Paredes and Chilagan vs. Executive Secretary, et. al. GR 55628 03/02/1984 Ponente: Fernando, C.J.

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Pambansa #86 and Presidential Proclamation # 2034, COMELEC was charged with the implementation of a plesbiscite to be held in certain barangays within the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao Province to to determine whether the said Barangays shall become a new municipality to be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao. Petitioners allege that BP 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. ISSUE: WON, all inhabitants of Mayoyao, and not just those to be separated, should be included in the plebiscite? RULING: The Court rules in the negative, Petition is dismissed. It is a settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one upholding constitutionality, and the other upholding unconstitutionality, the former must be preferred. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. And this is supported by the Constitution promoting the autonomy of local units, especially the smallest unit, the barangay. And when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality, they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. If is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will.

Tan vs. COMELEC GR 73155 07/11/1986 Ponente: Alampay, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to BP 885, an act creating a new province in the island of Negros to be called Negros del Norte. Section 3 of BP 885 provides: No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional and not in accord with the LGC because: 1) Only those living in the terri tory of the new province were included in the plebiscite and 2) The area of the new province (2,856.56 sq.km.) is less than the required area mandated by the LGC. ISSUE: WON, the plebiscite held was legal and complied with the Constitutional Requirement that states: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. RULING: The court rules in the negative. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable: when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, support the points raised by the petitioners.

Ermita-Malate Hotel, et.al. vs. City Mayor of Manila GR L-24693 07/31/1967 Ponente: Fernando, J.

FACTS: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance # 4760, with the following provisions questioned of its alleged violation of the due process clause: 1) refraining from accepting any customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; 2) prohibiting admission to customers below 18 years old; 3) usurious increase of license fees to P4,500(150%) and P6,000(200%); 4) prohibiting the leasing of any room for more than twice a day, and 5) cancellation of license for subsequent violation. ISSUE: WON, the ordinance is unconstitutional. RULING: The court rules in the negative. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute. An ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and general welfare. Taxation may be made to implement the states police power, and the amount, object, and in stance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. The broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.

Magtajas vs Pryce & PAGCOR GR 111097 07/20/1994 Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS: In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its casino operations in Cagayan de Oro City. Most inhabitants of the city opposed i t. To this end, the local legislative body enacted Ordinances 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permits to any establishment for the operation of casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare. Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that both violated P.D. 1869, which permits the operation of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR. ISSUE: WON, the ordinances are valid. RULING: The Court rules in the negative. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. CDOC is vested with the police power under the General Welfare Clause; however, it is still only an agent of the national government; the former only exercises delegated legislative powers conferred to them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. PD 1869 has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

Aquilino Pimentel Jr. vs. Alexander Aguirre GR 132988 07/19/2000 Ponente: Panganiban, J.

FACTS: On December 27, 1997, the President issued Administrative Order 372 directing all government department and agencies, including state universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs to reduce total expenditures for the FY 1998 by 25%, and 10% from their internal revenue allotment shall be withheld from LGUs pending the assessment and evaluation of DBM, as a response to the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation. Petitioners are seeking to annul sections 1 and 4 of AO 372. ISSUES: WON Sections 1 and 4 are valid. RULING: The petition is partially granted. Section 1 is upheld on the contention that it is merely advisory, not mandatory; consistent with the Presidents power of general supervision. However, Section 4 is invalid as it contravenes the Constitutional mandate of automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. Section 6 of Article 10 provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Additionally, Article 286 of the Local Government Code provides: The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Section 4 clearly contravenes the constitution and the law. Any retention is prohibited. In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.

Juan Frivaldo vs. COMELEC & Raul Lee GR 120295 06/28/1996 Ponente: Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Rogelio Torayno et.al. vs. COMELEC and Vicente Emano GR 137329 08/09/2000 Ponente: Panganiban, J.

FACTS: During the 1995 elections, Emano ran for and was elected for the third consecutive time as Provincial Governor of Misamis Oriental. In his certificate of candidacy, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. In January 1997, Emano secured his Community Tax Certificate, declaring therein his residence to be at Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, CDOC. On June 1997, while still governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a voter registration record in the city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence and subsequently filed his candidacy for Mayor on March 1998. Emano won the elections and was proclaimed as Mayor. Petitioners herein are seeking his disqualification on the ground that he failed to meet the 1-year residency requirement. ISSUES: WON, Vicente Emano should be disqualified. RULING: The court rules in the negative. Section 39 of the LGC provides: Qualifications - An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. Such provision is to prevent the possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community. In the case at bar, private respondent and his family had actually been residing in the city in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during his tenure as provincial governor, he physically lived in that city. Furthermore, the provincial capital is located in the city, and as such, provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. The actual, physical and personal presence of private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. For all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.