Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S.

436 (1966) Facts: This case actually deals with four separate cases: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v . New Yor , Westover v. U.S., and California v. Stewart. In each of these four c ases, officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney questioned the defendants, who were in custody, in a room where they were cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants were given full and effective warnings of their rights be fore the interrogation began. All four cases resulted in oral confessions. Ernesto Miranda was arrested for idnapping and rape. He was identified by the c omplainant and ta en to Interrogation Room No. 2. He was subsequently questioned by two police officers without being advised that he had the right to have an a ttorney present. After two hours the police obtained a written confession signed by Miranda. Procedure: At trial, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection o f Miranda's attorney. The jury found Miranda guilty of idnapping and rape. He w as sentenced to 20 to 30 years on each count. Miranda appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which held that Miranda's rights were not violate d in obtaining the confession and his conviction was affirmed. Issue: Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without informing them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate t he Fifth Amendment? Holding: Yes. Prosecutors may not use statements obtained during a custodial interrogatio n of defendants unless they can demonstrate that the defendants were given proce dural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Reasoning: The prosecution cannot use statements, exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from "custodial interrogation" of the defendant unless it is shown that procedural s afeguards have been applied to protect persons against self-incrimination. Custo dial interrogation means questioning someone after a person has been ta en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. To protect one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination the follow ing warnings must be given: (i) that defendant has a right to remain silent, (ii ) that anything defendant says may be used against him in a court of law; (iii) that defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (iv) that if de fendant cannot afford an attorney, he has the right to have one appointed. The p rivilege against self-incrimination applies only to interrogation initiated by t he police. It does not matter whether the defendant nows of his rights or not; the police must still warn him. The object of these procedural safeguards is to insure that the person ma es use of his privilege against self-incrimination based on real understanding and nowledge of the consequences of what he chooses to do. Waiver of the privilege may not be presumed from silence after a defendant has b een warned of his rights. (1) The defendant must expressly articulate a waiver. (2) Police cannot tric the defendant into a waiver. (3) The defendant can withdraw a waiver once given. (a) The defendant's privilege is a continuous one; once it has been relinquished it can be reasserted at any time. (b) At any point that a defendant as s for counsel, the questioning must stop un til the defendant's lawyer arrives. (4) It is unconstitutional to persuade a defendant not to withdraw his waiver. (5) If the interrogation continues without the presence of counsel, a heavy burd

en rests on the state to show that the defendant nowingly and intelligently wai ved his rights to counsel and to remain silent. There can be no admissions by silence when the defendant is in custody. Dissents: The majority's arbitrary Fifth Amendment rule is unnecessary and its effect unpr edictable (Clar , J.). The new rule does not protect against police brutality or other overt coercion; it merely discourages any confession at all. Miranda himself confessed in a shor t time without any force, threats, or promises. The new rule is not supported by history or the language of the Fifth Amendment itself. The Court has simply mad e new law and policy without an adequate empirical basis (Harlan, Stewart, White , JJ.).