Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries

Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries Author(s): Gary Goertz, Bradford Jones, Paul F.
Diehl Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Oct., 2005), pp. 742-769 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045151 Accessed: 04/09/2010 17:33
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Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries

GARY GOERTZ BRADFORD JONES
Departmentof Political Science Universityof Arizona
PAULF. DIEHL
Departmentof Political Science Universityof Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
This articleasks a new question:what are the processes thatmaintainrivalries?The authorsarguethat rivalriesaremaintained ones. Theyfocus on through failureof realiststrategiesandconflictmanagement the stalemateoutcomes as both a signal thatmilitarizedstrategiesfor dealingwith conflict have not succeeded and as reasons for the countriesto continue the rivalry.They explore the process of rivalrymaintenance, largely from the perspectiveof the punctuated equilibriummodel of rivalries,and examine 1,166 rivalries acrossthe periodfrom 1816 to 1992. Theycontrasttheirapproach with thatof the "repeated conflicts"literaconflict. The authorsfind thatthe ture,which only examinesthe impactof the previousdisputeon recurring They also find most recentconflict does matter,andthe longertermhistoryof the rivalryis moreimportant. that the impactsof variousfactors(e.g., democracy)change over the course of the rivalry. Keywords: rivalry;stalemate;punctuatedequilibrium;recurringconflict
Throughout the 1980s, the United States providedsignificantsupportto Iraqin its war with Iran.This relationshipchangedradicallyandquickly with the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait.The United Statesandits allies won a decisive victoryin the firstGulf War. Yet this was not the end of the U.S.-Iraq rivalry.During the next fifteen years, the United StatesandIraqwere engagedin a numberof militarizeddisputesthatended in stalemates. The punctuatedequilibrium framework (Diehl and Goertz 2000) for radicalchanges takingplace understanding rivalriessuggestsjust this sort of pattern: in shortperiods of time and long sequences of indecisive outcomes. rivalrieshas become prominent As the study of enduringand other international the over the past decade, much of the attentionhas been devotedto understanding terminationof those competitions(e.g., Colaresi 2001; Bennett 1998), perhapsstimulatedby the end of the cold war.Some workshave also begunto addressthe origins of
in AUTHORS'NOTE:This researchis supported, part,by a grantfromthe NationalScience Foundation (SES-0004279). We thankPaul Hensel andBrandonValerianofor comments.All replicationmaterialsare availableat http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. JOURNAL CONFLICT OF 2005 Vol. RESOLUTION, 49 No. 5, October 742-769 DOI:10.1177/0022002705279375
2005 Sage Publications
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2003; StinnettandDiehl 2001; Maoz andMor2002). Yetconrivalries(e.g., Valeriano siderablyless attentionhas been focused on what happensin between those two endpoints. Specifically,little researchhas been done on rivalrymaintenanceprocesses or the conditionsthatkeep rivalriesgoing. Morethanthree-fourths nascentrivalriesdie out quickly,lastingonly a few years of and involving only one or two militarizedconfrontations.Similarly, only approximately 5 percentof all rivalriesdevelop into full-blown enduringrivalries(Diehl and Goertz2000). Yet once established,such rivalrieslast an averageof forty-plusyears' and involve a large numberof conflict events. The continuationof rivalriesinvolves Statesmustdevotegreatattentionto intelligence, significantcosts to theirparticipants. planning,and otherpolicy makingfor the rivalry,often to the exclusion of otherconcerns. Participating in an enduring rivalry also means transferring substantial resourcesto defense concerns,includingmaintaininglargerstandingarmiesandpurcosts. Furtherchasing and/or building weaponry,as well as other military-related more,rivalrycontinuationinvolves opportunity costs stemmingfrom the loss of trade andothercooperativeactivitieswith one's rivalandits allies (note, however,thateven states at war may sometimes continue trading;see Barbieriand Levy 1999). Thus, relainternational maintaininga rivalryseems to swim againstthe tide of "normal" tions behavior.This articleis thereforededicatedto understanding conditionsthat the keep rivalriesgoing, even in the face of incentives to terminatethem. Weposit two generalkindsof rivalrymaintenance processes,bothof which emphasize thefailure of governmentsto end the rivalry.This is very differentfrom another conception in which analysts startfrom the perspectivethat some factor(s) must be presentto keep the rivalrygoing ratherthan assuming stasis of conflict as a starting point. We begin with the expectationthatan ongoing rivalrysets the tone for the two rival states and thatrivalrycontext is an importantinfluence on rivalrymaintenance. One rivalrymaintenanceprocess occurs throughthe failureof realistor coercive policies to achieve victory. A rivalry can end if one side prevails, presumablythrough superiority capability)in disputesandwar.In this form,therivalryends becausethe (in weakerside realizes thatit cannotattainits goals and renouncesthe pursuitof further and victory in dismilitarizedconflict. Empirically,however,power preponderance putesdo not seem to end manyrivalries.Even in those cases in which one side has prevailed, success does not necessarilypreventthe losing side from startinganotherdispute or war.It may even be seen as the cause of the next dispute,as was the case with War,which was followed quite soon by the Warof Attritionand the 1967 Arab-Israeli then the 1973 Yom KippurWar,involving many of the same participants.Furthermore,even winnersmay choose to continuethe rivalry,as the victoriousstatedoes not achieve all of its goals in the war or now has additionalgoals that it seeks to achieve throughthe use of militaryforce.
1. Given thatmost of the enduringrivalriesidentifiedby Diehl and Goertz(2000) had not ended by the 1992 (the last year of dataavailable),this figureunderestimates truelength of the averagerivalry,given and that many of those rivalriescontinuedfor years afterward indeed still remainin place today.
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processoccursthroughthe failureof conflict manThe secondrivalrymaintenance agementattempts.Insteadof using powerpolitics strategies,governmentsmay resort to negotiationand compromiseto deal with theirdifferences.Formallyor informally, rivals bargainwith one another,and thirdpartiesfrequentlyget involved in various ways to end the rivalry.For example, one reason why rivalriesbetween democracies may be shorter(Hensel, Goertz,andDiehl 2000) is thatthey aremorelikely to resortto negotiation,mediation,and compromise(Dixon 1994; Dixon and Senese 2002). Perhapsthis is thereasonthatmaritimedisputesbetweenIcelandandthe UnitedKingdom have not developed into an enduringrivalry. In this initialexploration,we concentrate the firstrivalrymaintenance on processthe failure of coercion. We addressthe second process-failure of conflict management-only indirectlythroughconsiderationof joint democracyeffects. In exploring the puzzle, we look at 1,166 rivalriesacross the period from 1816 to 1992.
THE LITERATURE ON RIVALRY MAINTENANCE What keeps rivalriesgoing? Few studies have been devoted directly to this quesprovideinsights into the answer.Gartzke tion, but a numberof theoreticalapproaches challenged the idea that there is any sort of and Simon (1999) have mostly clearly dependencybetween militarizedconflicts in dyads. If one conceives of rivalriesas as processcan be understood the repetitionof repeatedgames, the rivalrymaintenance the same conditions producingthe same outcomes over time. Yet such a conception suggests that rivalryevents are independentof one another;indeed, rivalriesthemselves are epiphenomenal,and thereforethe whole idea of rivalry maintenanceis moot. Nevertheless,the work thathas directlyor indirectlyexaminedtheirclaim has found withoutexception (thatwe are awareof) very strongdependencybetween disputes. All these studies (Hensel 2001; Colaresiand Thompson2002a; Crescenziand Enterline2001) have found significantcorrelationsbetween "rivalryvariables"and the currentdispute.In all cases, these variablesare among the most influentialof the model. Similarly,conflict studiesthatuse the Beck, Katz, and Tucker(1998) "peaceyears spline" also implicitly confirm hypotheses about dispute linkage; these spline variablesarethe elapsed time since the previousdispute.Finally,common sense tells us in a numberof cases thatsome events affect futureconfrontations, such as the 1974 Turkishinvasion of Cyprusand the subsequentimpact of that incident on Turkey's rivalrieswith Greece and Cyprus,respectively. Several studies have sought to provide a generaloverview of rivalrymaintenance by considering their "durationdependence"-that is, whetherrivalriesare increasingly likely to end over time. Bennett(1998) has arguedthatthe longer a rivalryis in existence, the more likely it is to terminate (positive duration dependence). He acknowledges,however,thathe cannot as yet provide an explanationfor this effect. Similarly,Cioffi-Revilla (1998) finds that rivalriesare unstable, with an increasing tendencyto end in theirlatterstages. He speculatesthatthe propensityfor termination may be a generational changein leaders,the effectivenessof deterrence,or the impact of balance of power-although none of these explanationsis directly tested. More-
time dependencyfrom models of failure over, the issue of substantivelyinterpreting time processes (i.e., duration-type models) can be tenuous.As Box-Steffensmeierand Jones(2004) note, "duration dependency" highly sensitiveto the type of distribution is (e.g., an exponentialhas to yield a conclusion of no time dependfunction specified ency) as well as the covariatestheorizedto influence the survivalof a rivalry.
"REPEATED CONFLICTS"
Among the most prominentrecent studies in international conflict are those concernedwith whatwe call "repeated conflicts."These focus on the connectionbetween conflict events, althoughthe termrivalryis not used. Some studies(e.g., Grieco2001) look at the likelihood thata given crisis or confrontationwill be followed by another similar conflict event. Other studies (e.g., Werner 1999; Senese and Quackenbush of military 2003) explorethe "duration peace"following the conclusionof a particular confrontation; peace is said to end when anothermilitaryconfrontationensues. Both kinds of studies are fundamentallyconcerned with how conflict continues (or not) betweenthe samepairof states.Otherstudies(Gelpi 2003; Fortna2004a) focus on the effects of agreements(cease-fire or broaderpacts) on futureconflict but still have a orientation. short-term On one hand,studiesof repeatedconflict providea numberof suggestivefindings. Different kinds of settlement (especially the absence of a settlement) (Senese and Quackenbush 2003) or the occurrenceof a stalemate(Grieco2001) in a confrontation decrease the period of peace or increase the likelihood of anothermilitary conflict between the same parties. These studies also suggest that military capabilities are in important generatingfutureconflict (see also Werner1999). Democracymightalso 2003) may be difalthoughthe dyadiceffects (Senese andQuackenbush be important, ferentthan monadicones (Grieco 2001). they Although studies of repeatedconflicts have a numberof desirableattributes, also have some flaws. First, such studies ignore the rivalrycontext underwhich decisions to use militaryforce again (or not) are taken.2These studies typically consider to of only the characteristics one confrontation predictthe onset of anothersuch conflict. Yet is it reasonableto predictfutureU.S.-USSR relationsafterthe U-2 incident by referenceto only thatincident and not the superpowerrivalryas a whole? Surely, some characteristicsof that single confrontationare important,but these cannot be paramount the exclusion of the relevanthistoryof the two states.Thus,these studies to aremyopic in identifyingpast influenceson presentor futurebehavior.Hensel (1999) introducesvariablesto measurethe conflict historyof the two states, defined as their rivalryphase. Not only arethese factorssignificantin predictingthe onset of new disputes(new disputesaremorelikely laterin the rivalry),butthe effects of the othervariables (e.g., previousoutcome, previousdisputeissues) also change dependingon the rivalryphase.
2. An extremecase of this is Grieco (2001), almost all of whose variablesare at the nationallevel (challengeror defender)and thereforenot at the dyadic level, which might deal with somethingaboutthe relationship,and possibly the rivalry,between the states involved.
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Second, and symmetrically, studiesof repeatedconflict look too far into the future for possible instancesof renewedconflict. Typically,these studiesexaminethe entire period following the originalconflict (the period of "opportunity" "risk")for evior dence of renewedhostility.The preferredmethodis event historyor hazardanalysis. Yet only data availabilitylimits the length of the period examined. Accordingly, in some cases, the authorsconsiderup to 127 years (see Werner1999) aftera given dispute to see if anotherconflict occurs. This is well afterany rivalryhas ended and any reasonable chance of furtherconflict is past. For example, the rivalrybetween the United Kingdom and Brazil ends around1863 but is still consideredsalient today in dyadsto see if those analyses.This is the equivalentof examiningpoliticallyirrelevant conflict occurs. Most often, not surprisingly,such conflict does not recur.If conflict does occur years later,the connectionbetween the originaldispute and the new confrontationis tenuousat best. This can have a perniciouseffect on the statisticalanalysis. The waiting times for the next dispute (typically the dependentvariablein these analyses)arewildly overestimated. the Furthermore, characteristics the last dispute of in a rivalry sequence are heavily overweighted, sometimes getting well over 100 observationsaddedto the pool of years studied. By examining rivalries, which better account for dyadic history and have endpoints, we avoid the worst of these two problems.Below, we constructdifferentmeasures of our key variablesaccordingto the repeated-conflictsapproachand our own rivalryapproachand then proceedto test them against one another.
RIVALRY-SPECIFIC STUDIES
Colaresi and Thompson (2002a) demonstratethat previous rivalry crises make futureones more likely. Althoughthis is criticalin demonstrating conflict interdependence, it begs the questionsomewhatas to why or how such connectionsexist. Other rivalryanalysesofferinsightsinto whatkeeps themgoing, althoughthe empiricalverificationof such claims is often indirectandconfinedto a small numberof cases. Maoz andMor (2002) see rivalrycontinuingas long as at least one side is dissatisfiedandhas the capabilityto challenge the statusquo. This suggests thatone of the keys to understandingrivalrycontinuationlies in the outcomes of the initial confrontationsof the two rivals.If one side has superiorcapabilitiesand is able to impose an asymmetrical outcome,the rivalrymay end becausethe weakerside is unableto continuethe competition.This meansthatrivalrymaintenance may occurwhen disputesproduceindeterminateoutcomesthatleave one or morepartiesdissatisfied.This is perhapswhy Maoz in and Mor observe many instancesof "deadlock" the early stages of enduringrivalries. This is also consistentwith StinnettandDiehl's (2001) findingthatstalemateoutcomes in initial disputes are good predictorsof enduringrivalrydevelopment.Yet if the preferencesof the rivalschange (anda regimechangeas well as a dramatic victory can facilitatethis), the resultcan also be the terminationof a rivalry.Thus, divergent preferences(or at least the perceptionof them) can also drive rivalrycontinuation. Maoz and Mor find some supportfor these notions among a handfulof Middle East rivalries.
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McGinnisandWilliams(2001) mergea rationalactormodel with an organizational behaviorone to accountfor the dynamicsof the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.They contendthat a rivalryis sustainedby an underlyingprocess by which the rivalrybecomes institutionalized.Thatprocessis rootedin the belief systems of the participants, who come to and view theiropponentin hostile terms.Bureaucracies planningbasedon those belief systems become ingrainedand are hardto change as expectationsharden.Domestic public opinion is also a factorthatsupportscontinuationof the rivalry,as it constrains decision makers. Thereare hints of otherfactorsthatlead to the continuationof rivalries.Levy and Ali (1998) and Ganguly (2001) arguethatrivalrieswere maintained,in part,because of theirlinkage to othermajorpower rivalries.Yet we know that severalrivalriesthat Israelhas with its neighbors(e.g., Jordan,Syria,Egypt, Iraq),while initiallyreinforcing one another,did decouple with some ending, some continuingat lower levels, and others remainingat high levels of hostility. Furthermore, other rivalriesmight arise thathave a negativeeffect on rivalrypersistence.Bennett(1996) notes thatnew securitythreatsmay lead statesto end theirrivalryto deal with new ones with otherstates.
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AND RIVALRY MAINTENANCE In this section, we outline our theoreticalargument, based on the punctuated equilibrium model of rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000; see also Cioffi-Revilla 1998; approach. The core feature Goertz2003), andcontrastthis with the repeated-conflicts cross-sectionalapproachesis thatdistinguishesall rivalryapproachesfrom standard the claim that disputes in a rivalry are causally linked. Many cross-sectional timeseries studies implicitly recognize the "statistical" problems (temporaldependence) practiceto use associatedwith linked disputesin rivalries.Indeed,it is now standard peace-year splines (or other techniques)to control or correctfor this, following the advice of Beck, Katz, and Tucker(1998). Most scholars following Beck, Katz, and Tuckerregardserialcorrelationas "anuisancewhich impedes estimationof the beta" (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1283), but one scholar's nuisance is another'smain causal effect. Ratherthantreatingrivalryeffects as "nuisances," incorporate them we theoreticallyas well as methodologicallyinto the model. The repeated-conflictsliteraturerecognizes some linkage between conflicts, and this is clearly a step in the rightdirectionfrom hiding it in the peace-yearspline variable. Nevertheless,the repeated-conflictsapproachdoes not go so far as to introduce the rivalry into the theoreticalframeworkexplicitly. Fundamentally, repeated-conremainswithinwhatwe call the "t-1" mind-set.These models include, flicts literature in additionto other variablescoded at time t-1, only informationaboutthe previous but regardst-1 disputesas important, only as partof conflict. In contrast,ourapproach a largerpicture.The rivalryapproachnotes thatthe previoushistoryof the rivalry(not merely a single event) matters,especially the early stages of the competition.In short, from the rivalryperspective,repeated-conflictsmodels are theoreticallyand methodologically incomplete:they recognize a limitedform of conflict linkagebut not all, or even the most importantforms, of such linkage.
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The punctuatedequilibriummodel and several other rivalryapproaches(Hensel 1999) postulatethatrivalriesgo throughseveral stages, and the processes that occur differsubstantially accordingto the life cycle of the rivalry.In short,these approaches invoke some sort of path dependence. The punctuatedequilibriummodel is one of strongpath dependencebecause of the emphasisplaced on the initial disputes in the rivalry. Duringthis initialphase,the rivalseitherresolve the disputesrelativelyquickly or patternsof hostility "lockin,"with the consequencethatthe rivalrybecomes endurpering. Following the "lock-in"phaseis one of "stasis," which hostile interactions in sist between the rivals with some regularityor consistency.In contrast,the repeatedconflicts approachassumes thatthe effects of the previousconflict are uniformover the life of the rivalry. Underlying the punctuatedequilibriummodel and the connection between the policy model of decision lock-in and stasis phases of the rivalryis an organizational equilibriummodel envisionsrivalrymaintenanceas a consemaking.The punctuated quence of governmentslocking into conflict policies of various sorts. Hence, initial policy decisions are crucial because they shape future decisions in powerful ways. Internally,the policy model has future and past dimensions. A policy is a commitment-implicit or explicit-to act in a certainway in the future.The concept of "preThe cedent"is key in looking backwards. policy may proveto be dysfunctionalor have negative unexpected consequences. Nevertheless, the governmentis constrainedto follow preestablishedpolicy or standard operatingprocedures(Wilson 1989). Interactions the firstseveralconfrontations in betweenstatesset the tone for the rest and the rivalry.Policy makerstakelessons fromthese interactions establishpolicies of patternsof behaviorthatwill be repeatedover the course of the rivalry.This conand ception is largely consistent with that of McGinnis and Williams (2001), who argue policies hardenover time in a rivalry,making that belief systems and bureaucratic rivalrybehavior (such as conflictual interactionsand arms races) hard to dislodge. Similarly,Leng (2000) indicatesthatthe belief systems of leadersarecriticalin crisis behavior,andthese systemsarelargelydefinedby priordisputesandcrises. Overtime, the externalrivalrybecomes entrenchedin the domesticpolitics of the two rivalstates of (Hensel 1999). The inertialcharacter governmentsthus supportsthe basic punctuated equilibriumframework,with its emphasison stasis most of the time. has behaviorpolicy literature focused on the importance draof The organizational matic statusquo alterations,often from "loss"or policy failure,as motivatorsfor polequilibriummodel, this has takenthe form of political icy change. In our punctuated alterthe statusquo andtherebythe preferencesandopporshocks, which dramatically tunitiesof rivalryparticipants. Accordingly,we do not thinkthatthe linkagebetween conflicts will be broken by small failures; a significant loss by one side, however, mightconstitutethe occasion to reevaluate policy. Yetthe window for these changesis generallynarrowand comes more often at the outset of rivalry,before it is locked in, ratherthan laterin the process. Givenourfocus on rivalrymaintenance,we takeas given thata rivalryexists. We do not deny the importanceof how dyads "select themselves"in rivalries(Lemke and Reed 2001), but the vast majorityof militarizedconfrontationsoccur between states thatare alreadyin a rivalry,shortor long term(Diehl and Goertz2000). Contrastthis
with the usual cross-sectionalview of international conflict. The implicit assumption dyads are at peace and that variousfactors or eventsproduce conflict. This is is that equilibriumview of what happensbefore a rivalrystarts. analogousto the punctuated Almost inherent in the cross-sectional research design is the theoretical goal of explaining what causes conflicts. This can be seen by the referentgroup, which is essentiallya combinationof statesat peace with those thathave an ongoing rivalrybut are not currentlyexperiencing actual military conflict. The hidden theoretical and methodologicalassumptionis thatnonactiverivalriesarethe same as peaceful dyads. Yet, empirically,Colaresiand Thompson(2002b) demonstrate behaviorwithin a that rivalryis very differentthan if the states were not alreadyin a rivalry;that is, rivalry context matters. All things being equal, states may prefernot to continue a rivalry,given the costs and risks involved. Nevertheless,each rival has a certainset of goals that it wants to achieve (regional or global influence, territorialcontrol, etc.), even at the cost of as rivalry.Furthermore, much of the literature territoryand conflict demonstrates, on disputes do not just go away; active steps by governmentsmust be taken to resolve them(e.g., Gibler 1997). The firstmechanismby which statescan exit a rivalryoccurs before inertiaprocesses have locked in. States may adoptcoercive or "realist" strategies (Leng 1993) and attemptto settle the disputeby prevailingover theiropponents; thatis, they try to use militaryforce to prevail.The initial occurrenceof a militarized disputeis a signal thatcoercive mechanismsarebeing tried:at least one side has displayed, threatened,or used militaryforce to achieve its goals. A militarizedstrategy is sometimes effective, with one side prevailing over the other.This is consistentwith Maoz and Mor's (2002) argumentthatrivalriescan end when one side is superiorin capabilitiesandthe otherside cannotchallengethe status quo, even if it is dissatisfied.For example, the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American Warforestalledthe developmentof an enduringrivalrywith Spain over colonial possessions in the WesternHemisphereand elsewhere. Thus, one might expect that a strongerstatecould preventthe formationof an enduringrivalryby forcing its opponent to back down or defeating it militarilyin an early confrontation.If the coercive policy works, then we should see success as a frequentoutcome of disputesand a significantly reduced likelihood of future confrontations.Empirically,few militarized disputes(roughly25 percent)end with one side prevailing(Jones,Bremer,and Singer 1996), suggestingthatthe realiststrategiesmay be a relativelyinefficientmechanism to escape from rivalries.Indeed, stalemateis the overwhelminglymost common outcome of a militarizeddispute (approximatelytwo-thirdsof the time).3Furthermore, power preponderance not correlatedwith the outcome. Tir and Diehl (2002) find is composed of disputes over territorial that enduringrivalries are disproportionately issues; for example, the Israel-Syria rivalry involves several territorialconcerns. Despite frequentattempts,stateshave difficultyacquiringterritory throughthe use of
3. When we refer to stalemates,we mean outcomes with respect to the stakes in one or more conas flicts. This is quitedifferentfroma generalorbroadimpassein the rivalry, maybe impliedby phrasessuch as "hurtingstalemate."
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force (Goertzand Diehl 1992). Vasquez(2004) arguesthatwhen statesresortto militaryforce over territory, highly salientconcern,they areless willing to compromise, a andrepeatedstalematesarethe likely outcomes. Domestic audiencesalso resist compromises on highly salient territory, especially thatwith intangible(religious, ethnic, symbolic) value.Forexample,ethnicconcernsin the Ogadenareimportant at least for rivalry. one side in the Ethiopia-Somalia The failure of coercive strategiescontributesin several ways to rivalry maintenance.Most obviously,the issues in disputeareleft unresolved.One or both sides in a conflict may tryagainto gain satisfactionthroughthe use of militaryforce. Indeed,it is not uncommonfor the same rivalto press its claims repeatedly. example,Pakistan For is always the revisioniststateand most frequentlythe side thatinitiatesmilitaryforce in the forty disputes it has had with India over the statusof Kashmir.Yet Pakistanis never successful in disputeswith India,and the overwhelmingmajorityend in stalemates. The salience of the issue domestically makes it untenablewith the Pakistani publicandthe influentialmilitaryfor anyleaderto abandonthe claim on this territory. Even the statusquo statein a rivalry-if thereis one-may desirerivalrycontinuation. Usually, it will preferrivalryto conceding to its opponent.It must, however,be capableenough to resist the claims of its rivaland not back down. Nevertheless,even weaker rivals can resist the demands on strongerenemies; Cuba has successfully resisted U.S. efforts at regime change on thatisland for more thanfour decades. The stakesinvolvedor the salience of the rivalryissues also mustbe greatenoughto justify Thus, not surprisingly, manyrivalriesarefought over the costs andrisks of the rivalry. with greatintankey issues, such as regionalhegemony(e.g., Iranvs. Iraq)or territory gible value (e.g., Israelvs. its Arabneighbors). consequencesbeyondits inabilityto find a The failureof coercionhas downstream satisfactoryresolutionto the conflict.The firstis thatit is often muchharder resortto to anotheroption for ending the rivalry:negotiationand compromise.In the presenceof and severalconfrontations hostility,the rivalrybecomes locked in. In this context,real concessions may be viewed as insincereor even hostile by statesin a rivalrywith one another (Colaresi and Thompson 2002a). Realist strategies,even though they fail, strengthenthe hands of the hard-linerson both sides. Although we have described they are not necessarily stalemateor indecisive outcomes as indicativeof "failures," large ones. Dramatic failure-such as losing a war-might lead to major policy changes (oftenbecauseleadershipalso changes),butminorfailuresrarelyset the stage for policy change. For example, realistscan always arguethatnot enough power and leads force was used. In fact, dissatisfactionwith the outcomes of past confrontations statesto adoptmorecoercivebargaining strategiesin the future(see Leng 2000 andhis detailedanalysesof the India-Pakistan, rivalries).DemU.S.-USSR, andEgypt-Israel ocraticstatesaregenerallymoreinclinedthanothersto seek negotiationandcompromise, but even those states arereluctantto do so in the context of an enduringrivalry (Huth and Allee 2003). The failureof realist strategiesalso contributesto rivalrylock-in by strengthening political forces within society for rivalrycontinuation.In our descriptionof the puncadoptlong-termstratetuatedequilibriummodel above, we noted thatbureaucracies gies (armsacquisitions,defense planning)predicatedon rivalrycontinuation. Contin-
uing competition over importantissues makes such policies appropriate,but they outcomesdo not become difficultfor leadersto changein the shortrun.Unsatisfactory producea reevaluation outlookor strategiesbuttendto reinforcehostilityovertime. of Even leaderswho desire conciliationwith an enemy are restrictedby domestic audiences who may regardsuch concessions as unacceptable.For example, neitherTurkish nor Greek leaders could make wholesale concessions on Aegean Sea claims withoutincurringthe wrathof theirpopulaces. Thus, when coercion fails and the outcome leaves at least one side dissatisfied, thereis a basis for rivalrycontinuation. use the occurrenceof a stalemateoutcome We to signal the failureof coercivemechanisms.Stalemateoutcomesindicatethatthe initiatorof the dispute did not achieve its goals and remainsdissatisfied.Thatit did not to lose the disputemay give it hope andopportunity be successful in the future.Abanits goals or conceding to its opponent may be politically untenable.Indeed, doning even risking futuredefeat in a war may be more desirable(see Colaresi 2004 for the mutedpoliticaleffects of losing a warduringrivalry)for a leaderthangrantingconcesstatusquo targetstates4are not necessarily satisfiedwith a stalesions. Furthermore, mate outcome, although it may representsuccessful deterrence.Such states would clearlypreferto resolve the disputeby winning andeliminatingfuturechallengesby a rival;that was certainlythe preferenceof Kuwaitin its rivalrywith Iraq.Yet a stalemateoutcomedoes not producethis outcome,andincreasedhostility towardan opponent andthe othereffects noted above arethe likely results.In policy models, it is significantfailurethat typically promptsa reevaluationof policy. Stalemateindicates a unchangedstateof affairs.A single stalemateis not enoughby itself to fundamentally promptleaders or domestic audiences to change strategy.U.S. occupationpolicy in Iraqis but one majorexampleof how even majorfailuresdo not always lead to policy change. There is no reason why slightly negative (or positive, for that matter) outcomes should lead to policy shifts. In ourconception,however,it is not merelysingle instancesof indecisiveoutcomes that promptrivalrymaintenancebut a series of them, especially at the outset of the rivalry.It may take severalinstanceof failureat coercion (andthe lack of compromise outcomes) to signal decision makersthat the rivalryis unlikely to be resolved. With thatrecognition,decision makersbegin to plan for the long haul (longertermdefense decisions) in the expectationthatthe rivalrywill continue.Suchpolicies havethe paradoxical effect of contributing rivalrymaintenance to themselves.Thus,ourconception in differsfromthe repeated-conflicts literature two ways. We thinkthatseveralindecisive, or a history of indecisive, outcomes are more importantin rivalrymaintenance than single stalemates.Second, we anticipatethatthis effect will dissipateover time, being strongestin the earliestpartsof the rivalry. We do not deny thatdecisive outcomes (victoriesby one side or the other)cannot promoterivalrymaintenance,but we regardthis as much less likely than indecisive outcomes. Indeed, victories can have the effect of strengtheningsome rivalries,such
4. Not all rivalrieshave a statusquo state-sometimes, all participants revisionist.For example, are to of duringthe cold war,boththe UnitedStatesandthe USSR often took advantage favorablecircumstances make gains at the expense of the other.
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as the effect of the Arab-IsraeliWarof 1967. The loser in the confrontationmay be willing to fight again to recoup its losses. In some scenarios,winnersmay even seek greatergains, emboldenedby theirinitialsuccesses. Forexample,a statemay gain territoryfrom an opponentbut still pressfurtherdemandsin the future(see Tir2003 for a discussion of the logic). Still, decisive outcomes are generally confined to the most severe confrontations(i.e., wars), and even these are increasingly rare over time (Fortna2004b). to Some might also suggest thatcompromiseoutcomesmay contribute futureconflicts, if leadershipchange or other factors lead states to renege on previous settlements.Althoughthereareinstancesof reneging(e.g., Chile andArgentinaovera 1902 treatyconcerningthe Beagle Channel),these are relativelyrare.Stronginternational norms (pacta sunt servanda) have the effect of producinga good recordof compliance. Furthermore, compromiseoutcomeprovidesseveralsignals to disputantsthat a underminerivalry maintenance.First, the compromise may indicate that the main issue(s) underlyingthe rivalryis resolvedandthereis no need to continuethe competition. Even if the compromisedoes not resolve all outstandingissues, it signals to both parties that peaceful settlements and accommodationare possible and that rivalry conflict is not necessaryto achieve one's ends. is A secondmechanismfor rivalrymaintenance thefailure of conflict management. Although we do not address this mechanism empirically in this article, except as relatedto some notions of the democraticpeace, we briefly note it here for theoretical purposes.That is, efforts at direct negotiationand third-party facilitationare unsuccessful at producinglong-termchange in the rivalryrelationship(e.g., resolving the disputedissues), even as they may amelioratethe most hostile manifestationsof the rivalry(e.g., preventescalationto war). Conflictmanagementmay be presentearly in the rivalry such that states reach accommodationbefore many confrontationstake place. Early in a rivalry,conflict-generatingpolicies as well as conflict management ones can be implanted.Depending on how the issues in dispute are handled,conflict managementat the early stage can become conflict resolution(i.e., the rivalryends in the nascentstage).Failureat mediation,negotiation,andthe like may sourparticipants (andthirdparties)on futurediplomaticinitiativesandreinforcethe perceptionthatthe rivalry requires long-term commitments of resources and policies, thereby to contributing its maintenance. Our punctuatedequilibriummodel suggests that rivalrieslock in early and have extended periods of stasis, until political shocks and other conditions facilitatetheir termination.Implicit in our descriptionof the rivalrymaintenanceprocess, flowing fromthe failuresof coercion andconflict management,aretwo elements.First,rivalry maintenanceis influenced less by single events and more by the entirehistory of the rivalryto date.Conflictevents arerelatedovertime, andthereis no reasonto thinkthat only the most recentdisputeis the only one affectingthe likelihoodof rivalrymaintenance. Second, the punctuated equilibriummodel indicatesthatrivalrieshardenover time, and thereforethe influence of variousrivalrymaintenancefactorsshould dissipateoverthe life of the rivalry. Once a rivalryis well establishedandpolicies havebeen locked in for rivalrycompetition,mitigatingfactors(e.g., victoryin a war,democracy) should be less important thanhad they occurredin earlierphases of the rivalry.
EXPECTATIONS
equilibrium model, ourdiscussionof rivalrymaintenance, Based on the punctuated and extantresearchfindings on international conflict, we have a numberof specific expectations about empirical patternsin internationalrivalries. We have identified roughlythreedifferentsets of factorsthatmay facilitatethe rivalrymaintenanceprocess: characteristicsof the last dispute, longer term or rivalry context factors, and traditionalconflict influences. Characteristicsof the last dispute.For the characteristics the dispute, we focus of centrallyon its outcome. Stalematesshould be associatedwith the onset of new disputes,signifying thatthe issues or factorsdrivingthe rivalryhave not been resolved.In contrast,when one side prevailsin a dispute,our expectationis thatrivalrycontinuation is less likely. Victorymay resolve the rivalry5 at least deterthe losing side from or pressing its demandsfurtherwith militaryforce. Such logic is consistent with realist expectations.Still, the outcome least likely to promotefutureconflict would seem to be compromises.A full explicationof this logic is given in the previous section. We believe thatthe repeated-conflictsliterature correctin one respect:the outcome of is the last disputemay be relevant,sometimesto exclusion of longertermrivalryfactors. of The immediateoutcomeof a disputecan alteror reinforcepreviouspatterns conflict behaviorbetween rivals. For example, if a dispute settlementdoes producea resolution of issues, the rivalry could end and thereby wipe away years of hostile interactions. We also examine two other factors associated with the most recent dispute in the rivalrysequence.We do this largelyto test the repeated-conflicts againstour literature rivalryapproach,ratherthan with an expectationthat these with be importantinfluences on rivalrymaintenance.In his evolutionarymodel, Hensel (1999) cites a possible negativeeffect on repeatedconflict from high-severityconflicts; these could end the rivalry. As the severityof conflict betweenrivalsincreases,one mightexpect thatthe likelihood of another conflict is less. Nevertheless, the punctuatedequilibrium model makes a different prediction;the severity of the previous dispute should have no impacton rivalrymaintenance. model posits thatrivalries equilibrium The punctuated have a "basicrivalrylevel" (Diehl andGoertz2000), such thatdisputessharesimilariin ties, especially in severity,acrosstime. Variations the basic rivalrylevel with respect to severityand otherdisputedimensionstend to be idiosyncraticto the individualdispute without much effect on the rivalryas a whole. Rivalriesmay have basic rivalry levels at either very high or very low levels (or anythingin between). Furthermore, individualwars are found at the beginning, middle, and ends of rivalriesand do not necessarilyaffect rivalrymaintenance,or at least theirhigh level of severityper se has no impact.Diehl andGoertz(2000) foundno systematicpattern(e.g., rising or declining) in the severityof disputesoverrivalries.Thus,althoughwe includea severityvari5. Werner (1999) does not find, however,thatthe resolvingissues in a settlementlengthenthe period of peace following that settlement.
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able in our analyses, we expect thatit will not be significantlyassociatedwith rivalry maintenance. Rivalriesmay develop and be sustainedby one or severalcontentiousissues. Yet a disputesgeneratemoreviolent conflict than consistentfindinghas been thatterritorial other,less salientissues (e.g., questfor a regimechangein yourrival'sstate).Enduring rivalriesalso disproportionately involve territorial issues (Tir and Diehl 2002). Such rivalriesare more likely to continuebecause rivals are less willing to accept compromise solutions;indeed,the set of compromiseoutcomesfor the competingpreferences may be empty.Everydisputein a rivalrydoes nothaveto concernterritory, a signifbut icant number may be necessary for rivalry development (Valeriano2003) and, by implication,for rivalrycontinuance.We test the expectationthatif the most recentdispute in the rivalrywas aboutterritory, then the rivalryis more likely to continuein the future.Although we expect that this factor may be significant,we anticipatethat its impact will be less than the contextualizedissue variablebelow. That is, we expect whetherthe rivalryas a whole has been aboutterritory be moreimportant rivalry in to maintenancethan whetheronly the most recent disputehas been. model, context Rivalrycontextfactors. Consistentwith the punctuated equilibrium is thoughtto have a primaryeffect on rivalrydynamics.In effect, this means that we consider the history or life cycle of the rivalry(Crescenzi and Enterline2001) and assess its impact on rivalry maintenance.One key component is the "age" of the equilibriummodel posits thatrivalrieslock in quickly to their rivalry.The punctuated dominantpatterns.Following that lock-in period, rivalriesare hardto dislodge. The age of a rivalryhas two differentdimensions.One is merely the passage of time. The longer a rivalryhas been in existence, the more it has influenced differentgovernments,regimes, and generationswithin a state.Yet acclimationto being in a rivalryis morethanjust a functionof time. Frequentconflict interactions provideampleopporseveralconfrontunityfor policies and attitudesto be adjustedto hostile interactions; tationsin a narrowtime framemay be equivalentto a few decadesof less frequentconflict interactions.Thus, a second element of rivalry age is the number of conflict interactionsbetween the rivals.Ourhypothesisis thatas a rivalryages, the likelihood of rivalrycontinuationincreases. This is a classic expectationof negative duration dependence-a rivalryis less likely to end the older it gets. variables,conBeyond the age of a rivalry,we also taketwo previouslyarticulated flict severity and territorial them. Thus, we examine the issues, and "contextualize" severity history, or the average severity of conflict across the whole rivalryto date, rather thanjust whathappenedin the t- 1 dispute.We expect thatmore severerivalries reinforcehostilityin the respectiverivalstatesandthereforemakerivalriesmorelikely to experiencefutureconflicts andthereforemaintainthemselves.Similarly,we look at the extent to which the rivalryas a whole at any given point in time has been fought issues. Again, we anticipatethatrivalrieswith a higher percentageof over territorial territorial disputeswill be more likely to continueinto the future. Traditional factors. A thirdset of influences on rivalrymaintenancederivesfrom standardanalyses and logics in international conflict research.In some sense, these
factorsare additionalcausal factorsthat supplementotherfactorsnoted above. Most notablein thatliterature been the influenceof democracyon conflict behavior.We has suspect thatdemocracywill have a reduced(thoughperhapsstill significant)impact on rivalrymaintenanceas comparedto its impact on other violent conflict behavior. Recall that we are assuming that a rivalryexists, and relativelyfew rivalriesinvolve two democraticstates (Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 2000). Thus,joint democracyhas already had some significant impact on keeping states out of violent interactions joint democracyis relatedto ourconcernwith (KinsellaandRussett2002). Indirectly, conflict management.Democratic states have a bettertrackrecord of resolving disputes between themselves (Dixon 1993) than otherpairs of states. Thus, our second mechanism of rivalry maintenance-the failure of conflict management-is likely negativelycorrelatedwithjoint democracy.Nevertheless,if a rivalryhas occurredin a democraticdyad, this means that the democraticpeace has in some sense already failed. Althoughdemocracycan mitigatethe noxious effects of rivalry(Comwell and Colaresi2002), we hypothesizethatits negativeeffect on rivalrymaintenancewill be less thanits impacton keepingdyadsout of rivalryaltogether. Thatis, joint democracy is likely to have a strongereffect on rivalrypreventionthanits absence has on rivalry maintenance. factoris the capabilityor power distribution A second traditional between the two conflict is thatpowerparrivals.The most common findingin studiesof international ity is associatedwith a higherlikelihoodof conflict (e.g., RussettandOneal2001). Yet mostrivalriesinvolve asymmetricdyads(Diehl andGoertz2000). We can see a similar sortof logic at workwith the capabilitydistribution with the democraticpeace. If an as asymmetricdyad does find itself in a rivalry,then, in some sense, deterrencefrom power superiority failed. When they compare"one-crisis" has rivalrieswith multiplecrisis rivalries,Colaresiand Thompson(2002b) find the capabilityratioto be significantbut its substantiveeffect. Hence, here too we expect to see at best a modestpositive-if not zero-impact of power symmetryon rivalrymaintenance.
RESEARCH DESIGN
RIVALRIES AND DISPUTES
To test the predictionsmade by the punctuated equilibriummodel, we use a set of rivalriesidentifiedby Diehl andGoertz(2000), composed of 1,166 miliinternational tarizedrivalriesoverthe periodfrom 1816 to 1992.6We includedataon censoredrivalries-rivalries that are ongoing accordingto the Diehl and Goertz coding rules as of
6. An updatedversion of the rivalrylist (through2001) has only been releasedas a "beta"version, andwe arereluctantto use it unless all errorshave been detectedandcorrected.Furthermore, severalof the variablesneededfor ouranalysesherehave not yet been constructed. did look at the distribution waitof We in ing times betweendisputesandfoundthatthe patterns the new betaversionarealmostidenticalto the origby findingswould not be undermined using the new inal rivalrycollection, suggestingthatourfundamental collection.
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December 31, 1992. The unit of analysis thereforeis the rivalryyear, as we examine whethera disputebetween the rivalsrecurred a given year.We look at each year of in the rivalry, beginningwith the yearof the firstdisputeuntilthe yearof the last dispute.7 Because we cannotprecisely say when a rivalryterminates, decision ruleis to treat our as terminated rivalrythathas not engagedin a disputein a ten- to fifteen-yearwinany cutoff as thereis a stronginducdow following the last dispute.This is not an arbitrary tive case for empiricalbreakpointsin dispute frequency at these junctures,and the breakpointsselected mapwell to ourtheoreticalrivalryframework. This decision rule of the avoidstwo problems:(1) false precisionin determining termination a rivalryand (2) the assumptionthateach dyadis always at risk.Note thatthis is farmoreconservaliterature, which lacks clear theoreticaland empirical tive thanthe repeated-conflicts justificationfor looking at all yearsfollowing a disputeuntil 1992, even if the original dispute began in the early nineteenthcentury.The numberof observationsfor our analysis,dependingon the analysis andmissing dataconcerns,rangesfrom 11,297 to 15,258 rivalryyears.
METHODS OF ANALYSIS AND CONTROLS FOR DURATION DEPENDENCE
The dependentvariableis the waiting time from the end of the previousdisputein the rivalryuntilthe beginningof the next one.8Giventhatthe dependentvariableis the waiting time between conflicts, we employ a series of event history models (BoxSteffensmeierandJones 2004; see also Beck, Katz,and Tucker1998). Given thatour data are discretizeddurationdata, we applied a logit model with a durationdependency parameter; dependentvariableis measuredas a binary indicatordenoting the whethera dispute recurredin a given year; a longitudinalprocess coded as a binary sequence is equivalent to durationdata (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The standarderrorsreportedin the models are robust standarderrorsto account for the temporalclusteringof data across rivalries.To accountfor durationdependence,we included a variable(log waiting) thatwas measuredas the naturallog of the waiting
in 7. Waitingtimes aremeasured yearsandfractionsthereof.Oneproblemis thatnew disputessometimes arise before another,ongoing disputehas ended, resultingin so-called negativewaitingtimes. There was no way to imputepositive times onto negativetimes. We note thatwell over 75 percentof the negative duration of times were one yearor less. We decidedto code these cases with the minimumpositivevalue,1/12 a yearor one month.Withthis coding scheme,the meanwaitingtime is about4.20 (SD = 3.19). Thereis little significantdifferencewhen excludingthe negativewaiting time cases; the mean is about4.75 (SD = 3.27). was greaterthanwhateverlimited We decidedto keep these cases in the analysesas the loss of information costs might ensue from imperfectcoding. 8. Disputesoccurrelativelyrapidlyin ourrivalries(see moreon this below). The dyad-year datagengiven ourinterests.EUGeneoutputsonly the eratedby EUGene (BennettandStam2000) proveproblematic the firstdisputeof the calendaryear,systematicallyundercounting numberof disputeoccurrences. Thus,we add additionalobservationsfor a given year if therewere additionaldisputesin thatyear.A lagged dispute variable-notably, whetherthe previousdisputeendedin stalemate-will be incorrectlycoded by EUGene if it takes only the first dispute in a calendaryear. Similarly,given the rapid succession of disputes, we encountera situationin which one disputebeginsbutdoes not end beforea seconddisputebegins.We define the previousdisputeto be the one thatendedlast. This is a nontrivial problemfor rivalriessuch as the United States-USSR, in which thereis, on average,morethanone disputeperyear.This is also a problemwith some rivalriessuch as Zaire-Angola,which have had one very long-lastingdispute(more thanten years) with a few isolated disputeswithin this long period.
dependencyin the logit discretetime duration equivalentto is times. Ignoringduration assuming an exponentialdistributionfor the waiting times (Box-Steffensmeierand Jones2004); hence, this covariateis includedto accountfor anydependencyacrossthe waiting times. Several functional forms were tested, including a locally weighted scatterplotsmoother(lowess); however,likelihood ratio tests indicatedthat duration dependencytreatedas a naturallog functionfit the databest.
PREVIOUS DISPUTE CHARACTERISTICS
The firstset of characteristics we posit will affectrivalrymaintenance related is that of to the previousdisputein the rivalrysequence.Thatis, the characteristics a dispute will influence the likelihood that anotherdispute will occur. Our centralconcern is with the outcome of thatdispute.We turnto the Correlatesof War(COW)militarized disputedataset (Jones, Bremer,and Singer 1996). The COWdataset providesinformationon what is referredto thereas the "outcome"of the dispute.This variablehas nine categoriesof disputeoutcomes:(1) victory for side A, (2) victory for side B, (3) yield by side A, (4) yield by side B, (5) stalemate,(6) compromise,(7) released, (8) unclear,and (9) missing.9 One way to thinkaboutthis is scheme is by referenceto the numberof satisfiedparties in each category.Compromiseusually indicates that both sides achieved some goals andarerelativelyhappy.Victories,as well as the two categoriesof yield, indicate thatone partyis reasonablycontent with the outcome, while the loser/yielderis not. Stalemate signifies that neither side is especially satisfied with the results. To the extent that there is a clear initiatorand target,the targetmay be more content, but a pushed back the challenge. Similarly, stalemateindicatesthatit has not permanently with therelativelyspecialcategoryof released(exclusivelyfor fishing boatandrelated seizures), this rarelyindicates that the underlyingreasons for the seizure have been successfully dealt with. We collapse these outcomesinto threebasic categories,accordingto the numberof satisfied parties:'"stalemate (no satisfied parties: stalemates and released), victory (one satisfiedparty:victories or yields), and compromise(two satisfiedparties:compromises). In the analysis, compromisesbecome the referentcategory,and therefore there are dichotomousvariablesfor stalematesand victories, respectively. The militarizedinterstate dispute(MID) dataset also containsa settlementvariable thattaps a dimension of unresolvedconflict thatparticularly interestsus. The settlement variable has four categories: (1) negotiated, (2) imposed, (3) none, and (4) unclear.Clearly,a negotiatedsettlementseems relatedto the compromisecoding of the outcomevariable.Similarlyimposedsettlementswould appearto be relatedto vicmatchwell with staletories and yields, while no and unclearsettlementsapparently the mateoutcomes.Indeed,if we cross-tabulate two dimensions(COWoutcomes and
9. Released is used in a special set of disputes,usually fishing disputes,in which one side seizes the releasedback to the originalowner.The issues propertyof anotherstate.The disputeends with the property in dispute(e.g., limits of territorial waters)areusually not resolved in such instances,andthereforethe outcomes are akin to stalemates. 5 10. We droppedmissing and unclearcases from the analysis (approximately percentof cases).
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settlementcategories), we see thatthese suppositionshold up quite well empirically (y= .85). The majordifferenceoccurswithrespectto the intersectionof negotiatedand compromisecategories.Negotiatedsettlementsappearmorefrequentlyandaretherefore not confinedto compromiseoutcomes.Apparently, manyoutcomesin which one side prevailsstill involvenegotiatedsolutions.Forouranalysesbelow, we use only the satisfactionvariablebased on the COW outcome coding. Nevertheless,we reranall the analyses with the settlementvariableand essentially draw the same substantive conclusions. A second characteristic the previousdisputeis its severity.Foranalysesof severof which scales severityroughlyon a ity, we adoptthe Diehl andGoertz(2000) approach, 0 to 200 scale based on the "level of hostility"exhibitedby both states in the dispute We and the numberof fatalitiesin the confrontation. look at the severityscore for the most recent disputeat any given point in time. Similarly,we also look at the issues in of contentionas a thirdcharacteristic that most recent dispute.We consider whether issues. If one or both sides in the disputewere the previousdisputeinvolvedterritorial seeking a territorial All revision, then the dispute is coded as being about territory. other issues are collapsed into a referentdichotomouscategory.
RIVALRY CONTEXT FACTORS
Looking beyond the characteristics the most recent dispute,we also arguethat of the rivalrycontextitself will influencewhethera rivalrypersists.One contextualfactor We is the "age"of the rivalry. measurethis in two differentways. The firstis the age of the rivalry,measuredin numberof disputes-disputes in the rivalrypriorto the year underscrutiny.Anothermeasureof rivalryage is the durationof the rivalryin years. This is measuredfrom the beginning of the first dispute between the rivals to the currentyear. We wantedto measurerivalrycontextwith a broader back horizonandlook farther in the rivalry, beyondthe most recentdisputeto the rivalryhistoryas a whole. Accordingly, we constructseverityandterritorial issue indicatorsfor the whole rivalry.Thus, one indicatoris the percentageof previous territorialdisputes in the rivalry at any given pointin time;thus,if attime t, a rivalryhas experiencedfourdisputesandtwo are over territory, variableis coded as 50 percent.Similarly,we calculatethe average the severityscorefor the all the previousdisputesin therivalryat anygiven pointin time.
TRADITIONAL FACTORS
The thirdset of factorspossibly affectingrivalrymaintenanceincludes those typically found in standard treatmentsof international conflict: nationalcapabilitiesand regime type. For analyses of capability,we examine both pure militarycapabilityas well as an economic measure of capability,relying on data from the COW project (Singer,Bremer,and Stuckey 1972).1 We use militarypersonneland militaryexpendetails on the indicatorsare given in Singer,Bremer,and Stuckey (1972) 11. Specific measurement and are availablefrom the Correlatesof Warproject.
diture indicators to signify military capabilities. Economic capabilities are representedby the COWeconomic indicator--energyconsumption,which is stronglycorrelatedwith variousdemographic,military,and othereconomic indicators,providing a basis for assessing the strengthof the state. In our statisticalanalyses, we take the logged values of these two indicatorsto minimizethe impactof extremevalues andto reflectthe expectationthatthe marginaleffects of capabilitydecline as preponderance increases.Because we are dealing with dyads, we take a simple ratio of the indicator concernedin which the largestvalue of the dyad is put into the numerator. take an We averageof the two militaryindicatorsfor the last year of the dispute.This means that all relativecapabilityindicatorshave a minimumof 1.00. Democracy is measuredusing the Polity IV scale of -10 (authoritarian) +10 to We adopted the standard"weakestlink" approach(Dixon 1993) in (democracy).12 measuringdyadicdemocracy.Thus,we took the lowerof the regime-typescores in the dyad.A dyad was coded as democraticif the least democraticrivalreceiveda score of 7 or greateron this scale.13
EMPRIRICAL RESULTS
WAITING TIMES AND DISPUTE INDEPENDENCE
As a first step, we consider the averagelength and distributionof dispute waiting times across all rivalries.Of particularinterest is noting how short the interdispute waiting times are across the rivalries.For these data, the averagewaiting time, even after accountingfor the "at-risk" years following the last dispute, is about 4 years, while the medianwaitingtime is about3.5 years.Yetbecausethese statisticsarebased on inclusion of the 10- to 15-yearat-riskperiod, statisticsdescribingthe centraltendency of the waiting times will be inflatedby inclusion of these years. Excludingthe at-riskyears, the averagewaiting time between disputes is a little less than 2 years, while the medianwaitingtime is abouthalf a year.About 50 percentof the cases have waitingtimes of less thanhalf a year.Inclusionor exclusion of the excess at-riskperiod does not alterthe fundamental conclusion:the durationtime between disputesamong the rivalriesin the datais extremelyshort.Forexample,disputesbetweenNorthKorea and South Korea occur in rapid-firefashion during some periods, most obviously duringthe 1950s and the 1990s. We can contrast these basic empirical facts with the assumptions made in the repeated-conflictsliteraturenoted earlier. Specifically, consider perhaps the most careful methodological treatmentin that literature.Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002) conduct separateanalyses on two subpopulations, which are createdbased on the medianwaiting time of fourteenyears. Actually,what they have done is to divide the Russett and Oneal (2001) data set into two groups. The first group consists of
12. ftp://isere.colorado.edu/pub/datasets/p4/p4vksg.asc collapse of centralpolitical authority, polity interruption, identifiedby as or 13. Periodsof transition, Polity, are coded as nondemocracies.
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than roughlythe datawe analyzehere.The second group,with waitingtimes of greater fourteen years, combine two differentpopulations:those politically relevantdyads that have no disputes (e.g., Algeria-Mali) and those rivalriesthat have ended (e.g., United Kingdom-Germany). Fromthe rivalrypoint of view, this second groupis one of apples and oranges:dyads thathave ended theirrivalriesare not the same as dyads risk"assumption,which has thathave neverhad a rivalry.In addition,the "perpetual no theoreticalbasis, leads to the calculationof waiting times that are most likely too long. Moreover,in the analysisof binarydurationdata(as is done here;see also Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), the perpetualrisk assumptionhas the deleteriouseffect of periods (i.e., the "zeros")relativeto spuriouslyincreasingthe numberof "nonevent" the event occurrences(i.e., the "ones"). Our findings on the shortnessof waiting times suggest more ammunitionagainst the originalindependenceargument(Gartzkeand Simon 1999). The waitingtimes of disputesbetween the samepair of countriesaremuch greaterthanmightbe predicted by chance;an independencemodel would expectfrequentdisputesbutmorerandomly distributedacross differentstates ratherthanclusteredtightly in space and time. The time density of Israel-Egyptdisputes is a familiarillustration.In addition,we tested the fit of our models (which maintainthe assumptionof nonindependenceof events) againsta null model of independence.In every case, models accountingfor dependency among events were far superiorto models assumingindependence.The variable for durationdependence, log waiting, was also statistically significant in virtually but every analysis,indicatingthatdisputesnot only arerelatedto one another arealso a functionof time in the rivalry.Consistentwith virtuallyevery othersystematicanalysis, therefore,the assumptionof dispute independencecannotbe sustained.
INFLUENCES ON RIVALRY MAINTENANCE
Model 1 in Table 1 presentsthe resultsof an analysis in which we can both see the impactof previousdisputeson the occurrenceof futuredisputesandthe rivalryhistory perspectiveis the role of stalematesin proas a whole. Key to the rivalrymaintenance longing rivalries. A stalemateoutcome is a significant predictorof rivalrymaintenance, andthe sign is positive, indicatingthata stalematein a disputereducessignificantly the waiting time until the next militaryconfrontation.Yet even victory is no howguaranteethatthe rivalrywill end or moderate.In termsof rivalrymaintenance, ever,thereis no differencebetween compromiseandvictory in termsof the reduction in the risk for occurrenceof a futuredispute. Box-Steffensmeier,Reiter, and Zorn (2003) discuss the importanceof thinking hazardsin event history analysis. Inductively,especially with aboutnonproportional hazardsfor all variablesby interrespectto stalemates,they look for nonproportional acting them with time. As partof the rivalryapproach,we are sensitiveto and indeed expect dynamiceffects overtime. To test for this, we includedan interaction termwith the log of the waitingtime. We find thatthis interaction significantlydifferentfrom is zero, indicatingthatthe effect of stalemateson subsequentdisputesis conditionalon time (which, in the logit setting,is akinto "nonproportional In hazards"). Table 1, the main effect of stalemate(0.32) must interpreted along with the interactionwith (log)
TABLE 1
Influence on RivalryMaintenance
Variable Stalemate Victory Dispute severity Rivalryseverity Dispute territory Rivalryterritory Rivalryduration Rivalryorder Democracy Stalematex Waiting Economic capabilities Militarycapabilities Log waiting Constant Wald 2 Pseudo-R2 n Model 1 0.32** 0.04 0.004*** -0.005*** -0.012 0.73*** -0.004* 0.06*** -0.80*** 0.10** Model 2 0.36** 0.16 0.003** -0.003** 0.19 0.51** -0.006** 0.06*** -0.88*** 0.09 0.004 -0.04 -0.72*** -2.45** 1341.75*** 0.27 11,297
-0.80*** -2.55*** 1548.85*** 0.28 15,258
NOTE:Dependentvariable:recurrence a disputeor not. Methodof analysis:logit with durationdependof ency parameter. *Significantat .10. **Significantat .05. ***Significantat .001.
time (0.10). The main effect gives us the impact of a stalematewhen the interaction termis zero (i.e., afterone year,the log of zero). At this point, the effect of the stalemate covariateon the odds of a dispute occurringis 1.37 (or 37 percentmore likely than when comparedto the baseline condition of compromise).As the waiting time increases,the effect thatstalemateshaveon the likelihoodof a disputeoccurringseems to decrease. Yet, because we hypothesize that the stalemateeffect will be conditionedby the waiting times, it must be the case that the statistical significance of the stalemate covariatewill also be conditionedby the effect of time. Todeterminethe overallsignificance of the stalematecovariate,we computedthe "conditional" errorsfor standard this variable.14 so doing, we find thatthe stalemateeffect is not statisticallydifferent In fromzero untilthe log of the waitingtimes is about-0.90 (or,in unloggedterms,about when the waitingtimes betweendisputesarehighly comfive months).Putdifferently, pressed (i.e., occurringin rapid-firesuccession and where log(t) < -0.90), the impact
14. The conditionalstandard errorswere computedas the squareroot of (var[p,] + logwait2var[3] + 2logwait cov[plp3]), wherepi is the coefficientestimatefor the stalematevariable,and f3 is the coefficientestimatefor the intererrorsin this way allows us to assess the signifiactionterm(Stalematex Log Wait).Computingthe standard cance of the stalematevariableacross the range of the waiting time variable.
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that a stalematehas on subsequentdisputes is negligible. Given that there are many conflicts with waitingtimes of only a few days, the effect of the waitingtime variable termallows "swamps" substantive the effect of the stalematevariable.The interaction us to get some leverage on this problem, and patternsindicate that stalemates are strongly related to future dispute occurrences,but only after the waiting time has stretchedout severalmonths.Substantively, makessense as it takesdecision makthis ers a periodof time to reevaluatestrategiesandplan theirnext moves following a confrontation.Disputes thatalmost immediatelyfollow the end of a previousconfrontation likely have had theirorigins in a policy processthatpredatedthattermination and For thereforewould not be influencedby the outcome, whateverit might be.15 example, the U.S. policy of containmentdoes not become manifestuntil afterthe first few confrontationswith the Soviet Union and tightly clusteredconfrontationsover Iran, Greece, and Berlin. Severalvariablesin the model tap into the historicaldimensionof the rivalry,some beyond the most recent dispute. There are two sets of variables that contrast the repeated-conflictsversus the rivalryapproach.The first deals with the importanceof territoryin producingfuture disputes. Model 1 shows that there is no dependence between whetherthe currentdisputeis aboutterritory futuredisputes.If we conand territory in the historyof the rivalry,however,it has an imporsiderhow important is tant impact on the occurrenceof futuredisputes.The coefficient denoted as "rivalry territory" highly significant.Forexample,for a 10 percentincreasein the proportion is of previous territorialdisputes between rivals, the odds of a subsequent dispute increaseby about 8 percent.Hence, it is much more a question if the rivalryis about territorythan if the last disputehappenedto be aboutterritory. example, it is the For ongoing clashes over border issues that sustained the Saudi Arabia-NorthYemen rivalry,ratherthan any single incident. The second set of variablesdeals with the severityof the previousdisputeversusthe generalseverityof the whole previousrivalryhistory.The severityof the previousdispute increases the hazardof a dispute recurring.Exponentiatingthe coefficient estimate of 0.004, we find thatfor each 10-pointincreasein the disputeseveritymeasure, the odds of dispute increase by about 3.6 percent. In many rivalries,a loss in war incites it to continue the conflict, ratherthan signaling that its realist strategiesare costly andineffective.Forexample,repeateddefeats in wars (1948, 1956, 1967) only emboldenedArab states to continue their rivalrywith Israel. A high-severityrivalry may have its disputes spreadout more than in low-severityrivalries,suggesting that rivals have a limited "carrying capacity"for dealing with violent conflict (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Thus, for the rivalry severity variable, we find that for a 10-point increasein the averageconflict severityof the rivalry, odds of a subsequentdispute the decrease by about4.8 percent.Beyond illustratingthe importanceof looking at the rivalryhistory,animportant aspectof ouranalysisis the differencebetweenshort-term (i.e., previousdispute)andlongertermrivalrycontexteffects. Herewe see an example in which they work in opposite directions.
15. This is clearly true for cases involving "negative"waiting times, discussed in the previous footnote.
Otherrivalrycontextualvariablesaresignificantas well. If we view the life cycle of the rivalryin termsof the numberof previousdisputes,we find thatthe frequencyof priordisputes on subsequentdisputes is substantial.The coefficient estimate for the rivalryordervariablesuggests that as the numberof previous disputes increases by one, the odds of the next disputeincreaseby about6.4 percent.Insteadof conflict weariness, well-institutionalizedrivalries (as suggested by the punctuatedequilibrium approach) producedisputesin fastersuccession thanshortertermones (of course,this is somewhatmitigatedif those conflicts aresevere).The otherrivalrycontextvariable, rivalryduration,indicatesthatas the rivalryages, the time until the next disputeactually increases (equivalently,the hazardrate is moderatelydecreasingwith respect to time). Well-established rivalries,those well engrainedin society and governmentpolicy throughgenerations,may need less reinforcementto maintainthemselves than those less established.We also note, not surprisingly, democracyhas a pacifying that effect on rivalries,delaying the timing of the next militarizedconflict. Here we find that the odds of a dispute are about 55 percent lower for democracies than for nondemocracies. In the next set of analyses,we includecapabilityvariables(economic andmilitary) becausethese arewidely seen to have an impacton the incidenceof disputes.We treat these separatelybecause of the large amountof missing data in the COW capability dataset. Clearly,these missing dataarenot randomlydistributed amongcountriesbut in occur disproportionately ThirdWorldcountriesand in more distanthistoricalperiods. Model 2 in Table 1 indicatesthatneithereconomic normilitarysuperiority an has effect on the occurrenceof the next dispute.The resultsfor the othervariablesin the model remainlargelythe same, even afterlosing a numberof the cases andaddingthe capabilityvariables.
RIVALRY LIFE CYCLE ANALYSES
The analyses above implicitly assumedthatthe variablesin the model had a constanteffect over the course of the rivalry.Yetrivalryapproachessuggest thatnot only does the recent and longer history of a rivalrymatter,but we also see distinctivepatlife ternsin the standard cycle of a rivalry(see also Hensel 1999). Overall,we expect effects of some variablesto be strongerin the initial stage of a rivalry(first two disare putes). The punctuated equilibriummodel arguesthatmanyrivalrycharacteristics fixed at this first stage. Also, we expect that conflict managementeffects (e.g., joint democracy) and deterrenceeffects (e.g., capability superiority)would mattermore earlyin therivalry.Similarly,with victoryandstalemate,we assumethatonce a rivalry is well established,therewill be less differencein how stalemateand victory produce furtherconflict thanearly in the rivalry,when stalemateis more likely to establishthe rivalryandvictory is morelikely to end it. This is consistentwith the punctuated equilibriummodel, which sees stasis factorsbecoming important following the "lock-in" of the rivalry. We conductanalyses similarto those in the previoussection but with stratacorrespondingto threephases of the rivalry:infancy(firsttwo disputes),adolescence(third throughfifth disputes), and maturity(sixth dispute and beyond). This is consistent
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TABLE2
RivalryLife Cycle Analyses

Variable Stalemate Victory Rivalryseverity Rivalryterritory Democracy Stalematex Waiting Log waiting Constant Wald x2 Pseudo-R2 n Model 1, Phase 1 0.21 0.02 -0.002** 0.65*** -0.88"* 0.19*** -0.81** -2.53*** 711.12*** 0.17 9,653 Model 2, Phase 2 0.28 -0.007 -0.005 0.55** -1.02** 0.06 -0.69*** -2.13*** 312.23*** 0.22 3,379 Model 3, Phase 3 0.41 0.50 0.003 0.90*** -0.35 0.08 -0.86*** -2.27*** 301.69 0.32 2,226
**Significantat .05. ***Significantat .001.
with Hensel's (1999) argument rivalries"evolve"throughseveralstages with difthat ferent behaviorsin differentstages. From the rivalryapproach(punctuatedequilibwe hazards.Givenourtheoretical riumor evolutionary), expectto see nonproportional we framework, examinehow this worksbasedon some notionof a rivalrylife cycle.16 We dropsome variablesbecause they makelittle sense in these contexts-notably, the rivalrydurationanddisputeordervariables,which in the above analysesindicated the age or phase of the rivalry.In addition,we droppedvariablesconcerningthe characteristicsof the most recentdispute (i.e., territory severity)while retainingtheir and Our contextualcounterparts. first analyses,reportedin Table2, include all cases (i.e., withoutthe capabilityvariables,which introduceso much missing data,althoughwe do discuss below the implicationsof includingthose variables). Model 1 in Table2 presentsthe resultsfor disputesin the earlieststageof the rivalry. Stalemates,independent the waitingtime, exerciseno significantimpacton mainteof nancein the earlyphaseof rivalries.Yet,once again,the effect of stalematesis dependent on waitingtimes between disputes,as indicatedby the interaction term(Stalemate x Waiting).It takes over a year before stalematesare integratedinto the rivalryrelationship, and then they generateadditionaldisputes. Democracyas a conflict managementvariablehas a significantimpactearly on in rivalries.Even when higherlevels of democracydo not headoff militarizedconfrontations, it is able to mitigatetheir long-termeffects and effectively end some rivalries. Severityis negativelyassociatedwith rivalrymaintenance, suggestingthatvery severe confrontationsat the outset of rivalriesmay delay the next conflict or even end the for competitions. Yet we know that this is far from guaranteed; example, the U.S.16. In contrast, Box-SteffensmeierandZorn(2002) consideronly the firsteightdisputes.Yetwe know thatthe vast majorityof rivalriesend afterone or two disputes(so-called isolated conflict), a second group has a moreextensiveconflicthistorybutone thatends afterfive to twentyyears,andthereareenduringrivalries with many disputesand that last decades.
rivalrieseach began with significantwars and still experiChinaand the Arab-Israeli enced frequent and extended disputes over a long period of time. Severity is very closely correlatedwith victory (i.e., one side is much morelikely to prevailin a severe conflict, and low-severityconflicts overwhelmingend in stalemate).Thus, both conflict management(definedhere in surrogatetermsas the democraticpeace) and realpolitik (severity) lead to a reduced risk of dispute recurrence.Territoryhas a very strongimpacton the evolutionof rivalriesat this earlyphase,consistentwith the many argumentsthat territoryis core to the developmentof enduringrivalries. Models 2 and3 examinepatternsin more advancedstages of rivalry,andwe expect thatthe results will be differentfrom those in Model 1. Model 2 examines what happens in the secondphaseof rivalrydevelopment.Herewe haverivalriesthathavemade it past the initial stages but arenot yet enduringrivalries.As hypothesized,stalemates no longer have an impacton rivalrymaintenance,even when interactedwith waiting time. Similarly,the severityof the rivalryno longermatterseitherin influencingfuture disputes(low-level disputesbetweenEcuadorandPeru,for example,do not lessen the likelihood of rivalrycontinuation).Rivalrieshave begun to lock in, and the impactof previous disputes has dissipated. Several influences, however,retain some explanatory value. Democracy still has a pacifying effect. In contrast,territorycontinues to exacerbatethe conflict, suggesting that the underlyingissues of the rivalryremain of importantdeterminants futuredispute activity. Model 3 considers those dyads that qualify as enduringrivalries-the advanced stages of militarizedcompetition.As expected, few of the early influences on rivalry maintenanceremainrelevant.The outcomes of recentdisputesmatterlittle, as almost 80 percentof disputesin this rivalryphasenow end in stalemate.Even warsdo not necessarily serve to end a rivalry;note that high-severity conflicts between Japanand Chinain the 1930s did little to preventfutureconfrontations. The democracyvariable are very few long-termrivalriesbetween democrano longer important; there is also cies, and its effects arefelt earlierin the competitionratherthanlater.Consistentwith aboutthe importanceof territory, however,we find thatrivalriesover terriarguments producingfuturedisputesandmaintainingthe rivalry. toryhave a muchhigherrisk of Thus, the historyof territorial conflict, even from the early stages of the rivalry,has a strong and lingering effect in promoting rivalry maintenance, despite many subsequentdisputes and the significantpassage of time. We repeatedthe analyses of models 1 through3 and includedcapabilityvariables. Box-Steffensmeierand Zorn (2002) found that the effects of the capabilityvariable change from significantlynegative to significantlypositive. Box-Steffensmeierand Zornfind (with manyothers)thatcapabilitysuperiority does have a deterrent effect in preventingdisputesfromoccurring.But once states are in a rivalry(as with ouranalyses here), capabilitysuperiorityshould have less impact.This makes sense once one realizes that our populationunderanalysis is one in which deterrencein some sense has failed. Indeed, there are few changes from any of the models in Table 2, and the capabilityvariablesare insignificant,for all phases of rivalry.In general,the analyses with capabilitiesconfirm the patternswe found in the more complete data without capabilities.
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CONCLUSION We exploredthe processof rivalrymaintenance, largelyfromthe perspectiveof the punctuatedequilibriummodel of rivalries.In thatmodel, rivalrystasis occurs aftera lock-in stage, representinga failure of coercive and conflict managementstrategies. We arguedthat stalematesin militarizedconfrontationsare repeatingindicatorsthat the rivalrypersists and thatthe forces drivingthe rivalryare unaltered. We see our analysis as making three significant contributionsor improvements over the repeated-conflictsliterature,with importantimplicationsfor understanding the process of rivalry maintenance.First, we made a significant methodological improvement analysesmake Repeated-conflicts over the repeated-conflicts literature. a largely atheoreticalassumptionthatonce a pairof statesexperiencesa dispute,they This leads those scholarsto look too are perpetuallyat risk for anotherconfrontation. farinto the future,examiningbroadswatchesof time to ascertainwhetheranotherconflict would recurbetween the same pairof states.This is often theoreticallyunappealing because the connectionbetween conflicts, sometimes more thana hundredyears apart,is frequentlytenuous. Methodologically,it introducessignificant bias in the waitingtime estimatesfor the eventhistoryanalysesthataretypicallyconducted.Our rivalryapproachprovidesa theoreticaland empiricalbasis for assessing when rivals remain at risk. Our analysis of waiting times between disputes indicates that the repeated-conflicts literature badly overestimatessuch waitingtimes;indeed,our analysis reveals that contraryto the impressionleft by previous studies, we demonstrate that disputes accordingly occur in rapid fashion, usually less than two years apart. Overestimation the disputewaitingtimes overweightsthe impactof the last dispute of in a rivalrysequence.If we madeno otherchangesto the repeated-conflicts approach, our modificationof the "at-risk" years alone producesmore valid results. literYetwe do morethanperforma methodological"fix"to the repeated-conflicts model posits, equilibrium our ature.Second, andperhapsmore important, punctuated with empiricalconfirmation,thatthe rivalrycontext mattersin predictingfuturedisputes between the same pairs of states. Repeated-conflictsanalyses are myopic in looking backwardto the historyof the relationshipbetween the statesunderscrutiny. In ourinitialanalyses,a numberof rivalrycontextualmeasures(severity,territory, and two measuresof age) were significantpredictorsof rivalrymaintenance.The impact as of the most recentdispute,as opposedto the historyof confrontations a whole, was insignificant or substantiallyweaker than the rivalry context measures. Thus, our results indicate, contraryto the repeated-conflictsliterature,that conflict must analyzed within its rivalrycontextand not merely as a series of discreteevents connected only to one otherrecent event. Third, most studies of repeated conflicts assume proportionalhazards for the effects of its key variables.Ourresultsdemonstrate rivalrymaintenance that processes equilibriummodel providesus varyover the life cycle of rivalries,andthe punctuated with a coherenttheoreticalframework understand to those effects (somethinglacking in those few studiesthataccountfor nonproportional effects). Outcomesof confronta-
RIVALRIES 767 Goertzet al. / INTERNATIONAL
tions matterearly in a rivalrybut dissipate quickly in sustainingrivalries.Similarly, pacifying effects on democracyare no longer relevantin the enduringrivalrystage. issues remainsa significantinfluence on rivalrymainOnly the presenceof territorial tenancethroughout differentrivalrystages, and even then, the magnitudeof the effect equilibriummodel variesovertime. In these results,we see the logic of the punctuated and its emphasison political shocks. Once a dyad is in the maturephase of the rivalry life cycle, all the forces point to a continuationof thatrivalry.It thus takes some massive change in the domestic or international environmentto dislodge the institutional stabilitybuilt into rivalries.
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Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries

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Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries Author(s): Gary Goertz, Bradford Jones, Paul F.

Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries

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RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

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-0.80*** -2.55*** 1548.85*** 0.28 15,258

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RivalryLife Cycle Analyses

**Significantat .05. ***Significantat .001.

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-0.80* -2.55* 1548.85*** 0.28 15,258

Significantat .05. *Significantat .001.