ida Banez vs.

Gabriel Banez Facts: the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, decreed the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets. Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996. She filed a motion for execution pending appeal. RTC granted the petitioners motion for execution of decision pending appeal. In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 1997, the appellate court rendered its decision setting aside the motion for execution pending appeal. In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15, 1997 the entire case records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners-appellant. In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed on November 27, 1997, and for failing to pay the required docket fee within the prescribed period under Rule 41, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appeal instituted by the petitioner Aida P. Baez is hereby DISMISSED. Issue: whether execution of judgment pending appeal was justified. 1st issue As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity. In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.

2nd issue Is an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed? We do not think so.

Petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,] is required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we should direct the appellate court to return the records of the case to the RTC of Cebu. Thereafter, according to her, respondent should file his record on appeal for approval and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the alternative, she prays that the appellate court retain only the pleadings and evidence necessary to resolve respondents appeal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case records to the RTC. Held :

In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held: Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence. PETITIONS DENIED

FERNANDO FAJARDO vs. Sheriff RODOLFO V. QUITALIG Facts: Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in entitled Spouses Fernando Fajardo and Evangeline Perez vs. Maria Datuin, alleged that the complaint for ejectment which they was finally decided on July 29, 1999 against the defendant Courtt issued a Writ of Execution which was brought by the respondent Sheriff to the defendant Datuin on March 9, 2000. Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was served, defendant asked for a period of two (2) weeks for her to remove her personal properties on the land. After two (2) weeks he went to Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be implemented but he was told that a restraining order was issued, but when he asked for it, the respondent told him that he left it in the office. On March 24, 2000, he and his lawyer went to the court to verify whether a restraining order has really been issued but they found out that there was none; so he told the respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of Execution is to be implemented

at 10:00 that morning but when they reached the place, respondent did not do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her personal properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ of execution can no longer be implemented. Respondent denied the charge. He asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. The OCA found respondent to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as asheriffrecommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000. Ruling: The court agrees with the OCAs findings and recommendation. A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules provides the manner in which the execution is to be implemented Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000. Nonetheless, because of the request of the defendant and her promise that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000, he allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24, 2000, he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC of San Carlos, Pangasinan. The respondent is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the Reports.

Carolyn Clarin EDGAR Y. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, after the votes were counted and canvassed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a judgement declaring and proclaiming protestant/petitioner Edgar Y. Santos as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on petitioners motion, respondent filed on April 22, 2002 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the trial court.2 Likewise on April 22, 2002, respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the COMELEC. COMELEC dismissed the petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the TC on lack of merit. The RTC granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal. After petitioner posted the required bond, the trial court issued the Writ of Execution,5 thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Accordingly, petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter assumed the duties and functions of his office.

 The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition with the RTC, assailing the order of execution pending appeal that was granted to petitioner. Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while his motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition in RTC were pending, respondent filed another petition with the COMELEC.9 The petition contained the same prayer as that in the supplemental petition. COMELEC granted the private respondents motion for reconsideration and set aside the RTCs order of execution pending appeal. Whether or not it was proper for COMELEC to set aside TCs order of execution pending appeal? HELD: NO. First, COMELEC should have dismissed the case outright. The private respondent is guilty of forum shopping. Forumshopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and while the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. There is clearly forum shopping in this case. Second, The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The private respondent failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion. COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree. While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC22 that: A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending. The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people. Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail.

Rcbc vs Magwin Marketing G.R. No. 152878. May 5, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial. For about six (6) months thereafter, discussions between petitioner and respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99518, were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation. Petitioner approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation which was communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin Marketing

Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof.[8] Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the restructuring.[ Subsequently, RTC of Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner as plaintiff therein to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time x x x., stating: Acting on plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 20 July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute, it appearing that there was already conformity to the restructuring of defendants indebtedness with plaintiff by defendant Nelson Tiu, President of defendant corporation per Manifestation and Motion filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probabil ity of settlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July 2000 is hereby set aside. Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromis e agreement within 15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of paymen t of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case. Petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging that [t]o date, only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000 letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff [herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and conditions specified in said letter. But the same was denied by the court for failure to reach an agreement with the others defendant within the specified time. The petitioner filed an appeal with CA and the court affirmed the lower courts decision. The petitioner contends that the court a quo had no authority to compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-trial conference on the ground that no compromise agreement was turned over to the court a quo. The lower court was incorrect in the inclusion of the following statement: Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromis e agreement within 15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of paymen t of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct? HELD: Yes. The petition of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation is meritorious. The Court sees no reason why RTC-Br. 135 of Makati City should stop short of hearing the civil case on the merits. There is no substantial policy worth pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it has already discharged this obligation simultaneously with the filing of the complaint for collection of a sum of money. The procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to which the original case pertained.[25] A complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings with the concomitant full attention of the same trial court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and control over the case that was previously dismissed,[26] which in the context of the instant case is a waste of judicial time, capital and energy. In Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[28] a similar directive, i.e., [t]he parties are given a period of fifteen (15) days from today within which to submit a Compromise Agreement, was held to mean that should the parties fail in their negotiations the proceedings would continue from where they left off.Goldloop Properties, Inc. further said that its order, or a specie of it, did not constitute an agreement or even an expectation of the parties that should they fail to settle their differences within the stipulated number of days their case would be dismissed.

PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR. and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS, respondents. The Facts Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region.

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary Cal at DOTC. Without acting on respondents request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order. On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit. On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial court was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.[1][6] On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit until further orders by the trial court. For petitioners continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of 26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. With the filing of the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted respondents motion for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. Subsequently, Solicitor Restituto Tuando, Jr. who was handling the case was appointed Regional Trial Court judge of Dumaguete City. The case was re-assigned to Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Resolution became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition. Acting on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution on 22 September 1997. On 3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting on 23 February 1998 the sale of petitioners real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83030. On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel,[2][10] filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial courts decision never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the trial courts order granting respondents motion for execution. Petitioner further asserted that the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-96-0090[3][11] superseded the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.

Hence, the instant petition. Issues: 1. THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DATED JULY 11, 1996 IS VOID FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND COULD NOT HAVE BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. 2. Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable. On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds petitioner. The Court of Appeals admonished petitioner for his failure to ascertain periodically from the OSG or from the Court of Appeals the status of his appeal. The appellate court cited Reyes v. Court of Appeals ,[4][14] which held that it is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to his counsel on matters concerning his case. A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to apprise himself of the progress of the case. A lawyers negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer the consequences of such negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no proof that the OSG failed to inform petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal. The Ombudsmans Resolution Does Not Render the Execution of the Trial Courts Decision Unjust and Inequitable Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable. Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.[5][27] True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[6][28] This, however, is not the case here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial courts decision became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court. Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action. The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable. WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Spouses JAIME and PURIFICACION MORTA, complainants vs. Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and Sheriff DANILO O. MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao, Albay, Respondents. FACTS: Sometime in March 1994, petitioners were plaintiffs in Civil Cases 481 & 482 in which the MTC ordered in their favor that they should not be disturbed in the peaceful possession of the subject lot as well as payment for damages brought by the destruction of their plants. Defendants appealed. RTC: dismissed the aforesaid cases on the ground that the claims for damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). CA:

Affirmed RTCs decision SC: (1ST DIVISION) FOR PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI Set aside RTC & CAs decision and affirmed that of MTCs. Herein petitioners, spouses Morta filed an administrative complaint against respondents, Judge Bagagnan (MTC, Guinobatan, Albay) for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and delay, while, Sheriff Danilo Matias for gross ignorance of the law, negligence and connivance with the defendants in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482. Petitioners contended that despite the SCs decision had been final & executory, the respondent Judge failed to; a) act on the motion to find Jaime Occidental (defendant) in contempt b) to grant the Motion for execution. Respondent judge explained that he had denied complainants Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by this Court on June 10, 1999, they (Morta Spouses) had already been ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil Case No. 1920, which became final and executory. Also, Respondent judge never resolved the Motion, filed on June 6, 2000 , to cite Defendant Occidental for contempt due to absence of The Sheriffs Return of Service of the Writ of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1920 which would have clarified whether or not Occidental had already been fully restored in possession. The reason of Sheriffs delay was due to heavy workload. ISSUE: WON, EXECUTION ON FINAL JUDGMENT MAY BE REFUSED? ISSUE 2: WON, RESPONDENTS ARE NEGLIGENT? HELD: No. Respondent Judge was held guilty of undue delay and Sheriff Matias was for simple neglect of duty. Respondent Judge was correct for denying the Motion. Records showed that they( Morta Spouses) had indeed been evicted from the lots they were claiming when Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1999 . IN WHICH, the execu tion of a final judgment may be refused, as in this case, when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that would make its execution inequitable. A decision that is left unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because of the sheriffs inefficiency or negligence remains an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. For this reason, any inordinate delay in the execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be countenanced by the Court. There is no mistaking the mandatory character of the period prescribed under Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Return of a Writ of Execution, which reads: SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

SPOUSES ARTURO AND NICETA SERRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF EMILIO S. GELI,respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45573 setting aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-24790 with motion of herein petitioners, Spouses Arturo and Niceta Serrano, for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. FACTS: On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as vendors, and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as vendees, executed a deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon for the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property, the balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses Geli thereafter

took possession of the property. In the meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was survived by her husband Emilio Geli and their children. However, the GSIS filed a complaint against Emilio Geli and his children for failure to settle the account due to GSIS. The TC ordered the rescission of the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage. Emilio Geli appealed the decision with the CA. Pending appeal, the subject property was sold in a public auction in which the GSIS was the highest bidder. Emilio paid the redemption price on 10/30/87 and 11/3/87, two receipts were issued for a total of P67,701.84 with a notation amounts paid were for the account of Arturo Serrano and on 2/22/88, GSIS executed a certificate of redemption and turned over the title of the subject property to Emilio. Emilio did not inform the Serrano spouses and the CA of its redemption of the said property. Meanwhile, the CA dismissed the appeal for failure of Emilio to pay the correct docket fees despite notices from the former. Since no MR was filed, the resolution became final and executory. Entry of judgment was issued and records of the case were remanded to the lower court. On 1/14/94, Serrano spouses filed a motion for the execution of the trial courts September 6, 1984 Decision. On 2/15/94, the trial court issued an order granting the motion and forthwith issued a writ of execution. On 9/6/96, Emilio Geli filed a motion to quash writ of execution, claiming that he had already redeemed the subject property in 1988 and that such redemption constitute a supervening event that would make the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and equitable. His motion to quash was denied. On 10/10/97, the heirs of Emilio Geli filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition on the order of the TC granting the writ of execution. The CA granted the petition. It ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987 while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said redemption was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the trial court against them unjust and inequitable. ISSUE: WON, REDEMPTION CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH CHANGE THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THUS RENDERING EXECUTION INEQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES. HELD: In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made while the appeal of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the RTC was pending. The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory. It behooved the said respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where they should have invoked the payment of the redemption price as a ground for the reversal of the trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners. Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite docket fees for their appeal, which resulted in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of the trial court to become final and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be frustrated by the respondents payment, through Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in 1987. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and executory. The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts. It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.