VILLAROSA V.

BENITO Facts: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named inSection 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager Held: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. GALURA vs. MATH ARGO FACTS: Spouses Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers from Math-Agro Corporation (MAC). The Spouses Galura paid MAC P72,500. Despite several demands, they failed to pay the P353,500 unpaid balance. MAC engaged the services of a certain Atty. Pasamba for the purpose of collecting the unpaid balance from the Spouses Galura. A demand letter was sent to spouses Galura wherein it stated that they were giving them 5 days upon receipt of the letter, to pay the unpaid balance plus interest; that failure to pay would result in an action in court.

Because of non-payment after demand was made, MAC filed a complaint with the RTC praying that the court would order spouses Galura to settle the balance plus attorneys fee and litigation expenses. In their complaint, MAC provided for their address where summons may be served to them. Clerk of Court Ortega issued the summons.

1st SERVICE: went to 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights , Quezon City where he was informed that the Spouses Galura were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City .

2nd SERVICE: went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona , Tarlac to serve the summons, however he learned that the property had been foreclosed and that the Spouses Galura no longer resided there.

3rd SERVICE: went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City , to serve the summons. Sildo served the summons on Teresa L. Galuras sister, Victoria Lapuz.

The Spouses Galura failed to file their answer. RTC declared them in default and allowed MAC to present its evidence ex parte.

RTC ruled in favor of MAC and ordered the Spouses Galura to pay the unpaid balance, attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation. Subsequently, RTC issued a writ of execution to implement its Decision.

Thereafter, Spouses Galura received from their parents-in-law a copy of the 10 November 2004 Order. Spouses Galura filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and final order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, claiming that the RTCs Decision and Order were void beacuse the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of summons was invalid, and there was

extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe that it would not file a case against them - MAC, despite the commitment of its owner not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the part of Math-Agro and its owner constitutes extrinsic fraud, as it prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action lodged with the RTC.

common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.

CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that there was a valid substituted service of summons, that the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that the Spouses Galura should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief. The Spouses Galura filed a MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition.

In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the Spouses Galura. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura, and thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTCs Decision and Order.

ISSUES: 1. Was there a valid substituted service of summons? NONE.

2. Should have they availed first of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief? NO.

2. When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of his or her own.

HELD:

1. Sildo, in his Rertun, did not state that his attempts to serve the summons by personal service at the Tierra Pura Subdivision address failed, and that the same could not be made within a reasonable time. He likewise failed to state facts and circumstances showing why personal service of the summons upon the petitioners at the said address was impossible. Finally, he also failed to state that Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with whom he left the summons, was a person of sufficient age and discretion, and residing in the said Tierra Pura address.

In a case where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order an any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY The requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service. In Sandoval, the Court held that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. FACTS: Spouses Tijam filed a civil case for recovery of a sum of money and corresponding interests against Sopuses Sibonghanoy in the CFI of Cebu. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Defendants after being duly served with summons filed an answer with a counterclaim. CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. A writ of execution was issued against defendants, however it was unsatisfied. Spouses Tijam then moved for a writ of execution against the Surety, but the Surety opposed on the ground that no prior demand was made and that there was failure to prosecute. CFI denied this motion on the ground that no previous demand had been made on the Surety. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. Surety motioned for extension to filed an answer, which was granted. However,

The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service in the Return. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of the

upon its failure to file such answer, CFI granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued. Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing, but CFI denied the motion. Surety appealed to the CA, which affirmed the orders appealed from. It then filed a motion asking for extension to file a MR, which was granted, but instead of filing a MR it filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case as in false under the jurisdiction of the Inferior Courts as per RA 296. CA required Spouses Tijan to answer the motion to dismiss but failed to do so. CA then resolved to set aside its decision and certified the case to SC. ISSUE: Does failure to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for a considerable length of time bar a motion to dismiss the case? YES. HELD: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment

creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

PPA vs. GOTHONG FACTS: Veterans Shipping Corporations lease over the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor expired on December 31, 2000, because of this WG&A requested PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the facility. President Estrada issued a memorandum approving the request. A contract of lease was executed with the following terms: (1) duration is from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that PPA turns over its operation to the winning bidder for the North Harbor modernization; (2) payment of monthly rentals of P12.15 per square meter or an aggregate monthly rental amount of P886,950.00; (3) all structures/improvements introduced in the leased premises shall be turned over to PPA; (4) Water, electricity, telephone and other utility expenses shall be for the account of WG&A; (5) Real Estate tax/insurance and other government dues and charges shall be borne by WG&A. On November 12, 2001 PPA sent a letter to WG&A directing it to vacate the premises and to turnover the improvements made therein. WG&A requested for reconsideration, but it was denied. FIRST COMPLAINT: Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO. 1ST AMENDMENT: Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO plus second cause of action - estopped from denying that the correct period of lease and additional relief if they should be forced to vacate the facility they are entitled to be refunded of the value of the improvements it introduced in the leased property. PPA submitted its answer. Meanwhile, the TRO sought was denied. WG&A moved for the reconsideration, subsequently filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint 2nd AMENDMENT: Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of Contract plus additional relief of reformation of the contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent of the contracting parties. PPA opposed this second amendment - reformation sought for constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will substantially alter the cause of action and theory of the case.

RTC denied admission of second amendment. WG&A filed a motion MR but was denied. WG&A then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was granted. CA directed RTC to admit second amended complaint. PPA file a MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

SWAGMAN HOTELS vs. CA FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty. Infante and ] Hegerty, its president and vicepresident, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In 1998, Christian informed the Swagman Hotels that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests. In 1999, Christian filed with the RTC of Baguio a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. Alleging that:Petitioner obtained loans from him, total amount of US$150,000 payable after three years, with an interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or every three months. However, starting January 1998 until December 1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per annum. Thus, Christian prayed that the trial court order them to pay him jointly and solidarily the total amount, the unpaid interests, moral damages; attorneys fees; and the cost of the suit. The petitioners filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations. The petitioner and its co-defendants then prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that Christian be ordered to pay moral damages; exemplary damages; and attorneys fees. RTC declared the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the loans had been reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then ordered the petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of $100,000 representing the principal obligation covered by the promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, plus interest of 6% per month thereon until fully paid, with all interest payments already paid by the defendant to the plaintiff to be deducted therefrom. RTC held that when the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date however, the first and the second promissory notes have already matured. Hence, payment is already due. It held that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable. Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, holding that in the case at bench, while it is true that appellant Swagman raised in its Answer the issue of prematurity in the filing of the complaint, appellant Swagman nonetheless failed to object to appellee Christians presentation of evidence to the effect that the promissory notes have become due and demandable. The

ISSUE: Should the second amended complaint be admitted? YES.

HELD: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion denying the admission of second amended complaint. By applying the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court almost five years after its amendment patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

OLD SECTION 3, RULE 10: Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. After the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. NEW SECTION 3, RULE 10: SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

afore-quoted rule allows a complaint which states no cause of action to be cured either by evidence presented without objection or, in the event of an objection sustained by the court, by an amendment of the complaint with leave of court A motion for consideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Does Section 5, Rule 10 allows a complaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without objection during the trial? NO. HELD: Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial. However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible. Contrary to the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the defect of lack of cause of action at the commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.

Cagayan de Oro belonging to the Imperial Development Corp. into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati . In 1998, Imperial Development Corp. filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Villarosa before the RTC of Makati allegedly for failure to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the Villarosa, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Imperial filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for failure to file an Answer despite its receipt of the summons and the complaint. Villarosa filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. RTC issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. RTC stated that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch manager, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Villarosa filed a MR alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. This was however denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Did RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager? NO. HELD: NEW Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. OLD Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that: Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered,

VILLAROSA vs. BENITO FACTS: Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St. , Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive , Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa and Imperial Development Corp. executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the Villarosa agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen,

service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. (emphasis supplied). The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus: . . . the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to "be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors." The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word "agent" of the corporation. It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,25 the Court held: A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . . The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, "to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action." . . . . The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firm's principal office. Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned. The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper

service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.

SANTOS vs. PNOC FACTS: On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.

Personal service of summons to Santos failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on PNOCs motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. PNOC caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines , on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, PNOC submitted the affidavit of publication and an affidavit to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to Santos last known address.

When Santos failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, PNOC moved that the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex partewhich was granted.

On October 28, 2003, Santos filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by PNOC failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. However, RTC denied his motion and held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address.

Santos filed a petition for certiorari in the CA contending that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. During the pendency of the petition in the CA, the RTC rendered its decision in the civil case ordering Santos to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit. CA on the other hand sustained the decision of the RTC. It also denied Santos MR. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1.

Was there proper service of summons? YES.

2. Does the rules on service of summon by publication apply only to actions in rem? NO. 3. Was there a defect in the affidavit of complementary service having been executed by PNOCs messenger and not the Clerk of Court? NONE.

Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

HELD:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

1. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides: Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Adm SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.

SOLIVEN vs. FAST FORMS FACTS: Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for sum of money with damages against Fastforms Philippines, Inc. Soliven alleges that Fastforms through its president Dr. Escobar, obtained a loan from her amounting to P170,000.00 payable in a period of 21 days, with a 3% interest. This loan was evidence by a promissory note executed by Dr. Escobar. Respondent issued a postdated check but advised petitioner not to deposit the check as the account from where it was drawn has insufficient funds. Respondent proposed to petitioner that the P175,000.00 be "rolled-over," with a monthly interest of 5% (or P8,755.00). Petitioner agreed to the proposal. Respondent then issued several checks as payment for interests but, despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent refused to pay its principal obligation and interests due. Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim, denied that it obtained a loan from petitioner; and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Escobar, to secure any loan from petitioner or issue various checks as payment for interests. RTC rendered its decision in favor or Soliveb and ordered Fastforms to pay their obligation. Respondent then filed a MR questioning for the first time the trial courts jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioners principal demand (P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the MTC. Soliven opposed the MR, stressing that respondent is barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the latters jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial. RTC denied the MR, ruling the totality of the claim therein exceeds P200,000.00 and that under the principle of estoppel, respondent has lost its right to question its jurisdiction. On appeal, CA reversed the trial courts Decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.

2. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.

This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

3. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC? NO. HELD: While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse it Attached Answer. This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner RTC RAPID CITY VS. VILLA

Motion todeclare them in default, which the trial court againgranted..So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion forreconsideration of the second order declaring them indefault and to vacate proceedings, this time claimingthat the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over theirpersons due to invalid service of summons.The trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion byOrder and proceeded to receiveex-parte evidence forpetitioner.Petitioner s motion for reconsideration having beendenied by the appellate court by Resolution of August12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for reviewon certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, infiling the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default,voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over thepersons of the defendants [respondents].RULING: YES The petition is impressed with merit.It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons,the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter s voluntaryappearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20.V oluntary appearance . The defendant svoluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalentto service of summons. The inclusion in a motion todismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdictionover the person shall not be deemed a voluntaryappearance.And Phili ppine Commercial International Bank v.Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civilcase is acquired either by the coercive power of legalprocesses exerted over his person, or his voluntaryappearance in court. As a general proposition, one whoseeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submittedto the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of thisrule that we have had occasion to declare that the filingof motions to admit answer, for additional time to fileanswer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, andto lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,is considered voluntary submission to the court s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the conceptof conditional appearance, such that a party who makesa special appearance to challenge, among others, thecourt s jurisdiction over his person cannot beconsidered to have submitted to its authority.Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:(1) Special appearance operates as an exceptionto the general rule on voluntary appearance;(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendantmust be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in anunequivocal manner; and(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntarysubmission to the jurisdiction of the court,especially in instances where a pleading ormotion seeking affirmative relief is filed andsubmitted to the court for resolution. Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that theirfiling thereof was a special appearance for the purposeonly to question the jurisdiction over their persons.Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of thecourt.

FACTS: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and DevelopmentCorporation (petitioner) filed a complaint fordeclaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamusand damages against several defendants includingSpouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, court process server resorted to substitutedservice by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names.Despite substituted service, respondents failed to filetheir Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion toDeclare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default"which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.More than eight months thereafter respondents filed aMotion to Lift Order of Default,claiming that onJanuary 27, 2006 they "officially receivedall pertinentpapers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they denied the existence of two women helpers whoallegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended thatassuming that the allegation were true, the helpers hadno authority to receive the documents.

By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Defaultand gave herein respondents five days to file theirAnswer. Respondents just the same did not file anAnswer, drawing petitioner to again file a

FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESJULY 14, 2008NACHURA, J.SUBJECT AREA: Estoppel by laches NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. TheRTC found hi m guil ty. I n hi s appeal before the CA, the peti ti oner, for the fi rst ti me, questi oned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA i n affi rming the deci sion of the RT C, rul ed that the pri nciple of estoppel by l aches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 y e a r s w i t h t h e p e t i t i o n e r a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i pati ng therei n and wi thout hi m ever rai si ng the jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be rai sed at any ti me even for the fi rst ti me on appeal . As undue del ay i s further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON peti ti oners failure to rai se the i ssue of juri sdi cti on duri ng the trial of thi s case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding thefact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA HELD: No. RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that i s,l ack of juri sdi cti on must have been rai sed so bel atedl y as to w arrant th e presumpti on that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the recei pt of the Court of Appeal s resoluti on fi ndi ng her guil ty of contempt,promptl y filed a M otion for Reconsi derati on assailing the sai d courts juri sdi cti on based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive toshow cause

why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringt h a t h e r a i s e d the lack thereof in his appeal before the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . A t t h a t t i m e , n o considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.