amount of time to accomplish each project phase. The management team delivered a requirements document to the development team at T1. The document outlined the requirements for the project, and was read and assessed by the development team. At T2, the development team delivered a system prototype to the management team, which examined it relative to the initial requirements. At T3 the management team delivered a feedback document to the development team, proposing changes to the system prototype. This feedback document was read and assessed by the developers. Finally, at T4 the development team delivered the nal system. The management team examined the nal product relative to both the initial requirements and the change requests from T3. Our analysis of trust follows this ow of project deliverables. As a deliverable is presented from Team A (which can be either the management or developer team role depending upon the stage of the project) to Team B, the deliverable and the interactions that transpired between the two teams as the deliverable was constructed affect Team Bs perceptions of Team As ability, benevolence, and integrity. These Team B beliefs have an immediate impact on Team Bs trust, and subsequently on the risk-taking actions that Team B exhibits (Mayer et al., 1995). Teams submitted their deliverables at the start of class and the instructors provided time in class for teams to review and discuss the
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submitted deliverables. The instructors did not restrict teams from interacting outside of class. We instituted a number of steps to mitigate dependence in the responses representing the two roles. For each of the 24 teams, the instructor identied which team was being evaluated. Researchers were careful to space out survey administrations to reduce methods bias. Instructors also emphasized to the students the importance of completing the surveys honestly and accurately, since they would be considered in determining a teams nal project grade. Our model (Figure 1b) hypothesizes that a teams actions (in the form of the deliverables and actions related to the deliverables) inform subsequent perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity from the other team. These trustworthiness perceptions immediately trigger changes in the other teams trust level, which then affect that teams RTRs throughout the next stage of the process. Since the delivery of the requirements document provides an indication of the management teams initial trustworthiness (and hence, a basis for the development teams initial trust in the management team), our model starts with the development teams perceptions of the management teams ability, benevolence, and integrity after its review of the requirements document. It should be noted that management RTRs at T1 would have reected managements monitoring and delegating actions leading up to the delivery of this requirements documentbefore the development team had been actively involved with the project.
Measures
To measure perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity, three questions were adapted from previous trust research (Mayer & Davis, 1999). Both management and development teams answered identical questions with the referents modied accordingly (see Appendix). For ability, benevolence, and integrity, each team member responded to questions that asked about that teams perceptions of these qualities in the other team. Measures of RTRs for the task at hand were developed for this study based on interviews with systems developers and IT managers. The developer RTRs included formalizing inter-team procedures and scoping (attempting to control the scope of) the size of the project. Management RTRs included delegating and monitoring. All scales in this study used a 5-point Likert-type format with agreedisagree anchors at each scale point. Both management and development teams completed surveys whenever a project phase was completed. The internal validity of the study was bolstered in a number of ways. Data were collected from both management teams and development teams at points that corresponded to the times that either the management team (T1 and T3) or the development team (T2 and T4) submitted a project deliverable to its counterpart team. Unlike earlier published research on mutual or reciprocal trust, the longitudinal and repeated nature of the data collection allowed us to examine the interactive evolution of trust between interdependent teams over a 6-week time period. Our analyses involve both cross-source and longitudinal relationships. RTRtrustworthiness relationships involve cross-source data. At T2, for example, RTRs represent a development teams responses of its actions in the previous time period. The trustworthiness responses represent the management teams perceptions of the development team. Relationships between trust and subsequent RTRs involve longitudinal data, since the perceived trust at the end of one time period (e.g., T2) should foster action during the subsequent time period (and therefore measured at the end of T3). This design should mitigate concerns about the effects of common methods bias. Reliability and validity estimates were completed using individual level data (n 94). Correlations and descriptive statistics are listed in Table 1, along with Cronbachs alphas. Reliability levels were acceptable for the most part (i.e., greater than 0.70), although the new formalizing (T2 and T4) and scoping (T2) RTR scales were lower than expected. Previous studies have recommended a lower reliability standard (0.60), however, for exploratory measures (Nunnally, 1978). The lower levels for the
Table 1. Correlations and descriptive statistics of constructs at team level (Cronbachs alpha)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Mean SE
T1: 0.85*** (0.84) 0.86*** 0.80*** (0.85) 0.70*** 0.51* 0.05 0.23 (0.60) 0.07 (0.95) 0.22 0.58** (0.94) 0.44* 0.69*** 0.78*** 0.69*** (0.78) 0.61** 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.18 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.26 0.21 0.44y 0.62*** 0.37y 0.64*** 0.49* 0.49* 0.37y 0.37y 0.32 0.01 0.21 0.27 0.45* 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.58** 0.17 (0.85) 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.32 0.28 0.49* (0.82) 0.16 0.46* 0.27 (0.95) 0.28 0.27 0.41y 0.73*** (0.96) 0.20 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.39y 0.33 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.55** 0.07 0.05 0.53** 0.28 0.20 0.51* 0.17 0.15 0.59** 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.77*** (0.79) 0.76*** 0.59** 0.15 0.15 0.47* 0.01 0.44* 0.30 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.58** (0.72) 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.30 0.42* 0.35y 0.36y (0.56) 0.66*** (0.87) 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.47*0.10 0.00 0.49* 0.00 0.04 0.36y 0.06 0.30 0.39y 0.57** 0.49y 0.49y 0.31 0.47* 0.25 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.43* 0.25 0.32 0.21 0.39y 0.05 0.10 0.48* 0.49* 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.46* 0.56** 0.23 0.07 0.43* 0.31 0.28 0.13 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.32 0.39y 0.29 0.07 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.35y 0.39y 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.48* 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.47* 0.11 0.04 0.63*** 0.32 0.05 0.01 0.49* 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.56** 0.10 0.13 0.14 (0.64) 0.62*** (0.63)
Ability
1 3.62 0.61 (0.96)
Dev.
Benev.
2 3.14 0.39
teams
Integrity
3 3.59 0.43
responses Trust
4 3.07 0.41
T2: 0.25 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.34
Formalizing 5 3.70 0.33 0.10

0.52** 0.32 (0.81) 0.00 0.42* (0.95) 0.19 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.88*** (0.97) 0.73*** 0.83*** (0.87) 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.77*** 0.40y 0.44* 0.15 0.34y
Mgmt
Scoping
6 3.20 0.38 0.31
teams
Ability
7 4.33 0.48
responses Benev.
8 3.72 0.58
Integrity
9 3.86 0.42
Trust
10 3.32 0.45
T3:
Delegating 11 3.23 0.47 0.02
Dev.
Monitoring 12 3.42 0.44
teams
Ability
13 3.90 0.66
responses Benev.
14 3.39 0.63
Integrity
15 3.66 0.43
Trust
16 3.13 0.49
T4:
Formalizing 17 3.84 0.44 0.09
Mgmt
Scoping
18 3.39 0.50 0.34
teams
Ability
19 4.25 0.85
responses Benev.
20 3.83 0.85
Integrity
21 3.91 0.59
Trust
22 3.41 0.53
(0.73)
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***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; y p < 0.10.
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RTRs are likely also due in part to the brevity of the scales. Cronbachs alpha for the trust scale at T1 was also low, possibly indicating that trust perceptions had not yet been solidied this early in the project. These variables were retained, but the reliability levels may reduce our ability to detect relationships with these constructs (Nunnally, 1978). Conrmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine the constructs underlying measurement characteristics at the individual level (Table 2). Because trustworthiness and risk-taking indicators are likely to covary within each analysis (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002), we used an oblique rotation (oblimin direct) to facilitate factor interpretation. Each group of indicators (trustworthiness, trust, and RTR) was run in separate analyses for each time period. The KMO (KaiserMeyerOlkin) statistic was included to test the adequacy of our sample for factor analysis: values greater than or equal to 0.50 are considered acceptable (Chow, 2004; Ferguson, Sanders, OHehir, & James, 2000; Hughes et al., 2003). All KMO levels pass the 0.50 level. We also included Bartletts chi square statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix and therefore inappropriate for factor analysis. The null hypothesis is easily rejected for all analyses. We next examined the magnitude and nature of the factor loadings. Trustworthiness and RTR factor loadings all exceed accepted standards (>0.50). Trust factor loadings are also acceptable, except for one loading at T4. Based on these results, we conclude that our trustworthiness, trust, and RTR measures demonstrate acceptable convergent and discriminant validity. One of the issues in studying team trust relates to how trust at the group level is best measured. There are at least three options. The rst is to allow members of a group to come to a collaborative unanimous decision, and then answer questions on trust as a group. Although this does indeed force a group-level answer, social inuence issues like domination or coalitions may bias the results. A second commonly used option is to ask questions at the individual level and subsequently aggregate to a higher level (Van Der Vegt, Emans, & Vliert, 2001). This technique is problematic as well, however, since the mean (or median) response may not be a valid indicator of the teams collective perception. In this latter scenario, valuable information about perceived group beliefs is lost, as a given member may personally hold one set of beliefs while recognizing that the group itself shares beliefs that differ from the members. For measuring shared team properties, a third alternative has been proposed (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Instead of aggregating questions posed at the individual level, this approach recommends wording questions using the team as the referent, not the individual. Each respondent becomes a data source, reporting not on his or her own beliefs, but on what he or she perceives the team to believe. Second, it is necessary to demonstrate substantial within-group agreement. If these two standards are met, the data should be aggregated to the team level of analysis to represent the shared team construct. This method of measuring group attitudes is consistent with an extensive body of literature focused on group potency (Gibson, 1999) and collective efcacy (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Gibson, 1999; Shamir, 1990). Consistent with this recommendation (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000), our questions were worded using the team as the appropriate referent (see Appendix). Next, to determine whether or not the data sample exhibited cohesive group characteristics, we used two procedures (Table 3): between-group ANOVA and rwg(j) (Demaree, James, & Wolf, 1984), an indicator of within-group agreement (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). For the ANOVA, 15 of the 22 study constructs indicate signicant between-group differences (p < 0.05). Insignicant ANOVA results, however, may indicate either insufcient variance across groups or a lack of agreement within groups. Therefore, we also calculated the rwg(j) statistic, which measures the level of agreement within a group (Table 3). All levels exceed the 0.70 standard, indicating that team-mates were consistent in their responses within the teams. This result indicates that the lack of signicance of some of the ANOVAs was due to a lack of variance across teams rather than a lack of team agreement. The data were collected specically to be analyzed at the team level and these analyses supported the aggregation. The data were aggregated to the team level by taking the average response for all team members.
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Table 2. Factor analyses Ability, benevolence, and integrity T1 1 Ability1 0.92 Ability2 0.97 Ability3 0.87 Benev1 0.08 Benev2 0.03 Benev3 0.01 Integrity1 0.05 Integrity2 0.03 Integrity3 0.12 2 3 1 T2 2 3 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.76 0.80 0.86 1 T3 2 3 1 T4 2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.77 0.99 0.90 3 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.05 0.08 0.01 0.88 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.87 0.81 0.04 0.87 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.94 0.08 0.83 0.02 0.77 0.15 0.42 0.51 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.92 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.81 0.09 0.06
0.91 0.07 0.91 0.02 0.86 0.09 0.30 0.76 0.15 0.83 0.17 0.81 0.28 0.37 0.20 0.02 0.43 0.18
0.01 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.86 0.08 0.98 0.07 0.94 0.81 0.07 0.90 0.03 0.51 0.04
KMO 0.84 KMO 0.76 KMO 0.89 KMO 0.90 Bartletts 2(23) 436.23 Bartletts 2(36) 424.77 Bartletts 2(36) 564.20 Bartletts 2(36) 783.57 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 Separate factor analyses were conducted for each time period. Bold values reect the loading for the expected construct. Trust T1 Trust1 Trust2 Trust3 Trust4 1 0.54 0.70 0.66 0.67 KMO 0.51 Bartletts 2(6) 39.50 p < 0.001 T2 1 0.64 0.76 0.71 0.68 T3 1 0.64 0.85 0.50 0.64 T4 1 0.48 0.91 0.66 0.75 KMO 0.52 Bartletts 2(6) 92.04 p < 0.001
KMO 0.67 KMO 0.52 Bartletts 2(6) 45.14 Bartletts 2(6) 52.76 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Risk-taking in relationship: development team T2 1 Scoping1 Scoping2 Formalizing1 Formalizing2 0.79 0.86 0.17 0.36 2 0.15 0.15 0.90 0.63 1 0.91 0.93 0.02 0.02 T4 2 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.82 KMO 0.57 Bartletts 2(6) 66.81 p < 0.001
Continues
KMO 0.59 Bartletts 2(6) 34.38 p < 0.001
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Table 2. Continued Risk-taking in relationship: management team T3 1 Monitoring1 Monitoring2 Delegating1 Delegating2 0.84 0.91 0.05 0.03 KMO 0.62 Bartletts 2(15) 208.47 p < 0.001 2 0.14 0.11 0.86 0.92
Results
We ran a separate regression for each dependent variable in Figure 1(b). The sample size for all regressions was n 24. Ability, benevolence, and integrity from the same time period were included as independent variables for each of the four models predicting trust. This analysis was run as four separate regressions, one for each time period. The time periods occurred approximately 10 days apart. A separate regression was run for the prediction of each of the three trustworthiness constructs. At T2, for example, the development teams reports of its formalizing and scoping actions were used to predict the management teams perceptions of the development teams ability, benevolence, and integrity in three separate models. For each model predicting an RTR, trust from the previous time period was included as an independent variable. These regression models represent longitudinal models, with trust from one time period predicting each RTR for the next time period, which occurred approximately 10 days later. Analyses for all T3 and T4 models included an additional independent construct. We included the previous level of the dependent variable to control for pre-existing perceptions. As an example, the model predicting trust at T3 includes the trust level at T1 as an independent construct. The strengths of the relationships are listed in Table 4.
The prediction of trust

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the three trustworthiness factors will signicantly predict trust in the counterpart team. For the development teams trust in management (T1 and T3), integritys importance increased from insignicance at T1 to being highly signicant at T3. Benevolence was actually negatively related to trust at T1, but teams may have little basis for the perception this early in the project (T1) (Mayer et al., 1995). Benevolence subsequently drops to insignicance at T3. For both teams trust perceptions, ability is a consistently strong predictor of trust. Both teams apparently became more task-oriented as the project progressed, as evidenced by the relative importance of ability at T3 and T4 versus benevolence and integrity. Thus, nine out of the possible 12 predictors from the two teams perspectives across the four waves of data collection are signicant in the hypothesized direction, providing support for Hypothesis 1. We also note that while previous levels of trust were added for the T3 and T4 analysis, controlling for previous perceptions apparently had little effect. Trust was insignificant at T3, and somewhat signicant at T4.
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Table 3. Analysis of data at the group level T1 Trustworthiness of management team Ability Benevolence Integrity 2.770 0.001 (0.89) 1.350 0.173 (0.88) 2.249 0.006 (0.92) 1.953 0.019 (0.82) 2.235 0.006 (0.92) 3.056 <0.001 (0.88) 2.223 0.006 (0.91) 2.111 0.010 (0.80) 0.905 0.591 (0.84) 1.064 0.407 (0.78) 1.059 0.413 (0.91) 1.554 0.087 (0.75) T2 T3 2.491 0.002 (0.89) 2.486 0.003 (0.89) 1.571 0.083 (0.89) 2.030 0.015 (0.80) 5.335 <0.001 (0.92) 4.955 <0.001 (0.89) 3.863 <0.001 (0.91) 2.467 0.003 (0.78) 1.697 0.053 (0.84) 1.774 0.040 (0.78) T4
Development teams trust in the management team Trust
Trustworthiness of development team Ability Benevolence Integrity
Management teams trust in the development team Trust Development RTRs Formalizing Scoping
Management RTRs Monitoring Delegating
Each cell lists the F23,64 statistic and resulting p-value using team as a categorical independent variable. Value in parentheses is the rwg(j), which is a metric of within-group agreement.
The prediction of risk-taking behaviors

We tested the hypothesis that trust will increase risk-taking behaviors (H2) using data that were lagged by one time period, or about 10 days. The analysis was conducted with trust from the previous time period, because the level of trust a team has in its counterpart team at one wave of data collection
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Table 4. Regression results Development teams Hypothesis 1: Prediction Ability Benevolence Integrity Trust (control) Hypothesis 2: Prediction Trust Formalizing (control) Hypothesis 2: Prediction Trust Scoping (control) Hypothesis 3: Prediction Formalizing Scoping Ability (control) Hypothesis 3: Prediction Formalizing Scoping Benevolence (control) Hypothesis 3: Prediction Formalizing Scoping Integrity (control) Management teams Hypothesis 1: Prediction Ability Benevolence Integrity Trust (control) Hypothesis 2: Prediction Trust Hypothesis 2: Prediction Trust Hypothesis 3: Prediction Delegating Monitoring Ability (control) Hypothesis 3: Prediction Delegating Monitoring Benevolence (control) Hypothesis 3: Prediction Delegating Monitoring Integrity (Control) of trust in development team 0.43** 0.51*** 0.35** of RTRs (delegating) 0.49** of RTRs (monitoring) 0.16 of trustworthiness: ability 0.47*** 0.42** 0.38** of trustworthiness: benevolence 0.28** 0.59*** 0.48*** of trustworthiness: integrity 0.30y 0.43** 0.30y 0.59*** 0.28* 0.29* 0.27* of trust in management team 0.74*** 0.31** 0.14 of RTRs (formalizing) 0.14 of RTRs (scoping) 0.56*** of trustworthiness: ability 0.22 0.10 of trustworthiness: benevolence 0.51** 0.27 of trustworthiness: integrity 0.65*** 0.38** T1 T2 T3 0.05 0.31y 0.53*** T4 0.14 0.35* 0.58*** 0.00 0.39** 0.57*** 0.47** 0.14 0.14 0.49** 0.68*** 0.19 0.33** 0.12 T1 T2 T3 T4
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; y p < 0.10.
should affect its subsequent behavior in the period that follows. Thus, management team trust at T2 would affect its decisions to delegate and monitor in the time period from T2 to T3, reected at the T3 data collection. The T3 and T4 analyses also included the appropriate construct to control for previous levels (at T1 and T2 respectively) of the risk-taking action.
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The results indicate that trust is a signicant predictor for some risk-taking behaviors, but not for others. Trust is not a signicant predictor of formalizing (T1 and T3), but the formalizing control variable was signicant at T3. In contrast, scoping was strongly related to trust at both T1 and T3, but the scoping control variable at T3 was insignicant. In predicting management actions, trust was strongly related to delegating, but not to monitoring. This result provides some evidence that some management and development risk-taking behaviors were a function of their trust in the other team.
The prediction of reciprocal trust

Hypothesis 3 embodies the concept of reciprocal trust, since it predicts that one teams actions will affect the other teams beliefs about the rst teams trustworthiness. To test this hypothesis, the relationships between Team As risk-taking behaviors and Team Bs perception of Team As ability, benevolence, and integrity perceptions were examined. For the T3 and T4 analyses, we again included constructs (ability, benevolence, and integrity at T1 and T2, respectively) to control for previous perceptions of trustworthiness. We tested whether developer risk-taking actions were related to managements perceptions of development team trustworthiness at T2 and T4. Formalizing was strongly related to benevolence and integrity perceptions at T2. Developer efforts at scoping were negatively related to integrity at T2, but only weakly related to integrity at T4. At T4, however, scoping was a signicant predictor of ability and benevolence. We note that for all the T4 analyses previous levels for the trustworthiness constructs were all highly signicant (p < 0.001), indicating that the previous levels of trustworthiness were the primary predictors. We also tested whether managements actions (RTRs) were related to the development teams perceptions of management team trustworthiness at T3. Delegation had a negative relationship with all three trustworthiness perceptions (ability, benevolence, and integrity), but the relationship with ability was especially strong. Monitoring had the strongest effect on benevolence, but had a strong negative relationship with all three trustworthiness constructs. The variables controlling for previous actions were again signicant, but were not as strong as the developer results at T3. Previous levels of integrity were marginally signicant, perhaps indicating that integrity is driven more by management behaviors (monitoring and delegating) than previous perceptions. These results indicate that the teams actions were related to its counterparts beliefs about trustworthiness, and therefore support Hypothesis 3.1
Discussion
This study makes three primary contributions to research on trust. First, this research answers the call to extend research on trust to the group level of analysis (Schoorman et al., 1996b). Interacting teams are a fact of organizational life and, given the important role that trust can play in organizational
1 We conducted non-parametric KomolgorovSmirnoff tests on all 45 variables in the study. None of the results was signicant, indicating that none of the distributions were signicantly non-normal. Of the 45 variables under study, only management benevolence at wave 4 had any signicant outliers. We removed the two outliers from this variable and reran the associated regressions. The regression coefcients remained relatively stable, although several of the signicance levels declined somewhat. Given that outliers were at issue in only 2 per cent of the studys variables and that the magnitude of the effects on the regressions involved was sporadic and modest, for consistency we opted to stay with the original data as reported by the teams without exclusion of the outliers.
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effectiveness, advances in the understanding of how trust can be built or eroded in the team environment should prove valuable to organizations and managers. This research proposes and nds support for the assertion that trust at the team level will act similarly in terms of its antecedents and consequences to trust at the interpersonal level, thus extending the Mayer et al. (1995) model of trust to the intergroup level of analysis. In addition, this research addresses the different ways that trust at the group level of analysis could be measured, and approaches the issue consistent with past research on groups that allowed individual respondents to assess their perceptions of the groups beliefs. Second, this research develops and tests several new measures of risk-taking behavior specic to interacting project teams, facilitating future research in this domain. Although these measures were studied using student teams, a condition that was necessary given the control we sought in this research, we believe that these constructs may be applicable outside of the educational environment. Both development and management team behaviors were shown to be related to trust. We also found that these behaviors had implications for how they were perceived by their counterpart team. Contextually appropriate measures of risk-taking behaviors are apparently an important tool for understanding the ongoing development of trust in any environment. This research highlights this fact, and provides four specic types of risk-taking behaviors that could be utilized in research in project management environments. Finally, and most signicantly, our results support our central proposition that changes in trust over time may occur as part of a cyclical (or reciprocal) process. The behavioral consequences (risk-related actions) of trust on the part of one team have consequences, since they appear to affect the second teams perceptions of the rst teams trustworthiness, and then subsequently the second teams own risk-related actions. This process continues for as long as the parties interact. Our tests for reciprocal trust were largely successful. In T2, T3, and T4, risk-taking actions were signicantly related to the other teams trustworthiness perceptions, which in turn affected trust and risk-taking behaviors. This pattern of action and reaction held true as management and development teams interacted throughout the duration of the project. Ultimately, no study can prove causality, and the current research is no exception. We do note, however, that the pattern of relationships among the variables is quite consistent with the proposed model despite the small sample size.
Practical implications
The importance of context (e.g., the stage of development of the team) was evident throughout this study. For the reciprocal trust results, for example, the development teams attempts to control project scope at T2 were negatively related to integrity. At the same time, actions that formalized the process were positively related to integrity and benevolence. Neither scoping nor formalizing was related to ability. Management teams apparently interpreted early efforts by the development team to structure the process as an indication that they cared about the management team and would complete the project as promised. At T4, however, formalizing actions were no longer related to trustworthiness, but scoping actions were signicantly related to all three trustworthiness dimensions. In contrast with T2, the negative relationship with ability was especially strong. These results indicate that by the end of the project developers attempts to reduce the size of the project may have been interpreted by management as excuses for a lack of competence. Thus, one teams interpretation of the other teams actions appears to depend on when the actions occurred during the projects evolution. These results underscore the previously discussed importance of tracking not only behaviors, as is common in game theory research, but also perceptions of the other party and trust. In another example, we expected that delegation by the management team would signal a level of trust in the developer team and would be positively received. Indeed, there was a strong positive
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relationship between the management teams trust in the developer teams and managements subsequent delegating behavior. The reaction of the development teams to the delegating was decidedly negative on their perceptions of the management teams trustworthiness, however, suggesting that delegation may have been interpreted by the developers as an abdication of responsibility on managements part rather than a demonstration of trust (Leana, 1986; Schriesheim, Neider, & Scandura, 1998). It would appear that the management teams needed to more carefully communicate the intentions behind their actions to make clear that the delegation was driven by their trust in the developers. Further research to tease out the effects of the context and communications between the teams on subsequent reactions is clearly needed.
Strengths, limitations, and conclusion

To increase the internal validity of this research we designed a study that had features of both laboratory and eld studies. Both designs have their relative advantages and disadvantages. Laboratory studies provide good control, but tend to lack the longer-term relationships and also the salient risk to the parties that are both important to study trust effectively. Conversely, eld settings provide these rich contextual factors, but tend to be open to alternative explanations due to the lack of control over extraneous inuences. The current research employed a controlled eld study that enabled random assignment to groups and control over many factors such as the difculty of the projects and the time allowed for project completion. At the same time, the study provided a task in which the teams were interdependent, had something of value at stake (a grade), and interacted over a considerable period of time (6 weeks). This research was conducted employing a student sample, which in many instances raises issues of generalizability. Previous research has argued, for example, that college students have a weak denition of self, have less established attitudes, and are more easily inuenced (Sears, 1986). Two factors may help reduce these generalizability concerns for our particular research. First, this research was conducted with senior-level undergraduates who were familiar with the task domain (systems analysis and design), who would be working in such an environment in the near future, and who had meaningful performance metrics (grades) directly tied to their project performance. Second, the primary purpose of this research was not to extrapolate our results to real project teams (where generalizability concerns might best be categorized as those involving external validity), but rather to study the evolution of reciprocal trust between teams, a phenomenon that we believe can reasonably be studied with student groups (Mook, 1983). Our sample size was also small (N 24), but not unusual for research involving teams. We encourage other studies to replicate our results with larger samples in different contexts. The longitudinal nature of our study provides insights that would not be possible with either a crosssectional or a traditional laboratory design. Not only did this research demonstrate that one way trust levels can change between teams (i.e., through an actionreaction cycle), but it also allowed us to examine how time can serve as a contextual variable, where actions may be interpreted differently depending on factors like the stage of a project. The number of signicant relationships in our model is particularly remarkable given the limited number of groups being observed (n 24 teams). Despite support for our model of reciprocal trust, it should be noted that reciprocal trust is not the same as a systematic evolution of trust, where trust continues to build or erode over time. Such systematic evolution may be inuenced by a number of other factors in addition to reciprocal trust, such as changes in the workplace or job structure, changes in personal needs, new information on trustees, and changes in other relationships that inuence the focus relationship. Thus, while reciprocity may be necessary for the systematic evolution of trust, it does not guarantee it. This study provides rare evidence of reciprocal trusta phenomenon that is difcult to observe given the complexities of gathering longitudinal observations in a reasonably controlled environment.
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These results indicate that reciprocal trust warrants additional study. Future research should explore how other contextual variables may inuence trust formation between interacting parties. As an example, while we focus on the effects of actions driving trust, other factorse.g., environmental factors might also be examined. In addition, studies which encompass group interaction characteristicssuch as the frequency and types of communications between membersmay also be informative. Factors such as power and status differences between the interacting parties may also play a signicant role on trust formation and change over time. Research on reciprocal trust may also benet from complementary theories such as attribution theorye.g., Ferrin and Dirks (2003) and Korsgaard, Brodt, and Whitener (2002)which may provide insights about how perceptions of trustworthiness are formed. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the extension of an interpersonal model of trust to the domain of interteam trust creates new opportunities for multilevel research, an important step for gaining a full theoretical understanding of trust in the future.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the editor and the three anonymous reviewers in helping us improve our manuscript. We also want to thank Philip Bobko and Rosalie Hall for their guidance on the statistical analysis. This work was funded by a research grant from the Lerner College of Business. Their support is also acknowledged and appreciated.
Author biographies
Mark A. Serva is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Accounting and MIS at the University of Delaware. His research is focused on trust in e-commerce environments, the use of technology to improve learning, virtual communities, and stereotype threat theory. His research has been published in DATABASE for Advances in Information Systems, Journal of Management Education, and IS Frontiers. Mark A. Fuller is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Information Systems at Washington State University. He received a PhD in Management Information Systems from the University of Arizona. His major research interests include virtual teamwork, technology-mediated learning, and consumer trust in e-commerce. Dr Fullers past research has appeared in outlets such as Information Systems Research, Group Decision and Negotiation, Decision Support Systems, DATABASE for Advances in Information Systems, the Journal of Information Systems Education, and the Journal of Management Education. He is the past editor for the journal Group Facilitation, and has served on the Editorial Boards of the Academy of Management Journal and the Academy of Management Learning and Education Journal. Roger C. Mayer is Professor and Chair of the Department of Management in the College of Business at the University of Akron. His research is focused on trust, employee decision making, attitudes and productivity. His research has been published in many top scholarly journals. He authored a theory of trust with James Davis and David Schoorman which was recently recognized with the Inuential Article Award 19951999 by the Conict Management Division of the Academy of Management. Mayer is a member of the Editorial Review Board of Academy of Management Journal and the advisory board
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for Annual EditionsOrganizational Behavior. He serves as a director for Marathon Development Group, Inc., and has served as an organizational consultant to numerous for-prot and not-for-prot organizations.
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Appendix
Only development team questions are listed. Management teams were asked the same questions, with the references changed accordingly (e.g., question 1 for the management team read, Our management team felt that the development team was very capable of performing its job).
Ability
Our development team felt that the management team was very capable of performing its job. Our development team had condence in the skills of the management team. Our development team believed that the management team was well qualied.
Benevolence
The management team really looked out for what was important to our development team. Our development teams needs and desires were very important to the management team. The management team went out of its way to help our development team.
Integrity
Our development team believed that the management team tried to be fair in dealings with others. The management team had a strong sense of justice. Our development team liked the values of the management team.
Trust
If our development team had its way, we wouldnt have let the management team have any inuence over issues that were important to us.
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Our development team would have been comfortable giving the management team a task or problem that was critical to us, even if we could not monitor the management teams actions. Our development team would have been willing to let the management team have complete control over our future in this company. Our development team really wished that we had a good way to keep an eye on the management team.
Mgmt RTR: Monitoring

Our management team closely monitored potential problems encountered by the development team. Our management team exerted extra effort in overseeing project progress. Our management team tried to keep a close eye on the development teams activities.
Mgmt RTR: Delegating

Our management team gave the developers substantial leeway in determining how they accomplished the nal deliverable of this project. Our management team gave the development team a great deal of autonomy on this project. Our management team allowed the development team to have control over the project.
Developer RTR: Formalizing

To prevent misunderstandings, our development team tried to document communication with the management team as much as possible. Our development team instituted specic procedures for communication between the development team and the management team.
Developer RTR: Scoping

Our development team took extensive steps to prevent the project from increasing in scope. Our development team took preventive measures to keep the management team from changing project deliverables once the project was underway.
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Journal of Organizational Behavior J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005) Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/job.

The reciprocal nature of trust: a longitudinal study of interacting teams

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 17 July 2003 Revised 12 November 2004 Accepted 8 March 2005

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Team A Perceives Team B to be Trustworthy (Trustworthiness)

Team A Trusts Team B (Trust)

Team A Takes a Risk (Risk-taking in Relationship)

Team B Takes a Risk (Risk-taking in Relationship)

Team B Trusts Team A (Trust)

Team B Perceives Team A to be Trustworthy (Trustworthiness)

Trustworthiness: Developers Perceptions of Mgmt Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity

Development Teams Trust in the Management Team

Trustworthiness: Mgmts Perceptions of Developer Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity

Management Teams Trust in the Development Team

Trustworthiness: Developers Perceptions of Mgmt Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity

Development Teams Trust in the Management Team

Trustworthiness: Mgmts Perceptions of Developer Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity

Management Teams Trust in the Development Team

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Study Overview and Hypotheses

Risk-taking in relationship hypothesis

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Reciprocal trust hypothesis

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

1 3.62 0.61 (0.96)

Formalizing 5 3.70 0.33 0.10

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

6 3.20 0.38 0.31

Delegating 11 3.23 0.47 0.02

Monitoring 12 3.42 0.44

Formalizing 17 3.84 0.44 0.09

18 3.39 0.50 0.34

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

KMO 0.59 Bartletts 2(6) 34.38 p < 0.001

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)

The prediction of trust

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Development teams trust in the management team Trust

Trustworthiness of development team Ability Benevolence Integrity

Management RTRs Monitoring Delegating

The prediction of risk-taking behaviors

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

The prediction of reciprocal trust

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Strengths, limitations, and conclusion

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Organiz. Behav. 26, 625648 (2005)

THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST

Mgmt RTR: Monitoring

Mgmt RTR: Delegating

Developer RTR: Formalizing

Developer RTR: Scoping

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KMO 0.59 Bartletts 2(6) 34.38 p < 0.001